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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
From the Original Edition: 
 
 The United States Tax Court has played a key role in the development 
of Federal tax law since its founding as the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924.  
For this reason, and because of its unusual procedures and judicial status, 
we determined that it would be useful if a comprehensive study were 
prepared dealing with the history and evolution of the Court.  To this end a 
grant was arranged to permit Professor Harold Dubroff of Albany Law 
School to undertake the project.  Although members of the Court reviewed 
Professor Dubroff’s manuscript from time to time, the content of the study 
is solely the responsibility of Professor Dubroff and should not be taken to 
reflect the views of the Court or any of its Judges.  
 
 Work on the Tax Court project was commenced in 1974 and concluded 
in 1977.  As the various parts of the study were completed, they were 
published in the Albany Law Review.  *  *  *  
 
 We believe that the study is an important piece of scholarly work which 
will be useful to both the Tax Court and the public in providing insight into 
the forces which created and shaped the Court, its procedures and its 
jurisdiction.  We appreciate the efforts of the Albany Law Review in 
publishing the study and permitting Commerce Clearing House, Inc. to 
photocopy its issues, thereby making possible a wide public distribution at a 
modest cost.  
 
           C. Moxley Featherston, Chief Judge 
           United States Tax Court 
 
           Howard A. Dawson, Jr. Judge 
           United States Tax Court 




 The concept of a history of the United States Tax Court largely came 
from Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr., then Chief Judge, and I wish to 
express my gratitude to him for the suggestion that I undertake the project 
and for the continuing help and support he furnished me as the work 





 Other judges of the Court have also furnished their assistance during the 
course of the work, and I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to them as 
well.  In particular, I would like to thank Chief Judge Moxley Featherston, 
who made completion of the study possible, and Judge Charles R. Simpson, 
who gave unstintingly of his time in reviewing manuscripts.  Additionally, 
Judge Bolon B. Turner, who served as a member of the Board of Tax 
Appeals, and later as a judge of the United States Tax Court from 1937 to 
1971, was of great assistance in providing me with valuable insights into 
events which transpired during his long and productive tenure.   
  
 With respect to the research and writing of the book, several former 
students provided valuable research assistance.  Joseph R. Cook and Dan S. 
Grossman deserve special thanks for their part in the preparation of Parts 
V, VI, and VII [of the original edition.]  Other former students whom I 
wish to thank are Chris Boe, Judith L. Needham, and Kim Oster.  
  
 This book was originally published in six separate issues of the Albany 
Law Review, and I am grateful for the editorial assistance provided by three 
generations of law review members.  My association with former Editor-in-
Chief Joseph H. Reynolds and former Managing Editor Gary Centola is one 
which I will not soon forget.  
 
 Finally, I would like to thank my secretary, Iris Baum, whose persistent 
good humor and cooperative spirit in the face of innumerable drafts and 
redrafts were a constant source of wonder to me.   
 
               Harold Dubroff 






 Following the publication of the original edition of this text, Professor 
Dubroff published supplemental articles in the Albany Law Review that 
brought the Tax Court study current to 1988.  The original and 
supplemental articles authored by Professor Dubroff represent a unique 
source of detailed information about the Tax Court’s history and the 
development and expansion of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  In 2010, the 
Court concluded that it would be appropriate to undertake a 
comprehensive update of Professor Dubroff’s original work in this field.   
 
 Accordingly, the Court arranged for Professor Brant Hellwig of the 
Washington and Lee University School of Law to draft the second edition 
   iii 
 
of the text.  The second edition updates the material originally authored by 
Professor Dubroff and addresses important developments at the Tax Court, 
including the considerable expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction subsequent 
to the publication of Professor Dubroff’s work.   
 
 Work on the second edition commenced in 2010 and concluded in 
2013.  As a general matter, the second edition strives to bring the material 
current to the beginning of 2013.  The content of the revised text is solely 
the responsibility of Professor Hellwig and should not be taken to reflect 
the views of the Court or any of its Judges.  
 
 The Court appreciates the willingness of Professor Dubroff, Albany 
Law Review, and CCH to graciously release any claim to the copyright so 
that the second edition could be undertaken.   
 
           Michael B. Thornton, Chief Judge 
           United States Tax Court  
 
           John O. Colvin, Judge 
           United States Tax Court 
            




 Judge John O. Colvin, then Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court, 
approached me in 2009 with an exciting albeit daunting proposition:  
updating the seminal text authored by Professor Dubroff on the Tax 
Court’s historical origins and its evolution as a court.  I accepted, and the 
second edition of the text is the product of that effort.  The original 
manuscript understandably served as a valuable source of information 
about the Tax Court, and it is an honor to bring the text in line with more 
recent developments. 
 
 The second edition leaves largely intact the first four Parts of the 
original text, which provide a remarkably detailed history of the creation of 
Board of Tax Appeals through the congressional chartering of the United 
States Tax Court as a court of record established under article I of the 
Constitution.  Part V is a new chapter devoted to the judicial consideration 
of the Tax Court’s constitutional status that culminated in the Supreme 
Court’s 1991 decision in Freytag v. Commissioner.   
 
 Whereas the original text addressed procedural matters following the 
discussion of the historical development of the Court, the second edition at 
iv 
 
this point turns to an examination of the Court’s jurisdiction.  This portion 
of the text represents the largest source of new material.  In addition to 
incorporating various aspects of the supplemental articles authored by 
Professor Dubroff in the 1980s, the second edition details the numerous 
ways in which Congress has expanded the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in recent 
times.  Whereas the original text devoted a single, lengthy chapter to the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction, the second edition breaks this material into three 
chapters.  Part VI addresses foundational aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
such as its deficiency and refund jurisdiction.  Part VII examines a number 
of innovations in the Tax Court’s jurisdiction that, broadly speaking, are 
intended to improve the efficiency of tax litigation.  Lastly, Part VIII 
explores the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to review  the administration of a 
variety of recently created taxpayer rights.   
 
 Following the examination of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, the second 
edition turns to a discussion of Tax Court procedure.  Part IX is devoted to 
pretrial matters, Part X to trial procedure, and Part XI to post-trial 
considerations.  Part XII is a new chapter devoted to the position of the 
Special Trial Judge.  Part XIII concludes by addressing the various means 
by which the Court provides institutional support to self-represented 
taxpayers. 
 
 In the course of this project, I have received considerable support from 
several of the Court’s Judges and members of its professional staff.  I 
greatly appreciate the encouragement and guidance I have received from 
Chief Judge Michael B. Thornton and Judge John O. Colvin.  I wish to 
extend a particular note of gratitude to Special Trial Judge Daniel A. Guy, 
Jr.  In addition to generously devoting his time in reviewing drafts of the 
manuscript, he largely oversaw the project on behalf of the Court.  Andrea 
Blake and Audrey Nutt of the Court’s staff devoted significant effort to this 
project by providing drafts of updates on discrete topics, and I greatly 
appreciate their contributions.   
 
 Additionally, I am grateful for the research assistance I received from 
law students over the years I worked on this project.  One former student, 
Christopher Hines, significantly improved the text through his editorial 
efforts.  As a final matter, I commenced work on this project while a 
member of the Law School faculty at the University of South Carolina and 
concluded it while a member of the Law School faculty at Washington and 
Lee University.  I thank both institutions for their support.   
 
               Brant J. Hellwig 
Lexington, Virginia 
2014   
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ORIGINS OF THE TAX COURT 
 
As with most institutions, the Tax Court, which was created in 1924 as 
the Board of Tax Appeals, originated in response to an existing need.  In its 
case the need was created by the combination of two factors.  The first of 
these was the development of the federal income and profits taxes and their 
emergence during World War I as the preeminent devices for financing the 
operations of Government.  The second was the inadequacy of preexisting 
institutions, both administrative and judicial, for adjudicating in an 
acceptable manner the disputes growing out of the changed conditions 
brought on by the new taxes. 
 
A. Development of the Income Tax 
 
Although the Tax Court has had other duties, the principal reason for its 
creation was, and its main function has always been, the adjudication of 
disputes involving the federal income and profits taxes.1  For this reason, 
the history of the court must start with the development and early history 
of the modern income tax.2 
In present times, federal income taxes are of such a pervasive and 
significant influence that it is easy to forget that these taxes did not exist for 
                                                     
1 In the course of its history, the Tax Court has also had jurisdiction to 
redetermine deficiencies in estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes on foundations.  
Additionally, for a period of almost three decades, it had jurisdiction to redetermine 
excessive profits under the Renegotiation Acts.  The jurisdiction of the Tax Court 
is more particularly described in Parts VI through VIII.   
2 Much of the material dealing with the development of the income tax and the 
early administrative problems faced by the Bureau of Internal Revenue was derived 
from secondary sources. These sources are identified below and, in general, will not 
be cited further. BORIS I. BITTKER AND LAWRENCE M. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, 
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (4th ed. 1972); ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. 
BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1940); BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (1948); 
JOHN C. CHOMMIE, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1970); LOUIS 
EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INCOME 
TAXES 1862–1962:  A HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1962); 
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); SIDNEY RATNER, 
AMERICAN TAXATION (1942); 1 STANLEY S. SURREY, WILLIAM C. WARREN, PAUL 
R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1972); Bolon B. 
Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, its Origin and Function, in THE HISTORY 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. 
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much of the country’s history.  The colony of New Plymouth had imposed 
a rudimentary income tax as early as 1643 and other colonies and later some 
states had made use of such taxes in the 17th and 18th centuries.  However, 
the first federal income tax was not imposed until the latter half of the 19th 
century.  Prior to that time, the small revenue needs of the Federal 
Government were primarily satisfied by tariffs, although internal excise 
taxes and the sale of public lands also played some part in financing the 
Government. 
The most important factor in the development of the income tax has, 
unfortunately, been the financial exigencies attendant on the state of war.  
Toward the end of the War of 1812, Alexander J. Dallis, Secretary of 
Treasury, recommended enactment of an inheritance and income tax that 
he thought could “be easily made to produce $3 million.”  However, the 
war ended before the proposal could be enacted and the following half-
century of relative peace resulted in little further attention being paid to 
income taxation. That peace was shattered by the Civil War, which created 
unprecedented revenue needs not capable of being fulfilled by traditional 
techniques.  Government expenditures jumped from $67 million in 1861 to 
$475 million in 1862, $715 million in 1863, $865 million in 1864, and $1.3 
billion in 1865, an increase of 19 fold in only five years.3  During the war, 
most revenue was raised by public debt financing, and budget deficits 
amounted to more than two-thirds of the Union’s expenditures for the 
years 1862–65. 
The Government fell into such an unfortunate financial position as a 
result of a combination of factors.  First, the war had an unexpectedly high 
cost because the Confederate armies proved to be a more formidable 
adversary than the initially optimistic Union forces estimated.  Second, the 
Lincoln administration was not particularly adept in public finance.  Many 
years before his election, Lincoln himself conceded that he “had no money 
sense” and did not “fret” over the subject.  His Secretary of the Treasury 
for the initial war years, Salmon P. Chase, was similarly ungifted.  Chase’s 
principal interests were in military and political affairs, and he relied heavily 
on a noted financier of the day, Jay Cooke, to raise revenue through the sale 
of government bonds.  Finally, the United States since its inception had 
been a country of low government expenditures and correspondingly low 
taxes.  By 1860 tax revenues had reached a high of only $56 million, and in 
most prior years the budget was in surplus.  Against this background, 
neither the Congress nor the citizenry were well equipped to cope with 
                                                     
3 Statistical data contained herein was derived from the following sources: 
COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1941 pt. 1 at 270 
(1945) (corporate return statistics, 1909–41); JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 1964, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 214–15 
(1964) (individual return statistics, 1913–61); 1962 TREAS. ANN. REP., FINANCES, 
508–15 (1963) (government receipts and expenditures 1789–1962). 
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financing the staggering new expenditures, which exceeded $2 million per 
day for the war alone. 
Nevertheless, the need for new and increased taxes soon became 
painfully apparent since the major existing revenue source, tariffs, was 
clearly inadequate to satisfy the revenue requirements.  Some favored 
supplementing tariffs only with direct taxes on real estate apportioned 
among the states according to population, as required by the Constitution.  
However, representatives of the Western states felt that this would unduly 
favor the Northeast where it was thought there existed a heavier 
concentration of wealth in proportion to population.  In response to this 
pressure, Congress adopted in 1861, and implemented in 1862, the first 
federal income tax as part of a multi-faceted program of taxation.4 
This first income tax was a modest one.  It exempted incomes below 
$600, and taxed amounts above that level at a rate of only 3% from $600 to 
$10,000 and at a rate of 5% on income above $10,000.5  In its first year it 
raised only $2.7 million as opposed to government expenditures for the year 
of more than $700 million.  Subsequently, as the need for revenues 
mounted, the tax rates were increased.  By 1865, the rates stood at 5% on 
income from $600 to $5,000 and 10% on income above $5,000.6  This was 
to be the high water mark of income taxation for more than 50 years.  With 
the end of the Civil War the exemption was enlarged and the rates reduced, 
and finally, effective in 1872, the income tax was repealed.7 
At no time did the Civil War income tax represent as significant a source 
of government revenues as the modern day income taxes.  The lowest yield 
occurred in 1863 when $2.7 million was raised, and the highest yield 
occurred in 1866 when $73 million was raised.  This is to be contrasted with 
total revenues in those years of $113 million and $559 million, respectively.  
By 1872, the last year of the tax, its yield had declined to $14 million as 
against total revenues of $374 million.  But despite its relative unimportance 
as a source of revenue, the income tax attracted a considerable amount of 
attention during this period. 
At the time of its adoption, the income tax was generally supported as a 
necessary step in solving the financial needs of the war.  The end of the war 
                                                     
4 Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 
§ 89, 12 Stat. 473. 
5 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 473. 
6 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 479. In the interim between 1862 and 
1865, the tax had been increased to 5% on income between $600 and $5,000, 7½% 
on income between $5,000 and $10,000, and 10% on income in excess of $10,000. 
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 281. 
7 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 257. In 1867, the exemption was 
increased to $1,000 and the rate reduced to 5%. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 
§ 13, 14 Stat. 478. In 1870, the exemption was further increased and the rate further 
reduced to $2,000 and 2½%, respectively. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, §§ 6, 8, 16 
Stat. 257–58. 
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and the reestablishment of regular surpluses of revenue over expenditures 
brought increasing pressure for reduction and finally repeal of the tax.  
Primarily, this pressure came from the banking and commercial interests of 
the Northeast, which much preferred tariffs to income taxes since the 
former had the double advantage of being taxes on consumption and 
providing domestic products with a competitive advantage.  The income tax 
had its defenders who strenuously argued that taxation based exclusively on 
consumption was unjust because it imposed disproportionately heavy taxes 
on persons of lower income who by necessity consumed a higher 
percentage of their income than persons with large incomes. 
Despite these arguments, the anti-income tax forces prevailed essentially 
because of their greater political power both as lobbyists and propagandists.  
They argued that the tax was superfluous in periods of surplus, that it was 
inequitable in many of its provisions, and that it necessitated the creation of 
an inquisitorial enforcement bureaucracy which proved to be inefficient and 
subject to political influence. 
The quarter of a century following the repeal of the income tax was a 
period of considerable social ferment in the United States.  A severe 
financial panic occurred in 1873 and was immediately followed by a 
devastating depression.  The farmers of the South and the West were 
particularly hard hit during these years by declining prices for their products 
with no corresponding decline in the prices they had to pay for supplies, 
storage, and transportation.  Economic power became concentrated in 
banks, railroads, and various other industrial and commercial interests.  
Against this background a strong agrarian and populist movement 
developed to challenge the power of the Northeast.  Among the important 
objectives of these groups were cheap money, regulation or destruction of 
the monopolies, and the imposition of an income tax. 
Reinstitution of the income tax had been proposed by Southern and 
Western congressmen throughout the post-Civil War period.  It was not 
until 1894, however, that a coalition of Populists and Southern and Western 
Democrats succeeded in engineering its passage as part of a program to 
reduce tariffs and tax the rich.8 The measure was totally congressional in its 
initiation and passage.  President Cleveland, who favored reduced tariffs but 
opposed passage of an income tax, allowed it to become law without his 
signature. 
The tax, which was miniscule by modern standards (2% of the income 
of individuals and corporations, with an exemption of $4,000), was bitterly 
opposed by the Eastern establishment, who viewed it as the opening salvo 
in a class war of poor against rich.  They found substantiation for their fears 
in the new measure itself which exempted from tax all but the wealthiest 2 
percent of the population, whereas under previous taxes this same group 
paid only 2 percent of the total revenues generated.  Moreover, if a 2% tax 
                                                     
8 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553.  
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on incomes above $4,000 could be imposed, nothing would prevent 
imposition of a 20% tax on incomes above $40,000.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the rhetoric employed was extreme.  In polite society the tax 
was referred to as radical; in other circles it was characterized as an 
adventure in “socialism, communism and devilism” devised by “the 
professors with their books, the socialists with their schemes,” and “the 
anarchists with their bombs.” 
These, of course, were not charges of impressive legal weight, and when 
the validity of the tax reached the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
& Trust Co.,9 the tax was challenged principally on three constitutional 
grounds: (1) that it constituted a direct tax which did not meet the 
constitutional requirement that such measures be apportioned among the 
states on the basis of population;10 (2) that because it exempted incomes 
below $4,000, it violated the constitutional requirement that taxes be 
uniform throughout the United States;11 and (3) that it impinged on the 
rights of state and local governments by taxing the interest on obligations 
issued by these bodies.12  Although the Supreme Court previously had 
indicated that direct taxes included only land and capitation taxes,13 and had 
upheld the constitutionality of the Civil War income taxes,14 it nonetheless 
ultimately concluded in Pollock that taxes on income from real and personal 
property were direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution, that the 
Federal Government could not validly tax the obligations of state and local 
governments, and that the 1894 tax was so infected with unconstitutionality 
that it was totally void.15  The Pollock decision has been severely criticized by 
students of constitutional law and others; nevertheless, it had the effect of 
delaying general income taxation in the United States for almost two 
decades. 
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed important social and 
political changes in the United States.  Public attention was increasingly 
focused on the abuses of economic power characteristic of the time.  
Extreme poverty among workers, exploitation of labor generally and child 
labor in particular, increasing concentration of wealth, and monopolistic 
and corrupt practices of corporate giants were all issues that were colorfully 
ventilated by a new form of journalism, “muckraking.”  Powerful new 
                                                     
9 157 U.S. 429, rehearing 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
12 Cf. U.S. CONST. Amend. X. 
13 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796). 
14 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
15 The Court did not pass on the question of whether the uniformity clause was 
violated. Later, it was established that uniformity meant geographic uniformity 
rather than rate uniformity—rates could be progressive so long as the same rates 
applied equally throughout the nation. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
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political leaders emerged, such as Robert LaFollette and Theodore 
Roosevelt, who were sensitive to these issues.  These events had an impact 
on the question of income taxation and gave it a new respectability. Perhaps 
the best illustration of this rested in remarks of President Roosevelt in 1906 
on the occasion of the laying of the cornerstone of a new office building for 
the House of Representatives. 
 
[The President] made a flamboyant Fourth-of-July speech for ten 
minutes, an uplift speech for fifteen, skinned the muckrakers within 
an inch of their lives, and delivered a few light taps on Democratic 
ribs.  The mouths of the eminent Republican magnates were spread 
in smiles reaching from ear to ear.  They were having the time of 
their lives, when suddenly, without any connection whatever with 
anything he had said, apropos of nothing, he declared vehemently 
for both a graduated income tax and a graduated inheritance tax.  
The Democrats were jubilant and applauded hilariously, while the 
smiles froze on the faces of the Republicans.  They would not have 
been more astonished if he had struck them betwixt the eyes with a 
maul.  They had to pinch themselves to see if they were awake.  The 
President seemed to be delighted with the sensation he had created 
and the consternation he had wrought among Republican statesmen.  
Their curses on him for that speech were not only deep, but loud.16 
 
Roosevelt continued to make statements supporting a graduated income 
tax, but took little if any affirmative action to secure its adoption.  
Nevertheless, the fact that a Republican President would even 
philosophically support such a measure did much to defuse the temper of 
the debate—one could hardly accuse the President of being a “bomb 
throwing anarchist.”  Furthermore, Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard 
Taft, gave campaign speeches expressing support for such a tax when 
demanded by revenue needs.  In his view an income tax could be devised 
which would be constitutional notwithstanding the Pollock decision.  As 
with Roosevelt, Taft did not initiate an income tax program and it has been 
suggested that his public enthusiasm for the tax was manufactured as a 
shrewd ploy to steal the thunder of his Democratic rival, William Jennings 
Bryan, who was an outspoken advocate of income taxation. 
Yet, it was during the Taft Administration that the seed of the modern 
income tax was planted.  This is ironic because during this period 
Republicans, traditionally hostile to the measure, controlled not only the 
White House but the House of Representatives and the Senate as well.  The 
irony is explained by the character of the congressional Republican 
delegation which had changed from earlier years.  Midwestern Republican 
                                                     
16 1 CHAMP CLARK, MY QUARTER CENTURY OF AMERICAN POLITICS 440 
(1920). 
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progressives such as LaFollette and Cummins had recently entered the 
Senate and forged an alliance with Democrats favorable to income taxation.  
During the Senate consideration of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill, this 
coalition actively pressed for inclusion of a general graduated income tax.  
The Republican hierarchy opposed the measure but could not control the 
insurgents within their party.  Ultimately, in an effort to save the tariff 
legislation and also to prevent an open breach within the Republican party, 
President Taft effected a grudging compromise.  Taft had come to change 
his mind on the question of whether Pollock would be overruled by the 
Supreme Court and felt that the more prudent course was to amend the 
Constitution to permit an income tax without apportionment.  A proposal 
for such an amendment constituted one element of his compromise plan.  
The second element of the plan was the immediate enactment of a 
corporation excise tax measured by corporate income.  Taft felt that such a 
tax would not be a direct tax and could withstand constitutional attack.  
Although the Taft proposal was opposed by a few diehard advocates of an 
immediate general income tax, it was reluctantly backed by the conservative 
Republicans who saw it as the lesser of two evils.  This support, along with 
the approval of the moderate pro-income tax forces, was sufficient for 
passage.17 
The corporation income tax, which was 1% of taxable income in excess 
of $5,000, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1911.18  As anticipated by 
Taft, the Court distinguished the Pollock case on the ground that the levy 
was indirect since it was imposed on the privilege of doing business as a 
corporation and not on the income from property.  That the tax was 
measured by income from property was not a constitutional defect, even 
though a tax imposed directly on such income might be invalid. 
By 1913, two thirds of the states had approved the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which provides: 
 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the 
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
 
The debate concerning the Amendment was a lively one, but approval 
was assured because of the new respectability of the income tax and 
because the more numerous and less wealthy elements of society believed 
such a tax would shift a greater portion of the tax burden onto the wealthy.  
The arguments against the proposed amendment, that it would permit the 
taxation of state and local bonds and that the income tax would be difficult 
to administer and produce a nation of liars, were of insufficient persuasive 
force to stanch the flow of popular support. 
                                                     
17 Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.  
18 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
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One month after final ratification of the income tax amendment, 
Woodrow Wilson assumed the Office of President.  Although Wilson was 
not an advocate of free trade, he was decidedly hostile to what he saw as the 
excesses of the existing tariff system, both in its adverse effect on 
competition and in its use as an indirect tax on consumption.  Similar 
sentiments were commonplace in Congress.  By the fall of 1913, legislation 
had been adopted substantially cutting the tariff schedules and, more 
importantly, imposing a general income tax to balance the lost customs 
revenues.19  Conservatives actively opposed adoption of the income tax, but 
it was an idea whose time had come (for the third time) and the anti-tax 
forces did not even succeed in their efforts to eliminate progressive rates.  
They did, however, have some success in moderating the rates of tax.  The 
1913 legislation provided a 1% normal tax on taxable income of individuals 





1%   $20,000 – $50,000 
2%   $50,000 – $75,000 
3%   $75,000 – $100,000 
4%  $100,000 – $250,000 
5%   $250,000 – $500,000 
6% Over $500,000 
 
 
Thus, the maximum rate of tax on individuals was 7% on taxable 
income above $500,000.  Corporations were subject to a flat rate of 1% on 
all their taxable income.21 
In addition to providing relatively low rates, which produced only $28 
million of revenue in the first year, the 1913 tax also contained a generous 
exemption, with the result that for 1913 only 358,000 individual income tax 
returns were filed in a nation with a population of 97 million.  However, the 
upcoming war was to change drastically the character of the income tax. 
In 1914, World War I broke out in Europe.  Initially committed to a 
policy of neutrality, President Wilson by the spring of 1917 was compelled 
to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany.  The war had a 
staggering impact on the financial affairs of the United States.  One of the 
first casualties was the customs receipts that soon dwindled as a result of 
trade reduction.  This was a significant setback to a nation that in 1913 still 
derived almost one-half of its government revenues from these sources.  
                                                     
19 Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
20 Id. §§ II(A), (C), 38 Stat. 166, 168. 
21 Id. § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 166. 
  The Origins of the Tax Court                               9 
 
The diminution in these revenues was felt as early as 1914 and resulted in 
the enactment of the War Revenue Bill of 1914,22 which levied various 
internal excise taxes to make up for the lost revenue. 
Of course, even more significant was the staggering growth of 
expenditures required of a nation at war.  The cost of operating the 
Government grew from approximately $700 million in each of the years 
1913–16, to $2 billion in 1917, $13 billion in 1918 and $19 billion in 1919.  
For 1914 there was a deficit of $400,000; for 1919, the deficit was $13 
billion. 
Although Wilson’s hopes for neutrality were not finally extinguished 
until 1917, he foresaw the possibility of American involvement as early as 
1915, and toward that end the United States commenced a military 
expansion program in 1916.  The income tax was to play an increasingly 
important role in financing both the military preparedness program and the 
costs of subsequent entry into the war. 
Within a period of three years, the Revenue Acts of 1916,23 1917,24 and 
191825 (the latter being enacted in 1919 but made retroactive to January 1, 








Additionally, there was imposed a surtax ranging from 1% on income in 
excess of $5,000 to 65% on income in excess of $1,000,000.26  Thus, the 
maximum rate was 77%, which was 1,100% greater than the maximum rate 
prevailing from 1913–1916.  Corporate tax rates also advanced 
spectacularly.  By 1918, corporations were paying a tax of 12% on net 
income,27 plus a profits tax escalating from 30% to 80% of so-called excess 
profits or war profits.28 
The excess profits tax was introduced by the Act of March 3, 1917,29 
just one month prior to the declaration of war against Germany.  Although 
the March 3 legislation was soon to be superseded by the War Revenue Act 
                                                     
22 Act of October 22, 1914, ch. 331, 38 Stat. 745. 
23 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. 
24 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300. 
25 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057. 
26 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 211, 40 Stat. 1062. 
27 Id. § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1076. 
28 Id. § 301(a), 40 Stat. 1088. 
29 Ch. 159, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000. 
                    Normal Tax 
Rate Income 
6 % $2,000 – $6,000 
12 % Over $6,000 
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of 1917, enacted October 3, 1917,30 the excess profits tax itself persisted 
until it was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1921.31  It was later to reappear 
during World War II and the Korean War.  The tax had the dual purpose of 
curbing war profiteering and raising revenue from those best able to afford 
to pay a larger share of tax.  The tax was a complicated one in that it 
required the measurement of excess profits.  Whether such profits were 
measured by income in excess of a percentage of capital32 or by profits in 
excess of those from a prior base period,33 the determination created many 
uncertainties and disputes.34  These difficulties were to play an important 
part in providing the impetus for the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals. 
The effect of the wartime revenue measures on the importance of 
income taxes was impressive.  Government revenue rose from $780 million 
in 1916 to $6.7 billion in 1920.  As a result of the wartime revenue acts, 
receipts from income and profits taxes over this same period rose from 
$125 million to $3.9 billion.  In 1916, they represented 16 percent of 
receipts; by 1920, this percentage had risen to 55 percent. 
These spectacular increases were accompanied by a corresponding, and 
universally recognized, increase in the complexity of the law.35  One 
indication of this appeared in the increased length of the succeeding acts.  
Excluding the tariff and excise provisions, the 1913 Act took up only 16 
pages in the Statutes at Large, the 1916 Act took up 22 pages, and the 1918 
Act required 53 pages.  This increase in statutory length mirrored the 
substantive evolution of the tax law.  Several important and complicating 
provisions were added by the 1916 legislation:  the term “dividend” was 
defined for the first time;36 taxpayers were permitted to report income on a 
method other than the cash method of accounting;37 losses incurred in a 
transaction for profit were made deductible even though not incurred in a 
trade or business;38 detailed statutory treatment was provided for 
nonresident aliens;39 the income of estates and trusts was subjected to tax 
                                                     
30 Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300. 
31 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1400(a), 42 Stat. 320. 
32 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 301, 312, 40 Stat. 1088, 1091 (relating to 
excess profits tax). 
33 Id. §§ 301, 311, 40 Stat. 1088, 1090 (relating to war profits tax). 
34 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 168 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Investigation of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 132 (1924) (statement of 
David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Select Comm. 
Hearings]. 
35 See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 120–21 (1924) 
(statement of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.); Turner, supra note 2, at 32. 
36 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757. 
37 Id. § 8(g), 39 Stat. 763. 
38 Id. § 5(a), 39 Stat. 759.  It was later held that no such losses were allowed 
under the 1913 Act. Mente v. Eisner, 266 F. 161 (2d Cir. 1920). 
39 Ch. 463, § 6, 39 Stat. 760. 
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for the first time;40 and the class of organizations exempt from tax was 
substantially increased.41  The most important change from earlier law 
effected by the 1917 Act was, of course, the addition of the excess profits 
tax.42  The Act provided for the filing of consolidated returns for excess 
profits tax purposes,43 which added some complexity.  The 1918 Act also 
contained many important amendments:  consolidated returns were 
authorized for both income and profits tax purposes;44 substantial 
modifications were made in the profits tax;45 provision was made for the 
nonrecognition of gain in connection with corporate reorganizations;46 
authority was given to the Bureau to require the taking of inventories;47 a 
provision for the carryover of net operating losses was added;48 and a 
special amortization deduction was authorized for war facilities.49 
With the end of the war and the return of surplus revenues, pressure for 
reduction in the income taxes became overwhelming.  In addition to 
eliminating the excess profits tax, the Revenue Act of 1921 substantially 
reduced the individual and corporate income tax rates.50  Even with the 
                                                     
40 Id. § 2(b), 39 Stat. 757. 
41 Id. § 11, 39 Stat. 766. 
42 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 201, 40 Stat. 303. 
43 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1331, 42 Stat. 319 (construing provisions of 
Revenue Act of 1917). 
44 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240(a), 40 Stat. 1081. 
45 See H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 15–21 (1918); S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 11–15 
(1918). 
46 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060. 
47 Id. § 203, 40 Stat. 1060. 
48 Id. § 204, 40 Stat. 1060. 
49 Id. §§ 214(a)(9), 234(a)(8), 40 Stat. 1067, 1078. 
50 The 1921 Act provided a normal tax on married individuals (ch. 136, §§ 210, 




4% $2,000 – $6,000 
8% Over $6,000 
 
In the case of a single person, these rates were 4% on income from $1,000–
$5,000, and 8% on income in excess of $5,000.  In the case of a married couple 
with income of not more than $5,000, the exemption was $2,500 instead of $2,000.  
The individual surtax rates ranged from 1% of income over $6,000 to 50% of 
income in excess of $200,000. Ch. 136, § 211, 42 Stat. 233. For the transition year 
1921, these rates ranged from 1% on income in excess of $5,000 to 65% on income 
in excess of $1 million. 
Although the tax rate on corporations was increased from 10% to 12½% for 
years following 1921 (§ 230, 42 Stat. 252), a $2,000 exemption (§ 236(b), 42 Stat. 
257) and the elimination of the excess profits tax resulted in corporations being 
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reduction of rates in 1921, and the later reductions that were to take place 
during the 1920’s, the income tax had firmly established itself as the 
principal device for financing government activities.  Since 1918, receipts 
from the income (individual and corporate) and excess profits taxes have 
rarely yielded less than half of annual government receipts; in some years 
they have yielded considerably more than half.51 
 
B. Inadequacy of Preexisting Adjudicative Institutions 
 
The income and excess profits taxes of the World War I period placed 
an enormous strain on the Bureau of Internal Revenue and, to a lesser 
extent, on the federal courts.  In the first place, the taxes were considerably 
more complicated than any other revenue device previously utilized by the 
Federal Government.  This problem was recognized at the very beginning 
of the modern income tax.  A friend who complained to Senator Elihu 
Root of the complexities of the 1913 Act elicited the following response: 
 
I guess you will have to go to jail.  If that is the result of not 
understanding the Income Tax Law I shall meet you there.  We shall 
have a merry, merry time, for all of our friends will be there.  It will 
be an intellectual center, for no one understands the Income Tax 
Law except persons who have not sufficient intelligence to 
understand the questions that arise under it. 
 
Even the income tax of the Civil War period, while much simpler than the 
later measures, was not without its complexities.  For example, Abraham 
Lincoln, an able lawyer of his day, overpaid his 1864 income tax by $1,250, 
which sum was ultimately refunded to his estate in 1872. 
The excess profits tax was, if anything, even more complicated than the 
income tax.  Dr. Thomas S. Adams, a distinguished political economist, 
professor at Yale University, adviser to the Treasury Department, and 
fervent supporter of income taxation, urged repeal of the profits tax in 1921 
on the ground that its continuation would inevitably lead to the breakdown 
of tax administration and the repeal of the income tax as well. 
In addition to their complexity, the income taxes of the World War I 
period affected vast numbers of people.  The lowering of exemptions 
resulted in a staggering increase in the number of returns filed.  Until 1917, 
                                                                                                                       
subject to less overall tax than under the 1918 Act. See supra notes 27–28 and 
accompanying text. 
51  However, in recent years, social insurance taxes have represented an 
increasing share of federal revenue, reaching as high as 42.3% in 2010. See STAFF 
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN 
EFFECT FOR 2012, JCX-18-12, app. A-3 (Comm. Print 2012).   
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the number of income tax returns filed by individuals did not exceed 
450,000 for any single year.  In 1917, this number increased to 3.5 million 
and by 1920 more than 7 million individual income tax returns were being 
filed.  Not until 1925 did the number of filings fall below 6 million. 
Finally, the experience of the last century has demonstrated that, 
regardless of the detail provided, it is impossible to draft an income tax 
statute that clearly provides for all factual circumstances.  Accordingly, in 
addition to the taxing statute, an income tax system requires a sophisticated 
administrative body to collect the tax and provide interpretations of the 
statute.  As shall be seen, such a body cannot be built overnight. 
 
1. Dilemma of the Bureau 
 
Revenue legislation in the United States dates back almost as far as the 
formation of the Republic.  The first July 4th after adoption of the 
Constitution was marked by the enacting of a duty on goods, wares, and 
merchandise imported into the United States.52 This enactment even 
preceded establishment of the Treasury Department.53  Numerous revenue 
measures followed, but until the Civil War these were almost exclusively 
tariffs.  Only during two brief periods was there resort to internal taxation:  
1791–1802 and 1813–1817.54  This sparing use of internal taxation seems to 
have been consistent with the intention of the framers of the Constitution, 
who felt that such techniques should be utilized only in exceptional 
circumstances,55 reminiscent as they were of the hated excises imposed in 
the pre-revolutionary period by the British Parliament.  Moreover, internal 
taxation was not popular with the public and the first imposition of internal 
excises on distilled spirits gave rise to an insurrection by Pennsylvania 
farmers in the summer of 1794. 
During each of the early periods of internal taxation, an office of 
Commissioner of the Revenue was created to administer the levies.  
However, the office was abolished each time the internal duties were 
repealed.56  The modern Internal Revenue Service traces its lineage to the 
legislation imposing the income tax of 1862 and the various other internal 
taxes that were established to finance the Union’s war effort.57  The first 
Commissioner appointed under the 1862 legislation, George Boutwell, 
worked industriously to establish the organization, regulations and forms 
                                                     
52 Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, § 1, 1 Stat. 24. 
53 Act of September 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65. 
54 For a detailed account of these measures, see BUREAU OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE 5–28 (1948) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE]. 
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 93-95, 124–25 (R.P. Fairfield ed. 1966). 
56 BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 54. 
57 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat. 432. 
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necessary for tax administration.  Within six months, the Bureau had grown 
from a staff of one (Mr. Boutwell) to an organization of almost 4,000 
employees.58 
In view of the enormous responsibilities suddenly thrust upon the 
organization, it was not surprising that in its early years the Bureau was far 
from an unqualified success.  The United States Revenue Commission 
established in 1865 to study the raising of tax revenues and the efficiency of 
tax administration concluded that “in point of organization and 
administration, . . . [the Bureau] is very far from what it should be.”59 The 
cited weaknesses of the Bureau included the following:  lack of policy 
making authority; inadequate pay; appointments based on patronage rather 
than ability; and political interference with its decisions.60 
The income tax of the Civil War period was repealed effective 1872,61 
and most of the other internal taxes imposed to finance the War were 
repealed by 1877.  Nevertheless, the Bureau continued in existence to 
administer the remaining internal taxes and those thereafter enacted, such 
as the taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco.62  Additionally, it was 
given charge of various non-revenue regulatory measures such as the 
bounty for United States sugar producers, the certification of Chinese 
laborers, and the taxes on opium and oleomargarine. 
The imposition of the corporation income tax in 1909 and the general 
income tax in 1913 added new duties to the Bureau, and created a 
concomitant growth in its size.  But the changes wrought by the early 
income tax acts were small compared to those of the World War I revenue 
legislation.  As a result of the introduction of the excess profits tax and the 
expansion of the income tax, there was a more than ten-fold increase in the 
number of returns filed.  The Bureau was buried under a mountain of 
paper.  Because it was the policy of the Bureau to review virtually each 
return filed,63 and because the laws under which the returns were filed were 
considerably more complicated than any previous tax measures, 
monumental problems of administration arose.  The turmoil that ensued 
persisted for a decade. 
The years 1917 through 1919 witnessed almost complete paralysis of the 
Bureau.  The personnel of the Washington office increased from 585 in 
                                                     
58 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INCOME TAXES 1862–1962: A HISTORY OF 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 7 (1962) [hereinafter cited as INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE]. 
59 Id. at 11. 
60 Id. 
61 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 257. 
62 See Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 120 (1924) 
(statement of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
supra note 58, at 12. 
63 See 1919 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 18. 
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1917 to 4,088 in 1919,64 but few of the Bureau’s staff were equipped with 
the special legal, accounting, and engineering background necessary to 
assess the accuracy of millions of the returns filed.65  Particularly 
troublesome were questions of property valuation on which depended 
deductions for depreciation, amortization, and depletion, and on which 
invested capital was computed for excess profits tax purposes.66  According 
to some, there were not sufficient trained people in the entire country to 
satisfactorily audit the returns that poured in during the war period.67  As a 
result, only the simplest returns, approximately 40 percent of the total, were 
processed before 1920.68  Massive recruitment efforts were begun in 1919, 
and 1,000 auditors were hired in the first six months of the year.69  
However, before they could commence work, the auditors required four to 
six months of training in a discipline in which there were few teachers and 
no textbooks.70  Moreover, even after training, the solution of the difficult 
questions presented under the wartime revenue acts eluded the grasp of 
many.  The problem was compounded by the fact that taxpayers also had 
difficulty understanding the new laws, and frequently their accounting 
records, especially in the case of the profits taxes, were inadequate.71  This 
made the settlement of many cases difficult because of the Bureau’s 
insistence on absolute accuracy in the computation of tax liability.72 
Throughout its history, the Bureau has been plagued with personnel 
problems.  Levels of compensation prevailing in the private sector for tax 
competency generally have been higher than in the Government.  This was 
especially true during the World War I period, when the Bureau had 
difficulty attracting employees from a labor market already reduced by 
virtue of the war effort.73  Even more troublesome was the fact that when 
the Bureau succeeded in hiring and training an able agent, the effort served 
only to make his skills that more marketable, and the chances were that he 
                                                     
64 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 540 
(1940). 
65 Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 3, 121 (1924) (testimony 
and statement of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
66 Id. at 121; TREASURY DEP’T, SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INCOME 
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67 Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 3 (1924) (remarks of 
Senator Jones). 
68 Id. at 121 (statement of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 121, 132. 
71 Id. at 121. 
72 TREASURY DEP’T SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4. 
73 Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 3 (1924) (testimony of 
David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
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would soon leave for greener pastures.74  Morale within the Bureau was 
poor, and the chances for promotion slight.75  Employee turnover was a 
severe problem, especially since it was greatest among the highest paid and 
most skilled Bureau personnel.76  The scope of the problem is revealed by 
the fact that in 1920, 50 percent of the personnel of the Income Tax Unit, 
which had primary responsibility for income and excess profits tax 
matters,77 either resigned or were discharged.78  The average tenure at that 
time was approximately one year, and when the training period is taken into 
account, the time actually spent on Bureau work by the average employee 
was six to eight months.  Additional problems were generated because of 
periodic scandals involving corrupt agents.  When disclosed, these practices 
                                                     
74 Id. at 132. 
75 See 1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 6. 
76 1919 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 32. 
77 The operation of the Income Tax Unit was described as follows:   
The Income Tax Unit is the agency of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for 
administering the income and profits tax laws.  Its duties are: 
(a) To prepare regulations for the administration of laws relating to taxes 
on income and profits; 
(b) To conduct correspondence relating to the subject matter of income 
and profits taxes; 
(c) To receive from collectors of internal revenue all returns covering 
taxes on income and profits; 
(d) To audit and verify returns and consider and dispose of reports 
relating to returns or questions appertaining thereto; 
(e) To assess all original and additional income and profits taxes; 
(f) To assemble and audit certificates of ownership; 
(g) To review and dispose of claims for abatement and refund of income 
and profits taxes; 
(h) To compile statistics relating to income and profits taxes; and 
(i) To control and operate all field forces verifying income and profits tax 
returns. 
 The audit work consists of handling all income and excess-profits tax 
returns of corporations, partnerships, fiduciaries, and individual income-tax 
returns wherein the income is in excess of $5,000, filed under three separate 
and distinct revenue acts.  All returns filed for the year 1917 were audited 
and handled by the Income Tax Unit’s forces, both in Washington and in 
the field.  For all years subsequent to the year 1917 all individual income tax 
returns with an income of less than $5,000 were audited in the offices of the 
collectors of internal revenue. 
Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 130–31 (1924) (statement of 
David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
78 George Maurice Morris, The Organization of the Federal Income Tax Unit, NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 9 (June, 1923); see also TREASURY DEP’T SURVEY, supra note 66, at 
35, 155. 
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occasionally required the discharge of auditors and reorganization of review 
sections.79 
It is therefore small wonder that an enormous backlog soon 
accumulated.  In April, 1921, approximately 25 percent of the 1917 returns 
and 50 percent of the 1918 returns were still pending.  As late as 1924, 
more than 300,000 returns for the tax years 1917–20 remained unaudited.  
Moreover, these unreviewed cases represented the larger and more 
complicated returns.80  Not until 1927 could Treasury report that the 
Bureau was “practically current” with the processing of returns.81  The Bureau 
publicly recognized that it was falling behind in audits, and combined a plea 
for adequate personnel with a statement of the importance of prompt 
review of returns. 
 
Were the millions of dollars assessable upon revenue agents’ 
discoveries left out of the question, it is still important that such 
examinations and audits as are to be made, both out of and in the 
office, should be made with a reasonable degree of promptness after 
the returns are filed.  After a year or two books are destroyed, the 
details of transactions forgotten, and the returns themselves become 
“ancient history,” so that an attempt to verify a return or check it up 
with any available records is attended with difficulty, is often 
unsatisfactory, and may result in an injustice to the taxpayer or to the 
Government.  Nothing has more served to render the income-tax 
law unpopular or subject its administration to unfavorable criticism 
than this one thing of delay in the examinations and audits.  The 
remedy lies through an efficient and sufficient working force to bring 
the work up to date and keep it current which force will, in the 
additional tax which it uncovers and causes to be assessed, repay the 
Government its costs many times over.82 
 
Criticism of the backlog was common during the early 1920’s. Some 
criticism was mild: 
 
[T]o date there have been six general Revenue Acts placed on the 
statute books since 1913.  This is an average of one new law for 
every two years.  Each successive Act is more comprehensive and 
probably more complicated than its predecessor.  Under these 
                                                     
79 Income Tax Unit Stirred by Graft Exposures, NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 28 (Dec. 
1923). 
80 REPORT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 9–10; 
Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 at 5, 131 (1924) (testimony and 
statement of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
81 TREASURY DEP’T SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2. 
82 1917 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 22. 
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conditions it is not surprising that the Treasury Department is 
considerably behind with the audit of returns.83 
 
Other commentators were not so understanding: 
 
All those familiar with the situation at Washington are agreed that if 
the income tax is to be preserved its friends will have to make a 
vigorous fight for better administration.  Delay has become almost a 
scandal.  Many of the 1917 and 1918 taxes are not yet finally 
adjusted, and it is beginning to impress some people that this is one 
of the ways by which enemies of the income tax propose to kill it.  
Friends of the income tax should insist that its administration be 
placed upon an efficient basis, so that it may not be discredited and 
discarded as a result of indirection. Congress has appropriated funds 
enough for administration and it is a question of either ability or 
inclination.84 
 
In addition to its personnel problems and the attendant backlog, the 
Bureau during this period struggled with other problems of administering 
the income and profits taxes.  Since the situation with which it was faced 
was unprecedented, these problems were most often solved on a trial and 
error basis.  The pervasive influence of the backlog contributed to the 
creation of some of these problems and also may have been influential in 
the selection of erroneous solutions for other problems. 
Early income tax administration was characterized by the policy of 
centralizing the audit function in Washington.  All returns for tax years 
through 1917 were forwarded to Washington for audit.85  For tax years 
following 1917, an increasing number of returns were initially audited in the 
field before being sent to Washington, but as late as tax year 1925 all 
corporate returns and all returns of individuals showing gross income in 
excess of $25,000 were still being forwarded directly to Washington.86  
There seems to have been two reasons for centralization.  First, the scarcity 
of trained auditors to deal with the complexities of the new laws created 
strong pressures for maximizing the efficiency of the available work force.  
Initially it was felt that this could best be accomplished by concentrating a 
specialized and more sophisticated force in the central office, rather than 
                                                     
83 1 WALTER E. BARTON & CARROLL W. BROWNING, BARTON’S FEDERAL 
TAX LAWS CORRELATED, Vol. 1, v (2d ed. 1925). 
84 H.C. McKenzie, A Look Ahead into Prospective Tax Legislation, NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 12 (Nov. 1923). 
85 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. Rep. 9. 
86 TREASURY DEP’T SURVEY, supra, note 66, at 10–11. 
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spreading it abroad in the field.87  Second, centralization was justified as a 
means of assuring the development of a uniform and detailed body of 
precedent that would serve as a guide for the disposition of future cases.88  
A policy instituted in 1918 directed at increasing the benefits of 
centralization by specializing auditors within industrial classifications89 was 
apparently unsuccessful and was abandoned in 1924.90 
Although it was always recognized that centralization was a temporary 
expedient,91 the policy had serious drawbacks.  Questions frequently arose 
in an audit that could not be answered from the taxpayer’s return.  In most 
cases the taxpayer’s residence or office was outside the Washington area 
and an attempt was made to resolve these questions by correspondence.  
This proved to be a cumbersome procedure that materially added to the 
time and expense necessary to audit a return.92  The situation was equally 
burdensome to the Government and the taxpayer.  As a partial solution to 
the problem, initial efforts were made at decentralization by which the basic 
audit responsibility was maintained in Washington, with field agents 
obtaining desired information directly from the taxpayer.93  Later, the entire 
responsibility for the initial audit was shifted to the field with the central 
office reserving authority to verify field actions.94  This latter phase was 
completed in 1927.  It was believed that as the field agents became more 
proficient fewer instances would arise when the Washington office would 
be required to reverse field judgments.95 
Unquestionably, decentralization was necessary and desirable, but the 
early attempts to combine centralized auditing functions with the activities 
of field agents generated organizational problems.  In many instances the 
Bureau was unable to coordinate its operations,96 and it was not uncommon 
for determinations of field agents to be overruled in Washington with the 
result that taxpayers were audited several times with respect to the same tax 
year.  The problem was heightened by the Bureau’s willingness to reopen an 
audit whenever an error was suspected or a new administrative position was 
                                                     
87 1918 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 18–21; see also REPORT OF TAX 
SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 6 (1923). 
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96 This problem was even recognized, although delicately, by the Bureau. Id. at 
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taken with respect to an issue involved in a return.97  A popular pastime of 
the day was the recounting of horror stories growing out of these 
problems.98 
 
A comparatively small concern in an inland city far from Washington 
filed its 1917 return and paid tax thereon.  Later it found that it had 
omitted certain income and filed an amended return.  After 
correspondence additional tax was assessed and paid.  In 1920 an 
office audit was made and the company advised of an additional 
assessment of some $20,000.00.  The company with its attorney, who 
was not very well versed in tax matters, went to Washington.  As a 
result of a hearing, the additional assessment was reduced to 
$10,000.00 and as stated by the president of the company, this 
additional tax, while it was feld [sic] to be unjust, was paid “with tears 
in their eyes.” 
 
In 1922 a field examination was had and the field agent reported that 
an over assessment of approximately $10,000.00 had been made and 
recommended a refund.  The company was about to declare an extra 
dividend when it was advised by an A-2 letter that the field agent was 
in error, that there was no refund, and $18,000.00 more was due. The 
company engaged experts and at a considerable expense in the 
compiling of evidence and after several hearings at Washington and 
considerable time succeeded in having the additional assessment 
eliminated and a refund of some $6,000.00 ordered.  There was no 
doubt in the minds of the company or its representatives but that the 
refund should have been the full $10,000.00 recommended by the 
field agent.99 
 
The problem of multiple audits attracted considerable attention.100  By 
1921 the practice was considered to be so abusive that the Revenue Act of 
1921 specifically prohibited unnecessary examinations or more than one 
inspection of a taxpayer’s books for a taxable year unless the taxpayer 
requested the additional audit or the Commissioner, after investigation, 
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notified the taxpayer that the additional examination was necessary.101  In 
1923, on the recommendation of the Tax Simplification Board, the 
Commissioner ordered that closed returns should not be reopened in the 
absence of fraud or gross error.102  These actions did not completely 
ameliorate the problem, as evidenced by the fact that in 1926 an attempt 
was made, albeit unsuccessful, to make the legislation even more restrictive 
by absolutely barring more than two audits with respect to the same year.103 
Another troublesome practice characteristic of the World War I period 
was the omission of any procedure by which a taxpayer could obtain an 
administrative hearing before being assessed for an underpayment of tax.  
Until 1921, the statute did not require such a hearing or, indeed, require 
notice that an assessment was contemplated, before the tax was assessed.  
Once the tax was assessed and notice and demand for payment made, the 
statute provided that the tax be paid forthwith; in the absence of such 
payment the Bureau could commence collection proceedings such as 
distraint and levy on the taxpayer’s property.104  Inasmuch as the decision to 
assess was frequently made by auditors in Washington, a few taxpayers 
never even received informal notice in advance of an actual assessment.105 
The absence of any right for an administrative appeal of a determination 
of underpayment led to an unfortunate practice prevalent between 1919 
and 1921.  The Bureau had fallen far behind in the auditing of returns, and 
it was felt that many of the returns contained errors that if corrected would 
result in greatly increased revenues needed for the war effort.  To obtain 
this revenue as promptly as possible, the Bureau embarked on a program of 
superficially auditing large numbers of returns, disallowing all questionable 
deductions, and immediately assessing the additional tax.106  Besides raising 
large amounts of revenue, it was hoped that this practice would result in the 
closing of many unaudited returns and thereby reduce the backlog.  The 
Bureau believed that any errors made through this procedure could be 
subsequently corrected either by claims for refund or claims in abatement. 
A claim for refund was precisely what its name implied.  A taxpayer who 
had paid more tax than he felt was due could file a claim for refund with the 
Commissioner.  An audit would then be made, and the tax would be 
refunded if the Commissioner determined the claim to be meritorious.  If, 
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on the other hand, the Commissioner rejected the claim or did not approve 
it within a certain period of time, the taxpayer could commence a suit in 
either district court or the Court of Claims to recover the excessive tax.107 
The claim in abatement, on the other hand, was not a procedure to 
secure a refund of tax paid.  Rather, the procedure permitted the taxpayer 
to administratively appeal an assessed tax prior to paying the assessment.  
The claim in abatement was initially a purely administrative creation108 that 
permitted a taxpayer to defer payment if he provided a bond for the 
payment of the tax and any interest or penalties thereon.109  The claim was 
required to be supported by affidavits of the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner was to presume that the assessment was correct in 
considering the validity of the claim.  The claim in abatement was not, 
however, a completely adequate solution for a taxpayer who believed he 
had erroneously been assessed.  It was not permitted with respect to an 
assessed tax that had been administratively reviewed.  Once administrative 
action was completed, the assessed tax would have to be paid.  
Furthermore, although the cost of a bond was less than the tax assessed, the 
cost was not insubstantial and could not be recovered even if the 
assessment was abated.  Moreover, taxpayers in financial straits might not 
be able to obtain a bond at all, with the result that they were not able to 
avail themselves of the abatement procedure.  Finally, the filing of a claim 
in abatement was no guarantee that collection efforts would be suspended; 
if the collector in his discretion felt collection of the tax was in jeopardy, he 
could collect the tax regardless of the fact that a claim in abatement was 
filed.  In such a case, the taxpayer was consigned to a remedy based on a 
claim for refund.  The claim in abatement became less important with the 
enactment of section 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921,110 which 
provided, in most cases, for pre-assessment review of tax deficiencies 
                                                     
107 See infra notes 142–197 and accompanying text. 
108 A limited statutory claim in abatement was provided by the Revenue Act of 
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within the Bureau.  When such review was available, no claim in abatement 
could be made.111 
Despite its shortcomings, the claim in abatement procedure resulted in 
the failure of the abbreviated audit and assessment policy.  Instead of 
paying the tax assessed, many taxpayers filed claims in abatement with the 
result that little additional revenue was collected.  Other taxpayers who paid 
the assessment filed claims for refund.  Returns temporarily closed by 
assessment of additional tax had to be reopened for a complete audit of the 
merits of the claims in abatement and claims for refund.112 
This unfortunate episode in the history of tax administration made 
apparent the undesirability of summary assessments.113  The Revenue Act 
of 1921 provided a partial answer to this vexing problem by requiring the 
Commissioner to give the taxpayer notice of his intention to assess and an 
opportunity, within 30 days after notice was mailed by registered letter, to 
file an administrative appeal.114  The appeal would afford the taxpayer an 
opportunity for a hearing, and no assessment could be made until the 
appeal was concluded.  Significantly, however, the statute permitted the 
Commissioner to assess without notice or opportunity for hearing if he 
believed that the ensuing delay would jeopardize collection of the amount 
due. 
As a result of the audit backlog and the operation of the statute of 
limitations on assessment, even after the enactment of the 1921 provision, 
many taxpayers did not obtain the opportunity for an administrative hearing 
prior to assessment.  The early revenue acts provided a period of either 
three, four, or five years from the filing of the return within which an 
underpayment of tax could be assessed.115  After the period expired, no 
further tax could be demanded.  In many cases the expiration of the 
statutory period would become imminent before the audit was completed, 
and, until 1926, the running out of the statutory period was considered 
justification for making a jeopardy assessment116 unless the taxpayer agreed 
to an extension of the period.117  The assessment, not based on a well-
considered audit, would be exaggerated by resolving every questionable 
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issue against the taxpayer.118  These assessments were in many cases 
additionally burdensome because, coming many years after the tax period in 
issue, the taxpayer’s economic situation had deteriorated with the result that 
the assessment spelled financial ruin, unless the taxpayer was in a position 
to defer payment of the tax by filing a claim in abatement.119  A post-war 
business recession served to heighten this effect.120 
A final problem that emerged in the early years of the administration of 
the modern income tax concerned the application and publication of 
precedents.  One source of precedents, court decisions construing the tax 
laws, provided useful guidelines to the Bureau and taxpayers.  But court-
made law accumulates slowly, and frequently the judicial resolution of an 
issue is not finally settled until reviewed by the Supreme Court.  In the case 
of complex statutory provisions, such as income and profits taxes, many 
questions of statutory interpretation arise, and resolution of these questions 
solely by the courts is inadequate. 
Another source of precedents was Treasury decisions and regulations, 
which were published guidelines of interpretation of the statute and 
represented the most persuasive authority that could be issued by the 
Treasury Department.  The early income and profits tax acts were both 
vague and unrealistic on many important points; legislative correction of 
these deficiencies was, in many cases, impracticable, and the publication of 
regulations was employed with some success to fill the void.121  Particularly 
notable in this regard was the assembling of a task force known as the 
Excess Profits Tax Advisers, a group of experts who worked with Treasury 
staff to draft regulations dealing with the difficult problems raised by the 
first excess profits taxes.122 
But the promulgation of regulations was itself a time consuming 
process, and regulations, like court decisions, could not adequately answer 
the myriad questions arising under the statutes.  Naturally, the Bureau in 
reviewing returns was engaged in a continuous process of interpreting and 
applying the statute.  Rulings generated in the audit process were recorded 
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notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
120 See Turner, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
121 1918 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 9. 
122 Id.; George O. May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income 
Taxation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 380–82 (1947). 
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by the Bureau and served as precedent in future cases.123  However, these 
rulings of the Bureau were rarely made available to the public prior to 1922, 
and, prior to 1925, publication was on a sporadic basis.124  The pressures of 
disposing of the backlog of cases were such that there was simply no time 
either to issue rulings on prospective or hypothetical situations or to reduce 
such rulings to publishable written form on a systematic basis.125  
Additionally, the Bureau during this period exercised considerable caution 
in publishing positions that had not been fully considered in the regulation-
making process.126  Despite these justifications, the existence of secret 
rulings127 aroused a good deal of criticism. 
In early 1926 the Senate Select Committee on Investigation of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue reported that the absence of published rulings 
had resulted in a variety of problems: 
 
1. Information for the guidance of the employees of the income 
tax unit is so incomplete that gross discrimination results from the 
failure to apply uniform principles to similar cases. 
 
2. Taxpayers, in many instances, have failed to claim allowances 
granted others similarly situated. 
 
3. To secure the benefit of unpublished precedents, taxpayers are 
forced to employ former employees of the income tax unit to advise 
and represent them in tax cases. 
 
4. Their exclusive possession of information as to the 
unpublished precedents and practices of the income tax unit has 
placed an artificial premium upon the value of the services of ex-
employees which enables them to demand and receive immense fees 
for information which should be freely available to everybody. 
 
5. This artificial premium, thus placed upon the exclusive 
information possessed by the employees of the Income Tax Unit, 
and the opportunity thus afforded for highly lucrative outside 
                                                     
123 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 9. 
124 See Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 17 at 3643–44 (1925) 
(testimony of C.R. Nash, Ass’t to the Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
125 “If you turn these committeemen loose to write opinions they would want 
to write a real judicial opinion.”  Senate Select Comm. Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1 
at 30 (1924) (testimony of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.); 1919 COMM'R OF  
INT. REV. REP. 17. 
126 1919 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 16–18. 
127 “[W]e have a list of secret rulings . . . ”  Senate Select Comm. Hearings, 
supra note 34, pt. 1 at 30 (1924) (testimony of David H. Blair, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
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employment, is the cause of the extraordinary turnover among the 
employees of the unit and of the difficulty experienced by the unit in 
retaining the services of competent employees at salaries within the 
range of the salaries paid by the Government for comparable service. 
 
6. The failure to consider closed cases as precedents and to 
publish the principles and practices followed in closed cases as 
precedents has deterred the formation of a body of settled law and 
practice. The unsettled state of the law and practice has encouraged 
the filing of claims for allowances and require the constant 
rediscussion and reconsideration of questions, which should be 
settled by precedents established by closed cases. 
 
7. The fact that a ruling will be published and the benefit of its 
principles claimed by taxpayers similarly situated is the strongest 
possible deterrent against making unsound rulings. 
 
8. During the course of the hearings there has been a great deal 
of evidence tending to show that it is the policy of the bureau to fix 
taxes by bargain rather than by principle.  Rulings based upon 
bargains cannot be published as precedents.  The best and most 
persistent trader gets the lowest tax and gross discrimination is the 
inevitable result of such a policy.128 
 
In evaluating these criticisms it is important to note that the Select 
Committee was dominated by senators, particularly Senator James Couzens 
of Michigan, who were hostile to virtually every aspect of the tax policy of 
Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon.  The Committee was spawned in 
a period of intense anti-Bureau sentiment, its activities were highly 
controversial, and the criticism on both sides was frequently bitter.129  It is 
generally believed that personal animosity was behind a deficiency of $9.5 
million asserted against Senator Couzens in respect of the sale by him of a 
large block of stock in the Ford Motor Co.130  Ironically, Senator Couzens 
found salvation in a ruling of the Board of Tax Appeals,131 an agency that 
Secretary Mellon was largely responsible for creating.132 
                                                     
128 S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 7–8 (1926). 
129 E.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2387–90, 6224 (1924). 
130 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 552–
57 (1940); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1954). 
131 Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).  For a detailed account 
of the feud between Senator Couzens and Secretary Mellon, see George K. Yin, 
James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,” and 
Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 787 (2013).   
132 See Part II. 
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In view of the many problems encountered in administering the new 
taxes, it is not surprising that the Bureau in the post-World War I years was 
the subject of continuing investigation and criticism.  Undoubtedly some of 
the criticism was politically inspired, but much of it was well founded.  This 
is not to say that these shortcomings were the result of incompetent or 
venal management; to the contrary, it would appear that many of the 
officials involved in tax administration were men of great ability.133  The 
inadequacies resulted from the enormity of the task of creating an 
administration for a mass income and profits tax in a short period of time 
and in the absence of an adequate supply of trained manpower.  Regardless 
                                                     
133 In a healthy spirit of partisanship, endorsements of Administration officials 
occasionally got out of hand: 
At the head of the Treasury Department is a farsighted financier, the 
greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton.  Under his 
leadership financial order has come out of chaos.  Liberty bonds that were 
lingering around 86¾ cents on the dollar under Democratic 
mismanagement were brought to par under the Mellon policies.  Debts that 
had piled mountain high under the Democratic policies of extravagance 
were paid off at the rate of $2,000,000 per day while other nations were 
piling up more debts every day.  The financial record made by the 
administrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge is unsurpassed in the 
annals of history.  This success is very largely due to the wise policies and 
farsighted genius of Andrew W. Mellon, of Pittsburgh.  There is widespread 
demand for the enactment of legislation for the reduction of taxes.  The 
Mellon plan is known in every hamlet in the land and uncounted millions 
look to Congress for its enactment.  It is the hope of the enemies of this 
plan that one result of the so-called investigation of the Treasury 
Department will be the crippling of the Mellon tax-reduction plan.  By 
innuendo against Mr. Mellon it is hoped to break down the Mellon plan. 
The work which President Coolidge and his Cabinet are carrying forward 
is the work planned and so well begun by President Harding.  Warren 
Harding—how fine and frank and honorable he was!  The poisoned arrows 
of malice lie broken at his feet.  There is only pity and disgust for the 
cowardly cur who would seek to cast suspicion on his motives, or leave 
scandal on the doorstep of the tomb.  In the few short months of his 
administration more great problems were grappled with and solved than 
ever before in a like period of our history. 
65 CONG. REC. 7432 (1924) (address by Senator Frank B. Willis [Rep., Ohio] at 
Americus Club banquet, Pittsburgh, Apri1 26, 1924).  
Politics aside, it would appear that there was general respect for the integrity 
and efficiency of Treasury and Bureau officials. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2622 
(1924) (remarks of Mr. Young); R.H. MONTGOMERY, EXCESS PROFITS TAX 
PROCEDURE 13 (1921); see also George O. May, Accounting and the Accountant in the 
Administration of Income Taxation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 379–81, 384–85 (1947) 
(lauding the work prior to the close of World War I of lawyers and accountants in 
administering and improving the tax laws; the article, however, decried the rise of 
what was viewed as excessive legalism following the war). 
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of the reasons, however, there can be no doubt that problems existed and 
that these problems supplied an important impetus for the creation of 
various bodies to investigate and correct the abuses of early tax 
administration.  These bodies included the Excess-Profits Tax Advisers,134 
the Excess-Profits Tax Reviewers,135 the Advisory Tax Board,136 the 
Committee on Appeals and Review,137 the Tax Simplification Board,138 the 
Senate Select Committee on Investigation of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue,139 the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,140 and the 
United States Board of Tax Appeals.141 
The purpose of the Board of Tax Appeals, as it ultimately evolved, was a 
narrow one, to assure that in most cases a taxpayer could obtain an 
independent review of the assertions of a tax deficiency before the 
deficiency would be assessed and collected.  But before the legislative 
history of the Board is detailed, it is necessary to consider two additional 
features of income tax administration extant at the time.  The first of these 
was the judicial remedy for challenging Bureau action.  The inadequacy of 
                                                     
134 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text; infra notes 203–205 and 
accompanying text. 
135 See infra notes 202–212 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 213–221 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 221–265 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 258–259 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra notes 128–132 and accompanying text. 
140 The Joint Committee, a standing committee of Congress, was created by the 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1203, 44 Stat. 127 (now codified at I.R.C. §§ 8001–
23).  Its duties were: 
(1) To investigate the operation and effects of the Federal system of 
internal-revenue taxes; 
(2) To investigate the administration of such taxes by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue or any executive department, establishment, or agency 
charged with their administration; 
(3) To make such other investigations in respect of such system of taxes 
as the Joint Committee may deem necessary; 
(4) To investigate measures and methods for the simplification of such 
taxes, particularly the income tax; 
(5) To publish, from time to time, for public examination and analysis, 
proposed measures and methods for the simplification of such taxes and to 
make to the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 
December 31, 1927, a definite report thereon, together with such 
recommendations as it may deem advisable; and 
(6) To report, from time to time, to the Committee on Finance and the 
Committee on Ways and Means and, in its discretion, to the Senate or the 
House of Representatives, or both, the results of its investigations, together 
with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1203(c), 44 Stat. 127 (now codified at I.R.C. § 8022). 
141 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336. 
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these procedures was a key element in providing the need for a body such 
as the Board of Tax Appeals.  The second feature was the character of the 
administrative remedy available to forestall erroneous Bureau action.  The 
administrative bodies and procedures established within the Bureau in the 
World War I and immediate post-war periods were the direct ancestors of 
the Board of Tax Appeals. 
 
2. The Judicial Remedy 
 
For those taxpayers who believed themselves aggrieved by erroneous 
Bureau action, judicial review was available.  Before 1924 such review was 
generally restricted to one of two types of refund suits:  (1) an action of 
mixed legal ancestry against the collector of internal revenue to whom the 
disputed tax was paid; and (2) a statutory action under the Tucker Act 
against the United States.  These proceedings were virtually exclusive, and 
only in extraordinary cases could taxpayers obtain judicial review of a tax 
determination of the Bureau prior to actual payment of the tax.142 
The common law right to sue a tax collector for refund of wrongfully 
collected taxes was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1836, in the 
case of Elliott v. Swartwout.143  The action was maintainable against the 
collector personally and was in assumpsit for money had and received.  
Because the liability of the collector was considered to be that of an agent 
who had wrongfully collected a tax for his principal, the Court held that the 
action would only lie if the collection of the tax was protested by the payor 
at the time of its payment to the collector.144  Absent such protest, the agent 
would not be on notice that his claim to the taxes was questioned and 
would not be entitled to withhold the payments from his principal.  Of 
course, without its consent, the principal was immune from suit as a 
sovereign.  This immunity extended as well to virtually all suits to restrain 
the assessment or collection of a tax.145  Thus, refund suits against 
                                                     
142 The claim in abatement did not permit judicial review prior to collection of 
the tax.  Rather, it permitted the continuation of administrative review of a matter 
after the tax was assessed, but before it was collected. See supra notes 108–111 and 
accompanying text. 
143 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137; see also Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839). 
144 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 156.  Although not clearly stated, there was some 
suggestion that a protest lodged following payment of the tax to the collector but 
prior to its transmission to the Treasury would also be adequate.  Id. at 154. 
145 Since 1867 this bar has been statutory, Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 
14 Stat. 475 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7421(a)), but the statute was apparently 
merely a restatement of previously recognized doctrine. See Miller v. Standard Nut 
Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 
(1914); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 388 (1902); Belknap v. Schild, 161 
U.S. 10, 17 (1896); Boeing Air Transport Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 
1935); Note, 13 N.C. L. REV. 265 (1935). 
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collectors generally were the sole judicial recourse of taxpayers prior to the 
creation of the Court of Claims in 1855 and the enactment of the Tucker 
Act in 1887.   
Although not clearly entitled by law to do so, following the decision in 
Elliott v. Swartwout collectors routinely refrained from paying taxes over to 
the Treasury when collected under protest.146  It soon developed that these 
funds were being unlawfully converted by the collectors for their personal 
purposes.  In 1839, Congress enacted legislation requiring the payment of 
the taxes into the Treasury regardless of the fact that they were collected 
under protest but requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to refund taxes 
paid under protest when such taxes were shown to be excessive.147  As a 
result of this legislation, the Supreme Court in Cary v. Curtis148 held that if a 
collector was not free to retain protested taxes, he could not be personally 
accountable in assumpsit.  The basis of the action was a promise implied in 
law to repay sums wrongfully taken.  Because the new legislation made it 
illegal for collectors to pay the tax to anyone but the Government, no 
promise could be implied to the taxpayer.  “[T]he law . . . never implies a 
promise to do an act contrary to duty or contrary to law.”149  After the 
decision in Cary v. Curtis, there was a short period of time in which a serious 
question existed as to whether any judicial remedy was recognized for the 
review of the legitimacy of tax collections.  The Court in Cary v. Curtis 
expressly refused to rule on this question.150  Although the subject has been 
treated in dicta, the Supreme Court has never had to face the question of 
whether Congress could, consistently with due process, withdraw all judicial 
review over tax matters.  The dicta has not been altogether consistent, so it 
is not clear how the question would be resolved.151  Happily, however, 36 
                                                     
146 See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 240, 261–62 (1845). 
147 Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 348. 
148 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). 
149 Id. at 251. 
150 “The legitimate inquiry before this court is not whether all right of action 
has been taken away from the party, and the court responds to no such inquiry.”  
Id. at 250. 
151 Compare Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 430 (1931) (indicating 
that some form of judicial remedy for illegal tax exactions must be afforded) with 
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 341–43 (1937); Bull v. United States, 295 
U.S. 247, 259 (1935); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885); McMillen 
v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877) (each indicating that no constitutional right to 
judicial review exists). In a broader article examining the constitutional status of the 
Tax Court against the separation-of-powers aspect of article III of the Constitution, 
Professor Deborah Geier has characterized the Tax Court’s small tax case 
procedures contained in § 7463 as presenting “the most troubling aspect of the Tax 
Court’s current jurisdiction in article III terms” because those procedures 
necessitate a pre-trial waiver of any appellate review, much less appellate review 
before an article III tribunal.  See Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and 
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days after Cary v. Curtis was decided, Congress in effect overruled it by 
passing legislation providing that nothing in the 1839 legislation should be 
construed to eliminate the right to sue collectors for customs duties paid 
under protest.152  The legislation also provided that to preserve the action, 
the taxpayer’s written protest setting forth his objections had to accompany 
or precede the disputed tax payment.  In 1924, the requirement of protest at 
the time of payment as a condition of maintaining suit for refund was 
eliminated.  Thenceforth suit could be commenced after a claim for refund 
was denied or after six months from the filing of the claim, whichever came 
earlier.153  The claim itself could generally be filed up to four years after 
payment of the disputed tax.154   
As might be expected, the early cases dealing with refund actions against 
collectors all involved customs duties.  The first case involving internal 
taxes was City of Philadelphia v. Collector,155 an 1866 decision in which the city 
contested a tax imposed upon illuminating gas.  The Court held that, as 
with the case of customs duties, actions in assumpsit would lie against a 
collector of internal revenue taxes for wrongfully collected amounts.  The 
principal difficulty encountered by the Court in reaching this conclusion 
was that as with customs collections, collectors of internal revenue were 
required to pay their tax collections to the Treasury regardless of any 
protest as to the legality of the collections.156  The collector argued that this 
provision required reasoning similar to Cary v. Curtis because, unlike the 
case with customs, there was no explicit statutory provision recognizing 
assumpsit actions in the case of internal taxes.  The Court, however, 
rejected this argument on the ground that other statutory provisions dealing 
with removal of tax proceedings from state to federal courts157 and directing 
the Commissioner to pay judgments against collectors158 indicated 
congressional recognition that the assumpsit action should be recognized. 
Until the corrective legislation following Cary v. Curtis, there was no 
statutory provision bearing on refund suits against the collector.  For this 
reason the action could be said to have arisen under common law.  In fact, 
this was clearly the position of the Supreme Court.159  As time passed, 
however, the nature of the refund action became murky.  Some courts held 
that the action was a statutory form of remedy against the United States 
                                                                                                                       
the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee:  A Study in Applied 
Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 1032 (1991).   
152 Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727. 
153 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014, 43 Stat. 343. 
154 Id. § 1012, 43 Stat. 342. 
155 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720. 
156 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 74, § 18, 12 Stat. 725. 
157 Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633. 
158 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 44, 13 Stat. 239; Act of March 4, 1863, ch. 
74, § 31, 12 Stat. 729. 
159 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 239–40 (1845). 
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with the collector the nominal defendant,160 and others have taken the view 
that it remained a common law action against the collector personally.161 
Unfortunately, the nature of the refund action was not a purely 
academic problem, and several questions arose that turned on this difficult 
issue.  The issues that arose included: whether a decision in a refund action 
against a collector would be res judicata in a subsequent action against the 
United States;162 whether a suit could be maintained against the collector 
holding office when the action was commenced, when the collector who 
had actually collected the tax had left office or died;163 and whether interest 
could be recovered against a collector in a refund action although a 
sovereign, absent consent, is generally not liable therefor.164  The answers 
                                                     
160 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151–58 (1960); George Moore Ice 
Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 383 (1933); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 
105–06 (1927); Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238, 243 (1883); Collector v. Hubbard, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1, 14, 16 (1870); Curtis’s Adm’x v. Fiedler, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 461, 
479 (1862); William T. Plumb, Jr., Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 685, 688–91 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Plumb]. 
161 See Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1, 4 (1921); Sage v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 33, 36–38 (1919); Patton v. Brady, Ex’x, 184 U.S. 608, 614, 15 
(1902); Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 75, 77 (1872); M. Carr Ferguson, 
Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IOWA L. REV. 312, 328–29 (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as Ferguson]. 
162 Before 1942, the rule had developed that res judicata and collateral estoppel 
could not be invoked in a refund action against the United States with respect to a 
prior judgment in a suit against a collector.  Thus a taxpayer who had lost a suit 
against a collector was not barred from suing the United States on the same issue 
for the same or different tax years.  United States v. Nunnally Inv. Co., 316 U.S. 
258 (1942); Bankers Pocohantas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932); Sage v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 33 (1919).  On the other hand, a judgment in a suit against 
the United States or the Commissioner was a bar to a later action against a 
collector.  Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1933).  In 1942, the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was amended to apply estoppel when the refund 
action against the collector occurred first. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 503, 56 
Stat. 956 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7422(c)). 
163 Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1 (1921) (suit must be maintained 
against collector who was in office when tax was collected, even if at the time suit 
was commenced he had left office); Patton v. Brady, Ex’x, 184 U.S. 608, 615 (1902) 
(if collector dies while suit is pending, action may be revived against his estate); 
Smith v. Hoey, 153 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1946) (collector died, suit commenced against 
his executrix); Swenson v. Thomas, 68 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Tex. 1946).  These 
rulings were predicated on the suit being personal against the collector. Contra, 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1960). 
164 Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 75, 77 (1872) (interest permitted 
on refund from collector from time of payment to time of judgment); Mellon v. 
United States, 36 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (in absence of statute, no interest 
on refund after issuance of certificate requiring United States to pay judgment 
against collector; United States then became liable for refund but, in absence of 
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given to these questions were never wholly satisfactory.165 As a result, the 
refund action against a collector was beset by procedural uncertainties and 
criticism.166  In 1966, it was discontinued by act of Congress.167 
Refund suits directly against the United States first became available in 
1855 with the creation of the Court of Claims.168 However, until 1866, the 
decisions of the Court of Claims were advisory and required approval by 
Congress.169  With the enactment of the Tucker Act in 1887,170 refund suits 
against the United States were permitted in either the Court of Claims or 
the district courts.171  The essential features of suit in the Court of Claims 
have remained essentially unchanged since 1866.  No jury trial is available, 
and no monetary limitation is imposed as a condition of jurisdiction.  Until 
1982, an appeal from a Court of Claims decision lay only with the Supreme 
Court.  Currently, an appeal from the Court of Federal Claims lies with the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.172 
                                                                                                                       
waiver of sovereign immunity, was not liable for interest). Statutory provisions 
enacted between 1921 and 1928 secured to taxpayers the right to interest on 
refunds from the time the overpayment was made to 30 days prior to refund, 
without regard to whether the refund was recovered in a refund action against a 
collector or against the United States.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1324, 42 
Stat. 316; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1117, 44 Stat. 119; Revenue Act of 1928, 
ch. 852, § 615(a), 45 Stat. 877. Until this legislation was enacted interest was not 
recoverable in a refund suit under the Tucker Act against the United States. The 
basis for permitting the recovery of interest against collectors was that the action 
was personal. 
165 See Ferguson, supra note 161, at 327–31; Plumb, supra note 160, at 685. 
166 See Plumb, supra note 160. 
167 Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 1108. 
168 Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. 
169 In 1863, Congress attempted to grant the power to render final decision to 
the Court of Claims and permit appeals to the Supreme Court therefrom.  Act of 
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765.  In 1865, the Supreme Court in Gordon v. 
United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865), concluded the legislation was deficient 
because judgments of the Court would be paid only upon further action by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and Congress.  Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 14, 12 
Stat. 768.  Accordingly, the Court refused to review decisions of the Court of 
Claims.  In 1866, the offensive provisions were removed. Act of March 17, 1866, 
ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 561–64 (1933). 
170 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346, 1491). 
171 Suits up to $1,000 were to be brought in district court, and suits of more 
than $l,000 but not more than $10,000 in circuit court.  Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 
359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505. 
172 The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 replaced the Court of Claims 
with the U.S. Court of Claims (renamed the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1992), 
and established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was given jurisdiction to hear appeals from Federal 
district courts in matters of copyright, patent, and trademarks.  Additionally, the 
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On the other hand, refund actions against the United States in district 
court have undergone significant modifications.  Unlike the situation with 
respect to refund actions against collectors, jury trial was not initially 
available in district court suits against the United States and there could be 
no allowance of costs to the taxpayer.  In 1954, jury trial was authorized;173 
in 1966, costs in favor of the taxpayer were permitted.174  Additionally, the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts has changed.  Originally, 
these actions could only be brought if the amount in controversy did not 
exceed $10,000,175 but in 1921 jurisdiction was expanded to permit suits 
against the United States, regardless of the amount at issue, if the collector 
had died before action was commenced.176  Apparently this amendment was 
based on uncertainty over the question of whether a suit against a deceased 
collector could be commenced against his estate.177  In 1925 the statute was 
further liberalized to remove any dollar limitation if the collector was out of 
office at the time the suit was commenced.178  These amendments obviated 
the venue difficulties of a taxpayer living in, say, Minnesota who wished to 
sue in district court for the recovery of more than $10,000, when, by the 
time suit was commenced, the collector of the disputed tax had retired to 
Florida.  Suit could be brought under the Tucker Act and venue based upon 
the residence of the taxpayer.179  Finally, in 1954, all dollar restrictions in 
district court actions were lifted.180 
The diversity of judicial remedies for excessive tax collections, each of 
which had its own peculiarities, was sometimes the source of difficulties for 
taxpayers.  Most troublesome were suits against collectors, because the 
action had to be maintained against the particular collector to whom the 
                                                                                                                       
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was designated as the primary court of 
appeals for the territorial courts and the reconstituted Court of Claims.  See Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 105(a), 122–133, 96 Stat. 
25, 36–41 (1982) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 171–173, 1291, 1292, 1295, 1491–1507).  
173 Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 1, 68 Stat. 589 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2402). 
174 Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (now codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2412). 
175 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505. 
176 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1310, 42 Stat. 310. 
177 H.R. REP. NO. 67-486, at 57 (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 7506–07 (1921) 
(remarks of Senator Jones).  In Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1960), 
the Court assumed that such an action could not be commenced.  At least one 
commentator has taken a different view of the matter. Plumb, supra note 160, at 
692. 
178 Act of February 24, 1925, ch. 309, 43 Stat. 972. 
179 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 5, 24 Stat. 506 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1402(a)). 
180 Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 1, 68 Stat. 589 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(a)(1)). 
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disputed tax was paid.  An error in selecting the proper defendant could 
result in dismissal of the action at a time when the statute of limitations 
barred commencement of another action.181  Nevertheless it is probably 
true that the introduction of a new tax tribunal, the Board of Tax Appeals, 
would not have been considered necessary had the existing judicial 
remedies not shared two common drawbacks.  First, neither permitted suit 
to enjoin or restrain the assessment or collection of tax.182  Second, each 
required full payment of the tax as a condition of maintaining suit.183  
Throughout the entire history of tax litigation, these limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have 
remained generally constant. 
A limited exception, “narrow but ill defined”184 on the bar to restraining 
tax collections has been recognized, but only in those exceptional cases in 
which it appears that there is no basis in law for the assessment and 
collection of the tax would result in irreparable injury to the taxpayer.185  
Even rarer have been those suits in which the taxpayer has been permitted 
to seek refund of a tax when less than the full tax assessed has been paid.186  
Although it has been suggested that an exception based on similar grounds 
to those which permit restraining assessment or collection should be 
recognized in refund suits,187 the most definitive pronouncement of the 
Supreme Court on the issue indicates a flat bar on refund suits unless the 
                                                     
181 See Wolinsky v. United States, 271 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1959); Buhl v. 
Menninger, 251 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1958); Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 
121 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1941). 
182 See supra note 145. 
183 See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). 
184 Ferguson, supra note 161, at 324. 
185 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932), is the leading 
authority in this area, and the doctrine has been applied in a score of other cases. 
The constitutionality of the 1894 income tax act was tested in equitable 
proceedings, but the relief requested was not an injunction against the collection of 
the tax, but rather an injunction of the corporate taxpayer, of which the petitioner 
was a shareholder, barring it from paying an unconstitutional tax.  Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 553–54, rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).  
More recently, Congress has confirmed that taxpayers may seek to enjoin the 
assessment and collection of a tax that serves as the subject of a notice of 
deficiency during the period in which the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of the deficiency.  See I.R.C. § 6213(a).  If the taxpayer has 
petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the subject tax, the Tax Court 
possesses concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal district courts to issue an 
injunction.  For a discussion of Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this context, see Part 
VI.A.3.   
186 See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 170–75 (1960). 
187 Ferguson, supra note 161, at 336. 
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entire tax has been paid.188  The general denial of access to the federal 
courts absent full payment of the disputed tax has been continued in the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.  When it was pointed out that as originally 
enacted in 1934,189 declaratory judgments were available in tax matters,190 
Congress promptly amended the Act to exclude controversies “with respect 
to Federal taxes.”191  Except as subsequently superseded by statute,192 this 
bar has been applied without exception.193 
Apparently this scheme of judicial review worked well enough for the 
first century and a quarter of the Republic.  This is not remarkable when it 
is considered that, prior to World War I, federal taxes were generally neither 
high nor complicated.  The War Revenue Act of 1917 and succeeding acts 
effected drastic changes in the level of taxation, the degree of complexity of 
tax laws and the number of individuals and businesses covered. When 
combined with the administrative difficulties being encountered by the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, these acts created an entirely different 
situation.194  The scope of the problem was suggested by the increase in the 
number of refund suits being brought in district court.  As of June 30, 1917, 
there were 472 district court civil tax cases pending that involved the United 
States.195  By June 30, 1924, this number had more than tripled to 1,507.196  
                                                     
188 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).  For a critique of the full-
payment rule of Flora, see Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation:  An 
Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 205, 267–71 (2013).    
189 Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. 
190 Frank J. Wideman, Application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to Tax Suits, 13 
TAXES 539 (1935). 
191 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 405, 49 Stat. 1027. 
192 Congress has more recently permitted taxpayers to seek declaratory 
judgments on discrete issues of federal taxation.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6234 (Tax Court 
jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgment concerning adjustment of losses on an 
oversheltered partnership tax return); I.R.C. § 7428 (Tax Court jurisdiction to issue 
a declaratory judgment regarding the classification or status of any organization 
formed under §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2), 509(a), 4942(j)(3), or 521(b)); I.R.C. § 7476 
(Tax Court jurisdiction to determine initial or continuing qualification of retirement 
plan under §§ 401 or 403); I.R.C. § 7477 (Tax Court jurisdiction to issue declaratory 
judgment concerning the value of taxable gift); I.R.C. § 7478 (Tax Court 
jurisdiction to determine whether interest on prospective government bonds will be 
entitled to the § 103(a) exclusion from gross income); I.R.C. § 7479 (Tax Court 
jurisdiction to determine whether an estate qualifies for deferred payment of estate 
tax pursuant to § 6166).  The Tax Court’s expanded declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction is examined in Part VII.A.   
193 See Ferguson, supra note 161, at 325. 
194 See CHARLES D. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE U.S. 
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 4–5 (1938); Turner, supra note 2, at 32. 
195 1918 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 
  The Origins of the Tax Court                               37 
 
Although no figures are available, it is reasonable to assume that a similar 
increase occurred in refund actions against collectors.  The Attorney 
General commented on burgeoning tax litigation in his 1924 report. 
 
There has . . . been a marked increase in the number of [tax] 
cases . . . handled in the courts.  A great many cases which arose out 
of the business prosperity of the war era have furnished and are still 
furnishing quite a volume of tax litigation.  These cases involve not 
only large sums of money but extremely important principles.  Their 
decision is making for a greater certainty in the administration of the 
various revenue acts which is highly desirable not only from the 
standpoint of the taxpayer but as an aid to efficient administration of 
the law.197 
 
Despite the general satisfaction expressed by the Attorney General with 
respect to the situation, the increasing litigiousness of taxpayers resulted 
from changed circumstances that demanded provision for a remedy not 
theretofore available—independent review of tax determinations without 
the requirement of payment.  As will be seen in succeeding pages, the 
Bureau had for several years struggled with the problem of providing full 
and impartial pre-assessment review.  Whether such review was either full 
or impartial was a matter of some question, but there could be no question 
that it was not independent. 
 
                                                                                                                       
196 1925 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. Listed below are the number of civil tax cases 
involving the United States pending at the close of fiscal years 1912–32.  (Source 
1913–1933 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REPS.) 
Year No. of Cases Year No. of Cases 
1912 633 1923 1,185 
1913 604 1924 1,507 
1914 631 1925 1,751 
1915 590 1926 1,872 
1916 495 1927 2,144 
1917 472 1928 3,136 
1918 560 1929 3,303 
1919 705 1930 3,468 
1920 795 1931 3,056 
1921 1,238 1932 2,787 
1922 1,777   
 
197 1924 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 82. 
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3. Pre-Assessment Review Within the Bureau 
 
Until 1921, the law permitted the Bureau to summarily assess and collect 
whatever amount of tax it deemed proper.198  Neither notice nor 
opportunity for hearing was required by the statute prior to assessment.  
Thus, taxpayers who felt aggrieved by Bureau action could have been 
restricted to obtaining redress solely by way of a refund suit. 
However, it would have been shortsighted to administer the tax law in 
this manner.  The income and profits taxes, which raised the bulk of the 
revenue necessary for the war effort, were not designed to be coercively 
extracted.  The initiative was with the taxpayer to make out his return and 
remit the tax.  Without his active cooperation, the system would have been 
wholly inoperable.  A citizenry that perceived the tax collection system as 
arbitrary could hardly be expected to cooperate. 
The Bureau was obviously concerned with its public image and 
endeavored to foster a positive attitude towards tax administration.  One 
step along these lines was the formulation of the claim in abatement, which 
permitted a taxpayer to obtain a full administrative review of an assessment 
without the necessity of paying the disputed tax.199  Another action 
designed to bolster public confidence in the system was the enlisting of 
distinguished private citizens to participate in the drafting of rules and 
regulations under the new laws.200  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the Bureau and Congress embarked on a program which stemmed from 
early recognition of a need for a procedure to afford taxpayers pre-
assessment administrative review on disputed matters before a sophisticated 
group of experts.  The need for such review was widely perceived.  Income 
and profits taxes had become of great personal importance to many 
taxpayers.  The Bureau, as a result of its spectacular growth, had lost some 
of its earlier efficiency, and it was generally felt that inexperienced 
government auditors were making numerous errors, most of them in favor 
of the Bureau.  These errors frequently resulted in erroneous summary 
assessments that had disastrous consequences for taxpayers.201  There 
resulted a succession of reviewing bodies that was ultimately to culminate in 
establishment of the Board of Tax Appeals. 
Because the excess profits tax, first imposed in 1917,202 was probably the 
most complex and troublesome of the new measures, it is not surprising 
that the first such body was charged with resolving the knotty problems it 
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199 See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text; infra notes 203–205 and 
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201 See Albert L. Hopkins, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 12 A.B.A. J. 
466, 466–67 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Hopkins]. 
202 Act of March 3, 1917, ch. 159, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000. 
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raised.  The Excess Profits Tax Reviewers, established in 1918, was largely 
dominated by the same men who had comprised the Excess Profits Tax 
Advisers,203 a group of distinguished lawyers, accountants, and 
businessmen, appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to assist the 
Commissioner in drafting excess profits tax regulations.  The chairman of 
the Advisers was Dr. T. S. Adams.  Other notable members were Arthur A. 
Ballantine, who was later to become the Solicitor of the Internal Revenue 
Service and Under Secretary of the Treasury, and J. E. Sterrett, a noted 
accountant and later a member of the Tax Simplification Board.204  The 
Commissioner appeared well satisfied with the technique of public 
participation in tax administration. 
 
The appointment of the excess-profits tax advisers had the 
immediate effect of inspiring confidence in the purpose of the 
Department to administer the law with due regard for established 
business practices and with proper consideration of the effect the 
large rates of tax would have upon business activities.  The tide of 
general criticism that had arisen against the law was stemmed, and 
the Bureau began to receive innumerable expressions of confidence 
and offers of cooperation and assistance from accountants, lawyers, 
bankers, and business men [sic] throughout the country.205 
 
The Excess Profits Tax Reviewers, successors to the Advisers, were 
principally concerned with giving expeditious review to two types of 
cases.206  The first of these were cases arising under section 209 of the 
Revenue Act of 1917, which provided a separate formulation of excess 
profits tax liability in the case of a business that had “no invested capital or 
not more than a nominal capital.”207  Obviously, the proper application of 
this statute to a particular taxpayer could be quite difficult, but because of 
the importance of the question in the computation of tax liability, the 
Commissioner felt it should be resolved in any case in which it was raised 
before any assessment was made.208 
The second type of case concerning the Excess Profits Tax Reviewers 
was even more difficult.  Section 210 of the Revenue Act of 1917209 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to estimate a taxpayer’s invested 
capital, when such capital could not otherwise satisfactorily be computed, 
                                                     
203 1918 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 13. 
204 George O. May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income 
Taxation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 380–81 (1947). 
205 1918 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 9 
206 1918 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 12–13 
207 Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 307. 
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on the basis of invested capital employed by other taxpayers “in a like or 
similar trade or business.”  As with the section 209 cases, the Commissioner 
felt this to be a question of such basic importance that it had to be resolved 
before any assessment could be made. 
The Excess Profits Tax Reviewers held formal “hearings” in a “large 
number” of these cases at which taxpayers were permitted to present their 
views.210  Presumably, the Commissioner acted in accordance with the 
Reviewers recommendations. 
The Commissioner never intended that the Reviewers would be a 
permanent body.  Rather, its purpose was to serve as a vehicle for providing 
experience in these matters to the Bureau personnel assigned to work with 
the Reviewers, with such personnel to be absorbed into other 
administrative units within the Bureau organization.211  The Excess Profits 
Tax Reviewers apparently ceased functioning as a separate unit in 1919,212 
but it was replaced by a group with broader jurisdiction, the Advisory Tax 
Board. 
Section 1301(d) of the Revenue Act of 1918213 provided for the creation 
of the Board, composed of no more than six members appointed by the 
Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.  
Membership was largely drawn from the Reviewers and included Dr. 
Adams, Mr. Sterrett, Fred T. Field, a distinguished Boston lawyer later to 
serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Stuart W. Cramer, a businessman and engineer, and Luther F. Speer, 
formerly Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue.214 
The jurisdiction and function of the Advisory Tax Board was described 
by statute as follows: 
 
The Commissioner may, and on the request of any taxpayer directly 
interested shall, submit to the Board any question relating to the 
interpretation or administration of the income, war-profits or excess-
profits tax laws, and the Board shall report its findings and 
recommendations to the Commissioner.215 
 
The Advisory Tax Board had a more formalized procedure than its 
predecessors.216  In order for a taxpayer to bring an appeal to the Board, he 
must first have received a determination of the Income Tax Unit.  The 
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213 Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1141. 
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request for Board review was required to be made within 30 days of 
notification to the taxpayer of the decision of the Income Tax Unit.  
Evidence could not be adduced before the Board that had not been 
brought to the attention of the Income Tax Unit.  Although Board 
consideration of a question did not take the form of a judicial proceeding, 
taxpayers were permitted, in the discretion of the Board, to orally argue 
their cases. 
The Board was given a statutory life of two years, but the Commissioner 
was authorized to dissolve it earlier with the approval of the Secretary.  The 
Commissioner exercised this authority on October 1, 1919, some six 
months after the Board was organized.217  In the words of the 
Commissioner, it had become “necessary for the members of the Board to 
return to their own personal affairs, from which they had only temporarily 
separated themselves.”218  Publicly, the Commissioner praised the Board: 
 
The members of the Board have rendered, through a period of heavy 
administrative pressure and strain, assistance of great value. Their 
constant endeavor has been to assist in the upbuilding within the 
Bureau of regular units designed to render permanently the special 
service which they have provided in a period of emergency.219 
 
However, in view of the sudden termination of the Advisory Tax Board, 
it would seem that the Commissioner regarded the body with somewhat 
less affection than he professed.  This may well have been due to its quasi-
independent nature.  Its successor, the Committee on Appeals and Review, 
was purely a Bureau creation and was fully staffed by Bureau personnel. 
Due to its brief tenure, the Board did not have an important quantitative 
impact on the adjudication of tax controversies.  It heard only 54 cases 
brought before it by taxpayer request. Additionally, it considered 75 
questions submitted by the Commissioner and examined 112 legal opinions 
of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, the latter being an officer of the Justice 
Department who acted as legal adviser to the Commissioner.220 
Nevertheless, the Advisory Tax Board did play a significant role in the 
development of the adjudication of tax controversies.  It was the first body 
of statutory origin to have as its principal function the review of 
determinations made by the regular Bureau organization.  It was staffed by 
                                                     
217 The Revenue Act of 1918 was not enacted until February 24, 1919, and the 
Board was organized on March 13, 1919.  Brewster, supra note 119, at 325–26. 
218 1919 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 13–14. 
219 Id. at 13. 
220 Id. The office of Solicitor of Internal Revenue was abolished by the 
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persons of considerable expertise and assured the opportunity for a hearing 
to any taxpayer meeting the requirements of its procedural rules. 
Simultaneously with the discontinuance of the Advisory Tax Board, the 
Commissioner created the Committee on Appeals and Review to carry on 
the work of the Board.221  During the entire period of its existence, the 
Committee on Appeals and Review was a part of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.  Although it was separate from the Income Tax Unit, which had 
general charge of administering the income and profit taxes, it was staffed 
by former members of the Unit who were either lawyers, accountants, or 
engineers.222  The Committee was directly responsible to the Commissioner 
and could act only in an advisory capacity.  Thus, the Commissioner was 
theoretically free to disregard Committee recommendations.223 
Although a matter was usually considered by a single member initially, 
the Committee functioned as a collegial body, and before any 
recommendation was made to the Commissioner, several members of the 
Committee would meet to approve the recommendation.224  In the early 
years, the full Committee would meet to approve each recommendation of 
a member.225  Later, when the number of members increased and the 
Committee was divided into subcommittees, each subcommittee would 
meet to approve recommendations of subcommittee members; thereupon 
the recommendation would be forwarded to the chairman of the full 
committee for his review.226  These procedures were an important feature 
of Committee operations and were apparently felt to be necessary to assure 
uniformity in Committee recommendations.  They were later to be carried 
forward by the Board of Tax Appeals.227 
Aside from its creation, the most important single event in the life of the 
Committee was the enactment of section 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 
1921.228  As previously described, Congress had become dissatisfied with 
the power of the Bureau to summarily assess additional taxes without giving 
the taxpayer either notice of, or the opportunity for a hearing with respect 
to, the assessment.229  Once notice of the assessment was given to the 
taxpayer he was required to either promptly pay the tax or file a claim in 
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abatement secured by a bond.  Section 250(d) of the 1921 Act radically 
revised this procedure by providing: 
 
If upon examination of a return made under the Revenue Act of 
1916, the Revenue Act of 1917, the Revenue Act of 1918, or this 
Act, a tax or a deficiency in tax is discovered, the taxpayer shall be 
notified thereof and given a period of not less than thirty days after 
such notice is sent by registered mail in which to file an appeal and 
show cause or reason why the tax or deficiency should not be paid.  
Opportunity for hearing shall be granted and a final decision thereon 
shall be made as quickly as practicable.  Any tax or deficiency in tax 
then determined to be due shall be assessed and paid, together with 
the penalty and interest, if any, applicable thereto, within ten days 
after notice and demand by the collector as hereinafter provided, and 
in such cases no claim in abatement of the amount so assessed shall 
be entertained: Provided, that in cases where the Commissioner 
believes that the collection of the amount due will be jeopardized by 
such delay he may make the assessment without giving such notice 
or awaiting the conclusion of such hearing. 
 
The Committee was the body chosen to afford the review required by 
the 1921 Act, and its workload changed dramatically.  In fiscal year 1922, 
the Committee received 1,148 appeals from taxpayers.230  This was an 
increase from 971 and 434 appeals received in the two preceding years.231  
In 1923, 3,889 appeals were received,232 and in 1924 there was a further 
increase to 4,879.233 
As a result of these events, several important changes were made in the 
Committee.  Of major importance was the increase in the size of the 
Committee.  For its first two years of existence it was composed of five 
members.234  In 1922 its membership was increased to ten, and in 1923 
there was a further increase to 20.235  During the latter part of its operation 
the Committee was divided into six subcommittees of three members each, 
comprised of a lawyer, an accountant, and an engineer.236 
There were other important changes in the operation of the Committee.  
Throughout its existence the Committee had two functions that had carried 
over from the Advisory Tax Board:  (1) to hear appeals initiated by 
taxpayers; and (2) to serve in an advisory capacity to the Commissioner with 
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respect to the preparation of Treasury decisions, regulations, and rulings.  
In its early years, the Committee’s non-appeal function was significant; it 
reviewed many administrative rulings for the Commissioner and 
additionally served in an advisory capacity to other Bureau personnel.  A 
significant amount of its time was taken up by consideration of questions 
arising during the pendency of audits by the Income Tax Unit.  After 
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921, however, the overwhelming portion 
of the Committee’s work soon became the consideration of section 250(d) 
cases.237  The duties of the Committee became “more closely confined 
to . . . [those] of a purely appellate body.”238  The increasing workload was 
also reflected in an increase in the number of smaller cases brought before 
the Committee.  This increase led to the creation in 1923 of the Special 
Committee on Appeals and Review, which only considered cases involving 
deficiencies of less than $2,500.239  This Special Committee, consisting of 
only four members, disposed of 3,058 cases in its first and only year of 
operation.240  Another form of specialization had started in the previous 
year with the establishment of the Committee on Review and Appeals, 
which reviewed estate tax cases.241 
Until 1923, hearings before the Committee could be held only in 
Washington, D.C.  The increased number of section 250(d) cases, and 
especially the presence of a large number of cases involving relatively small 
deficiencies, induced the Committee to dispatch subcommittees to hear 
cases involving taxpayers located west of the Mississippi.  In 1923 and 1924, 
these subcommittees heard more than 500 cases in Kansas City, Los 
Angeles, Portland, St. Paul, and San Francisco.242  As with the practice of 
collegially deciding cases, this circuit riding aspect of the Committee was to 
be carried forward as an important and distinctive characteristic of the 
Board of Tax Appeals.243 
In its later years, the Commissioner referred to the Committee as a 
“quasi-judicial body of appellate jurisdiction.”244  Emphasis must be placed 
on the word “appellate” because unlike the Board of Tax Appeals, the 
Committee was not a fact finder.  The taxpayer generally was permitted to 
introduce evidence to the Committee only in affidavit or documentary form 
and could not adduce evidence that had not been considered by the Income 
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Tax Unit.245  The Committee could in its discretion accept new evidence, 
but if it did so, it was free to resubmit the case to the Unit.246 
Throughout its history, the Committee operated under general rules of 
procedure and afforded taxpayers the opportunity for an oral hearing.247  If 
no oral hearing was desired, the matter could be submitted on the written 
record alone.  Briefs on behalf of the taxpayer could also be submitted in 
addition to oral argument.248  Until 1924, the rules applicable to committee 
practice provided that if the case involved a question of law, the Solicitor of 
Internal Revenue was to designate two members of his office to “sit with 
the Committee . . . for the purpose of hearing the appeal.”249  The 
Solicitor’s Office could then “if the Solicitor so desires” make a 
“recommendation” to the Committee “in the form of an opinion or 
memorandum.”250  However, it was not contemplated that the proceeding 
was to be an adversary one between the Solicitor and the taxpayer, with the 
Committee sitting as the impartial arbiter.  This impression is confirmed by 
the fact that until 1924 the Solicitor of Internal Revenue reviewed 
Committee decisions on behalf of the Commissioner and readily exercised 
authority to amend or reverse them.251  In 1924, this practice was 
discontinued, and the determination of the Committee with respect to an 
appeal became the final determination of the Bureau and could only be 
reopened as a result of a subsequent change in law or regulations.252  
Significantly, once this change in practice was effected, the rules no longer 
called for the Solicitor’s representatives to “sit” with the Committee.253  As 
a result of its nonadversarial and informal nature, Committee proceedings 
frequently became negotiating sessions; in these cases, Committee 
recommendations were no more than settlements of disputed issues rather 
than judicial determinations of legal questions.254 
                                                     
245 A.R.M. 219, III-1 CUM. BULL. 319, 319–120 (1924). 
246 Id. 
247 Requirements for perfecting and prosecuting an appeal to the Committee 
were published. E.g., T.D. 3492, II-1 CUM. BULL. 170 (1923); O.D. 709, 3 CUM. 
BULL. 370 (1920); A.R.M. 219, III-1 CUM. BULL. 319 (1924). 
248 A.R.M. 219, III-1 CUM. BULL. 319 (1924); O.D. 709, 3 CUM. BULL. 370 
(1920). 
249 O.D. 709, 3 CUM. BULL. 370 (1920). 
250 Id. 
251 REPORT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 2 
(1923). 
252 A.R.M. 219, III-1 CUM. BULL. 319, 320 (1924); T.D. 3492, II-1 CUM. BULL. 
170, 171 (1923). 
253 Id. 
254 Graupner, supra note 224, at 295; Miller, supra note 224, at 169. 
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With the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals, section 250(d) of the 
Revenue Act of 1921 was repealed255 and the Committee on Appeals and 
Review was abolished.256  New provision was made for prosecuting an 
appeal within the Bureau prior to the issuance of a deficiency notice, which 
was a condition precedent to petitioning the Board of Tax Appeals.257  The 
Committee had, however, left its mark.  In many respects the Board of Tax 
Appeals was a continuation of the Committee.  Moreover, several former 
members of the Committee were to join the Board.  In fact, the first 
Chairman of the Board, Charles D. Hamel, had come to that office directly 
from the chairmanship of the Committee on Appeals and Review. 
Pressures for the replacement of the Committee with the Board were 
largely the result of two factors.  First and most importantly, the Committee 
was not independent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  The Tax 
Simplification Board, created by the Revenue Act of 1921258 to investigate 
the administration of the internal revenue laws, made a detailed study of the 
Committee and identified lack of independence as its principal weakness.  
In discussing its recommendation to discontinue the Solicitor’s power to 
countermand determinations of the Committee, the Board stated: 
 
This recommendation and the investigation which preceded it and 
the discussion which followed it convinced practically everyone who 
participated in the discussions that it would never be possible to give 
to the taxpayer the fair and independent review to which he is of 
right entitled as long as the appellate tribunal is directly under, and its 
recommendations subject to the approval of, the officer whose duty 
it is to administer the law and collect the tax.  As long as the 
appellate tribunal is part and parcel of the collecting machinery it can 
hardly maintain the attitude essential to a judicial tribunal.  It is the 
situation which was developed in this way that leads our Board to 
make the recommendation relative to the establishment of a board of 
tax appeals hereinafter set forth.259 
 
The difficulty was heightened by the fact that three separate 
administrative bodies were formulating tax rulings—the Income Tax Unit, 
the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, and the Committee on Appeals and 
Review.  In many cases, the rulings were unpublished; they were also 
frequently inconsistent.  Yet Bureau reviewing agencies felt compelled to 
follow earlier rulings, regardless of their merits, when they favored the 
                                                     
255 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1100(a), 43 Stat. 352. 
256 1924 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 12. 
257 T.D. 3616, III-2 CUM. BULL. 275 (1924). 
258 Ch. 136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317. 
259 REPORT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 4 
(1923). 
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Government.  To be effective as a creator of precedent for the guidance of 
the Bureau and taxpayers, many felt that the expert reviewing body had to 
be independent of the Bureau and free to disregard earlier administrative 
rulings.260 
It was also observed that regardless of their good faith, the members of 
the Committee on Appeals and Review could hardly ignore the fact that a 
determination by them in favor of the taxpayer precluded further review of 
the question of tax liability.  The Bureau would not and could not seek to 
challenge its own determination before an independent judicial body.  On 
the other hand, a determination in favor of the Bureau did not foreclose a 
taxpayer from pursuing his judicial remedies.  For this reason, doubtful 
questions were believed to be regularly disposed of by the Committee in 
favor of the bureau, even though at least some statistical data supported the 
conclusion that the Committee favored taxpayers more frequently than 
not.261 
The second criticism of the Committee which had an important impact 
on the legislation creating the Board of Tax Appeals dealt with the nature of 
the proceedings.  They were not adversarial, they were not public, they did 
not permit the introduction of new evidence, and they were not conducted 
pursuant to traditional judicial standards of practice and procedure.  During 
this period, many people were highly suspicious of large refunds of tax 
made by the Bureau that had come to public attention.262  Although these 
suspicions may have largely been the result of political opportunism, it was 
nonetheless true that the informal and secret nature of the Committee 
permitted them to flourish in the first place.  The Bureau was on the horns 
of a dilemma.  On the one hand, it was excoriated for “negotiating” tax 
liability and not applying the letter of the law equally to everyone.263  On the 
other hand, the Bureau was criticized for insisting on absolute correctness 
in every assessment—a practice that some felt to be the fundamental curse 
of the administrative quagmire of the World War I period.264  The creation 
of the Board represented a victory for those forces of righteousness 
demanding absolute precision and equal applicability of the law without fear 
or favor.  However, the controversy did not terminate in 1924, and the 
                                                     
260 See Hopkins, supra note 201, at 467. 
261 R. MONTGOMERY, EXCESS PROFITS TAX PROCEDURE 12–13 (1921); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 7–8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 8–9 (1924); Miller, 
supra note 224. 
262 See, e.g., Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 21, 
1924, at 36, 156. 
263 S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 8 (1926) (Report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue); see also Graupner, supra note 224, 
whereas it was charged that this procedure resulted in undue delays. 
264 See TREASURY DEP’T SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4–5. 
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Administration, which favored some flexibility in the administration of the 
law, was to reassert this position in the future.265 
 
 
                                                     
265 Id.; see also statement of President Coolidge in signing the Revenue Act of 
1924, quoted at Part II, note 97; Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the Ways 
and Means Committee, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 932–33 (1925) (testimony of A.W. Gregg, 
Solicitor of the Bur. of Int. Rev.). 




PART II  
 
CREATION OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS: 
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1924 
 
 
A. The Revenue Act of 1924 
 
In March 1923, William Green of Iowa, Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, requested that Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon 
appoint an ad hoc committee to study revision of the Revenue Act of 
1921.1  Thus were initiated the steps that led to enactment of the Revenue 
Act of 1924,2 legislation that was to be the most sophisticated tax measure 
theretofore adopted.  The committee was specifically directed to prepare 
recommendations to remove “inequities” in the existing tax law, to close 
“loopholes” that permitted evasion and fraud, and to “simplify” tax 
administration. In compliance with the request, the Secretary appointed a 
committee composed of A.W. Gregg, a precocious tax wizard of 24 who 
was the Special Assistant to the Secretary, had formerly been Chairman of 
the Special Committee on Appeals and Review, and was later to become 
Solicitor and General Counsel to the Commissioner; William S. Moorehead, 
a Pittsburgh attorney then serving as Chairman of the Tax Simplification 
Board; and J.G. Bright, Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 
charge of the Income Tax Unit.  The committee was assisted in its task by 
the units of Treasury and the Bureau that were concerned with tax matters.  
Working with the committee on behalf of Congress were Middleton 
Beaman and Fredrick P. Lee, directors of the Legislative Drafting Services 
in the House and Senate.3  The committee regularly consulted Secretary 
Mellon and Under Secretary of the Treasury Garrard B. Winston; final 
responsibility for the draft was, of course, with the Secretary.4 
By the fall of 1923, the ad hoc committee had completed most of its 
task and on November 10, 1923, Secretary Mellon sent a letter to Chairman 
                                                     
1  For a discussion of this revision effort, see Hearings on H.R. 6715, Before the 
Comm. on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1–8 (1924) [hereinafter cited as 1924 Senate 
Hearings]. 
2  Ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253. 
3  The Legislative Drafting Service had been created in 1918.  Revenue Act of 
1918, ch. 18, § 1303, 40 Stat. 1141.  In the Revenue Act of 1924, its name was 
changed to the Office of the Legislative Counsel.  Ch. 234, § 1101, 43 Stat. 353. 
4  Garrard Winston, Changes Made by the Revenue Act of 1924, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION OF THE NATIONAL 
TAX ASSOCIATION 265 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Winston]. 
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Green outlining a comprehensive tax program.5 Subsequently, on 
December 17, 1923, Secretary Mellon sent Chairman Green draft legislation 
of the Treasury proposals, which the Ways and Means Committee 
immediately began to consider.6  Some six months later, the Revenue Act of 
1924 became law.  The provisions of the Act that ultimately emerged from 
the Mellon proposals were described as divisible into three parts: (1) 
political; (2) structural; and (3) administrative.7 
The political aspects of the legislation included the rates of income and 
estate taxes, the imposition of the gift tax, and the publicity of tax returns.8  
Naturally it was these provisions, and especially the question of income tax 
rates, that attracted the most attention. 
President Coolidge and Secretary Mellon believed the 1921 Act rates 
were excessive.  In their view, high tax rates destroyed initiative, encouraged 
tax evasion and avoidance, and reduced the flow of capital into 
economically productive activities.  The effect of such taxation was to 
encourage investment in the tax exempt securities of state and local 
governments, which the President and the Secretary regarded as 
nonproductive.  They were alarmed that a continuation of this trend would 
not only reduce tax revenues, but would also have catastrophic 
consequences for the economy.  The key element of the “Mellon plan,” as 
the Treasury proposal came to be known, was the substantial reduction of 
income taxes paid by individuals—a 25% reduction in the normal tax and a 
50% reduction in the surtax.  Under the 1921 Act, the maximum individual 
tax rate was 58% on incomes in excess of $200,000;9 under the Mellon plan, 
the maximum rate would have been reduced to 31% on incomes in excess 
of $100,000.  Additionally, the Mellon plan increased the level at which the 
surtax became effective from $6,000 to $10,000, and provided an “earned 
income” credit equal to 25% of the tax attributable to such income. 
Even though tax reduction was politically popular in some quarters, the 
Mellon plan aroused considerable opposition from liberals who viewed the 
proposal as class legislation in favor of the rich.  Neither side had the power 
to completely work its will, and compromise was inevitable.  The earned 
income credit and the normal tax reduction were enacted substantially as 
                                                     
5  Filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1924: Memoranda and 
Correspondence.” 
6  A copy of the covering letter is filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 
1924: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Mellon Letter].  The 
December 17, draft legislation was printed for the Ways and Means Committee on 
December 28, 1923, and designated as Committee Print No. 1 [hereinafter cited as 
1924 Administration Bill]. 
7  Winston, supra note 4. 
8  Id. at 266. 
9  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 210–211, 42 Stat. 233. 
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proposed by the Secretary,10 but the surtax was cut by 20% instead of 
50%,11 and the maximum tax rate came to 46% instead of the 31% 
proposed by Mellon.  
Additional setbacks were suffered by the Administration in the area of 
estate and gift taxes.  Mellon regarded these taxes as enemies of prosperity 
because they directly reduced capital; he therefore opposed any increase in 
the estate tax, originally enacted in 1916, and also opposed adoption of a 
gift tax.  However, he failed to achieve his goal, and the Act not only 
included a gift tax12 but also increased the estate tax by 60% at each tax 
bracket.13 
Finally, over strenuous Treasury opposition, the Revenue Act of 1924 
required the Commissioner to publish lists of each person filing an income 
tax return and the amount of tax paid.14 Additionally, congressional 
committees, state officials, and, upon order of the President, the public 
were given access to the returns themselves.15  As will be seen below, the 
same impulses that led to the elimination of tax return confidentiality were 
also to play an important part in molding the procedural rules that would 
govern the Board of Tax Appeals. 
It is interesting in connection with these publicity provisions to consider 
the curious reversal of ideological roles that occurred over the years.  By the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the cause of confidentiality of tax 
information had been identified with the liberal position supporting strict 
respect for Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.  Those urging broader 
dissemination of tax information had been regarded as conservative in 
preferring the interest of efficient criminal investigation.16  In 1924, 
                                                     
10 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 209, 43 Stat. 263 (earned income credit).  
Mellon recommended a normal tax of 3% of the first $4,000 of net income, and 
6% of net income above $4,000.  As enacted the normal tax was 2% on the first 
$4,000 of income, 4% on the next $4,000, and 6% on net income in excess of 
$8,000.  Id. § 210(a), 43 Stat. 264. 
11 Id. § 211(a), 43 Stat. 265. 
12 Id. §§ 319–324, 43 Stat. 313. 
13 Compare Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 401, 42 Stat. 277 (25% of net estate 
in excess of $10 million), with Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 301(a), 43 Stat. 303 
(40% of net estate in excess of $10 million).  For a thorough account of the 
circumstances leading to the publicity provisions included in the 1924 Act, see 
George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the 
World,” and Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 787 
(2013).   
14 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 253. 
15 Id. § 257(a), 43 Stat. 293. 
16 For discussion of the issue of return confidentiality, see STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM. ON TAX’N, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL 
52             The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
 
however, the positions of those then identified as liberals and conservatives 
were reversed.  The liberals, led by Senator George Norris, were suspicious 
that some wealthier members of society were not paying their fair share of 
taxes, either because of loopholes in the law or because of chicanery by 
Administration officials.17  The activity of the Couzens committee, which 
was commissioned to investigate the Bureau of Internal Revenue during 
this period, was a pointed illustration of the liberals’ concern.18  Disclosure 
of who was paying how much tax would give them an opportunity to 
validate their suspicions.  On the other hand, the conservatives of the 
Coolidge administration opposed publicity of tax information on the 
ground that it would encourage tax evasion; taxpayers who might otherwise 
be willing to pay their taxes would be reluctant to do so if as a consequence 
they were required to open their private financial affairs to public scrutiny.19 
The “structural changes” effected by the 1924 Act were largely 
noncontroversial and were adopted substantially as proposed by Mellon.  
The more important of these changes were a limitation on the reduction of 
tax as a result of capital losses to 12%—the maximum rate of tax for capital 
gains;20 a disallowance of interest and net loss deductions to the extent 
attributable to tax exempt interest income;21 and a substantial revision of 
the corporate reorganization provisions.22 
The Treasury proposal also suggested numerous administrative changes, 
such as a revision of the statute of limitation provisions, a requirement that 
tax exempt income be reported for statistical purposes, and a clarification of 
the situations in which consolidated returns were authorized.23  Most of 
these were adopted as proposed; however, one administrative proposal, the 




                                                                                                                       
REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND RELIEF ACT OF 1998, JCS-1-00 (Comm. 
Print 2000) (two volumes); Hearings on Tax Reform Before the Ways and Means Comm., 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 699–716 (1975) (testimony and statement of Professor Meade 
Emory).  
17 See 65 CONG. REC. 1207–09 (1924). 
18 See Part I, notes 128–129 and accompanying text; S. REP. NO. 69-27 (1926) 
(report of the Couzens committee).  For the riveting backstory of the events 
leading to the formation of the Couzens committee, see Yin, supra note 13.   
19 See Winston, supra note 4, at 266. 
20 Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 208(b), (c), 43 Stat. 263. 
21 Id. §§ 206(a)(5), 214(a)(2), 234(a)(2), 43 Stat. 260, 270, 283. 
22 Id. § 203, 43 Stat. 256. 
23 Winston, supra note 4, at 270–71. 
24 See 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1. 
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B. The Administration Proposal for a Board of Tax Appeals 
 
In his December 17, 1923 letter to Chairman Green, Secretary Mellon 
described the proposal for creation of the Board of Tax Appeals as follows: 
 
A board of tax appeals is created to hear all appeals from the 
assessment of additional income and estate taxes, which will sit 
locally in the various judicial circuits throughout the country.  The 
cases of both the Government and the taxpayer are presented before 
the board which acts impartially and the practice there is similar to 
that before the Interstate Commerce Commission.  Upon a decision 
in favor of the Government, the additional tax can be assessed by 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer is left to his 
remedy in the courts for a recovery of the tax.  If the decision is in 
favor of the taxpayer, the Commissioner may not assess the tax but 
is left to his remedy in the courts in a suit to collect the additional 
tax.  In a hearing in the courts, the findings of the board shall be 
taken as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.25 
 
Creation of a board of tax appeals had been advocated before the 1923 
Treasury proposal.  As early as 1920, the American Mining Congress had 
proposed creation of such a body.26  The United States Chamber of 
Commerce also had been an early advocate of a body independent of 
Treasury to adjudicate tax controversies.27  In 1922, Senator Atlee 
Pomerene introduced a bill to create a “United States Court of Appeals on 
internal revenue questions.”  It was Senator Pomerene’s hope that such a 
court would assure taxpayers that they were getting a “square deal” and 
would also serve to terminate the secrecy cloaking Bureau rulings and 
procedures.28 
Perhaps the most influential recommendation came from the Tax 
Simplification Board, which had been created by the Revenue Act of 1921 
to investigate the administration of the internal revenue laws.29  The Board 
was composed of three members representing the public who were 
appointed by the President, and three members representing the Bureau 
who were selected from the Bureau by the Secretary of the Treasury.30  
                                                     
25 Mellon Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
26 See Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1924, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 436–37 (1924) [hereinafter cited as 1924 House Hearings]. 
27 Id. at 459. 
28 62 CONG. REC. 8913–14 (1922). 
29 Ch. 136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317. 
30 Id. § 1327(a). 
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Many of the Board’s suggestions were adopted by the Bureau.31  Among its 
most important recommendations were those designed to improve the 
operation of the Committee on Appeals and Review.32  However, the Tax 
Simplification Board was convinced that there were definite limits on the 
possible improvements that could be made in the operation of the 
Committee.  Because the Committee was a part of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, it could never function as a truly judicial body and could not 
provide a completely adequate solution to the problem of pre-assessment 
review.33  Accordingly, the final report of the Tax Simplification Board 
contained a fairly detailed proposal for the creation of the Board of Tax 
Appeals.34  It was not surprising that the recommendation contained in the 
                                                     
31 These reforms included various improvements in the operation of the 
Committee on Appeals and Review, limitations on reopening closed cases, 
requiring information returns with respect to dividends, and improving tax forms.  
REPORT OF THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 2–6 
(1923). 
32 For example, as a result of a Tax Simplification Board suggestion, the 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue ceased to have review powers over Committee on 
Appeals and Review recommendations.  Id. at 3–4. 
33 See Part I, note 259 and accompanying text. 
34 The proposal read as follows: 
In the foregoing portion of our report dealing with the recommendations 
made touching the procedure of the committee on appeals and review, we 
adverted to the anomaly of providing for an appeal by a taxpayer from an 
additional assessment of taxes proposed to be made by the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue and prescribing that this appeal be taken to the officer 
who had announced his intention of making the additional assessment.  The 
function of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to assess and collect 
the taxes.  This function is administrative and not judicial.  The appeal given 
to the taxpayer from the action or proposed action of the commissioner 
should be to a judicial body independent of the commissioner.  It should be 
borne in mind that this appeal by the taxpayer must be heard and decided 
before the additional tax is collected.  It is, therefore, important that the 
appellate tribunal be so constituted that its decisions may be made 
expeditiously and its work kept approximately current with the appeals 
which are taken to it.  If this were not so, the collection of the public 
revenue would be seriously impeded.  It is, therefore, essential that the 
number of persons on the board of tax appeals may be increased or 
decreased according to the influx of work.  To insure the proper 
functioning of the board so as not to impede the collection of revenue, it 
would seem advisable that the appointments to the board be made by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  Adequate salaries should be provided to secure 
the services of able men, for the questions that will come before them will 
be difficult and will involve large sums. In establishing such an appellate 
body, the following essentials should be borne in mind: 
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Mellon plan bore a striking similarity to this proposal, since William S. 
Moorehead, Chairman of the Tax Simplification Board, and J.G. Bright, a 
representative of the Bureau on the Board, were both members of the ad 
hoc committee established by Secretary Mellon to draft the Revenue Act of 
1924. 
Under the Administration proposal, the Board of Tax Appeals was to be 
established within the Treasury Department, but separate from the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue.35  The Secretary of the Treasury was given authority to 
appoint as many members, numbering between seven and 28, as he deemed 
necessary.36  From these members, the Secretary would designate a 
chairman.37  Also reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury was the power 
to approve the selection of the Board divisions and chiefs thereof,38 and the 
power to approve procedural rules adopted by the Board.39 
The members were to be appointed for terms of ten years except that to 
secure rotation in office, the Secretary could designate original 
appointments for terms of two, four, six, or eight years.40  The members 
were to be compensated at $10,000 per year,41 a rather large sum that 
                                                                                                                       
(a) The board’s decision should be independent and not subject to review 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 
(b) Its proceedings should be informal; 
(c) Its membership should be capable of expansion or contraction in 
order to dispose of the work; 
(d) The members should be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
If a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of tax appeals 
he should be required to pay his tax, but should still have the opportunity of 
bringing a suit in court to recover back the amount paid.  If the 
Government is dissatisfied with the decisions of the board, it should be 
permitted to bring suit in court to collect the asserted tax liability, but 
should not be permitted summarily to assess and collect the tax. 
It is the belief of our board that if such a tribunal were established 
taxpayers would feel that they would receive a fair and impartial hearing 
before being required to pay any additional tax assessments.  We believe 
that the law creating the board should be so drafted as to permit the 
members to function in groups in various parts of the United States. 
REPORT OF THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 10–11 
(1923). 
35 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(a). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. § l000(b). 
39 Id. § 1000(e). 
40 Id. § 1000(a). 
41 Id. 
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compared favorably to the $8,000 salary of court of appeals judges and the 
$7,500 salary of district court judges and congressmen.42 
Under the Administration bill, the jurisdiction of the Board was to be 
limited to cases in which a deficiency had been declared in income, profits, 
or estate taxes.43  Within 30 days after the Commissioner sent notification 
of a deficiency by registered mail, the taxpayer could petition the Board for 
a redetermination of the deficiency.44  The Board also was to have 
jurisdiction over cases involving jeopardy assessments in which claims in 
abatement had been filed.45  The Board was to have no jurisdiction over 
refund cases. 
Decisions of the Board were not to be final determinations as to tax 
liability.  A decision in favor of the taxpayer would preclude the 
Government from summary assessment procedures, but within one year 
the Government could institute a court proceeding to collect any additional 
tax it believed was due.46  Conversely, a decision by the Board in favor of 
the Government would permit the immediate assessment and collection of 
the tax, but the taxpayer could, after paying the tax, file a claim for refund, 
and if it was disallowed, institute a refund action in either district court or 
the Court of Claims.47  In any further judicial proceedings, the factual 
findings of the Board were to be accepted as prima facie evidence.48 
Board proceedings under the Administration bill were to be informal 
with decisions “made as quickly as practicable.”49  No provision was made 
for trial by jury; fact finding was to be solely by members of the Board.  
Written findings of fact were to be made in each case, but no written 
opinions were required unless otherwise ordered by the Chairman.50  The 
Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary, was authorized to appoint 
three-member divisions and chiefs thereof to hear cases.51  Decisions by 
such divisions would be final unless within 30 days the Chairman directed 
full Board review.52  The headquarters of the Board was to be in 
                                                     
42 See 65 CONG. REC. 3283, 7694 (1924). 
43 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(c). 
44 Id. § 274(a). 
45 Id. §§ 279, 312, 1000(c). 
46 Id. § 274(b). 
47 The 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, did not contain a specific 
provision authorizing a refund suit following an unfavorable Board determination.  
However, it was clearly the intent of the Administration that such a remedy be 
available. Mellon Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
48 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § l000(d). 
49 Id. § 1000(e). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. § 1000(b). 
52 Id. 
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Washington, but the Board or its divisions could sit throughout the United 
States at the direction of the Chairman.53  
The Administration proposal was not revolutionary; rather in most 
respects it was simply a codification of the then existing Committee on 
Appeals and Review.  Both supporters and critics of the proposal 
recognized this fact.54  The two most important changes were that the body 
was to be removed from Commissioner supervision to Secretary of the 
Treasury supervision, and that the members were to receive a substantial 
increase in salary. Congressional consideration of the proposal, however, 
led to more fundamental changes. 
 
C. Controversy and Modifications 
 
Secretary Mellon was probably surprised by the controversy surrounding 
his proposal for the Board of Tax Appeals; later, he was to be displeased by 
the Board as it finally emerged from Congress. Two central characteristics 
of the proposal proved ultimately to be unacceptable to a majority of 
Congress.  These were the degree of control to be exercised by the 
Secretary over the Board, and the informality of Board procedures.  The 
debate stirred by these two features will be discussed in detail in the 
following pages. Additionally, other aspects of the Administration proposal, 
although not as fundamental as independence and informality, also proved 





                                                     
53 Id. § 1000(e). 
54 The following excerpts from the Congressional Record reflect this 
understanding: 
As originally drawn in the Treasury Department, it was merely, in my 
opinion, an increase in salaries of those who make up the present 
arrangement. . . . 
65 CONG. REC. 3283 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Garner). 
The reason why this board is being appointed is because we are unable to 
keep the proper class of men in the departments at this time on the salaries 
that are paid down there. 
Id. at 3282 (remarks of Mr. Green, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means). 
Now, you are not by this bill creating a new board, as someone said.  We 
have appeal boards down at the Treasury now. What we are proposing is to 
make a better board, make better procedure, protect the taxpayer, and give 
him a chance to have his rights passed upon inexpensively, quickly and 
properly. 
Id. at 3284 (remarks of Mr. Young). 





Under the Administration proposal, the Board of Tax Appeals was to be 
“established within the Department of the Treasury.”  The Secretary of the 
Treasury would determine the number of members between seven and 28; 
he was to have plenary power to appoint members without the approval of 
the Senate and, at least initially, to designate their terms of office between 
two and ten years; he could designate the Board’s Chairman; and his 
approval was to be required for procedural rules adopted by the Board as 
well as for the selection of divisions and division chiefs. Although not 
explicitly stated in the proposal, there could be implied a power of the 
Secretary to remove Board members at will. 
Some believed that the Mellon plan envisioned an independent Board 
and that subsequent congressional amendments were merely clarifications.55  
However, it is difficult to believe on the basis of the Administration bill that 
Secretary Mellon did not intend to retain substantial control over the Board.  
Few executives wish to preside over the reduction in size or influence of 
their organization.  As Secretary of the Treasury, Mellon had at least 
indirect control of the Committee on Appeals and Review, which was part 
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  It was contemplated that the Board of 
Tax Appeals would replace the Committee, and a fully independent Board 
would result in a net loss of power to the Treasury. 
One can only speculate as to the other motives behind the Treasury 
proposal to locate the Board within the Department. Possibly, the 
experience with the Advisory Tax Board was a consideration.  The 
Advisory Tax Board, organized on March 13, 1919, pursuant to the 
Revenue Act of 1918, was disbanded by the Commissioner some six 
months later.56  Although not formally independent of the Bureau and the 
Treasury, the Board was composed of distinguished personalities from 
academe, law, accounting, and business.  The Commissioner professed 
great faith in and gratitude for the work done by the Advisory Tax Board, 
but the circumstances surrounding its elimination were somewhat 
suspicious; possibly the Commissioner and the Secretary found a 
                                                     
55 Congressman George Young (R. N.D.), a senior member of the Ways and 
Means Committee who supported the amendment, stated the following: 
I want to be perfectly fair, and I think if you will read over the original 
draft carefully you will come to the conclusion that it was designed that this 
board was to be an independent board, but the Ways and Means Committee 
thought it could be strengthened and be made more specific and certain, so 
there was some added language. 
Id. at 2622. 
56 For a discussion of the Advisory Tax Board, see Part I, notes 213–221 and 
accompanying text. 
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quasi-independent, quasi-judicial body not to their taste.  Mellon, of course, 
was not in office during the period of existence of the Advisory Tax Board, 
but he may well have been influenced by any real or imagined defects from 
which it suffered. 
Mellon’s proposal to make the Board of Tax Appeals independent from 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue but not from the Treasury was defended by 
some outside the Department,57 but was viewed generally as an incomplete 
solution to the problem.58  Of principal concern was the plenary power of 
the Secretary to appoint and remove members of the Board.  Some feared 
the Secretary would be heavily influenced in his selection by the advice of 
the Income Tax Unit, which would recommend men sympathetic to the 
position of the Bureau.59  If these men were also former employees of the 
Bureau, additional problems might be encountered by their lack of 
objectivity due to their training and experience.60  Additionally, concern was 
expressed that the implied power of the Secretary to remove Board 
members at will would lead to pressure on the Board to favor the Treasury 
in its decisions.  John Nance Garner, ranking Democrat on the Ways and 
Means Committee, summed up the problem in his characteristically blunt 
fashion.61 
 
                                                     
57 Mellon’s proposal was supported by the National Industrial Conference 
Board and the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce.  
Memorandum of National Industrial Conference Board, Dec. 18, 1924, National 
Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of 
Tax Appeals 1923–24; Letter from President of U.S. Chamber of Commerce to 
Secretary Mellon, May 29, 1924, National Archives Building, Records of the 
Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24; see also The 
New Tax Board, 3 C.P.A. MAG. 31 (1924). 
58 See generally 65 CONG. REC. 2684 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Chindblom); see also 
1924 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 108, 460–62. 
59 See 1924 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 108. 
60 1924 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 462, 468 (remarks of Mr. Garner and 
Mr. Gore); Conflict Over Choice of Members for Board of Tax Appeals, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 218 (1924).  There were also those who believed that appointment to the 
Board by the President was not a completely adequate solution.  If the President 
was the chief tax collector, a decision by a Board member in favor of the 
Government would be a decision in favor of the President. 1924 House Hearings, 
supra note 26, at 461.  It was also feared that Presidential appointments would be 
based on patronage rather than ability.  65 CONG. REC. 2614 (1924) (remarks of 
Mr. Jeffers); see also id. at 2684 (remarks of Mr. Chindblom). 
61 65 CONG. REC. 3282 (1924).  For a less colorful expression of this same 
sentiment, see 1924 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 460 (statement of Edward 
Gore, American Institute of Accountants). 
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[I]f they did not decide cases to suit . . . he [the Secretary of the 
Treasury] could kick them out and get somebody who would. 
 
There were even some cynics who felt that Secretary Mellon had a personal 
interest in being able to appoint the members of the Board so they would 
be able to pass favorably on questions of great import to the Secretary’s 
personal fortune.62  
In addition to the problem of appointment and removal of Board 
members by the Secretary, troublesome questions were raised concerning 
conflicts of interest.  As long as Treasury employees and, in the case of the 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue, representatives of Treasury, continued to 
appear both before and behind the bench, many believed that an impartial 
hearing would be impossible since these men would feel it their duty to 
collect the maximum amount of taxes possible.  An appellate board could 
only hear both sides objectively if it was completely free of any possible 
pressure or loyalty to the collection agency.63  The basis for this criticism 
                                                     
62 The following remarks capture such cynicism: 
But the joker in the proposal was that the bill provided that the members of 
this tribunal should all be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, not to 
be confirmed by the Senate or anybody else. 
If that had gone through, it would have meant that Mr. Mellon would 
have been able to provide soft berths for as many as 28 of his friends at 
$10,000 per each annum, and it would have been up to those men to pass 
on the income-tax questions concerning and involving Mr. Mellon’s own 
great interests.  Mr. Mellon and his family are heavily interested in more 
than half a hundred great corporations. 
Would it have been a fair proposition for a man in his position to have 
been able to personally name the members of a board of tax appeals, and 
not only name all the members of the board but keep the board within the 
Treasury Department where it would have been under his own direct and 
personal control and where it would have had to pass on questions coming 
up in connection with the many great interests in which the Secretary is 
himself heavily interested financially? 
It was a monstrous proposal for him to make, and, with all due respect to 
Mr. Mellon, I must say that I think he had his nerve when he made it.  
While dealing out only a small amount of relief to people of modest 
incomes and to the small taxpayers of the country, Mr. Mellon certainly did 
propose to hand himself a nice, large, juicy portion. 
65 CONG. REC. 2614 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Jeffers). 
63 See id. at 3284 (remarks of Mr. Young), 2684, 3285 (remarks of Mr. 
Chindblom). 
When you appear now before one of these divisions of the committee on 
appeals and review you find yourself in the presence of a set of gentlemen 
who are, first, as representing the Treasury Department, selected for the 
purpose of getting all the taxes they can possibly lay against the taxpayer.  
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could be found in the experience with the Committee on Appeals and 
Review.  The Committee as it operated was a negotiation panel rather than 
a judicial tribunal.  Treasury’s only representative before the Committee 
was, in effect, the Committee members themselves.64  Although under the 
new plan it was anticipated that the proceedings would be adversarial and 
the Government would be represented before the Board by the Solicitor of 
Internal Revenue, an officer of the Justice Department,65 the taint of bias by 
Board members was not completely obviated. 
Another problem related to the Committee on Appeals and Review was 
the widespread belief that the Committee maintained a policy of resolving 
all doubts against the taxpayer.66  Under the procedure existing prior to the 
1924 Act, if the Committee ruled against the Income Tax Unit and in favor 
of the taxpayer, the Unit had no recourse to the courts to collect any 
additional taxes that it believed were due.  On the other hand, if the 
decision was in favor of the Government, the taxpayer could pay the tax 
and institute an action in the courts for refund.  Thus, the only way for the 
Bureau to get a day in court on a contested issue was to rule against the 
taxpayer in the first instance.  Some feared that the policy would continue 
with a new Treasury board even though the Mellon plan did provide an 
opportunity for judicial review of decisions in favor of taxpayers.67  It was 
probably their feeling that members of a Treasury dominated Board would 
be influenced by a natural reluctance to take another agency of Treasury to 
court. 
Finally, rumors abounded that a successful career in the Treasury 
Department would be aided by the collection of a large amount of tax.  
These rumors were officially denied, but they may have been believed by 
                                                                                                                       
They are the party in interest; they are the plaintiff and the prosecutor; they 
are the court and the jury.  When they have rendered their decision, they are 
the beneficiaries, the judgment or decree creditor, and they are the sheriff 
and the marshal making the execution and enforcing the collection; and 
what show has the taxpayer?  You might say that the members of the 
committee ought to be independent of their relations with the department.  
I am sure they are as fair to the taxpayer as they can be, but they know that 
their action will determine how much revenue the Government will get. 
Id. at 3285 (remarks of Mr. Chindblom). 
64 See id. at 2622, 3284 (remarks of Mr. Young); 1924 House Hearings, supra 
note 26, at 468. 
65 65 CONG. REC. 2622 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Young). 
66 For a typical example of such a charge and denial, see 1924 House Hearings, 
supra note 26, at 468; see also 65 CONG. REC. 3285 (1924) (remarks of Mr. 
Chindblom).  
67 See 65 CONG. REC. 3285 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Chindblom); 1924 House 
Hearings, supra note 26, at 466–67 (testimony of Edward Gore, American Institute 
of Accountants).  
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some, and if the Board was left in the Treasury it would always be subject 
to the charge that ambitious members would seek to gain favor for future 
promotions by deciding cases against taxpayers.68  In the final analysis, 
whether all such charges, fears and suspicions were well grounded was not 
the issue.  The proposal for the Board of Tax Appeals largely was motivated 
by popular concerns for adequate pre-assessment review.69  To assuage 
popular concern and assure that these things could not occur, it was 
necessary to put the Board beyond the immediate control of Treasury.70 
The first congressional body to consider the Mellon plan was the 25-
member Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives.  
Republicans, numbering 14, were a majority of the Committee, and all but 
one were in basic sympathy with the Secretary.71  As a result, the bill 
reported from Committee bore a great similarity to the Administration 
proposal.  Representative James W. Collier (Miss.), the second ranking 
Democrat on the Committee, later described its executive session 
deliberations: 
 
[W]hen it came to any material section of this bill I will never forget 
the maddening monotony of “Mr. Chairman, I move that the section 
as written in the draft be passed.” 
 
Did it pass, Mr. Chairman?  Does the shipwrecked mariner sigh 
for a peaceful haven?  Does the drooping flower open its petals to 
breathe the dew of heaven? [laughter.]72 
 
Nevertheless, the rate structure proposed in the bill did arouse 
opposition, and no majority of the entire Committee could be found for 
any single formula.  As a result, Chairman Green decided to exclude 
Democrats from Committee sessions and present the bill as a party 
measure.  Green, who himself was not in complete agreement with the 
Mellon plan rates, wanted to secure a bill that had reasonable prospects of 
                                                     
68 See 1924 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 469 (testimony of Edward Gore, 
American Institute of Accountants). 
69 See id. at 466–67. 
70 See 65 CONG. REC. 3285 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Chindblom); 1924 House 
Hearings, supra note 26, at 466–67.  As proposed and passed, the 1924 Act gave 
either party the right to institute court action after an adverse decision.  Thus, the 
Board could not foreclose the Government from further litigation by virtue of a 
decision in favor of the taxpayer.  See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
71 James A. Frear (R. Wis.) was considered a “radical.”  For a detailed 
description of the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1924, see ROY G. 
BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 223–50 (1940). 
72 65 CONG. REC. 2495 (1924). 
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success for passage in the full House and Senate.  In both of these bodies 
opposition to the Administration proposals was stronger than in the 
Committee.  But 11 of his Republican colleagues would not budge on the 
rate issue, and Chairman Green had to settle for a bill that made only four 
changes in the Mellon plan.  One of these changes involved making the 
Board of Tax Appeals independent of Treasury and, in view of the general 
intransigence of the Mellon supporters on the Committee, was indicative of 
the widespread distrust of a Treasury dominated Board.73 
As the bill was reported by the Committee, the Board was to be an 
independent body not within the Treasury Department.74  Appointments to 
the Board were to be made by the President and removal from the Board 
could only be for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  
The Chairman was to be designated biennially by the Board, not by the 
Secretary.  Finally, procedural rules of the Board and the selection of 
divisions and division chiefs were not to require approval of the Secretary. 
The amendments made by the Ways and Means Committee bearing on 
the independence of the Board were retained in the Act as it finally passed, 
and were augmented by two other amendments; one made on the House 
floor that required the advice and consent of the Senate to Presidential 
appointments to the Board,75 and the other made on the Senate floor that 
permitted the Board to make its own arrangements for housing, clerical 




The Administration proposal was vague on the subject of Board practice 
and procedure, providing only that 
                                                     
73 The other changes agreed to were:  (1) providing a 25% income tax rebate on 
1924 taxes; (2) defining earned income (for purposes of the earned income credit) 
as being all income below $5,000, but limiting earned income to $20,000; and (3) 
elimination of “nuisance” taxes in addition to the repeals suggested by the 
Administration. 
74 The bill as reported by Ways and Means did not specifically locate the Board 
in a particular branch of government; rather, it simply removed language from the 
Administration bill establishing the Board within Treasury. H.R. REP. NO 68-179, 
at 8 (1924).  Statutory language making the Board an agency in the executive 
branch was added by a Senate amendment.  65 CONG. REC. 7837 (1924). 
75 65 CONG. REC. 3285–86 (1924). 
76 As passed by the House, the bill required the Secretary to provide general 
administrative services for the Board.  Concerned that the Secretary might use this 
power to reduce the independence of the Board, the Senate permitted the Board to 
make its own arrangements if the Secretary did not “suitably” provide for these 
matters.  65 CONG. REC. 7837 (1924). 




[n]otice and an opportunity to be heard shall be given the taxpayer 
and the Commissioner by the Board and a decision shall be made as 
quickly as practicable.  The proceedings of the Board shall be 
informal and in accordance with such rules as the Board, with the 
approval of the Secretary, may prescribe.  The opinions of the Board 
(other than findings of fact) shall not be in writing unless the 
chairman so orders.  The findings of fact in each case shall be 
reported in writing.77 
 
The implication was that the proceedings were to be adversary because 
notice and an opportunity to be heard were required to be given to the 
Commissioner, as well as the taxpayer.78  In this sense, the proposal was a 
departure from preexisting practice of the Committee on Appeals and 
Review.  Another departure from preexisting practice was the requirement 
that Board’s findings of fact (but not opinions) be rendered in writing.  This 
was necessary in light of the new provision that factual findings of the 
Board were to be considered prima facie evidence in any further judicial 
proceedings.79  The procedural changes from past practice, however, were 
more apparent than real.  A central feature of the proposal was that the 
proceedings were to be informal, which was characteristic of practice before 
the Committee on Appeals and Review.  In Mellon’s view and in the view 
of his supporters on this question, informality of proceedings was necessary 
if the Board was to cope with its large work load in an expeditious 
manner—“[a] delay of justice is often a denial of justice, particularly in 
disputes involving large sums of money.”80  Because proceedings were to be 
informal, it probably also was true that they were to be closed to the public, 
like those of the Committee on Appeals and Review. 
The Ways and Means Committee, the Finance Committee, and the 
House were agreed that the need to expedite tax controversies was of 
foremost importance and accepted the Treasury proposal for informal 
proceedings conducted under rules adopted by the Board.81 As the bill 
moved through the Senate, however, the virtue of informality was 
                                                     
77 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(e). 
78 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (l924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 9 (1924).  But see 
infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text.  
79 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(d). 
80 65 CONG. REC. 2684 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Chindblom). 
81 See Revenue Bill of 1924, as reported by Senate Finance Comm. § 900(h).  
The Treasury had originally proposed that the rules adopted by the Board should 
be subject to the approval of the Secretary.  This provision was removed by the 
House Ways and Means Committee as part of the revision that removed the Board 
from the Treasury Department. 
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questioned on the ground that “[w]hat the taxpayer now wants from the tax 
board of appeals is quality of decision — not quantity.”82  In this view the 
absence of the requirement for formal procedure and written opinions was 
an invitation to arbitrary action.83  The Democratic minority of the Senate 
Finance Committee agreed with this criticism of the Administration 
proposal, and when the bill reached the Senate floor, Senators Jones (D. N. 
Mex.) and Walsh (D. Mont.) led a fight to amend the bill to conform Board 
proceedings more closely to those of a judicial body.84  Among the changes 
they proposed were removal of the reference to an informal procedure, 
insertion of a provision that the Board should prescribe its own rules of 
both procedure and evidence, and introduction of a requirement that all 
testimony before the Board be reduced to writing. 
Of equal interest to the advocates of judicial procedure was the need for 
provisions that would make Board proceedings and reports matters of 
public record.  The publicity proposals were part and parcel of the general 
controversy over tax information disclosure; it was hoped that in this way 
suspicions that had been generated concerning the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue would not carry forward to the Board. 
 
My contention is that whenever there is a controversy between the 
Government and a taxpayer which is being decided, the proceedings 
leading up to that decision should be public proceedings . . . . 
*       *      * 
To say that all that should be done in secret is obnoxious to every 
thing which we have been taught regarding judicial procedure as 
American citizens under our great system of jurisprudence . . . . 
[Proceedings and records should be] open to public inspections, so 
that we may understand the facts upon which decisions are reached, 
and the taxpayers in the country may have an opportunity to know 
just how it all happens.85 
 
It was argued that opinions, as well as findings of fact, should be in writing 
and that they should be published so the pressure of public scrutiny could 
be enlisted in aid of obtaining decisions based on sound reasoning.  
Publication would also aid formation of a body of precedent to guide the 
Bureau and taxpayers.86  Admittedly, such a procedure might reduce the 
                                                     
82 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 390 (statement of Frank Lowson, 
American Institute of Accountants). 
83 See id. at 389. 
84 65 CONG. REC. 8132–34 (1924). 
85 Id. at 8133 (remarks of Senator Jones); see also 1924 House Hearings, supra 
note 26, at 108. 
86 65 CONG. REC. 8133 (1924) (remarks of Senator Walsh). 
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quantity of cases that could be decided, but in contrast, it would also reduce 
erroneous decisions, which some saw resulting from the Income Tax Unit’s 
“rules forcing a quantity production.”87  The Senate insurgents won a total 
victory, and each of their proposals was incorporated in the bill as it passed 
the Senate.88 
What was the view of the Administration to these changes?  In the first 
place, it must be recognized that although Secretary Mellon was the 
dominant force in tax policy during this period, there were other officials 
who did not share his enthusiasm for the original proposal for the Board of 
Tax Appeals.  In particular, Nelson Hartson, Solicitor of Internal Revenue, 
and Charles D. Hamel, Chairman of the Committee on Appeals and 
Review, believed the whole concept for a Board of Tax Appeals was 
ill-advised.89 These officials believed that the replacement of the Committee 
on Appeals and Review by the Board would seriously jeopardize the 
expeditious handling of the pending 39,000 appeals that had been filed 
under § 250(d) of the 1921 Act90 and the additional appeals being currently 
filed, which numbered more than 150 per week.  The reasons for their 
foreboding were twofold.  In the first place, the Board was to have 
somewhat broader jurisdiction than the Committee.  The Committee had 
no responsibility for cases involving less than $2,500 or for estate tax 
controversies, but the Board, under the Administration proposal, was to 
have jurisdiction in both these categories.  Secondly, and of even greater 
significance, was the proposal that the factual findings of the Board be 
given prima facie weight in any subsequent judicial proceedings.  No such 
status was accorded to findings of the Committee.  The Board would thus 
be additionally burdened by a responsibility to make written factual findings 
of sufficient particularity and with a sufficient degree of care that would be 
accepted by the courts.  Accordingly, the productivity of the Board, even if 
a full complement of 28 members was appointed, would be substantially 
less than that which could be achieved by the Committee.91  The criticisms 
                                                     
87 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 390 (statement of Frank Lowson, 
American Institute of Accountants).  
88 65 CONG. REC. 8134 (1924). 
89 Memorandum from Charles D. Hamel to C.R. Nash, Ass’t to the Comm’r, 
May 5, 1924, National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record 
Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24 [hereinafter cited as Hamel 
Memorandum]; Memorandum from Nelson Hartson to Garrard B. Winston, 
Under Sec’y of the Treasury, April 30, 1924, National Archives Building, Records 
of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24. 
90 Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 265. 
91 The text of Chairman Hamel’s memorandum was as follows: 
At the present time the Committee on Appeals and Review has on hand 
approximately 1,900 cases.  For the week ending April 26 we received 211 
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by Chairman Hamel and Solicitor Hartson were made before the Senate 
took action to make Board proceedings even more cumbersome.  With the 
adoption of the Senate amendments, they had cause for even more alarm, 
and Solicitor Hartson concluded that the “Board as now provided for can 
not function satisfactorily,” and the “collection of the revenues will . . . be 
seriously interfered with . . . .”92 
                                                                                                                       
cases, and for the week ending May 3 approximately 277.  For the past 10 
weeks we have received an average of approximately 165 cases per week.  
As you know, there are in protest in the Unit at the present time 
approximately 39,000 cases.  A large part of those cases will ultimately find 
their way either to the Committee on Appeals and Review or to the Board 
of Tax Appeals, if created.  It should be remembered also that of the cases 
which the Committee now has on hand, and which it is receiving, [all] 
involve amounts of $2,500 or more.  Cases under that amount are being 
considered by the Special Committee.  We are working at top speed in the 
Committee and, for a considerable time, have been disposing of 
approximately 100 cases per week on an average.  This production is 
secured with a Committee of approximately twenty men.  The language of 
the provision relating to the proposed Board of Tax Appeals clearly 
contemplates that cases should be heard by divisions, consisting of three 
members.  It is also contemplated that the findings of the Board shall be 
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.  The procedure indicated is 
bound to slow up the production of cases.  The actual hearing of cases, with 
the provision here contemplated as to the findings of facts, will take a much 
longer time than is now taken and will also require more time on the part of 
members in the consideration of the records which may be made in 
connection with cases.  Taking into account only the income tax cases 
which may be before the Board, it is very likely that not more than eight of 
its divisions can hear and dispose of such cases.  If it may be assumed that 
each division may hear and dispose of ten cases a week, it would be able to 
dispose of only eighty cases a week.  As a practical matter when one 
contemplates the large amount of time that is bound to be taken in 
connection with some cases, I very seriously doubt whether the Board can 
dispose of more than fifty cases per week. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the cases are now coming up at 
the rate of 160 cases per week or more and it is my opinion that the number 
of cases per week will, for some time, increase rather than diminish.  The 
very creation of a Board, such as is contemplated, will tend to encourage 
appeals and thereby increase the number of cases to be heard. 
Hamel Memorandum, supra note 89. 
92 Memorandum from Nelson Hartson to Garrard B. Winston, Under Sec’y of 
the Treasury, May 21, 1924, National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury 
Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24.  The memorandum 
is quoted below: 
I believe as a practical matter the Board as now provided for can not 
function satisfactorily.  As now drawn the Bill provides that all appeals filed 
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Messrs. Hamel and Hartson were not, however, the only officials 
displeased with the emerging legislation.  Secretary Mellon himself was irate 
at congressional tinkering with his proposal, and on May 5, 1924, he wrote 
Chairman Reed Smoot of the Senate Finance Committee. 
 
The Board of Tax Appeals is to take over the work of the 
twenty-one members of the Committee on Appeals and Review.  
The Board will have more cases to pass on and a less informal 
practice, and, therefore, greater delay upon each case than at present 
. . . .  The amendments made to the bill ignore practical 
administration. Responsibility for the failure of the Board of Tax 
Appeals to meet the needs of the public and to protect the rights of 
the taxpayer and the Government must rest with Congress.  I am of 
the opinion that unless the Board is restored to somewhat its original 
form, the entire provision should be stricken out and the present 
practice, unsatisfactory as it may be, permitted to continue.93 
                                                                                                                       
under Sections 274, 313 and 317 shall be heard before this Board.  This 
jurisdiction is so broad as to permit of a case being taken to the Board on 
practically every controverted question pending in the Bureau. Twenty-eight 
men sitting in groups of three can not possibly decide cases with sufficient 
speed to permit of the satisfactory working out of the plan.  Substantial 
delays must occur when the Board is required to hold public hearings; to 
observe rules of evidence; to reduce the testimony to writing; and to report 
its findings of fact and decision in writing. The collection of the revenues 
will, I believe, be seriously interfered with because of the necessity for the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue to pass its cases through the long process of 
procedure on appeal before additional assessments can be made. It seems 
apparent that if an appeal is to be allowed a taxpayer, the production of the 
appellate body must be substantially equal to that of the auditing branches 
of the Bureau.  Unless the Board can keep up with the Bureau there will 
occur a vast accumulation of cases which will work seriously to the 
detriment of the Government and prompt and efficient administration of 
the law will be utterly impossible.  Considering that the present Committee 
on Appeals and Review, with a more restricted jurisdiction than that of the 
proposed Board of Appeals and with an informal procedure permitting of 
greater speed in the determination of cases, I fail to see how the proposed 
Board can begin to meet the task imposed upon it.  Under the proposed 
plan, findings of fact in each case are required to be in writing and are made 
prima facie evidence in court proceedings.  Bearing in mind the advantages 
afforded by the evidentiary presumption granted to the findings of the 
Board, both the taxpayer and the Commissioner would undoubtedly present 
the evidence in any case in great detail and insist upon voluminous findings 
of fact, thus greatly delaying final disposition of the case. 
93  National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 
56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24 [hereinafter cited as Mellon]. 




Reference in the Secretary’s letter to “less informal practice” and “greater 
delay” is somewhat obscure because it was not until three days after the 
date of his letter to Chairman Smoot that the Senate made the first 
substantial modification in the practice and procedure provisions of the 
bill.94  Perhaps Secretary Mellon was aware of the intended Jones-Walsh 
amendment and was attempting to forestall it.  Alternatively, he may have 
been displeased with the separation of the Board from the control of the 
Secretary of the Treasury and was using practice and procedure as a make-
weight argument to kill the provision entirely.  Despite the opposition 
fueled by the Jones-Walsh amendment, the House-Senate conference on 
the 1924 bill generally adopted the Jones-Walsh approach that Board 
proceedings be judicial in nature and subject to public inspection.  The only 
retrenchment was the limitation that in cases in which the amount in 
controversy was not more than $10,000, no written opinion would be 
required and testimony need not be reduced to writing.95  The conference 
recommendation was adopted by the House and Senate.96 
President Coolidge signed the Revenue Act of 1924 into law on June 2, 
1924.  However, he shared the views of those officers of the Treasury 
                                                     
94 65 CONG. REC. 8132–34 (May 8, 1924). 
95 H.R. REP. NO. 68-844, at 30 (1924). 
96 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337, provided:  
Notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be given to the taxpayer and 
the Commissioner and a decision shall be made as quickly as practicable.  
Hearings before the Board and its divisions shall be open to the public.  
The proceedings of the Board and its divisions shall be conducted in 
accordance with such rules of evidence and procedure as the Board may 
prescribe.  It shall be the duty of the Board and of each division to make a 
report in writing of its findings of fact and decision in each case, and a copy 
of its report shall be entered of record and a copy furnished the taxpayer.  If 
the amount of tax in controversy is more than $10,000 the oral testimony 
taken at the hearing shall be reduced to writing and the report shall contain 
an opinion in writing in addition to the findings of fact and decision.  All 
reports of the Board and its divisions and all evidence received by the Board 
and its divisions (including, in cases where the oral testimony is reduced to 
writing, the transcript thereof) shall be public records open to the 
inspection of the public.  The Board shall provide for the publication of its 
reports at the Government Printing Office in such form and manner as may 
be  best adapted for public information and use, and such authorized 
publication shall be competent evidence of the reports of the Board therein 
contained in all courts of the United States and of the several States without 
any further proof or authentication thereof.  Such reports shall be subject to 
sale in the same manner and upon the same terms as other public 
documents. 
70             The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
 
Department who felt that Congress had destroyed a good idea.  In a 
message delivered by the President at the time of signing, he stated: 
 
Criticism of the income tax and a large part of the dissatisfaction 
with it is the result of delay and uncertainty in the final determination 
of a taxpayer’s liability.  Taxes can usually be paid within a short time 
after the receipt of the income on which the tax is based without 
serious embarrassment.  The payment, however, of a large additional 
tax on income received several years previous and which may have 
since its receipt either been wiped out by subsequent losses or 
invested in nonliquid assets may force a taxpayer into bankruptcy 
and often causes financial sacrifice and hardship.  Provision should 
be made for the prompt and final determination of a taxpayer’s 
liability and such was the purpose in the suggestion for a Board of 
Tax Appeals. 
The provisions of the bill, however, with reference to the Board, 
make it in its essentials practically a court of record.  The Board is to 
be bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure.  In each case a 
formal record must be prepared and all oral testimony in cases 
involving more than $10,000 must be reduced to writing and an 
opinion in addition to the findings of fact and a decision must be 
written.  A taxpayer is entitled to appeal to the Board before any 
assessment can be made. . . . This Board of Appeals, . . . burdened 
with rules of procedure and evidence and forced to prepare a record, 
a finding of fact, and a decision in practically every case, will be 
unable to handle the business which will come to it.  The result will 
be greater delay in the final settlement of tax cases, and may 
ultimately result in the complete breakdown of the administrative 
machinery for the collection of taxes.97 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it can safely be said that the President’s 




A considerable amount of controversy attended those provisions of the 
Mellon plan dealing with the membership of the Board.  The 
Administration proposal specified a Board of between seven and 28 
                                                     
97 National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 
56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24 [hereinafter cited as Statement of President 
Coolidge]. 
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members, serving for ten year terms at salaries of $10,000 per year.98  To 
stagger members’ terms of office, the bill provided the Secretary to 
designate two, four, six, eight or ten-year terms for the initial appointees.99  
Appointments were to be made by the Secretary solely on the grounds of 
fitness for office, but no restrictions were placed on the Secretary in 
removing members from office. 
As part of the amendments making the Board an independent body, the 
Ways and Means Committee modified the bill to specify that members be 
appointed by the President rather than the Secretary,100 and that removal 
from office could only be for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.101  Some felt that additional assurance of an independent Board 
would be furnished by a requirement that Board appointments be subject to 
the advice and consent of the Senate.  The Ways and Means Committee had 
considered and rejected such an amendment “with almost complete 
unanimity,” fearing that the Board would become a “political football.”102  
Nevertheless, a majority of the House sided with the view that Senate 
consideration would prevent the appointment of individuals “subject to 
ulterior influences,”103 and the requirement of Senate approval was added 
on the House floor.104  All these amendments were retained in the final Act. 
In addition to the amendments bearing on the independence of the 
Board, amendments dealing with the number of Board members, their 
terms of office, their compensation, and the question of whether former 
members would be permitted to engage in a tax practice upon the 
expiration of their service, were the subject of some controversy. 
The Ways and Means Committee and the full House accepted the 
recommendation of the Administration with respect to the number of 
Board members and their terms of office.105  The House agreed that 
fluctuating membership between seven and 28 was desirable to take 
account of varying workloads that the Board would have.  It was felt that 
initially, because of the backlog of wartime taxes, especially the profits 
taxes, a large Board would be required, but as the backlog was discharged a 
smaller number of members would suffice.106 
                                                     
98 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(a). 
99 Id. 
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (1924). 
101 Section 900(a), 1924 Revenue Bill as reported by the Committee on Ways 
and Means to the House of Representatives, 65 CONG. REC. 3280–81 (1924). 
102 65 CONG. REC. 3285 (1924). 
103 Id. at 3286 (remarks of Mr. Larsen). 
104 Id. at 3285–86. 
105 H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (1924). 
106 See 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (testimony of A.W. Gregg); 
H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 45 (1924). 
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Some House members unsuccessfully objected to large Board 
membership on the ground that the upper limit would soon be reached and, 
in the nature of bureaucracies everywhere, would never be diminished.  The 
result would be an unnecessarily costly and cumbersome body perpetuated 
indefinitely.107  It was also argued that if the Supreme Court could function 
with nine members, no inferior judicial body should require more.108  These 
views had a more persuasive impact in the Senate Finance Committee, and 
the bill reported by it provided for a permanent Board of only seven 
members.  However, under the Committee bill, for the first two years the 
Board was to be composed of 28 members, a number believed sufficient to 
deal with the backlog.109  The terms of all 28 members were to expire two 
years after enactment of the 1924 legislation, and the seven members 
thereafter designated were to have staggered terms, with their successors 
having ten year terms.110  These provisions were adopted by the full Senate 
and became part of the Revenue Act of 1924.111 
The modifications reflected various attitudes toward both the Board and 
the federal income taxes.  Chairman Green was later to observe that 
Congress initially viewed the Board as something of an experiment;112 the 
limited tenure of the first members and the fairly small “permanent” size of 
the Board demonstrate this view. Additionally, in a nation that recently 
emerged from a costly war, there were many who believed the large and 
complex wartime taxes were merely an unpleasant, but temporary, necessity, 
and once the disputes arising from the measures were settled, income and 
profits taxes would become just a painful memory.  Evidence of this 
attitude could be found in the direction of Mellon policy, which was toward 
lower and lower taxes.  However, just as the Board came to be viewed as a 
successful experiment, future events established the income tax as an 
important and permanent part of the fiscal affairs of the nation.  The tax 
was not to become a truly mass tax until World War II, but the fact that its 
burden was mostly felt by persons of higher income did not result in the 
elimination of disputes arising under it.113 
                                                     
107 65 CONG. REC. 3283 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Blanton). 
108 Id. at 3288 (remarks of Mr. McKeown). 
109 S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 42 (1924). 
110 Id. at 42; H.R. 6715, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1000(b) (1924) as reported by 
the Senate Comm. on Finance. 
111 Ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336. 
112 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1926). 
113 See Part I, note 196 (indicating a steady increase in civil tax litigation in the 
federal courts).  As reflected in Appendix A, the volume of litigation in the Board 
dropped significantly after 1928; thereafter until the late 1970s, litigation levels 
before the Board and Tax Court remained relative stable.  Even with the advent of 
the mass income tax in World War II there was no startling increase in the number 
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A recurring problem of personnel management which drew attention 
during the consideration of the 1924 legislation involved the use by 
Government employees of their special knowledge and expertise for private 
gain.  As previously discussed, during and after World War I, the 
administration of federal taxes was in a state of considerable disarray.  The 
income and profits taxes were in their infancy, and the public at large had 
little reliable information on the policies and procedures of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue.  For this reason, former employees of the Bureau were 
able to command substantial fees for using their special information to aid 
clients involved in tax controversies before the Bureau.  With Bureau 
salaries and morale comparatively low, the opportunities of private practice 
encouraged a disruptively high turnover of personnel, and occasionally 
resulted in frauds being perpetrated.114 
Congressional reaction to these problems found expression in an 
amendment, offered by Congressman LaGuardia and adopted by the 
House, that barred former members of the Board, for a two-year period 
following the termination of their membership, from practicing before the 
Board, before any official of the Treasury, or with any firm of lawyers, 
accountants, or agents practicing before the Board or the Treasury.115  In 
the Senate, the provision was narrowed somewhat to only forbid practice 
by former Board members before the Board and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.116 
Secretary Mellon was very much opposed to the limitation on practice, 
on the ground that a two-year term, when combined with the practice 
limitations, would make it difficult to attract able individuals to the 
Board.117  This criticism had some impact; the conference committee and 
                                                                                                                       
of tax cases, although there has been a general upward trend.  The Tax Court’s 
caseload increased significantly in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, largely 
as a result of a spike in tax shelter litigation.  Case filings tapered off in the late 
1990s and hit historic lows at the turn of the century.  Thereafter, the volume of 
annual filings gradually returned the 30,000 range, where they currently remain.   
114 See generally Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 
21, 1924, at 36, 156. 
115 65 CONG. REC. 3286–87 (1924).  An effort was made by Representative 
Blanton to broaden the amendment to cover not only former Board members but 
also all former employees and officials of the Treasury Department.  Impetus for 
the broadened amendment came from disclosure that former Secretary of the 
Treasury McAdoo accepted a retainer of more than $100,000 with respect to a 
matter pending before Treasury when he was Secretary.  Although there was 
substantial support for the Blanton amendment, it was stricken as not germane. Id. 
116 S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 42–43 (1924). 
117 See Mellon, supra note 93. 
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Congress modified the restriction to apply only to members appointed 
following the terms of the original two-year members.118 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Administration bill was the 
annual salary of $10,000.  The Secretary and his supporters justified this 
relatively large amount ($2,000 more than circuit court judges and $2,500 
more than district court judges)119 on the ground that a substantial salary 
was necessary to attract and retain members of sufficient expertise and 
experience to creditably discharge the functions of the Board.  Government 
personnel problems had been particularly acute among the more skilled 
workers who could procure much higher compensation working for private 
interests.  The Committee on Appeals and Review was a case in point, and 
its members averaged just one year of service.120 The generous proposed 
salary was largely a response to this experience. 
On the other hand, there was substantial congressional opposition to 
the $10,000 figure.  Some outspoken opponents of the Administration held 
the view that the proposal envisioned a well-padded sinecure for friends of 
Secretary Mellon on an agency which would do little work to justify the 
expense.121  But even more moderate congressmen were disturbed by the 
prospect of paying Board members vastly more money than was currently 
paid to employees of the Bureau for substantially the same work.  For 
example, members of the Committee on Appeals and Review were 
receiving between $5,000 and $6,000, and other Bureau employees eligible 
for appointment to the Board were making as little as $2,000.  Salary 
increases of from 100 percent to 500 percent were felt by many to be 
unjustified.122  The fact that the Mellon plan called for higher salaries than 
those paid to most federal judges (including those sitting on appellate 
courts), to most state governors, and to all congressmen did little to help 
the Administration’s cause.123 Although some federal officials were 
receiving equivalent or larger salaries than that proposed for the Board 
(I.C.C. commissioners – $12,000; F.T.C. members – $10,000; Federal Farm 
Loan Board members – $10,000),124 the disparity between the proposed 
salary and that being paid to federal appellate judges was termed 
“inexcusable,” “contrary to the entire system,” and “perfectly ridiculous.”125 
                                                     
118 H.R. REP. NO. 68-844, at 30 (1924); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(c), 
43 Stat. 337. 
119 See 65 CONG. REC. 3283, 7694 (1924). 
120 Id. at 3285 (remarks of Mr. Chindblom). 
121 Id. at 3283 (remarks of Mr. Blanton). 
122 Id. at 3281–82, 7694. 
123 Id. at 3281, 3283, 7694. 
124 Id. at 3281. 
125 Id. at 3282, 7694. 
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Finally, some questioned the Administration’s premise that the 
compensation was justified in light of the expertise required of Board 
members.  It was noted that membership on the Board did not even require 
legal training or experience.  Senator Norris, for one, was of the opinion 
that a Board member required less skill than a judge of a court with more 
general jurisdiction. 
 
A district judge receives $7,500 a year and has to pass upon all kinds 
of litigation that comes before him . . . .  He has to be versed in all 
branches of jurisprudence and of law.  The members of the 
proposed tax court are going to become, after they have been 
educated by serving for a while, experts in tax matters only; they will 
have nothing else to do. 
The man who has the qualifications of a district judge possesses 
qualifications much superior to the qualifications necessary to fill one 
of these places, and the judge of a court of appeals more yet, so there 
is not anything involved in this work that requires a salary superior to 
that of our judges.126 
 
The progress of the salary provision through Congress was erratic.  The 
Ways and Means Committee reported the bill with a $10,000 salary.127  
Chairman Green strongly supported the provision on the House floor, 
contending that he would rather the Board be entirely eliminated from the 
bill than have a limitation on members’ salaries that would prevent its 
achieving the desired objective.128  Additional support for the $10,000 salary 
was voiced by Congressman Chindblom, who had been an outspoken 
opponent of tying the Board to the Treasury.  He argued that although no 
federal employee was being adequately compensated, that fact should not 
defeat equitable salaries for members of the new Board.129 Nevertheless, the 
full House was not sufficiently impressed with the necessity of the $10,000 
figure, especially when the Administration was taking a generally 
conservative position with respect to federal spending,130 and lowered the 
salary to $7,500.131 The Senate Finance Committee restored the $10,000 
salary,132 but Senator Norris led a floor fight to again reduce it to $7,500.133 
Chairman Smoot and Senator Jones, unlikely allies, combined forces to 
                                                     
126 Id. at 7695 (remarks of Senator Norris). 
127 H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (1924). 
128 65 CONG. REC. 3281–82 (1924). 
129 Id. at 3285. 
130 Id. at 3282–83 (remarks of Messrs. Garner and Blanton). 
131 Id. at 3285. 
132 S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 42 (1924). 
133 65 CONG. REC. 7694–95 (1924). 
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oppose the Norris amendment,134 but those favoring the lower salary 
prevailed.135 
Congressional amendments with respect to salary and limitations on 
practice by Board members disturbed Secretary Mellon as much as any of 
the other amendments and, along with the procedural changes, led him to 
request withdrawal of the whole Board idea. 
 
As the bill now stands in the Senate, the pay has been reduced to 
$7500, the term of office to two years, and there has been inserted a 
provision that no member of the Board may practice before the 
Board or the Treasury Department within two years after cessation 
of his employment as a member of the Board.  Under these 
conditions no capable lawyer would be willing to accept a position 
on the Board.  He would have only a short term, at moderate pay, 
and be deprived for two years after his term ceased from a profitable 
branch of practice in which he was particularly expert.  True, the 
Board could be filled, but only with indifferent or inexperienced 
members.  With such members the Board could not perform the 




In light of the importance of jurisdiction, it is somewhat surprising that 
little controversy was stirred by the rather restricted jurisdiction accorded 
the Board under the Administration proposal.  The Mellon plan provided 
for Board review only with respect to income, estate, and excess profits 
taxes, and only for such taxes imposed under the Revenue Acts of 1916–
24.137  There existed in 1924 a myriad of other internal revenue taxes,138 but 
                                                     
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 7695.  The Administration bill had also been generous with respect to 
per diem travelling expenses for Board members and employees.  It had provided a 
$10 allowance for members and an $8 allowance for other employees.  1924 
Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(h).  The usual per diem in other 
government agencies was $4, and Congress ultimately lowered the Administration 
provision to $7 for Board members and $4 for employees.  65 CONG. REC. 331, 
7837 (1924). 
136 Mellon, supra note 93. 
137 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, §§ 274, 279, 280, 308, 312, 316, 
1000(c).  The language of the statute was not clear that the Board was to have 
jurisdiction over deficiencies asserted under prior acts, providing only that taxes 
under such acts should be “assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and 
subject to the same provisions and limitations . . . as in the case of the taxes 
imposed by this title.”  Id. § 280.  The Board soon held that this provision was 
  Creation of the Board of Tax Appeals                   77 
 
 
since they raised comparatively little revenue and aroused practically no 
public interest, the Administration apparently felt that any questions 
concerning them were too insignificant to warrant pre-assessment review.139  
Congress agreed, and the only modification made with respect to 
reviewable taxes was the addition of gift tax controversies.140  That the 
Mellon bill did not provide for such review was perfectly understandable—
no gift tax was included in the Mellon plan, it was wholly a congressional 
creation in the Revenue Act of 1924 and was passed over the strenuous 
opposition of the Administration.141 
The jurisdiction of the Board under the Administration proposal and the 
ensuing legislation was further limited by the procedural requirements for 
obtaining Board review.  The Board was restricted to cases arising in one of 
two ways.  First and most important, the Board could hear taxpayer appeals 
filed in response to deficiency notices mailed by the Commissioner.142  
“Deficiency” was a term of art meaning generally, then as now, the excess 
of tax due over the amount conceded as due by the taxpayer.143  Second, the 
Board was given jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the 
Commissioner with respect to jeopardy assessments for which claims in 
abatement were filed by the taxpayer.144 
                                                                                                                       
sufficient to give it jurisdiction over such deficiencies when they were asserted after 
passage of the 1924 Act. Gutterman Strauss Co., 1 B.T.A. 243 (1924). 
138 Although the Revenue Act repealed many of the excise taxes that had been 
imposed by prior legislation, there remained a great many of these provisions, 
including taxes on tobacco, admissions, dues, automobiles, tires, cameras, coin 
operated machines, mahjong sets, artistic works, jewelry, corporate stock, boats, 
narcotics, and many other items and occupations.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 
Tit. IV–VII, 43 Stat. 316. 
139 See Dana Latham, Jurisdiction of the United States Board of Tax Appeals Under the 
Revenue Act of 1926, 15 CAL. L. REV. 199, 202 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Latham]. 
140 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 324, 43 Stat. 316. 
141 See statement of President Coolidge, supra note 97, at 1; 65 CONG. REC. 
3173 (1924). 
142 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 274(a).  Under the bill, the time for 
appeal was thirty days from the date the deficiency notice was mailed.  This period 
was extended to sixty days as the result of an amendment adopted on the House 
floor.  65 CONG. REC. 2969–70 (1924). 
143 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 273.  Then (as now) the definition 
of deficiency was somewhat more complex than is indicated above because account 
must be taken of situations in which prior deficiencies for the same year were 
assessed on the one hand, and taxes were rebated on the other.  Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, §§ 273, 307, 43 Stat. 296, 308 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6211). 
144 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, §§ 279, 312, as enacted, Revenue Act 
of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 279, 312, 43 Stat. 300, 310. 
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Authorization for jeopardy assessments, which formed a part of the 
Revenue Act of 1921,145 was continued in the 1924 Act as a means of 
immediately assessing a tax if collection would be jeopardized by delay.  
Under the 1924 Act, a jeopardy assessment could be made, either before or 
after the mailing of the deficiency notice and at any time before a final 
decision of the Board.146  If the taxpayer paid the assessment, the Board 
would lose jurisdiction to determine the correctness of the deficiency 
determination since the deficiency, if any, ceased to exist after payment.147  
However, the taxpayer could, in lieu of paying the assessment and pursuing 
his relief by way of refund litigation, file a claim in abatement which, if 
accompanied by a bond approved by the collector and in an amount not 
exceeding double the amount of the claim in abatement, would stay 
collection of the tax pending disposition of the claim.  If the Commissioner 
denied the claim, the taxpayer could, within 60 days of the mailing of the 
notice of denial of the claim, file an appeal with the Board contesting the 
denial.148 
Congress accepted virtually all aspects of the Administration proposal as 
to the jurisdiction of the Board.  The most significant change was a House 
floor amendment extending from 30 to 60 days the time within which a 
taxpayer could appeal a deficiency determination or the denial of a claim in 
abatement.149 
The limited jurisdiction of the Board stirred a small amount of 
Congressional debate.  Some felt that the proposal was unduly restrictive in 
limiting Board review to deficiencies and claims in abatement.  In the 
House, Congressman Jeffers argued for a Board of much broader 
jurisdiction than that proposed by the Administration. According to Mr. 
Jeffers, the Board should be a watchdog agency over the Bureau with an 
obligation to investigate, even on its own initiative, “anything like fraud, 
favoritism, gross error . . . and the board should have power to redetermine 
the tax in any such case. . . .”150  If adopted, the Jeffers proposal would have 
substantially broadened Board powers from adjudication to include 
investigation and prosecution of a wide range of abuses.  Had his 
suggestions been adopted, it is probable the Board would not have been 
able to carry on, as efficiently as it did, the determination of tax 
                                                     
145 Ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265. 
146 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(d), 308(d), 43 Stat. 297, 309. 
147 Cf. Everett Knitting Co., 1 B.T.A. 5 (1924).  But see California Associated 
Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 
(1925); California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 314 (1925).  
148 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 279, 312, 43 Stat. 300, 310. 
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controversies.  This proposal did not attract any significant support, even 
though substantial anti-Bureau sentiment prevailed in Congress. 
In the Senate some support was marshaled for a different sort of 
broadening of the proposed jurisdiction.  In hearings before the Finance 
Committee and on the floor of the Senate, proposals were made to grant 
Board jurisdiction in proceedings involving refund claims as well as 
deficiencies.  Thus, taxpayers who had already paid a disputed tax could 
seek refund in the Board as well as in district court and the Court of 
Claims.151  The arguments in favor of providing refund jurisdiction to the 
Board were not insubstantial.  A principal objective of the Board was to 
provide a more expeditious and less costly remedy than was available in the 
other courts, and some saw little reason why Board review should be 
granted to taxpayers who had not yet paid a disputed tax and withheld from 
those who had.152  Senator McKellar proposed an amendment that would 
have extended refund jurisdiction to the Board in cases involving more than 
$10,000, and had it been adopted, the structure of tax litigation might have 
developed very differently. Under the proposal, claims for refund of more 
than $10,000 were to be referred to the Board automatically, and the 
Board’s finding would be binding on Treasury.153  The amendment was 
strongly opposed by Senator Smoot, chairman of the Finance Committee, 
on the ground that it would increase the Board’s caseload by 5,000,000 
cases.  Senator McKellar was more than a little incredulous about this figure 
because there were only 4,300,000 taxpayers in the country, the vast 
majority of whom did not earn $10,000 a year, much less pay disputed tax 
of that amount.  Senator Smoot’s figure indicated that refund claims had 
been filed totaling more than $50 billion.  Yet, between 1913 and 1924 
internal tax revenues totaled only $29 billion. Nevertheless, Senator Smoot 
was adamant about the figure, and the amendment was withdrawn.154  The 
exchange between Senators Smoot and McKellar is an instructive example 
of one type of debating technique: 
 
Mr. SMOOT.  I do not think that even the Senator will ask that . . . 
[expansion of Board jurisdiction] be agreed to when he knows what 
it means. 
                                                     
151 Under the Administration proposal, the Board did not have jurisdiction 
over a tax that had been paid.  Even if Board jurisdiction had been properly 
invoked upon the mailing of a deficiency letter, any payment of the disputed tax 
prior to a decision of the Board would strip it of power to decide the case. This 
aspect of the proposal was continued in the final Act.  See Northwestern Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925). 
152 See 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 343, 389. 
153 65 CONG. REC. 7696 (1924). 
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Mr. MCKELLAR.  I think I do know what it means. 
Mr. SMOOT. This is what it means:  It means that instead of 
having 28 judges we will have over 300 judges.  We have over 
5,000,000 claims pending now, and if they are all to go — 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  Mr. President, it relates only to claims of over 
$10,000.   
Mr. SMOOT.  I know that it relates to claims of over $10,000. 
Could 400 judges handle it? I am sure we would have to have at least 
300 before the expiration of the time fixed in the amendment.  I 
know the Senator has not studied the question.  In fact, when I 
looked at it myself first I did not know how many claims there were. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  How many claims did the Senator say there 
were? 
Mr. SMOOT.  Over 5,000,000. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  Of over $10,000 each? 
Mr. SMOOT.  Of over $10,000. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  In taxes? 
Mr. SMOOT.  These claims 
Mr. MCKELLAR. I asked the Senator’s assistant, the gentleman 
from the Treasury Department, to give me the facts and he said he 
could not do it, that it would take him some time to find them. 
Mr. SMOOT.  That was as to claims and abatements.  That is quite 
different from this amendment.  This amendment relates to any 
claim, refund, or abatement. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  There are how many? 
Mr. SMOOT.  Over 5,000,000. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  Above $10,000? 
Mr. SMOOT.  Above $10,000. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  That involves quite a large amount of money. 
Mr. SMOOT.  It certainly does. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  Five million claims of over $10,000 each? I am 
sure the Senator can not be accurate in his statement. 
Mr. SMOOT.  All I know is that I have been informed by the 
department, since reading the amendment, that that is the fact.  I 
asked for the information, and that is what they told me. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  Has the Senator any information he can put in 
the RECORD from the department that there are over — did the 
Senator say 10,000,000? 
Mr. SMOOT.  Five million. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  That there are more than 5,000,000 claims of 
over $10,000 each? 
Mr. SMOOT.  We can get the information for the Senator by 
tomorrow.  
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Mr. MCKELLAR.  I ask to be allowed to have the amendment go 
over until we can get the facts.  
Mr. SMOOT.  There is no necessity of that.  If there were half that 
number, we have not enough judges.  We are not going to provide 
200 judges. 
Mr. OVERMAN.  The Senator certainly did not mean 5,000,000 
claims? 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  That would mean $50,000,000,000 — 
Mr. SMOOT.  I do not mean that. 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  I am sure the Senator could not mean that. 
Mr. SMOOT.  I do not mean in dollars at all; I mean in claims. 
*  *  *  *  * 
Mr. MCKELLAR.  If there were 5,000,000 claims of $10,000 each 
in taxes, it would be something so stupendous that the mind of man 
could hardly conceive it.  I am sure the Senator from Utah [Mr. 
SMOOT], who is generally accurate and who accused me of not 
knowing what my amendment meant, has his facts sadly mixed on 
this proposition.  I challenge him to bring the facts from the 
Treasury Department.  The Treasury Department can give them. 
Mr. SMOOT.  I have already stated to the Senator that I have not 
made a personal examination into those claims, and no one else has 
done so outside of the Treasury Department; but the Treasury 
Department officials tell me that there are over 5,000,000 claims 
which would be affected by this amendment.  It is impossible to 
have enough judges to handle those claims.  Of course, there is 
nothing to many of the claims.  There probably is nothing to 98 per 
cent of them.  But the taxpayers have a right to file claims.  They 
make the claims, and I refer to claims to abatement as well. 
For the reasons I have given, I hope the amendment will not be 
agreed to. 
 
5. Effect of Board Decision 
 
A key feature of the Administration proposal provided that Board 
decisions were only final on the issue of summary assessment, and not with 
respect to the question of liability.  Thus, the Government, if it lost before 
the Board, could not summarily assess additional tax; however, the 
Government could, within one year, commence a court action for 
collection of any amount disallowed as a deficiency by the Board.155  
Conversely, if the Government prevailed before the Board, the deficiency 
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would be immediately assessed and collected.156  Although the taxpayer 
could not directly appeal the Board decision to a higher court, he could file 
a claim for refund.  If the claim was either denied or was not acted on 
within six months, the taxpayer could then commence a refund action in a 
district court or the Court of Claims.157  In any further court proceedings, 
the Board’s decisions were to be taken as prima facie evidence of the facts 
found by the Board.158 
Since Mellon envisioned a Board that would conduct informal hearings, 
it was entirely appropriate that its decisions should not be appealable but 
rather should be subject to collateral review. However, in light of the 
congressional amendments, particularly those with respect to practice and 
procedure, it is somewhat surprising that serious consideration was not 
given to making Board decisions final with a right of appeal.  Nevertheless, 
no such modification was advanced, and the Mellon proposal on this point 
was adopted by Congress virtually without change. 
A Senate amendment was added to the bill that, if retained in the final 
Act, would have substantially changed the effect of Board decisions that 
were adverse to the taxpayer.  The amendment, introduced by Senator Reed 
of Missouri, put the initiative with the Government to collect disputed 
deficiencies.  If the Board determined a deficiency, the tax would be 
assessed and the taxpayer notified thereof.  Within 30 days of the mailing of 
the notice, the taxpayer could file a statement admitting so much of the 
deficiency as he felt was due.  If the deficiency determined by the Board 
exceeded this amount, the Government could collect the excess only by 
commencing a district court action that the taxpayer could defend on 
substantive grounds.  Interest of six percent would be added by the court to 
any judgment affirming a deficiency, and a penalty of 25% could be added if 
the court found the taxpayer’s defense to be frivolous.  The Government 
could apply to the district court for security to be given by the taxpayer if 
reasonable grounds existed for believing that collection of any judgment 
rendered for the Government would be jeopardized by the fraudulent or 
wrongful act of the taxpayer.159 
Senator Reed of Missouri, who introduced the amendment, admitted 
that he had drawn it before he knew of the proposal for a Board of Tax 
Appeals.160  Nevertheless, the Senate adopted it to enable the House-Senate 
                                                     
156 Id. 
157 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014, 43 Stat. 343; H.R. REP. NO. 68-
179, at 8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 42 (1924).  
158 1924 Administration Bill, supra note 6, § 1000(d), as enacted, Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337. 
159 65 CONG. REC. 8108–09 (1924). 
160 Id. at 8114. 
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conference to study the proposal and consult Treasury.161  In fact, the only 
true advocate of the proposal was Senator Reed.  The provision was excised 
by the conference,162 so the amendment itself was not of great importance. 
The debates, however, illustrated congressional suspicion of the Board. 
The proposal was intended to cure what Senator Reed saw as the 
existing evil of the power of Treasury to make an ex parte assessment of 
additional tax, long after the close of the taxable period.  This assessment 
could force an individual or a business, unprepared for the additional tax, 
into bankruptcy or subject it to distraint on its property without a chance to 
have a court hearing on the issue.  The amendment was to give the taxpayer 
his day in court.163  The principal argument against the Reed amendment 
was that the Board of Tax Appeals would solve the problem.  Senator Reed, 
however, did not see the Board’s hearing as the equivalent of a day in court 
and apparently did not believe that the Board would be truly independent. 
 
If the board works as perfectly as my friend from Utah (Senator 
Smoot) hopes it will, the taxpayer would in very few instances be 
obliged to go to court; but if it does not work perfectly, and if the 
taxpayer is really aggrieved, he will have his day in court according to 
the rules of law and evidence; otherwise he is remitted merely to the 
decision of a subdivision of a board created in the Treasury 
Department out of such material as they may be able to get, and that 
board is quite as likely to err as the boards that were voluntarily set 
up without any particular law or any law whatever to warrant their 
creation.164 
 
The provision was also seen as having a certain salutary effect on the 
Board’s deliberations.  Knowing that the case would go to court if they 
decided against the taxpayer, Board members might be more likely to be 
fair and just, rather than assuming an arbitrary position toward the 
taxpayer.165 
Although Senator Reed alone defended the amendment, it is apparent 
that others shared some of his views on the Board.166  This attitude was 
understandable since the Board was an untried body that in its initial 
conception was merely a successor to the Committee on Appeals and 
Review.  This same skepticism led to the more constructive amendments 
that secured the Board’s independence from the Treasury (an amendment 
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of which Senator Reed was apparently unaware) and provided a more 
formalized procedure.167 
 
D. The Board from 1924–1926 
 
When its first members assembled to be sworn in on July 16, 1924, there 
was considerable uncertainty as to both the Board’s prospects for success 
and the support it would receive from the Administration and Congress.  
President Coolidge had signed the Revenue Act of 1924 into law on June 2, 
1924, but he did so with serious reservations.  In the view of his 
Administration, the Board was to be created for the purpose of moving the 
review function from the Bureau to the Treasury Department.  Congress, of 
course, went much further than this and, in the words of President 
Coolidge, made the Board “in its essentials practically a court of record.”168  
The President felt that these changes would so burden the Board with 
procedural, evidentiary, and other formalistic rules that it would be unable 
to cope expeditiously with its expected caseload.  “The result will be greater 
delay in the final settlement of tax cases, and may ultimately result in the 
complete breakdown of the administrative machinery for the collection of 
taxes.”169  Not surprisingly, the President’s views were shared not only by 
Secretary Mellon170 and A.W. Gregg, special assistant to Secretary Mellon,171 
but also by Administration supporters on the Hill.172  The same view was 
reiterated more moderately by Under Secretary of the Treasury, Garrard B. 
Winston, at the organizational meeting at the Board on July 16, 1924.  He 
warned that “there is great danger that . . . [the] Board may be 
overwhelmed” because of its formalistic procedure and therefore urged the 
new members to organize quickly under rules that would permit the speedy 
settlement of cases.173 
                                                     
167 See supra notes 55–97 and accompanying text. 
168 See Statement of President Coolidge, supra note 97.  
169 Id. 
170 Mellon, supra note 93. 
171 Undated statement of A.W. Gregg, c. 1924, National Archives Building, 
Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–
24.  
172 65 CONG. REC. 9540 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Mills); see also id. at 9545 
(remarks of Mr. Tilson).  
173 Treasury Department, press release, July 16, 1924, National Archives 
Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax 
Appeals 1923–24 [hereinafter cited as Winston Press Release].  
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Of course, many people disagreed with these appraisals and felt that the 
Board had been strengthened by the amendments.174  Indeed, some even 
believed that Congress had not gone far enough and that the Board should 
have been made, in all respects, a court.175  Oddly enough, within a little 
more than a year, the very same Administration that had excoriated 
Congress for legislation that might lead to the breakdown of tax 
administration was to admit the error of its ways and to urge Congress to 
take additional steps to make the Board a court.176 
There were also those who believed that creation of the Board of Tax 
Appeals, no matter how constituted, would do little to relieve the 
fundamental problems of tax administration.  In the view of these 
observers, only improved performance by the Bureau could solve the 
problem, and such improvement would obviate the need for the Board.177  
They perceived the complexity of the law and the inefficiency and 
arbitrariness created by the personnel policies of the Bureau as the real 
culprits in the tax administration crisis.  Unless these problems were solved, 
creation of the Board would achieve little good.  Thus, Chairman Green of 
the Ways and Means Committee supported the Board only because he felt 
the proposed $10,000 salary would be sufficient to attract and hold 
competent personnel.  He did not regard the other aspects of the proposal 
as likely to relieve the problem and took the position that if the 
recommended salary for Board members was reduced he would favor 
eliminating the Board entirely.178 
To a large extent, these critics failed to appreciate the limited objective 
of the Board.  It was not intended by itself to solve all the problems 
associated with tax administration.  A more realistic appraisal of the Board’s 
function was given by its first Chairman, Charles D. Hamel. 
 
It must not be expected that the Board can in itself reduce or remove 
the complexities that are inseparable from the administration of any 
tax law similar to the laws which have been enacted since the 
adoption of the 16th Amendment.  It will afford an independent 
tribunal for the consideration of questions which grow out of a valid 
difference of opinion as to the correctness of the findings of the 
                                                     
174 See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 3284 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Young); id. at 9544 
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Bureau of Internal Revenue in any given case, and to that degree it 
will assist in the equitable and just collection of the tax and ensure 
that the rights of the taxpayer are duly protected and observed.179 
 
In the first hectic months following its creation, the Board moved toward 
fulfilling this objective. 
 
1. Selection of Members 
 
The first step in organizing the Board was the selection of its members.  
The Revenue Act of 1924 did not specify the qualifications for Board 
membership; it merely directed that selection be based “solely on the 
grounds of fitness to perform the duties of the office.”180  On July 2, 1924, 
President Coolidge selected the first 12 members of the Board.181  Seven 
were “from the public” and five were “from the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.”182  
 
From the Public: 
Adolphus E. Graupner (R) 
J.S.Y. Ivins (R)    
John M. Sternhagen (R)  
Sumner L. Trussell (R)   
John D. Marquette (D)   
W.C. Lansdon    
A.E. James (R)    
 
From the Bureau:  
Charles D. Hamel (R)   
Jules Gilmer Korner, Jr. (R) 
Benjamin H. Littleton (D)  
Charles P. Smith (R)   
Charles M. Trammell (D)  
 
California 














The Board members met for the first time on July 16, 1924, in the office 
of Under Secretary Winston, where they took the oath and officially 
assumed office.183  Congress was not then in session, so the Senate could 
                                                     
179 Letter from Charles D. Hamel to Carlyle S. Baer, dated December 29, 1924, 
pp. 22–23, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1924: Memoranda and 
Correspondence.” 
180 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336. 
181 N.Y. Times, July 3, 1924, at 8, col. 3. 
182 See Winston Press Release, supra note 173. 
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not confirm the nominations, but pursuant to a concurrent resolution of 
the House and Senate approved June 3, the new appointees could be 
compensated for services rendered prior to Senate approval.184 
The political affiliation of the first members is noted parenthetically in 
the same manner used by Secretary Mellon when he recommended the 
appointment of these individuals to President Coolidge.185 Of course, party 
affiliation was not a statutory criterion of appointment, but it should not be 
surprising that Presidents have tended to select appointees for the Board 
and the Tax Court from the ranks of their own parties. 
Occasionally political and professional considerations merged in the 
selection (or non-selection) of members.  In 1929, Mr. Walter S. Hallanan, 
then a member of the Republican National Committee, wrote Secretary 
Mellon concerning a prospective appointee. 
 
I have learned that Mr. L.S. Echols of Charleston, W. Va., is 
endeavoring to secure appointment as a member of the Board of Tax 
Appeals. 
Mr. Echols has only recently been deposed here as postmaster of 
the City of Charleston upon the recommendations of Senator Goff, 
Senator Hatfield and myself.  He has consistently opposed the 
Republican ticket and I feel that it would be most unfortunate for 
him to have any recognition from the administration at Washington. 
Mr. Echols was formerly employed in my office during my term 
as State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia.  He has no particular 
capacity for this work and, aside from this fact, is indolent and 
entirely lacking in any elements of aggressiveness. 
I am writing this letter with a view to calling your attention to the 
matter and protesting against any favorable consideration being 
given to the application which I understand has been filed by Mr. 
Echols.  I am sure that both United States Senators from West 
Virginia feel the same way concerning him.  Any appointment given 
him would operate to place a premium on party infidelity.186 
 
  
                                                     
184 N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1924, at 2, col. 4. 
185 Letter, July 2, 1924, National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury 
Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24. 
186 May 2, 1929, National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, 
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On March 18, 1925, an additional four members were appointed:187 
 
William R. Green, Jr. 
Percy W. Phillips 
Logan Morris 
William D. Love 
Iowa 




A mild flurry of protest accompanied the naming of these members.  
Mr. Green was the son of Chairman Green of the Ways and Means 
Committee; Mr. Love was a former law partner of Representative Garner, 
ranking Democrat on Ways and Means; Mr. Morris was a former secretary 
to Senator Smoot, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee; and Mr. 
Phillips was recommended by Senator Wadsworth, a member of the 
Finance Committee.  Some smelled a political deal in the appointments, but 
because no one disputed the qualifications of the new appointees and 
because Chairman Green and Representative Garner frequently disagreed 
with the Administration over tax policy, the controversy quickly subsided 
and the nominations were confirmed by the Senate on the same day they 
were announced.188 
The additional four appointments brought the total membership of the 
Board to 16, but almost immediately, Chairman Hamel resigned189 for 
reasons of health and inadequate compensation.190  In August, 1925, C.R. 
Arundell of Oregon was appointed, but Mr. Ivins resigned one month 
thereafter and Board membership remained at 15 until 1926.191 
The 1924 Act authorized a membership of up to 28 for two years, and it 
seems clear that initially it was contemplated the Board would be at full 
authorized membership.192  That this did not come to pass seems to have 
been the result of two factors.  First, the short two-year term of office for 
the initial members, combined with a relatively low rate of compensation, 
made it difficult to recruit qualified personnel.  Second, it quickly became 
apparent that although a Board of 28 members could hear more cases than 
a smaller body, a large number of members would make the work of the 
Board unwieldy.  Until July of 1926, the entire Board reviewed all decisions 
                                                     
187 N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1925, at 4, col. 6. 
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189 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 864 (testimony of Chairman 
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190 Id. at 922 (testimony of Mr. Hamel). 
191 2 B.T.A. iii. 
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before their promulgation.193  The purpose of this practice was to assure a 
high degree of uniformity to Board precedents.194  This was considered a 
very important feature of the Board, and it was felt that a body considerably 
larger than 15 or 16 could not practicably review all cases decided by the 
members.195  The questions of the appropriate qualifications of members, 
the composition of the Board, and the selection procedure were the subject 
of considerable interest in 1924 and later years.196  It will be recalled that a 
central issue in the legislative evolution of the 1924 Act was the selection 
procedure.  The Administration proposed that members be selected by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. As part of the congressional amendments 
designed to assure an independent Board, this authority was given instead 
to the President.  Nevertheless, the Treasury Department played a major 
role in the selection of the first Board members.  Solicitations and 
recommendations for appointment were referred to Secretary Mellon and 
his subordinates.197  On July 2, 1924, the date on which the President 
announced the first appointments, Secretary Mellon sent a letter to the 
President listing twelve individuals “whom you may desire to appoint.”198  
These twelve individuals in fact comprised the original appointments.  
Additionally, evidence exists that the Bureau of Internal Revenue itself had 
some influence in the selection of members.199 
                                                     
193 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 861 (testimony of Chairman 
Korner).  After June 1926, the Board became more selective in the cases it would 
review.  See B.T.A. Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
194 J. Gilmer Korner, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 642, 
643 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Korner]. 
195 J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress do with the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 391 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ivins]. 
196 Board of Tax Appeals Prepares for Early Hearings, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 247–
48 (1924). 
197 See generally letters dated 1924–29, National Archives Building, Records of 
the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–32. 
198 National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 
56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24. 
199 See, e.g., Memorandum from Under Secretary of the Treasury Winston to 
Commissioner Blair, August 1, 1924, National Archives Building, Records of the 
Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of Tax Appeals 1923–24.  
Robert S. Lovett, at present one of the Assistant Attorney Generals, wants 
to be a member of the Board of Tax Appeals.  I attach a statement of his 
qualifications.  I think he would make an ideal type of man . . . .  Will you 
remember to bring his name up, particularly when we are considering the 
balance of the members? 
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The part played by the Treasury in the selection process was widely 
known200 and, in some circles, disapproved.  Accountants were particularly 
distressed, and Edward Gore, president of the American Institute of 
Accountants, wrote President Coolidge in September, 1924, arguing that the 
legislative history of the 1924 Act indicated that Treasury should have no 
influence in the selection of Board members.  He warned that the public 
would lose confidence in the new agency if such influence persisted.201  
Treasury’s answer to this criticism was that the Board was an independent 
agency and its members, in discharging their duties, would not be affected 
by the selection procedure.202 
Treasury might have added that although Congress removed the direct 
authority of the Secretary to appoint Board members, it did not prohibit the 
President from consulting the Secretary and giving whatever weight he 
desired to the Secretary’s recommendations. Moreover, because Treasury 
was virtually the only government agency having direct contact with tax 
experts, that Department was the most obvious source of information on 
the competence of proposed members. 
It is likely that most of those who objected to Treasury’s influence in the 
selection of members were really concerned about the experience and 
professional background of the persons selected rather than the selection 
process.  Soon after the enactment of the 1924 legislation, a controversy 
erupted over whether persons who had served at Treasury or the Bureau 
should be eligible for appointment.  Some felt that such experience would 
give an anti-taxpayer bias that would be inconsistent with the duties of the 
Board; others felt that a Treasury background was virtually a sine qua non 
for having the degree of expertise necessary for Board membership.203  The 
controversy reached the White House, and the President attempted a 
compromise by appointing five members from the Bureau and seven from 
the public.  The compromise, however, did little to appease those who did 
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not want former Treasury people on the Board.204  While it was true that 
only five appointees came to the Board directly from service with the 
Bureau, of the remaining seven, three had been Bureau employees before 
entering the private sector,205 and two others had been employed by State 
taxing agencies.206  Adding salt to the wound, the first chairman of the 
Board, Charles D. Hamel, had up to the time of his appointment been 
chairman of the Bureau’s Committee on Appeals and Review.  At the 
organization meeting of the Board on July 16, Under Secretary Winston 
suggested Hamel’s election as chairman.207  No other nominations were 
made and Hamel was unanimously elected.208  It was rumored that the 
appointees had to give assurances that they would support Hamel for 
chairman in order to gain appointment. 
Because the Board was conceived to protect taxpayers from arbitrary 
Bureau action, domination of the Board by former employees of the 
“oppressor” was particularly irksome.  The Treasury and the Board strove 
to dispel the notion that the Board was “pro-Government,” but the idea 
persisted.  The New York Times editorialized in favor of selecting for 
membership “those who have to obey the law rather than . . . those who 
administer it.”209  The same sentiment was expressed more colorfully by a 
Toledo attorney in a letter to C. Bascom Slemp, Secretary to President 
Coolidge. 
 
[I]t is not possible to cure a sheep killing dog by tying a ribbon 
around his neck nor . . . is [it] possible to reform a tax hound by 
giving him a position of apparent independence of the Bureau.210 
 
Another source of dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that, with one 
exception (Lansdon), all the Board appointees were lawyers. Today it is 
taken for granted that a necessary qualification for appointment to the Tax 
Court is a legal background, but the situation in 1924 was considerably 
different.  In the first place, throughout the early years of the income and 
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profits taxes, accountants had dominated tax practice.211  Second, the 
members of the Committee on Appeals and Review were in large part 
accountants and engineers.  The Board was perceived by many as a 
successor to the Committee, and it was not understood why the 
membership of the Board was almost exclusively drawn from the bar. 
During this period, accounting organizations actively petitioned for the 
selection of accountants and engineers to the Board.212  Lawyers were 
criticized as being both overly technical and insufficiently grounded in 
practical experience with commercial transactions and practices.213  That 
these petitions went unheeded probably should not be attributed to 
anti-accountant sentiment at Treasury.  The presence of several non-lawyers 
on the Committee on Appeals and Review until its dissolution in 1924 
indicates that no such bias existed.  As a matter of fact, had Congress 
adhered to the Administration proposal in creating the Board, it is likely 
that lawyer dominance would not have developed. As much was said by 
Secretary Mellon when he wrote that 
 
the original recommendations for a Board of Tax Appeals 
contemplated an administrative body somewhat of the character of 
the board of referees which handles British income tax matters.  
Such a board properly would be made up of lawyers, accountants, 
and business men and would adjust tax questions with the taxpayers 
in a commonsense way around the table.  Congress, however, 
modified the proposal by creating a court in which taxes are to be 
litigated.  The requirements for membership on a court are 
knowledge of the law, experience in litigation, and appreciation of 
the value of evidence.  The training of a member of the court, 
therefore, should be essentially legal.214 
 
It is unlikely that these words did much to soothe the outraged sensibilities 
of the accountants. 
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The prognosis for the Board in the summer and fall of 1924 was 
gloomy.  In addition to the dissatisfaction of the Administration with the 
type of body Congress had created, large segments of the accounting 
profession, and to a lesser extent, the legal profession, were displeased by 
the close connection of the first Board members with Treasury, the 
influence of Treasury in their selection, and the absence of accountants, 
engineers, and businessmen from the Board.  Undoubtedly the first 
members of the new agency were well aware that if they fell behind with 
their caseload, Treasury could argue that it was correct all along in urging 
the creation of an informal hearing agency rather than a quasi-judicial body.  
The probable result would be a drastic change in the character of the Board.  
Moreover, if the Board permitted the appearance of Treasury bias in its 
proceedings or decisions, taxpayer representatives would be up in arms and 
the Board’s continued existence would be jeopardized.  In short, the Board 
was confronted with a situation in which it had to prove itself to a disgusted 
Treasury and a suspicious public. 
 
2. Rules of Practice and Procedure 
 
Describing the status of the Board on the date its first 12 members were 
sworn in, Chairman Korner stated: 
 
At that time there was nothing in the way of a board except the 
members who were just sworn in.  We had no quarters, no furniture, 
no cases, and no business.  We had nothing, and the first thing to do 
was to get quarters.  Tentative arrangements had been made for that 
purpose and soon after organization a lease was signed and we went 
into quarters in the Investment Building at Fifteen and K Streets.  I 
might say that under the act the commissioner began sending out the 
so-called statutory deficiency letters very soon after the passage of 
the act.  The board was not organized, as you will note, until about 
six weeks after the passage of the act. We realized that there were a 
great many taxpayers who did not know where to send their appeals 
and that they would be denied relief and the right of appeal unless 
they were forthwith instructed and given information as to how and 
where such appeals should be prepared and sent. 
Accordingly, the most urgent thing for us was the question of 
procedure, more particularly with reference to the style and manner 
of bringing appeals.  Therefore, we went to work and organized 
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ourselves into committees at once and started to work out our 
procedure.215 
 
The Board set to work formulating its procedural rules on July 17, 
1924,216 and after only ten days of “almost continuous session”217 its first 
rules of practice and procedure were released.218  The new rules, numbering 
26, covered nine printed pages and dealt with the essential subjects:  
eligibility to practice, pleadings, briefs, motions, hearings, subpoenas, 
testimonial and documentary evidence, depositions, written interrogatories, 
and stipulations.  Included in the rules were forms suggested by the Board 
for petitions, applications for admission to practice, subpoenas, and orders 
to take depositions. 
In formulating the rules, the most important policy question that the 
Board had to consider was whether practice should be formal or informal.  
The statute was specific as to certain matters:  notice and an opportunity for 
a hearing had to be afforded taxpayers and the Commissioner; hearings 
were required to be open to the public, and reports of the Board and 
evidence received by the Board were to be public records; findings of fact 
had to be in writing in all cases; in cases involving more than $10,000, a 
written opinion was required and oral testimony had to be reduced to 
writing; and the Board was to provide for publication of its reports “in such 
form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and 
use.”219  Beyond this the statute only stated that “proceedings of the Board 
and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of 
evidence and procedure as the Board may prescribe.”220  Thus, such matters 
as the requirement for and the nature of pleadings and briefs, the conduct 
of Board hearings, and the evidentiary rules to be applied were, on the face 
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of the statute, left to Board discretion.  Several considerations, however, 
compelled the Board to conclude that its practice rules should generally 
conform to the formal requirements of judicial procedure. 
In the first place, the legislative history of the 1924 Act strongly 
supported this conclusion.  The Administration proposal had specified that 
Board proceedings were to be informal, and the House retained this 
prescription.  However, the bill was amended on the Senate floor to remove 
the reference to informal procedure and to add requirements of publicity, 
written opinions, and recorded testimony.221  Debate in the Senate indicated 
that it was the intent of these amendments to provide a judicial 
procedure.222  The Senate changes were retained in the final Act and were 
interpreted by virtually all, including President Coolidge, to require the 
formality associated with a court of record.223 
Although the legislative history of the Act alone sufficiently 
demonstrated the need for a judicial procedure, there were other equally 
persuasive considerations in support of that conclusion.  Of these, the most 
important was the fact that the Board was established as an independent 
agency.224  An independent Board would have no access to Treasury files; 
thus, it could not peruse them privately, listen to the taxpayer’s version of 
the controversy, and render a decision.  Instead, it could only make a 
judgment on the basis of what the parties themselves presented on the 
record.  Such a record could best be compiled in a judicial format.225  
Additionally, the Board’s function was inherently judicial—deciding cases.  
Based on “the experience of all courts since the beginning of 
civilization,”226 it was determined that although formal procedure might 
slow up an individual trial, generally it accelerated the handling of large 
numbers of cases and preserved uniformity.227  Because the findings of the 
Board would be prima facie evidence in a future trial of the same issues, 
those findings had to be made in accordance with a legal record and be 
supported by legal evidence.228  In sum, the Board concluded that stricter 
rules than those of the Committee on Appeals and Review would best 
accommodate the conflicting demands of speed, accuracy, and justice.229 
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At the same time that the Board was pondering the question of whether 
a formal or informal procedure should be adopted, Treasury was 
considering a parallel problem under the new law.  The statute required that 
the Board provide an opportunity for a hearing to the Commissioner,230 but 
did not require that the Commissioner take advantage of the opportunity.  
The question then was whether the Commissioner should appear in every 
case before the Board.  Under the original Administration proposal for the 
creation of the Board, it was contemplated that the Commissioner would 
not be required to appear in every case and that he would not be prejudiced 
by his inaction.231  Rather, the Board would consider these cases on the 
basis of Bureau files.  Since under the proposal the Board was to be a part 
of Treasury, there was no impediment to access by the Board to Bureau 
files.  The Treasury evidently gave serious consideration to following the 
same plan as originally contemplated even though the Board, as created, 
was independent of Treasury and was to follow a formal judicial procedure.  
Ultimately, however, it was decided that the Commissioner should appear 
in every case lest the Board decide that his failure to appear should be 
treated as tantamount to a default.232 
The fact that proceedings were to be essentially judicial raised a novel 
question concerning requirements for practice before the Board.  In 
proceedings within the Bureau, taxpayers were permitted to be represented 
by persons of good moral character who were either attorneys or certified 
public accountants, or could otherwise “. . . show satisfactory educational 
qualifications and evidence of an ability to understand tax questions . . . .”233  
One of the first questions the Board had to decide was whether to adopt 
this liberal rule.  Tax practice had historically been open, and for that reason 
many tax agents appearing before the Committee on Appeals and Review 
were either certified public accountants or persons who were not formally 
qualified in any profession.  Indeed, in the early years tax practice was 
dominated by non-attorneys.234 Because the Board in some sense was an 
extension of the Committee on Appeals and Review, the expectations of 
many would be disappointed if the practice requirements were tightened.  
On the other hand, unlike the Committee on Appeals and Review, the 
Board was to operate under rules of judicial procedure.  If Congress had 
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indeed created a court, albeit naming the tribunal a “Board,” cogent reasons 
supported limiting practice to attorneys.  Practice before courts traditionally 
had been limited to lawyers whose specialized training was necessary to 
enable them to deal with highly technical questions of evidence and judicial 
procedure.  Moreover, if the Board adhered to the Bureau position, it 
would have to prescribe and administer detailed standards for admission to 
practice before the Board.  A practice limited to attorneys could more 
simply be geared to whether an applicant was licensed by a recognized 
licensing authority. 
The problem was a knotty one.  Its resolution could not be deferred, 
however, because the Board would be unable to hear appeals until it had 
determined who would be eligible to prosecute the appeals.  Accordingly, 
one of the first rules of practice announced by the Board dealt with 
admission to practice.235  In a spirit of compromise, the Board provided 
that attorneys and certified public accountants were eligible to practice.236  
The rule had the benefit of continuing the Treasury practice of relying on 
the relatively simple criteria of prior professional licensing.  However, as 
with any compromise, approval was not universal; some took the position 
that practice should be open to all “qualified” members of the public and 
others believed practice should be restricted to lawyers.237 
Aside from the question of whether the Board would adopt formal or 
informal procedural rules, the most important question faced in the new 
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rules was the burden of proof.  In refund actions in the courts, taxpayers 
generally had the burden of proving that they had overpaid their taxes and 
were entitled to a refund.238 The Board adopted the same rule in its 
proceedings239 for two reasons.  First, the taxpayer as the petitioner was 
alleging that the Commissioner had erred in asserting a deficiency in tax.  
Because he was challenging action of the Commissioner, the taxpayer under 
traditional evidentiary concepts would have the burden of proving the 
error.240  Second, the rule was seen as particularly appropriate in tax cases 
because the evidence necessary to determine the accuracy of the deficiency 
was almost always in the possession of the taxpayer.  Therefore, the 
taxpayer more easily than the Commissioner could adduce the evidence 
before the Board.241  In this regard, James Ivins, an original member of the 
Board and the draftsman of the burden of proof rules, contended that more 
than 24 of 25 cases decided for the Commissioner would have been decided 
differently if the taxpayer did not have the burden of proof.242 
 
If you are going to . . . [shift the burden of proof onto the 
Commissioner] you might as well repeal the income tax law and pass 
the hat, because you will practically be saying to the taxpayer, “How 
much do you want to contribute toward the support of the 
Government?” and in that case they would have to decide for 
themselves.243 
 
Despite efforts by the Board to make its procedural rules as simple as 
possible, these rules were criticized in some quarters as being overly 
technical.244  Although there are few today who would support this charge, 
it was nevertheless true that the Board encountered early difficulties with 
adherence to its rules, primarily as a result of the early practitioners’ 
unfamiliarity with the new procedures.245  This was particularly true in the 
case of pleadings and evidence. 
Pleadings, originally fashioned to expedite business, paradoxically were 
the greatest cause of delay until taxpayer representatives became familiar 
with Board rules.  Although the function of the Board was a mixture of 
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appellate and nisi prius courts, the Board believed that if the practice of 
either type of court were wholeheartedly adopted, proceedings could be 
subject to delay before issue was joined and the case made ready for 
hearing.246  Thus, a hybrid form of initial pleading, to be filed by the 
taxpayer, was prescribed that combined the functions of summons or 
notice of appeal, of complaint, and of an opening argument.247  This 
pleading, the petition, required concise assignments of error in the 
Commissioner’s deficiency determination and statements of fact and law to 
substantiate them.248  The petition was to be “complete in itself, so as fully 
but briefly to inform the Board of the issues to be presented.”249  A unique 
aspect of Board practice was that all papers, including pleadings, were not 
served by parties but rather by the Board itself through its docket office.  
This was felt to simplify and expedite procedure.250  
Difficulties arose principally because many petitioners were unaware of 
the independence of the Board from the Treasury and the Bureau.  Many 
petitioners apparently assumed the Board was privy to Bureau files and thus 
familiar with the details of their case.  This resulted in the filing of many 
insufficient petitions and led the Board to publicly urge compliance with the 
rules in hopes of stemming the tide of defective petitions.251  Typical 
incomplete filings were mere notices of appeals or conclusions that the tax 
was erroneous.  It was reported by a former member of the Board that 
“between 30 and 40 percent of the petitions filed are highly defective.”252  
In its statements, the Board emphasized its judicial character and affirmed 
that “[t]he statute clearly contemplates a trial before the Board and each 
case must be decided upon the record made before it by the parties.”253  
Probably as a result of difficulties with pleading, the first amendment to the 
Board’s procedural rules provided for motions in respect of the petition. 
Such motions, which included the motion to make more definite and 
certain, to strike out, and to dismiss, were intended to take the place of the 
demurrer, which was losing favor.254 
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A further difficulty, also related to widespread ignorance of the Board’s 
independent status, stemmed from the improper addressing of mail 
intended for the Board.  The problem became so acute that the Board felt 
impelled to issue a press release urging taxpayers not to address mail 
intended for the Board to “any other Department or Bureau.”  In the case 
of the petition, this could be disastrous.  Unless the Board received the 
petition within 60 days from the date on which the notice of deficiency was 
mailed, jurisdiction was irretrievably lost.255 
The responsive pleading to the petition, required to be filed in behalf of 
the Commissioner, was the answer.  The required specificity of the answer 
has been a bone of contention since the earliest days of the Board’s 
existence.256  The first rules prescribed that the answer should be drawn to 
admit or deny each material allegation of fact in the petition, and to set 
forth any new matters of fact and propositions of law on which the 
Commissioner relied.257  The Commissioner initially took the position that 
he needed to enter only a general denial to raise any issue supporting the 
deficiency determination.258  Basing his argument on a theory of 
presumptive weight for the Bureau’s findings, he denied responsibility to 
take any position or to give any reason as a basis for his determination.259  
The Board did not completely agree with this position, and it soon 
amended its rules to require the answer to “fully and completely . . . advise 
the taxpayer and the board of the nature of the defense.”260 
In these early days, the situation with respect to evidentiary rules was 
also troublesome.  The Revenue Act of 1924 empowered the Board to 
prescribe its own rules of evidence,261 but the Board chose not to publish a 
comprehensive statement of such rules to be followed in tax appeals.  
Rather, it chose to adopt judicial rules of evidence and began applying these 
rules in its earliest cases.262 The decision to require formal rules for the 
presentation and acceptance of evidence was grounded on the statutory 
provisions that defined the Board and its work. 
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Because the Board was statutorily established as independent, its record 
had to be independently compiled.  Thus, the Board stressed that “[w]hat 
has been submitted to or considered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is 
beyond the ken of this Board . . . . [E]vidence that has been presented 
before any other department of the Government must be reintroduced 
before this Board before we can consider it.”263  The Board was also 
compelled by statute to prepare findings of fact that would be given prima 
facie weight on appeal before appellate courts.264  To justify such respect 
for its findings and to cut down on the number of appeals that might ensue 
from a belief that different evidence could produce a different result, the 
Board felt the need to require evidence that would be competent before a 
court.  Because of the absence of a jury, the strictest rules were felt to be an 
unnecessary impediment to full presentation of facts,265 but it nevertheless 
remained true that the general equity rules of evidence were applicable.266 
Despite the Board’s best efforts to clarify the difference between its 
formal procedures and those applicable before the Bureau, practitioners, 
both lawyers and non-lawyers alike, were often lax about proving the facts 
they had alleged in their petitions and about proving them with competent 
evidence.  The contrast between practice before the Board and before the 
Treasury was clearly demonstrated in the case of a taxpayer who attempted 
to “negotiate” a $400 expense deduction without any records on the 
grounds that for someone in his financial and social bracket such a 
deduction was reasonable and fair.  This was an approach that was 
unacceptable to the Board because it was a request for a finding without 
proof.  “We can not indulge in conjecture,” concluded the Board, and 
refused relief to the taxpayer.267 
The Board was troubled over the early insufficiencies of pleading and 
proof that it encountered, and attempted, through its decisions and through 
articles and speeches by members, to educate the public about its rules.  An 
example of the Board’s attempt to proselytize the tax bar was a lengthy 
explanation of the fine art of pleading and preparing a case given to the 
American Institute of Accountants by Chairman Korner.268  He urged the 
parties to stipulate or admit facts that were uncontested, but failing such an 
agreement, he cautioned that it was the petitioner, the party with the burden 
of proof, who was required to present evidence. Among the items offered 
by taxpayers that could not be considered as evidence were petitions, briefs, 
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Bureau rulings, unauthenticated documents and letters, arguments of 
counsel, mathematical computations, and unsupported valuation 
appraisals.269  When limited to such data, the Board was unable to make any 
findings of fact and could only consider the issues on the basis of the 
petition, resolving all issues against the taxpayer.270 
 
3. The Board in Operation 
 
With the adoption of its procedural rules, the Board got down to the 
business of hearing and deciding appeals.  The general procedure that the 
Board followed was succinctly described by Chairman Korner in several 
speeches and articles he authored in an attempt to familiarize the public 
with the operations of the new agency. 
 
Upon the receipt of an appeal from a taxpayer it is given a 
number and then docketed.271  A copy of the petition is forthwith 
served upon the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, who is the law officer 
of the Commissioner.  The Solicitor is given 20 days in which to 
answer or move in respect to the petition.  When the Solicitor has 
thus answered or filed a motion in respect to the petition, a copy 
thereof is forwarded to the taxpayer by registered mail, and 
thereupon the case is considered at issue in the board.  When issue is 
thus joined, the appeal is transferred to a Day Calendar for hearing, 
and set at a day not less than fifteen days hence.  The Commissioner 
is notified of this date, and the taxpayer is also notified by registered 
mail. 
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At 9:30 A.M. on each hearing day the parties litigant, with their 
counsel and witnesses, assemble in one of the hearing rooms of the 
board.  At that time the Chairman calls the calendar for that day, and 
notes the appearances and readiness of the parties to go forward 
with the appeals set for that day.  The appeals in which issue is 
joined on motions of one kind or another are separated from those 
appeals in which issue is joined on the merits. 
The appeals involving motions are all assigned to one division for 
disposition.272  This is done in the interest of expedition and 
economy of time.  The cases which are for hearing on the merits are 
then assigned for hearing to the divisions, in the order of their 
appearance on the Day Calendar.  One appeal is assigned to each 
division sitting.  The remaining appeals which have been announced 
as ready are held in abeyance, and are thereafter assigned to divisions 
in the order in which they appear on the Day Calendar and as the 
divisions become vacant.  That is to say, as soon as a division has 
completed the first hearing assigned to it, the chairman is notified 
and the next appeal on the list is assigned to that division.  In this 
manner the divisions are kept busy throughout the day, or until the 
hearings for that day are completed. 
In the division the hearings are conducted substantially as in the 
courts, except that there is no jury.  Because there is no jury, the 
strict rules of evidence obtaining in law courts are relaxed, and the 
rules of evidence observed are more nearly those obtaining in courts 
of equity.  The taxpayer has the opening and closing of the case, 
both as to evidence and as to argument.  Counsel for both parties 
make opening statements in which are outlined the nature of the 
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appeal, the points in controversy, and the respective contentions of 
the parties.  The taxpayer then proceeds with the introduction of his 
evidence.  This may be by witnesses who are sworn and placed on 
the witness stand, or by competent and authenticated documents.  
The testimony of witnesses is reported by a court reporter, and 
transcribed and made a part of the record.273 Documents and other 
exhibits which are admitted as evidence are identified, marked, and 
received into the record.  The rules of the board provide for the 
taking of evidence by deposition on either oral or written 
interrogatories.  The practice in this respect is similar to that 
obtaining in court.  An order for the taking of depositions issues 
from the board upon application therefor made in accordance with 
the rules. 
At the close of the evidence, argument is heard on behalf of both 
parties and the case is then taken as submitted.  In cases in which 
either or both parties desire to file written briefs, the time for such 
filing is granted, and the case is deemed submitted at the expiration 
of the time allowed for that purpose. 
When a case has been submitted, the division which has heard it 
takes the case under advisement and reaches an agreement as to the 
proper decision.  Thereupon the division prepares a report, which 
consists of the findings of fact, the decision and an opinion, if an 
opinion is required or is deemed necessary.  This report is 
mimeographed, and a copy sent to each member of the board for 
consideration and study. 
The statute provides that a division decision shall become the 
decision of the board at the expiration of thirty days unless within 
that time the chairman shall refer the decision for consideration by 
the whole board. Up to the present time the practice has been 
followed by the chairman of referring every case to the whole board 
for adoption.  This is to preserve uniformity of decisions, and at the 
same time to allow each appeal to have the benefit of consideration 
by every board member. As stated before, the division decision is 
sent to each member, who studies it, and if he is in disagreement he 
prepares a statement of his views relative thereto. 
On Friday and Saturday of each week the board meets and 
discusses the proposed opinions submitted by divisions during the 
                                                     
273 The statute only required the recording of testimony in cases in which the 
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 
43 Stat. 337.  The Board, however, soon concluded that disputes as to evidence 
could be minimized if the testimony in all cases was reduced to writing.  1925 
House Hearings, supra note 176, at 912 (testimony of former member Ivins). 
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preceding week.  At these meetings the fullest discussion of each 
case is gone into, and thereafter a vote is taken on a motion to adopt.  
To this date every decision and opinion which has been adopted has 
had this consideration and discussion by the board. 
When the board has reached a decision in an appeal, a certified 
copy thereof is forwarded to the taxpayer, and likewise one to the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.274 
 
An important purpose in creating the Board was to offer taxpayers 
located outside Washington, D.C., the opportunity to dispute adverse tax 
determinations prior to assessment.  In its later years, the Committee on 
Appeals and Review attempted to fill this need and did, in fact, dispatch 
members to Western and Midwestern cities.275  Apparently, however, 
Congress felt this policy could be further advanced by the Board,276 and the 
statute specifically provided that 
 
the Board or any of its divisions may sit at any place within the 
United States.  The times and places of the meetings of the Board, 
and of its divisions, shall be prescribed by the chairman with a view 
to securing reasonable opportunity to taxpayers to appear before the 
Board or any of its divisions, with as little inconvenience and 
expense to taxpayers as is practicable.277 
 
The Board was well aware of the importance ascribed to field hearings 
and sent letters to all petitioners informing them of their right to a hearing 
at as convenient a location as was practicable and soliciting their wishes in 
the matter.278 Nevertheless, the requests for hearings outside Washington 
accumulated slowly, and it was not until May, 1925, almost a year after the 
Board’s creation, that the first division was sent forth from Washington.279  
The first field session was a lengthy one.  The division sat for a week in 
Milwaukee, ten days in St. Paul, a week in Seattle, a week in Portland, a 
                                                     
274 Speeches before the American Bar Association, Sept. 1925, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, May, 1925, Bar Assoc. of N.Y.C., October, 1925, and the 
American Assoc. of Ice and Refrigeration, June, 1925; see also J. Gilmer Korner, The 
United States Board of Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 642, 643 (1925); J.G. Korner, Jr., The 
Responsibility of the Bar in Income Tax Practice, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 359, 361 
(1925). 
275 See 1924 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 11–12. 
276 See S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 9 (1924). 
277 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
278 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 864. 
279 Id. 
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month in San Francisco, and a month in Los Angeles.280  In October, 1925, 
a second division went to St. Louis for a month and then to Kansas City for 
another month.281 Although these may seem lengthy sessions, it was 
nonetheless true that the vast bulk of cases were being heard in 
Washington, where trials were conducted virtually on a daily basis.282  
Apparently, there were several reasons contributing to the relatively small 
demand for field hearings.  First, the original 12 members of the Board, 
expecting 16 additional members to be appointed, at first indicated that no 
plans for field hearings would be finalized until the anticipated 
appointments were made.283  Second, the Board itself may have discouraged 
requests for hearings outside Washington by announcing that cases heard in 
the field, “[d]ue to loss of time in travelling and difficulties of 
administration,” would not be heard and decided as expeditiously as cases 
heard in Washington.284  Third, the bulk of the tax bar was concentrated in 
Washington and other Eastern cities.  These attorneys and accountants 
undoubtedly preferred to try their cases closer to their homes than to the 
homes of their clients.  Finally, the number of field hearing requests was 
affected by the location of the Board’s petitioners. For example, 
one-quarter of the Board’s petitions came from taxpayers in New York and 
Pennsylvania, yet these States had only approximately 16 percent of the 
Nation’s population.285 
Despite the fact that field sessions were less numerous than originally 
anticipated, it soon became apparent that there would be plenty of work to 
keep the Board busy.  Petitions came in slowly at first—only three were 
docketed in July 1924, and 120 in the following month—but soon 
increased.  In the two-year period commencing in July 1924, 18,087 
petitions were docketed, an average of 753 per month.286  In one month, 
April 1925, a total of 2,371 petitions were docketed as the result of a mass 
mailing of deficiency notices by the Bureau to forestall the anticipated 
expiration of the period of limitations.287 
As with the number of petitions, the number of hearings increased 
rapidly.  The Board heard three cases in August 1924, 18 cases in 
                                                     
280 Id. at 864–55. 
281 Id. at 865. 
282 See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
283 See 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 304 (1924). 
284 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 331 (1924). 
285 Id. at 863; 1 BUREAU OF CENSUS REP., Fourteenth Decennial Census, 13, 15 
(1920). 
286 Statistical data with respect to Board of Tax Appeals furnished by United 
States Tax Court, Statistics and Reports Section. 
287 See The Congestion of Tax Cases Before the Board of Tax Appeals, 4 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 303, 304–05 (1926). 
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September, 80 cases in October, 93 cases in November, and 123 cases in 
December.288  Because there were only three divisions during this period, 
each division heard an average of 41 cases in December, almost two for 
each working day in the month.  Chairman Korner was not guilty of 
exaggeration in asserting that by December 1924, the Board was “running 
under fairly full sails.”289  
In October 1925, the House Ways and Means Committee conducted 
hearings on legislation that was to become the Revenue Act of 1926. At 
that time the Board was able to report that 8,417 petitions had been filed 
since July 1924 and that dispositions had been made in 3,627 of these 
appeals.290  In almost one-half of the remaining 5,000 docketed cases, issue 
had not yet been joined; the remaining cases were listed on either the field 
or day calendars.291 
The Board had thus accomplished an enormous amount of work in its 
first 16 months of existence.  In addition to promulgating rules of practice, 
thousands of cases had been docketed and were being expeditiously 
handled.  One interesting statistic was that the number of cases docketed 
with the Board closely approached the total number of civil cases filed in 25 
U.S. district courts, having 54 judges, during the same period.292  
Additionally, members of the Board, and especially the chairmen, were 
regularly speaking and writing articles to familiarize the public with the new 
agency. On one occasion Chairman Hamel even delivered a speech on radio 
concerning the operations of the Board. 
The Board accomplished its work only by dint of the most extraordinary 
efforts of its members.  Hearings were regularly held late into the evenings; 
one even ran to 1 a.m.  The Board devoted virtually every Friday and 
Saturday, and frequent evenings, to meetings at which the members would 
review the decisions of the three divisions.  The actual decisions were 
written up by members on evenings that the Board was not meeting and on 
Sundays.293  This frantic pace took its toll.  Chairman Hamel resigned in the 
spring of 1925, and Mr. Ivins resigned in the summer of that year, partly 
because they feared that their health would be permanently impaired if they 
continued working under these conditions.294 
 
                                                     
288 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 859. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 862. 
291 Id. 
292 67 CONG. REC. 1129 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Beedy). 
293 Id. at 861. 
294 Id. at 922. 
108             The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
 
4. Success of the Board 
 
The extraordinary efforts made by the Board did not go 
unrecognized.295  It will be recalled that the legislation creating the Board 
was initially criticized by the Administration; also, members of the 
accounting profession were less than enthusiastic about the first 
appointments.  For these reasons and because of the importance of its 
work, there was intense interest in how the Board went about its 
business.296  The record of the Board bore this scrutiny well.  By the fall of 
1925, commentary was appearing that was virtually unanimous in its praise 
of the independence and accomplishments of the new agency.  These 
endorsements came not only from those expected to be well disposed 
toward the Board, such as former Chairman Hamel297 and former member 
Ivins,298 but also from sources not connected with the Board, such as the 
Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association. 
 
We want . . . [the Ways and Means Committee] to know that . . . [the 
Board] is probably the most popular tribunal that has been created 
by Congress for some time.  It functions speedily.  It functions 
definitely and openly.  It is untrammeled by any questions of 
administrative expediency, and its decisions have been uniformly 
independent, regardless of whether they are for the taxpayer or for 
the Commissioner.299 
 
Even more to the credit of the Board, many of its chief critics in 1924 
became its fervent supporters in 1925.  Chairman Green, who had serious 
                                                     
295 In its report on the Revenue Bill of 1926, the Ways and Means Committee 
observed that 
[t]he work of the Board has been uniformly praised by taxpayers, tax 
attorneys, and the Treasury Department. Representatives of the American 
Bar Association informed the committee that the Board functions speedily 
and definitely, is untrammeled by questions of administrative expedience, 
and renders decisions that are uniformly independent. 
H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 17 (1925); see also S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 34 (1926). 
296 Brewster, supra note 229. 
297 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 922. 
298 Ivins, supra note 195, at 392. 
299 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 882 (testimony of George M. 
Morris); see also id. at 66 (testimony of James A. Emery, National Association of 
Manufacturers); Lyle T. Alverson, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed?, 4 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 337, 359, 362 (1926); Brewster, supra note 229, at 251, 273; Hopkins, 
supra note 200, at 468; Latham, supra note 139, at 200–01; Willis W. Ritter, Pitfalls in 
Practice Before the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 297 (1925). 
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reservations concerning the Board when the 1924 Act was passed,300 later 
observed that creation of the Board “was the first time I had ever known 
one act of Congress that seemed to meet with general approval.”301  
Representative Ogden Mills of New York, the President’s chief spokesman 
on the Ways and Means Committee, had argued in 1924 that the 
congressional amendments had “wrecked” the Board.302  In 1925, his 
opinion changed and he called the Board “an unqualified success.”303  
Accountants and accounting organizations had been openly hostile to the 
Board when they learned that Treasury was playing a central role in the 
selection of members, and had become even more outraged when the 
members appointed were virtually all lawyers, most of whom had been 
trained at the Bureau.304  Edward Gore, president of the American Institute 
of Accountants, had been deeply troubled that a Treasury-selected Board 
would lack independence and public confidence.305 However, within 13 
months, he said that the Board “was the outstanding achievement of the 
1924 Act” and was “composed of men who are intent upon doing their full 
duty by the Government and by the taxpayer.”306 
Plaudits were not, however, limited to congressional and private sector 
sources.  Secretary Mellon, Solicitor Hartson, and Special Assistant Gregg 
all opposed the congressional amendments to the original Administration 
proposal.307  In 1925, they were all to recant.308 
                                                     
300 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
301 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1925); see also Proceedings of Dinner Given in Honor of Board 
of Tax Appeals, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 233, 240 (1926) (remarks of Mr. Green) 
[hereinafter cited as Honorary Dinner Proceedings]. 
302 65 CONG. REC. 9540. 
303 67 CONG. REC. 558. 
304 See supra notes 201–214 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
306 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 877.  Another distinguished 
accountant, Dr. Joseph Klein, an adviser to the Treasury, taking another tack, 
admitted that although he initially believed that the Board should have been made a 
part of Treasury, he later saw “the light.”  Id. at 851.  Addressing the Ways and 
Means Committee, he stated that “you have builded [sic] a wonderful body and that 
body ought to be preserved.”   Id.; see also Honorary Dinner Proceedings, supra note 
300, at 238–40 (remarks of Dr. Klein). 
307 See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
308 Andrew Mellon, as befitted a Secretary of Treasury, took his crow in a 
moderate dose. 
The Board of Tax Appeals was intended to be a short cut to an impartial 
determination of tax liability.  In the 1924 revenue act it was made an 
independent establishment, with quite formal rules of procedure.  This was 
a complete departure from the original idea.  The board has, however, been 
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The high praise lavished on the Board in 1925 was due to several 
factors.  First, despite being bound to formal judicial procedure, it had 
managed through dint of extraordinary efforts to keep current with its 
caseload.  Not only the members, but the clerical and professional staff of 
the Board regularly worked overtime in order to achieve this objective.  The 
                                                                                                                       
extremely valuable in the establishment of precedents which have aided the 
bureau in the determination of similar cases of other taxpayers. 
1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 10. 
Solicitor Hartson had been unable to comprehend how the Board, as created by 
Congress, could possibly cope with its workload, yet he was later to write: 
[t]he prompt way in which the Board was organized and the rapidity with 
which it began to hear appeals and dispose of them are matters of record 
and constitute a splendid tribute to the industry and ability of the 
membership of that organization. 
Hartson, supra note 231, at 215. 
Possibly the greatest tribute to the Board was paid by A.W. Gregg, who had 
played a central role in drafting the 1924 Administration bill as Special Assistant to 
Secretary Mellon, and who was later made Solicitor of Internal Revenue. 
When the act was first passed the President expressed some doubt — I 
know the Treasury Department felt considerable doubt — as to whether 
any body could take over and properly perform the task which Congress 
had placed upon the board.  The reduction of salary and the reduction of 
the term of office, we thought, would make it very difficult to get men, and 
I want to say right here that I do not think it would ever have been possible 
to get the type of men who were secured for the board had it not been for 
the fact that there was pioneer work to be done, a great work to be done, 
and men of ability were willing, for inadequate salaries and for short terms 
of office, to take over that task as a matter, really, of pride. 
The board immediately after the passage of the act had no organization.  
Of course the personnel had not been selected. Appeals began coming in 
immediately.  It was then that everyone doubted whether the board could 
perform the task which was placed on it. 
I think I am in a position where I can praise the work of the board — 
having been, at least theoretically, representing one side of every case before 
it — better than almost anyone else.  They have handled the work before 
them in such a way that they have received the very sincere admiration of 
attorneys and taxpayers who have seen the work of the board and its 
opinions, as well as of the Treasury Department.  I think that what they 
have done deserves the appreciation of Congress.  They have really done a 
wonderful piece of work in getting started, producing, and establishing the 
precedents that they have.  It seems to me that in order to be able to carry 
out what they have begun so well, they should be made a court in name as 
well as in fact, and that provision should be made which will enable the 
board to secure the services of competent men; and that provision, it seems 
to me, should be for a long term of office with adequate salary. 
1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 932–33. 
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Board’s staff was largely drawn from the ranks of Treasury and there is 
every indication that they were selected carefully.309  Several observers 
noted a certain special spirit among the earliest Board members and staff,310 
probably in large part due to a combination of the Board’s newness and the 
fact that the mighty and supposedly knowledgeable had predicted an early 
and ignominious end for the infant agency. Perhaps there was some 
significance in the fact that two of the earliest appointments to the Board 
staff were Misses Ruff and Ready.311 
The second element in the success of the Board was that it was able to 
demonstrate to a doubting public that, although its membership was largely 
composed of former Bureau employees, it could successfully maintain its 
independence from Treasury.  The Board consciously refrained from 
compiling statistics as to the number of cases won by taxpayers and the 
number won by the Government.312  The Board believed that its job was to 
decide cases on the merits, not to award a certain percentage of decisions to 
the Government or taxpayers.  Had statistics of this nature been kept, this 
objective might have been blurred.  Moreover, a substantial number of 
cases, if not a majority, were not won completely by either the Government 
or the taxpayer.  In these decisions the tax would be computed somewhere 
between the opposing positions.  For this reason, statistics would be 
difficult to compile and unreliable.  Despite the absence of detailed case by 
case statistics, it was apparent that a substantial number of Board decisions 
favored taxpayers.  In the three-year period between July 1924 and July 
1927, for example, the Board decided 11,000 cases; the total deficiencies 
claimed by the Commissioner in these cases were $209 million.  The Board 
determined deficiencies of only $87 million.  A good deal of reduction in 
deficiencies probably resulted from concessions by the Commissioner 
rather than from decisions by the Board, but there could be no doubt that 
the Board was deciding a substantial number of cases for taxpayers.  
Edward Gore of the American Institute of Accountants observed that  
 
[a]s I understand it, the proportion of findings in favor of the 
taxpayer has been sufficiently high to thoroughly justify all the 
representations that were made on behalf of the taxpayer, and it has 
been proven that nearly half the time the commissioner has been 
wrong in his conclusions.313 
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311 Letters from Robert C. Tracy, Sec’y to the Board, to Commissioner Blair, 
August 30, 1924, November 12, 1924, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Personnel: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
312 1925 House Hearings, supra note 176, at 862–63. 
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The final factor that assured the Board’s success was its contribution 
toward the formation of a body of precedent for the interpretation of the 
tax laws.314  The problem of tax precedent had been troubling.  Much of the 
precedent relied on by the Bureau was contained in unpublished rulings.  
The existence and use of these rulings was a source of controversy315 and 
undoubtedly led to the congressional insistence that Board proceedings be 
public and its opinions be open to inspection.316  But Bureau rulings were 
criticized on more grounds than their secrecy.  By 1925, published and 
unpublished rulings numbered in the thousands,317 and it was conceded by 
former Solicitor Hartson, under whose reign many of these rulings had 
been amassed, that a large number of the rulings were poorly considered 
because of the time pressure under which they were issued, that in many 
cases inconsistent rulings existed on the same point, and that even 
employees of the Bureau had difficulty applying the vast number of the 
rulings because they could not be located.318  For these reasons, Mr. 
Hartson concluded that 
 
[i]t may be high time to wipe the slate clean and start over 
again . . . [I]t is very desirable that a new line of precedent be created 
which is likewise binding upon the Bureau and the taxpaying public 
— a line of authority which all may see and follow whether within or 
without the Bureau.  The service being performed by the Board of 
Tax Appeals in this regard can be made most important.319 
 
Mr. Hartson might have added that the Board could not well have 
fulfilled its precedent-making role without the modifications that Congress 
had made to the original Administration proposal.  The fact that Board 
proceedings were public and that its rulings were disseminated helped 
create respectability for its precedents. Additionally, the Board’s 
rule-making function undoubtedly would have been impeded if it had been 
located in the Treasury Department.  In such a case, there would have been 
a serious question whether the Board could effectively overrule Bureau 
rulings with which it disagreed.  Moreover, even if a Treasury-located Board 
could overrule Bureau rulings, there would be considerable doubt as to its 
powers with respect to Treasury Decisions, which were the weightiest 
                                                     
314 Id. at 10 (testimony of Secretary Mellon); Hartson, supra note 231, at 217, 
238. 
315 See Part I, notes 123–132 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
317 Hartson, supra note 231, at 217. 
318 Id. at 217, 238. 
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authority that Treasury could issue.  In one of its earliest decisions,320 the 
Board chose to disregard a Treasury Decision denying depreciation 
deductions for leaseholds.321  Had the Board been a branch of Treasury, it 
probably could not have taken this action.322 
To fulfill its precedent-setting function, it was important that Board 
decisions successfully stand public and Treasury scrutiny.  There was 
general agreement that the early rulings of the new agency bore this scrutiny 
very well;323 by October 1925, the Bureau had filed nonacquiescences in 
only 13 Board decisions.324 
The widespread approval that greeted the first months of the Board’s 
operation did not signify a general belief that the 1924 legislation had 
created either a perfect Board or a perfect system for adjudicating tax 
disputes prior to assessment.  There were varied and conflicting proposals 
for improvements, and the Revenue Act of 1926 made fundamental 
changes in the Board.  These proposals and changes will be described in the 
succeeding chapter. Nevertheless, the Board was an experiment that 
seemed to be working. 
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THE REVENUE ACT OF 1926: 
IMPROVING THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
 
The Board of Tax Appeals, which had been created by the Revenue Act 
of 1924, was the object of close attention during its first few months of 
operation.1  Inevitably, comment began to appear with respect to how the 
new agency might be improved.  These suggestions found expression in the 
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the Revenue Act of 
1926. 
 
A. The Revenue Act of 1926 
 
President Coolidge and Secretary Mellon were not completely satisfied 
with the Revenue Act of 1924.  Income tax rates had not been sufficiently 
reduced, the estate tax had been increased, a gift tax had been imposed over 
their opposition, and Congress had provided for publicity of persons filing 
income tax returns and the amount of tax they paid.  However, the 
Administration was by no means resigned to accepting indefinitely these 
legislative defeats, and the years 1925 and 1926 provided them with an 
opportunity to correct the shortcomings of the 1924 legislation. 
Coolidge had won an impressive victory over the Democrats in the 1924 
elections, a victory which to some extent was undoubtedly attributable to 
public approval of the Administration’s economic and tax policies.  Further, 
the death of Robert LaFollette Sr. in 1925, removed an articulate critic of 
the Administration and left the Republican progressives without their most 
influential leader. As a result, the new version of the Mellon plan, which 
was presented in the fall of 1925 to the Ways and Means Committee, 
encountered little opposition. 
The principal components of the plan were: (1) reduction in the normal 
and surtax rates of the individual income tax;2 (2) repeal of the estate tax;3 
(3) repeal of the gift tax;4 and (4) repeal of the provision requiring the 
publication of the income tax paid by every taxpayer.5 
                                                     
1 Kingman Brewster, Some Observations Relating to the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 251 (1925). 
2 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5–6 (1925) [hereinafter cited as 1925 House Hearings]. 
3 Id. at 6–7. 
4 Id. at 7–8. 
5 Id. at 8–9. 
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These proposals were accompanied by a vigorous propaganda 
campaign.6  Particularly notable were the activities of an organization 
initially known as the American Bankers’ League and later called the 
American Taxpayers’ League, which formed “tax clubs” in every state to 
advocate the Coolidge position that taxes must be “scientifically revised 
downward.” 7  Significantly, two of the most active tax clubs were located in 
Iowa and Texas, the home states of William Green, Republican Chairman 
of the Ways and Means Committee, and John Garner, the Committee’s 
ranking Democratic member.  Both men had objected to several aspects of 
the Mellon plan and were particularly opposed to repeal of the estate tax.8 
A majority of the press, the public and the Congress favored the 
Administration proposals, and the Revenue Act of 1926, enacted on 
February 26, 1926,9 differed little from Secretary Mellon’s 
recommendations.  Income tax rates were reduced, especially at the higher 
income levels, to provide a maximum tax of 25% as opposed to the 
maximum rate of 46% under the 1924 Act;10 the gift tax was repealed;11 and 
publication of the income tax paid by taxpayers was eliminated.12  The only 
significant setback suffered by the Administration was the failure of 
Congress to repeal the estate tax. Congressmen Green and Garner managed 
to keep the tax alive by agreeing to lower rates and an increased credit for 
state death taxes.13 
Quite obviously, the Board of Tax Appeals, which directly affected a 
limited number of people, did not arouse the same degree of public interest 
as the issues discussed above. Nevertheless, in light of the Board’s newness 
and the controversy that attended its creation in 1924, it attracted some 
attention. 
The Administration had proposed in 1923 that the Board be created as 
an informal hearing body within Treasury.  However, Congress changed 
this plan to make the Board an independent agency in the executive branch 
that was generally required to follow formal judicial procedures.14 
Initially, the Administration view was that these changes would hinder 
the Board in the discharge of its duties and might even result in the total 
                                                     
6 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (1954). 
7 SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION 424 (1942). 
8 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 253–
54 (1940) [hereinafter cited as BLAKEY & BLAKEY]. 
9 Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9. 
10 Compare Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 210–211, 44 Stat. 21–23, with 
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 210–211, 43 Stat. 264–67. 
11 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 125. 
12 Id. 
13 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 8, at 251–54, 257, 269–70; H.R. REP. NO. 
69-1, at 14–15 (1925); H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 49–50 (1926). 
14 See Part II, notes 55–97 and accompanying text. 
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breakdown of tax administration.  Nevertheless, when the Board began 
operation, it soon won general approval from the public, and the 
Administration’s early criticism of the Board changed to support.  In 
connection with the 1926 legislation, Secretary Mellon made no detailed 
recommendation on the subject of the Board.  “It is in the interests of the 
Treasury only to see that there is in existence a board of capable men with 
the ability to decide tax questions fairly and promptly.”15  His only two 
specific proposals were that the number of Board members be continued at 
no less than 16 (under the 1924 Act, the authorized membership was to be 
automatically reduced to seven as of June 2, 192616) and that Congress resist 
suggestions to increase the scope of Board jurisdiction.  These were 
considered necessary to permit the Board to expeditiously handle its 
workload.17 
Both these matters were considered in connection with the 1926 
legislation.  Additionally, certain other issues arose that many believed 
deserved legislative attention.  These included the questions of court status 
for the Board, finality of Board decisions, and several matters relating to the 
membership of the Board and Board procedures.  These issues too were 
addressed in the 1926 Act, and the basic structure of the Board that 
emerged has changed little over the years. 
 
B. Status of the Board 
 
Against the advice of the Administration, Congress had created the 
Board in 1924 as an “independent agency in the executive branch”18 rather 
than as a division of Treasury.  After the Board began operation, it 
immediately became clear that President Coolidge was correct in 
characterizing the Board as virtually indistinguishable from a court.  Yet the 
body was called a “board,” not a “court,” and was located in the executive 
branch of Government, not the judicial. 
In general, courts of the United States are bodies either created by, or 
pursuant to, article III of the Constitution.  Such courts are frequently 
referred to as constitutional or article III courts.  Their judges are protected 
by life tenure during good behavior and a guarantee of no diminution of 
compensation while in office.19  Jurisdiction of these courts is limited to 
cases and controversies.20 
                                                     
15 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of Secretary Mellon). 
16 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336. 
17 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10. 
18 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(k), 43 Stat. 338. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. III provides in part: 
Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
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Although these courts have historically been the most important federal 
judicial agencies, as early as 1828, the Supreme Court recognized the 
existence of other bodies that adjudicated controversies in a manner similar 
to constitutional courts but were not created pursuant to article III.21  These 
bodies, referred to as legislative or article I courts, are created in furtherance 
of the powers reserved to Congress by the Constitution.22  The judges are 
not protected by tenure and compensation guarantees.  Further, the 
jurisdiction of these bodies is not limited to cases and controversies. 
In 1924, Congress clearly did not desire to accord the Board 
constitutional court status; the statute specifically placed the Board in the 
executive branch of Government and denied its members life tenure.  More 
difficult was the question of whether the Board was a legislative court.  
Apparently, Congress did not consider the issue.  Undoubtedly, this was 
due to the fact that until 1929, the only legislative courts expressly 
recognized by the Supreme Court were courts created in furtherance of the 
congressional powers to administer the territories and the District of 
Columbia.23  Thus, in creating the Board as an agency in the executive 
branch, Congress may have believed that it was employing the only 
alternative available to constitutional court status.  Whether the Board 
should be considered to have been created as a legislative court, in light of 
subsequent developments in the decisional law, is impossible to answer 
definitively.  Even today, when considerable literature exists on the 
distinction between article I and article III courts, virtually no attention has 
been paid to the distinction, if any, between an article I court and an 
independent agency in the executive branch performing purely judicial 
functions.24 
                                                                                                                       
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
Section 2.  The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, upon their Authority; . . . to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party; . . . . 
20 Id. § 2. 
21 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
22 Id. at 546. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, art. IV, § 3. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).  
In 1929, the Supreme Court recognized the Court of Customs Appeals as a 
legislative court.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
24 At least one commentator has suggested that no meaningful distinction exists 
between administrative agencies that exercise adjudication powers and non-article 
III courts.  See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the 
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 201 (1983) (“Despite several 
Improving the Board of Tax Appeals                     119 
 
Although the question of judicial status for the Board was ignored in 
1924, by the time Congress began consideration of the Revenue Bill of 
1926, certain officials, notably A.W. Gregg, Solicitor of Internal Revenue, 
were contending that the Board should be transformed from an 
independent agency in the executive branch into a court.25  Those 
supporting court status relied for the most part on the practical benefits 
that would be derived from the change.  First, they argued that the existing 
status of the Board was misleading the public, many of whom believed that 
the Board was part of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  In addition to 
fostering doubts in the minds of the uninformed with respect to the 
Board’s impartiality, this misapprehension undoubtedly encouraged the 
erroneous assumption that the Board’s procedures were, like those within 
the Bureau, informal.  By changing the Board to a court, confusion would 
be reduced with a concomitant improvement in public confidence in tax 
administration and a decrease in the number of procedural errors by 
practitioners.26 
Second, judicial status for the Board might help attract and retain 
capable members.  The term of office of the original members under the 
1924 Act lasted only until June 2, 1926,27 and some believed that such an 
abbreviated tenure served to discourage interest in appointment to the 
Board.28  The 1924 Act provided that members appointed after June 2, 
1926, would serve for terms of up to ten years, but there were some who 
believed even this would be inadequate.29  Life tenure during good behavior 
would be automatically guaranteed if the Board was made an article III 
court; a provision for life tenure without court status would raise 
constitutional questions.30 
Third, the question of finality of Board decisions was related to its 
status.  Under the 1924 Act, Board decisions were subject to collateral 
attack by either the Government or taxpayers.  The Board had 
                                                                                                                       
differences in both appearance and operation, their work cannot be functionally or 
theoretically distinguished.” (citations omitted)).   
25 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 933; see also id. at 914 (testimony of 
former member Ivins). 
26 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 916 (testimony of former member 
Ivins).  Of course, this shortcoming could be remedied by simply renaming the 
Board a court without otherwise changing its character as an independent agency in 
the executive branch.  This approach was taken in 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat.  
957.  However, there were other objections to the nonjudicial status of the Board 
that could not be so easily satisfied. 
27 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336. 
28 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 884 (testimony of George Morris, Am. 
Bar Ass’n), 938–39 (testimony of Dr. T. S. Adams). 
29 Cf. 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 939 (testimony of Dr. T. S. Adams). 
30 See infra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrated its competence and independence, and many believed that 
permitting de novo review of Board cases in the federal courts wasted the 
time and money of both taxpayers and the Government.31 By making the 
Board a court, its decisions would be assured of the finality reserved for 
judicial action. 
Fourth, if the Board were made a court, it would be invested with 
certain judicial powers that would ease its problems of administration and 
expedite its proceedings.  An example of this problem involved the power 
of the Board to subpoena witnesses and evidence and to order depositions.  
Although the 1924 Act authorized such action by the Board,32 it did not 
provide any direct means by which the Board could enforce its own 
process.  Thus, if a witness refused to appear in response to a subpoena, 
enforcement would require recourse to a federal court for an order 
compelling attendance.  Only if this order were disobeyed could the 
non-appearance be punished by contempt in a further federal court 
proceeding.33  On this basis former Board member James S.Y. Ivins argued 
the Board’s powers to subpoena were too cumbersome to be enforced 
against an unwilling witness.34  If the Board were made a court, it could 
itself punish contempt of its process. 
Fifth, some observers believed that the federal courts were not properly 
acknowledging the precedents established by the Board.35  Indeed, many 
federal judges in these early days may not even have known of the existence 
of the Board.  Making the Board a court would result in greater recognition 
of its decisions and would further the important congressional purpose of 
developing a uniform body of precedents interpreting the tax laws. 
Finally, the argument was made that the Board functioned like a court 
and this fact should be recognized by according it full judicial status.36  Its 
jurisdiction was limited to disputes that qualified as cases or controversies 
                                                     
31 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 935 (testimony of A.W. Gregg, 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue).  
32 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(i), 43 Stat. 338. 
33 James S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do With the Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391, 410 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ivins]. 
34 Id. 
35 Memorandum as to reasons for conversion of Board of Tax Appeals into a 
court, c. 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1926: Memoranda 
and Correspondence.” 
36 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 928 (testimony of former Chairman 
Hamel), 933 (testimony of A. W. Gregg, Solicitor of Internal Revenue); Ivins, supra 
note 33, at 393.  The literature is replete with statements that the Board of Tax 
Appeals was a court in everything but name.  E.g., Dana Latham, Jurisdiction of the 
United States Board of Tax Appeals Under the Revenue Act of 1926, 15 CAL. L. REV. 199, 
201, 203 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Latham]. 
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under article III of the Constitution,37 its practice and procedure conformed 
to judicial forms, and its members comported themselves with the 
independence and in the style customary to courts.  Possibly, only an 
accident of history resulted in the Board being made an agency in the 
executive branch instead of a court in 1924.  Because of the Administration 
proposal that the Board be made a part of Treasury, legislative attention 
was focused on the question of independence from Treasury.  Had the 
broader aspects of the independence question been as carefully considered, 
Congress might have concluded that an agency engaged in adjudicating tax 
disputes should not be located in the executive branch of Government. 
Substantial sentiment existed among Board members in favor of 
obtaining full federal court status, and in the late summer of 1925, several 
Board members drafted a proposal along these lines for submission to 
Congress.38  Apparently, the proposal had the support of Treasury officials, 
including Secretary Mellon.39  However, it soon became clear to friends of 
the Board that Congress, traditionally hostile to creating judicial offices, was 
not amenable to such a change.40  Additional opposition came from 
accountants who feared that their privilege to practice before the Board 
would be withdrawn if it were made a court.41  As a result of this 
opposition, neither the Ways and Means Committee nor the Finance 
Committee, both generally favorably inclined toward the Board, 
recommended any change in the Board’s name or its status,42 and no 
serious proposal along these lines was advanced in either the House or 
Senate.  Not until 1942 would the Board’s name be changed to the Tax 
Court,43 and almost one-half century elapsed before Congress recognized 
the inadvisability of having “one executive agency . . . sitting in judgment on 
the determinations of another executive agency.”44  With this recognition 
the Tax Court was established as a legislative court.45 
                                                     
37 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(e), 43 Stat. 337; General Equipment 
Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925). 
38 Letter from A.E. Graupner to J.G. Korner, Aug. 28, 1925, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1926: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Graupner]. 
39 Id.; see also 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 932 (testimony of A.W. 
Gregg, Solicitor of Internal Revenue). 
40 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 935 (remarks of Mr. Garner). 
41 Letter from H.E. Lumsford, President of American Society of Certified 
Public Accountants, to certified public accountants, November 9, 1925, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1926: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
42 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 17–21 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 34–38 (1926). 
43 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957. 
44 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 302 (1969). 
45 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
IRC § 7441). 
122           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
Although Congress was unwilling to transform the Board into a court, 
an effort was made in the 1926 Act to accord the Board more judicial 
attributes.  The compromises thus affected made the agency considerably 
more court-like. 
 
C. Appeals and Finality 
 
Under the 1924 Act, Board decisions were only final with respect to the 
question of summary assessment; they were not final on the question of 
liability.46  Thus, if the taxpayer prevailed in the Board, the Government 
could not summarily assess the tax but could commence a new action in 
federal court for a readjudication of whether a deficiency existed.  If it 
obtained a favorable judgment, the deficiency could then be assessed.  If 
the Government prevailed in the Board, the tax would be immediately 
assessed, but the taxpayer could sue for refund of tax paid pursuant to the 
assessment.  Any action commenced after the Board proceeding would be 
de novo, although the Board’s factual findings would be prima facie correct.  
In other words, no appeal was possible from a decision by the Board, but 
such a decision could  be reviewed collaterally. 
Several congressional concerns might explain this cumbersome statutory 
scheme.  The first of these was related to the question of the Board’s 
independence from Treasury.  The congressional committees studying the 
legislation stated that by permitting the Commissioner to obtain de novo 
review of an unfavorable decision, the Act would relieve “the board from 
the responsibility of finally passing upon questions involving large amounts 
and removes the necessity for a decision in favor of the Government in 
order to force the issues into court.”47  An obvious connection existed 
between this rationale and one of the basic considerations that originally led 
to the proposal to create the Board:  the belief that the Committee on 
Appeals and Review and other agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
took unjustifiably pro-Government positions because of their knowledge 
that an administrative decision in favor of the taxpayer could not be 
reviewed independently whereas a decision in favor of the Government 
could be challenged by the taxpayer in court by way of a refund action.48  
Even though the 1924 legislation established the Board as an independent 
executive agency, its historical roots in the Committee on Appeals and 
Review evidently caused concern that the Board might be no more 
independent than its predecessor. 
Because this concern would have been equally satisfied by permitting 
direct appeal of Board decisions, an alternative, and perhaps more realistic, 
                                                     
46 See Part II, notes 155–159 and accompanying text.   
47 H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 9 (1924). 
48 H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 8–9 (1924). 
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explanation of the provision for a trial de novo was that it constituted a 
vestigial trace of the original Administration proposal to make the Board an 
informal hearing division within the Treasury Department.49  Naturally, 
appellate court review of the determinations of such an agency would have 
been inappropriate.50  The provision requiring that Board proceedings be 
judicial in nature was not added until the 1924 Revenue Bill reached the 
Senate floor, and at that late date few may have realized the desirability of 
making a corresponding change in the appeal procedure. 
Finally, the Board, as conceived by the 1924 Act, was regarded by many 
as either an experiment or as a temporary expedient necessary to deal with 
the administrative difficulties created by the wartime taxes.51  Undoubtedly, 
these feelings concerning an untried body played some part in molding the 
provision for de novo review of Board decisions.  If the Board proved 
unsuccessful, taxpayers would not be unduly prejudiced by utilizing the 
Board procedure because they would retain their rights to a complete 
judicial remedy by way of a refund action. 
After only a year of operation, the Board was recognized as filling an 
important need that was likely to continue indefinitely, and attention was 
directed to the inefficiency of the collateral review procedure in the 1924 
Act.  Under that Act, each tax case could be litigated in two trial tribunals 
(first in the Board, then on a retrial in district court) and in two appellate 
courts (first in a court of appeals on appeal from a district court decision, 
and then in the Supreme Court).52  Under these circumstances, a Board 
proceeding was characterized as “little more than a preliminary skirmish, a 
run for luck.”53  Even granting the fact that few tax cases reached the 
Supreme Court, a taxpayer, who because of inclination or necessity desired 
to defer paying a disputed tax as long as possible and therefore chose to 
                                                     
49 See Part II, notes 25–54 and accompanying text. 
50 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 16.03 (3d ed. 
1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. 
51 See 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Green).  Under the 1924 Act, 
the authorized membership of the Board for the first two years was 28, but after 
this initial period it was to decline to seven.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 
§ 900(a), 43 Stat. 336. A.W. Gregg, representing Treasury at the Senate Finance 
Committee hearings on the 1924 Act, indicated that the business of the Board 
would be significantly reduced after it disposed of the excess profits tax cases 
growing out of the World War I period.  Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the Comm. on 
Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1924). 
52 If the collateral proceeding had been commenced in the Court of Claims, 
there would have been no appeal to a court of appeals.  Rather, at that time, 
decisions of the Court of Claims were appealable only to the Supreme Court.  
[Currently, decisions of the United States Court of Federal Claims are appealable to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See Part I, note 172 and 
accompanying text.]   
53 Blair v. Curran, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (lst Cir. 1928). 
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petition the Board, could be required to plead his case in three separate 
tribunals before receiving a final adjudication.  Virtually all who considered 
the problem believed this to be unduly burdensome.54 Additionally, since 
members of the Board were selected, at least in part, on the basis of their 
special expertise in taxation and financial matters, full-blown relitigation of 
their decisions was inappropriate and unnecessary.55  Finally, the system 
under the 1924 Act was seen as contrary to sound judicial procedure 
because collateral attack permitted cases to be moved from a specialized 
court to a generalized court; “we go from an informed tribunal to an 
uninformed tribunal.”56 
For these reasons, the 1926 Act provided for direct appellate review of 
Board decisions in the Courts of Appeals,57 the particular court in which the 
appeal would lie being prescribed by statutory venue rules.58  Further appeal 
                                                     
54 67 CONG. REC. 525 (1925) (remarks of Chairman Green); id. at 3755 (1926) 
(remarks of Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania); 1925 House Hearings, supra note 
2, at 917 (testimony of former member Ivins).  But see infra note 57. 
55 See H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36–37 (1926). 
56 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 894–95 (testimony of George Morris); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926); 67 
CONG. REC. 558 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Mills). 
57 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 44 Stat. 109.  The procedure 
ultimately enacted followed the recommendation of the tax committees of both 
Houses.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36–37 (1926).  
As a result of a floor amendment, the bill as passed by the Senate provided for 
appeals from Board decisions to district courts, thence to courts of appeals, and 
thence, possibly, to the Supreme Court. 67 CONG. REC. 3754–58 (1926).  The 
sponsor of the amendment, Senator James Reed of Missouri, believed it was 
desirable because it permitted taxpayers to take appeals of Board decisions in 
courts closer to their homes. Id. at 3755 (1926).  The amendment was opposed on 
the ground that it would increase litigation.  Id. (remarks of Senator David Reed of 
Pa.).  The House-Senate conference removed the James Reed amendment.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 69-356, at 26, 54 (1926). 
58 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1002, 44 Stat. 110. These rules could have 
substantive importance because the position of the various courts of appeals might 
differ with respect to the same issue, and the success of the taxpayer or the 
Government in a case might well then depend on appellate venue.  Moreover, the 
rules could have procedural significance if an appeal was filed with the wrong 
appellate court and by the time the error was discovered it was too late to perfect 
an appeal to the proper court.  Thus, to avoid many disputes and errors, it was 
important that the venue rules be unambiguous and easily understood. 
The 1926 Act provided, in effect, four separate venue rules depending mainly 
on the nature of the taxpayer.  First, in the case of an individual, proper venue was 
in the court of appeals for the circuit of which the individual was an inhabitant, or 
if the individual was not an inhabitant of any circuit, in the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia.  Id. § 1002(a).  Second, in the case of a person other than an 
individual or a corporation, i.e., a trust or estate, proper venue was in the circuit 
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could be obtained in the Supreme Court either upon certiorari issued upon 
the petition of a party or upon certificate of question by a court of 
appeals.59  The appellate proceedings provided by the Act were the 
                                                                                                                       
court for the circuit in which the collector of the tax to whom such person made 
the return was located, or, if no return was made, in the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia.  Id. § 1002(b).  Third, in the case of a corporation, venue was 
determined under a three-tier rule: if the corporation had no principal place of 
business or principal office or agency in the United States, venue was in the Court 
of Appeals of the District of Columbia; if the corporation had such a place of 
business, office, or agency, venue was in the circuit court for the circuit in which 
was located the collector of tax to whom such corporation made the return, or, if 
no return was made, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.  Id. 
§ 1002(b), (c).  Finally, the statute provided that “in the case of an agreement 
between the Commissioner and the taxpayer, [proper venue would be in] . . . the 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit, or the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia, as stipulated in such agreement.” Id. § 1002(d). 
These rules may seem both comprehensive and comprehensible; they aroused 
no controversy at the time they were enacted. Nevertheless, problems soon 
emerged in their interpretation and they were revised in 1934. Revenue Act of 
1934, ch. 277, § 519, 48 Stat. 760. 
59 The statutory provision could have been more clearly drafted: 
The Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the 
Board (except as provided in section 239 of the Judicial Code, as amended); and the 
judgment of any such court shall be final, except that it shall be subject to 
review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari, in the 
manner provided in section 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended.  
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003(a), 44 Stat. 110 (emphasis supplied). 
A cursory reading of this provision might indicate that Supreme Court review 
could only be by way of certiorari.  However, § 239 of the Judicial Code provided 
for certification of questions to the Court by the courts of appeals, and § 240 
provided for review by certiorari.  Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 938.  
Clearly, the implication was that both types of review could be had.  In fact, one 
leading appeal from an early Board decision was reviewed by the Supreme Court as 
a certified question.  See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 
(1929); see also Commissioner v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 592 (1933). 
Regrettably, the current codification perpetuates, and perhaps even increases, the 
ambiguity: 
The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the decisions of the Tax Court, except as provided in section 1254 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code, in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of 
the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury; and the judgment of 
any such court shall be final, except that it shall be subject to review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari, in the manner provided in 
section 1254 of Title 28 of the United States Code.  
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exclusive means of review.  Decisions of the Board became final six months 
after decision if no petition for review was filed.60  Thereafter no other 
court could restrain collection of the tax or order that it be refunded.61  In 
any further litigation, such as for collection of the tax, a final decision of the 
Board would be res judicata.62 
With respect to the scope of appellate review, the statute specified that 
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court 
 
shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in 
accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the 
Board, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice 
may require.63 
 
The reports of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees indicated that 
this language was intended to limit judicial review to questions of law,64 a 
limitation comparable to that provided in appeals from determinations of 
the Federal Trade Commission.65  The committees identified “questions of 
law” as including  
 
questions as to the constitutionality of the substantive law applied, 
the constitutionality of the procedure used, failure to observe the 
procedure required by law, the proper interpretation and application 
of the statute or any regulation having the force of law, the existence 
of at least some evidence to support the findings of fact, and the 
validity of any ruling upon the admissibility of evidence. . . .66 
 
The American Bar Association recommended that factual findings of 
the Board be accorded only prima facie weight;67 Congress rejected this 
                                                                                                                       
I.R.C. § 7482(a) (emphasis supplied).  Section 1254 of title 28 includes the 
successor of both §§ 239 and 240 of the old Judicial Code.  It is thus even less clear 
now whether the reference to review by certiorari is meant to be exclusive. 
60 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 1005(a)(1), 44 Stat. 109, 110. 
61 Rev. Stat. § 3224 (1873); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(d), 44 Stat. 67 
(now codified at I.R.C. § 6512(a)); see also, e.g., Baglivo v. Commissioner, 235 F. 
Supp. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Bottenfield, 442 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1971). 
63 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 110. 
64 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36–37 (1926). 
65 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 894. 
66 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19–20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926). 
67 The ABA made the following proposal: 
The findings of the board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional 
evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional 
evidence is material, and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure 
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position on the ground that “the complicated and technical facts governing 
tax liability require a determination by a body of experts,”68 a determination 
which should not be disturbed if supported by “at least some evidence.”69  
Except for the ABA proposal, the scope of review question attracted little 
attention in 1926.  Some two decades later, however, a serious controversy 
on this matter surfaced as the result of the Supreme Court decision in 
Dobson v. Commissioner.70 
An important question that had to be confronted in connection with the 
new appellate procedure was the extent to which it would be permitted to 
be used by taxpayers simply as a means of delaying the payment of tax.  
Even under the 1924 Act, which did not provide appeal rights, many cases 
were being filed with the Board solely to delay collection of the tax.71  With 
the granting of appeal rights, the danger of abuse was enhanced. 
Although the delay problem was a serious one, the 1926 Act did not 
eliminate the ban on assessment or collection prior to Board 
determination.72  However, if the decision of the Board was adverse to the 
taxpayer, an appeal of the adverse decision would not bar assessment or 
collection unless the taxpayer filed a bond with the Board on or before the 
date of filing of the appeal.  The bond was to secure the payment of any tax 
                                                                                                                       
to adduce such evidence in the proceedings before the board, the court may 
order such additional evidence to be taken before the board and to be 
adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and 
conditions as to the court may seem proper. The board may modify its 
findings as to the facts or make new findings by reason of the additional 
evidence so taken, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if 
supported by the testimony, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if 
any, for the modification or setting aside of its original decision with the 
return of such additional evidence. 
1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 893–94.  
68 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926). 
69 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926).  
70 320 U.S. 489 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 231 (1944).  See Part XI.H.8.   
71 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 912 (testimony of former member 
Ivins), 937 (testimony of A. W. Gregg, Solicitor of Internal Revenue).  In the case 
of tax years prior to 1921, these delay tactics were even more advantageous to 
taxpayers, since the 1924 Act did not provide interest charges for late payment. Id. 
at 937; S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 33 (1926).  This, of course, was a great inducement to 
use the Board procedure to increase the term of what amounted to an interest free 
loan.  The 1926 Act eliminated this problem by providing that thenceforth interest 
was to be paid on all deficiencies regardless of the year to which they related.  
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 283(d), 44 Stat. 64. 
72 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(a), (b), 44 Stat. 55.  An exception to this 
bar was made for so-called jeopardy assessments if the Commissioner believed 
collection of the tax would be jeopardized by delay in assessment.  Id. § 279, 44 
Stat. 59. 
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and interest thereon ultimately determined to be due.73  The statute required 
Board approval of the surety for the bond and permitted the Board to fix 
the amount of the bond up to twice the deficiency on appeal.74  The dual 
policies of the statute were to require payment or assurance of payment of 
any deficiency ultimately found due, and to discourage appeals from Board 
decisions simply to defer the day on which accounts had to be settled.75  
Another provision of the 1926 Act aimed at preventing the abuse of Board 
proceedings authorized the Board to impose a $10 fee for filing petitions.76  
Additionally, the Board, the Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court 
were provided with power to impose penalties or damages in appeals 
instituted merely for delay.77 
The committee reports and congressional debates on the 1926 Act 
evidenced a particular concern with respect to the constitutionality of the 
new appellate procedure.78  This concern probably stemmed from the 1923 
decision in Keller v. Potomac Electric Co.79  In Keller, the Supreme Court had 
refused jurisdiction granted it by statute to review a finding of the Public 
Utility Commission of the District of Columbia in a rate-making case.  The 
Court found that its duties under the statute required review of the entire 
record below and, in effect, substitution of its discretion for that of the 
agency.  The Court concluded that these duties, which permitted it “to 
                                                     
73 Id. § 1001(c), 44 Stat. 109. As originally reported to the House, the bill 
provided that no assessment was permitted until all rights of appeal were 
exhausted.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 10 (1925).  A committee amendment on the 
House floor eliminated this generous provision in order to conform the treatment 
of the taxpayer who had lost before the Board and was appealing, with the 
treatment of the taxpayer against whom a jeopardy assessment had been made.  67 
CONG. REC. 896–97, 1136 (1925). 
74 Moreover, the Act also permitted the appellate court to require security in 
addition to the specific bond requirements. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001(e), 
44 Stat. 110. 
75 This policy has remained in effect up to the present. See I.R.C. §§ 7482(c), 
7485. 
76 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 904, 
44 Stat. 106 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7451).  The maximum fee that may be 
imposed by the Tax Court currently stands at $60. 
77 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1000 (amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 911), 
1004, 44 Stat. 109, 110 (now codified at I.R.C. §§  6673, 7482(c)(4)). 
78 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 37 (1926); 67 CONG. 
REC. 3756–57 (1926) (exchange between Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania and 
Senator Cummins of Iowa). 
79 261 U.S. 428.  That the Keller case was a matter of concern is indicated by 
commentary which appeared after the enactment of the 1926 legislation. Joseph 
Kahn, The Status of the United States Board of Tax Appeals as a Judicial Body, 7 NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 135, 137–38 (1929); Joseph Kahn, The Judicial Status of the Board of 
Tax Appeals, 7 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 175, 177 (1929). 
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change present conditions and to guide future action,”80 were essentially 
legislative or administrative, and did not involve a “case or controversy” 
within the meaning of article III of the Constitution. 
The Board of Tax Appeals was technically an independent agency in the 
executive branch, and there was apparently some question whether its 
actions were reviewable by article III courts.  During the Senate’s 
consideration of the 1926 Act, Senator Albert B. Cummins expressed the 
“very gravest doubts” whether an article III court could directly review the 
decisions of an adjudicative body, the members of which were not afforded 
the protections of article III.81  Theretofore, orders of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission were 
reviewable in the federal courts, but so far as the Senator was concerned 
such review was not in the nature of a direct appeal as was being provided 
in the case of the Board.82 
The committee reports on the 1926 Act revealed that Senator Cummins 
was not alone in his concern for the constitutionality of the appellate review 
procedure. These reports read very much like briefs in favor of sustaining 
the validity of the statute. Of particular interest was the implied distinction 
of Keller on the ground that the administrative action to be reviewed in tax 
matters was mandatory and not discretionary. 
 
In the view of the committee the decisions of the board are 
judicial and not legislative or administrative determinations. Review 
of judicial decisions may be had by direct appeal to the courts (which 
is the method provided in this bill), and such appeal may be (and is 
by this bill) made exclusive of other methods, such as by petitions to 
the courts for the enforcement of an administrative order, or by 
extraordinary remedy such as injunction, or by suits for refunds.  
Further, the review of the decision of the board may be limited to 
the record made before the board.  The imposition upon the court 
of the duty of reviewing judicial decisions, such as those of the 
board, can not properly be urged as the imposition of a nonjudicial 
duty, by reason of the fact that execution of the decision is 
dependent upon the administrative action of the commissioner in 
assessing and collecting the tax in accordance with the decision.  The 
duty imposed upon the commissioner in respect of the deficiency 
                                                     
80 261 U.S. at 440. 
81 67 CONG. REC. 3756 (1926). 
82 Id. This same observation was made in James Craig Peacock, An Anomalous 
and Topsy-Turvy Appellate System, 19 A.B.A. J. 11 (1933). No such distinction was 
made by the Supreme Court when it, in 1929, approved the constitutionality of the 
appellate procedure; in fact, the Court cited the experience with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission as support for its 
holding.  Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 722–23 (1929). 
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decided is not discretionary but nondiscretionary, but its 
performance in accordance with law is mandatory. Such review of a 
judicial as distinguished from a legislative or administrative 
determination may be had as to either question of law or fact.  The 
proposed procedure, however, for reasons of policy and not of law, 
limits court review solely to questions of law as heretofore described. 
The principles discussed in the preceding paragraph are of 
general application and are not limited merely to matters over which 
Congress has peculiar control by reason of a proprietary interest, as 
in public lands or pensions, or by reason of an exclusive regulatory 
power, as in the importation of merchandise and the admission of 
aliens.  In adhering to such principles the committee is of the 
opinion that it is establishing an appellate procedure that is 
unquestionably constitutional.83 
 
One senses in this excerpt a desire to clarify the view that, at least as far 
as Congress was concerned, the Keller decision was not to be interpreted as 
precluding appellate review of administrative fact finding.  Although 
appellate review was limited under the statute to questions of law, that 
limitation was made for policy reasons and not on constitutional grounds.84 
Three years later the constitutionality of these provisions was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner.85 Without citing the 
Keller decision, the Court concluded that review of Board decisions had all 
the necessary requisites of a constitutional case or controversy.  Although in 
the view of the Court, the Board was not a “court” but was rather an 
“executive or administrative board,”86 appeals from its decisions involved 
                                                     
83 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 37 (1926); see also H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 20 (1925). 
84 History has vindicated the judgment of the tax committees.  In 1948, 
Congress expressly provided for the same review of factual determinations of the 
Tax Court as is accorded to findings of a district court sitting without a jury.  Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991.  No challenge to this provision has ever 
been sustained.  Although the area is not completely settled, it would seem that 
Congress, or, in appropriate cases, the courts, may undertake broad factual review 
of administrative fact finding.  See DAVIS, supra note 50, at §§ 29.01, 29.07, 29.09; see 
also Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (now 
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)), providing that a reviewing court must set aside 
administrative findings if “unsupported by substantial evidence.”  
85 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
86 Id. at 725. This view of the Board did not, in Old Colony, result in treating the 
Board’s decisions differently from those of a “court.”  Occasionally, however, there 
has been a different result. Blair v. Oesterlein Mach. Co., 274 U.S. 220 (1927) 
(Supreme Court refused to pass on issue not raised below, partly because the 
proceeding originated in an administrative agency rather than a court); Lasky v. 
Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1946), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957) 
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adverse parties disputing substantive claims based on federal law, and it was 
not constitutionally significant whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to 
review de novo the decisions of the Board or only could exercise appellate 




1. Exclusivity of Board Jurisdiction 
 
Under the 1924 Act, the taxpayer had several alternative forums to 
contest tax liability.  If a deficiency was asserted, he could either petition the 
Board for redetermination88 or pay the tax and sue for refund in a district 
court or the Court of Claims.89  If no deficiency was asserted but the 
taxpayer concluded that he had overpaid his tax voluntarily, he could claim 
a refund, and if it was not allowed he could sue for refund in either district 
court or the Court of Claims, but not in the Board.90  Early versions of the 
Revenue Bill of 1926 proposed drastic changes in this system of review by 
limiting the availability of refund actions and expanding the areas of 
exclusive Board jurisdiction. 
In hearings before the Ways and Means Committee, taxpayer 
representatives urged that Board jurisdiction be expanded to include refund 
claims. Board procedures were cheaper, quicker, and less complicated than 
those applicable in other courts, and taxpayers who had paid a disputed tax 
should be entitled to these benefits.91  Chairman Green was inclined to 
agree with this position.92  Secretary Mellon and Solicitor Gregg, however, 
opposed such a change on the ground that the Board was not equipped to 
handle the increased workload that would result—some 78,000 active 
claims for refund were pending within the Bureau, and theoretically all 
                                                                                                                       
(since Tax Court was an administrative agency and not a court, it had no equitable 
powers to vacate a decision after it became final). 
87 279 U.S. at 724–25.  Old Colony involved a case in which the taxpayer was 
appealing from an unfavorable decision of the Board, and was, at the same time, 
questioning the constitutionality of the procedure.  The procedure involved when 
the Government is the appealing party has also been sustained against the 
contention that no case or controversy exists when the dispute is between two 
agencies of the Government (the Board of Tax Appeals and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue), as when the Board’s decision was favorable to the taxpayer.  
Commissioner v. Liberty Bank and Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932). 
88 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274, 43 Stat. 297. 
89 See Part I, notes 142–197 and accompanying text. 
90 Id.; Part II, notes 142–144 and accompanying text. 
91 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 849 (testimony of D.A. Smith, 
American Paper and Pulp Assoc.), 854 (testimony of Dr. Joseph J. Klein). 
92 Id. at 849.  But see 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1925) (remarks of Chairman Green). 
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these claims could end up before the Board if its jurisdiction were 
expanded.93  Moreover, the Board had been established principally to afford 
a day in court to the taxpayer before he was required to pay his tax; in 
refund cases, the tax had already been paid, and the reason for a hearing 
before the Board was eliminated.94 
Apparently, the Ways and Means Committee and the House saw merit 
in both positions, and the bill as reported to and passed by the House 
attempted to find a middle ground. The Board would not be given 
jurisdiction of refund claims then before the Bureau.  However, with 
limited exceptions, in the case of future deficiency determinations, a 
taxpayer’s only remedy would be to use the Board procedure.95  Thus, 
taxpayers would not be permitted the option of paying a deficiency and 
then suing for refund in district court or the Court of Claims. Moreover, 
once the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency for a tax year, all 
questions of tax liability for that year could only be litigated before the 
Board.  If a taxpayer against whom a deficiency was asserted believed that 
not only was no deficiency due but that he had overpaid his tax for the year, 
he would be required to submit the questions of the deficiency and the 
overpayment to the Board. 
Although the refund action in district court and the Court of Claims was 
not completely abolished by the House bill (it would continue to be 
available in cases in which no deficiency notice was issued),96 the Senate 
Finance Committee concluded that the House provision barring recourse to 
traditional forums in refund cases was “too drastic.”97  Accordingly, it 
restored the prior practice of permitting the taxpayer who had received a 
deficiency notice the option of either filing a petition with the Board, or 
                                                     
93 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10, 934; see also id. at 923–24 (testimony 
of former Chairman Hamel). 
94 Id. at 934. 
95 As passed by the House, § 281(d) of the bill provided: 
If the Commissioner has notified the taxpayer of a deficiency, or has made  
. . . [a jeopardy assessment], the right of the taxpayer to file a petition with 
the Board of Tax Appeals and to appeal from the decision of the Board to 
the courts shall constitute his sole right to contest the amount of the tax for 
the taxable year in respect of which the Commissioner has determined the 
deficiency, and, whether or not he files a petition with the Board, no credit 
or refund in respect of such tax shall be made and no suit for the recovery 
of any part of such tax shall be maintained in any court . . . 
The principal exceptions to the bar on refunds were: (1) if the Board, having 
obtained jurisdiction as the result of the mailing of a deficiency notice, determined 
an overpayment, or (2) if the taxpayer could prove the notice of deficiency was not 
received by him within 45 days from the date it was mailed. 
96 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 10, 13–14 (1925). 
97 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 25–26 (1926). 
Improving the Board of Tax Appeals                     133 
 
paying the tax and suing for refund in either district court or the Court of 
Claims.98  In conference the House receded from its position.99 
If enacted, the House proposal would have had a profound influence on 
tax litigation by requiring that virtually all tax controversies be heard by the 
Board.  But this was not the only jurisdictional issue dealt with, and several 
other jurisdictional amendments were actually effected by the 1926 
legislation. Although none of them were controversial, they were of some 
significance and were the most complicated features of the new legislation 
dealing with the Board.100 
 
2. Effect of Payment and Limited Refund Jurisdiction 
 
The 1926 Act adopted two important jurisdictional changes involving 
the related subjects of the effect of payment on the Board’s power to 
review a deficiency assertion and the jurisdiction of the Board to consider 
whether an overpayment of tax had been made.  The Board had held that, 
under the 1924 Act, it lost jurisdiction of any case in which the deficiency 
asserted by the Commissioner was paid by the taxpayer prior to the time 
the Board rendered its decision.101  The Board’s only authority was to 
determine the existence of a deficiency; if the asserted deficiency was paid, 
the Board had nothing to decide.  Similarly, since no deficiency was 
involved, the Board had held that the 1924 legislation gave it no authority 
to decide whether a taxpayer was entitled to a refund of tax.102 
The first of these rulings burdened those taxpayers who wished to avail 
themselves of the Board procedure but wanted to forestall the running of 
interest on any deficiency ultimately found by paying the tax asserted in the 
deficiency notice.  Such a taxpayer could use the Board procedure or pay 
the tax; the taxpayer could not do both.  The second ruling made the Board 
procedure cumbersome for the taxpayer against whom a deficiency was 
asserted but who believed that not only was no deficiency due, but also that 
the taxpayer had overpaid the tax.  The taxpayer could contest the asserted 
deficiency before the Board but could obtain a refund only by instituting an 
action in district court or the Court of Claims—even though the deficiency 
related to the same year as the overpayment or the same issue.   
The House version of the bill, which virtually abolished separate refund 
proceedings, provided the Board with jurisdiction to determine all questions 
                                                     
98 Id. 
99 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 48–49 (1926). 
100 For contemporary descriptions of these changes, see Latham, supra note 36; 
Herman T. Reiling, Changes in the House Bill Affecting Taxable Income, 4 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 6 (1926); Willis W. Ritter, Jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals Under Act 
of 1926, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 128 (1926). 
101 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925). 
102 Everett Knitting Works, 1 B.T.A. 5 (1924). 
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of tax liability for the tax year in issue, including whether the taxpayer was 
entitled to a refund.103 Conversely, the bill permitted the Board to 
determine a greater deficiency than that initially asserted by the 
Commissioner in the deficiency notice and authorized the Board to 
prescribe rules governing “under what conditions and at what times” the 
Commissioner could assert the additional tax.104 
Senate amendments eliminated the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
tax years for which a deficiency notice was issued.  The taxpayer’s option of 
either contesting the deficiency before the Board, or paying the deficiency 
and seeking a refund by way of suit in either district court or the Court of 
Claims was preserved.  The Senate, however, did not completely revert to 
the statutory scheme that existed under the 1924 Act.  In the first place, the 
Senate substantially adopted the House provision granting the Board 
plenary jurisdiction to redetermine tax liability with respect to any year for 
which a petition was filed.  Thus, the Board could determine a greater 
deficiency than was initially asserted if the additional amount was claimed 
by the Commissioner at or before the Board hearing, or it could find that 
no deficiency existed and that the taxpayer had overpaid his tax for the year 
                                                     
103 The text of the House version of the bill is reproduced below: 
If the Board of Tax Appeals finds that there is no deficiency and further 
finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of tax in respect of the 
taxable year in respect of which the Commissioner determined the 
deficiency, the Board shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount of 
such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the decision of the Board 
has become final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer . . . . 
H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 281(e) (1925), as passed by the House, as enacted, 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(e), 44 Stat. 67.  This statute, as amended, is now 
codified at I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1).  
104 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 274(e) (1925), as passed by the House.  The 
final version of the Act made no reference to the Board’s power to make rules 
governing the assertion of greater deficiencies.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 
§ 274(e), 44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6214(a)).  Nevertheless, in its first 
revision of its rules of practice and procedure after enactment of the 1926 Act, the 
Board amended the rule with respect to the burden of proof to put the burden on 
the Commissioner “in respect of any new matter of fact pleaded in his answer . . . 
.” B.T.A. RULE 30 (April 1, 1926 ed.) 
Improving the Board of Tax Appeals                     135 
 
with a resulting entitlement to a refund or credit.105  These provisions were 
retained in the final version of the Act. 106 
Additionally, the Senate bill provided that a taxpayer could waive the 
restrictions on assessment and collection imposed during the pendency of a 
Board proceeding, and pay the asserted deficiency.  Such a waiver would 
not prevent the taxpayer from receiving a refund or credit of tax as a result 
of a Board determination that the deficiency was less than that asserted by 
the Commissioner.107  This amendment permitted a taxpayer to forestall the 
running of interest by paying the asserted deficiency without thereby 
depriving the Board of jurisdiction to decide the proper amount of tax due. 
The conference accepted the amendment.108 
 
                                                     
105 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 274(e), 284(e) (1926), as passed by the 
Senate.  Under the House bill, the Commissioner was not restricted to raising the 
deficiency at or before the Board hearing.  This was believed to be unjust as not 
giving sufficient opportunity to the taxpayer to rebut the claim for additional tax. 
67 CONG. REC. 3376 (1926). 
106 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(e), 284(e), 1001, 1005, 44 Stat. 56, 67, 
109, 110.  These provisions, as amended, are now codified at I.R.C. §§ 6214(a), 
6512(b)(1).   
107 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 274(d) (1926), as reported by the Senate 
Finance Comm. provided as follows: 
The taxpayer shall at any time have the right, by a signed notice in writing 
filed with the Commissioner, to wave the restrictions provided in 
subdivision (a) of this section on the assessment and collection of the whole 
or any part of the deficiency.  Such waiver shall not bar the taxpayer from 
receiving a credit or refund under subdivision (e) of section 284 if the 
decision of the Board which has become final determines an overpayment 
of tax in respect of the year to which the waiver relates. 
The House bill did not deal specifically with the question of whether Board 
jurisdiction would be lost if the contested deficiency was paid by the taxpayer prior 
to the time the Board rendered its decision.  The Board was given exclusive 
jurisdiction over any year with respect to which a deficiency notice was issued and 
could, if no deficiency was found, determine an overpayment of tax that would be 
refunded or credited to the taxpayer.  However, as used in the bill, “deficiency” 
seemed to refer only to the deficiency originally determined by the Commissioner, 
and the language was at least susceptible to the interpretation that no overpayment 
could be determined if at least some portion of the deficiency was correct.  Thus, if 
the Commissioner determined a deficiency of $1,000 that the taxpayer paid before 
the rendition of the Board decision, and the Board determined a deficiency of $1, 
arguably no overpayment of $999 could be determined by the Board because there 
was a deficiency.  H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 281(e) (1925), as passed by the 
House. 
108 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 40 (1926); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(d), 
44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(d)). 
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3. Jeopardy Assessments 
 
Other important jurisdictional changes from the 1924 Act were made 
with respect to jeopardy assessments.  In general, both the 1924 and 1926 
Acts provided that a deficiency could be neither assessed nor collected until 
60 days following the mailing of a deficiency notice, and, if a petition was 
filed with the Board with respect to the notice, the bar on assessment and 
collection was further extended until the Board rendered its decision.109 
In spite of the general policy of forbidding the Commissioner from 
assessing or collecting a deficiency before the taxpayer was afforded an 
opportunity for a hearing before the Board, an exception was necessary in 
those cases in which a delay in assessment would jeopardize collection of 
the tax.  Circumstances jeopardizing collection could arise in cases in which 
fraud was suspected or an imminent bankruptcy could deplete the assets of 
the taxpayer necessary to pay the asserted tax.110  To prevent disruptions in 
tax collections for these reasons, the 1924 and 1926 Acts authorized the 
Commissioner to make jeopardy assessments regardless of whether a 
deficiency notice had been sent to the taxpayer and regardless of whether 
the question of liability for the tax assessed was pending before the 
Board.111  The jeopardy assessment could vary from the deficiency asserted 
in a deficiency notice, if any, and could be made up to the time when the 
decision of the Board became final.112  The action of the Commissioner in 
                                                     
109 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a)–(c), 43 Stat. 297; Revenue Act of 
1926, ch. 27, §  274(a)–(c), 44 Stat. 55. 
Under the 1924 Act, a taxpayer aggrieved by a premature assessment was not 
given any express statutory remedy, and in one case, it was held that no injunction 
could be obtained against an illegal assessment.  Joseph Garneu Co. v. Bowers, 8 
F.2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).  Contra Lafayette Worsted Co. v. Page, 6 F.2d 399 
(D.R.I. 1925).  See Rev. Stat. § 3224 (1873) (now codified at I.R.C. § 7421(a).  In the 
1926 Act, this problem was eliminated by a provision authorizing an injunction 
against a premature assessment or collection.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 
§§ 274(a), 508(d), 44 Stat. 55 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(a)). 
110 See 1 LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 2.18 (1955).  Until 
1926, the Commissioner also viewed the expiration of the period of limitations on 
assessment as jeopardizing collection of the tax.  See Part I, notes 114–120 and 
accompanying text.   
111 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297; Revenue Act of 1926, 
ch. 27, § 279, 44 Stat. 59. 
112 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297; Revenue Act of 1926, 
ch. 27, §  279(c)–(e), 44 Stat. 59.  Under the 1926 Act, the Board decision was not 
technically final until rights of appeal had been exhausted, but no jeopardy 
assessment could be made after a petition for review of a Board decision was filed.  
Id. § 279(e), 44 Stat. 60.  Generally, the 1926 Act prevented the Commissioner from 
sending a second deficiency notice for the same year if a petition was filed with the 
Board with respect to the first notice.  Id. § 274(f), 44 Stat. 56.  By employing the 
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issuing jeopardy assessments, although not originally subject to review, 
withstood constitutional attack.113 
Under the 1924 Act, a taxpayer against whom a jeopardy assessment had 
been made could contest the assessment in one of two ways.  First, the 
taxpayer could pay the assessment and pursue the standard refund 
procedure before the Bureau and the courts.114  This procedure precluded a 
hearing before the Board.  Alternatively, the taxpayer could file a claim in 
abatement with the Bureau accompanied by a satisfactory bond in an 
amount up to twice the amount of the claimed abatement.115  Collection of 
the tax would then be stayed pending Bureau consideration of the claim.116  
The Commissioner was required to notify the taxpayer of his decision, and 
if the claim was denied in whole or in part the taxpayer could, within 60 
days of the mailing of notice of the denial of the claim, petition the Board 
                                                                                                                       
jeopardy assessment device, the Commissioner could avoid this prohibition since 
the jeopardy assessment could be more or less than the deficiency originally 
asserted.  Id. § 279(c), 44 Stat. 59.  The only limitation imposed on this power 
provided that after the Board had rendered a decision, the jeopardy assessment 
could be no more than the deficiency determined by the Board.  Id. § 279(d), 44 
Stat. 60. 
113 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (l931); see also S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 
27 (1926); Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928); California Associated 
Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925).  However, through two opinions issued in the 
mid-1970’s, the Supreme Court raised concerns over the constitutional adequacy of 
the then-existing procedures for challenging a jeopardy assessment.  See Laing v. 
United States, 423 U.S. 161, 185–88 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (raising Fifth 
Amendment Due Process concerns that were avoided by the majority’s statutory 
construction); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629 (1976) (noting that “the 
Due Process Clause requires that the party whose property is taken be given an 
opportunity for some kind of pre-deprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing 
at which some showing of the probable validity of the deprivation must be made”).  
Shortly after these decisions, Congress enacted § 7429 as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 to provide taxpayers with additional procedural protections in this 
setting.  To start, the statute provides taxpayers with a right to an administrative 
review of the jeopardy assessment.  See I.R.C. § 7429(a)(2), (3).  As originally 
enacted, taxpayers could seek judicial review of this administrative proceeding (or 
lack thereof) in Federal district court only.  See I.R.C. § 7429(b)(2).  As modified in 
1988, the statute now permits taxpayers to seek judicial review in the Tax Court if 
the taxpayer had previously invoked the court’s deficiency jurisdiction with respect 
to the tax liability that serves as the subject of the assessment.  See I.R.C. 
§ 7429(b)(3).  The Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this setting is discussed in more detail 
in Part VI.C.1.   
114 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 281(a), 1011, 1012, 1014, 43 Stat. 301, 
342, 343. 
115 Id. § 279(a), 43 Stat. 300. 
116 Id. 
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to review the Commissioner’s action.117  Collection of the tax would 
continue to be stayed until the Board’s decision.118  If the claim was allowed 
by the Board, the Commissioner could initiate suit in court to collect the tax 
that had been assessed, but the Commissioner could not collect the tax 
before obtaining a favorable judgment.119  If the Board, on the other hand, 
denied the claim, the tax would be immediately collected and the taxpayer 
could pursue a refund action.120   Thus, under a textual reading of the 1924 
Act, the only means by which a taxpayer could obtain a Board hearing was 
to file a claim in abatement, accompanied by a bond.121  Board review 
would be predicated not on the determination of a deficiency, but rather on 
the denial of the claim in abatement. 
In its version of the 1926 Revenue Bill, the House, which had eliminated 
federal court refund actions even with respect to jeopardy assessments,122 
generally retained the claim in abatement procedure that had applied under 
the 1924 Act.123  However, because this procedure was to be the only 
means of obtaining judicial review of jeopardy assessments, and because 
not all taxpayers could obtain bonds, claims in abatement were permitted to 
be filed even if not accompanied by a bond.124  In such a case the tax would 
be collected and the Bureau would then review the merits of the claim.  If 
the claim was denied, the taxpayer could appeal to the Board, and if the 
Board allowed the claim, the collected tax would be refunded to the 
taxpayer. 
The House bill continued the 1924 Act feature predicating Board review 
of a jeopardy assessment on the denial of a claim in abatement.  Such 
review was distinct from review of a deficiency determination, and once a 
jeopardy assessment was made, all prior Board proceedings with respect to 
a deficiency notice would be terminated. Because the House bill allowed a 
jeopardy assessment any time before a decision of the Board became final 
or an appeal from a Board decision was perfected,125 some cases could 
                                                     
117 Id. § 279(b). 
118 Id. § 279(a). 
119 Id. § 279(b). 
120 Id. 
121  Id.  But see California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925); 
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925); California Associated Raisin 
Co., 1 B.T.A. 314 (1925). 
122 See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
123 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 274(d), 279 (1925), as passed by the House. 
124 67 CONG. REC. 897 (1925). 
125 As passed by the House, the bill provided that a jeopardy assessment, in any 
amount, could be made at any time prior to a decision by the Board with respect to 
the tax year. H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 274(d) (1925).  Moreover, even after a 
decision by the Board, a jeopardy assessment could be made until the earlier of the 
expiration of the 90-day appeal period, or the filing of an appeal bond, although in 
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require two hearings in the Board, one hearing with respect to the original 
deficiency notice and a later hearing based on the denial of a claim in 
abatement. 
The Senate approved of late jeopardy assessments because collection of 
tax could become jeopardized at any time, and, to protect the revenues, 
summary assessment would have to be allowed until either completion of 
the judicial proceedings or until an appeal bond was filed.126  However, the 
claim in abatement procedure would be unnecessarily complicated for a 
taxpayer required to bring his case to the Board twice.127  Moreover, the 
procedure was to some extent a waste of time because it required 
administrative review of a jeopardy assessment that had already been 
approved.  Accordingly, the Senate bill substituted a streamlined procedure 
for obtaining Board review of taxes subject to a jeopardy assessment.  If the 
assessment was made prior to the mailing of a deficiency notice, the Senate 
bill required the Commissioner to mail such a notice within 60 days after 
making the assessment.128  The taxpayer could then file a petition with the 
Board based on that notice and the Board would proceed to determine tax 
liability for the year.129  If, on the other hand, the jeopardy assessment was 
made after a deficiency notice had been sent, the assessment would not 
terminate Board jurisdiction based on the original notice, and the Board’s 
proceeding would simply continue.130  No jeopardy assessment could be 
made after the Board’s decision became final or was appealed to a court of 
appeals.131  Regardless of when the jeopardy assessment was made, the 
taxpayer was extended the option of either paying the tax assessed or 
staying payment by filing a satisfactory bond.132  Whether or not a bond was 
filed would not affect Board jurisdiction; as under the House bill, if the 
assessment was paid, the Board proceeding would become in effect a 
refund action.  As a result of these changes, the claim in abatement became 
unnecessary and was abolished.133  The conference committee on the 1926 
                                                                                                                       
such a case the amount of the assessment could not exceed the deficiency found by 
the Board.  Id.  Thus, jeopardy assessments were permitted even after the Board 
proceeding was virtually completed. 
126 See S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 27 (1926). 
127 Id. at 26–27. 
128 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 279(b) (1926), as passed by the Senate. 
129 Id. §§ 274(a), 279(c). 
130 Id. § 279(c). 
131 Id. § 279(d). 
132 Id. § 279(f). 
133 Id. § 279(k). 
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Revenue Bill accepted the Senate modifications,134 and a procedure was 




The provisions of the 1926 Act concerning appeals and jurisdictional 
matters were of long-lasting importance to the Board, but they aroused little 
controversy compared to those aspects dealing with Board membership—
the number of members, their salary, tenure, background, appointment and 
removal, and the restrictions on their practice after they left office. 
To some extent the concern about these matters related to the efficiency 
and productivity of the Board.  In its first months of existence, the Board 
managed to keep pace with its workload, but the number of cases being 
                                                     
134 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 42 (1926). 
135 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279, 44 Stat. 59 (now codified, as amended, 
at I.R.C. §§ 6861, 6863).  [As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress 
enacted § 7429 to provide for administrative and judicial review of jeopardy 
assessments.  These provisions, and the Tax Court’s limited jurisdiction in this 
setting, are discussed in Part VI.C.] 
In addition to the provisions described above, various other jurisdictional 
changes were initiated in 1926 that have persisted to the present.  These included: 
1. A determination that an additional tax was due because of a “mathematical 
error appearing upon the face of the return” was not to be appealable to the Board 
and was subject to summary assessment.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(f), 44 
Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1)). 
2. In redetermining a deficiency for a tax year, the Board could consider facts 
with relation to tax liability for other years, but could not redetermine tax liability 
for such other years. Id. § 274(g) (now codified at I.R.C. § 6214(b)). 
3. The Board could determine the applicability of penalties, additional amounts, 
and additions to tax, as well as tax liability. Id. § 274(e) (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6214(a)).  The Board had held that it possessed such jurisdiction under the 1924 
Act, see Gutterman Strauss Co., 1 B.T.A. 243 (1924), but the issue was not free of 
doubt. 
4. Upon the adjudication of bankruptcy or the appointment of a receiver, the 
Commissioner was directed to assess tax deficiencies immediately, and the taxpayer 
was not permitted to petition the Board for redetermination.  Revenue Act of 1926, 
ch. 27, § 282(a), 44 Stat. 62 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6871). 
5. The period for filing a petition after the mailing of the deficiency notice was 
extended by one day if the last day of the regulation period fell on a Sunday. Id. 
§ 274(a), 44 Stat. 55 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(a)). 
6. The Board could increase the deficiency above the amount originally 
determined by the Commissioner, but the increased amount could not be asserted 
by the Commissioner in a further deficiency notice if a petition to the Board was 
filed with respect to the first notice. Rather, the increased amount would have to be 
asserted to the Board at or before the hearing.  Id. §§ 274(e), (f), 44 Stat. 56 (now 
codified at I.R.C. §§ 6212(c), 6214(a)).  
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brought was increasing dramatically and doubts were expressed whether the 
Board could continue to be effective if it became burdened with an 
unmanageable backlog.136 The number and quality of members would bear 
directly on the dispatch with which cases could be considered and disposed. 
 
1. Number of Members 
 
The 1924 Act authorized the appointment of up to 28 members for a 
two-year period ending June 2, 1926,137 at which time the terms of all the 
members appointed during the initial period were to expire and the 
permanent membership of the Board was to be reduced to seven.138  
Despite the authorization for 28 members during the two-year period, only 
12 persons were originally appointed to the Board, and at no time did the 
membership exceed 16.139 
By 1925, most observers were agreed that a seven-member Board would 
be insufficient, and debate centered on how many more than that figure 
would be needed. Although some support existed for maintaining the 
authorized Board membership at 28, at least temporarily,140 a consensus 
soon developed for a somewhat smaller number.  The Administration, 
while not taking a definitive position on the issue, contended that 
membership should be no less than 16.141  This view was publicly supported 
by Board Chairman Korner, who doubted that the Board could function 
with less than its current membership of 15142 and suggested that 16 would 
be preferable.143 
Because the Board was generally expected to encounter difficulties in 
keeping current with its caseload, it is somewhat surprising that only 
minimal support developed for providing a membership substantially in 
excess of 16.  Even strong supporters of the Board rejected the idea of a 
larger membership because of the effect it would have on the Board’s mode 
of operation.144  The Board held regular meetings to review decisions prior 
                                                     
136 Nelson T. Hartson, The Board of Tax Appeals in its Relation to the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 215, 216–17 (1925). 
137 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336. 
138 Id. §§ 900(a), (b). 
139 See Part II, notes 180–191 and accompanying text. 
140 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 66 (testimony of James Emery, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs.), 81 (statement of N.Y. State Soc’y of C.P.A.’s). 
141 Id. at 10 (testimony of Secretary Mellon). 
142 Id. at 868. 
143 Id. at 873.  There could then be sufficient personnel for five separate three 
member divisions in addition to the chairman.  See also id. at 883 (testimony of 
George Morris, Am. Bar Ass’n). 
144 Ivins, supra note 33, at 391; 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 883 
(testimony of George Morris, Am. Bar Ass’n).  In the summer of 1925, a legislative 
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to their promulgation,145 because decisions rendered in this manner would 
likely be well considered and not in conflict with earlier precedent.  A large 
membership might reduce the Board’s ability to function in this manner. 
  
The committee doubts whether any number in excess of 16 could 
continue to meet informally and avoid getting into the dangerous 
realm of requiring a formal procedure, thereby turning its judicial 
discussions into a form of parliamentary meeting conducted under 
artificial rules.146 
 
Additionally, maintaining a 16-member Board would permit the 
reappointment of the existing members, who were favorably viewed by the 
public, but would not so increase the size of the body that new 
appointments might change its character.147 
Not everyone was of the view that the Board should be composed of 16 
members or more.  Some critics contended that the Board should be 
smaller, and proposals were made for six, seven, eight, ten, and twelve 
members.  These proposals were based on diverse grounds.  Some felt that 
the increase in tax litigation was due to problems within the Bureau, “the 
officious agents who stir up tax questions and then keep them pending and 
pending and pending for the purpose of keeping themselves in positions 
and drawing their salaries.”148  If the Bureau were managed properly, these 
abuses would cease and the volume of tax litigation would be reduced 
dramatically.  Others believed that the best solution to the problem of tax 
administration was to improve the law by creating an income tax that by 
virtue of its simplicity and clarity would not generate many disputes.  Such 
improvement would obviate the necessity of “multiplying staffs and 
benches of lawyers.”149  Finally, there were those who argued that although 
                                                                                                                       
committee of the Board suggested a permanent membership of 19.  See Graupner, 
supra note 38.  Its concern was to have enough members to deal with the increasing 
caseload.  However, this proposal was never advanced in public. 
145 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 34–35 (1926). 
146 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 34–35 (1926). 
147 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 884 (testimony of George Morris, 
Am. Bar Ass’n). 
148 67 CONG. REC. 1127 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Edwards).  Mr. Edwards 
preferred a Board of six, eight, or ten members.  Id. at 1128.  
149 S. REP. NO. 69-52, Part 2, at 13 (1926).  The report of the Finance 
Committee minority recommended a Board of 12 to be reduced to seven within 
five years. Congressman Edwards, an advocate of reducing Government spending 
by eliminating unnecessary commissions, boards, and bureaus, warned that 
Americans might find themselves in the position of a man lynched by a lawless 
mob around whose neck a placard had been hung “I am in statu quo.” 
The people from around the country gathered and viewed the situation, 
but they could not make out this Latin: “Statu quo.”  They sent for the 
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there were bound to be many uncertainties in the tax law, the volume of 
case precedents that was being accumulated would soon answer most of the 
questions raised by the statute.  When that happened, the number of cases 
would diminish, and a smaller Board would be sufficient.150  Board 
supporters confronted these arguments by pointing out that tax litigation 
was increasing and showed no sign of lessening in the foreseeable future.151  
Additionally, a reduction in the number of Board members might 
jeopardize the practice of holding hearings outside Washington, D.C.  
These hearings were considered an important function of the Board, but 
they reduced its efficiency.  A small Board might not be able to continue 
them.152 
In the final analysis, the controlling consideration was probably that the 
Board seemed successful with its current membership and any 
congressional tinkering would be unlikely to improve it.  Accordingly, a 
membership of 16 was proposed by both tax committees153 and 
incorporated in the bills as passed by the House and the Senate.  The only 
disagreement between the two bodies on this issue related to a Senate 
amendment authorizing the President to reduce the number of members in 
the event of a decrease in the volume of tax litigation.154  The Senate 
amendment was rejected in conference,155 and the authorized membership 
of the Board/Tax Court remained at 16 until 1981. 
Citing the expanded jurisdiction of the Tax Court and the growth of 
complex tax litigation in the tax shelter arena,156 Congress in 1980 increased 
                                                                                                                       
justice of the peace, the wise man of the community, to come over and 
interpret the Latin.  The old justice came over, with his dictionary, viewed 
the remains, took in the situation, and said: “That is Latin, and the best I 
can make out of it is it means, in this case, ‘I am in a hell of a fix.’” 
67 CONG. REC. 1127 (1925). 
150 67 CONG. REC. 3749 (1926) (remarks of Senator King). 
151 Id. at 1128 (remarks of Messrs. Green and Garrett). 
152 Id. at 3749 (remarks of Senator George). 
153 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 34 (1926). 
154 Pursuant to the Senate bill, the President was authorized to reduce by 
executive order the number of members of the Board if he determined that the 
functions of the Board could be performed by less than the number of members 
then in office.  After the promulgation of such an order, no further appointments 
to the Board could be made until its membership was reduced below the number 
of members specified in the order.  H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1000, amending 
Revenue Act of 1924, § 901(c) (1926), as reported to and passed by the Senate; S. 
REP. NO. 69-52, at 35 (1926). 
155 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 53 (1926); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 
amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 900, 44 Stat. 105 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7443(a)). 
156  S. REP. NO. 96-933, at 2 (1980).   
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the membership of the Tax Court from 16 to 19.157  As part of the same 
legislation, Congress dropped the statutory prohibition on individuals being 
appointed to Tax Court bench after attaining age 65.158  In addition to 
expressing concern that the prohibition could deprive the court of 
experienced personnel, Congress noted the incongruity of the provision 
with federal policies against age discrimination.159 These legislative changes 
to the contours of the Tax Court bench took effect on February 1, 1981.160   
 
2. Compensation of Members 
 
The 1924 Act had set Board members’ compensation at an annual rate 
of $7,500,161 despite a strong Administration plea that the figure should be 
$10,000.162  In 1925, a renewed effort was made to have the compensation 
increased. 
Some were opposed to increasing Board members’ pay, especially in the 
Senate, where a provision to retain the $7,500 salary was defeated 41 to 
19.163  The sponsor of the provision, Senator King, objected to the increase 
on the ground that many of the Board members came from the Bureau 
where they earned at most $6,000.  Moreover, Senator King could not 
conceive of a proposal to pay Board members, who the Senator referred to 
as “young boys,” more than district court judges.164 
Most sentiment, however, favored an increase.  Witnesses testifying 
before the Ways and Means Committee in 1925 were unanimous in the 
view that compensation should be raised to attract and retain qualified 
members, a serious problem because of the opportunities for lucrative 
                                                     
157  Pub. L. No. 96-439, § 1(a), 94 Stat. 1878 (1980).  
158  Id. § 1(b).   
159  S. REP. NO. 96-933, at 2–3. 
160  Pub. L. No. 96-439, § 1(c), 94 Stat. 1878. 
161 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336. 
162 See Part II, notes 119–135 and accompanying text. 
163 67 CONG. REC. 3881–82 (1926). 
164 Senator King explained his position in the following terms:   
I think it is unfair.  It may not be defended it seems to be by any Senator.  I 
am willing that they shall receive the same compensation that is now 
received by the district judges of the United States, to wit, $7,500 per 
annum.  This salary is more than is received by the judges of the supreme 
court of a majority of the States of the Union.  Why these young boys, 
many of who went into the bureaus as young boys 22 or 23 years of age and 
have been there only a few years, should be transplanted to these positions 
and then receive more than the Federal judges of the United States, many of 
who are lawyers of distinction and character and ability and who have been 
practicing their profession for 20 or 30 years, surpasses my comprehension. 
Id.  The average age of the 15 Board members in 1925 was 45 years. 
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private practice.165  Two highly qualified members of the original Board had 
left after only brief tenures, but they might have remained if the 
compensation had been more generous.166  The $7,500 salary was 
characterized as “a pittance” that made “it quite impossible, judged by 
ordinary standards, for [a member] properly to maintain and support his 
family.”167  George Morris, representing the American Bar Association, 
suggested that “as long as we pay them $7,500 a year, they all ought to 
resign.”168  Congressman Ogden Mills took a broader view of the situation: 
 
I venture to say that the historian of the future will be amazed at the 
lack of emphasis which has been placed upon adequate [tax] 
administration in the United States during this period, and the utter 
failure and unwillingness to provide the proper salaries and the 
conditions necessary to retain the extraordinarily competent men 
which the Treasury Department has secured from time to time, only 
to see them just pass through the Treasury, acquire an education in 
tax matters and then become tax experts in private employment.169 
 
George Morris and former Board member Ivins favored an increase to 
$12,000.170  Former Chairman Hamel was a little more conservative and 
estimated that a $10,000 salary should be sufficient.171  The $10,000 figure 
was apparently the compensation favored by most Board members.  The 
Board privately proposed to Administration and congressional officials that 
members’ compensation be raised to $12,000; however, this was “done with 
the full knowledge that it will not be likely to pass but with the purpose of 
getting a compromise raise to $10,000.”172 
Advocates of higher compensation regularly drew comparisons with 
members of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States 
Shipping Board, and the Federal Reserve Board, who received salaries of 
                                                     
165 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 852–53, 885–87, 922; see also 67 
CONG. REC. 524 (1925) (remarks of Chairman Green); id. at 558 (remarks of Mr. 
Mills). 
166 “I can say frankly to you that $12,000 would have kept me on the job, but I 
doubt if any less would.”  1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 920–21 (testimony 
of former member Ivins).  “If the salary had been $10,000 a year, with a term of at 
least 15 years, giving some feeling of permanency, I do not believe that those two 
would have resigned.  I think I would not have resigned.” Id. at 928 (testimony of 
former Chairman Hamel referring to the resignations of Mr. Ivins and himself). 
167 Id. at 852 (testimony of Dr. Joseph J. Klein). 
168 Id. at 885. 
169 67 CONG. REC. 558 (1925). 
170 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 886, 920–21. 
171 Id. at 928. 
172 Graupner, supra note 38. 
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$12,000, and members of the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Farm 
Loan Board, and the Railway Labor Board, who received $10,000.173  On 
the other hand, district court judges received only $7,500.174  The Ways and 
Means Committee settled on a salary of $10,000,175 and this figure was 
ultimately enacted.176 
 
3. Tenure of Members 
 
The question of term of office stirred the greatest controversy of all the 
Board provisions. Under the 1924 Act, the terms of the original members 
were to expire on June 2, 1926; the tenure of the first seven members 
appointed after June 2, 1926, were to be staggered,177 but the succeeding 
terms were set at a uniform period of ten years.178 
Members of the Board, who were privately seeking full article III status, 
naturally favored life tenure.179  In hearings before the Ways and Means 
Committee, this position was advanced by two distinguished witnesses—
Solicitor of Internal Revenue A.W. Gregg, one of the principal draftsmen of 
the 1924 Act, and Dr. T. S. Adams, an economist and academician who was 
an important figure in the early development of the income tax.180  Several 
reasons were advanced for life tenure.  First, a limited term of office was 
frequently cited as a reason for the difficulty of attracting qualified 
members.181  Monetary compensation provided to Board members was low 
compared to what they could obtain in private practice, and tenure security 
was considered a necessary countervailing inducement.182  Additionally, 
tenure guarantees were seen as a means of protecting the independence of 
the Board. No evidence existed that the Board had ever succumbed to 
outside influence, but the protection was nevertheless deemed desirable in 
                                                     
173 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 5 (1926). 
174 67 CONG. REC. 3881 (1926) (remarks of Senator King). 
175 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925). 
176 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, 
§ 901(a), 44 Stat. 106. 
177 Staggering the terms, which prevented a simultaneous change in the entire 
Board membership, was believed to be necessary to assure the stability of the 
Board, an important objective in view of the value associated with its 
precedent-setting function. See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 884 
(testimony of George Morris, Am. Bar Ass’n). 
178 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336. 
179 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
180 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 932 (testimony of Solicitor Gregg), 
939 (testimony of Dr. T. S. Adams). The Committee on Taxation of the American 
Bar Association, however, proposed a 16-year term as adequate. Id. at 884. 
181 E.g., Ivins, supra note 33, at 39l. 
182 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 938–39 (testimony of Dr. T. S. 
Adams). 
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view of the sensitivity of matters passed on by the Board and the members’ 
vulnerability to pressure from both private and governmental sources.183  
Finally, life tenure was also supported on the basis of an analogy to the 
Board of General Appraisers (later to become the Customs Court and, later 
hence, the United States Court of International Trade), the members of 
which held appointment during good behavior.184  Because the Board of 
General Appraisers had a similar function in respect to customs duties as 
the Board of Tax Appeals did in respect to internal taxes, members of the 
latter body should have the same benefits as those of the former. This was 
especially true, it was argued, since the work of the Board of Tax Appeals 
was more important.185 
                                                     
183 The Board dealt with issues involving hundreds of millions of dollars, and 
its judgments ought not be subject to extraneous pressure.  This point was 
emphasized by Ogden Mills, who saw the danger to the Board’s independence 
coming from both private and governmental sources. 
These men know that at some time or other they are going to be subjected 
to two kinds of pressure, the one, political pressure, exerted, it may be, in 
the guise of a congressional investigation committee that years after they 
have exercised their best discretion and judgment may challenge that 
discretion and judgment on a set of facts which might justify two 
conclusions; the other of a different kind – pressure that may come from 
powerful and dissatisfied taxpayers. You are not going to get the best kind 
of service from those men unless you say to them, “Gentlemen, we have 
picked you because you are competent, we have picked you because you 
know the law, we are going to trust you, and we are going to assure you that 
as long as you use your best ability, as long as you are competent the United 
States Government will see to it that you have that security which will 
enable you at all times and in the most difficult cases to give the kind of 
decision that will be prompted not by fear of political or other pressure, but 
by your own judgment and conscience.” 
67 CONG. REC. 732 (1925).  The allusion in Congressman Mills’ remarks to 
congressional investigating committees undoubtedly had particular reference to the 
then current activities of the Couzens’ committee in the Senate, which was 
investigating the operation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. See Part I, notes 
128–132 and accompanying text. 
184 The Board of General Appraisers was created in 1890.  Act of June 10, 
1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 136.  Its members were granted life tenure in 1908.  
Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 406.  In 1926, it was renamed the 
Customs Court.  Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 669.  As a result of the 
Customs Courts Act of 1980, the court was subsequently renamed the United 
States Court of International Trade. See Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727 
(1980).  
185 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); 67 CONG. REC. 732 (1925) (remarks of 
Mr. Mills). 
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The Ways and Means Committee was generally friendly towards the 
Board of Tax Appeals,186 and it was therefore not surprising that the 
Committee recommended granting Board members tenure during good 
behavior.187  What may have been surprising, however, especially to the 
members of the Committee, was the profound opposition that the proposal 
encountered. 
Several arguments were advanced against life tenure. First, the 
Constitution provided life tenure for federal court judges but made no such 
provision for any other officials.  On this basis, Representative Collins 
argued that the framers intended to restrict life tenure to those for whom it 
was specifically reserved.188  The argument could be supported by the 
general structure of the Constitution, under which the executive and 
legislative branches were essentially under political control while the judicial 
branch alone was insulated from such control.  To grant life tenure to an 
executive branch employee was to insulate him from the public 
responsibility inherent in the political process.  Either unaware that 
members of the Board of General Appraisers had been accorded life 
tenure,189 or believing that Board to be an article III court, Representative 
Collins found evidence for his position in the fact that the proposal was 
unprecedented.190 
Opponents of life tenure also pointed out that the provisions of the 
1924 Act, while not providing indefinite tenure to members, did guarantee 
terms of ten years. They argued that because this amount of time would 
span more than two presidential administrations, appointees were 
sufficiently insulated from the effects of inappropriate political pressure.191  
Some even challenged the desirability of an independent Board on the 
ground that each Administration is accountable for the activities of the 
executive branch and should be in a position to control its activities 
through personnel of its own choice.192 
                                                     
186 The Committee had figured prominently in the creation of the Board, and 
its ranking Republican and Democratic members were closely tied to certain 
members of the Board.  Chairman Green was the father of William R. Green Jr., 
and ranking Democrat John N. Garner was a former Law partner of William D. 
Love.  See Part II, notes 188–189 and accompanying text.  Moreover, witnesses 
appearing before the Committee in 1925 were uniformly favorable toward the 
Board and its work.  See 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Green). 
187 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925). 
188 67 CONG. REC. 1130–31 (1925). 
189 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 406. 
190 67 CONG. REC. 1130 (1925). 
191 Id. at 715 (remarks of Mr. Johnson). 
192 See id. at 1131 (remarks of Mr. Collins).  One Senator observed, “I have 
been one of those who believed that to a very great extent to the victor belongs the 
spoils, and I think that each administration ought to have people within it who are 
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Finally, there were those who observed that any move toward indefinite 
tenure was premature.  The taxes that formed the basis of Board 
jurisdiction were relatively new, and their future was uncertain.  The Board 
itself was only two years old and had been instituted on an experimental 
basis.  Although it seemed to be successfully filling what appeared to be a 
continuing need, the possibility existed that Congress might decide to 
discontinue its activities.  Were it to do so, the Government would be faced 
with the problem of “a number of governmental wards whose salaries we 
can not get rid of even though we may want to install another or a better 
system of handling these tax appeals.”193 
To a considerable extent, the validity of the pro and con arguments on 
life tenure was obscured by the ambiguous status of the Board itself.  If the 
Board was viewed as a judicial body, its members ought to have been 
provided with the independence ordinarily associated with courts.  Because 
the Board was functioning like a court without any of the traits ordinarily 
associated with an administrative body, there was solid support for the 
position of the Ways and Means Committee.  On the other hand, few 
congressmen advocated making the Board a court in form as well as in 
substance.  Even the Ways and Means Committee bill continued the status 
of the Board as an independent agency in the executive branch.194  Because 
of this refusal to recognize the Board as a court, a strong argument could be 
made against providing protections to Board members that historically had 
been generally reserved for courts. Theoretically, the question was a close 
one—as a practical matter, the decisive considerations were probably based 
on less lofty considerations. 
It is frequently difficult to convince a congressman, who has to run for 
reelection every two or six years, that some offices of the Government 
should be free of accountability to the people or their elected 
representatives.  Although the Constitution authorizes the creation of such 
offices, many people cannot escape the feeling that there is something 
fundamentally undemocratic in life tenure.  Accordingly, much of the 
debate on tenure focused on considerations that would be equally 
applicable to lifetime appointments to the Supreme Court as well as to the 
Board of Tax Appeals.  Congressman Doughton, for example, maintained 
that “to hold a member on, drawing full pay, when on account of age or 
disability he is unable to perform the duties of his office in a proper and 
satisfactory manner . . . [is] an unwise and indefensible policy.”195  The life 
tenure proposal was also criticized as “un-American, un-Democratic . . . 
                                                                                                                       
in sympathy with it and its policies.”  Id. at 3791 (1926) (remarks of Senator 
Harrison). 
193 Id. at 1131 (remarks of Mr. Collins). 
194 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
195 67 CONG. REC. 665 (1925). 
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un-Republican” and “extremely vicious.”196  “[I]t breeds and nurtures 
autocracy.  It is the womb of despotism.”197  One member, who did “not 
believe in a life-term office for the judiciary, particularly for judges of 
inferior courts,”198 asserted that life tenure was obnoxious to the “genius 
and spirit of American institutions.”199 
These views were apparently shared by an overwhelming majority of the 
House.200 Rather than suffer certain defeat on the floor, the Ways and 
Means Committee offered an amendment to its own bill eliminating tenure 
during good behavior and substituting a 14-year term for Board members, 
with the initial members having staggered terms of from eight to 14 years.201  
The amendment was adopted by a vote of 200 to 10.202 
In the Senate, the Finance Committee reported the bill preserving the 
ten-year term of office provided in the 1924 Act, believing that this tenure 
in combination with a $10,000 salary would be sufficient to retain the 
                                                     
196 Id. at 1133 (remarks of Mr. Lazier); see also id. at 1127 (remarks of Mr. 
Edwards). 
197 Id. at 1133 (remarks of Mr. Hill). 
198 Id. at 731 (remarks of Mr. Garrett). 
199 Id. 
200 Cf. id. at 1125 (remarks of Chairman Green).  The unpopularity of life 
tenure is further illustrated by the following quotes. 
It undermines the structure of our free institutions.  It strikes at the very 
heart of the Republic. Carried to its logical conclusion, it means autocracy, 
despotism and tyranny.  Let us strike it from this bill or announce that the 
words, “a government of the people, by the people, and for the people” are 
but barren sounds and that democracy has been stifled and time has barred 
appeal. 
Id. at 1133 (remarks of Mr. Hill). 
[I]t will only be a short time before this body will be setting aside the 
judgment of the legislative branch of the Government on questions of 
legislation; and the partisan press and the party leaders whose views this 
board will reflect, will declare their actions to be finalities and point to its 
immaculate wisdom and purity.  Statutes will be enacted which they will 
declare inoperative and this “August tribunal” will be referred to as if 
endowed with a wisdom unknown to the rest of mankind on tax questions. 
Id. at 1131 (remarks of Mr. Collins). 
If this board is to be created and its members hold office for life, you create 
an office-holding aristocracy and destroy the incentive for young men to 
qualify themselves for this service.  This proposal is the essence of 
bureaucratic government, and as Archibald Allison said nearly 100 years 
ago, in discussing conditions in France, that tyranny may be exercised by 
bureaus as well as by kings and autocrats. 
Id. at 1134 (remarks of Mr. Lozier). 
201 Id. at 1125.  
202 Id. at 1135. 
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services of “competent men.”203 Efforts were made on the Senate floor to 
reduce the term to five204 or six205 years, and the latter proposal failed 
passage by only two votes.206  In the conference between the House and 
Senate, a compromise of 12 years was reached207 and adopted in the final 
legislation.208  The 12-year term of office remained until 1969, when, as part 
of the amendments effected by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, it was 
increased to 15 years.209 
 
4. Removal of Members 
 
Under the 1924 Act, the exclusive statutory basis for removal of 
members was on the grounds of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”210  Only the President could exercise the power of 
removal and only for the reasons specified.  This removal provision had 
been inserted in 1924 as a means of further ensuring the independence of 
the Board from the Treasury Department.211  The 1926 Revenue Bill, as 
reported by the Ways and Means Committee, contained substantially the 
same removal procedure but additionally provided that removal could be 
effected only after “notice and opportunity for hearing.”212 
During the consideration of the 1926 bill, questions were raised 
concerning the propriety of the removal provision in light of the status of 
the Board.  If the offices were judicial, as some believed, then life tenure 
should be provided and removal should be exclusively by impeachment in 
the House and trial in the Senate.213  If, on the other hand, the members 
were executive officers, they should not have life tenure, and their removal 
should be by the President for any cause.214 
An amendment was offered on the House floor to strike out the 
restrictions on presidential removal on the theory that a Board member 
                                                     
203 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 35 (1926). 
204 67 CONG. REC. 3748 (1926). 
205 Id. at 379l. 
206 Id. at 3792. 
207 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 53 (1926). 
208 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, 
§ 901(b), 44 Stat. 106 
209 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 952(b), 83 Stat. 730 (amending I.R.C. § 7443(e)).   
210 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336.  
211 See Part II, notes 55–76 and accompanying text. 
212 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 901 
(1925). 
213 67 CONG. REC. 1130 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Summers). 
214 Id. at 1128 (remarks of Mr. Garret).  Arguably, however, even if the Board 
was purely executive in nature, the fact that Senate approval was necessary for 
appointment to the Board might justify restricting the power to remove to cases in 
which the Senate concurred.  See id. at 1132–33 (remarks of Mr. Collins). 
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might not be chargeable with inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance, 
yet be unfit for office, and the President ought to have the power to 
remove him.215  The amendment was rejected concurrently with 
modification of the tenure provision,216 and the two actions appear 
interrelated.  Although few congressmen were able to support life tenure 
for Board members,217 considerable sentiment existed in favor of protecting 
the Board insofar as possible from political pressure.218 Retaining the 
limited removal provision was a middle ground for accommodating the two 
positions, and a further illustration of the ambiguous status of the Board.  
As stated above, the procedure was open to criticism on constitutional 
grounds, but the criticism was relatively insubstantial, since the members of 
several preexisting agencies were similarly protected.219  The provision has 
remained in the law to the present day.220  
 
5. Restrictions on Practice 
 
The 1924 Act provided that no member, after leaving the Board, could 
practice before either the Bureau or the Board for a period of two years.221  
The limitation was only applicable to those members appointed after the 
expiration of the two-year temporary Board.222  Thus, Chairman Hamel and 
member Ivins, who had left the Board in 1925, were unaffected by the 
restriction. The provision had been inserted at the prompting of 
Congressman LaGuardia, who like others was concerned with the problem 
                                                     
215 Id. at 1133. 
216 Id. at 1135. 
217 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., 67 CONG. REC. 1134–35 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Mills). 
219 These agencies included the Board of General Appraisers, the Railroad 
Labor Board, the Federal Farm Loan Board, the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United 
States Tariff Commission, and the United States Shipping Board. Id. at 1135. 
220 I.R.C. § 7443(f).  In the course of the appeal of the Tax Court’s decision in 
Kuretski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-262 (generally rejecting the taxpayers’ 
challenges to the Commissioner’s determination to proceed with a proposed levy), 
the taxpayers contended that § 7443(f) is unconstitutional because the prospect of 
the President removing a Tax Court judge, who exercises the judicial power of the 
United States, violates separation-of-powers principles.  See Brief for Appellants, 
Kuretski v. Commissioner, Case No. 13-1090 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  The taxpayers 
therefore sought a declaration that § 7443(f) is  unconstitutional and a remand of 
their case to be heard before an adjudicator who was not subject to the removal 
power.  At the time of publication, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit had heard oral argument but had not issued its opinion in the 
case. 
221 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(c), 43 Stat. 337. 
222 Id. 
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of former government employees using their position and experience in 
public service for purposes of private gain.223  High turnover had been 
disrupting the operations of the Treasury Department—it had been termed 
“the Nation’s scandal”—and many felt that if the opportunity for 
capitalizing on the special expertise obtained in government work were 
removed the problem could be alleviated.224  Deferring the effective date of 
the provision had largely defused the issue in 1924, but it attracted an 
increasing amount of attention in the ensuing months. 
At the hearings of the Ways and Means Committee on the 1926 
Revenue Bill, several witnesses addressed the problem,225 and most agreed 
that the restriction should be eased.  Curiously, while the arguments in 
favor of the restriction were based on retaining the services of competent 
personnel, the critics of the limitation opposed it on virtually the same 
ground—that its effect would be to make recruitment more difficult since 
more flies could be caught “with honey than with vinegar.”226  According to 
former member Ivins, the practice restriction amounted to a “dishonorable 
discharge” from service on the Board and was “calculated to deter anyone 
with the requisite qualifications from accepting appointment.”227  Other 
critics of the restriction argued that members remained on the Board 
because of “devotion to service” rather than because of the practice 
limitation.228  Moreover, the practice limitation may well have played a part 
in the early resignation of two members of the original Board, and if the 
limitation was retained, other members of the Board might resign to retain 
the right to practice their profession.229  Finally, the argument was made 
that federal judges were not forbidden to practice before the courts of 
which they were formerly members, and no special considerations existed in 
the case of the Board to merit a different treatment.230  True, certain former 
employees of the Treasury were able to capitalize on the inside information 
they had acquired; but this was not the case with Board members.  The 
Board was independent of Treasury, and Board members’ familiarity with 
cases they worked on was derived from evidence introduced in public 
proceedings. 
Opponents of the practice limitations contained in the 1924 Act 
advanced several alternative proposals. One group suggested that the 
                                                     
223 See Part II, notes 114–118 and accompanying text. 
224 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 853 (remarks of Mr. Garner). 
225 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 81–82, 852–53, 884–85, 918, 929. 
226 Id. at 853 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Klein). 
227 Ivins, supra note 33, at 394. 
228 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 852 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Klein). 
229 Id. at 853, 918. 
230 Id. at 852 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Klein), 885 (testimony of George 
Morris, Am. Bar Ass’n) 
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restriction be eliminated entirely.231  Others proposed that a retired Board 
member only be barred from participating in a matter that was before the 
Board during his term in office.232  A third position was that the restriction 
could be eased, but its purpose retained, if it were only applied in the case 
of a member who failed to serve out his term.233  Although the Ways and 
Means Committee was generally sympathetic toward the Board, it chose not 
to adopt any of these proposals.  Rather, as reported by the Committee, the 
1926 bill provided that a retired member would not be permitted to practice 
before the Board for a four-year period after leaving office, and if a 
member were removed from office for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance, 
the member would be forever barred.234  In one sense, the Committee 
provision was a relaxation of the restriction contained in the 1924 Act 
because it did not bar a former member from practice before the Bureau.  
On the other hand, it extended the period of ineligibility to practice before 
the Board from two to four years, and indefinitely if the member was 
removed for cause.  The provision was a pointed illustration of the depth of 
the concern over high turnover, and apparently followed a proposal by Dr. 
T. S. Adams that the retention of the practice limitation would not 
prejudice recruiting competent personnel in view of the $10,000 salary and 
life tenure that was provided by other portions of the bill.235 
When the Committee members recognized that the life tenure provision 
would not pass the House floor, they offered an amendment reducing 
tenure to 14 years and eliminating the four-year bar on practice by former 
members.236  Tying elimination of the practice limitation to the elimination 
of life tenure was opposed by some members of the House, who believed 
that the restriction should be retained in any event.237 However, the 
lopsided margin by which the Committee amendment was adopted (200 to 
ten)238 indicated that most agreed with Chairman Green’s response to a 
die-hard advocate of practice limitations.  “If the gentleman wants to fix 
things so we can not get any good men on the board, that would be one 
way of doing it.”239 
Thus, as passed by the House, the bill only prohibited Board practice by 
members who had been removed for cause. The provision was retained in 
                                                     
231 Id. at 884–85. 
232 Id. at 82, 854. 
233 Id. at 919. 
234 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 902 
(1926), as reported to the House.  
235 See H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925).  
236 67 CONG. REC. 1125 (1925).  
237 Id. at 1126 (remarks of Mr. Lozier).  
238 Id. at 1135. 
239 Id. at 1126. 
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the final Act,240 and, with one modification, has remained the rule to the 
present.241 
 
6. Background of Members 
 
The controversy that surrounded the activities of members when they 
terminated their service on the Board was mirrored by the concern over the 
background of appointees.  For example, one proposal was made to require 
a bipartisan Board, with no more than nine members selected from any one 
political party.242  The membership of various other executive agencies was 
restricted in this manner, and the argument was made that the same policy 
should apply to the Board.  The proposal was not adopted, principally on 
the ground suggested by Chairman Green that the Board functioned as a 
court and limitation of the political affiliations of judicial appointments was 
inappropriate.243  Rather ingenuously, Chairman Green also stated that the 
politics of the members of the Board were both irrelevant and unknown.244  
Although Chairman Green’s profession of ignorance may have been 
honest, available evidence indicates that the Administration took a keener 
interest in the subject.245 
Another source of concern over the background of Board members 
related to the suspicion that appointments were made on the basis of 
favoritism. “[A] remarkable number . . . [are] related to distinguished 
gentlemen in the public service.”246  The four members who were 
appointed in March of 1925 all had apparently close ties to members of the 
Ways and Means Committee or the Finance Committee. Opposition 
erupted when the nominations were announced, but quickly diminished, 
and the appointments were expeditiously confirmed.247  The memory 
nevertheless apparently still rankled some, although no specific proposal 
was made to legislate an end to the practice. 
The greatest concern over the background of Board members related to 
their past employment by Treasury or by the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, 
                                                     
240 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 902, 
44 Stat. 106.  
241 I.R.C. § 7443(g). In 1953, when retired pay was provided for Tax Court 
judges, a proviso was inserted requiring a judge to forfeit retired pay if, after 
retirement, he obtains employment with the Federal Government or performs 
“legal or accounting services in the field of Federal taxation . . . .”  I.R.C. § 
7447(f)(2), added by Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 352, 67 Stat. 482. 
242 67 CONG. REC. 1126 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Moore). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 See Part II, notes 180–188 and accompanying text. 
246 67 CONG. REC. 3752 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Reed). 
247 See Part II, notes 187–188 and accompanying text. 
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an official of the Justice Department, who was the legal counsel of the 
Commissioner.248  When the first appointments to the Board were 
announced in the summer of 1924, a wave of protest issued from 
accountants and, to a lesser extent, lawyers.249  They felt that the purpose of 
Congress in removing the Board from the Treasury Department and 
making it an independent executive agency would be thwarted if Treasury 
played a part in selecting appointees for the Board.  Even more damaging 
would be a Board dominated by former employees of the tax collection 
system, supposedly imbued with a pro-Government bias, and of the first 12 
appointees, five came directly from employment with Treasury or the 
Solicitor, three had been so employed previously, and two had been officials 
of state taxing agencies.250 
After the Board began operation, the furor soon subsided.  By the time 
congressional consideration of the 1926 Revenue Bill had begun, 
accounting and legal associations were unanimous in their respect for the 
independence of the Board.251  Nevertheless, the issue revived when the bill 
reached the Senate floor, where an amendment was adopted with no 
discussion that would have made ineligible for appointment to the Board 
any person who within two years had been an “attaché” of the Bureau; the 
provision was made inapplicable to those then members of the Board.252  
Although there was apparently strong support for the amendment in the 
Senate, the provision was deleted by the House-Senate conference,253 and 
no such limitation was contained in the Act as finally passed. 
The controversy seemed to have ended with the enactment of the 1926 
legislation in February of that year.  However, on May 26, 1926, it again 
surfaced with the announcement of the names of the 16 individuals whom 
President Coolidge nominated for appointment to the Board.254  Thirteen 
of the nominees were holdovers from the old Board of 15, and their 
nominations did not arouse opposition.255  The two members who were not 
                                                     
248 The 1926 Act eliminated the position of Solicitor and replaced it with the 
General Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, an official of the Treasury 
Department. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1201, 44 Stat. 126. 
249 See Part II, notes 196–214 and accompanying text. 
250 See Part II, notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
251 See Part II, notes 295–306 and accompanying text. 
252 67 CONG. REC. 3754 (1926) (amendment offered by Sen. Glass). 
253 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 53 (1926). 
254 Thirteen Members of Board of Tax Appeals Reappointed, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 
206 (1926). 
255 These individuals were:  Charles Rogers Arundell, William R. Green Jr., 
Jules Gilmer Korner Jr., William C. Lansdon, Benjamin H. Littleton, William D. 
Love, John J. Marquette, Logan Morris, Percy W. Phillips, Charles P. Smith, John 
M. Sternhagen, Charles M. Trammell, and Sumner L. Trussell. Id. 
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reappointed, A.E. Grapnel and Albert E. James, both Republicans,256 were 
widely rumored to have been passed over because of their differences of 
opinion with the Board’s Chairman, Jules Gilmer Korner, concerning 
“administrative matters.”257  Of the three new appointees, two had no 
Bureau affiliation and were noncontroversial.258  The third, however, John 
B. Milliken, was an Assistant Solicitor of Internal Revenue, and his 
nomination provoked the fury of the Senators who had originally led the 
effort to prohibit appointment of former employees of the Bureau.  These 
Senators, led by Carter Glass of Virginia and George W. Norris of 
Nebraska, believed that the Milliken nomination was inconsistent with the 
expressed “judgment of the Senate,”259 and a resolution was proposed to 
express “the sense of the Senate” that future appointments to the Board 
should only be made in accordance with the provisions of the Senate 
amendment that had been eliminated by the conference from the 1926 
Act.260 The resolution sparked rather lengthy debate and afforded an 
opportunity for Senator Norris to repeat, in a different context, the same 
points he made in 1924 in successfully arguing for reduction of the salaries 
of Board members from $10,000 to $7,500.261 
 
Considerable has been said at various times, in conversations and 
otherwise, to the effect that the members of this board ought to be 
experts, and that they ought to come from a bureau that is dealing 
with tax questions.  I want to say just a few words about that point. 
These men are going to occupy positions which are easier to fill 
than that any judge anywhere in the United States of general 
jurisdiction now occupies, so far as work is concerned. In any State 
court in this Union a judge of general jurisdiction, who tries a 
                                                     
256 See Part II, note 182 and accompanying text. 
257 67 CONG. REC. 10817–18 (1926). 
258 J. Edgar Murdock was formerly an assistant district attorney in 
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania; Ernest H. Van Fossan had been the Director 
of Claims for the U.S. Shipping Board.  Thirteen Members of Board of Tax Appeals 
Reappointed, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 206 (1926).  
259 67 CONG. REC. 10812 (1926) (remarks of Mr. Glass). 
260 S. Res. 242, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).  As introduced, the resolution 
provided: 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that hereafter no person who has 
been an attaché of the United States Bureau of Internal Revenue should be 
appointed to any vacancy on the Board of Tax Appeals until at least two 
years have elapsed since such official connection with said Bureau. 
67 CONG. REC. 10764 (1926). 
Some question existed whether the resolution, if adopted, would apply to the 
Milliken nomination, which was then before the Senate for confirmation.  The 
intent that it would not was made clear.  Id. at 10814, 10816, 10818. 
261 See Part II, notes 126–135 and accompanying text. 
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criminal case to-day, a civil case to-morrow, a tax case the next day, 
and a replevin case the day after that, as far as work is concerned, as 
far as study is concerned, has more work to do than anyone of these 
appointees. As far as ability is concerned, it requires at least as much, 
because the jurisdiction of such a judge covers a world of subjects 
and a great deal of ground upon which technicalities may arise. 
These men are going to adjudicate one law, practically, pass on 
one statute, and the questions which arise under it. Even though he 
had never read the statute, any lawyer in a few days’ time could easily 
become familiar with it and be able to fill completely and entirely all 
the requirements of a position on this board.262 
 
The author of the resolution, Senator Glass, believed that it should be 
prospective only and should not apply to the 16 nominations that had been 
recently presented for Senate confirmation.263  Senator Norris, on the other 
hand, believed that if the principle behind the resolution was sound, it 
should be applied to the current nominations as well, and he offered an 
amendment to that effect.264  A third alternative, offered by Senator Heflin, 
                                                     
262 67 CONG. REC. 10813 (1926). 
263 See supra note 260. 
264 67 CONG. REC. 10813 (1926).  One highlight of the debate was an 
interchange between Senator Norris and an opponent of the amendment, Senator 
Ashurst, who believed that since a provision similar to S. Res. 242 had been 
removed from the 1926 Act, the resolution should not be retroactive: 
Mr. ASHURST. . . . I wish it distinctly understood that no one who has 
served a day in the Senate with the esteemed Senator from Nebraska would 
think of him for a moment in connection with any purpose other than that 
moved by a high order of statesmanship.  But I do say, if the Senator will 
pardon me further, and this will appeal to the logic of my friend, whom I 
recognize as a logician, that the Senate first went on record as opposed to 
nominating for membership on the Tax Appeals Board men in the bureau.  
The Senate went on record in that fashion, did it not? 
Mr. NORRIS. Yes; it went on record. 
Mr. ASHURST. The next and only action taken by the Senate since that 
time upon the same subject was the action recalling that first action — 
Mr. NORRIS. Oh, no. 
Mr. ASHURST. Otherwise the amendment would be in the law to-day. 
Mr. NORRIS. I do not agree with the Senator in that statement. 
Mr. ASHURST. It required action on the part of the Senate before we 
could dispose of that matter. 
Mr. NORRIS. The Senate did recede; I admit that. 
Mr. ASHURST. Is not the Senator, therefore, bound to admit that the 
previous action on this subject by the Senate cancelled and recalled its prior 
action? 
Mr. NORRIS. No; I do not admit that. 
Mr. ASHURST. Then we did not take any action at all. 
Improving the Board of Tax Appeals                     159 
 
would have barred appointment of any person who had, during the 
previous two-year period, worked as a “tax expert” for “private” 
interests.265  The resolution was adopted, but without the Norris and Heflin 
modifications.266  On the following day, the Senate confirmed the new 
nominations to the Board, including that of Mr. Milliken.267 
For almost four years, there was adherence to the terms of the Senate 
resolution; four new Board members were appointed to succeed retiring 
members, and none had served with the Bureau within two years of their 
appointment.268  Then, in 1930, the President nominated the first woman 
Board member, Annabel Matthews, who was on the staff of the 
Interpretative Division of the General Counsel to the Commissioner. 
Amidst statements that her case was not to be a precedent for the future, 
and justifications based on her replacement of a member who had come to 
the Board from the Solicitor’s office, her nomination was confirmed.269  
Following Matthews’ appointment, several individuals joined the Board and 
Tax Court after recent service with Treasury with no resulting 
controversy.270 
 
F. Practice and Procedure 
 
By its terms, the 1924 Act left the resolution of most procedural and 
evidentiary issues to the discretion of the Board.271  But despite the broad 
latitude granted in the statute, the Board felt constrained to adopt, in 
general, judicial forms of procedure.272  Provisions for pleadings were based 
on those prevailing in courts, and similar provisions were made for 
                                                                                                                       
Mr. NORRIS. I will concede the Senator has a right to take that view of 
it. 
Mr. ASHURST. Then I will have to withdraw some of the praise which a 
moment ago I gave the Senator as a logician. [Laughter.] 
Mr. NORRIS. The Senator can not get me to agree to something that I 
do not believe in by calling me a logician. [Laughter.] 
Id. at 10815. 
265 Id. at 10813, 10816-17. 
266 Id. at 10818. 
267 N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1926, at 22, col. 8. 
268 The appointees during this period were Eugene Black, Stephen J. 
McMahon, Herbert F. Seawell, and Forest D. Siefkin.  
269 See 8 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 105 (1930). 
270 Those judges included Craig S. Atkins, Howard A. Dawson Jr., William M. 
Fay, Clarence V. Opper, Irene Feagin Scott, Charles R. Simpson, Norman O. 
Tietjens, Russell E. Train, and Bolon B. Turner. Today, it is common for 
individuals to join the Tax Court bench from private practice, from the staffs of 
congressional tax committees, or from the Service.   
271 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
272 See Part II, notes 219–229 and accompanying text. 
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motions, briefs, depositions, calendars, subpoenas, and admission to 
practice.273  The Board adopted judicial standards for the receipt of 
evidence,274 and, as in federal court tax proceedings, imposed the burden of 
proof on the taxpayer.275  In 1926, some attention was directed to these 
matters, but the new legislation made few changes. 
Minor criticism had been directed at the Board for its adoption of 
judicial rules of practice and procedure.276  Because the Board was formally 
at least an agency in the executive branch, many persons who were familiar 
with practice before the Bureau of Internal Revenue expected Board 
procedure to continue the informality that had obtained before the Income 
Tax Unit and the Committee on Appeals and Review.277  The adoption of 
formal practice requirements left these expectations unfulfilled, and the 
unfamiliarity of many tax practitioners, particularly accountants, with 
judicial forms of procedure led to costly errors by taxpayers’ 
representatives.  Arguably the purpose in creating the Board was subverted 
when faulty pleadings, failures of proof, or other formalistic irregularities 
resulted in a large number of otherwise meritorious cases being lost on 
purely procedural grounds.  A further difficulty with formal procedures was 
found in the additional time required for the Board’s consideration and 
disposition of cases.278  Certainly, informal procedures would be more 
expeditious.  Moreover, the publicity associated with the judicial type 
proceedings required by the 1924 Act279 was criticized as forcing taxpayers 
to choose between unattractive alternatives—either pay the tax or disclose 
private financial and business matters to creditors and competitors.280 
Comment was also directed at the Board rule requiring the taxpayer to 
bear the burden of proving the deficiency erroneous, and some argued that 
because the Government was the party seeking to impose an additional tax, 
it should be required to show some rational basis for the proposed 
action.281  In less than dazzling displays of legal erudition, it was alleged that 
placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer was “contrary to established 
                                                     
273 See generally B.T.A. Rules of Practice and Procedure (July, 1924 ed.). 
274 See, e.g., Bruce & Human Drug Co., 1 B.T.A. 342 (1925); Lee Sturgess, 2 
B.T.A. 69 (1925); Harlan A. Allen, 2 B.T.A. 794 (1925). 
275 B.T.A. RULE 20 (July, 1924 ed.). 
276 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 937–38, 943–44; Should the Board of 
Tax Appeals Modify its Rules of Practice?, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 270 (1924). 
277 See Part II, notes 244–269 and accompanying text. 
278 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 943 (testimony of L.R. Gottlieb, Nat’l 
Industrial Conference Board). 
279 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
280 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 943–44 (testimony of L.R. Gottlieb, 
Nat’l Industrial Conference Board). 
281 See id. at 877 (testimony of Edward Gore, American Institute of 
Accountants). 
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legal practice”282 and violated the Anglo-Saxon presumption of 
innocence.283  
Finally, controversy was created by the Board’s rule permitting practice 
by attorneys and certified public accountants.284  The Bureau did not restrict 
the persons who could practice before it so long as the applicant was of 
good moral character and could demonstrate “satisfactory educational 
qualifications and evidence of an ability to understand tax questions . . . .”285  
For this reason some argued that admission to practice before the Board 
should be more liberal.286  However, the Board’s judicial procedure led 
others to conclude that the admission rules were too liberal and only 
attorneys should be permitted to practice.287 
Criticism on these counts was relatively sparse and ineffectual, and no 
serious effort was launched to undo either the court-like practice before the 
Board or the compromise effected with respect to admission to practice.  If 
anything, the difficulties encountered by the Board in requiring 
conformance to its rules strengthened the position of those who argued 
that the Board should be made a court in name as well as substance.288  If 
this had been done, confusion concerning the nature of the Board would 
have been reduced and persons practicing before it would have better 
understood that the informal procedures applied in the Bureau were not to 
be used. 
No change in the Board’s general rules of practice and procedure were 
made as a result of the 1926 Act. In the view of Chairman Korner, none 
were necessary because the 1926 amendments, although significant in other 
areas, did not materially affect the conduct of Board proceedings.289  
Nevertheless, controversy did arise in connection with the Board’s rule on 
admission to practice.290  Because Board decisions could be appealed 
directly to the circuit courts after the 1926 Act, there was some question as 
to the propriety of permitting certified public accountants to continue to 
                                                     
282 Id. at 849 (testimony of D.A. Smith, American Paper and Pulp Assoc.).  In 
fact, the rule was well established in the federal courts that taxpayers had the 
burden of proof in refund actions. See, e.g., Germantown Trust Co. v. Lederer, 263 
F. 672 (3d Cir. 1920). 
283 Id. at 877 (testimony of Edward Gore, American Institute of Accountants). 
284 B.T.A. RULE 2 (July, 1924 ed.). See Should the Board of Tax Appeals Modify its 
Rules of Practice?, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 270 (1924). 
285 Circular 230, II-2 CUM. BULL. 372, 373 (1923). 
286 Should the Board of Tax Appeals Modify its Rules of Practice?, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 270, 271 (1924). 
287 Id. at 271, 277. 
288 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
289 J. Gilmer Korner, Procedure in the Appeal of Tax Cases Under the Revenue Act of 
1926, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 413, 415 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Korner]. 
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represent taxpayers before the Board.  Only attorneys were admitted to 
practice in the circuit courts, and a taxpayer who was represented in the 
Board by an accountant would have to retain an attorney if the case were 
appealed.  Obviously some duplication of effort and additional expense 
would attend such a change of counsel.  Moreover, since the proceeding on 
appeal would not be de novo, as it had been under the 1924 Act, the record 
compiled in the Board would be of great importance in the ultimate 
outcome of the case.  All but one of the members of the Board were 
lawyers,291 and apparently they generally believed that attorneys were better 
able than accountants to prepare a record before the Board that would 
withstand appellate scrutiny.292  Nevertheless, probably as the result of 
pressure from accounting associations, no change was made in the rule 
permitting accountants to practice.  That this decision was arrived at 
reluctantly was indicated by Chairman Korner’s suggestion that an 
accountant would only be justified in appearing for a client before the 
Board if the accountant could determine in advance that the client would be 
willing to abide by an unfavorable decision of the Board and that the 
Government would be unlikely to appeal if the Board decision went against 
it.293  Obviously, not many cases could meet these requirements. 
The only significant statutory amendment in 1926 with respect to Board 
procedure related to the rules of evidence to be applied.  Despite statutory 
authority in the 1924 Act to develop its own rules of evidence,294 the Board 
refused to do so. As was pointed out by Chairman Green of the Ways and 
Means Committee, it would have been impracticable for the Board to 
“write a treatise on evidence.”295  Rather, the Board concluded that it must 
follow evidentiary rules generally accepted by courts.296  Because its 
proceedings did not involve juries, the Board chose to adopt the liberal 
rules of evidence applicable in equity proceedings.297  But these rules were 
neither codified nor uniform, and because they differed from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, the Board had the problem of identifying the particular rules to 
follow. Apparently, the Board chose to follow generally the evidentiary rules 
applicable in the particular jurisdiction in which a case was tried.298  Most 
                                                     
291 W. C. Lansdon, who served on the Board from 1924–34, was an economist 
and journalist. He was the only non-lawyer ever appointed to the Board/Tax 
Court. 
292 See Korner, supra note 289. 
293 Id. 
294 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
295 67 CONG. REC. 1143 (1925). 
296 See Part II, notes 261–265 and accompanying text. 
297 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 929 (testimony of former 
Chairman Hamel). 
298 See Memorandum from Thomas C. Lavery to Robert H. Jackson, General 
Counsel, c. August, 1935, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence.” 
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cases were tried in the District of Columbia,299 and as a result those rules 
were most often applied.  In any event, the particular rules applied were not 
of critical importance under the 1924 Act, because Board decisions were 
not final and could be collaterally reviewed in district court or the Court of 
Claims.300  
The changes made in the 1926 Act with respect to the appealability of 
Board decisions made the identification of applicable evidentiary rules more 
important.  Board decisions were no longer subject to collateral review; 
once the jurisdiction of the Board was invoked, it would serve as the 
exclusive trial forum.301  For this reason, the proper factual development of 
a case before the Board was essential—errors by counsel or the Board 
could no longer be corrected in a subsequent proceeding. Moreover, rulings 
by the Board on the admissibility of evidence were clearly within the scope 
of appellate review,302 and a more certain identification of the applicable 
evidentiary rules became essential.303 
Accordingly, the 1926 Act removed the reference to Board 
determination of rules of evidence and required the Board to follow the 
rules applied “in courts of equity of the District of Columbia.”304  Equity 
rules were selected because they were the most permissive in admitting 
evidence.305  More specifically, the equity rules applicable in the District of 
Columbia were chosen over the equity rules applicable in the federal court 
for the district in which the Board happened to hear an appeal because each 
district court applied the rules of evidence of the state in which it sat.306  To 
require the Board to apply 48 different rules of evidence depending on 
where it tried a case was felt to be too onerous a burden to impose.307 
 
G. Division Decisions and Expediting the Board’s Workload 
 
The Bureau of Internal Revenue’s Committee on Appeals and Review, 
which was the forerunner of the Board of Tax Appeals, had generally 
                                                     
299 See Part II, notes 270–284 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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functioned in divisions comprised of three committee members.308  
Probably the Committee could have processed more cases had it used 
single-member divisions, but certain advantages were gained by collegial 
review of cases.  This was especially true in the case of the Committee, the 
members of which were divided among lawyers, accountants, and engineers 
whose different fields of expertise could be brought to bear in the solution 
of problems.  Because the Committee’s proceedings were not public and 
because it functioned pursuant to informal procedures, the inefficiency 
inherent in having three committee members consider a single case never 
presented a critical problem.  The Committee managed to stay relatively 
current with its heavy workload.309 
The original Administration proposal for the creation of the Board of 
Tax Appeals sought generally to perpetuate the character and procedures of 
the Committee on Appeals and Review; it provided for informal procedures 
and for the designation of divisions and division chiefs.310  Without stating 
so directly, the proposal indicated that divisions would be comprised of at 
least three members.311 
Congress, however, modified the Mellon plan to make the Board’s 
functions more nearly judicial than those of the Committee;312 not only 
were written findings of fact required in every case, as proposed by the 
Administration,313 but written opinions were required as well whenever the 
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.314  Additionally, Board 
proceedings had to be open to the public and conducted in accordance with 
judicial standards of procedure.315  Even though these modifications 
virtually assured that membership on the Board would be confined to 
                                                     
308 For a discussion of the Committee on Appeals and Review, see Part I, notes 
221–256 and accompanying text.  
309 See Part II, note 91. 
310 Committee Print No. 1 of the Revenue Bill of 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 1000(b), (e) (Dec. 19, 1923) [hereinafter cited as 1924 Administration Bill]. 
311 Id. § 1000(b) provided: 
The chairman, with the approval of the Secretary, may from time to time 
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lawyers,316 the portion of the Administration proposal authorizing the 
creation of divisions was retained.317  Its retention may have resulted either 
from a failure to recognize that the inter-disciplinary nature of the 
Committee would not be carried forward and therefore no benefit would be 
derived from multi-member divisions, or from a belief that sounder 
decisions could be obtained through a collegial process even when the 
background and training of the judicial officers were similar. 
Although the statute provided for the creation of divisions, it clearly 
indicated that decisions could be made by the full Board as well.318   
Chairman Hamel initially refrained from exercising his authority to create 
divisions, with the result that the first few cases were heard en banc.319  By 
the end of the summer of 1924, it was apparent that the Board would not 
be able to handle the numerous cases coming up for trial if the en banc 
practice was retained, and in September Mr. Hamel divided his 12-member 
Board into three divisions—one division had three members320 and two 
others had four members each.321  With the appointment of four additional 
members in March 1925, a fourth division was created.322  The Chairman of 
the Board, who had important administrative and review responsibilities, 
was excluded from membership on a division. 
As the number of appeals to the Board increased, the issue of division 
size soon emerged as part of a general concern with productivity.  A great 
many small cases were being filed, 323 and the question was raised whether 
special small case divisions should be established having only a single 
member.324  Obviously, a greater number of cases could be disposed of in 
this manner, but ambiguities in the 1924 Act created doubt as to whether 
                                                     
316 See Part II, notes 213–215 and accompanying text. 
317 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
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divisions of less than three were authorized.325  Because of uncertainty over 
this question, no special small case divisions were established.326 
With the congressional consideration of the Revenue Bill of 1926, a 
proposal was advanced to eliminate any inference that divisions must be 
comprised of more than a single member.327  Supporters of the proposal 
argued that one-member divisions would enable the Board to hear more 
cases both in Washington and in the field by increasing the number of 
divisions; that individual members would be able to devote more time to 
the consideration of cases with a resulting increase of decisions; and that 
the Board as a whole would be able to review more division decisions 
because of the reduced burden on the individual members.328  The House 
adopted the proposal but required that decisions by single-member 
divisions be reviewed by the entire Board.329 Obviously, the proviso 
attached to single-member divisions was a vestige of the belief in the value 
of collegial decisions.  The Senate, probably at the urging of the Board, 
adopted the authorization for single-member divisions without the 
requirement of Board review.330  The Senate version prevailed in 
conference.331 Although the roots of the single-member division proposal 
lay in the concern over small cases, no limitation was imposed on the use of 
small divisions. 
Four months after the passage of the 1926 Act, the Board adopted a 
“plan of reorganization,” which had as its foundation the institution of 
one-member divisions.332  By this time a substantial backlog of cases had 
developed, and the problem of productivity was becoming acute.  More 
than 11,000 cases were pending before the Board and new appeals averaged 
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800 to 900 per month.333  In contrast, for fiscal 1926, the Board had 
managed to dispose of cases at the rate of slightly more than 300 per 
month.334 
There was considerable concern on the Board with its growing docket 
of cases.335  From a purely personal point of view, the members must have 
viewed with some alarm the increasing popularity of their new agency.  
Throughout the first two years of the Board’s existence, they had invested 
enormous time in discharging their duties.  It is doubtful that they had 
much time or energy to devote to their personal lives.336  One can well 
imagine their frustration at being unable to decrease the backlog with these 
efforts. But aside from the personal sacrifices required, they also recognized 
the danger to the Board if it became so overwhelmed with work that it 
could not discharge its statutory mandate to decide cases “as quickly as 
practicable.”337 Some persons professing to be friendly to the Board were 
already beginning to call for modifications in the law that would decrease 
the importance of the Board in tax litigation.  For example, one proposal 
was made to give the federal district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Board to redetermine deficiencies.338  Naturally, Board members opposed 
such a plan,339 because its adoption might well have resulted in the Board’s 
immediate obsolescence.  To forestall these proposals some action was 
necessary to make the Board more efficient. 
Part of the workload problem was beyond the control of the Board.  
For example, many taxpayers were appealing from deficiency assertions that 
were clearly proper.340  The Board hoped that the newly authorized 
imposition of a $10 filing fee341 would decrease the number of frivolous 
appeals, and, in fact, evidence soon indicated that the filing fee was 
reducing appeals by 25 percent.342 
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Another cause of the growing backlog could be attributed to audit 
practices in the Bureau. Many conferees in the Income Tax Unit were 
hesitant to settle cases on a basis acceptable to taxpayers. They were 
probably concerned that their careers would be retarded if they became 
known as pro-taxpayer.  The availability of the Board procedure 
undoubtedly encouraged this practice since an aggrieved taxpayer would 
have a further appeal before having to pay a disputed tax.  Additionally, 
many appeals resulted from the issuance of deficiency notices to preserve 
the Bureau’s position in the face of an imminent tolling of the statute of 
limitations.  Finally, many erroneous deficiencies were asserted as a result of 
field audits that were not reviewed by the generally more competent staff 
located in the Bureau’s central office in Washington.343  Interestingly, 
decentralization of the audit function during this period was being urged as 
a means of reducing the Bureau’s backlog of unaudited returns.344 The 
errors thereby spawned served to increase the Board’s backlog. 
The Board received assurances that Treasury was endeavoring to solve 
these problems,345 but Chairman Korner was convinced that the Board 
must take steps of its own to increase the number of cases it could 
handle.346  To this end the Board adopted two significant procedural 
changes.  First, the four multi-member divisions were replaced by 16 
single-member divisions.347  An indication of how quickly the backlog 
problem developed was that, under the reorganization plan, single-member 
divisions were to hear all appeals, even though the authorization for these 
divisions was justified principally as a means of disposing of small cases. 
The second procedural modification involved Board review of division 
decisions. Up until this time, the entire Board reviewed every decision prior 
to its promulgation.348  The statute had never required such review,349 but 
the importance of uniformity of decision was believed to make the practice 
necessary.  Board review, however, consumed considerable time, and 
Chairman Korner believed that a great number of cases simply involved the 
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application of well-established precedents to disputed facts.  In these 
situations, he urged that review by the full Board was unnecessary and 
proposed that the Board should employ an expert, to be called either a 
“coordinator” or “administrative assistant,” to review division decisions and 
make recommendations as to whether they deserved consideration by the 
entire Board.350 Chairman Korner, however, was not prepared to dispense 
altogether with collegial review, and a further element of his plan was the 
grouping of single-member divisions into “parts” comprised of three 
divisions. Division decisions would be reviewed by the parts much as they 
had been formerly reviewed by the entire Board; the decisions would then 
be forwarded to the Chairman and the coordinator, who would determine 
on a case by case basis whether full Board review was necessary.351 
Although the Board members had no objection to the use of 
single-member divisions,352 a majority were unwilling to accept the Korner 
proposal insofar as it eliminated the necessity for full Board review of 
division decisions.353  The legislative history of the 1926 Act indicated that 
Congress believed Board review to be of the utmost importance354 and little 
sentiment existed in favor of thwarting congressional expectations.355 
Accordingly, a compromise was struck.  The services of a coordinator 
would not be retained and the Chairman would continue to refer all 
division decisions to the full Board for review. However, the proposal to 
group the single-member divisions into parts would be retained, and the 
parts would be given the additional duty of recommending to the Chairman 
whether a case should be given “full consideration by the Board” or should 
be promulgated without “exhaustive Board consideration.”356 Hopefully, 
this procedure would reduce the burden on the Board while preserving the 
practice deemed so important by Congress. 
The system thus adopted was retained for only a year.  In the spring of 
1927, the Board changed to an approach similar to that originally proposed 
                                                     
350 Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 326, at 10–16. 
351 Id. 
352 The creation of the divisions was, under the statute, solely within the 
province of the Chairman.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue 
Act of 1924, § 906(a), 44 Stat. 106. 
353 B.T.A. Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
354 “The committee . . . is of the opinion that the great value of the board lies 
in its practice in meeting regularly for common discussion and consideration of 
opinions prepared and proposed to be issued.”  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925). 
355 As with the selection of divisions, the decision to call for Board review was, 
under the statute, within the discretion of the Chairman.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 
27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 906(b), 44 Stat. 106.  Thus, Chairman 
Korner could have enforced his will on the Board.  That he did not is indicative of 
the collegial nature of the Board. 
356 B.T.A. Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
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by Chairman Korner.  Division decisions would be reviewed by the parts 
and then forwarded to the Chairman who would decide whether full Board 
review would be desirable.  If cases were reviewed by the full Board, such 
would be indicated in the published reports.  If no Board review was given, 
the names of the members of the part that had considered the case would 
be printed with the report of the case.357  Five years later, with the abolition 
of parts, the present system was adopted, under which division decisions 
are forwarded directly to the Chief Judge who then determines whether or 
not the full court should review.358 
The benefits of the streamlined procedure soon became apparent, and 
the number of cases disposed of by the Board increased from 3,900 in 1926 
to 5,400 in 1927.359  With the elimination of the necessity for Board review 
in every case, further efficiencies were achieved, and in 1928 the Board 




The creation of the Board in 1924 and the statutory modifications 
accomplished in 1926 were responsive to a basic need of tax administration:  
the provision of a procedure for pre-assessment adjudication of tax 
disputes.  As has been described in this and the preceding parts of the 
study, controversy surrounded the determination of the best means of 
filling this need; hence, the statutory rules concerning the Board resulted 
from a series of compromises.  But even though the statutory structure of 
the Board did not completely conform to the views of any single group, 
certain general characteristics of the new agency could be identified, 
characteristics which in large measure have remained unchanged over the 
years. 
The most important of these characteristics resulted from the 
recognition that the adjudicating body should be independent of the agency 
charged with the collection function.  The Board was spawned in a period 
of general disfavor with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which was 
experiencing considerable difficulty in coping with the administrative 
problems created by the new broad-based income and profits taxes.361  
Among the Bureau’s real or imagined defects were inefficiency, 
arbitrariness, and favoritism.  The original Administration proposal for 
creation of the Board provided that the Board would be independent of the 
Bureau, but would remain a part of the Treasury Department.362  Such a 
                                                     
357 B.T.A. Conference Minutes, May 31, 1927, June 3, 1927. 
358 B.T.A. Conference Minutes, April 1, 8, 1932. 
359 See Part II, note 113. 
360 Id. 
361 See generally Part I, notes 52–141 and accompanying text. 
362 See Part II, notes 25–54 and accompanying text. 
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connection with the Bureau, albeit indirect, proved unacceptable to 
Congress.  The Board ultimately was established separate from both 
Treasury and the Bureau as an independent agency in the executive branch 
of Government.363  It retained this status for almost half a century.  
Although its members originally had been chosen largely on 
recommendations from Treasury officials and it has had to work closely 
with the tax collection agency (which has been a party in every one of its tax 
proceedings), the Board and later the Tax Court has striven to maintain its 
independence in both substance and appearance.  Its success in this 
endeavor is suggested by the fact that throughout its history no serious 
charge of conscious partiality has ever been leveled against it.364  The issue 
of independence has continued to be a major theme of Tax Court affairs 
and was largely responsible for the court’s change of status in 1969 from an 
independent agency in the executive branch to a legislative court.365  This 
issue also figured prominently in the provision of the Tax Court with its 
own building in 1974.  Until that time, for most of its history, the 
                                                     
363 See Part II, notes 55–97 and accompanying text. 
364 Occasionally, critics have contended that the court’s lack of full judicial 
status may cause it to unconsciously favor the Government.  See B. Anthony 
Billings, D. Larry Crumbley & L. Murphy Smith, Are U.S. Tax Court Decisions Subject 
to the Bias of the Judge?, 55 TAX NOTES 1259 (1992); Deborah A. Geier, The Tax 
Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee:  A 
Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 997–99 (1991); 
Daniel Ginsberg, Is the Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 MISS. L.J. 382 (1964); see also J. 
Edward Maule, Instant Replays, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls:  An Empirical Study of 
Alleged Tax Court Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351, 355–63 (1999) (recounted the then-
existing charges that the Tax Court decisions exhibited bias in favor of the 
Government).  Not surprisingly, a few Tax Court judges have gone on record to 
dispute allegations of bias. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an 
Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 25–26, 28 (1995) (describing why it is 
“myopic to derive any meaningful conclusion of bias based solely on statistics of 
the prevailing party in the Tax Court,” concluding that taxpayers “need not have 
any anxiety with respect to claims of alleged pro-government bias” at the Tax 
Court); Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The United States Tax Court:  Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 15 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 1, 5 (1998) (describing the characterization of the 
Tax Court as a pro-Government tribunal as “a canard that has existed for a long 
time”). In a 1999 article, Professor James Maule undertook an empirical 
examination of whether a pro-Government bias exists at the Tax Court, one that 
focused on the resolution of issues by the Tax Court that present the opportunity 
for the exertion of bias, rather than focusing on overall case outcomes than can 
have a variety of contributing causes.  Maule, supra at 365–67.  He concluded that 
no pro-Government bias exists.  Id. at 425–26.    
365 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7441). 
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Board/Tax Court366 had been physically located in the Internal Revenue 
Building. 
A second characteristic of the Board/Tax Court has involved the nature 
of its proceedings. The Coolidge Administration favored informal 
proceedings as a means of expediting the Board’s work,367 but Congress 
insisted on the more formal practice of courts.368  In Congress’ view the 
interests of precision, publicity of proceedings, and the establishment of a 
cohesive body of precedents were of paramount importance and could only 
be achieved by a judicial-type body.  Undoubtedly, the strictures of formal 
procedures have slowed the handling of cases, and the problem of backlog 
has plagued the Board/Tax Court almost from the first.  Nevertheless, the 
tax laws are of such intrinsic complexity that the need for a specialized 
“court” to resolve disputes and formulate interpretations has not been 
questioned since 1924.  The Board/Tax Court has continuously operated 
pursuant to judicial procedures and its member/judges,369 especially in 
recent times, usually have been selected from the swelling ranks of the tax 
bar.  Efforts to increase the efficiency with which tax disputes are 
adjudicated generally have been restricted to improvements of 
administrative procedures within the Bureau/Service370 and increased 
reliance on streamlined judicial procedures that encourage pre-trial 
settlements.371 
                                                     
366 Any effort to describe events spanning the history of the Board of Tax 
Appeals and the Tax Court is met with a formidable problem of nomenclature.  In 
1942, the name of the Board of Tax Appeals was changed to the Tax Court of the 
United States.  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 957.  At that time, 
“members” of the Board became “judges” of the court. Id. The “Chairman” of the 
Board was changed to the “Presiding Judge” of the court. Id.  In 1948, the 
“Presiding Judge” became the “Chief Judge.”  Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 32, 
62 Stat. 991.  In 1969, the “Tax Court of United States” became the “United States 
Tax Court.”  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 951, 961, 83 Stat. 
730, 734.  Adding to the confusion, in 1953, the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
became the Internal Revenue Service.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INCOME 
TAXES 1862–1962: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 26–27 
(1962). 
367 See Part II, notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
368 See Part II, notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra note 366. 
370 Id. 
371 An exception to the general requirement of formal judicial procedures was 
the institution of a small tax case procedure in 1969.  Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 733 (amending I.R.C. § 7463).  In cases in which the 
procedure is applicable, no appeal is permitted from the Tax Court decision and 
formal procedural rules are relaxed.  See TAX CT. R. 174 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  The Tax 
Court’s small tax case procedures are discussed in Part XIII.A. 
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Related to the Board/Tax Court’s judicial “nature” is a third 
characteristic of court status.  Over the years, attempts have been made to 
accord it full article III court status.372  Although other specialized courts 
have been established under article III,373 Congress has consistently resisted 
similar proposals with respect to the Board/Tax Court. The Board/Tax 
Court has always performed an exclusively judicial function, and the failure 
to fully recognize this fact has created certain ambiguities.  In general, the 
response of Congress has been to provide the Board/Tax Court with an 
increasing number of court indicia while withholding formal recognition.  
For example, in 1926 Congress provided for appeal of Board decisions 
rather than collateral review;374 in 1948 the law was further amended to 
make clear that Tax Court decisions would be reviewed on appeal under the 
same standards applicable to decisions by district courts sitting without 
juries.375  In the case of Tax Court judges, a similar evolution has occurred; 
in 1953 a pension system was provided similar to that applicable to federal 
judges,376 and 16 years later a form of modified life tenure was granted to 
Tax Court judges.377  The most significant softening of the congressional 
refusal to recognize the judicial status of the Board/Tax Court was 
accomplished by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which changed the Tax 
Court from an independent agency in the executive branch to a court 
established under article I.378  Despite the fact that some questions may still 
be raised concerning the court’s status,379 the compromise effected in 1969 
would appear to have settled the court’s status for the foreseeable future. 
A fourth important characteristic of the Board/Tax Court has involved 
its jurisdictional role within the general tax litigation structure.  Prior to 
1924, tax controversies could be tried in either district court or the Court of 
                                                     
372 See, e.g., supra notes 18–45 and accompanying text. 
373 For example, the United States Court of International Trade (successor to 
the Board of General Appraisers, which later became the Customs Court) enjoys 
article III status.  Similarly, the Court of Claims once held article III status.  See 
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).  [However, as part of the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Congress replaced this tribunal with the United 
States Court of Claims (later renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims), 
which Congress established as an article I legislative court.  See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 
§ 171(a), 96 Stat. 25, 27 (1982).] 
374 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001, 44 Stat. 109. 
375 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991. 
376 Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 352, 67 Stat. 482. 
377 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 954(a), 83 Stat. 730 
(amending I.R.C. § 7447(b)(3)).  Under the new law, a Tax Court judge who is not 
reappointed will be entitled to a full judicial pension if he has notified the President 
of his willingness to accept reappointment. 
378 Id. § 951 (amending I.R.C. § 7441).  
379 See Harold Dubroff, Federal Taxation, 1973/74 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. LAW 
265, 272–85 (1974). 
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Claims.380 Payment of the disputed tax and disallowance of a claim for 
refund served as a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of these courts.  With the 
creation of the Board in 1924, taxpayers for the first time could obtain an 
adjudication of tax liability in advance of the necessity for payment.  This 
fundamental change was effected as an addition to the existing system and 
not as part of a general overhaul of the entire litigating structure.  Thus, the 
jurisdiction of district courts and the Court of Claims continued to be 
limited to refund claims.  Conversely, the Board’s jurisdiction was restricted 
to redetermining deficiencies; it was given no authority to review the merits 
of refund claims.  In 1926, the Board was given a limited degree of refund 
jurisdiction,381 and, more recently, taxpayers have been permitted to seek 
declaratory relief in the Tax Court with respect to certain matters.382  But in 
general the structure created in 1924 has remained to the present despite 
criticism that it provides taxpayers with too much opportunity for forum 




                                                     
380 See Part I, notes 142–197 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. In 1988, Congress provided 
the Tax Court with authority to order payment of any refund it determined.  See 
I.R.C. § 6512(b)(2) (enacted as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6244(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3750).  This outwardly 
judicial component of the Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction is discussed in Part 
VI.B.  
382 Act of September 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1041(a), 88 Stat. 949, 
adding I.R.C. § 7476 (qualification of certain deferred compensation plans). For a 
discussion of the Tax Court’s declaratory judgment jurisdiction, see Part VII.A.     





THE BOARD BECOMES A COURT 
 
The evolution of the name and status of the Tax Court has occurred in a 
three-stage process.  The court was originally established in 1924 as the 
Board of Tax Appeals, “an independent agency in the executive branch of 
the Government.”1  In 1942, the name of the Board was changed to the 
Tax Court of the United States, but despite its new title the court’s status as 
an agency of the executive branch was not disturbed.2  Finally, in 1969, the 
court was established as a legislative court under article I of the 
Constitution, and its name was changed to the United States Tax Court.3 
To the uninitiated these changes in the status and name of the court may 
seem of minor significance.  They had little effect on the court’s function 
and powers.4 Moreover, since the protections afforded to most federal 
judges only apply to courts created pursuant to article III of the 
Constitution,5 the changes had only minor impact on the status of Tax 
Court judges.6  Nevertheless, the changes made in the name and status of 
the court have been highly controversial and provide an insight into the role 
of this tribunal as perceived by the Congress, the Departments of Treasury 
and Justice, the tax bar, and the court itself. 
 
A. The Board of Tax Appeals from 1924 to 1942 
 
The original proposal to create the Board of Tax Appeals was submitted 
to Congress in late 1923 by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon.  It 
provided that the Board would be an agency of the Treasury Department, 
                                                     
1 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 900(a), (k), 43 Stat. 336, 338. 
2 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957. 
3 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, amending 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441.  For a discussion of the meaning of the term 
“legislative court” see notes 65–69 and accompanying text infra. 
4 As part of the legislation establishing the Tax Court pursuant to article I, the 
court was given power to enforce its own process and to punish contempt. Id. 
§ 956, 83 Stat. 732 (adding the provision now codified at I.R.C. § 7456(c)). 
5 These protections include tenure during good behavior and undiminished 
compensation while in office.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
6 The 1969 Act increased the terms of office of Tax Court judges to 15 years 
(formerly terms had been 12 years) and provided for full judicial pensions to judges 
who are not reappointed after the expiration of their terms, provided they notify 
the President prior to such expiration that they are willing to accept reappointment. 
Id. §§ 952(b), 954(a), 83 Stat. 730 (amending I.R.C. §§ 7443(e), 7447(b)). 
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independent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,7 which would review tax 
deficiency assertions pursuant to informal procedures.8  In the view of 
Treasury, such a body would combine the advantages of impartiality with 
expeditious disposition of the troublesome number of disputes arising 
under the tax laws.9  Congress, which was well aware of shortcomings in the 
administration of the tax laws, adopted in general the proposal for creation 
of the Board, but in doing so made substantial modifications.10  Most 
importantly, Congress insisted that the Board be independent of Treasury 
and that it follow the formal procedures of courts rather than the informal 
practice generally applicable in the Bureau.11 
Although independence and judicial procedures are characteristics 
shared by all federal courts, the legislative history of the 1924 Act does not 
disclose that any congressional consideration was given to according the 
Board full court status. The only alternatives Congress considered in this 
regard were (1) the Administration’s proposal that the Board be a division 
of the Treasury Department; (2) the House-passed version of the bill, 
which, while not creating the Board as a full-fledged federal court,12 
removed statutory reference to the status of the Board and eliminated the 
Secretary of the Treasury’s control over the Board; and (3) the Senate 
version of the bill, ultimately enacted, which retained the House provisions 
but added that the Board was “an independent agency in the executive 
branch of the Government.”13  The provision added by the Senate was 
apparently inserted at the suggestion of Middleton Beaman, House 
Legislative Counsel, to provide for the treatment of the Board’s financial 
accounts by the General Accounting Office.14 
The first effort to remove the Board from the executive branch and 
formally declare it to be a court was made in connection with the 
consideration of the Revenue Act of 1926.15  By this time the Board had 
                                                     
7 The name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was changed to the Internal 
Revenue Service in 1953.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INCOME TAXES 1862–
1962:  A HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 26–27 (1962). 
8 See Part II, notes 25–54 and accompanying text. 
9 Id. at notes 77–80 and accompanying text.  
10 Id. at notes 55–167 and accompanying text. 
11 Id. at notes 55–97 and accompanying text. 
12 The Board could not have been a full federal court under the House bill 
because members of the Board were provided with tenure for a term of years—not 
good behavior as required under article III of the Constitution.  Moreover, 
although not controlling, the fact that the House bill did not change the name of 
the Board to a court indicated the absence of intention to create a court.  
13 Part II, notes 55–76 and accompanying text. 
14 Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Roswell Magill, June 17, 1947, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
15 Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9. 
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been in existence for more than a year, its judicial character was clearly 
manifested by the procedures it had adopted, and its work was favorably 
viewed by lawyers, accountants, businessmen, and the Treasury.16  At the 
suggestion of A.W. Gregg, who was then Solicitor of Internal Revenue as 
well as an adviser and protégé of Secretary Mellon, the Board organized a 
committee to formulate legislative proposals with respect to its status and 
operations.17  Among the changes proposed by the committee was 
replacement of the Board with a “Court of Tax Appeals,” a court of record, 
the members of which would serve during good behavior.18 Secretary 
Mellon and the Treasury Department privately supported the Board’s 
proposal for court status.19  However, when Mellon later testified before the 
Ways and Means Committee at its hearing on the Revenue Bill of 1926, his 
comments with respect to the Board were quite general and did not include 
any reference to making the Board a court.20  Subsequently during the 
hearings, Solicitor Gregg suggested that the Board be made a court,21 but he 
did not press the suggestion after being informed by Representative Garner, 
ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, that there was great 
reluctance in Congress to create additional federal courts with tenured 
judges.22  The Board itself did not publicly urge that it be formally changed 
to a court, and no version of the 1926 bill contained such a provision. 
Even though no serious congressional consideration was given to 
making the Board a court, the Board’s peculiar status as “a court in all but 
name”23 did have an impact on the 1926 legislation, and in several respects 
the Revenue Act of 1926 was a response to suggestions that if full court 
status for the Board was infeasible, an effort should be made to provide the 
Board with as many court attributes as possible.24  These suggestions were 
based on the widespread view that the Board was successfully functioning 
as a judicial body, and could be even more successful if it were made more 
court-like.  To some extent Congress proved willing to adopt this 
                                                     
16 Part II, notes 270–323 and accompanying text.   
17 See Letter from A.E. Graupner to J. Gilmer Korner, Aug. 28, 1925, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1926: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1925) [hereinafter cited as 1925 House Hearings]. 
21 Id. at 932–33, 935–36. 
22 See id. at 935 (remarks of Mr. Garner). 
23 FINAL REP. OF THE ATT’Y GEN’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC. IN GOV’T 
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 205 (1941). 
24 1925 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 935–36 (testimony of Solicitor A.W. 
Gregg). 
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approach.25  Of major importance, Board decisions were made directly 
appealable to the courts of appeals and from these courts, on certiorari, to 
the Supreme Court; in the absence of an appeal, Board decisions were final 
and not subject to collateral attack.26  Additionally, the requirement that 
Board proceedings conform to judicial standards of procedure and evidence 
was clarified;27 the Board was given power to dismiss cases for procedural 
defects without the necessity of written findings of fact and opinions,28 and 
it was authorized to impose filing fees.29 
These changes did not, however, meet all the criticisms that had been 
leveled against the Board’s status as an agency of the executive branch.  The 
Board still had a name that obscured the nature of its activities.  As a result, 
many taxpayers who were unfamiliar with the Board assumed it functioned 
like an administrative body rather than like a court and were thereby led 
into procedural errors.30  Additionally, the Board lacked judicial powers of 
trial courts generally to enforce subpoenas and punish contempt.  
Enforcement of the Board’s process could only be obtained in United 
States district court, a cumbersome procedure that reduced the efficiency of 
the Board’s operation.31  Finally, the usual constitutional guarantees of 
independence accorded to federal judges—tenure during good behavior 
and compensation undiminished while in office—were not applicable to the 
Board.32  There was some suggestion that the absence of the constitutional 
protections might subject Board members to inappropriate pressures from 
governmental and private sources.33  Additionally, the absence of life tenure 
and the prestige associated with the federal judiciary were thought by some 
                                                     
25 See Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, its Origin and Function, in 
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 37–38 (1955) [hereinafter cited 
as Turner].   
26 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1005, 44 Stat. 109, 110; see also Part III, 
notes 46–87 and accompanying text. 
27 See Turner, supra note 25, at 37. 
28 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 907(b), 
44 Stat. 107. 
29 Id. § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 904, 44 Stat. 106; see also Part III, 
notes 46–87 and accompanying text. 
30 See Part III, notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1025(a), 43 Stat. 348; see also Part III, 
notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
32 The Ways and Means Committee recommended that the 1926 Act provide 
members of the Board with life tenure.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925).  
Congress, however, rejected this proposal and instead provided a term of office of 
12 years.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, 
§ 901(b), 44 Stat. 106; see also Part III, notes 177–209 and accompanying text. 
33 67 CONG. REC. 732 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Mills). 
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to make it difficult to induce able people to accept membership on the 
Board.34 
In spite of these criticisms, during the next 16 years the issue of Board 
status received legislative attention only once.   In 1928, a decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that the Board’s duties 
included investigating as well as adjudicating tax disputes, and thus it should 
consider evidence other than that which was introduced by the parties.35  
This ruling was clearly contrary to the legislative purpose in creating the 
Board,36 but the confusion of the Seventh Circuit was understandable in 
view of the Board’s formal status as an agency of the executive branch.  
The decision provoked an immediate congressional reaction.  The Revenue 
Bill of 1928, as it passed the House, provided that no Board decision should 
be modified or reversed because of the failure of the Board to consider 
evidence that was not adduced at the hearing.37  The Senate shared the 
House view that the functions of the Board were purely judicial, but it 
believed the provisions of existing law clearly indicated that the decision of 
the Seventh Circuit was erroneous.38  Accordingly, the Senate excised the 
House provision.  The Senate opinion prevailed.  As enacted, the Revenue 
Act of 1928 made no reference to the question on the assumption, which 
proved correct, that future courts would heed the congressional view clearly 
expressed in the committee reports.39 
The limited amount of consideration given to formally establishing the 
Board as a court in these early years is somewhat surprising since virtually 
no precedent existed for making a body like the Board an agency of the 
executive branch.  By 1924, several independent executive agencies had 
been created, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Federal Trade Commission,40 which had adjudicatory functions.  These 
agencies, however, were distinguishable from the Board, because the former 
agencies also performed functions that were clearly administrative in nature, 
                                                     
34 See Part III, notes 27–30, 177–185 and accompanying text. 
35 Although the case was not identified by name in later congressional criticisms 
of it, it was apparently Chicago Ry. Equip. Co. v. Blair, 20 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1927).  
See Turner, supra note 25, at 43. 
36 See Part II, notes 77–97 and accompany text. 
37 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 30–31 (1927); H.R. REP. No. 70-1882, at 21–22 
(1928). 
38 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 38 (1928). 
39 H.R. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 21–22 (1928). 
40 The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887 (Act of Feb. 4, 
1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 383 (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1971)), but 
was later abolished in 1995 (Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995)).  The  Federal Trade Commission was 
created in 1914 (Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (now codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 41)). 
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such as investigation and rule-making.41  Obviously, such bodies could not 
appropriately be lodged in the judicial branch of Government.  The Board, 
on the other hand, was to perform only judicial duties, and no 
constitutional problems would have been presented by the functions of the 
Board had it been made a court. 
The closest existing parallel to the Board of Tax Appeals was the Board 
of General Appraisers, later to become the Customs Court, which had been 
created in 1890.42  Like the Board of Tax Appeals, the Board of General 
Appraisers was created to adjudicate disputes concerning revenue matters.43  
Also like the Board of Tax Appeals, the Board of General Appraisers had a 
name that obscured its judicial function.44  However, unlike the Board of 
Tax Appeals, the status of the Board of General Appraisers was not clearly 
defined by law.  No provision in the statute stated whether the Board of 
General Appraisers was an executive agency or a court, and, initially, no 
mention was made of the tenure of its members.45  In 1908, tenure during 
good behavior was provided by statute for Board of General Appraisers 
members, as was the power to punish contempt.46  Both of these were 
characteristic of court status.  On the other hand, the President could 
remove Board members for neglect, malfeasance, or inefficiency,47 which 
did not accord with the rule that article III judges could only be expelled 
from office by impeachment in the House and trial in the Senate for high 
crimes and misdemeanors.48  As a result of these apparent inconsistencies, 
no definitive conclusion could be drawn with respect to the status of the 
Board of General Appraisers.49 
                                                     
41 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, §§ 12, 13, 24 Stat. 383 (previously codified at 49 
U.S.C. §§ 12, 13 (Interstate Commerce Commission) but later repealed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995)); Act of Sept. 26, 
1914, ch. 311, §§ 5, 6, 38 Stat. 719 (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (Federal 
Trade Commission)). 
42 Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 136; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, 
§§ 1, 3, 35 Stat. 403, 406; Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 12, 36 Stat. 98; Act of Sept. 
21, 1922, ch. 356, § 518, 42 Stat. 972.  The Board of General Appraisers was 
changed to the Customs Court in 1926.  Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 
669. 
43 Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, §§ 13, 14, 26 Stat. 136. 
44 Its name was not changed to the Customs Court until May 28, 1926, three 
months after enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926. Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 
§ 1, 44 Stat. 669. 
45 Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 136. 
46 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 406. 
47 Id. 
48 U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. 
49 In 1894, an opinion of the Attorney General concluded that the General 
Appraisers were officers of the Treasury Department.  21 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 85 
(1894).  This ruling, however, preceded legislation that gave them life tenure and 
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Clearly, in both the 1924 and 1926 Acts, Congress did not allow any 
similar ambiguity to arise in the case of the Board of Tax Appeals.  By 
statute the Board was expressly made a part of the executive branch of 
Government and the term of office of its members was limited to a definite 
number of years.50  Legislative history does not directly disclose the factors 
that figured in the failure of Congress to provide court status for the Board.  
However, several possible explanations may be suggested.  First, the Board 
was not to be a court in the traditional sense; juries would not be available, 
jurisdiction would be highly specialized and based solely on statute, and one 
of the parties, the Commissioner, would be the same in every one of its 
proceedings.51  Of course, these were characteristics shared with other 
bodies that arguably were courts, such as the Court of Claims.52 
Nonetheless, the fact that in some respects the Board of Tax Appeals did 
not conform to the popular image of a court probably was significant to 
some members of Congress. 
Second, the income and profits taxes were relatively new and 
undoubtedly many hoped they would not be permanent.53  On that note, 
the Board itself generally was regarded as experimental.54  If the taxes were 
repealed, or if the Board proved to be a failure in coping with the situation 
it was created to address, its discontinuance would be simplified if its 
members were not accorded tenure during good behavior.  Of course, the 
                                                                                                                       
judicial powers to punish contempt.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  In 
1929, the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that the status of the Customs Court 
was still subject to question after its name change.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 
U.S. 438, 457–58 (1929).  In 1956, Congress declared the Customs Court to be an 
article III court, and there was good reason to believe the Supreme Court would 
honor that declaration.  Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532; Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).  
50 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 900(b), (k), 43 Stat. 336, 338; Revenue Act 
of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 900, 901(b), 44 Stat. 105, 
106.  
51 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 589 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that such courts are not comprehended by article III). 
52 Not until 1933 was it settled that the Court of Claims was a legislative court.  
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).  In 1962, the court’s status was 
resettled when it was held to be an article III court following a congressional 
declaration to this effect in 1953.  Act of July 28, 1953, § 1, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226; 
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).  However, the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982 replaced the Court of Claims with the U.S. Court of 
Claims (renamed the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1992), which Congress 
designated as an article I court.  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-164, § 105(a), 96 Stat. 25, 26–28 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171). 
53 See Letter from Robert Ash to Harold Dubroff, June 4, 1975, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1924: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
54 See Part II, note 112 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution would probably be satisfied if the judges of a defunct article 
III tribunal were transferred to another court,55 but it was generally 
expected that the expertise of Board members would be restricted to tax 
matters and therefore would not be suitable for courts of general 
jurisdiction.56 
Third, elevation to court status would most immediately benefit Board 
members and, in the ordinary course, they would be the ones who would 
actively seek the change.  However, when the Revenue Bill of 1924 was 
being considered, there were no Board members yet appointed.  A potent 
source of support for court status therefore was lacking.  By the fall of 
1925, when Congress began consideration of the Revenue Bill of 1926, the 
Board did have a membership “constituency” that sought court 
recognition.57  However, the Board was in its infancy, and though it found 
support for its cause in the Coolidge Administration,58 this was not 
sufficient to overcome the traditional reluctance of Congress to create 
offices of indefinite tenure.59 
Fourth, the time and manner of the congressional treatment of 
legislation concerning the Board made unlikely any consideration of making 
it a court.  The House of Representatives, which considered the Revenue 
Bill of 1924 before the Senate, modified the Administration proposal so as 
to make the Board independent of Treasury.60  But since the House 
retained that part of the Treasury proposal that provided for informal 
procedures,61 court status would have been inappropriate.  When the bill 
reached the Senate floor, a successful effort was made to require the Board 
to conform to judicial procedures.62  But by this time the Board’s 
independence was apparently considered assured, and the possibility of 
providing it with the constitutional protections associated with article III 
was not even raised.  The issue of the Board’s independence received scant 
attention two years later during consideration of the Revenue Bill of 1926.63  
To some extent, the Board’s prospects for court status at that time were 
diminished by the high praise lavished on it for its impartiality in the first 
                                                     
55 Such a procedure was employed when Congress abolished the Commerce 
Court in 1913.  See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 560–61 (1962). 
56 See 67 CONG. REC. 524 (1925)(remarks of Mr. Green); 65 CONG. REC. 7695 
(1924) (remarks of Senator Norris). 
57 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
58 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
59 See Part III, notes 186–209 and accompanying text. 
60 See Part II, notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
61 Id. at notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
62 Id. at notes 82–97 and accompanying text. 
63 See Part III, notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
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years of its existence.64  With the disappearance of the controversy over the 
Board’s independence, a potent argument for court status was removed. 
Finally, the location of the Board in the executive branch was probably 
influenced by the then-existing state of decisional law with regard to the 
recognition and classification of judicial bodies.  Today, ample authority 
exists for the proposition that courts created by or pursuant to article III of 
the Constitution, termed either constitutional courts or article III courts, are 
not the only types of courts that may carry out judicial functions of the 
Federal Government.65  Other types of courts, termed either legislative 
courts or article I courts, are permitted to perform a variety of specialized 
judicial activities.  Article I courts, not being subject to the requirements of 
article III, may have jurisdiction over matters that are not cases or 
controversies, and their judges are not protected by the guarantees of tenure 
during good behavior and undiminished compensation.  As early as 1828, 
the Supreme Court recognized the validity of legislative courts created to 
carry out judicial activities in the territories.66  By 1924, legislative courts 
were also sanctioned for the District of Columbia.67  Until 1929, however, 
territorial and District of Columbia courts were the only types of legislative 
courts expressly recognized by the Supreme Court.  In that year, the Court 
decided the case of Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,68 which, in holding the Court of 
Customs Appeals to be a legislative court, broadly construed the 
congressional power to create such bodies with respect to  
 
various matters, arising between the government and others, which 
from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are 
susceptible of it.  The mode of determining matters of this class is 
completely within congressional control.  Congress may reserve to 
itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive 
officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals. 
Conspicuous among such matters are claims against the United 
States.  These may arise in many ways and may be for money, lands 
or other things.  They all admit of legislative or executive 
determination, and yet from their nature are susceptible of 
determination by courts; but no court can have cognizance of them 
except as Congress makes specific provision therefor.  Nor do 
claimants have any right to sue on them unless Congress consents; 
and Congress may attach to its consent such conditions as it deems 
                                                     
64 See Part II, notes 294–323 and accompanying text. 
65 See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). 
66 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
67 See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). 
68 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
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proper, even to requiring that the suits be brought in a legislative 
court specially created to consider them.69 
 
Were the Bakelite decision available in 1924 and 1926 when major 
legislation with respect to the Board was considered, Congress might well 
have chosen to adopt the article I approach. However, in the absence of 
that decision and with the uncertainty of the boundaries of the legislative 
court doctrine, denominating and creating the Board as a “court” may have 
been viewed as tantamount to providing article III status.  This, of course, 
would have been incompatible with the refusal of Congress to provide life 
tenure to Board members.70  With the identification of the broadened 
legislative court doctrine in 1929, the issue of court status for the Board 
might have been opened for reconsideration were it not for the decision in 
that same year of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,71 in which the 
Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of providing appeals from 
Board decisions to the courts of appeals and then to the Supreme Court.  In 
the course of its opinion, the Court also indicated approval of the Board’s 
status as “an executive or administrative board.”72 
Old Colony presented the Court with the opportunity to hold that the 
Board, although denominated an agency of the executive branch, was in 
effect a legislative court.  However, it chose not to do so, perhaps as a result 
of the approval in Bakelite, decided two weeks earlier, of the broad 
discretion of Congress to provide for the adjudication of disputes “arising 
between the government and others.”73  As a result, the status of the 
Board/Tax Court until 1969 was always subject to some question.74  On the 
basis of Old Colony, many concluded that the Board’s status was 
indistinguishable from any other agency of the executive branch—in effect, 
it was an administrative body.75  However, others argued that its functions, 
                                                     
69 Id. at 451–52 (footnotes omitted). 
70 See supra note 59.  
71 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
72 Id. at 725. 
73 Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 45l (1929). 
74 In 1969, the court was established as a legislative court.  Tax Reform Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, amending I.R.C. § 7441.  Even after 
this change, some questions could be raised concerning the court’s status.  See 
Harold Dubroff, Federal Taxation, 1973–74 ANN. SURVEY OF AMER. L. 265, 272–85 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Dubroff].  
75 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 495 (1943) (referring to the Tax 
Court as an “administrative tribunal”); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 0.4[3], at 
66 (2d ed. 1948); Letter from Francis Biddle, Attorney General to Rep. Robert L. 
Doughton, July 3, 1942, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate Comm. on 
Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,299 (1942).  
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powers, and duties compelled treating it as a legislative court.76  Support for 
this view could be found in the fact that the Board was in most material 
respects similar to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court 
of Claims, both of which had been held to be legislative courts.77  Still, 
others argued that in view of the importance of the Board’s duties and the 
primacy of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the Board 
should be recognized as an article III court.78 
 
B. The Tax Court of the United States – An Independent Agency in the 
Executive Branch of the Government 
 
The years 1926 through 1940 did not witness any significant effort to 
change either the name or status of the Board of Tax Appeals.  The 
decisiveness with which the 1926 life tenure proposal was defeated and 
Congress’ refusal at that time even to consider full court status for the 
Board undoubtedly discouraged even the most optimistic Board supporters 
from publicly broaching the subject.  Additionally, the economic depression 
of the 1930’s, if anything, increased congressional hostility to creating 
judicial offices of privilege in a society beset by uncertainty.79  Finally, the 
Supreme Court had in several opinions at least implicitly approved the 
constitutionality of an agency of the executive branch performing judicial 
functions80 and thereby eliminated a potentially compelling reason for 
change.81 
                                                     
76 Turner, supra note 25, at 38–46. 
77 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (Court of Claims); Ex parte 
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).  
Following congressional declarations that these tribunals were article III courts, the 
Supreme Court ruled that they had constitutional court status.  See Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); see also Dubroff, supra note 74, at 275–79. 
78 Daniel L. Ginsberg, Is the Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 MISS. L. J. 382 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Ginsberg]. 
79 Evidence of this view could be found in legislation adopted during this period 
reducing the compensation of judges not protected by article III.  The Legislative 
Appropriation Act of 1932, ch. 314, § 107(a)(5), 47 Stat. 402, reduced judicial 
salaries of non-article III judges to a maximum of $10,000.  This act was the subject 
of Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), in which it was held that the Court 
of Claims was a legislative, not a constitutional, court, and therefore the salaries of 
its judges could be reduced. 
80 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1931); Old Colony Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929); Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 551, 265–65 (1928); Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 
U.S. 220, 225–227 (1927); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 121–
22 (1926). 
81 Although not widespread, the view was held by some that the 1926 legislation 
was unconstitutional in permitting direct appellate review in the federal courts of 
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By 1941, however, the depression was ending and the memory of the 
1926 defeat of formal court recognition was fading.  A time had been 
reached when the Board and its supporters in Congress, the Administration, 
and the bar could resume efforts to conform the status and perquisites of 
the “Board” to its judicial nature. Probably few foresaw in 1941 that these 
efforts would ultimately span a period of almost three decades and would 
be marked by as many failures and frustrations as successes. 
 
1. The Revenue Act of 1942 – the Board of Tax Appeals is Renamed 
the Tax Court of the United States 
 
In 1941, Board members and their supporters apparently believed that 
the Board’s best chance for elevation to court status lay in its similarity to 
the Customs Court, formerly named the Board of General Appraisers.  Like 
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court adjudicated disputes with 
respect to revenue legislation, its procedures were judicial in nature, it 
functioned without juries, and its jurisdiction was highly specialized.82  Also 
like the Board, the Customs Court had started out as part of the executive 
branch83 and with a name that belied its true nature and duties.  Yet 
Congress had seen fit in due course to accord the Customs Court a court 
name,84 if not a full court status,85 and also to accord its judges life tenure,86 
                                                                                                                       
findings by the Board, since the latter was an agency of the executive branch. 67 
CONG. REC. 3756 (1925) (remarks of Senator Cummins); see also James Craig 
Peacock, An Anomalous and Topsy-Turvy Appellate System, 19 A.B.A. J. 11 (1933).  This 
view was rejected by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 
U.S. 716 (1929). 
82 See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text.  
83 Although not specified in the statute, the status of the General Appraisers as 
Treasury officials was recognized in an early opinion of the Attorney General.  21 
OP. ATT’Y GEN. 85 (1894).  
84 Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 669. 
85 Even under the 1926 legislation, the right to remove judges of the Customs 
Court was reposed in the President.  If these judges were article III judges, removal 
should only be by impeachment in the House and conviction in the Senate.  The 
judicial status of the Customs Court has never been passed on by the Supreme 
Court, and although it seems clear that the body is today a full article III court, 
Congress having specifically provided such in 1956 (Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, § 
1, 70 Stat. 532), its status in 1941 was far from clear.  In 1929, in Ex parte Bakelite 
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, the Supreme Court had said in dicta of the Customs Court: 
Formerly [the Customs Court] . . . was the Board of General Appraisers.  
Congress assumed to make the board a court by changing its name. There 
was no change in powers, duties or personnel.  The board was an executive 
agency charged with the duty of reviewing acts of appraisers and collectors 
in appraising and classifying imports and in liquidating and collecting 
customs duties.  But its functions, although mostly quasijudicial, were all 
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judicial-type retirement provisions,87 and powers to preserve order, to 
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and to 
punish contempt.88 
Relying on the analogy to the Customs Court, Board of Tax Appeals 
Chairman C. Rogers Arundell, in April 1941, sought Treasury support for a 
legislative proposal that Board members be provided with life tenure and 
retirement provisions similar to those applicable to Customs Court judges.89  
Apparently, informal support for the proposal was obtained from 
Administration officials, such as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John L. 
Sullivan and Commissioner of Internal Revenue Guy Helvering, as well as 
from influential members of the tax bar, such as Professor Roswell Magill 
of Columbia University and George Morris of the American Bar 
Association.90  However, there is no evidence that the Board was ever able 
to gain approval of the proposal from either Administration officials of 
cabinet rank or influential members of Congress, and this undoubtedly 
explains why no legislative action was initiated on the matter. 
In spite of this early defeat, the Board continued to seek at least partial 
recognition as a court, and in 1942, having set aside its proposal for judicial 
tenure and retirement, it concentrated its efforts on securing legislation that 
would provide the Board with a court name.  By this time, the Board had a 
new Chairman, John Edgar Murdock, who was to play the predominant 
role in securing approval of the 1942 change.  Judge Murdock  served on 
the Board/Tax Court from 1926 to 1961, the second longest tenure of any 
judge of the Tax Court.91  Noted for his terse opinions,92 Judge Murdock 
was aggressive and blunt.  With the beginning of consideration of the 
legislation that was to become the Revenue Act of 1942,93 Chairman 
                                                                                                                       
susceptible of performance by executive officers and had been performed 
by such officers in earlier times.   
Id. at 457–58 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). 
86 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 406. 
87 Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 518, 42 Stat. 973. 
88 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 406. 
89 Letter from C. Rogers Arundell to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John L. 
Sullivan, April 1, 1941, filed at National Archives Building, Records of the Treasury 
Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax—Board of Tax Appeals 1933–42. 
90 See Letter from Professor Roswell Magill to C. Rogers Arundell, April 24, 
1941, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
91 Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr. was appointed to the Tax Court bench in 1962 
and is still serving at the time this text was revised in 2014.   
92 This is illustrated by a story, which may be more fable than fact, involving a 
petitioner who concluded his argument before Judge Murdock with the statement, 
“as God is my judge I do not owe this tax.”  The judge is reputed to have replied, 
“He isn’t, I am, and you do.” 
93 Ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798. 
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Murdock actively sought support from both congressional and 
Administration sources for a proposal to change the name of the Board of 
Tax Appeals to the United States Tax Court.  Among the officials he 
solicited were Randolph Paul, then Assistant to the Secretary of the 
Treasury and a principal draftsman of the 1942 Act, Colin Stam, the 
powerful chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation,94 and Dean Acheson, a personal friend and then Assistant 
Secretary of State.95  Most importantly, Chairman Murdock found a strong 
supporter on Capitol Hill:  Wesley Disney, a member of the Ways and 
Means Committee, was the brother of Richard L. Disney who served on the 
Board and Tax Court from 1936 to 1951.  Congressman Disney actively 
supported the proposal in the House.  Due to the substantial opposition 
that developed to the plan, this support proved to be essential.96 
Chairman Murdock was at pains to point out that the proposal only 
related to changing the name of the Board to the United States Tax Court 
and changing the statutory designation of Board “members” to “judges.”  
No amendment was sought with respect to the status of the Board as an 
agency in the executive branch, or with respect to the term of office, 
compensation, or retirement provisions of Board members.97  Quite clearly, 
the reception of the 1941 proposal of Chairman Arundell to accord Board 
members life tenure and judicial retirement indicated that little sympathy 
then existed for such changes. 
Chairman Murdock advanced several reasons for the name change.98  
Among these were arguments that had been raised in 1926 when the Board 
first attempted to secure full court status.  The change (1) would reduce 
confusion among the public with respect to the Board’s judicial procedures 
and would reduce the number of errors spawned by the belief that, because 
it was an agency of the executive branch, its practice was informal; (2) 
would enable the Board to be given the power to enforce its own processes 
and thereby reduce delays in those cases in which enforcement had to be 
                                                     
94 Letter from Chairman Murdock to Randolph Paul, Feb. 14, 1942, on file with 
the office of Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treas. Dep’t [hereinafter cited as Paul, 
Feb. 14, 1942]; Letter from Chairman Murdock to Colin Stam, Feb. 28, 1942, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda &: Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Stam]. 
95 Letter from Chairman Murdock to Dean Acheson, May 26, 1942, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
96 See Letter from Chairman Murdock to Representative Disney, Oct. 22, 1942, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Disney, Oct. 22, 1942]. 
97 See Paul, Feb. 14, 1942, supra note 94, at 5. 
98 See Stam, supra note 94 and accompanying memorandum. 
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sought in United States district court;99 and (3) would validate the generally 
recognized view that the Board was a court in everything but name.100 
Additionally, several new reasons were developed in support of the 
name change.  First, Chairman Murdock contended that the difficulties the 
Board was experiencing in obtaining the use of hearing rooms in many of 
the 50 cities in which it held trials could be reduced by simply naming the 
Board a court.  The nature of Board proceedings was judicial and 
courtrooms were the most appropriate sites for trials.  But many providers 
of court space throughout the country were, according to Chairman 
Murdock, reluctant to permit administrative hearings to be carried on in 
their facilities since such hearings were generally informal ones “to which 
large and undesirable crowds [were] attracted” and at which “smoking” was 
permitted.101  Accordingly, many courtrooms were unavailable to 
administrative bodies; since the Board was such a body in name, it was 
frequently covered by the ban on the ground that if an exception was made 
in its case the provider of the courtroom space would be subjected to 
criticism for favoritism.  Further support was found for the change of name 
in the fact that proposals had been made to give the Board concurrent 
jurisdiction, with the district courts and the Court of Claims, over refund 
litigation,102 and to accord the Board power to designate trial 
commissioners to conduct hearings, receive evidence, and make findings of 
fact with respect to certain unusual cases.103  Chairman Murdock believed 
that these changes, made in the name of furthering the goal of providing 
taxpayers with their traditional “day in court,” would be more appropriate if 
the Board were called a court.104  Finally, Chairman Murdock frankly 
admitted that a change of name, which would designate “members” of the 
Board as “judges” of the Tax Court, would ease a constant source of 
embarrassment. 
                                                     
99 This argument was not persuasive and was later dropped.  If the purpose of 
the legislation was to simply change the name of the Board, presumably no change 
in the Board’s inherent powers would be effected and it would not thereby be 
invested with the general powers of courts to enforce orders.  Thus, legislation 
would be necessary to permit the Board to enforce its orders, and such legislation 
could as easily give the “Board of Tax Appeals” the power to enforce its orders as 
it could the “United States Tax Court.” 
100 FINAL REP. OF THE ATT’Y GEN’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC. IN GOV’T 
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 205 (1941); Joseph Kahn, The Status of the United 
States Board of Tax Appeals as a Judicial Body, 7 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 135, 136 
(1929); Dana Latham, Jurisdiction of the United States Board of Tax Appeals Under the 
Revenue Act of 1926, 15 CAL. L. REV. 199, 201, 203 (1927); John D. Martin, The 
Problem of Reducing the Volume of Published Opinions, 28 A.B.A. J. 528, 530 (1942). 
101  See Stam, supra note 94, accompanying memorandum, at 5. 
102  See Paul, Feb. 14, 1942, supra note 94. 
103  Id. 
104  Stam, supra note 94, accompanying memorandum at 7. 
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It is frequently necessary, during the course of a trial and at other 
times, for persons to address Members of the Board.  Practitioners 
and others have been at a loss to find any convenient title which is at 
the same time proper.  They are sometimes embarrassed in this 
connection and the situation is always awkward.  The fact of the 
matter is that they do not choose to use any such proper title as Mr. 
or Member.  Occasionally, Commissioner is heard, but, generally, for 
their own convenience, persons address the Members as Judges.  
This puts the Members in a false and uncomfortable position which 
seems entirely undesirable for a tribunal of the dignity and 
importance of the Board.  The change in name would immediately 
relieve this situation.105 
 
Innocuous as the proposal to change the Board’s name might seem to 
be, it drew substantial opposition.  One uncharitable observer who believed 
the proposal emanated from “nothing more than a little vanity” suggested 
constitutional infirmities in naming an agency of the executive branch a 
“court.”106  The most formidable opposition to the change came from 
Francis Biddle, then Attorney General.  Initially under the impression that 
the proposed legislation would make the Board into a full-fledged federal 
court, the Attorney General wrote Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau expressing his disapproval of the measure.107  In the view of 
the Attorney General, the Board was operating well as an executive agency; 
changing it to a court would simply create confusion and cause the Board to 
lose the desirable flexibility with which it had operated in the past.108  
Additionally, the need for such a change should be demonstrated publicly, 
and no hearings were ever held on the proposal with cogent arguments 
advanced for creating the Board as a court.  Finally, if the Board were 
                                                     
105  Id. at 8–9. 
106  Letter from Robert Klepinger to Chairman George, Aug. 20, 1942, 
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2300–01 (1942) [hereinafter cited as 1942 Senate Hearings].  
107  Letter, June 5, 1942, reprinted in 1942 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 
2298.  The view that the Board sought court status in 1942 was, although 
erroneous, widespread.  See Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1948) (testimony of Maurice 
Austin) [hereinafter cited as 1948 Senate Hearings].  Judge Turner categorically 
denied this rumor, which seems to have been based on Attorney General Biddle’s 
misunderstanding.  Id. at 280–81. 
108  The Attorney General did not specify in which regards the Board benefitted 
from the flexibility associated with its non-court status.  In fact, the Board had 
since its inception functioned pursuant to judicial procedures.  See Part II, notes 
77–97, 168–293, and accompanying text. 
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changed to a court, the Attorney General would be obliged to assert 
responsibility for representing the Government in its proceedings.109  Since 
1926, the Treasury Department had represented the Commissioner before 
the Board and this was not objectionable to the Attorney General only so 
long as the Board remained an agency of the executive branch, not a 
court.110 
When the Attorney General discovered that the Board had proposed 
merely to change its name and not its status, he was not appeased—if 
anything, his opposition seemed stronger and he expressed it to the 
chairmen of both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee.111  In his view, a “court” operating in the executive 
branch would be an incongruity, and a proposal to create such a body was 
so illogical that it could only be regarded as the first step in a concerted 
effort to change the Board into a full-fledged court.  He also contested the 
assertion that the Board was a court in everything but name.  In this regard, 
he pointed out that the Supreme Court had described the Board as an 
“administrative body,”112 that its jurisdiction was limited by statute,113 that it 
lacked the authority to enforce its decisions,114 and that it did not possess 
the inherent powers of a court.  Finally, the Attorney General argued that 
no convincing reasons had been furnished for changing the Board’s name, 
and that the probable result of such a change would be to breed confusion 
among the public and additional litigation over the bona fides of a “court” 
located in the executive branch of Government. 
Chairman Murdock was aware of the Attorney General’s views 
concerning the change of the Board’s name.115  In an effort to dilute this 
                                                     
109  Executive Order No. 6166, promulgated in 1933, generally provided that 
the Justice Department would represent the Government in the federal courts. 
110  Between 1924 and 1926, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, an official of the 
Justice Department, represented the Government before the Board of Tax 
Appeals.  The Revenue Act of 1926 abolished the Solicitor’s office and transferred 
its duties to a new office at the Treasury Department, General Counsel for the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Ch. 27, § 1201(a), 44 Stat. 126. 
111  Letter from Attorney General Biddle to Chairman Doughton, July 3, 1942, 
reprinted in 1942 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 2299 [hereinafter cited as 
Biddle]; Letter from Attorney General Biddle to Chairman George, July 24, 1942, 
reprinted in 1942 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 2297–98 [hereinafter cited as 
George]. 
112  Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929). 
113  This was not a persuasive reason for contending that the Board was not a 
court inasmuch as every inferior United States court has a statutorily prescribed 
jurisdiction, and even the Supreme Court has some of its jurisdiction determined by 
statute. 
114  United States ex rel. Girard Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 542 (1937). 
115  Letter from Chairman Murdock to Randolph Paul, May 30, 1942, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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opposition while the bill was pending before the Ways and Means 
Committee, he urged Treasury to make good on the informal support for 
the proposal that it had already manifested. Characteristically, the manner in 
which Chairman Murdock conveyed this request to Randolph Paul was 
direct. 
 
You have told me that you personally approve of . . . [the proposal] 
and that the Secretary [of the Treasury] also approves of it.  The 
Board is grateful for this support from the Treasury and we are 
looking to you to present the matter to the Ways and Means 
Committee before it closes its deliberations on the present bill.116 
 
Randolph Paul had not misrepresented his “personal” views to 
Chairman Murdock—Paul was an admirer of the Board of Tax Appeals and 
probably believed that it should have been accorded full court status.117  
Nevertheless, it would have been unseemly for two important executive 
departments to differ over a rather minor issue and Treasury yielded to the 
deep feelings of the Attorney General; accordingly, when the name change 
was considered by the Ways and Means Committee in executive session, 
Treasury joined Justice in opposing approval of the provision.118 
Despite these formidable adversaries, the Ways and Means Committee 
adopted the change in its version of the bill (undoubtedly a result of the 
support of Congressman Disney), and this version was subsequently 
adopted by the full House.119  Following the Ways and Means deliberations, 
Randolph Paul wrote Chairman Murdock congratulating the Board on its 
victory and indicating regret that Treasury was obliged to officially oppose 
the proposal before the Committee.120  Chairman Murdock, who had 
become a student of the legislative process, responded with the suggestion 
                                                     
116  Id. 
117  In 1954, Paul was to write: 
In point of fact the Board . . . exercises functions similar to those of a 
Federal district trial court without a jury.  It is difficult at this late date to 
imagine how our tax system could have survived many of its tribulations 
without the aid of this safety valve and judicial arrangement for the 
disposition of tax controversies. 
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (1954).  
118  Letter from Henry Morgenthau to Francis Biddle, July 2, 1942, National 
Archives Building, Records of the Treas. Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax—Board of 
Tax Appeals 1933–42; Letter from Randolph Paul to Chairman Murdock, July 3, 
1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Paul, July 3, 1942]. 
119  H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 60, 172–73 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 77-2586, at 21, 
72 (1942). 
120  Paul, July 3, 1942, supra note 118. 
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that “when the whole thing is over I hope to have some interesting 
discussion with you on the general subject of legislation and how it comes 
about, or doesn’t come about.”121 
Under the House bill, the name of the Board was to be changed to the 
“United States Tax Court,” its members were to be designated “judges,” 
and the position formerly denominated “chairman” would be changed to 
“presiding judge.”122  The change would not affect the status, jurisdiction, 
powers or duties of the Board, or the tenure of its members; the 
Government would continue to be represented in Tax Court proceedings 
by the Chief Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, an official of the 
Treasury Department.123 
In addition to the name change, the House bill incorporated a related 
change that was not recommended by the Board.  Sponsored by 
Representative John Dingell, a member of the Ways and Means Committee, 
a provision was inserted in the bill which provided that “[n]o qualified 
person shall be denied admission to practice before . . . [the Tax Court] 
because of his failure to be a member of any profession or calling.”124  
Pursuant to a Board rule dating back to 1924, only lawyers and certified 
public accountants were eligible to represent taxpayers before the Board.125  
Congressman Dingell, however, was under the impression that professional 
status had not been requisite for practice before the Board, and he desired 
assurance that the change in name of the Board would not provide the 
Board with an occasion to restrict practice to lawyers or any other 
professional group.126  Congressman Dingell’s erroneous understanding of 
prior Board practice was soon corrected by Chairman Murdock, but the 
Congressman continued to support the provision in the interest of not 
jeopardizing the means of livelihood of qualified tax practitioners solely by 
reason of their lack of professional status.127 
The form of the bill that reached the Senate was objectionable to both 
Chairman Murdock and Attorney General Biddle.  Chairman Murdock took 
strong exception to the House provision with respect to lay practice before 
the Board.  He conveyed his views to Senator Walter George, Chairman of 
the Finance Committee, and urged that the Senate delete the provision 
                                                     
121  Letter from Chairman Murdock to Randolph Paul, July 7, 1942, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
122  H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 172 (1942). 
123  Id. 
124  H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 504(b) (1942) as reported to and passed 
by the House. 
125  B.T.A. RULE 2 (July, 1942 ed.). 
126  88 CONG. REC. 6335–36 (1942). 
127  See Letter from Chairman Murdock to Senator George, Aug. 10, 1942, 
reprinted in 1942 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 2304. 
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because it would do a disservice to both the public and the Board.128  
Formerly, the Board had relied on professional licensing as the criteria for 
admission to its bar.  By this means it was relieved of the responsibility to 
investigate independently the intellectual and ethical qualifications of 
applicants.  The new provision would require the Board to make such 
investigations, and Chairman Murdock feared that such a duty would 
impose an unduly heavy burden.  Additionally, Chairman Murdock pointed 
out that the Board’s rules on eligibility to practice should not be primarily 
directed to protecting the means of livelihood of would-be tax practitioners.  
Rather, the object of the rules should be to protect the public from 
inadequate representation before the Board; membership in the legal or 
accounting profession had traditionally been regarded as the best means of 
assuring adequate representation.  He did not believe that the Board’s own 
efforts to determine qualifications to practice could be as efficient.  The 
result would be poorer representation for taxpayers. 
Attorney General Biddle was equally displeased with the House bill.129  
For the reasons expressed above,130 he continued to maintain that the name 
of the Board should not be changed.  He found additional support for this 
position in the House provision opening practice to all qualified individuals.  
Lay practice before an administrative body was entirely appropriate in his 
view, but to permit such practice before a body denominated a court was an 
anomaly that could only add to the confusion engendered by the proposed 
name change. 
Chairman Murdock actively sought the support of the Finance 
Committee for both the name change and the elimination of the 
open-practice provision.131  He received a sympathetic hearing from 
Chairman George,132 but ultimately the Finance Committee yielded to the 
Biddle position and eliminated the House provision changing the Board’s 
name.133  This modification was accepted, and the Senate version of the bill 
that went to the House-Senate conference made no change in preexisting 
law with respect to either the name of the Board or its rules on eligibility to 
practice.134  However, in the conference Chairman Murdock’s efforts were 
partially rewarded when Senator George successfully urged the Senate 
                                                     
128  Id.; see also Letter from Chairman Murdock to Representative Disney, Aug. 
10, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Disney, Aug. 10, 1942]. 
129  George, supra note 111. 
130  See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
131  Disney, Aug. 10, 1942, supra note 128. 
132  Id. 
133  H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), as reported by the Senate Finance 
Comm. 
134  H. R. REP. NO. 77-2586, at 72 (1942). 
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conferees to accept, virtually unchanged, the House provisions dealing with 
the Board.135  In this version the bill passed both the House and Senate.136 
In only one minor respect did the final version of the 1942 Act fail to 
conform to the original House bill.  Whereas the House had adopted a 
change of name to “United States Tax Court,” the conference committee 
bill, and the version ultimately enacted, adopted the name “Tax Court of 
the United States.”137  Apparently, the change was incorporated at the 
request of Commerce Clearing House, a publisher of law books.138  
Commerce Clearing House included in its tax services a series of books 
entitled “United States Tax Cases,” and it was concerned that if the Board 
was named “United States Tax Court,” confusion would result due to the 
identity of the initials of the court and the books. 
Although the 1942 Act retained the so-called Dingell amendment,139 on 
balance, the new legislation represented a significant victory for those who 
viewed the Board as “a court in everything but name”—a victory made all 
the more sweet in the overcoming of the Justice and Treasury Department 
opposition.  One can easily sense Chairman Murdock’s gratification in the 
remarks he addressed to his friend and principal supporter on the Hill, 
Representative Disney: 
 
I am . . . frank and glad to acknowledge that I will take great personal 
satisfaction from having the right to be called Judge, and to be 
relieved of the embarrassment which I have heretofore felt when so 
frequently people address me by that unauthorized title.140 
 
2. Attempts to Incorporate the Tax Court into the Federal Judicial 
System 
 
In opposing the 1942 legislation changing the name of the Board of Tax 
Appeals to the Tax Court of the United States, Attorney General Biddle 
observed that the measure was simply a first step in a calculated design to 
make the Board a full-fledged federal court.141  Although the name change 
could be justified on independent grounds,142 most Board members would 
                                                     
135  Letter from Chairman George to Chairman Murdock, Oct. 26, 1942, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
136  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957. 
137  Id.; H. R. REP. NO. 77-2586, at 21 (1942). 
138  See Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Judge Maris, Nov. 9, 1946, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
139  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(b), 56 Stat. 957 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7452). 
140  Disney, Oct. 22, 1942, supra note 96.  
141  Biddle, supra note 111. 
142  See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
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probably have agreed with the Attorney General as to their ultimate 
objective.  The point at which the opposing forces disagreed was the 
desirability of such a change.  Oddly, however, the next major effort to 
elevate the court’s status was initiated without the court’s instigation or 
even knowledge. 
In 1943, the House of Representatives undertook a project to revise and 
codify into positive law title 28 of the United States Code, dealing with the 
federal judicial system.143  For the most part, the codification effort dealt 
with noncontroversial matters and was directed toward eliminating 
inconsistencies in prior law and providing an authoritative code that could 
be relied on to be complete and current.144  Nevertheless, the task was a 
formidable one, and the committees of the House which considered the 
matter145 were assisted in the undertaking by an advisory committee of 
distinguished members of the bench and bar.146 
In early 1945, during the deliberations of the advisory committee, Judge 
Justin Miller of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, formerly 
a member of the Board of Tax Appeals,147 raised the subject of the Tax 
                                                     
143  Hearings on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 6 (1947) (testimony of Mr. Keogh) 
[hereinafter cited as 1947 House Hearings]. 
144  Id. 
145  Originally, the codification was assigned to the Committee on Revision of 
the Laws. In 1946, that Committee was abolished, and its work was taken over by 
the Judiciary Committee.  1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 531 (testimony 
of Charles Zinn). 
146  Charles Zinn was general counsel to the committees.  John F. X. Finn of 
the New York Law Revision Commission was its special counsel.  An advisory 
committee was also assembled to assist in the work, and it consisted of Judge Floyd 
Thompson, former chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court; Justin Miller, former 
member of the Board of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia; Judge John B. Sanborn of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; 
Walter P. Armstrong, former president of the American Bar Association; Professor 
John Dickinson of the University of Pennsylvania; Judge John Parker of the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; Judge Alexander Holtzoff of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia; and Professor James Moore of Yale Law 
School.  In addition to the advisory committee, the United States Judicial 
Conference and the Supreme Court appointed panels to assist in the revision effort.  
These panels consisted of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone and Justices Felix 
Frankfurter and William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court; Judge Albert Maris of 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Judge Clarence Galston, district court 
judge of the eastern district of New York; and Judge William Smith, district court 
judge of the district of New Jersey.  H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at 2–4 (1947); H.R. REP. 
No. 79-2646, at 2–4 (1946). 
147  Judge Miller resigned from the Board in 1937.  In 1945, Judge Miller 
resigned from the Court of Appeals to become President of the Association of 
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Court and suggested that the provisions dealing with the court should be 
incorporated into the revised title 28.148  Judge Miller argued that because 
the court was a judicial tribunal, both its codification in the Internal 
Revenue Code149 and its status as an agency of the executive branch of 
Government were inappropriate.150 
Moreover, judges of the court should be provided with the same life 
tenure and other emoluments as were applicable to judges of the Court of 
Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Customs 
Court.151  Apparently, most members of the advisory committee favored 
the idea.152  However, Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a member of the advisory 
committee and then an Assistant Attorney General,153 and representatives 
of the Internal Revenue Bureau questioned what effect the change would 
have on the rules regarding representation of the Government before the 
court.  This question resulted in the initial rejection of the proposal.154  As 
discussed below, the question of the appropriate agency to represent the 
Government has never been resolved to the satisfaction of all.  Ultimately, 
however, the House Committee on Revision of the Laws, which initially 
considered the legislation, concluded that a jurisdictional dispute between 
Justice and Treasury should not prevent recognition of the Tax Court’s true 
nature.  In the middle of 1946, when it reported the bill to revise title 28, 
the Committee recommended that the Tax Court be removed from title 26 
and placed in title 28.155  This bill died without House action when the 79th 
Congress adjourned.156  The Committee on Revision of the Laws was 
abolished by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,157 but its work on 
code revision was continued in the 80th Congress by the Committee on the 
Judiciary, and in 1947 substantially similar bills were introduced and 
                                                                                                                       
Broadcasters.  However, he remained as a member of the advisory committee to 
revise title 28. 
148  Memorandum prepared by Judge Arundell, February 1945, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited 
as Arundell]. 
149  INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 1100 et seq.  
150  Arundell, supra note 148. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Judge Holtzoff was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia in 1945. 
154  Arundell, supra note 148; Letter from Judge Miller to Presiding Judge 
Murdock, June 25, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
155  H.R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 271–277 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, 
79th Cong., at A38–40 (1946). 
156  1947 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 9–10. 
157  Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812. 
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reported to the House that incorporated the same general provisions with 
respect to the Tax Court.158 
Judge Miller had originally proposed that the Tax Court should be 
granted the same status and perquisites as the other federal courts of 
specialized jurisdiction.159  As the title 28 revision bills were reported to the 
House, however, the only major change recommended was that the 
provisions governing the court be moved from the Internal Revenue Code 
to title 28 and that the existing statutory language with respect to the court’s 
status as an agency of the executive branch be eliminated.160  That this 
action was based more on political reality rather than theoretical purity is 
evidenced by suggestions in the committee reports that Congress might 
wish to consider providing tenure during good behavior to Tax Court 
judges as was provided to the judges of most other federal courts.161  This 
suggestion, however, received scant attention, and at no time was any 
significant effort made to do more than incorporate pre-existing provisions 
governing the court into title 28.  The effect of the legislation merely would 
have been to settle the court’s status as an article I court.162 
In view of the political impossibility of attaining article III status, the 
judges of the court approved of the change.  Judge Murdock was Presiding 
Judge when the proposal was first advanced in 1945, and he initiated action 
to obtain support from the American Bar Association.163  In mid-1945, 
Judge Bolon B. Turner succeeded Judge Murdock as Presiding Judge.164  
Judge Turner, an affable Arkansan, served on the Board and Tax Court 
from 1934 to 1971.  Having participated in the drafting of the 1924 and 
1934 Revenue Acts, Judge Turner was no stranger to the legislative process, 
and he devoted considerable energy to shepherding the title 28 proposal 
through Congress.  In this regard, he participated in the proceedings of the 
advisory committee in drafting the recodification,165 prepared memoranda 
                                                     
158  H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 271–277 (1947); H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. §§ 271–277 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A39–41 (1947). 
159  See Arundell, supra note 148. 
160  H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A 39–41 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A38–
40 (1946). 
161  H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A 40 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A38–39 
(1946). 
162  There were those who believed that even without such legislation, the court 
was for all practical purposes an article I court.  Turner, supra note 25. 
163  Letters from Presiding Judge Murdock to Weston Vernon Jr., Esq. 
(formerly Chairman of the American Bar Ass’n Section on Taxation, 1942–43) Feb. 
14, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
164  Judge Turner became Presiding Judge on July 1, 1945. See 5 T.C. ii (1945). 
165  See Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Eugene Keogh, Nov. 30, 1945, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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for congressional use detailing the history of the court and the reasons 
supporting the change,166 and gave testimony before congressional 
committees advancing the court’s position.167  A fervent supporter of court 
status, and an expert on both the federal judicial system and the history of 
the Tax Court, Judge Turner had no difficulty in articulating reasons for the 
proposal.168  Many of the arguments he relied on had already been used in 
1926 and 1942.169 Chief among these was the contention that the judicial 
nature of the court was solidly established after more than two decades of 
operation, and many authoritative statements could be assembled 
evidencing virtual universal recognition of this fact.170  In fact, Congress 
                                                     
166  See Memoranda prepared by Judge Turner dated May 29, 1947, June 11, 
1947, June 12, 1947, June 30, 1947, May 19, 1948, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
167  1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 41–68, 280–301; Hearings on H.R. 
3113, Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 
34–47 (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949 House Hearings]. 
168  See Turner, supra note 25. 
169  See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text; Part III, notes 25–37 and 
accompanying text. 
170  A memorandum prepared in June, 1946, by Judge Leech and filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence” provides 
some of this authority. 
The judicial functions of this Court, it is thought, are fully recognized by 
both Houses of Congress.  The Committee on Ways and Means in its 
Report of December 7, 1927, 70th Cong., 1st sess., states:  
. . . The committee is of the opinion that the Board’s function is 
purely judicial, and in order to clarify the situation, has provided that 
no decision of the Board (whether rendered before or after the bill 
becomes law) should hereafter be modified or reversed because the 
Board or any of its divisions has failed to consider evidence not 
adduced before the Board or division.  At the same time the 
committee has provided that the rules of practice and procedure of 
the Board shall, just as the Federal equity rules, have the force and 
effect of law. 
The Senate Report No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st sess., states:  
In view of certain expressions in a recent court opinion, the 
House bill in section 601 provides that no decision of the Board 
shall be modified or reversed because the Board has failed to 
consider evidence not adduced before it.  While an appellate court 
has the right and duty, if an error of law has been made, to remand a 
case to the Board for subsequent proceedings in accordance with 
law, the existing provisions of law clearly contemplate judicial, not 
administrative, procedure on the part of the Board and the 
committee can see no need of further legislation on this subject.  It 
is not the duty of the Board to make investigations of tax cases but 
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during this period gave real recognition to the court’s judicial character by 
                                                                                                                       
to decide the case on the basis of evidence properly placed before it 
by the Commissioner and the taxpayer.  
In fact, only two years after its creation, the Report of the Ways and 
Means Committee (1926 Revenue Bill) stated: 
Since its organization in July, 1924, there have been 8,417 appeals 
filed with the Board up to October 24 of this year, [1926] involving 
an aggregate amount of $134,000,000. . . . 
. . . No other court in the world tries cases which in the aggregate 
involve such great amounts. . . .  
Mr. Justice Jackson in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, thus describes 
the Court: 
The court is independent, and its neutrality is not clouded by 
prosecuting duties.  Its procedures assure fair hearings. Its 
deliberations are evidenced by careful opinions.  All guides to 
judgment available to judges are habitually consulted and respected.  
It has established a tradition of freedom from bias and pressures.  It 
deals with a subject that is highly specialized and so complex as to 
be the despair of judges. . . .  
Professor Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School, in the Harvard 
Law Review of October 1944, says of this Court: 
At the present time, most of the tax cases which get into court 
start in the Tax Court of the United States.  Congress has, of course, 
declared that the Tax Court is “an independent agency in the 
executive branch of the government.”  This is a polite fiction that 
may once have served a purpose.  The Tax Court is in organization, 
tradition, and function a judicial body, and should be treated as such 
in any survey of judicial review in tax cases.  
As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bingham et al. v. Commissioner, 325 
U.S. 365: 
. . . Congress has invested the Tax Court with primary—and largely 
with ultimate—authority for redetermining deficiencies.  It is a 
tribunal to which mastery in tax matters must be attributed.  The 
authority which Congress has thus given the Tax Court involves the 
determination of what really happened in a situation and what it 
means in the taxing world.  In order to redetermine deficiencies the 
Tax Court must apply technical legal principles. . . . 
The late Chief Justice Stone, in Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 274 U.S. 220, said: 
. . . An examination of the sections creating the Board and investing 
it with power can leave no doubt that they were intended to confer 
upon it appellate powers which are judicial in character. . . . 
In American Woolen Co. v. White, 56 Fed. (2d) 716, it was said: 
. . . This board, with the right of a judicial review of its decision 
granted by the statutes, afforded the plaintiff a forum with full 
authority and jurisdiction in which it could have, a judicial 
determination as to every question involved in its tax liability for the 
year in question. . . . 
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including it within the judicial salary legislation of 1946,171 and providing 
compensation for its judges at the same rate applicable to judges of United 
States district courts.172  When the salary bill was introduced in the House, it 
did not include provision for Tax Court judges.173  In an unusual and 
apparently unsolicited action, Chief Justice Stone met with the sponsor of 
the bill and sought to convince him to amend the bill and expand its 
coverage.174  The Chief Justice was aware that the Tax Court was technically 
an agency of the executive branch and not part of the federal judiciary, but 
he did not believe that this fact should bar recognition of the type and 
quality of work performed by the court. 
 
For a long time we have been reviewing their decisions and I can tell 
you out of my experience that they not only perform judicial service 
but that they do it well.  I hope that you will reconsider and amend 
your bill so that it will include them.175 
 
Despite the intervention of the Chief Justice, the salary bill as passed by 
the House did not cover Tax Court judges.176  Nevertheless, as a result of 
efforts by Presiding Judge Turner, it was so amended in the Senate, and 
since then the salaries of Tax Court judges have been identical to those of 
United States district court judges.177 
In addition to arguments based on judicial attributes, advocates of the 
proposal could point to problems that the court was encountering as a 
result of its technical status as part of the executive establishment.  Some of 
these were merely annoyances, as when the court was required to respond 
to inquiries from supervisory or budgetary agencies that were routinely sent 
to administrative bodies and often were wholly inappropriate when applied 
to the court.178  Two other problems were more substantial and figured 
                                                     
171 Act of July 31, 1946, ch. 704, 60 Stat. 716. 
172 Id. § 1. 
173 See 93 CONG. REC. A3280 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Hobbs). 
174  Id. The bill was sponsored by Congressman Sam Hobbs, who did not 
believe that legislation dealing with the salaries of federal judges should provide for 
the compensation to be paid to members of an agency of the executive branch.  
Congressman Hobbs was, however, a strong supporter of legislation to change the 
formal status of the Tax Court and incorporate it into the federal judicial 
establishment. Id. at A3279–81. 
175  Id. at A3280. 
176  Id.  
177  Since 1969, this has been an explicit provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 953, 83 Stat. 730, amending 
I.R.C. § 7443(c). 
178 An example of this was an inquiry addressed to administrative bodies, and 
the Tax Court, by the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 
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prominently in the polemics surrounding the codification of title 28.  The 
first of these involved the 1943 Supreme Court decision in Dobson v. 
Commissioner,179 in which the Court had ruled that, in light of the expertise of 
the Tax Court and its status as an administrative body, appellate courts 
should strictly adhere to the statutory admonition limiting review of Tax 
Court decisions to errors of law.180  In this regard, a unanimous Court, 
speaking through Justice Jackson, ruled that “when the [reviewing] court 
cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut 
                                                                                                                       
1945.  The court was asked for its recommendations, along with reasons therefor, 
with respect to the following subjects: 
The functions of the court which should be abolished; 
The functions, agencies, or parts of agencies which properly should be 
transferred to the court; 
The functions and units of the court which more appropriately belong in 
another department or establishment; and  
The functions or units of the court which should be consolidated or 
transferred from one part of the court to another part and which the court 
lacks statutory authority to consolidate or transfer.  
Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Harold Smith, Director, Bureau of the 
Budget, Jan. 25, 1946, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda 
& Correspondence.”  Never one to pass up the opportunity to proselytize an 
official to his point of view, Judge Turner concluded his response to the inquiry as 
follows:  
It has been my purpose in outlining the organization of the Court and its 
functions to bring to your attention the fact that the Tax Court is not in any 
true sense an administrative or executive department, but by the nature and 
purposes served and the work done, is a part of the judicial scheme of the 
Government.  In connection therefore, with the plan under the 
Reorganization Act of improving the administration of the Executive 
Branch of the Government no change in the Tax Court under any of the 
four headings outlined in your letter suggests itself or appears to be 
pertinent or desirable.  It is believed, however, that much confusion would 
be avoided and that the Tax Court in its functioning could operate more 
effectively and efficiently if it were placed in the Judiciary where its 
purposes and functions indicate that it should be, rather than in the 
Executive Branch of the Government where it is technically placed by 
statute.  It is not clear, however, that your request for recommendations 
together with drafts of suitable reorganization provisions contemplates the 
submission of recommendations or drafts designed to effect changes not 
wholly within the Executive Branch of the Government.  We are not, 
therefore, submitting the draft of any plan nor of any legislation with 
respect to the Tax Court. 
Id. 
179  320 U.S. 489, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 231 (1944). 
180  INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 1141, as amended, act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 
§ 36, 62 Stat. 991; see also Part XI.H.8. 
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mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand.”181  Appellate 
review of Tax Court decisions after Dobson thus was considerably more 
restricted than review of the decisions of district court judges sitting 
without juries, the findings of which could be reversed or modified if 
“clearly erroneous.”182  The Dobson decision aroused criticism from bar 
groups as well as from lower appellate courts,183 and some supporters of 
incorporating the Tax Court into the federal judiciary noted that the Dobson 
problem was directly related to the court’s anomalous status as one of the 
executive branch agencies.184  The decisions of such agencies were generally 
subject to more limited appellate review than the decisions of federal trial 
courts sitting without juries, and Dobson was a natural, if erroneous, 
extension of the illogical placement of the Tax Court in the executive 
branch. 
A second problem resulting from the court’s peculiar status was even 
more serious than Dobson.  The Administrative Procedure Act, which had 
been enacted in 1946,185 provided rules governing decision-making by 
administrative bodies.  The purpose of the Act was to provide procedural 
protections to persons affected by government action and to minimize the 
risks of abuse of bureaucratic discretion.186  During congressional 
consideration of the Act, the question had arisen whether, in light of its 
application only to executive agencies and not to courts, its provisions 
would apply to the Tax Court.  An opinion of the Attorney General 
concluded that the Act would be inapplicable to the Tax Court and, 
apparently on this basis, the statute did not specify that the Tax Court was a 
court for purposes of the Act.187  Despite this authority, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was convinced that the position of the 
Attorney General was erroneous and announced that the provisions of the 
Act applied to Tax Court proceedings.188  The Sixth Circuit never had to 
                                                     
181  320 U.S. at 502. 
182  See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
183  E.g., 1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 167–73 (testimony of W.A. 
Sutherland); Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 452–53 (2d Cir. 
1946).  
184  93 CONG. REC. 8387 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Robsion); Daniel M. Gribbon, 
Should the Judicial Nature of the Tax Court Be Recognized?, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619, 
622 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Gribbon]. 
185  Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237. 
186  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 1.04 (3d ed. 
1972). 
187  S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 38 (1945); see also Note, Effect of the Administrative 
Procedure Act on Decisions of the Tax Court, 2 TAX L. REV. 103 (1946). 
188  Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 379, 382 (1947). The Sixth 
Circuit repeated these views in Lawton v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 380, 383–84 (1947).  
See also Dawson v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 664, 667 (1947). 
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face the issue of precisely how the Administrative Procedure Act should be 
applied to the Tax Court; however, it was clear that if the Act was applied, 
the court would have to make substantial modifications to its procedures.  
For example, the Act required that the findings of an administrative hearing 
officer be served upon the parties who could then demand a hearing before 
the entire membership of the agency.189  Neither the Board nor the Tax 
Court had ever provided parties with a hearing before the entire 
membership, and in 1927 the Board had ceased its practice of reviewing all 
reports of the divisions;190 only those cases deemed significant were referred 
by the Presiding Judge to the conference, and these constituted a minority 
of the cases handled by the court. 
Judge Turner argued that if the Administrative Procedure Act was 
applied to the court, most of the judges’ time would be taken up with 
hearing appeals from determinations of the initial hearing officials.  This 
would probably require the cessation of the practice then followed of 
having the original trial before a member of the court; commissioners 
would have to be appointed for this task.  The resulting procedure would 
be cumbersome and would result in the court being able to handle far fewer 
cases than before.191  By locating the court in title 28 and outside the reach 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the problem would be alleviated. 
These reasons for change attracted strong support among members of 
the judiciary, the bar, and Congress.192  One potent supporter of the 
proposal was Congressman John M. Robsion of Kentucky, chairman of the 
Judiciary Subcommittee that considered the title 28 revision legislation.  He 
summarized the position in favor of incorporation of the court into the 
federal judiciary as follows: 
 
It seems to me that there can be no question but that the 
provisions relating to the Tax Court properly belong in the Judicial 
Code because it is clear that the Court is strictly judicial in nature.  
Let us consider . . . what would be the result of leaving them out of 
the Judicial Code in view of the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  If that body is not a court but a purely 
administrative agency it would come within the purview of the 
                                                     
189  Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 8, 60 Stat. 237. 
190  Part III, notes 357–358 and accompanying text.  At no time, however, did 
full court review of division reports include a hearing for the parties. 
191  Memorandum prepared by Presiding Judge Turner, “Attention-Special,” 
June 12, 1947, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda and 
Correspondence;” see also Memorandum prepared by Judge Murdock “14 Tax 
Court Questions,” Dec. 1947, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
192   See, e.g., Gribbon, supra note 184; 93 CONG. REC. 8385 (1947) (remarks of 
Mr. Robsion). 
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Administrative Procedure Act. Of course, in the view of the 
Attorney General, . . . the term “court” includes the Tax Court and 
similar courts and the act does not apply to their procedure nor 
affect their requirements nor resort thereto. . . . 
However, because the provisions relating to the Tax Court are 
not now in the Judicial Code considerable confusion has arisen 
regarding its status and the status of litigants.193  
 
Although the court and its supporters had no difficulty perceiving the 
desirability of the proposed transfer to the judiciary, there were those who 
did not share this view.  Among these were persons prominent in the 
Administration, in the Congress, and in the ranks of tax practitioners, and 
they constituted a formidable obstacle to adoption of the proposal. 
Lack of Administration enthusiasm for the proposal was prevalent 
within both the Treasury and Justice Departments.  Attorney General 
Biddle had actively opposed both federal court status and the name change 
for the Board of Tax Appeals in 1942, and had enlisted the support of 
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau in this view.194  With changes in the 
heads of these Departments (Tom Clark succeeded Biddle in 1945, and 
John W. Snyder succeeded Morgenthau in 1946), the Administration’s 
attitude toward court status for the Tax Court moderated temporarily to the 
point that, in April 1947, Attorney General Clark indicated that he had no 
objection to the proposal.195  Treasury also signified that it did not oppose 
the legislation.196  However, neither Department appeared at hearings to 
urge passage or in any way publicly endorsed the measure apart from 
indicating that they had no objection to its adoption.  Opposition continued 
to be strong among some non-cabinet rank officials, particularly in the 
Justice Department.197  Indeed, in the spring of 1949, while Clark was still 
                                                     
193   93 CONG. REC. 8387 (1947). 
194   See supra notes 107–118 and accompanying text. 
195  Letter from Tom Clark to Earl Michener, Chairman, House Judiciary 
Comm., April 17, 1947, reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 8 (1947). 
196  93 CONG. REC. 8385 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Robsion). 
197  For example, on May 16, 1947, one month after Attorney General Clark 
had expressed no objection to the proposal, a 43-page memorandum was prepared 
by I. Henry Kurtz, a Justice Department attorney, for Sewell Key, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tax Division, which took the position that making the Tax 
Court a federal court would, in effect, have created new judicial offices that would 
have required new presidential appointments.  This, of course, could have resulted 
in a complete change of court personnel and would have made the legislation 
unacceptable to the court.  Memorandum prepared by I. Henry Kurtz, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  The 
memorandum was in accordance with Sewell Key’s position and that of members 
of his division, which had consistently opposed court status for the Tax Court.  
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Attorney General, a proposed report of the Justice Department opposing 
incorporation of the Tax Court into title 28 was delivered to the Bureau of 
the Budget.198  Available evidence indicates that Attorney General Clark 
remained steadfast in his acquiescence to the title 28 proposal and that the 
proposed report, not having his personal approval, was not finalized.199  
However, soon after Clark’s resignation in the summer of 1949 to become 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Justice Department formally 
changed its position and once again opposed legislation to integrate the Tax 
Court into the federal judicial system.200 
Attorney General Biddle had expressed several reasons for his 
opposition in 1942,201 but the basic reasons for the  reluctance of Justice 
and Treasury to support the proposal centered on the question of 
representation of the Government before the Tax Court.  In 1924, when 
the Board of Tax Appeals was created, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, an 
official of the Justice Department, was the legal representative of the 
Commissioner and in this capacity represented the Government in Board 
proceedings.  As part of the Revenue Act of 1926, the position of Solicitor 
was abolished and its functions transferred to the newly created General 
Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, who was an official of the 
Treasury Department.202  Curiously, this transfer of the Commissioner’s 
legal representative did not occasion any opposition from the Attorney 
General, apparently because the move was supported by Secretary Mellon, 
the most influential member of the Coolidge cabinet.  Alexander W. Gregg 
was the Solicitor of Internal Revenue at this time, and he was a protégé of 
Mellon and had formerly been his special assistant.  The transfer resulted in 
Gregg being brought back under the direct supervision of Mellon and also 
made possible a significant pay increase for Gregg.203 
Since 1926, Treasury had represented the Government in all Tax Court 
proceedings, with the exception of the highly specialized renegotiation cases 
                                                                                                                       
Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Charles Hamel, Sept. 22, 1948, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
198   See Memorandum from Mr. Kirby to Mr. Lynch, June 13, 1949, filed in the 
Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treas. Dep’t. 
199   See Letter from Presiding Judge Kern to Erwin Griswold, Sept. 8, 1949, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
200   See Letter from Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General, to Emanuel 
Cellar, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., March 14, 1950, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Ford]. 
201   See supra notes 107–114 accompanying text. 
202   Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1201(a), 44 Stat. 126. 
203   The 1926 Act provided a salary to the General Counsel for the Bureau of 
$10,000.  Id. As Solicitor, Gregg could not have earned more than $7,500.  The 
Classification Act of 1923, ch. 265, § 13, 42 Stat. 1492. 
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that were handled by the Justice Department.204  If the status of the Tax 
Court was changed, the whole issue of representation of the Government 
would have to be reopened.  Treasury, which had represented the 
Commissioner for more than two decades, was strongly opposed to 
relinquishing that role.205  It could argue with some justification that its 
litigation responsibilities in the Tax Court were part of its overall 
jurisdiction to collect revenue and set Administration tax policy.  If it lost 
this function, the discharge of its duties might become more difficult 
because of the problem of coordinating litigation policy with another 
Department.  On the other hand, the Justice Department had, since 1933, 
represented the Government in virtually all court actions.206  Although 
several regulatory agencies represented themselves in judicial proceedings, 
Justice’s litigating role had never been seriously questioned in connection 
with the Department’s representation of the Government in refund actions 
or in appellate proceedings following Tax Court determinations.207  If the 
Justice Department’s role in these proceedings had never proved 
troublesome, why should its representation of the Government in Tax 
Court proceedings create any additional problems?  Many officials in the 
Justice Department therefore took the position that the crucial distinction 
was between judicial and administrative proceedings.  So long as the Tax 
Court was characterized as an agency of the executive branch, Justice 
should not object to Treasury representation of the Government position.  
However, if the Tax Court was to be integrated into the system of federal 
courts, even as an article I court, Justice should assume the function as the 
Government’s lawyer.208 
These opposing positions had an important influence on the attitudes 
that Justice and Treasury adopted toward the proposal for federal court 
status.  They had no strong objection to the status quo and had no 
particular desire to become involved in an inter-Department dispute.  As a 
result, neither Department ever gave the proposal its active support, 
support which would have been valuable in counteracting opposition from 
other sources. 
In addition to the lack of Administration enthusiasm, the proposal also 
suffered from limited but vociferous opposition in Congress.  As with the 
Treasury-Justice situation, this opposition was largely the product of 
                                                     
204   The court’s former renegotiation jurisdiction is detailed in Appendix C.   
205   See 93 CONG. REC. 8385 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Robsion). 
206   Exec. Order No. 6166. 
207   Prior to the promulgation of Exec. Order No. 6166, the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue generally represented the Government in district court refund actions.  
Hearings on S. 2041 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 170 (1968) (testimony of 
Professor M. Carr Ferguson) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Senate Hearings]. 
208   Ford, supra note 200. 
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jurisdictional concerns.  Since its creation in 1924 as the Board of Tax 
Appeals, the court had always been within the general legislative province 
of the congressional tax committees, the Ways and Means Committee in the 
House and the Finance Committee in the Senate.  If the court were to be 
incorporated in title 28 and removed from title 26, it would then come 
under the supervision of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.  
Many members of the Ways and Means Committee were particularly 
concerned about such a change; additional opposition emanated from the 
technical staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
headed by Colin Stam.209  When the bill to revise title 28 and incorporate 
the Tax Court therein came to the House floor, where it passed by 342 to 
23, 14 of the no votes were cast by Ways and Means Committee 
members.210  Most vocal of the congressional critics of the measure was 
Representative John Dingell, a member of the Ways and Means Committee 
who had sponsored the adoption of the 1942 provision guaranteeing 
admission to practice before the court of all “qualified” persons regardless 
of their membership in any profession.211 
In articulating the concern of congressional opponents, Mr. Dingell 
expressed the fear that Tax Court procedures would become formalistic if 
the change were adopted and that the court’s ability to dispose of cases 
rapidly would be decreased.212  Additionally, Mr. Dingell deeply believed in 
permitting non-attorneys to practice before the court and, indeed, to 
become members of the court, and he felt these privileges would be 
jeopardized if the tribunal were incorporated into the federal judiciary.213  
The difficulties raised by the Dobson case and the Administrative Procedure 
Act were conceded by Mr. Dingell to be serious, but he believed that these 
were isolated problems that could appropriately be dealt with by specific 
legislation without disturbing the court’s status as an agency in the executive 
branch.214  Mr. Dingell concluded that the proposal was nothing more than 
an effort by Tax Court judges to satisfy their vanity and was unjustified in 
light of the fact that tax administration would suffer as a result.215 
Were the congressional opposition and the lack of Administration 
enthusiasm described above the only obstacles to incorporating the court 
                                                     
209   See Letter from Robert N. Miller to Presiding Judge Turner, June 13, 1947, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
210   93 CONG. REC. 8392 (1947).  It should be noted that nine members of the 
committee voted for the bill, and among these was Wilbur D. Mills, who would 
later support article III status for the Tax Court.  See infra note 305 and 
accompanying text. 
211   See supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text. 
212   1949 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 49–50. 
213   Id. at 50–51. 
214   Id. 
215   93 CONG. REC. 8388 (1947). 
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into the federal judiciary, the measure might have been adopted.  However, 
in addition to these difficulties, the supporters of the proposal found 
themselves whipsawed between the concern of accountants that they be 
permitted to continue to represent taxpayers before the court, and the belief 
of bar groups that if the Tax Court were formally made a court, such 
continuation would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
The root of this problem could be traced back to 1924, when in one of 
its first announced rules, the Board of Tax Appeals provided for admission 
of attorneys and certified public accountants to its practice.216  Probably, the 
Board would have preferred to restrict its bar to lawyers, but due to the 
significant role that accountants had played in the development of 
administrative tax practice, the fact that the Board was at least technically a 
part of the executive branch, and the significant political influence of 
accounting associations, the exclusion of all accountants from practice was 
infeasible.  Accordingly, the compromise was struck to exclude from 
practice only those accountants who had not been professionally licensed.  
A large number of certified public accountants exercised their privilege to 
be admitted to practice before the Board/Tax Court.  By 1948, 7,310 had 
been admitted to its bar, compared to admissions of 28,707 attorneys.217  
Nevertheless, most accountants recognized that their training did not equip 
them to prosecute cases in a judicial context218 and relatively few actually 
practiced.  As a result, the great majority of cases were handled by either 
lawyers alone or lawyers assisted by accountants.219  The emphasis on 
judicial rules of procedure, the technical nature of the tax laws, the 
importance in tax cases of general legal doctrines relating to property, 
contracts, corporations, trusts, and estates, and the inability of accountants 
to represent clients in appellate proceedings, probably all contributed to 
lawyer domination of Board/Tax Court practice.  The results in those cases 
in which accountants attempted to try cases before the Board were not 
wholly satisfactory, and on more than one occasion the Board considered 
restricting its bar to attorneys.220  Yet because so few accountants actually 
tried cases, the rule permitting accountant practice was not modified by the 
Board prior to the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1942 and the so-called 
                                                     
216   B.T.A. RULE 2 (July, 1924 ed.).   
217  1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 60 (testimony of Presiding Judge 
Turner). 
218   1949 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 37 (testimony of Presiding Judge 
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Dingell amendment, permitting practice before the Tax Court by all 
qualified persons regardless of their professional standing.221 
Following the adoption of the Dingell amendment, the Tax Court 
substantially revised its rule respecting admission to practice.  Whereas 
practice privileges formerly had been virtually automatically conferred on 
attorneys and certified public accountants, under the new rule only 
attorneys were given this treatment.222  All other persons, including 
accountants, would be eligible to practice before the court only if they 
passed an examination to be administered by the court.223  The court 
believed this result was demanded by the statutory language restricting 
practice to “qualified” persons.  Since by background and training there was 
no reason to suppose that a certified accountant was any more qualified to 
try court cases than a noncertified accountant, the court concluded that it 
could be rightly accused of discrimination if it continued to admit 
automatically the former group to practice while insisting that the latter 
group pass an examination.224 
The new rule had an immediate and dramatic effect.  Prior to 1943, 
7,300 certified public accountants had been admitted to practice under the 
original rule, but in the six-year period between 1942 and 1948, a total of 
only 12 persons qualified for enrollment in the Tax Court bar as a result of 
passing the examination.225  As would be expected, many certified public 
accountants were angered by the interpretation the court placed on the 
Dingell amendment,226 and the new rule probably served to exacerbate 
professional jealousies between accountants and lawyers. 
The proposal to incorporate the Tax Court into the federal judiciary 
rekindled the inter-professional dispute and proved to be the most 
controversial aspect of the legislation.  Essentially two alternative proposals 
were presented to Congress.  One version retained the language of the 
Dingell amendment and therefore authorized the continuation of 
non-attorney practice.227  The other version prospectively allowed the court 
to determine qualifications to practice, but contained a “grandfather” 
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provision permitting non-attorneys previously admitted to Tax Court 
practice to continue to represent clients before the court in the future.228 
Neither version of the bill obtained the unqualified support of either 
accountant or lawyer groups.  Naturally, the continuation of the Dingell 
amendment was totally unacceptable to bar associations.229  They had 
opposed non-attorney practice before the court when it was an agency of 
the executive branch, and their opposition was even stronger if the court 
was to be incorporated into the federal judiciary.  In their view, such a rule 
would expressly condone an activity that traditionally constituted the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Somewhat surprisingly, in addition to bar 
groups, some accountant associations opposed the title 28 proposal even 
with the Dingell amendment retained.230  They did not see the benefit to be 
derived from changing the status of the court and feared that the direction 
of the legislation toward fuller court recognition would ultimately lead to a 
repeal of the Dingell amendment and the banning of practice by all but 
lawyers.231 
If the accountants were divided on the merits of the legislation with the 
Dingell amendment retained, they were unanimous in their opposition to 
the alternate proposal, which left the qualifications of practitioners to the 
discretion of the court and protected only existing members of the Tax 
Court bar with a grandfather clause.232  Accountants had little doubt that 
such a rule would inevitably result in the court barring all but attorneys 
from practicing before it.  Statements by Tax Court judges indicated this 
was not an unrealistic fear.233  Many accountants recognized that they were 
generally not as well qualified to try Tax Court cases as were lawyers.  
Nevertheless, they contended that they could better serve their clients, 
many of whom they represented in administrative proceedings before the 
Bureau, if they could continue their representation to at least the pre-trial 
stages of Tax Court proceedings.234  Frequently, the most realistic 
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229   E.g., 1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 88 (testimony of John Randall, 
American Bar Ass’n). 
230   Id. at 271–72 (testimony of George Carlson, California Society of Certified 
Public Accountants).  Most accounting organizations, on the other hand, had no 
objection to incorporating the court into the federal judiciary so long as the Dingell 
amendment was retained.  See id. at 231 (statement of American Inst. of 
Accountants). 
231   Id. at 274–76 (testimony of George Carlson).  
232   See, e.g., 1949 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 8 (testimony of Spencer 
Gordon, American Inst. of Accountants). 
233  1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 52–56 (testimony of Presiding 
Judge Turner).  
234  Id. at 221–26 (testimony of Maurice Austin, American Inst. of 
Accountants). 
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settlement negotiations occurred after a Tax Court petition was filed, and 
accountants felt that taxpayers should not have to be put to the trouble and 
expense of hiring attorneys to pursue what they saw as merely an extension 
of the administrative procedure. 
Bar groups felt strongly that these views were unjustified.  They could 
perceive no adequate reason why the commencement of a court proceeding 
involving tax liability should not call for the same legal skills than would the 
commencement of any other kind of court action.235  The depth of these 
views is indicated by the fact that the American Bar Association refused to 
endorse unqualifiedly one version of the bill that proposed to place the 
grandfather provision in the text of title 28, and only grudgingly approved a 
later version that would have enacted the provision in uncodified form as a 
transitional rule.236 
The effort to incorporate the Tax Court into title 28, which spanned 
more than four years, ultimately ended in failure.  Two bills to revise and 
codify title 28 were reported favorably by committees of the House of 
Representatives.237  Both bills provided for the Tax Court to become part 
of the federal judicial establishment.238  The first of these, H.R. 7124, died 
without House action at the end of the 79th Congress.  The second bill, 
H.R. 3214, was passed by the House under suspension of the rules by the 
vote of 342 to 23,239 the major opposition coming from Congressman 
Dingell and other members of the Ways and Means Committee, despite the 
addition, on the House floor, of the Dingell amendment protecting the 
rights of non-attorneys to practice before the court.240  When the bill 
reached the Senate, it was referred to a subcommittee of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator Forrest Donnell.  Senator Donnell 
probably favored the proposal for changing the status of the Tax Court, but 
he felt obliged to provide ample time for interested parties to express their 
views publicly.241 Extensive hearings therefore were held on H.R. 3214 
                                                     
235  Id. at 175–76 (testimony of Cuthbert Baldwin, Louisiana State Bar Ass’n); 
H.R. REP. NO. 81-1138, at 4–5 (1949). 
236  1949 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 52–53 (statement of American Bar 
Ass’n). 
237  H.R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (reported by Committee on Revision 
of the laws), H.R. REP. NO. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946)); H.R. 3214, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (reported by committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 80-
308 (1947)). 
238  H.R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 271–277 (1946); H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. §§ 271–277 (1947). 
239  93 CONG. REC. 8392 (1947). 
240  Id. at 8384. 
241  Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Judge Albert Maris, March 25, 1948, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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before it was reported to the Senate floor.242  As a measure of the 
controversy engendered by the Tax Court proposal, although it constituted 
only a small part of the recodification of title 28, most of the hearings were 
concerned with the question of whether Tax Court practice should be 
restricted to attorneys.  The delay in holding and concluding public hearings 
resulted in H.R. 3214 not receiving final committee consideration until the 
last few days of the 80th Congress.243  Because of the procedural rules of 
the Senate, the bill could only reach the Senate floor for a vote by way of 
the consent calendar, which permitted any Senator to bar consideration of 
the bill by objection.244  The Judiciary Committee had been advised by one 
of its members that if the Tax Court provision remained in the bill as 
reported he would object to the bill’s consideration on the Senate floor.245  
Not wishing to delay passage of the remainder of H.R. 3214, which was 
unobjectionable to all, the committee excised all Tax Court provisions from 
the bill it reported except for one amendment reversing the rule in the 
Dobson case.246  The bill as reported passed the Senate,247 and this version 
also passed the House,248 although the House Judiciary Committee 
reaffirmed its support for changing the status of the Tax Court at the 
earliest practical date.249 
Following passage of H.R. 3214, other bills were introduced in the 80th 
and 81st Congress to amend title 28 to incorporate the Tax Court.250  In 
1949, hearings on one of these bills, H.R. 3113, were held by a 
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee,251 but the problems that had 
arisen earlier were apparently still present.252  The bill was favorably 
reported from committee by unanimous vote,253 and a rule was secured for 
its introduction on the House floor.254  However, the bill was never 
                                                     
242  1948 Senate Hearings, supra note 107. 
243  See Letter from Presiding Judge Turner to Attorney General Clark, June 17, 
1948, at 14, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
244  Id. 
245  Id.; Memorandum from Judge Turner to Judge Dawson, April 13, 1967, at 
1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
246  S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 2 (1948). 
247  94 CONG. REC. 7930 (1948). 
248  Id. at 8501 (1948). 
249  Id. 
250  H.R. 7154, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. 2447, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1949); H.R. 3113, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). 
251  1949 House Hearings, supra note 167. 
252  See id. at 7 (testimony of Spencer Gordon, representing American Institute 
of Accountants). 
253  H.R. REP. NO. 81-1138 (1949). 
254  H.R. REP. NO. 81-1301 (1949). 
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calendared for consideration by the House and ultimately died at the end of 
the 81st Congress. 
The collapse of the effort to incorporate the Tax Court into the newly 
recodified title 28 represented the nadir of the struggle for court status.  
The court and its supporters could justifiably believe that their cause was 
just.  In the words of one court, “[t]he Tax Court . . . [was] for all practical 
purposes a judicial tribunal operating in the federal judicial system.”255 
Support for this position could even be found among opponents of judicial 
status, many of whom believed that the Administrative Procedure Act 
should not apply to the court and that its decisions should be reviewed 
under the same standards applicable to district court decisions.256  These 
opponents also readily conceded that the court had compiled a splendid 
record for impartially and expertly adjudicating controversies within its 
jurisdiction.257  Yet, recognition of its court status was denied because of 
controversies that, especially to a judicial mind, must have seemed wholly 
irrelevant. 
Defeat of a similar proposal in connection with the 1926 legislation was 
followed by a long period of diminished interest in the status question258 
                                                     
255  This is an excerpt from Judge Maris’s opinion in Stern v. Commissioner, 215 
F.2d 701, 707–08 (3d Cir. 1954).  In elaborating this view, Judge Maris wrote:  
But although Congress in the Internal Revenue Code has continued to call 
the tribunal “an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the 
Government” it has at the same time more realistically designated it as a 
court and its members as judges.  And it is the fact that from its inception 
as the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924 it has operated only as a judicial 
tribunal in adjudicating controversies as to tax liabilities arising between 
taxpayers and the Government.  Its powers are wholly judicial in character.  
It has never been given any administrative powers or functions nor has it 
ever had any investigatory, regulatory or policy-making duties or powers.  
Since the passage of the Revenue Act of 1926 its decisions have been final 
and reviewable only on the record by the United States courts of appeals.  
Since 1948 the scope of that review has been the same as in the case of like 
decisions of the district courts.  The Tax Court is thus for all practical 
purposes a judicial tribunal operating in the federal judicial system.  
Whether it is a legislative court created by Congress under Article I, section 
8, of the Constitution, like the Customs Court, or some other form of 
judicial agency placed for convenience of housekeeping in the Executive 
Branch of the Government is, therefore, merely a matter of legal semantics 
since, whatever it may be called, it is an “independent” judicial agency the 
work of which is not subject to supervision or review in the Executive 
Branch of the Government but only by the federal appellate courts. 
256  See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
257  See 1949 House Hearings, supra note 167, at 48–49; Letter from Francis 
Biddle to Henry Morgenthau, June 5, 1942, reprinted in 1942 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 106, at 2298. 
258  See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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and, not surprisingly, the same result followed the events of 1945 to 1949.  
Between 1949 and 1967, only one minor effort was made to incorporate the 
Tax Court into the judiciary.  This followed the report of the Commission 
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known as 
the Hoover Commission, which was established in 1953.259  The Hoover 
Commission and its Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure concluded 
that the Tax Court was a judicial body and, as such, should be moved from 
the executive branch to the judiciary as part of an Administrative Court of 
the United States with jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes dealing with labor, 
trade, and tax matters.260  Although the Tax Court and its supporters 
welcomed the Hoover Commission finding that the court properly 
belonged in the judiciary, the proposal to incorporate the court into an 
Administrative Court that would deal with other specialized questions of 
administrative law was regarded as unfortunate.261  Since judges of such a 
court would be required to hear cases in several disparate fields and could 
not be expected to be experts in each, many believed that the expertise of 
the Tax Court would inevitably be lost.  This effect would be heightened by 
an increased unwillingness of tax experts to accept appointment to such a 
court if they were required to hear unrelated cases, as well as make the 
financial sacrifice frequently attendant on leaving the private sector for 
government service. 
The American Bar Association agreed with these criticisms of the 
Hoover Commission report and, in conjunction with the Tax Court, drafted 
proposed legislation to incorporate the Tax Court into title 28 as an article 
III court, independent of any administrative court having non-tax 
jurisdiction.262  The proposal was introduced in Congress by Senator 
Hennings in 1958 and 1959, in connection with proposals to create separate 
courts for tax, labor, and trade matters.263  Considerable care went into 
drafting the legislation, but apparently little effort was made to enlist 
                                                     
259  Act of July 10, 1953, ch. 184, 67 Stat. 142. 
260  COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GOVERNMENT,  LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE; A REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, 85–88 (1955): COMMISSION ON 
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK 
FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, 246–56 (1955). 
261  Gribbon, supra note 184; Letter from Chief Judge Murdock to Daniel 
Gribbon, June 18, 1956, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
262  See DOYLE, REPORT IN EXPLANATION OF S. 3796, 85th CONG., 2d SESS., c. 
1958, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
263  S. 3796, S. 3797, S. 3798, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 1274, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1959). 
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supporters in Congress or the Administration.  Accordingly, the bills never 
proceeded beyond introduction. 
Although the effort made to elevate the status of the Tax Court in the 
1950s was half-hearted, a more serious and successful campaign was 
initiated during this period to provide Tax Court judges with the benefits of 
judicial-type retirement provisions.  Tax Court judges, as employees of the 
executive branch, were covered by the Civil Service retirement system, but 
because benefits under this system depended on a lengthy period of federal 
service, in many cases it was inadequate.264  This was especially true for 
those judges who came to the court from private life without many years of 
prior government work.  Since few were wealthy, they were compelled to 
remain on the court for personal financial reasons when age and health 
considerations might otherwise have led them into retirement.265  As a 
result, the average age of Tax Court judges had increased substantially.  For 
example, in 1925, the average age of members of the Board of Tax Appeals 
was 45; in 1952, the average age of judges of the Tax Court had risen to 60, 
with three judges over 70.  Some of the judges had suffered debilitating 
illnesses but simply could not afford to retire to make way for those 
younger and healthier.266  Recognition of these problems in other courts 
had led Congress to provide pensions for all judges except those of the Tax 
Court.267  The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association 
believed that the situation was not only inequitable but could lead to a 
serious weakening of the court because of the declining productivity of its 
judges.268  Accordingly, in 1951, the Section formed a Committee on 
Retirement Benefits for Tax Court Judges to study the problem.269  The 
committee, composed entirely of former Board of Tax Appeals members, 
was chaired by Edgar J. Goodrich, who served on the Board from 1931 to 
1935 and was a successful Washington attorney.270  The committee, with 
the support of various allies, such as Randolph Paul,271 Arthur Krock,272 the 
                                                     
264  H.R. REP. NO. 83-846, at 2–4 (1953); S. REP. NO. 83-675, at 2–4 (1953). 
265  Krock, A Harsh Exclusion from Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1952 at 
22, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Krock]. 
266  Id. 
267  See H.R. REP. NO. 83-846, at 2–3 (1953). 
268  See Section of Taxation Bulletin, March, 1953, at 19. 
269  Letter from Morton Fisher, Chairman, Section of Taxation, to Edgar 
Goodrich, March 15, 1951, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Material of ABA 
Comm.” 
270  The other members of the committee were: Charles Hamel, James Ivins, 
Albert James, Jules Korner, Logan Morris, Percy Phillips, and C. M. Trammell.  Id. 
271  Letter from Randolph Paul to Arthur Krock, March 4, 1952, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Material of ABA Comm.”  
272  Krock, supra note 265. 
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American Institute of Accountants,273 and the Treasury Department,274 was 
singularly successful, and in two years secured legislation incorporating 
most of its recommendations.  Specifically, the legislation permitted Tax 
Court judges to retire with pay after either 18 years of service or 10 years of 
service and attainment of age 70.275 
The enactment of the pension legislation could not, however, obscure 
the fact that in the matter of formal recognition of judicial status, the 
court’s only advance since its creation in 1924 had been the change of name 
effected by the 1942 legislation. It remained for a new generation of Tax 
Court judges to attempt once again to have the Tax Court properly 
recognized as a court, not an agency of the executive branch. 
 
C. The United States Tax Court – A Court of Record Established Under 
Article I of the Constitution 
 
The evolution of the status of the Tax Court began to take a decisive 
turn in 1967, when, at the request of the court, identical bills were 
introduced in the House and Senate by the chairmen of the congressional 
tax committees.276  The bills, H.R. 10100, introduced by Chairman Wibur 
D. Mills, and S. 2041, introduced by Chairman Russell B. Long,277 
reorganized the Tax Court as part of the federal judicial system.  Like H.R. 
3214 and H.R. 3113 some 20 years earlier, the Mills-Long bills proposed to 
incorporate the Tax Court in title 28; unlike the earlier bills, however, the 
effect of H.R. 10100 and S. 2041 was to make the Tax Court an article III 
                                                     
273  H.R. REP. NO. 83-846, at 4 (1953). 
274  Id. 
275  Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 352, 67 Stat. 482. The ABA committee originally 
proposed that the legislation also provide for dependents of judges.  This aspect of 
the proposal was rejected, but was later enacted in 1961.  Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. 
L. No. 87-370, 75 Stat. 796. 
276  Letter from Chief Judge Tietjens to Chairman Mills, March 27, 1967, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Hearings 
on S. 2041 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967) (testimony of Senator Long) 
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings]. The bills had been originally drafted by 
the legislative committee of the Tax Court. 
277  H.R. 10100, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2041, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967).  S. 2041 was cosponsored in the Senate by Senator Carl Curtis. H.R. 10100 
and S. 2041 are hereinafter referred as the Mills-Long bills.  Of the two bills, S. 
2041 was the more significant since, as described below, it served as the impetus 
for the initiation for public hearings by the Tydings subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary.  See infra notes 301–341 and accompanying text.  No 
hearings were ever held and no committee report was ever issued with respect to 
H.R. 10100. 
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court.278  Thus, the bills accorded Tax Court judges tenure during good 
behavior and eliminated the statutory provision permitting removal of 
judges by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”279  The transition of the court to an article III court was not to be 
immediate, however, because the bills provided for the continuation in 
office of existing judges for the remainder of their 12-year terms.280  Other 
significant provisions of the new bills (1) granted the court powers to 
preserve order, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to compel the 
production of evidence;281 (2) required that Tax Court procedural rules 
conform “as nearly as practicable” to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure;282 (3) authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to 
designate Tax Court judges to perform judicial duties on district courts and 
courts of appeals;283 and (4) authorized the Tax Court to appoint up to ten 
commissioners to perform such duties as the Chief Judge might require, 
including the hearing of small claims cases.284  Finally, on the sensitive issue 
of representation, the bill provided that the Government would continue to 
be represented by the Chief Counsel for the Service,285 and that taxpayers 
would be represented by those authorized to do so by the court’s rules of 
practice, but that persons formerly admitted to practice before the court 
would continue to be eligible to practice.286 
As might be expected, many of the arguments in favor of the Mills-Long 
bills resembled those brought forth during earlier debates over similar 
proposals.287  Thus, recognition of court status was advocated on the 
ground that the Tax Court functioned as a judicial body, not as an agency of 
the executive branch,288 and that the court’s non-judicial status was 
misleading to the public and could erode taxpayer confidence in a system 
that relied heavily on voluntary taxpayer compliance.289  Additionally, 
judicial status would permit the court to punish contempt and enforce its 
                                                     
278  113 CONG. REC. 17646 (1967) (remarks of Senator Long). 
279  Grounds and procedure for removing Tax Court judges were, and are, 
contained in I.R.C. § 7443(f).  The provision for life tenure was contained in § 2 of 
S. 2041, adding § 274(a) to title 28. 
280  Mills-Long bills, supra note 277, § 26. 
281  Id. § 25(a), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 2651. 
282  Id. § 25(a), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 2652. 
283  Id. § 4, proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 293(e). 
284  Id. § 17(a), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 911. 
285  Id. § 13(a), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 527. 
286  Id. § 27. 
287  See supra notes 23–34, 98–105, 168–191, and accompanying text. 
288  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 30 (testimony of Harry Mansfield, 
American Bar Ass’n), 93, 101 (statement of Chief Judge Drennen). 
289  Id. at 35–36 (statement of Harry Mansfield); 113 CONG. REC. 17646 (1967) 
(remarks of Senator Long); 114 CONG. REC. 29843 (1968) (remarks of Senator 
Tydings). 
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own orders,290 and would eliminate controversies such as those involving 
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Dobson case, which had their 
roots in the court’s anomalous “administrative setting.”291  The increased 
prestige of the Court and the provision of life tenure for its judges would 
also make recruiting top caliber people for judgeships easier.292  In addition 
to these “traditional” arguments, new considerations were raised which 
reflected more recent concerns.  First, the court, for several years, had been 
under pressure to conform its rules of practice and procedure to those of 
the federal district courts, especially with regard to pretrial discovery 
techniques.293  Some advocates of H.R. 10100 and S. 2041, which 
specifically provided for movement in the direction of conformance,294 
supported the bills on the ground that court status would facilitate such a 
change.295  Second, as described more fully below, consideration of the bills 
resulted in serious attention being given to the question of complete 
overhaul of the tax litigating system.296  Some of the proposals made in this 
regard would have increased the importance of the district courts and the 
Court of Claims in relation to the Tax Court.  Making the Tax Court an 
article III court would permit the assignment of its judges to these other 
courts, which would thereby benefit in handling the increased workloads.297  
Finally, some taxpayers had recently challenged the constitutionality of the 
Tax Court, arguing that the court’s non-judicial status violated the principle 
of separation of powers.298  Although the court’s constitutionality had been 
sustained by several decisions of the courts of appeals,299 the issue, 
                                                     
290  113 CONG. REC. 17646 (1967) (remarks of Senator Long); 114 CONG. REC. 
29843 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
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292  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 35 (statement of Harry Mansfield, 
American Bar Ass’n). 
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especially in light of a 1962 decision of the Supreme Court,300 was not 
entirely free of doubt.  The enactment of the bills would put such 
arguments to rest.301 
The principal public forum for discussion of the status of the Tax Court 
was hearings conducted over a two-year period by a subcommittee, chaired 
by Senator Joseph Tydings, of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.302  
Support at the hearings for the proposal to establish the Tax Court under 
article III came from the Tax Court itself,303 from Senator Roman Hruska, 
ranking Republican on the Tydings committee,304 from Chairman Mills,305 
from the American Bar Association,306 and from tax practitioners and 
academicians.307 
                                                     
300  Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).  For a discussion of the 
implications of the Glidden case on the Tax Court, see Dubroff, supra note 74, at 
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For this reason, some expressed doubts as to the validity of the proposed 
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1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276; 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207; 
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CONG. REC. 10439–40 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
303  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 88 (testimony of Chief Judge 
Drennen); 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 130 (testimony of Chief Judge 
Drennen, Judge Fay, and Judge Tannenwald); 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 302, 
at 428 (testimony of Chief Judge Drennen). 
304  1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 141–42. 
305  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 11; 1968 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 207, at 136. 
306  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 30 (letter from Orison Marden, 
American Bar Ass’n). 
307  Id. at 57 (statements of Charles Davis, Rupert Gresham, Brian Holland, 
Hart Spiegel, and Laurens Williams), 71 (letter from Professor Alan Polasky); 1968 
Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 151 (statement of Harry Mansfield, American 
Bar Ass’n); 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 302, at 183 (testimony of Bruce Lane, 
The Board Becomes a Court                              221 
 
But despite the substantial support for article III status, most of the 
problems that had blocked judicial status for the court in the past persisted.  
One constant, and seemingly insoluble, problem was the issue of 
representation of the Government in Tax Court proceedings.  Treasury, the 
traditional representative of the Commissioner before the Tax Court, was 
loath to give up that role; Justice, the traditional representative of the 
Government before the federal courts, opposed making the Tax Court a 
full-fledged court unless it could assume full responsibilities of 
representation.308 
In Treasury’s view, its continued representation of the Government 
before the Tax Court was vital for two reasons.  First, the Office of the 
Chief Counsel, as part of the same Department as the Internal Revenue 
Service, could work closely with the Service in settling Tax Court cases.  
Because more than 80 percent of the cases docketed with the court were 
disposed of by settlement, this relationship was central to the court’s ability 
to continue to handle expeditiously its workload.309  Second, Treasury 
perceived its litigating role in the court as necessary to its more general 
function of setting Administration tax policy.  If Justice were given control 
of this function, litigating positions might be adopted on the narrow ground 
of winning a particular case rather than establishing cohesive and uniform 
precedents.310  These objectives were considered so important that even 
though the bills providing article III status for the Tax Court specifically 
provided for representation by the Chief Counsel,311 and even though there 
was substantial sentiment among Treasury officials for enhancing the 
prestige of the court,312 the Department felt obliged to oppose H.R. 10100 
and S. 2041 on the chance that making the Tax Court a full constitutional 
court could ultimately lead to Justice usurpation of its role.313 
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Polasky), 334–35 (testimony of Marvin Garbis), 348 (testimony of Professor 
Richard Pugh), 352 (testimony of John Sexton). 
308  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 45–46 (statement of Mitchell 
Rogovin, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division), 79 (statement of Fred Smith, 
General Counsel, Treasury Dep’t). 
309  Id. at 79. 
310  1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 163–64 (testimony of Sheldon 
Cohen, Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
311  Mills-Long bills, supra note 277, § 13(a), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 527; S. 
4144, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(a) (1968), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 527; S. 1974, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1969), proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 527. 
312  1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 116 (testimony of Sheldon Cohen, 
Comm’r of Int. Rev.). 
313  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 91 (testimony of Chief Judge 
Drennen). 
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The Justice Department, represented at the Tydings hearings by Mitchell 
Rogovin, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, also opposed 
enactment of the Mills-Long bills,314 but in doing so placed surprisingly 
little public emphasis on the bills’ delegation of litigating responsibilities to 
Treasury.  On this question, the suggestion of Justice was that Congress 
leave to executive order the disposition of the representation issue.315  The 
major concern of the Justice Department was that the entire structure of 
the system by which tax disputes were litigated was suspect.316  Tax cases 
could be tried in three separate systems of trial forums, each with different 
procedures, attitudes, and jurisdictional requirements.  Appeals from the 
trial level courts could be taken to eleven intermediate appellate tribunals, 
which frequently disagreed with one another, and to a single court of final 
review which had a legendary distaste for tax cases.  In these circumstances 
the existing system was subject to criticism as being unfair to taxpayers, 
unfair to the Government, and inconsistent with the goal of establishing a 
uniform and rational body of interpretations of the tax laws.317  
Accordingly, Justice urged that legislative action with respect to the Tax 
Court was premature and should await the outcome of a comprehensive 
Department study of reform possibilities.318 
This position was well received by Senator Tydings and immediately 
changed the tenor of the debate over article III status for the Tax Court.319  
In the early hearings virtually all attention was directed toward the issue of 
Tax Court status, but after the Justice position was announced, the major 
emphasis shifted to far more general questions, such as whether the trial of 
tax cases should be restricted to a single court system, whether concurrent 
jurisdiction to hear deficiency and refund cases should be given to more 
than one court system, and whether a single court of appeals should be 
established to provide the sole intermediate review of all tax cases. 
                                                     
314  Assistant Attorney General Rogovin spoke for Justice at the Tydings 
hearings, but other officials of Justice may not have entirely agreed with his views.  
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold had been a long-time supporter of incorporating 
the court into the federal judiciary and it is unlikely that his position on this 
question had changed over the years. 
315  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 45–46 (statement of Mitchell 
Rogovin). 
316  Id. at 40–46. 
317  See, e.g., ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943). 
318  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 46.  Assistant Attorney General 
Rogovin testified at the 1967 Hearings that the Department had “taken steps to 
initiate [such] a study.” Id. at 51. 
319  Senator Tydings, who did not attend the 1967 hearings held by his 
committee on S. 2041, when it was felt that the only issue was the status of the Tax 
Court, became a champion of reform of the entire litigating structure in later years.  
See 114 CONG. REC. 29842–44 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tydings); 115 CONG. 
REC. 10439–40 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
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These were questions of considerable complexity, and the Tydings 
hearings soon became a forum for widely disparate and irreconcilable 
positions.  For example, the Rogovin report to the Tydings subcommittee 
manifested a preference for a system in which all trial jurisdiction in tax 
cases would be given to the district courts.320  This would eliminate forum 
shopping by taxpayers as well as end the system’s built-in bias against those 
who could not afford to pay a disputed tax and were therefore forced to 
litigate in the Tax Court.321  It would also provide a judicial remedy in a 
familiar forum close to the taxpayer’s home.  Since the Tax Court would be 
eliminated, such a change would probably result in the Justice Department’s 
obtaining control over all tax litigation. 
On the other hand, most tax practitioners favored retention of the Tax 
Court but urged that it and the district courts, and possibly the Court of 
Claims,322 be given concurrent jurisdiction in all tax cases.323  This would 
result in the granting of refund jurisdiction to the Tax Court and deficiency 
jurisdiction to the district courts and, possibly, the Court of Claims.  
Although such a change would increase the ability of taxpayers to select the 
most favorable forum, it would eliminate the existing discrimination against 
taxpayers who could not afford to pay the tax before litigating and were 
thus barred from district court and the Court of Claims, which could only 
entertain refund actions.324 
Still a third position on the issue of reform emerged from the Treasury 
Department.  Although Treasury was receptive to some proposals for 
                                                     
320  Although not explicitly stated, a comparison of the study’s discussion of 
reform alternatives indicates that this was the Justice view.  1968 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 207, at 120–25. 
321  Jurisdiction of the district court and the Court of Claims is predicated on 
prior full payment of the disputed tax.  Thus, some taxpayers, because of 
inadequate resources, may be foreclosed from litigating in these forums.  See Part I, 
notes 143–198 and accompanying text. 
322  Some practitioners suggested that to simplify the tax litigating structure, the 
tax jurisdiction of the Court of Claims should be eliminated.  1969 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 302, at 224 (testimony of Jerry Hamovit), 246 (statement of John Jones), 
248 (testimony of Luther Avery), 277 (statement of C. W. Wellen), 348 (testimony 
of Professor Richard Pugh).  The Court of Claims opposed loss of its tax 
jurisdiction, and was supported in this by several practitioners.  Id. at 427 
(statement of Chief Judge Cowen, Court of Claims), 313 (testimony of Professor 
Richard Pugh), 332 (statement of Marvin Garbis), 408 (statement of John Sexton). 
323  See testimony and statements collected in note 322, supra. 
324  After the conclusion of the Tydings hearings, the Tax Section of the 
American Bar Association endorsed the position of concurrent jurisdiction with 
article III status for the Tax Court. Report of Comm. on Court Procedure for the Tax 
Court, 23 TAX LAWYER 706 (1970). 
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change,325 it strongly opposed any change in the existing structure tending 
to reduce the importance of the Tax Court, which it believed was the most 
important forum for establishing tax precedents to guide both the Service 
and taxpayers.326  For this reason Treasury opposed the proposal for 
exclusive tax jurisdiction in the district courts that, of course, presupposed 
the elimination of the Tax Court.327  This proposal did not appear to have 
wide support.328  There were, however, numerous proponents of 
concurrent jurisdiction of the Tax Court and the district courts, and 
Treasury also opposed this plan on the ground that it would have 
substantial impact on the number of cases going to the Tax Court.  Juries 
were available in district court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
applicable to district court proceedings were more familiar to many 
practitioners than were Tax Court procedures, and district courts were 
generally more geographically accessible to taxpayers than the Tax Court, 
which sat in only 60 locations throughout the country and generally heard 
motions only in Washington.  Finally, whether true or false, many were 
under the impression that district courts were more favorable to taxpayers 
than the Tax Court.329  These factors all pointed toward taxpayers 
preferring to litigate in district court.  Yet the overwhelming bulk of tax 
cases were litigated in the Tax Court.330  Treasury believed that the major 
reason for this was the fact that only the Tax Court had jurisdiction to 
redetermine deficiency assertions, and that if such jurisdiction was given to 
district courts the business of the Tax Court would be substantially 
reduced.331 
With the new direction of the Tydings hearings, it was inevitable that the 
cause of article III status for the Tax Court would suffer.  Chief Judge 
Drennen and other supporters of the Tax Court, including the Tax Section 
of the American Bar Association, Senator Hruska, and Chairman Mills, 
continued to urge that the original proposal be enacted expeditiously since 
the controversy over more substantial changes in the tax litigating structure 
                                                     
325  In this regard, Commissioner Thrower testified that the Service was 
considering several reforms.  These were: (1) modification of procedures to speed 
up administrative action; (2) legislative modification of the Flora rule; (3) legislative 
reversal of the Lawrence rule; (4) article III or article I status for the Tax Court.  
1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 302, at 463–67. 
326  Id. at 448–51 (testimony of Randolph Thrower, Comm’r of Int. Rev.), 469–
76 (testimony of K. Martin Worthy, Chief Counsel for Int. Rev.). 
327  Id. at 476 (testimony of K. Martin Worthy). 
328  Id. 
329  Id. at 487–88. 
330  In the years preceding the 1969 hearings, more than 80% of tax cases were 
litigated in the Tax Court.  Id. at 470. 
331  Id. at 477–78. 
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assured that no prompt action in this direction could be taken.332  
Apparently Senator Tydings supported the Tax Court in this matter,333 but 
Justice and Treasury, for their own reasons, refused to endorse article III 
status.  Without their support the proposal had little chance of passage. 
Other opposition further dimmed the prospects for passage of the 
Mills-Long bills.  Senator Long, who had himself introduced S. 2041 “by 
request,”334 appeared at the Tydings hearings to testify that although he 
continued to support several features of the bill,335 he had serious 
reservations concerning its most important aspect—establishing the court 
under article III.336  Senator Long recognized the desirability of enhancing 
the independent image of the court, and to this end favored moving the 
court out of its headquarters in the Internal Revenue Service Building, 
where it had been housed for several decades, into its own courthouse.337  
However, he could not support making it an article III court.  Such action 
might eventually lead to Justice Department representation of the 
Government in its proceedings and the exclusion of non-lawyers from its 
bar.  Both of these consequences would, in the Senator’s view, be 
regrettable.  Moreover, article III status required tenure during good 
behavior for Tax Court judges, and, like many other congressmen, Senator 
Long was fundamentally opposed to such a guarantee because it could 
result in the refusal by a judge to apply faithfully the enactments of 
Congress, secure in the knowledge that his position would not thereby be 
jeopardized.  Senator Long did not oppose the tradition of generally 
reappointing Tax Court judges when their terms expired;338 nevertheless, he 
believed that periodic review of a judge’s fitness to continue in office was 
healthy.  Although Senator Long was the only witness to express these 
views at the Tydings hearings, there is little doubt that they had wide 
support in Congress. 
                                                     
332  1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 130 (testimony of Chief Judge 
Drennen), 136 (letter from Chairman Mills to Senator Tydings), 151 (statement of 
Harry Mansfield, American Bar Ass’n). 
333  The Tydings subcommittee favorably reported S. 2041 to the full Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  However, no further action was taken on the bill.  115 
CONG. REC. 10439 (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
334  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 23. 
335  These included: granting the court subpoena and contempt power; 
permitting the expanded use of commissioners, especially in small tax cases; and 
conforming the Tax Court retirement plan to the provisions applicable to other 
judges.  Id. at 24. 
336  Id. at 23. 
337  Id. at 22. 
338  Since 1924, only three members of the Board and Tax Court had ever been 
refused reappointment.  Id. at 22. 
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Finally, article III status for the Tax Court was also opposed by the 
United States Judicial Conference.339  Composed of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, the chief judges of each judicial circuit, the Chief Judge of 
the Court of Claims, the Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, and a district judge from each judicial circuit, the Judicial 
Conference met annually to consider the problems and procedures of the 
United States courts and to recommend legislation to Congress.340  As Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren was the head of the Judicial 
Conference in the late 1960s, and he opposed article III status for the Tax 
Court.  Apparently his feeling and that of a majority of the Conference was 
that full court status was inappropriate for a tribunal with such a specialized 
jurisdiction as the Tax Court.341  Although lacking direct legislative 
authority, the Judicial Conference exerted considerable influence in 
Congress, especially with the judiciary committees that had jurisdiction over 
S. 2041. 
The period of 1967 to 1969 was one of considerable frustration for the 
Tax Court.  Two decades had passed since the previous major effort to 
incorporate the court into the judiciary, but apparently little had changed 
except for the addition of a new opponent of judicial status, the Judicial 
Conference, and the failure of an old adversary, the accounting profession, 
to make its views known publicly.342  By mid-1969 the court and its 
supporters had concluded that the prospects for enactment of article III 
status were remote.343  Accordingly, an alternative proposal, H.R. 13494,344 
was introduced by Chairman Mills in the summer of 1969, providing for the 
court to be established as a court under article I of the Constitution.  As an 
article I tribunal, the court would have to forego the constitutional 
                                                     
339  Letter from William Foley, Deputy Director, Administrative Officer of the 
United States Courts, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, 
March 4, 1968, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
340  28 U.S.C. § 331. 
341  See Letter from Chief Judge Drennen to Chief Justice Warren, Feb. 28, 
1969, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
342  No accountant or accounting organization appeared to testify at the 
Tydings hearings.  In the quarter of a century since the adoption of the Dingell 
amendment, few non-lawyers had gained admission to the Tax Court bar, and 
apparently accountants had become resigned to their de facto exclusion from 
practice.  1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 276, at 89. 
343  Letter from Chief Judge Drennen to Judge Robert Ainsworth Jr., June 20, 
1969, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence;” Letter from Chief Judge Drennen to Chairman Mills, Nov. 20, 
1969, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
344  91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
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guarantees of life tenure and undiminished compensation, as well as the 
prestige associated with full constitutional court status.  Nevertheless, H.R. 
13494 had several advantages.  Of primary importance, the court would no 
longer be an independent agency of the executive branch of the 
Government.  Formal judicial status would help eliminate the 
misapprehension of many that the court was simply an extension of the 
administrative procedures of the Internal Revenue Service; it would also 
relieve the court of the necessity of satisfying administrative procedures that 
were not appropriate to its function.  Even as late as 1969, the question of 
the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Tax Court had 
not been definitively resolved, even though it had been first raised more 
than two decades earlier.345  The bill also authorized the court to punish 
contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment, and provided that in 
carrying out its powers the court would have the same assistance as is 
provided generally to federal courts.  The term of office of judges would be 
increased from 12 to 15 years, and although automatic reappointment was 
not provided, a judge who was not reappointed after serving 15 years could 
retire with full pay.  This was a novel approach to the problem of judicial 
tenure, and permitted the forced retirement of judges without formal 
removal proceedings, while guaranteeing financial independence to those so 
retired.  Provisions dealing with retirement benefits and survivor benefits 
were liberalized to provide greater uniformity with the treatment of district 
court judges.  The bill also changed the name of the court to the United 
States Tax Court, following the general form by which federal courts are 
named, which form had been disregarded in 1942 when the Board of Tax 
Appeals was renamed the Tax Court of the United States.346  The final, and 
perhaps most appealing aspect of H.R. 13494, was its acceptability to most 
of the opponents of S. 2041.  The amendments contained in the bill only 
affected the Internal Revenue Code and made no changes in title 28.  Thus, 
the issue of representation of the Government was not raised to the same 
degree as in prior bills that would have incorporated the court into the 
judicial code.  As a result, the Treasury Department indicated its approval 
of the bill,347 and the proposal ceased to be a matter of concern to the 
Judicial Conference.  Moreover, even though the bill increased the term of 
office of Tax Court judges from 12 to 15 years, tenure during good 
behavior was not applicable and the major concern of Senator Long and 
those sharing his view was eliminated.  Finally, the bill made no change in 
the Dingell amendment and thus was not offensive to accountants, who in 
                                                     
345  See supra notes 185–191 and accompanying text. 
346  See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text. 
347  Letter from Paul Eggers, Treasury General Counsel, to Chairman Mills, c. 
1969, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “79th–91st Cong.: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
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prior times had vociferously objected to permitting the court to prescribe 
its own rules with respect to eligibility to practice. 
H.R. 13494 was noncontroversial, and its major supporters in Congress, 
chairmen Mills and Long, felt no need to hold public hearings on the 
subject.  The provisions of the bill were quietly inserted into the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 by the Senate Finance Committee in executive 
session348 and became law on December 30, 1969.349  The only significant 
departure the enacted provision made from H.R. 13494 was the proviso 
that for a judge who was not reappointed to be eligible for retirement at full 
pay, he would have to notify the President in writing of his willingness to 
accept reappointment between nine and six months prior to the expiration 
of his term.350  
 
D. Questions Concerning Constitutional Status of the Court’s Jurisdiction 
 
Soon after the enactment of the 1969 legislation, the constitutional 
propriety of the Tax Court was challenged by the taxpayer in Burns, Stix 
Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner.351  The taxpayer in Burns contended that the 
creation of the Tax Court as a court of record that exercised the judicial 
power of the United States violated the doctrine of separation of powers 
because its judges were not afforded the protections of lifetime tenure and 
undiminished salary required by article III.   
Noting that several circuit courts had expressed approval of the 
statutory creation of the Tax Court when the court remained an executive 
agency,352 the Tax Court posed the following question: 
 
Did the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 so change the 
status and function of the Tax Court that it is now exercising the 
“judicial powers” referred to in article III and must be established as 
an article III court with its judges having the tenure and 
compensation protection provided in section 1 of article III?353   
 
The court resolved this question in the negative with relative ease, citing the 
continuation of the court’s basic jurisdiction through the enactment of the 
1969 legislation, the limitation of the court’s jurisdiction by statute, and the 
                                                     
348  See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 301–05 (1969). 
349  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 951–962, 83 Stat. 730. 
350  Id. § 954(a), adding I.R.C. § 7447(b)(3). 
351  57 T.C. 392 (1971). 
352  See id. at 395 (citing Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 
636 (5th Cir. 1966); Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1966); Willmut 
Gas & Oil Co. v. Fly, 322 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1963); Standard Hosiery Mills v. 
Commissioner, 249 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1957)). 
353  Id. 
The Board Becomes a Court                              229 
 
court’s lack of jurisdiction to exercise the broad common law concept of 
“judicial power.”354  The court then buttressed its affirmation of its 
constitutional legitimacy on a series of Supreme Court decisions approving 
the broad authority of Congress to create non-article III tribunals to 
adjudicate disputes involving the Government as a party.355  Although 
concluding that the cases supported the authority of Congress to establish 
the Tax Court as a legislative court outside of article III, the Tax Court 
nonetheless acknowledged that the cases did not do so unequivocally:  
“[U]nfortunately, rather than being conclusive of the issue before us, [the 
cases] reveal the diversity of opinion that still exists on the subject.”356 
The Burns decision was reviewed by the court without dissent.  A 
concurring opinion filed by Judge Raum and joined by four other judges 
was more vigorous in its defense of the Tax Court’s constitutionality: 
 
Nothing in the 1969 legislation made unconstitutional that which 
was valid prior thereto.  . . . [T]he action of Congress in describing 
the Court as being established as a legislative court under article I 
and in endowing it with some comparatively minor additional 
powers was not of such nature as to alter the basic character of the 
Court as it existed prior thereto.  . . . The Court was a constitutional 
judicial body prior to the 1969 Act and the validity of its continued 
existence was not affected by the Act.357 
 
The decision of the Tax Court in Burns was not appealed.  For that 
matter, it is doubtful that the constitutional authority of the Tax Court to 
adjudicate cases within its statutory jurisdiction would be questioned by the 
circuit courts or the Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, commentators have 
continued to explore whether the scope of the Tax Court’s article I 
jurisdiction impermissibly encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary 
as protected by article III.358  More recent examinations of this 
                                                     
354  See id. at 396.  The Tax Court did not view its judicial character as 
mandating that it be chartered under article III:   
The fact that the Tax Court has characteristics of a court and performs its 
functions in a judicial manner, as we think it does, . . . and has no legislative 
administrative, or advisory powers, does not necessarily mean that it must 
be established under Article III of the Constitution. 
Id.  
355  See id. at 396–400 (citing and analyzing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 
530 (1962); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 
279 U.S. 438 (1929)).   
356   Id. at 397. 
357  Id. at 402 (Raum, J., concurring). 
358  These questions typically have been raised in the context of examinations of 
the expansions of the Tax Court’s statutory jurisdiction or in connection with the 
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constitutional issue focus on a trio of cases issued by the Supreme Court in 
the 1980’s, the first of which held that ancillary jurisdiction over state law 
claims afforded to federal bankruptcy courts established under article I was 
unconstitutional.359  In general terms, these cases evidenced the Court’s 
intention to move away from a rigid set of disputes that could be 
adjudicated before a non-article III tribunal360 and toward an analysis that 
balanced the institutional interests of an independent Judiciary against the 
interests of Congress in providing innovative dispute resolution fora.361  In 
                                                                                                                       
consideration of reforms that would further elevate that primacy of the Tax Court 
in the tax adjudication process.  See, e.g., Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction 
Over Due Process Collection Appeals:  Is it Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453 
(2003); Deborah L. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee:  A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 985 (1991).   
359  Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).  
360  In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
portion of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that conferred upon federal bankruptcy 
judges (who are appointed to serve terms of 14 years) jurisdiction over state law 
claims that related to a title 11 proceeding.  Stressing the “fundamental principle” 
that the judicial power of the United States is vested in article III courts, a plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Brennan and joined by three other Justices recognized 
three historical exceptions in which judicial power could be constitutionally 
exercised outside of the article III realm:  (1) territorial courts; (2) courts-martial; 
and (3) cases involving the adjudication of “public rights.”  Id. at 63–70.  This third 
exception, as the Court explained, applies to matters between the Government and 
third parties that could be resolved exclusively within either the executive or 
legislative branch.  That being the case, there can be no constitutional objection to 
those branches establishing court-like tribunals for purposes of resolving such 
disputes.  See id. at 68.  The plurality opinion contrasted public rights cases from 
disputes concerning private rights, the latter of which the opinion described as 
resting “at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.” Id. at 70. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that such private right disputes could not be 
adjudicated by bankruptcy judges who lacked lifetime tenure and salary protection.  
Id. at 71–72.   
361  In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), the 
Supreme Court upheld a binding arbitration provision under federal law against an 
article III challenge.  While the Court could have justified its holding on the public-
rights doctrine outlined in the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, the Court in 
Thomas explained that the application of article III should be informed by “practical 
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories.” Id. at 
568.  Focusing on the right at issue and the congressional motivation in granting it, 
the Court upheld the arbitration regime on grounds that it did not threaten “the 
independent role of the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme.”  Id. at 590.   
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Commodity Futures Tradition Commissioner v. Schor,362 the last in the 
aforementioned trio, the Supreme Court articulated the balancing test in the 
following terms: 
 
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to 
authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III 
tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the 
Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and 
unbending rules.  Although such rules might lend a greater degree of 
coherence to this area of law, they might also unduly constrict 
Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its 
Article I powers.  Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have 
weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed 
determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the 
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of 
the federal judiciary.  Among the factors upon which we have 
focused are the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial 
power” are reserved to Article III courts and, conversely, the extent 
to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction 
and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and 
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that 
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.363  
 
Tasked with determining whether Congress could permissibly confer 
jurisdiction to the Commodity Futures Tradition Commission to adjudicate 
state law counterclaims raised in connection with a claim for reparations 
brought against a professional broker (pursuant to a statutory dispute-
resolution regime), the Court in Schor determined that the balancing of 
interests weighed in favor of Congress.364 
The balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Schor provides 
sufficient grounds for a reviewing court to uphold the constitutionality of 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction if it were ever challenged.  Factors weighing in 
favor of the constitutionality of the Tax Court include the court’s limited 
statutory jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to federal taxation; the 
availability of an article III refund forum at the trial level; and the prospect 
of appellate review of its decisions by article III regional circuit courts.365  
                                                     
362  478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
363  Id. at 851 (citations omitted).  
364  Specifically, the Court found that the agency’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
state law claim “as a necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims 
willingly submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication [did] not 
contravene separation of powers principles or Article III.” Id. at 857.   
365  This last factor is not available for taxpayers who qualify for and elect to 
proceed under the Tax Court’s small case procedures.  See I.R.C. § 7463(b) 
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While countervailing points certainly can be made,366 a reviewing court 
would not likely decide the matter in a vacuum.  Context is critical, and that 
context includes a Tax Court that has exercised its statutory jurisdiction as 
an article I tribunal for well over 40 years.  Faced with a balancing test, it is 
not likely that a reviewing court would interpret the scales in such a way as 
to render decades’ worth of decisions from the Tax Court constitutionally 
illegitimate.  Hence, while the constitutional foundation of the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction may not be immutable, it is by no means precarious.367   
 
E. Proposals to Consolidate Tax Litigation Before the Tax Court 
 
Of course, a straightforward means of eliminating any lingering 
concerns over the constitutionality of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is to 
establish the court under article III of the Constitution.  While there has 
been no stand-alone proposal to afford the Tax Court article III status as it 
is presently constituted, article III status was considered by the Federal 
Courts Study Committee in 1990 as part of its proposal to restructure the 
federal tax controversy landscape.  The deliberations and recommendations 
of this committee are discussed below.    
As part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,368 
Congress in 1988 authorized Chief Justice Rehnquist to appoint a 15-
person committee to comprehensively investigate issues plaguing the 
federal court system and to make recommendations for improvement.369  
The resulting Federal Courts Study Committee was comprised largely of 
judges from the federal bench, attorneys in private practice, and members 
                                                                                                                       
(rendering Tax Court decisions in this setting final).  Professor Geier has noted that 
the constitutionality of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is most vulnerable in this 
setting, commenting that the preservation of this helpful portion of the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction may be the most compelling reason to grant article III status to the 
court.  See Geier, supra note 358, at 1025–32.   
366  See Geier, supra note 358, at 989, 1016–25 (examining the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction in light of Schor and its companion cases, and finding that the court, as 
currently constituted, does not survive a “principled application of article III 
doctrine”).  As one factor that would weigh against the Tax Court in the 
application of the balancing test, Congress’ departure from article III in this setting 
appears to be largely a product of political expediency in the broader goal of 
moving the Tax Court out of the Executive Branch.   
367  That said, it is not only appropriate but wise to consider the limitations on 
non-article III adjudication when considering expansions of the Tax Court’s 
precedent or the elimination of alternative article III fora.  See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 
358; Geier, supra note 358. 
368  Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).   
369  Id. at §§ 102, 103, 102 Stat. at 4644.   
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of Congress.370  After receiving testimony and conducting public hearings 
for roughly a year, the committee released tentative recommendations near 
the end of 1989.   
One of the committee’s proposals would have restructured the 
prevailing federal tax controversy landscape by elevating the role of the Tax 
Court.  The committee was disturbed by the availability of three separate 
trial-level fora in which to litigate a tax dispute, finding that such a regime 
encouraged forum shopping and operated in a manner unfair to certain 
taxpayers (presumably those who lacked the financial means to pay the 
asserted deficiency to pursue refund litigation outside of the Tax Court).371  
The committee therefore proposed to make the Tax Court’s dominant 
jurisdiction over the litigation of tax disputes nearly exclusive.  Specifically, 
the Tax Court would serve as the exclusive forum for the trial disputes 
concerning tax liability, whether originating in the deficiency or refund 
posture.372  The proposal would have constrained the jurisdiction of the 
federal district courts over tax matters considerably, leaving those courts 
with jurisdiction over criminal tax cases and enforcement actions only.373  
By implication, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in the federal tax 
arena would have been abolished altogether.   
                                                     
370  The committee was chaired by Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., of the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The remaining 14 committee members 
included:  J. Vincent Aprile II (General Counsel of the Kentucky State Dep’t of 
Public Advocacy); Jose A. Cabranes (Judge, District Court for the District of 
Connecticut); Keith M. Callow (Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Washington); 
Levin H. Campbell (Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit); Edward 
S.G. Dennis, Jr. (Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States 
Dep’t of Justice); Charles E. Grassley (United States Senator); Morris Harrell 
(attorney in private practice); Howell T. Heflin (United States Senator); Robert W. 
Kastenmeier (member of the United States House of Representatives); Judith N. 
Keep (Judge, District Court for the Southern District of California); Rex E. Lee, Jr. 
(President, Brigham Young University); Carlos J. Moorhead (member of the United 
States House of Representatives); Diana Gribbon Motz (attorney in private 
practice); and Richard Posner (Judge, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).  
Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
app. B (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC Final Report].     
371  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 69.   
372  Id. at 70.  The practical effect of the proposed expansion of the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction would have been modest from a macro perspective, as the committee 
observed that the Tax Court already handled 95% of tax disputes.  Federal Courts 
Study Committee, Tentative Recommendations for Public Comment 30 n.20 (Dec. 
22, 1989) [hereinafter FCSC Tentative Recommendations].  Accordingly, the 
proposal envisioned the addition of only one or two additional Tax Court judges at 
the trial level.  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 70. 
373  Id.    
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The proposal from the Federal Court Study Committee did not stop 
with a restructuring of tax adjudication at the trial level.  The committee 
was troubled by the sheer number of courts possessing intermediate 
appellate jurisdiction over tax disputes, with appeals from the Tax Court 
and federal district courts being heard by twelve regional courts of appeals 
and appeals from the Court of Claims being heard by the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals.374  Finding this structure detrimental to the development 
of a uniform body of tax law, the committee proposed the creation of an 
appellate division within the Tax Court.  This division would hear all 
appeals from the trial division of the Tax Court, which would amount to 
the majority of all intermediate appeals, given the proposed expansion of 
the Tax Court’s trial-level jurisdiction.375  In this manner, the Federal Courts 
Study committee endorsed the persistent calls for the creation of a national 
court of tax appeals.376   
The Federal Court Study Committee originally proposed that the Tax 
Court, with its expanded trial-level jurisdiction and its newly conferred 
appellate jurisdiction, be constituted as an article III tribunal.377  
Interestingly, the committee tapped into the theme of perceived Treasury 
Department influence over the court as a justification for the provision of 
article III protections: 
 
Article III status of the judges should insulate them from undue 
influence by the Treasury Department and would thus eliminate the 
need to provide taxpayers with “competitive” alternatives in the 
federal district courts and in the Claims Court.378     
 
Perhaps seeking to avoid the turf battles that contributed to defeat of past 
attempts to confer article III status on the Tax Court, the committee’s 
tentative proposal contemplated the maintenance of a division of labor 
among governmental agencies in the tax controversy setting.  The Internal 
Revenue Service would continue to represent the Government before the 
                                                     
374  Id. at 69–70; FCSC Tentative Recommendations, supra note 372, at 30.   
375  The proposal contemplated the addition of five judges to staff the appellate 
division.  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 70.  
376  Indeed, the committee found the creation of an appellate division in the 
Tax Court to hear all tax appeals to be the more important of the two proposals, as 
the committee offered this proposal as an alternate, stand-alone provision in the 
event Congress did not wish to pursue the suggested restructuring of the trial level 
adjudication.  Id.  
377  FCSC Tentative Recommendations, supra note 372 at 30. 
378  Id. at 31. Although not mentioned, article III status for the newly 
envisioned Tax Court would have foreclosed constitutional objections resulting 
from the elimination of the federal district court as a venue for the adjudication of 
tax liability.   
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trial division of the Tax Court, whereas the Department of Justice would 
represent the Government before the appellate division.379   
Proposed article III status for the trial level division of the newly 
conceived Tax Court was not included among the committee’s final 
recommendations.  Rather, only the judges of the appellate division were to 
be afforded the protections of lifetime tenure and salary protection under 
article III.380  The apparent justification for the revision was concern raised 
by members of the committee that the new article III Tax Court may be 
asked to resolve federal issues beyond the federal taxation arena when 
presented with cases involving related non-tax federal questions,381 and that 
a specialist court presumably would not be well-equipped to do so.   
Conceding that its proposed restructuring of the federal tax adjudication 
landscape would do little to ease the workload of federal district and 
appellate courts,382 the committee nonetheless found the reforms worth 
pursuing.  Of the various articulated benefits of the proposal, the 
committee found the prospect of increasing the quality and uniformity of 
tax adjudication most compelling.383  The proposed reforms served as a 
vote of confidence in the Tax Court.  The committee observed that the Tax 
Court was the only available forum that possessed the “the time and 
sufficiently substantial volume of tax litigation to develop expertise in one 
of the most specialized and technically demanding fields in American 
jurisprudence.”384 However, the committee’s proposed reform of the 
federal tax adjudication landscape did not enjoy unanimous support.  A 
dissenting statement authored by Edward S.G. Dennis Jr. (of the 
Department of Justice) and joined by four other committee members 
                                                     
379  Id. 
380  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 70. 
381  FCSC Tentative Recommendations, supra note 372, at 31. 
382  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 70. 
383  The committee touted the following benefits of the proposed reforms in 
the following terms: 
These changes . . . would rationalize federal tax adjudication, reduce forum-
shopping, relieve workload pressures on the existing Article III appellate 
courts, and reduce the pressure on the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
tax cases to resolve intercircuit conflicts.  Above all, they would increase the 
quality and uniformity of tax adjudication by shifting it form overworked 
judges sitting in a large number of diverse courts to a single court of highly 
trained specialists.   
Id. 
384  Id.  The proposals of the Federal Courts Study Committee in this setting 
and the articulated justifications for such proposals are remarkably consistent with 
an article proposing restructuring of the civil tax litigation system published by Tax 
Court Judge Dawson expressing his individual views.  See Howard A. Dawson, Jr., 
Should the Federal Civil Tax Litigation System Be Restructured?, 40 TAX NOTES 1427 
(1988).  
236            The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
(including Senator Grassley and Congressman Moorhead) touted the 
benefits of the existing regime.  In particular, the dissenting group found 
the “genius” of the existing regime to rest in the effective blending of 
specialist and generalist elements, which it found to be efficient and 
“perceptively fair.”385  Indeed, this group of committee members appeared 
heavily influenced by how the proposed reforms would be received by the 
public, expressing their grave concern that the centralization of tax litigation 
in a specialized court “would leave the American taxpayers with the 
impression that the judicial system is remote and unresponsive.”386  To 
bolster its position, the dissenting group highlighted the opposition of 
institutional segments of the tax bar to the proposals, including the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Treasury Department, the Claims Court, and the 
American Bar Association—and even the Tax Court itself.387   
The concerns articulated by the dissenting faction of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee evidently prevailed.  The implementing legislation 
proposed by Congress did not include any of the committee’s proposals 
concerning the litigation of federal civil tax disputes.388  Accordingly, the 
landscape of federal tax adjudication remains in central respects largely 
consistent with the compromise reached by Congress in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969.   
 
F. Subsequent Developments Consistent With Judicial Status 
 
By chartering the United States Tax Court as a court of record 
established under article I of the Constitution through the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, Congress supplied the court with a judicial form to match its long-
held character as a judicial arbiter.  Although the true effect of the 
legislation initially was subject to some doubt, the Supreme Court through 
                                                     
385  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 72. 
386  Id.  
387  FCSC Final Report, supra note 370, at 71.  The attribution of opposition to 
the Tax Court as a body appears to have been an overstatement.  To start, it is 
doubtful that the Tax Court would have articulated an institutional position on the 
matter.  Furthermore, at the time, Judge Dawson had recently expressed his private 
support for the consolidation of trial-level adjudication of tax disputes before the 
Tax Court and for the creation of a national court of tax appeals.  See Dawson, 
supra note 384.  However, around the same period, Judge Sterrett expressed his 
disapproval of a national court of tax appeals.  See Michael S. Moriarty & R. Eliot 
Rosen, An Interview with Former Tax Court Chief Judge Sterrett, 41 TAX NOTES 910 
(1988).    
388  See Federal Courts Study Group Implementation Act of 1990,  H.R. 5381, 
101st Cong. (1990).  For that matter, none of the implementing legislation became 
law.  Although the bill passed the House of Representatives, the Senate failed to 
take action on the legislation.   
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its opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner389 (detailed in Part V below) confirmed 
that the Tax Court “exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, or 
administrative power,”390 and that the court stands “independent of the 
Executive and Legislative Branches.”391  Hence, following the 1969 
legislation, the Tax Court emerged as a body no longer subject to, what in 
the circumstances was, the demeaning characterization as an executive 
agency.  Judges of the court, although not guaranteed life tenure, can be 
reasonably assured of reappointment until they reach retirement age (even if 
the reappointment process has become protracted in recent years392), at 
which time a judicial-type pension is available to them.  Because the court is 
a creature of the Internal Revenue Code rather than title 28 of the United 
States Code, it is subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the congressional 
tax-writing committees that are familiar with the work of the court.  The 
Tax Court submits its budget requests directly to Congress and has a 
considerable amount of flexibility in establishing its internal administrative 
procedures. 393  Many of these practical advantages would be lost if the Tax 
Court were afforded article III status.   
Through a combination of statutory enactments and actions taken by 
the Tax Court, Congress and the court have steadily implemented policies 
making the Court more closely resemble other federal courts.  For instance, 
soon after enactment of the 1969 provisions, the Tax Court determined 
that its notices, orders, rules, and other public documents were no longer 
required to be published in the Federal Register pursuant to the 
                                                     
389  501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
390  Id. at 890–91 
391  Id. at 891.   
392  See Danshera Cords, Tax Court Appoints and Reappointments:  Improving the 
Process, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 501 (2012).   
393 In the original edition of this text, Prof. Dubroff opened the sentence above 
with the following clause:  “As a legislative body performing judicial functions,  . . . 
.”  However, that characterization came before the Supreme Court in Freytag v. 
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991), described the Tax Court as being 
“independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches.”  Furthermore, as 
reflected in the recent case of Kuretski v. Commissioner, – F.3d – (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(Docket No. 13-1090), the location of the Tax Court in the constitutional scheme 
of government is subject to dispute.  [The Freytag and Kuretski decisions are 
discussed in Part V.]  Nonetheless, given Prof. Dubroff’s contemporaneous 
research of the 1969 Tax Reform Act and, in particular, its effect on the Tax Court, 
Prof. Dubroff’s characterization of the Tax Court as a “legislative body” is 
noteworthy.   
In light of the insertion of this editorial comment and in the sake of 
completeness, this footnote in the original text provided as follows:  “The fact that, 
despite efforts over many years, the court was only able to secure its own 
courthouse after the 1969 changes is ample evidence of the benefit of its new 
status.” 
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Administrative Procedure Act, and it ordered deletion of the provisions 
dealing with the court from the Code of Federal Regulations.394  More 
recent developments in the transition of the Tax Court’s status to an article 
I court are detailed below.  
 
1. Court Security 
 
In 2008 Congress amended § 7456(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 566 to make the 
Tax Court a protectee of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) to an 
extent equivalent to article III courts, and to provide that the USMS retains 
final authority regarding security requirements for the Tax Court.395  Section 
7456(c) authorizes the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to request the United 
States Marshal for any district in which the Tax Court is sitting to attend a 
session of the Tax Court in that district.  Legislative history underlying the 
amendment to § 7456(c) states that enhanced security for the Tax Court 
was warranted in the light of several acts of violence in 2005 and 2006 that 
resulted in the deaths of employees, judges, and judicial family members of 
courts other than the Tax Court.396  
  
2. Tax Court Personnel System  
 
When the Board of Tax Appeals was established in 1924, its governing 
statutes provided that its employees were subject to personnel provisions 
primarily applicable to employees of the Executive Branch.397  Section 7471 
authorized the Tax Court to appoint, in accordance with provisions of title 
5 governing appointment in the competitive service, employees as necessary 
to operate the court.  In 2010 Congress approved, and on January 4, 2011, 
President Obama signed into law, amendments to § 7471(a) authorizing the 
Tax Court to appoint employees, generally, without regard to title 5.398  The 
statute, as amended, authorized the court to establish an independent 
personnel system399 and directed the court, to the extent feasible, to align its 
employees’ pay to that of similarly situated employees in article III courts.400  
                                                     
394  See 35 Fed. Reg. 12462 (1970).   
395  I.R.C. § 7456(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 566(a) were amended by the Court Security 
Improvement Act of 2007,  Pub. L. No. 110-177, §§ 101, 102, 121 Stat. 2534, 
(signed into law on January 7, 2008).   
396  H. REP. NO. 110-218, at 828 (2007). 
397  Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900(k).  The same provision appears in the 1925 
Statutes at Large as § 1222 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
398  I.R.C. § 7471(a)(1)–(3); Pub. L. No. 111-366, § 1(a), 124 Stat. 4063 (2011). 
399  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 111TH CONGRESS, pt. 20 (2011).  
400  Id.; I.R.C. § 7471(a)(4). 
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The provision became effective on October 9, 2011, when the Court 
Conference of the Tax Court adopted the independent personnel system.401  
 
3. Codes of Conduct and Public Disclosures 
 
On August 29, 1985, the Court Conference adopted resolutions that the 
Court would follow the Code of Conduct for United States Judges as the 
basis for the ethical standards applicable to all Tax Court judges and be 
guided by the rulings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
applying the ethical standards.  On June 21, 1991, then Chief Judge Arthur 
L. Nims, III wrote to Judge Walter K. Stapleton, chair of the Committee on 
Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States, stating 
that Tax Court judges wished to have the Committee on Codes of Conduct 
act as their “supervising ethics office” within the meaning of titles III and 
IV of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.402  That request was subsequently 
granted.  Effective January 1, 2007, the Tax Court made the Code of 
Conduct for Judicial Employees applicable to all the court’s employees.  On 
July 16, 2009, the Court Conference clarified that the Codes of Conduct for 
Judges and Judicial Employees apply “as amended as then in effect”, 
making revisions in these Codes automatically apply to Tax Court judges 
and employees. 
On April 26, 2007, the Court Conference adopted the private seminars 
disclosure policy established in September 2006 by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States.403  As a result, the public may obtain information from 
the Tax Court’s website about nongovernmental education programs 
attended by the court’s judges for which the seminar provider pays or 
reimburses judges’ expenses.404  These reports are available for 3 years on 
the Tax Court’s website. 
 
4. E-Government Act 
 
The E-Government Act,405 enacted in 2002, does not expressly apply to 
the Tax Court.  In 2006, however, the Tax Court voluntarily began to meet 
the standards set by the E-Government Act for other federal entities.406  
                                                     
401  See Pub. L. No. 111-366, § 1; Tax Court Personnel Manual (adopted on 
October 9, 2011). 
402  Pub. L. 101-194, 92 Stat. 1824. 
403  See http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judbrappc906c.pdf. 
404  See http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/042607.pdf. 
405  Pub. L. 107–347, 116 Stat.  2899 (2002).    
406  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 27, 135 T.C. 395, 396 (2008).  For a 
detailed discussion of the subject, see Appendix G. 
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Notwithstanding the developments by which the operation of the Tax 
Court has become more consistent with that of other federal courts, the 
Tax Court remains unique with respect to ability of non-attorneys to 
represent taxpayers before it.  Nonetheless, the Tax Court has adopted 
more formal procedures for admissions to practice before the court and for 
disciplining members of the Tax Court bar for professional misconduct.  
After reviewing allegations of professional misconduct by members of the 
court’s Bar, the Admissions Committee submits recommendations to the 
Chief Judge regarding the proper course of action in individual cases.407  
The court issues periodic press releases on its Web site announcing its 
disciplinary actions.  No less than every two years, the Admissions 
Committee conducts the court’s written examination for non-attorneys 
seeking admission to the court’s bar.408 
                                                     
407  See TAX CT. R. 201(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (stating that practitioners before the 
Court shall carry on their practice in accordance with the letter and spirit of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association). 
408  See TAX CT. R. 200(a)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
 5. Admissions and Discipline 





A JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF THE TAX COURT’S  
CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE: 
FREYTAG V. COMMISSIONER 
 
In Freytag v. Commissioner,1 the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to 
the constitutional validity of the appointment of special trial judges of the 
Tax Court.  The taxpayers, whose cases had been selected as test cases in 
wide-ranging litigation concerning the same tax shelter transaction, 
challenged the validity of the assignment of their cases to a special trial 
judge for hearing and preparation of a preliminary report.  In addition to 
contending that the assignment was not authorized by statute, the taxpayers 
argued that the Chief Judge’s statutory authority to appoint special trial 
judges failed to comply with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.   
After dispensing with the taxpayers’ statutory argument, the Court 
unanimously held that the appointment of special trial judges complied with 
the constitutional limitations on the appointment power.  Hence, from a 
narrow perspective, the decision clarifies that the Tax Court’s use of special 
trial judges2 does not suffer from constitutional infirmity.   
The Freytag decision, however, has significance to the Tax Court far 
beyond its relatively narrow holding.  Resolution of the Appointments 
Clause challenge required the Supreme Court to examine the role of the 
Tax Court in the constitutional structure of government.  On this issue, the 
Supreme Court was sharply divided.  A five-Justice majority of the Court 
upheld the appointment on grounds that the Tax Court constituted one of 
“the Courts of Law” under the Constitution.  In reaching this 
determination, the Court stressed the exclusively judicial nature of the Tax 
Court and declared that the court exercises a portion of the judicial power 
of the United States.  The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Tax Court’s 
status within the federal judicial scheme in Freytag later would lead the Tax 
Court to revisit the scope of its ancillary equitable jurisdiction.  For 
instance, in Estate of Branson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected prior 
case law interpreting its equitable powers narrowly, citing Freytag to support 
its determination that the Tax Court “should be properly viewed as 
exercising full judicial power within its limited subject matter jurisdiction.”3    
                                                     
1 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
2 The office of the special trial judge is discussed in Part XII.   
3 113 T.C. 6, 11 (1999).  The invocation of Freytag as supporting the Tax Court’s 
equitable powers first appeared in Judge Halpern’s concurring opinion in Estate of 
Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551 (1993).  The Tax Court’s equitable jurisdiction 
is discussed in Part VI.D.   
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In determining that the Tax Court constituted a “Court of Law” for 
constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court in Freytag laid to rest any 
lingering ambiguity concerning the Tax Court’s relationship with the 
Executive Branch following its establishment as an article I court through 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.  The Court confirmed that Congress 
accomplished what it set out to do in the legislation—to terminate the 
court’s status as an executive agency sitting in judgment of another.  In so 
doing, the Court rejected the determination of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the companion case of Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner4 
that the Tax Court’s designation as an article I court of record in the 1969 
legislation accomplished nothing apart from changing the label used to refer 
to the institution.   
This part explores the litigation in Freytag and Samuels, Kramer that 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag.  The full landscape 
of the litigation reveals a number of interesting developments, including a 
complete reversal of the Government’s position once the Solicitor General 
assumed responsibility for litigating the cases on behalf of the 
Commissioner.  Additionally, neither party to the case endorsed the 
rationale adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court.  Rather, the Tax 
Court’s inclusion in “the Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause 
was advanced only through an amicus brief submitted by Erwin N. 
Griswold, ostensibly acting in his individual capacity.   
 
A. Developments Before the Tax Court 
 
The Freytag litigation concerned the tax consequences of straddle 
investments in futures contracts pertaining to government-backed mortgage 
securities.  All told, the litigation relating to this shelter transaction involved 
roughly 3,000 taxpayers against whom approximately $3 billion in 
deficiencies had been asserted.5   The Freytag litigation before the Tax Court, 
however, concerned ten test cases that had been selected for consolidated 
discovery, briefing, trial, and opinion.  Trial of the test cases began before 
Judge Richard C. Wilbur in November of 1984, but the trial was 
periodically postponed on account of Judge Wilbur’s illness.  In November 
of 1985, Chief Judge Samuel Sterrett of the Tax Court assigned Special Trial 
Judge Carlton D. Powell to preside over the trial as an evidentiary referee.  
The proceedings were videotaped for the benefit of Judge Wilbur, 
permitting him to observe the proceedings from his home.  At this point in 
the case, Judge Wilbur anticipated that he would prepare the factual 
findings and opinion in the case when he recovered.  However, Judge 
                                                     
4 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1991).   
5 See Brief for Petitioner at 11 & 24, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).   
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Wilbur’s continued illness eventually forced him to retire from his full-time 
position as judge in April of 1986, whereupon he assumed senior status.  In 
July of 1986, Chief Judge Sterrett notified the parties that he intended to 
assign the case to Special Trial Judge Powell pursuant to what was then 
§ 7443A(b)(4) for the preparation of findings of fact and opinion,6 unless 
the parties objected.  All but one of the taxpayers (whose case was severed) 
consented to the assignment, on the condition that either Judge Wilbur or 
Chief Judge Sterrett would bear responsibility for entering the decision in 
the case.7   
Trial of the consolidated cases before the Tax Court in Freytag was fairly 
complex.  The trial lasted 14 weeks, yielding 9,000 pages of transcripts and 
over 3,000 exhibits.8  Special Trial Judge Powell, who already had presided 
over nine weeks of the trial in his capacity as evidentiary referee before 
being formally assigned the case, prepared a report that eviscerated the 
straddle investment strategy at issue on the merits.  Special Trial Judge 
Powell determined that the component transactions of the shelter did not 
constitute bona fide transactions for federal income tax purposes; rather, 
the transactions were properly disregarded as illusory.9  Alternatively, 
Special Trial Judge Powell found that even had the transactions at issue 
been economically meaningful, the taxpayers nonetheless would not be 
entitled to claimed losses because the taxpayers lacked the requisite profit 
motive.10  In addition to sustaining the deficiencies, Special Trial Judge 
Powell upheld the imposition of a negligence penalty.11  Judge Powell 
concluded his report by issuing a reminder to future counsel concerning the 
standards imposed by the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure for 
                                                     
6 At that time, § 7443A(b)(4) permitted the chief judge of the Tax Court to 
assign “any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate” to a special trial 
judge, in addition to the types of cases enumerated in prior portions of § 7443A(b).  
However, pursuant to § 7443A(c), the special trial judge lacked authority to enter 
the final decision in a § 7443A(b)(4) case.  Hence, the special trial judge’s report 
had to be submitted to a presidentially appointed judge of the Tax Court for 
proposed adoption.    
7 See Freytag v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1990); Brief for 
Petitioner at 8, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
8 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 871 n.1 (1991) (citing statements of 
taxpayers’ counsel at oral argument).   
9Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 875 (1987).  In describing the claimed 
economic consequences of the underlying straddle transactions, the report 
commented that “[t]he wearing of judicial robes does not require that we take leave 
of common sense.”  Id. at 878.    
10 Id. at 876.   
11 See id. at 887–89.   
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signing a pleading, as well as the broader duty that counsel owe the court to 
decline to litigate unmeritorious claims.12  
On October 21, 1987, Chief Judge Sterrett issued an order assigning the 
case to himself for disposition.  On the same day, Chief Judge Sterrett 
adopted the report of Special Trial Judge Powell in full.   
The same shelter transaction arrived before the Tax Court a few years 
later in First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner,13 a case 
concerning the promoter of the straddle investment strategy.  Chief Judge 
Arthur L. Nims, III assigned the case to Special Trial Judge Powell pursuant 
to then § 7443A(b)(4) to hear the case and to prepare a preliminary report.  
Having the benefit of Special Trial Judge Powell’s prior report in Freytag, the 
taxpayers in First Western understandably moved to vacate the assignment of 
their cases.  In addition to contending that the assignment was not 
permitted under then § 7443A(b)(4) (which the Court rejected as 
inconsistent with the statutory text and congressional intent),14 the 
taxpayers objected to the assignment on constitutional grounds.  
Specifically, the taxpayers contended that assignment of their case to a 
special trial judge was not permissible because the appointment of special 
trial judges by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court failed to comply with the 
Appointments Clause of article II of the Constitution.  That provision 
provides as follows: 
 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.15 
 
The taxpayers in First Western focused on the first half of the 
Appointments Clause, contending that a special trial judge of the Tax Court 
constituted a principal officer of the United States.  Because special trial 
judges were appointed by the chief judge of the Tax Court instead of by the 
President (with the advice and consent of the Senate), their appointments 
were invalid, or so the argument went.  The Service argued from the 
opposite side of the spectrum, contending that the Appointments Clause 
                                                     
12 See id. at 890–91 (quoting Tax Court Rule 33(b) and citing Rule 3.1 of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983 ed.)).   
13 94 T.C. 549 (1990).   
14 See id. at 553–56.  The taxpayers’ narrow interpretation of § 7443A(b)(4) and 
its rejection by the Tax Court and other appellate courts is addressed in Part XII.C.  
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.   
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had no application whatsoever to the appointment of special trial judges.  
Drawing on the Tax Court’s prior practice of appointing attorneys from its 
legal staff to perform the functions of commissioners (who were later 
designated as special trial judges), the Service contended that special trial 
judges constituted “lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the 
United States” in the parlance of the Appointments Clause.16  In other 
words, the Service contended that the special trial judges merely assisted the 
court in an employee capacity when hearing cases assigned to them 
pursuant to § 7443A(b)(4).  In the Service’s view, special trial judges in this 
setting were not officers of any sort for purposes of the Constitution. 
The Tax Court rejected the positions of both parties and resolved the 
matter in the space between the two.  The court first determined that 
special trial judges constituted officers of the United States rather than 
employees, citing the significant authority that special trial judges possess to 
enter final decisions in certain cases and to hear any case assigned to them.17  
However, the Tax Court did not believe that special trial judges rose to the 
level of principal officers, citing the following limitations on the position:  
the chief judge possesses authority to appoint and remove special trial 
judges; the duties of special trial judges are defined by the order issued by 
the chief judge assigning a particular case to them; and special trial judges 
may enter final decisions only in a narrow, statutorily defined range of 
cases.18  These limitations—not to mention the unstated but inescapable 
practical consequences of finding special trial judges to be principal officers 
under the Appointments Clause—led the Tax Court to conclude that 
special trial judges constituted inferior officers for this purpose.  As such, 
their appointment would comply with the Appointments Clause so long as 
(1) the Tax Court constituted one of “the Courts of Law” under the Clause 
that acted through its chief judge, or (2) the Tax Court constituted a 
“Department” with the chief judge as its “Head.”  
Both the taxpayers and the Commissioner in First Western recognized 
that an article III court constituted one of the “Courts of Law” for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause.  The issue was whether the two were 
                                                     
16 Respondent’s Objection to Petitioner’s Motion for the Assignment of This 
Case to a Presidentially Appointed Judge of the United States Tax Court, at 11–14 
(Jan. 16, 1990) [hereinafter “Respondent’s Objection”].  Alternatively, the Service 
argued that if the special trial judges were officers for Appointments Clause 
purposes, their appointments were valid on grounds that (a) the Tax Court 
constituted one of the Courts of Law capable of appointing inferior officers, or (b) 
the chief judge of the Tax Court constituted the Head of a Department capable of 
appointing inferior officers.  See id. at 15–22 (Court of Law argument), 22–24 (Head 
of Department argument).      
17 First Western, 94 T.C. at 557.   
18 See id. at 558.   
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synonymous.  The Tax Court observed that the question constituted one of 
first impression.19   
The taxpayers contended that “the Courts of Law” under the 
Appointments Clause stood as a reference to the Judicial Branch, which is 
limited to courts established under article III of the Constitution.  The 
Commissioner, on the other hand, contended that the scope of “the Courts 
of Law” under the Appointments Clause was broad enough to include 
article I courts that performed exclusively judicial functions.  The Tax 
Court was clearly troubled by the narrow interpretation offered by the 
taxpayers.  Citing its prior history as an independent agency within the 
Executive Branch, the court noted that its ability to appoint special trial 
judges previously stood unquestioned.  However, if congressional 
establishment of the Tax Court as an article I court through the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 did not bring the Tax Court within one of “the Courts 
of Law” for Appointments Clause purposes, then the 1969 legislation 
would have had the anomalous effect of rendering the court powerless to 
appoint special trial judges or, for that matter, its own clerk of court.20  The 
Tax Court found this conclusion “untenable.”21  Citing the Supreme 
Court’s prior explanation in Williams v. United States that legislative courts 
“possess and exercise judicial power—as distinguished from legislative, 
executive, or administrative power—although not conferred in virtue of the 
third article of the Constitution,”22 the Tax Court in First Western 
determined that it constituted one of “the Courts of Law” under the 
Appointments Clause based on its judicial nature.23   
The decision of the Tax Court in First Western was reviewed by the entire 
court without a single dissent or separate opinion.  Nonetheless, noting the 
importance of the resolution of the Appointments Clause issue to its 
operations, the court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal.  Less 
than a year later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would affirm the Tax 
Court in Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner,24 but only pursuant to a 
                                                     
19 See id. at 560.   
20 See id. at 563.   
21 Id.  Interestingly, the Tax Court in First Western never appeared to give any 
consideration to the possibility that the Tax Court could continue to serve as a 
department within the Executive Branch.  Perhaps the court viewed the intent of 
Congress to terminate the Tax Court’s status as an independent administrative 
agency through the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as so obvious as to not warrant 
further comment.   
22 289 U.S. 553, 566–67 (1933).   
23 First Western, 94 T.C. at 564 (“Because the powers exercised by the Tax Court 
are judicial powers, not legislative powers, Tax Court judges are judicial officers, 
not legislative officers.”).     
24 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1991).   
  The Freytag Case                                        247 
 
widely disparate interpretation of the Tax Court’s standing in the 
Appointments Clause framework.   
 
B. Decisions at the Courts of Appeals 
 
Before the Second Circuit could weigh in on the matter, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in the appeal of the Freytag 
case.25  There, the taxpayers raised an Appointments Clause challenge to the 
referral of their cases to a special trial judge for the first time. The Fifth 
Circuit refused to entertain this argument, holding that the taxpayers had 
waived any constitutional objection to the assignment of their cases to the 
special trial judge when they consented to the assignment.26  The Fifth 
Circuit then proceeded to sustain the Tax Court’s decision on the merits.   
After the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Freytag in which it avoided 
addressing the Appointments Clause issue on the merits, the Second Circuit 
heard oral argument in the appeal of the Tax Court’s decision in First 
Western.  The appeal before the Second Circuit was captioned Samuels, 
Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner.27  In terms of placing the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Samuels, Kramer in the context of the Freytag litigation that would 
proceed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court granted the taxpayers’ 
writ of certiorari in Freytag after the Second Circuit heard oral argument in 
Samuels, Kramer.  The Second Circuit issued its opinion months later, in 
advance of the Supreme Court’s definitive opinion in Freytag.   
Before turning to the substance of the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Samuels, Kramer, it is worth highlighting the individuals primarily responsible 
for litigating the appeal.  The taxpayers were represented by Kathleen 
Sullivan, a constitutional law expert who at the time was a professor at 
Harvard Law School (and who would later become Dean of Stanford Law 
School).  On the other side, the Government was represented by Kenneth 
W. Starr in his capacity as Solicitor General.  Among others assisting the 
Solicitor General was John G. Roberts, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General and 
future Supreme Court Chief Justice.  Yet perhaps the most intriguing 
participant in the Samuels, Kramer appeal was Erwin N. Griswold, former 
Solicitor General and a former long-serving Dean of Harvard Law School.  
Dean Griswold filed an amicus brief in his individual capacity. 
Dean Griswold initially attempted to appear in a representative capacity 
on behalf of the chief judge, the judges, and the senior judges of the Tax 
Court.  These judges sought leave to participate in the appeal as amici curiae 
after being informed by individuals in the Department of Justice that the 
Government would seek to have the Tax Court’s decision in Samuels, Kramer 
                                                     
25 See 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1991).   
26 See id. at 1015 n.9.   
27 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1991).   
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affirmed solely on the basis that the chief judge constituted the “Head” of a 
“Department” under the Appointments Clause.28  Although the 
Government had prevailed at the Tax Court on the basis that the Tax Court 
constituted one of the Courts of Law under the Appointments Clause 
capable of appointing inferior officers, the Government intended to 
abandon this rationale on appeal.  The various judges of the Tax Court 
therefore sought to participate in the appeal to preserve the argument that 
the Tax Court constituted one of the Courts of Law.  The Department of 
Justice objected to the request, contending that the Attorney General and 
officers of the Department of Justice were the only parties authorized to 
conduct litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof 
was interested.29  However, the Government did not oppose the 
participation of Dean Griswold in the case altogether; the Government 
stated that it would not object to the filing of an amicus brief by Dean 
Griswold in his individual capacity, whether on his own accord or at the 
invitation of the court.30  Dean Griswold thereafter moved to file a brief as 
amicus curiae on his own behalf, which was granted.    
The basis for the interest of the judges of the Tax Court in participating 
in the appeal of the Samuels, Kramer decision turned out to be well founded.  
The Commissioner—no longer represented by the IRS Office of Chief 
Counsel but instead by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Department 
of Justice—modified its position considerably.  For the first time, the 
Commissioner endorsed the taxpayers’ position that “the Courts of Law” 
under the Appointments Clause referred exclusively to the article III courts 
that make up the Judicial Branch.  The Government thereby abandoned the 
basis on which it had prevailed before the Tax Court below.  Dean 
Griswold, in his position as amici curiae, supplied the lone voice contending 
that the Tax Court constituted a Court of Law capable of appointing its 
                                                     
28 See Affidavit in Support of Motion For Leave to File A Brief As Amici Curiae 
and For an Extension of Time at 2, Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, Nos. 
90-4060 and 90-4064 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 1990).     
29 See Letter from Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General (Tax 
Division) to Elaine B. Goldsmith, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit at 1–2, Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, No. 90-4060 (2d Cir. Aug. 
17, 1990).  [Dean Griswold privately complained about the Government’s position, 
contending that it reflected the Department of Justice’s “current mechanical state 
of mind.”  Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, May 
31, 1991.]  The taxpayer objected as well, contending that the participation of the 
judges of the Tax Court in an appeal of a decision issued by the Tax Court was not 
appropriate.  See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of the Judges of the 
United States Tax Court for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae, For Extension of 
Time, and For Permission to Participate in Oral Argument, Samuels, Kramer & Co. 
v. Commissioner, Nos. 90-4060 and 90-4064 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 1990).   
30 See Letter from Shirley D. Peterson, supra note 29, at 2.   
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inferior officers.  As discussed below, the Second Circuit favored the 
Commissioner’s newly minted position.       
The Second Circuit in Samuels, Kramer began its Appointments Clause 
analysis by agreeing with the Tax Court’s determination that special trial 
judges constituted inferior officers under the provision.  The court was not 
troubled by the limitations imposed on special trial judges hearing cases 
pursuant to § 7443A(b)(4).  Rather, the court stressed the considerable 
authority that the special trial judge exerts in that capacity:  conducting 
trials, receiving testimony, making evidentiary rulings, and enforcing 
compliance with discovery orders.  The court found this level of 
responsibility and discretion to be inconsistent with employee 
classification.31   
Given the status of special trial judges as inferior officers of the United 
States, their appointment would be constitutional only if the chief judge of 
the Tax Court constituted the “Head” of a “Department” under the Clause, 
or if the Tax Court constituted one of “the Courts of Law” that acted 
through its chief judge.  The Second Circuit rejected the amicus’ arguments 
in favor of the latter.  The court found no indication that the Framers 
contemplated any courts other than those created under article III when it 
identified “the Courts of Law” as a potential repository of appointment 
power.32  And although no precedent existed addressing whether “the 
Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause could encompass an article 
I court, the Second Circuit noted that its article III-exclusive interpretation 
had the benefit of complying with the Supreme Court’s prior paraphrasing 
of the provision.  In Buckley v. Valeo,33 the Supreme Court examined the 
authority of Congress to designate commissioners to the Federal Elections 
Commission.  In the course of its analysis, the Court described the 
operation of the Appointments Clause as follows:  “Inferior officers 
Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of 
departments, or by the Judiciary.”34  Noting that “the Judiciary” had been 
consistently interpreted as referring to judges who enjoyed the political 
protections of article III, the Second Circuit concluded that only courts that 
possessed the article III attributes could exercise the judicial power of the 
United States.35   
Dean Griswold as amicus curiae argued against the maintenance of a 
formal distinction between article I and article III courts.  He contended 
that “the Courts of Law” for purposes of the Appointments Clause should 
encompass any court of record authorized by Congress to adjudicate 
                                                     
31 Samuels, Kramer, 930 F.2d at 985–86.   
32 See id. at 989.   
33 424 U.S. 1 (1976).   
34 Id. at 132 (emphasis added).   
35 Samuels, Kramer, 930 F.2d at 989.   
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cases.36  On that note, he emphasized the Tax Court’s exclusively judicial 
role—a characterization the Second Circuit did not dispute.37 Instead, the 
court rejected the notion that adjudicatory function alone sufficed to render 
a body a Court of Law.  The Second Circuit explained that a purely 
functional analysis could disturb the Constitution’s separation of powers 
framework, an approach the court believed could lead to “untenable 
results,”38 even if threat to the constitutional scheme posed in the present 
case were “minimal.”39  
The Second Circuit’s refusal to treat the Tax Court as a Court of Law 
under the Appointments Clause did not portend victory for the taxpayer.  
The court went on to adopt the Commissioner’s position that the Tax 
Court constituted a “Department” under the Clause that acted through the 
chief judge as its “Head.”  The Second Circuit opened its explanation by 
noting the Tax Court’s origins as the Board of Tax Appeals, an independent 
agency within the Executive Branch.  That status did not change when 
Congress renamed the Board the “Tax Court of the United States” in 1942.  
Although Congress established the Tax Court as a court of record under 
article I of the Constitution as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the 
Second Circuit did not view the legislation as effecting meaningful change 
to the Tax Court’s constitutional status.  The Second Circuit found nothing 
in the legislation itself that necessitated a determination that Congress had 
removed the court from the Executive Branch.  Additionally, the court read 
the Senate report accompanying the 1969 legislation as failing to 
demonstrate congressional intent to cease the Tax Court’s classification as 
an administrative agency.40  In the Second Circuit’s view, the practical effect 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on the Tax Court was paltry.  The 
legislation merely changed the name of the Tax Court once again, this time 
from the Tax Court of the United States to the United States Tax Court.41  
                                                     
36 See id. at 988.   
37 The Second Circuit conceded the amicus’ premise in the following terms: 
We do not dispute Amicus’ factual assertions.  Indeed, we acknowledge that 
the Tax Court performs many functions similar to those performed by 
Article III courts.  The judges of the Tax Court hear evidence, make rulings, 
review briefs, and render opinions that are binding on the parties and 
appealable to the Courts of Appeals.   
Id. at 990.   
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 987–88.   
40 See id. at 991.  On this point, it bears observing that the Senate report 
explained the effect of the legislation as establishing the Tax Court as “an Article I 
court rather than an executive agency.”  S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 (1969) (emphasis 
supplied). 
41 See Samuels, Kramer, 930 F.2d at 991 (characterizing the legislation as 
“renaming this adjudicatory body”).     
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The court bolstered its determination that Congress “did little more than 
change the label to be used” when referring to the Tax Court by citing the 
congressional directive that the reconstituted Tax Court represented a 
continuation of the court as it existed prior to the legislation.42   
The Second Circuit supported its conclusion that the Tax Court 
constituted a department “associated”43 with the Executive Branch by citing 
several connections between the two.  Perhaps the most persuasive 
connection rested in the President’s ability not only to appoint judges of the 
Tax Court, but also to remove them pursuant to § 7443(f).  Even though 
the grounds for removal were limited to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office,” and even though the targeted judge would possess 
the right to notice and a public hearing before being removed, the Second 
Circuit concluded the judges of the Tax Court “ultimately remain 
answerable to the President and are not wholly divorced from his 
oversight.”44  To the extent the Appointments Clause is intended not only 
to divest Congress of the power to appoint officers to positions it creates, 
but, from a larger perspective, to maintain a balance of power between the 
three branches of government,45 the President’s continuing oversight of the 
Tax Court judges provided the strongest justification for treating the Tax 
Court as continuing to reside within the Executive Branch.46  
Although recognizing that the Appointments Clause question before it 
was “not susceptible to easy analysis,” the Second Circuit in Samuels, Kramer 
provided a thorough brief for why the Tax Court should be regarded as 
continuing to reside in the Executive Branch notwithstanding its 
establishment as an article I court.  To the extent the Tax Court possessed 
an institutional desire to be regarded as part of the federal judicial regime, 
the Second Circuit’s determination that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
accomplished “little more than chang[ing] the label” used to refer to the 
court had to come as a dispiriting blow.47  Yet, to the extent the Tax Court 
preferred to be slotted alongside article III courts for purposes of 
determining its appointment power, it possessed a second, more definitive 
                                                     
42 See id. (citing the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 961, 83 Stat. 
487, 735).   
43 Id.   
44 Id. at 993.    
45 See id. at 988 (“The provisions of Article II incorporate the principle of 
separation of powers . . . .”).   
46 As a final matter, the Second Circuit seized on the source of the power to 
appoint special trial judges to support its position.  The court interpreted Congress’ 
decision to vest the power in the chief judge of the Tax Court, as opposed to the 
Tax Court as a body, as evidencing Congress’ apparent belief that the chief judge 
constituted the head of his department for Appointments Clause purposes.  See id. 
at 993.   
47 Id. at 991.   
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opportunity to obtain this characterization when the Supreme Court heard 
the taxpayers’ appeal in the Freytag case.    
 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
 
The principal advocates before the Supreme Court when it considered 
the appeal of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Freytag were identical to those 
before the Second Circuit in Samuels, Kramer.  Kathleen Sullivan represented 
the taxpayers, Kenneth Starr represented the Government in his capacity as 
Solicitor General (with John G. Roberts, Jr., arguing the case as Deputy 
Solicitor), and Erwin Griswold submitted a brief as amicus curiae on his own 
behalf.48  Due to the participation of Sullivan, Roberts, and Griswold, the 
litigation before the Supreme Court in Freytag has been characterized as a 
“three-way clash of the titans.”49   
The case provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the 
taxpayers’ challenge to the constitutional validity of the Tax Court’s use of 
special trial judges, an issue that no court had addressed in the Freytag line of 
cases.  The taxpayers in Freytag raised the Appointments Clause challenge 
for the first time on appeal of the Tax Court decision, and the Fifth Circuit 
determined that the taxpayers had waived any constitutional objection by 
consenting to the assignment of their cases to the special trial judge.  Based 
on the posture of the case, the Supreme Court could have easily avoided the 
constitutional question as well.  However, the Second Circuit’s intervening 
decision in Samuels, Kramer effectively negated that option—that is, unless 
the Court largely agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis of the issue.50  
                                                     
48 The case was argued by Kathleen Sullivan, on behalf of the taxpayer, and 
John Roberts, Jr., who represented the Solicitor General’s office as Assistant 
Solicitor.  Erwin Griswold sought leave to participate in oral argument of the case 
in his capacity as amicus curiae, but his request was denied.  Dean Griswold did not 
take the denial lightly.  In a letter to Justice Blackmun following the decision in 
Freytag, he expressed his frustration in the following manner: 
The latter [motion to participate in oral argument] was denied, despite the 
clear precedent of the appearance to present argument some thirty years ago 
in the cases involving the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals.  I must confess that I was rather annoyed with this, since it 
meant that there was no one who would present argument in support of 
what I call the “classical” position.  The British, I think, have long 
maintained a relationship between bench and bar which would have 
welcomed my appearance.  
Letter to the Honorable Harry A. Blackmun from Erwin N. Griswold at 3, Dec. 20, 
1991.  [Copy of letter on file with author; original in Harvard Law Library.]   
49 See Tuan Samahon, Blackmun (and Scalia) at the Bat:  The Court’s Separation of 
Powers Strike Out in Freytag, 12 NEV. L.J. 691, 693 (2012).      
50 Indeed, the four-Justice concurring opinion in the case favored passing on the 
constitutional question by affirming the Fifth Circuit’s decision on the issue of 
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Had the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit on the waiver issue, the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Samuels, Kramer would have served as the definitive 
interpretation of the Tax Court’s status within the constitutional 
framework.   
The Supreme Court therefore first had to decide if it would entertain the 
taxpayers’ Appointments Clause challenge on the merits.  The majority of 
the Court did so in fairly short order.  The Court noted that the 
constitutional challenge questioned the validity of the underlying Tax Court 
proceeding in the case.  Additionally, the Court observed that the case 
implicated the interests of the judiciary in “‘maintaining the constitutional 
plan of separation of powers.’”51  These considerations, coupled with its 
characterization of the taxpayers’ challenge as a serious one,52 prompted the 
Court to declare the proceeding “one of those rare cases” in which it would 
consider a matter that had not been raised below.53   
Turning to the merits of the alleged Appointments Clause violation, the 
Court first addressed whether the appointment of special trial judges 
implicated the Constitution in the first place.  Noting that the special trial 
judges in the Tax Court first took the form of staff attorneys who were 
appointed to assist the judge in the disposition of cases, the Commissioner 
contended that special trial judges hearing cases pursuant to § 7443A(b)(4) 
constituted employees whose hiring fell outside the scope of the 
Appointments Clause.  Because the special trial judge could not enter a 
decision in these cases, the judge constituted a mere assistant to the Tax 
Court judge in hearing evidence and preparing a proposed opinion, or so 
the argument went.   
Like every court before it, the Supreme Court refused to treat special 
trial judges as mere employees.  The Court explained that the 
characterization ignored the significant duties performed and considerable 
discretion exercised by special trial judges in § 7443A(b)(4) cases, which 
included conducting a trial, ruling on admissibility of evidence, evaluating 
the credibility of witnesses, and preparing the initial proposed report in the 
case.54  Additionally, the Commissioner’s argument produced the 
disconcerting prospect of special trial judges having dual status—officers 
when they heard cases in which they could enter the final decision under 
§ 7443A(b)(1)–(3), but employees when hearing cases under § 7443A(b)(4).  
The Court concluded that if special trial judges constituted officers for any 
purpose, their appointment had to comply with the Appointments Clause.  
                                                                                                                       
waiver.  See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).   As discussed below, 
the concurring opinion then proceeded to endorse an analysis of the constitutional 
issue consistent with that of the Second Circuit.   
51 Id. at 880 (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)).   
52 See id. at 883. 
53 Id. at 880.   
54 Id. at 881–82.   
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Accordingly, the Court determined that special trial judges constituted 
“inferior Officers” whose appointment was subject to the restrictions of the 
Appointments Clause.   
Having found the Appointments Clause implicated, the text of the 
provision presented two options for compliance:  (1) the chief judge could 
constitute the “Head” of a “Department” within the executive branch; or 
(2) the Tax Court could constitute one of “the Courts of Law.”  If neither 
of these characterizations were appropriate, the taxpayers would prevail on 
their claim that the appointment of the special trial judge was 
constitutionally infirm.  
Reversing course from its position before the Fifth Circuit,55 the 
Commissioner advanced the executive branch approach for compliance 
with the Appointments Clause.  The Commissioner arrived at this position 
through a process of elimination.  The Tax Court clearly was not a 
legislative body under article I.  And because the Tax Court was not an 
article III court whose judges enjoyed lifetime tenure and salary protection, 
the Commissioner contended that it did not constitute one of “the Courts 
of Law” under the Appointments Clause.  Accordingly, the Commissioner 
contended that the Tax Court continued to reside within the Executive 
Branch of article II where it originated, even though it conceded that the 
Tax Court’s fit there “may not be a perfect one.”56  Having settled on the 
article II approach, the Commissioner interpreted the scope of a 
“Department” under the Appointments Clause as including any 
independent component of the Executive Branch.  Because the Tax Court 
stood as an independent body, the Commissioner contended that it 
constituted a department under the Appointments Clause with the chief 
judge as its head.   
The taxpayers were less concerned with identifying the Tax Court’s 
position in the tripartite governmental structure and more interested in 
articulating what the Tax Court was not.  The taxpayers agreed with the 
Commissioner that “the Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause 
were limited to article III courts—the only courts mentioned in the 
Constitution.  However, they disagreed that the Tax Court remained within 
the Executive Branch.  The legislative history accompanying the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 provided plenty of support for this position.  In 
particular, Congress commented that the Tax Court’s status as an executive 
agency, “no matter how independent, raises questions in the minds of some 
as to whether it is appropriate for one executive agency to be sitting in 
                                                     
55 Although the Fifth Circuit did not address the taxpayers’ Appointments 
Clause challenge, the Commissioner on brief took the position that the Tax Court 
constituted a “Court of Law” under the Appointments Clause.  See Brief for Erwin 
N. Griswold as Amicus Curiae at 11 n.8, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991) (citing briefs before the Fifth Circuit).  
56 Brief for Respondent at 41, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
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judgment on the determinations of another executive agency.”57  Finding it 
“anomalous to continue to classify it with quasi-executive agencies that 
have rulemaking and investigatory functions,”58 Congress viewed the 
legislation as rendering the Tax Court “an article I court rather than an 
executive agency.”59  Accordingly, to conclude that the Tax Court 
continued to reside in the Executive Branch following the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 would be tantamount to characterizing this portion of the 
legislation as wholly ineffectual.   
After arguing that the Tax Court was not part of the Executive Branch 
and not part of the Judiciary, counsel for the taxpayers was pressed on 
where the Tax Court fit within the federal structure.  Taxpayers’ counsel did 
not provide an affirmative answer.  Instead, she reiterated that the Tax 
Court was neither legislative, executive, nor judicial, and she concluded her 
response by positing that “perhaps Congress should not create entities that 
are outside the tripartite structure of government.”60   
Erwin Griswold, arguing on brief as amicus curiae, challenged the point of 
agreement between the taxpayers and the Commissioner:  that “the Courts 
of Law” under the Appointments Clause were limited to those courts 
established under article III of the Constitution.  Noting that no such 
express limitation appeared in the relevant text, Griswold contended that 
the phrase should be afforded a “fair and natural construction” that would 
encompass all courts that “administer, interpret, and apply the laws of the 
United States.”61  From this perspective, the Tax Court possessed the 
requisite judicial nature.  As noted by Griswold, the Tax Court exercised 
judicial power in resolving disputes between taxpayers and the 
Government; its decisions were not subject to intermediate review by 
Federal district courts but, instead, were appealable to the courts of appeals 
in the same manner as a district court decision; and Congress supplied the 
court with power to enforce its orders and punish contempt.  In this 
manner, Griswold advocated a functional interpretation of “the Courts of 
Law” under the Appointments Clause, one that did not turn on the 
derivation of the court’s charter.   
With these three approaches on the table, the Supreme Court began its 
analysis of the Appointments Clause issue by dismissing the 
Commissioner’s position that the chief judge of the Tax Court served as the 
head of a department within the Executive Branch.  The Court noted that 
for the Commissioner’s argument to prevail, it was incumbent upon the 
Commissioner to demonstrate not only that the Tax Court was part of the 
                                                     
57 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 302 (1969).   
58 Id.   
59 Id. at 303 (emphasis supplied).    
60 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).   
61 Brief of Amicus Curiae at 7, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
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Executive Branch but also that the court rose to the level of a Department 
therein.62  Having framed the argument in these terms, the Court opened its 
analysis by simply stating “We are not so persuaded.”63   
The Court did not identify at the outset whether it found only one or 
both of the conjunctive elements of the Commissioner’s argument to be 
lacking.  Yet the Court began its analysis by examining the more narrow 
point—the scope of a “Department” for purposes of the Appointments 
Clause.  The Court began its explanation by exploring the definition of a 
“Department” for this purpose.  The Court explained that interpreting 
“Department” as including any independent component of the federal 
administrative regime would permit wide dissemination of the appointment 
power that the Appointments Clause was intended to foreclose.  Yet 
drawing a precise boundary on the scope of a “Department” proved 
difficult.  The Court viewed the term as referring to Cabinet-level agencies 
and, in addition, “Cabinet-like” departments within the Executive Branch 
that Congress designated as departments.64   
The Court’s analysis of the scope of a “Department” under the 
Appointments Clause in Freytag was somewhat curious, as that issue 
required resolution only if the Court determined that the Tax Court 
continued to reside in the Executive Branch.  After concluding its 
discussion of the more narrow element of the Commissioner’s argument 
(whether the Tax Court could qualify as a Department), the Court in Freytag 
appeared to turn its attention to the broader premise—that is, whether the 
Tax Court remained in the Executive Branch in any capacity.  The Court 
explained that, even if it were not persuaded that the Commissioner’s 
suggested interpretation of the scope of a Department under the 
Appointments Clause did not contravene the intended meaning of the term 
and did not threaten to diffuse the appointment power (in other words, 
even if the Court were to accept the Commissioner’s contention that the 
definition of a Department could encompass the Tax Court),65 the Court 
explained that it “still could not accept [the Commissioner’s] treatment of 
the intent of Congress . . . .”  At this point in the opinion, the Court did not 
specifically identify the Commissioner’s treatment of the intent of Congress 
that it was rejecting.  Nonetheless, at the outset of its discussion of this 
issue, the Court characterized the Commissioner’s position in the following 
                                                     
62 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 885–86. 
63 Id. at 886. 
64 Id. at 885.  Years later, the Supreme Court interpreted a “Department” under 
the Appointments Clause as including the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
grounds that the commission constituted “a freestanding component of the 
Executive Branch,” that was “not subordinate to or contained within any other 
such component.”  Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).   
65 See Freytag, 501 U.S.at 887.   
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terms: “[T]he Commissioner argues that § 7441 simply changed the status 
of the Tax Court within [the Executive Branch].  It did not remove the 
body to a different branch or change its substantive duties.”66  The 
Commissioner’s treatment of the intent of Congress that the Court declared 
it could not accept therefore appears to be that Congress did not remove 
the Tax Court from the Exectuive Branch through the Tax Reform Act of 
1969.  The Court’s subsequent explanation supports this interpretation.  
Quoting the Senate Report that accompanied the 1969 legislation, the Court 
noted that Congress enacted the legislation “with the express purpose of 
‘making the Tax Court an Article I court rather than an executive 
agency.’”67  Additionally, the Court recounted that Congress found it 
“‘anomalous to continue to classify’ the Tax Court with executive 
agencies,”68 in light of the dubious propriety of “‘one executive agency’ [the 
pre-1969 tribunal] to be sitting in judgment on the determinations of 
another executive agency [the IRS].’”69  
The Court in Freytag evidently viewed its references to the legislative 
materials accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as self-explanatory.  
The Court never expressly declared that Congress removed the Tax Court 
from the Executive Branch, nor did it offer a concluding sentence of any 
sort to this paragraph.  Rather, in the subsequent paragraph, the Court in 
Freytag concluded its entire discussion of the Commissioner’s two-pronged 
argument by returning to the more narrow ground:  “The Tax Court is not 
a ‘Department[t].’”70  Nothwithstanding the absence of an express 
resolution of the Executive Branch issue, it is difficult to faithfully read the 
Freytag Court’s rejection of the Commissioner’s interpretation of 
congressional intent as not indicating its view that Congress removed the 
Tax Court from the Executive Branch when it “transform[ed]” the Tax 
Court into a court of record established under article I.71   
After concluding that the Tax Court was not a Department within the 
Executive Branch—effectively overruling the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Samuels, Kramer in the process—the Court in Freytag next turned to the 
                                                     
66 Id. at 885.    
67 Id. at 887 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 (1969)).   
68 Id. at 887–88 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 (1969)). 
69 Id.at 888.  
70 See id. (referring to the “clear intent of Congress to transform the Tax Court 
into an Article I legislative court”).   
71 Indeed, the only way to read this portion of the Freytag opinion otherwise 
would be to interpret the Tax Court as constituting a body within the Executive 
Branch that was not an agency.  However, the Court in Freytag never attempted to 
make such a distinction.  Additionally, such an interpretation—that Congress 
changed the status of the Tax Court within the Executive Branch—would have 
represented an endorsement of the  Commissioner’s interpretation of congressional 
intent, rather than a refusal to accept it.   
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second avenue for finding that the appointment of special trial judges was 
constitutionally permissible:  that the chief judge of the Tax Court acted on 
behalf of one of “the Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause.  The 
Court dispensed with the contention that this term was limited to courts 
chartered under article III, noting the absence of any express limitation to 
that effect.  Additionally, the Court found its prior paraphrasing of the 
Appointments Clause in Buckley v. Valeo, wherein the Court stated that the 
Appointments Clause permitted appointment of inferior officers by “the 
President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary,”72 to be 
non-binding.  The Buckley case did not purport to resolve the scope of “the 
Courts of Law” under the Appointments Clause; rather, the Court in 
Buckley examined the Appointments Clause to determine whether Congress 
could appoint commissioners to the Federal Elections Commission.  
Hence, the scope of judicial exercise of the appointment power was not at 
issue.  Having eschewed any implicit article III limitation on “the Courts of 
Law,” the Court in Freytag interpreted the term as referring to any court that 
exercised the judicial power of the United States—power that Congress 
could choose to confer upon a legislative court.73   
At this stage in the analysis, the only question remaining was whether 
the Tax Court exercised the judicial power of the United States.  Focusing 
on the nature of the Tax Court and its functions (as suggested by Dean 
Griswold as amicus), the Court in Freytag unequivocally resolved this 
question in the affirmative:   
 
The Tax Court exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, or 
administrative, power.  It was established by Congress to interpret 
and apply the Internal Revenue Code in disputes between taxpayers 
and the Government.  By resolving these disputes, the court 
exercises a portion of the judicial power of the United States.  
The Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of any 
other function.  It is neither advocate nor rulemaker.  As an 
adjudicative body, it construes statutes passed by Congress and 
regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service.  It does 
not make political decisions.  
The Tax Court’s functions and role in the federal judicial scheme 
closely resemble those of the federal district courts, which 
indisputably are “Courts of Law.”  Furthermore the Tax Court 
exercises its judicial power in much the same way as the federal 
district courts exercise theirs.  It has authority to punish contempt by 
fine or imprisonment, 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c); to grant certain injunctive 
relief, § 6213(a); to order the Secretary of the Treasury to refund an 
                                                     
72 Id. at 890 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)).   
73 See id. at 888–90.   
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overpayment determined by the court, § 6512(b); and to subpoena 
and examine witnesses, order production of documents, and 
administer oaths, § 7456(a).  All these powers are quintessentially 
judicial in nature.  
The Tax Court remains independent of the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.  Its decisions are not subject to review by either 
the Congress or the President.  Nor has Congress made Tax Court 
decisions subject to review in the federal district courts. Rather, like 
the judgments of the district courts, the decisions of the Tax Court 
are appealable only to the regional United States courts of appeals, 
with ultimate review in this Court.  The courts of appeals, moreover, 
review those decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent 
as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury”.  
§ 7482(a).  This standard of review contrasts with the standard 
applied to agency rulemaking by the courts of appeals under . . . the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).74  
 
Given the Tax Court’s exclusively judicial role in the federal system, the 
Court in Freytag held that it constituted a “Court of Law” under the 
Appointments Clause.  Accordingly, the chief judge’s appointment of 
special trial judges on behalf of the Tax Court complied with the 
constitutional limitations on the dissemination of the appointment power.75   
The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by three 
other Justices, also would have upheld the validity of the appointment of 
special trial judges against the taxpayers’ Appointments Clause challenge if 
pressed to address the issue on the merits (which the concurrence was 
disinclined to do).76  However, the concurring Justices would have done so 
under the Executive Branch approach advocated by the Commissioner.77  
Although the concurrence would have selected a different rationale to 
achieve the same result, the concurrence did not view the matter as an 
inconsequential parsing of obscure constitutional doctrine.  Rather, the 
                                                     
74 Id. at 890–91.   
75 By determining that the Tax Court constituted one of “the Courts of Law” 
for purposes of the Appointments Clause rather than a “Department” within the 
Executive Branch, the Supreme Court in Freytag created a legitimate constitutional 
objection to the President’s authority to remove Judges of the Tax Court pursuant 
to § 7443(f).  If the Tax Court is no longer an executive agency, then the 
President’s removal power may well be viewed as unconstitutional on separation-
of-powers grounds.  See Tuan Samahon, Blackmun (and Scalia) at the Bat:  The Court’s 
Separation of Powers Strike Out in Freytag, 12 NEV. L.J. 691, 693 (2012) (suggesting 
that, following Freytag, § 7443(f) is subject to constitutional challenge on separation-
of-powers grounds).      
76 Id. at 892–901 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
77 Id. at 901.   
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concurring opinion characterized the majority’s willingness to treat an 
article I court as one of “the Courts of Law” under the Appointments 
Clause as being “both wrong and full of danger for the future of our system 
of separate and coequal powers.”78   
Beyond the textual interpretation of “the Courts of Law” as including 
only those courts envisioned and referenced in the Constitution (that is, 
those chartered under article III), the concurring opinion found support for 
this contextual interpretation in the purpose of the Appointments Clause 
itself.  The Appointments Clause was chiefly designed to preclude Congress 
from exercising the power to appoint officers to the governmental bodies it 
created.  In the view of the concurrence, only judges of article III courts 
possessed the requisite protections—that is, lifetime tenure and salary 
protection—to resist congressional encroachment on its appointment 
power.79  The concurring Justices charged that interpreting “Courts of Law” 
under the Appointments Clause to include courts that lack these 
protections “utterly destroys this carefully constructed scheme.”80  
Not surprisingly, the concurring Justices were not enamored with the 
functional approach to determining the constitutional status of an 
adjudicative body.  Believing that “the judicial power of the United 
States”—the identical phrase that appears at the outset of article III—could 
be exercised only by those judges who enjoyed the political protections of 
article III status, the concurrence eschewed function in favor of identity of 
the adjudicator.81  Accordingly, the concurring Justices had no trouble 
viewing the Tax Court as a purely adjudicative body.  They simply were not 
willing to admit this group of “adjudicative decisionmakers” into the 
judicial circle.82   
It is worth noting that the interpretation of the Appointments Clause 
favored by the concurring opinion offered the path of least resistance for 
the Supreme Court in Freytag.  After all, none of the actual parties to the 
litigation contended that the Tax Court constituted a Court of Law for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause, and the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals had already adopted the position that the chief judge served as the 
head of a “Department” within the Executive Branch.  A resolution on 
these grounds by the Supreme Court therefore would not have come as a 
                                                     
78 Id.   
79 Id. at 907–08.  In contrast, the Second Circuit had described the “potential for 
disruption to our constitutional scheme” posed by the issue in this context as 
“minimal.”  Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 988 (2d Cir. 
1991).  
80 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 908.  
81 Id. at 911.   
82 Id. at 911 (“Where adjudicative decisionmakers do not possess life tenure and 
a permanent salary, they are ‘incapable of exercising any portion of the judicial 
power.’”).   
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surprise, and had the majority adopted this rationale, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the case would have proved unanimous.  It is therefore 
interesting that a five-Justice majority eschewed this approach in favor of 
characterizing the Tax Court as one of “the Courts of Law” for 
constitutional purposes.  Perhaps a majority of the Supreme Court was 
reluctant to adopt an exclusionary stance with respect to legislative courts—
that a court of record established by Congress to perform exclusively 
adjudicative functions nonetheless did not rise to the level of a “Court of 
Law” under the Constitution simply because its judges lacked preferred 
article III status.   
However, questioning of the Commissioner’s counsel at oral argument 
suggests that a more practical consideration may have been at play.  The 
Court appeared keenly interested in the ramifications on the status of the 
Tax Court’s chief judge if the Tax Court were regarded as a department 
within the Executive Branch: 
 
QUESTION: May I ask how is the chief judge of this court 
appointed? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: The chief judge is elected by the regular judges on a 
-- 
 
QUESTION: And is that -- is that a valid method of appointing a 
head of a department in the executive branch? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: No challenge has been raised to that -- 
 
QUESTION: Well, I know no challenge has been raised, but under 
your argument it is clearly invalid, is it not, because the appointment 
was not made by the head of a department? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, it would have to be considered, not only a 
separate office, but what the chief -- the -- the attributes of the chief 
judge that are different from -- 
 
QUESTION: Well, surely the chief judge is an officer of the United 
States. 
 
MR. ROBERTS: The chief judge is an officer of the United States. 
The question is is the difference between the chief judge and a 
regular judge, does that require a -- 
 
QUESTION: Well, it gives him the authority to appoint assistant 
trial judges. 
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MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 
 
QUESTION: That’s a pretty importance difference, I guess. 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, it is -- it is a difference. It is not, as I say -- it 
has not been presented or briefed -- 
 
QUESTION: But under your argument it is clear that the present 
appointment of the chief judge of the court is invalid I think? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, with respect, Your Honor, I’m not sure that 
that is clear. It’s an issue that has not -- 
 
QUESTION: I know it hasn’t been raised, but I’m trying to think of 
the implications of accepting your argument. 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, we would have to look at all the added 
authority -- 
 
QUESTION: Can you give me a reason why, consistent with your 
argument, that the appointment could be valid -- the appointment by 
his colleagues as chief judge? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, one question would be is whether or not his 
additional authorities are such as require a separate appointment. 
 
QUESTION: I see. 
 
MR. ROBERTS: And it may be, for example, that the head of a 
collegial body does not have to have a separate appointment 
particularly here where the collegial body acts together in electing 
him. He may be more in the nature of a -- I don’t know if it’s a 
chairman or -- or a -- 
 
QUESTION: But not a head of a department with authority to 
appoint assistant trial judges? 
 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, he is clearly the head of this -- of this 
department. There’s no question about that. He doesn’t -- 
 
QUESTION: He became head by collegial action that did not have 
to comply with the appointments clause? 
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MR. ROBERTS: Well, it’s a complicated question -- answer, but 
perhaps -- and I’m thinking -- 
 
QUESTION: A question we can entirely avoid if we assume it’s a 
court of law.83 
 
If the chief judge of the Tax Court, as the head of a Department within 
the Executive Branch, had not been properly appointed,84 it would follow 
that the validity of all action taken in the name of the Tax Court by any one 
of its chief judges could be called into question.  Hence, the issue 
implicated much more than the validity of the appointments of special trial 
judges.  The challenge to the appointment of the chief judge of the Tax 
Court was not raised in the Freytag litigation, but such a challenge would 
remain around the corner.85  The majority of the Court in Freytag apparently 
anticipated the next shoe to drop under the Executive Branch approach, 
and wished to avoid it altogether.   
 
D. Postscript  
 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag characterizing 
the Tax Court as one of the “Courts of Law” under the Constitution was 
warmly received by the Tax Court.  The judges were imminently grateful to 
Dean Griswold for his role in the litigation.  Chief Judge Arthur Nims, 
author of the Tax Court’s decision in First Western, invited Dean Griswold 
and his wife to a luncheon at the court in his honor.  Chief Judge Nims 
opened the invitation with the following acknowledgement: 
                                                     
83 Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–55, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991). The transcript of the oral argument in the case does not reveal which 
Justice undertook this line of questioning, but the audio recording suggests that it 
was Justice Stevens (who joined the majority opinion in the case).   
84 If the Tax Court were a “Department” within the Executive Branch, 
presumably the appointment of the chief judge as its “Head” would have to be 
made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. II. § 2, cl. 2.   
85 Subsequent case law suggests that a challenge to the validity of the election of 
a duly appointed judge of the Tax Court to the position of chief judge of the court 
may not have been fruitful.  In Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994), the 
Supreme Court addressed whether the Appointments Clause required a 
commissioned military officer to receive a second appointment as a military judge 
before assuming judicial duties at the trial or appellate level in such capacity.  The 
Court held that the additional appointment was not required on constitutional 
grounds, reasoning that the role of a military judge is sufficiently germane to that of 
a military officer.  Id. at 176.  Under a standard of germaneness, one would expect 
that the role of chief judge of the Tax Court is sufficiently similar to that of a 
regular judge of the Tax Court to not require a separate appointment.    
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I wanted to formally thank you personally and on behalf of the Tax 
Court for giving us the benefit of your knowledge, wisdom, and 
prestige in connection with our travails in Samuels, Kramer in the 
Second Circuit and Freytag in the Supreme Court.  I, for one, am 
certain that we would not ultimately have prevailed but for your 
superlative efforts.86   
 
After attending the event, Dean Griswold expressed lament for the narrow 
breadth of the “victory” in a letter thanking Chief Judge Nims for hosting 
the affair: 
 
It [the decision] was too close for comfort, and I am chagrined 
that I was not able to attract more than five votes for a proposition 
which it seems to me was well settled long ago, and then again in the 
cases some forty or fifty years ago involving the Court of Claims, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Federal Courts in the 
District of Columbia.  
. . .   
It was a real pleasure to have the opportunity to support the Tax 
Court in these cases.  I particularly appreciate the help you gave in 
your thorough and careful opinion, and in your conversation while 
the case was making its way to the Supreme Court.87   
 
Dean Griswold later conveyed his dismay at the margin of the Supreme 
Court’s majority decision directly to Justice Harry Blackmun who, as the 
author of the majority decision, likely provided a friendly audience.  Dean 
Griswold remarked as follows: 
 
Of course, I liked the opinion, and the result, even though it was 
by such a slim margin.  As one reads your opinion, it is hard to 
escape the thought that it was prepared as a dissenting opinion, and 
that you must have been so persuasive that you won over one or 
more votes after your opinion was circulated.  If so, I join with the 
judges of the Tax Court in appreciation.  They are a fine group of 
people, who work hard, and judicially.  They are, indeed, in my view, 
                                                     
86 Letter from Arthur L. Nims, III, Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court 
to Dean Erwin N. Griswold, June 28, 1991.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
Professor Tuan Samahon, who shared this letter and other documents referenced 
below that he obtained in connection with his research on an article on the Freytag 
decision.  See Tuan Samahon, Blackmun (and Scalia) at the Bat:  The Court’s Separation of 
Powers Strike Out in Freytag, 12 NEV. L.J. 691 (2012).      
87 Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to the Honorable Arthur L. Nims, III, July 
10, 1991.   
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one of the better judicial tribunals in the country.  It seems odd to 
me that they should have had to go through this proceeding more 
than twenty years after Congress had done its best to establish the 
court as an Article I court, pursuant to long-standing decisions of 
your Court.  (I could hear Felix moaning in his grave.  He was the 
one who introduced me to this general area of the law.) 




The Freytag litigation may have technically concerned the constitutional 
validity of the appointment of special trial judges by the Chief Judge of the 
Tax Court, but the Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue turned on its 
interpretation of the Tax Court’s role in the federal system.  Although the 
Court did not articulate a home for the Tax Court within the tripartite 
governmental structure,89 the strong implication from the Court’s rejection 
of the Commissioner’s argument in the case and the Court’s recitation of 
the legislative history accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is that 
Congress effectively removed the Tax Court from the Executive Branch by 
chartering the institution as a court of record under article I of the 
Constitution.90  While the Supreme Court in Freytag was not prepared to 
                                                     
88 Letter to the Honorable Harry A. Blackmun from Erwin N. Griswold at 3, 
Dec. 20, 1991.  [Copy of letter on file with author; original in Harvard Law 
Library.]   
89 Indeed, the Tax Court may have no such home.  See Leandra Lederman, Tax 
Appeal:  A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1195, 1199 (2008) (observing that the Tax Court “is ‘neither fish nor fowl’—it 
is no longer an agency, but it is not a member of the judicial branch of 
government”).  
90 This aspect of the Freytag decision has not been universally embraced by later 
serving Justices of the Supreme Court.  In a 2005 case concerning the Tax Court’s 
procedures for reviewing a report issued by a special trial judge, Justice Breyer 
made the following remarks at oral argument: 
JUSTICE BREYER:  What -- what is -- can I ask you a really esoteric 
administrative law question, which I have never been able to figure out?  It’s 
probably relevant, but I -- this [the Tax Court] is an agency.  That’s what -- 
my great tax professor -- Ernie Brown, used to say there is no Tax Court.  
He says, the Board of Tax Appeals shall be known as the Tax Court.  What 
he meant by that is it’s not -- it isn’t the Tax Court, just known as.  So -- so 
this is an agency, an administrative agency.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).  
While it is worth noting that Justice Breyer graduated from Harvard Law School in 
1964 (several years before Congress established the Tax Court as an article I court 
through the Tax Reform Act of 1969), Justice Breyer’s understanding that the Tax 
Court constitutes an executive agency appears intentional rather than anachronistic.  
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include the Tax Court in the federal Judiciary,91 the Court declared that the 
Tax Court is independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches and 
that it exercises a portion of the judicial power of the United States.  The 
Freytag decision therefore provided a powerful affirmation of the Tax 
Court’s judicial character. 
 
F. Subsequent Development:  Kuretski v. Commissioner 
 
Just prior to the publication of the second edition of this text, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals had reason to examine the constitutional nature of 
the Tax Court in Kuretski v. Commissioner.92  The taxpayers in Kuretski 
invoked the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review an adverse determination in 
the collection due process setting, and the Tax Court largely sustained the 
Service’s determination.93  In addition to appealing the merits of the Tax 
Court’s decision, the taxpayers in Kuretski raised a constitutional objection 
to the Tax Court proceedings below.  Specifically, the taxpayers contended 
that the authority of the President to remove a Tax Court judge for 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” pursuant to 
§ 7443(f) violated the principle of separation of powers embedded in the 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag served as the 
foundation for their argument:  Because the Tax Court exercises a “portion 
of the judicial power of the United States,”94 the taxpayers contended that 
the President’s authority under § 7443(f) impermissibly subordinated the 
                                                                                                                       
In Federal Marine Commissioner v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 
(2002), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded 
a federal agency from adjudicating a complaint lodged by a private party against a 
nonconsenting State for violations of federal law, basing its decision in part on the 
similarity between the administrative adjudication regime at issue and civil litigation 
in federal courts.  See id. at 757–59 (“[T]he similarities between FMC proceedings 
and civil litigation are overwhelming.”).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer 
explained that administrative agencies, even so-called “independent” agencies, are 
not part of the Legislative or Judicial Branches of government; rather, such bodies 
“are more appropriately considered to be part of the Executive Branch.”  Id. at 773 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer supported this point with the first of several 
favorable citations to Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Freytag.  Justice Breyer 
was not alone in this view.  His dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg.          
91 Indeed, such a characterization would have transgressed the longstanding 
interpretation of the “Judiciary” as synonymous with courts that enjoy the political 
protections provided by article III.   
92 -- F.3d -- (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Docket No. 13-1090).   
93 See T.C. Memo. 2012-262, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 295.   
94 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).  
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Tax Court’s exercise of judicial power to an executive officer.95  The 
taxpayers therefore sought a remand of their case to the Tax Court with 
instructions for new proceedings to be conducted before an adjudicator no 
longer subject to the removal power. 
In a case of first impression, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
§ 7443(f) did not infringe the constitutional separation of powers.  While 
the court’s reluctance to undermine the legitimacy of every Tax Court 
decision issued since the Tax Reform Act of 1969 may have been 
understandable, the court’s rationale for its holding was somewhat 
surprising.  Rather than addressing whether an “interbranch” removal 
power of the qualified sort contained in § 7443(f) raised constitutional 
concerns, the D.C. Circuit instead rejected the premise of the taxpayers’ 
argument—that is, that the President’s removal power under § 7443(f) 
implicated two branches of government.  The court did so by asserting that 
the Tax Court “exercises Executive authority as part of the Executive 
Branch.”96  Having thus characterized the removal power at issue as of the 
“intrabranch” variety, the separation of powers argument fell by the 
wayside.   
The D.C. Circuit in Kuretski recognized that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Freytag posed something of an obstacle to its holding, noting 
that the Freytag case “adds a wrinkle to what otherwise would be a 
straightforward analysis.”97  Conceding that the Court in Freytag declared 
that the Tax Court exercises a portion of the judicial power of the United 
States, the D.C. Circuit in Kuretski determined that the Court had employed 
the concept of judicial power in an enlarged, “overarching” sense to refer to 
adjudication through adversarial proceedings by any unit of the federal 
government.98  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit was not troubled by the Supreme 
                                                     
95 The prospect that § 7443(f) violated the separation of powers doctrine was 
raised by Prof. Tuan Samahon, as part of his article criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Freytag.  See Samahon, supra note 49, at 695–96.  Interestingly, Prof. 
Samahon served as counsel to the Kuretskis before the D.C. Circuit, and he argued 
their case on appeal.   
96 Id. slip op. at 2.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly 
characterized the Tax Court as part of the Executive Branch following the Freytag 
decision, indeed citing Freytag for the proposition that the Tax Court “is a Court of 
Law despite being part of the Executive Branch.” South Carolina State Ports Auth. 
v. Federal Maritime Com’n, 243 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 2001).  The Executive 
Branch characterization, however, was not repeated when then case proceeded to 
the Supreme Court.  See Federal Maritime Com’n v. South Carolina State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).     
97 Kuretski, slip op. at 18.   
98 Id. slip op. at 19–20.  This is consistent with Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
the majority opinion in Freytag:  “‘The judicial power,’ as the Court uses it, bears no 
resemblance to the constitutional term of art we are all familiar with, but means 
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Court’s statement in Freytag that the Tax Court remained “independent of 
the Executive . . . Branch[].”99  Rather, the D.C. Circuit understood the 
Supreme Court to have made this statement to describe the Tax Court’s 
functional independence, rather than speaking to the court’s constitutional 
status.100   
In addition to addressing what appeared to be contradictory guidance 
from the Supreme Court in Freytag, the D.C. Circuit analogized the Tax 
Court to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.  Both courts were 
created by Congress pursuant to its article I powers, and Congress cited the 
then Court of Military Appeals as an example when chartering the Tax 
Court as a court of record under article I through the Tax Reform Act of 
1969.  The D.C. Circuit in Kuretski then cited the Supreme Court’s 
observation in the 1997 case of Edmond v. United States101 that “it is clear that 
[the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces] is within the Executive 
Branch.”102       
The determination of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Kuretski that 
the Tax Court exercises executive authority as part of the Executive Branch 
of government stands in considerable tension with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Freytag.  Indeed, the Kuretski decision aligns more closely with 
the rationale of the concurring opinion in Freytag authored by Justice Scalia 
and joined by three other Justices.103  The Kuretski case therefore may 
present the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify its decision in 
Freytag and, in the process, once again examine the constitutional nature of 




                      
                                                                                                                       
only ‘the power to adjudicate in the manner of courts.’”  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 908 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).          
99 Id. at 891.   
100 See Kuretski, slip op. at 24.   
101 520 U.S. 651 (1997).   
102 Id. at 664–65 n.2.  
103 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 908 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“Despite this unequivocal text [introduction to Article III], the Court 
sets forth the startling proposition that ‘the judicial power of the United States is 
not limited to the judicial power defined in Article III.’”).  As discussed in supra 
note 9085, other Justices continue to appear sympathetic to Justice Scalia’s minority 
position in Freytag.    





FOUNDATIONAL PARAMETERS OF  
TAX COURT JURISDICTION  
 
The major jurisdiction of the Tax Court, since its creation in 1924 as the 
Board of Tax Appeals,1 has involved the redetermination of tax deficiency 
assertions by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.2  Since then, the court 
has remained the primary judicial body in which a taxpayer may litigate the 
question of liability in advance of having to pay the disputed tax.3  In 
general, the procedure is for a taxpayer who has received a deficiency notice 
to file a petition with the court within a prescribed time period for review 
of the deficiency determination.4 During the pendency of the Tax Court 
proceeding, the Commissioner is forbidden to assess or collect, without the 
taxpayer’s permission, any additional tax.5  If the taxpayer does not file the 
requisite petition with the court, or if a petition is filed but the court finds 
in favor of the Commissioner, the tax will be assessed and steps then may 
be taken by the Commissioner to collect the assessed amount.6 
Measured by number of cases, the most important element of the 
court’s deficiency jurisdiction has, since 1924, involved deficiencies with 
respect to income taxes.7  Of less numerical significance have been 
                                                     
1 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336. 
2 Id. §§ 274(a), 308(a), 43 Stat. 297, 308 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(a)). 
3 See I.R.C. § 7421(a).  Federal bankruptcy courts possess concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Tax Court to review unadjudicated determinations of tax 
deficiencies asserted against a debtor who has sought federal bankruptcy 
protection.  See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1), (2) (providing that the bankruptcy court “may 
determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or 
any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid,” 
provided the matter was not adjudicated prior to the commencement of the 
bankruptcy proceeding); see also Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy, 25 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 1364, 1397–1401 (1994) (describing the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court and the Tax Court in this context and, in particular, the 
bankruptcy court’s power to determine the venue in which the proceeding will go 
forward).   
4 Under the 1924 Act, the period for filing a petition was 60 days. Revenue Act 
of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297. Present law requires filing within 90 days, 
unless the notice is addressed to someone outside the United States, in which case 
the filing period is extended to 150 days.  I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
5 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a)–(c), 43 Stat. 297 (now codified at 
I.R.C. § 6213(a)). 
6 Id. § 274(b)–(c). 
7 Id. § 274(a). 
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controversies involving deficiencies in excess profits, estate, and gift taxes.8  
The court has also had jurisdiction of these matters since 1924.9   
Although jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies has been the most 
important aspect of the business of the Tax Court, its jurisdiction has, from 
time to time, included other subjects.10  Since 1926, the court has had the 
power to determine overpayments of tax and therefore a taxpayer’s 
entitlement to a refund with respect to those tax years properly before the 
court in connection with a deficiency dispute.11  Some efforts have been 
made to expand the court’s refund jurisdiction, but these have not been 
successful.12  From the time of its inception, the court also could review 
disputes arising as a result of jeopardy assessments.13  This arena witnessed 
significant change, occasioned as a result of both decisional14 and statutory 
law.15  This Part will review the history and development of the foregoing 
jurisdictional matters, which make up the foundation of the Tax Court’s 
modern jurisdiction.  Additionally, attention will be given to certain 
quasi-jurisdictional questions that have arisen by virtue of the court’s 
unusual status, first as an agency of the executive branch and, since 1969, as 
a legislative court.  These involve the authority of the court to enforce its 
judgments and process, and to punish contempt; the power of the court to 
determine the constitutionality of the tax laws; and the applicability in Tax 
Court proceedings of doctrines rooted in equitable principles. 
 
                                                     
8 Id. §§ 280, 308(a), 324, 43 Stat. 301, 308, 316. 
9 Id.  
10 For example, in 1943, the court was given jurisdiction to redetermine 
excessive profits under the renegotiation acts applicable to government contractors.  
Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701(e), 58 Stat. 86.  [This jurisdiction was 
withdrawn from the Tax Court and given to the Court of Claims in 1971. Act of 
July 1, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-41, § 3, 85 Stat. 98.]  Also in 1943, the Tax Court 
succeeded to the jurisdiction of the United States Processing Tax Board of Review 
to adjudicate controversies concerning the refund of amounts collected under the 
depression-inspired processing tax,  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 510, 56 Stat. 
967, which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.  See United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).  These aspects of the Tax Court’s former 
jurisdiction are detailed in Appendix C.  
11 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(e), 44 Stat. 67 (now I.R.C. § 6512(b)).  
12 See infra notes 296–326 and accompanying text.  
13 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(d), 279, 43 Stat. 297, 300 (now codified 
at I.R.C. §§ 6861–6864).  
14 Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976). 
15 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1204(a), 90 Stat. 1695; 
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,  Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6237, 
102 Stat. 3741–43. 
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A. Deficiency Jurisdiction 
 
Three principal factors were important in shaping the 1924 provisions 
dealing with the Board of Tax Appeals.  The first of these was the 
recognition of the necessity for expert and impartial review of tax disputes.  
This recognition led to the creation of the Board as an independent agency 
of the executive branch rather than as part of the Treasury Department.16  
The second factor was the desire for procedural rules that would tend to 
assure accurate decisions and would lead to the creation of a uniform body 
of precedents that would aid in future interpretations of the tax laws.  As a 
result, Board proceedings were required to be conducted publicly in 
accordance with judicial-type procedures.17  The third major factor, which 
was largely responsible for shaping the jurisdictional provisions dealing with 
the Board, was the conviction that taxpayers should be given the 
opportunity to litigate the question of tax liability in advance of the time 
when the disputed tax had to be paid. 
Before 1924, taxpayers could obtain administrative review of tax 
disputes within the Bureau of Internal Revenue prior to the necessity for 
payment.18  However, judicial review of such disputes was restricted to 
suits, originating in district court or the Court of Claims, for refund of taxes 
erroneously collected.19  To bring such suits, the taxpayer had to pay the full 
amount of the tax in dispute20 and then file a claim for refund with the 
Bureau.  The Bureau then either had to deny the claim or fail to act on the 
claim within six months.21  In the years following the end of World War I, 
this limitation on access to independent review was particularly 
troublesome.  The income and profits taxes had generated a tremendous 
amount of revenue for the war years,22 but they were new and complex 
provisions that the Bureau of Internal Revenue was ill-equipped to 
administer.23  As a result, audits took many years to conclude, 
inconsistencies arose in the positions that the Bureau took on various 
issues, and many disputes arose with taxpayers. These disputes frequently 
involved taxpayers who had suffered financial reverses since the end of the 
war, and, for them, the necessity of paying high taxes based on wartime 
revenue was ruinous.24  Pre-assessment review might not relieve the 
                                                     
16 See Part II, notes 55–76 and accompanying text.  
17 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text.  
18 See Part I, notes 197–265 and accompanying text.  
19 See Part I, notes 142–197 and accompanying text. 
20 See Part I, notes 182–193 and accompanying text. 
21 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1318, 42 Stat. 314. 
22 See Part I, notes 23–36 and accompanying text. 
23 See Part I, notes 93–195 and accompanying text 
24 Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origins and Functions, in 
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 32–33 (1955). 
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ultimate necessity of payment, but it would at least afford taxpayers 
protection against ill-advised Bureau action based on erroneous 
interpretations of the law.  As a consequence of this concern, the 
jurisdiction of the Board was framed to provide for the availability of an 
independent, judicial-type review between the initial determination by the 
Bureau that additional tax was due, and the time of assessment of such tax.  
The Board’s jurisdiction and its procedure for reviewing deficiency 
determinations were immediately successful, and few modifications have 
proved necessary. 
 
1. Taxes Subject to the Tax Court’s Deficiency Jurisdiction 
 
The taxes subject to the deficiency jurisdiction of the Board/Tax Court 
have never included the entire gamut of federal taxes.  Even in 1924, when 
the federal tax system was less sophisticated than it is now, many types of 
taxes were not covered by the Board’s deficiency jurisdiction.  These 
included all external taxes, as well as many internal excise taxes on specified 
goods and activities.  In fact, only four types of taxes were made subject to 
the Board’s jurisdiction: the excess profits, income, estate, and gift taxes.25 
The reasons for so limiting the Board’s jurisdiction are not difficult to 
identify.  In the case of external taxes, exclusion from the Board’s 
jurisdiction undoubtedly resulted from the fact that an elaborate system of 
judicial review of such taxes had been established in specialized courts for 
many years,26 and there was no inclination to abolish such system.  The 
internal excise taxes excluded from the Board’s jurisdiction were relatively 
simple and did not directly affect many taxpayers.27  Moreover, the Bureau 
had been administering these taxes for a relatively long period of time 
without significant difficulty.28  Certainly, whatever problems existed with 
these taxes did not occasion the degree of public criticism associated with 
the income and profits taxes.  Finally, and most significantly, the subject 
matter of the Board’s jurisdiction was influenced by the purpose of the 
original Administration proposal from which the legislation creating the 
Board originated.  In proposing creation of the Board, Secretary of the 
Treasury Mellon generally sought a mere continuation of the Committee on 
                                                     
25 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(a), 280, 308(a), 324, 43 Stat. 297, 301, 
308, 316. 
26 The Board of General Appraisers (later to become the Customs Court and, 
later hence, the United States Court of International Trade), established in 1890, 
and the Court of Custom Appeals (later to become the Court of Custom and 
Patent Appeals and, later hence, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit), established in 1909, were created to review the legality of customs 
exactions.  See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 558 (1962). 
27 Part II, notes 137–141 and accompanying text. 
28 See Part I, notes 52–62 and accompanying text. 
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Appeals and Review, which had been operating as part of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue since 1919.29  The only major changes sought by the 
proposal were to change the name of the committee to the Board of Tax 
Appeals; to remove the committee from within the organization of the 
Bureau and make it a separate agency of the Treasury Department; to 
provide higher salaries than those paid to members of the committee; and 
to make the findings of the Board prima facie evidence in any subsequent 
federal court proceeding involving the disputed tax. 
Congress saw fit to modify the Administration proposal in several 
respects to assure the Board’s independence and judicial character.30  
However, Congress gave no consideration to expanding the Board’s 
jurisdiction from what was proposed.  The Committee on Appeals and 
Review only heard cases originating in the Income Tax Unit of the 
Bureau.31  The exclusive responsibility of this Unit was for income and 
profits taxes.  A body similar to the Committee on Appeals and Review was 
established in 1922 to hear cases originating in the Estate Tax Unit and was 
called the Committee on Review and Appeals.32  This similarity likely 
accounted for the proposal to include the estate tax within the Board’s 
jurisdiction.  The Administration did not propose to assign gift tax cases to 
the Board, but this was due to the fact that prior to 1924 no gift tax existed.  
The gift tax was enacted in 1924 only over the strenuous objections of the 
Administration.33  Including the gift tax within the Board’s jurisdiction was 
natural given that the tax largely was designed to supplement the income 
and estate taxes by preventing avoidance through inter vivos gifts.34 
 Since 1924, there have been only limited changes in the taxes subject to 
the Board/Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction.  No part of the jurisdiction 
originally given with respect to excess profits, income, estate, and gift taxes 
has been withdrawn, except to the extent that the profits and gift taxes have 
been, from time to time, repealed and reenacted.35  On the other hand, the 
                                                     
29 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14–15; Part II, notes 25–54 and 
accompanying text. 
30 See Part II, notes 55–97 and accompanying text. 
31 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14–15; Part I, notes 221–257 and 
accompanying text. 
32 1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 11–12. 
33 See Part II, notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., CHARLES L.B. LOWNDES, ROBERT KRAMER & JOHN H. MCCORD, 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 640 (3d ed. 1974).  
35 The first excess profits tax was enacted in 1917 and eliminated in 1921.  Act 
of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 
§§ 301(a), 1400(a), 42 Stat. 272, 320.  A declared value excess profits tax, first 
imposed as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act, was in effect from 1933 
to 1946.  Ch. 90, § 216(a), 48 Stat. 208 (1933); Revenue Act of 1945, ch. 453, § 202, 
59 Stat. 574.  From 1940 to 1946, an additional excess profits tax was imposed as a 
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passage of years has witnessed the addition of a number of separate and 
alternative income taxes to the Board/Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  This 
expansion has been the result of the Board/Tax Court’s broad jurisdiction 
over all types of income taxes.36  Beyond this, the only other change has 
been the addition to the court’s deficiency jurisdiction of certain excise 
taxes imposed by chapters 41, 42, 43, and 44 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The first such tax, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,37 provides for 
certain taxes to be imposed on private foundations, both with respect to 
their investment income and with respect to certain activities that Congress 
deemed inconsistent with the tax preferences accorded such 
organizations.38  Five years later, as part of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974,39 Congress added a series of excise taxes to 
assure compliance with greatly expanded regulation of employee benefit 
plans and individual retirement accounts.40  As was true with the taxes on 
private foundations, these taxes were not primarily revenue raising devices, 
but were designed to prevent the abuse of favorable tax treatment accorded 
by other provisions of the Code.  In the Tax Reform Act of 1976,41 two 
additional specialized excises were added, one on excessive lobbying 
                                                                                                                       
result of World War II.  Second Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 710(a), 54 Stat. 
975; Revenue Act of 1945, ch. 453, § 122(a), 59 Stat. 568.  The Korean War gave 
impetus for the enactment of a fourth excess profits tax in 1950; this tax was 
eliminated for tax years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1954.  Excess Profits Tax Act 
of 1950, ch. 1199, § 430(a), 64 Stat. 1137; Act Extending Excess Profits Tax Until 
Dec. 3, 1953, ch. 202, 67 Stat. 175 (1953).  The gift tax was originally enacted in 
1924.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 319, 43 Stat. 313.  It was repealed by the 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 125, but was reenacted by the 
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501(a), 47 Stat. 245 (now codified at I.R.C. § 2501), 
and has been in effect since then. 
36 The deficiency jurisdiction of the Board/Tax Court always has been stated 
broadly enough to include all income taxes. Cf. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 
§ 274(a), 43 Stat. 297 (“If . . .  there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by 
this title. . . .”); I.R.C. § 6213(a) (“no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any 
tax imposed by subtitle A. . . .”).  Illustrations of income taxes added since 1924 
are:  minimum tax (Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 83 Stat. 
580); maximum tax (id. § 804(a), 83 Stat. 685); “wringer tax” (id. § 101(a), 83 Stat. 
492 (adding I.R.C. § 507(c))); personal holding company tax (Revenue Act of 1934, 
ch. 277, § 351(a), 48 Stat. 751); net investment income tax (Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.  No. 111-152, § 1402, 124 Stat. 
1060–63). 
37 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
38 Id. § 101(b), 83 Stat. 498 (adding I.R.C. §§ 4940–4948). 
39 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
40 Id. §§ 1013(b), 2001(f), 2002(d)–(e), 2003(a), 88 Stat. 920, 955, 966, 967, 971 
(adding I.R.C. §§ 4971–4975).  
41 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.  
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activities of public charities,42 and the other on real estate investment trusts 
that fail to distribute at least 75 percent of their income by the close of their 
taxable year.43  This limited set of excise taxes within the Tax Court’s 
deficiency jurisdiction has grown considerably over time.  Chapters 41 
through 44 of the Code now encompass §§ 4911 through 4982, which 
includes among other items an excise tax on black lung trust benefits, on 
political expenditures of § 501(c)(3) organizations, and taxes on certain 
distributions from donor-advised funds.  The most recent addition to the 
category of excise taxes within the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction is the 
tax imposed on high cost employer-sponsored health plans created as part 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.44   
As with the other taxes subject to Tax Court jurisdiction, disputes 
involving these excise taxes can be litigated either in the Tax Court through 
a deficiency proceeding45 or in district court or the Court of Federal Claims 
through a refund suit.46  The legislative history accompanying the excise tax 
legislation does not directly reveal congressional motivation in providing 
Tax Court jurisdiction over these measures.  Presumably, the same factors 
present in 1924 were believed to apply; that is, the taxes are complex and 
may involve substantial liability which, absent the opportunity for pre- 
assessment review, would impose undue financial hardship.  Given that the 
primary purpose of these excise taxpayers is to channel taxpayer behavior, 
the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction in this setting is rarely invoked.   
 
2. Deficiency Jurisdiction:  Procedural Requirements 
 
The procedure by which the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction may be 
invoked has remained generally unchanged since 1924.  In essence, three 
statutory requirements must be met: (1) determination by the 
Commissioner of a deficiency,47 (2) notification to the taxpayer of such 
deficiency determination,48 and (3) filing of a petition by the taxpayer with 
the court for redetermination of the deficiency within the prescribed 
period.49  The first two requirements are intertwined in a practical sense, as 
the requirement of a deficiency notice involves identification of a deficiency 
in tax, determination thereof by the Commissioner, and notification to the 
                                                     
42 Id. § 1307(b), 90 Stat. 1722 (adding I.R.C. § 4911). 
43 Id. § 1605(a), 90 Stat. 1754 (adding I.R.C. § 4981). 
44 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001, 124 Stat. 119, 847–53 (2010).   
45 I.R.C. § 6213. 
46 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). 
47 I.R.C. §§ 6211(a) (definition of “deficiency”), 6212(a) (phrasing the 
“determination” of a deficiency as a prerequisite to the issuance of a statutory 
notice). 
48 I.R.C. § 6212(a)–(b). 
49 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
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taxpayer.  Although the deficiency determination and notice are 
prerequisites to jurisdiction, the taxpayer actually invokes deficiency 
jurisdiction through the timely filing of a petition; the deficiency notice 
alone cannot serve as the basis of jurisdiction.50 
 
a. Determination of a Deficiency   
 
Jurisdiction of the Tax Court initially requires the determination of a 
deficiency.  “Deficiency” was first defined in the Revenue Act of 1924, 
which created the Board of Tax Appeals.51  Prior thereto there was no 
necessity for such a term of art, and reference was made instead to the 
difference between the amount paid and the amount that should have been 
paid.52  Following additional revisions in the Revenue Act of 1944,53 the 
statutory definition has remained virtually unchanged, representing the 
expression of a simple formula:  the excess of the sum of (1) tax liability 
plus rebates over (2) the sum of the amount shown as due on the return 
plus previously assessed deficiencies.54  The term applies only to taxes that 
may be the subject of Tax Court jurisdiction.55  In the years since 1924, the 
interpretation of the definition of a deficiency has posed little difficulty for 
courts.56   
The fact that a deficiency exists is not equivalent to the determination of 
a deficiency by the Commissioner.  A deficiency exists as a definitional 
matter in any situation in which taxes have been underassessed,57 but only 
the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency provides the predicate 
                                                     
50 Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1951). 
51 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 273, 43 Stat. 296. 
52 The Revenue Act of 1918 employed a general phrase to convey the concept 
of deficiency: “If the amount already paid is less than that which should have been 
paid . . . .” Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1083.  The word 
“deficiency” first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1921.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 
136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 265. 
53 Revenue Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 271(a), 58 Stat. 245. 
54 I.R.C. § 6211(a). 
55 Id. §§ 6211(a), 6213(a). 
56 See Oesterlein Mach. Co., 1 B.T.A. 159, 161 (1924) (providing that the 
definition of a deficiency makes no distinction between a deficiency “arising under 
one section of the title and that arising under any other section of the title”); 
Paccon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 392, 396 (1966) (stating that “[i]t is the 
existence of a deficiency at the date of the sending of the notice of deficiency that 
confers jurisdiction” on the court); Murphree v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1309 
(1986) (explaining that the disallowance of a refundable tax credit gives rise to a 
deficiency); Spurlock v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 155 (2002) (holding that the 
amount of tax shown on substitute return prepared by the Service represents a 
deficiency).   
57 Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 108 F.2d 656, 659 (6th Cir. 1940). 
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for Tax Court jurisdiction.58 The function of the court is to decide whether 
the deficiency as determined is correct; a finding that the Commissioner 
erred in computing a deficiency does not negate the court’s jurisdiction.59 
In the early years of the Board, considerable attention was directed to 
the question of what constitutes a “determination” of a deficiency by the 
Commissioner.60  In general, the issue has been viewed as a question of fact 
that turns on the existence of a communication from the Commissioner to 
the taxpayer setting forth a final administrative determination.61  Thus, it 
has been held that the determination of a deficiency is the Commissioner’s 
final decision as to the amount of tax owed.  From the Commissioner’s 
viewpoint, it is the termination of an existing administrative controversy 
with the taxpayer.62  The 15-day and the 30-day letters, tentative statements 
of Service opinion during the course of administrative consideration, do not 
represent final determinations by the Commissioner.  They merely notify 
the taxpayer of a proposed deficiency.63  Explanatory letters or letters 
acknowledging receipt of communications from the taxpayer do not 
constitute determinations.64  Similarly, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by a 
                                                     
58 Hannan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 787, 791 (1969). 
59 H. Milgrim & Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 853, 854 (1931); 
O’Meard v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 101 (1928), rev’d on other grounds, 34 F.2d 390 
(10th Cir. 1929). 
60 Dana Latham, Jurisdiction of the United States Board of Tax Appeals Under the 
Revenue Act of 1926, 15 CAL. L. REV. 199, 210 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Latham]; 
Willis W. Ritter, Jurisdiction of The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 133 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ritter].  In Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 
B.T.A. 1040 (1928), the Board of Tax Appeals described the “determination” 
requirement in the following terms: 
[T]he statute clearly contemplates that before notifying the taxpayer of a 
deficiency and hence before the Board can be concerned, a determination 
must be made by the Commissioner.  This must mean a thoughtful and 
considered determination that the United States is entitled to an amount not 
yet paid.  If the notice of deficiency were other than the expression of a bona 
fide official determination, and were, say, a mere formal demand or an 
arbitrary amount as to which there were substantial doubt, the Board might 
easily become merely an expensive tribunal to determine moot questions 
and a burden might be imposed on taxpayers of litigating issues and 
disproving allegations for which there had never been any substantial 
foundation.  
Id. at 1159–60 (quoted in Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 
1987)).   
61 Latham, supra note 60, at 210; Ritter, supra note 60, at 137.   
62 Terminal Wine Co., 1 B.T.A. 697 (1935). 
63 Mohawk Glove Corp., 2 B.T.A. 1247 (1925); Fidelity Ins. Agency, 1 B.T.A. 86 
(1924). 
64 Terminal Wine Co., 1 B.T.A. 697 (1925). 
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letter that merely advises the taxpayer of the right to appeal.65 A 
determination of a deficiency can be made even if no return for the 
disputed tax is filed.66  In accordance with the general rule of Tax Court 
practice, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner has 
determined a deficiency and that the court has jurisdiction.67 
For a considerable period of time, the jurisdictional requirement that the 
Commissioner “determine” a deficiency appeared to have been subsumed 
into the requirement that the Commissioner notify the taxpayer of the 
asserted deficiency.  This unified approach was aided in large part by the 
Tax Court’s explanation in Greenberg’s Express v. Commissioner68 that, as a 
general rule, it would not “look behind a deficiency notice to examine the 
evidence used or the propriety of the [Commissioner’s] motives or of the 
administrative policy or procedure involved in making his 
determinations.”69  However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals breathed 
new life into the determination requirement through its 1987 decision in 
Scar v. Commissioner.70  The Service in Scar sent the taxpayers a notice of 
deficiency that provided the taxpayers’ names and address, the taxable year 
at issue, and the amount of the asserted deficiency.  In addition, the Service 
attached an explanation of the proposed changes to the notice that 
identified a tax shelter transaction different from the shelter transaction in 
which the taxpayers had actually participated (with the mistake apparently 
resulting from an administrative coding error).71  On these facts, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the court-reviewed opinion of the Tax Court below 
upholding the validity of the notice.72  Explaining that the determination 
requirement has “substantive content,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the Commissioner’s mistaken basis for the deficiency identified in the 
statutory notice precluded the requisite determination, which in turn 
negated the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.73   
                                                     
65 Rateau, Battu, Smoot Co., 1 B.T.A. 354 (1925) (A letter informed the taxpayer 
of a decision of the Commissioner, not specifically a deficiency determination, and 
mistakenly advised the taxpayer of the right to appeal.). 
66 Hartman v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 542 (1975); Muncaster v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1976-17, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 61.  
67 Page v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 733, 734 (8th Cir. 1962). 
68 62 T.C. 324 (1974). 
69 Id. at 327–28. The Tax Court recognized an exception to not looking behind 
the notice of deficiency in situations in which there existed “substantial evidence of 
unconstitutional conduct” on the Government’s part.  Id. at 328.  However, even in 
such instances, the notice of deficiency would not be rendered invalid; rather, the 
appropriate remedy would entail a shifting of the burden of proof.  See id. at 330. 
70 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).   
71 Id. at 1364–65.   
72 See Scar v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 855 (1983). 
73 Scar, 814 F.2d 1369–70.   
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Not long after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Scar, the Tax 
Court interpreted the decision as applying only in instances in which the 
notice of deficiency on its face contained evidence that the Commissioner 
failed to make a determination of a deficiency with respect to the taxpayer.74  
The Ninth Circuit subsequently endorsed this circumscribed interpretation 
of Scar.75  Hence, the emphasis on the determination requirement in Scar 
may be misleading, as the instances in which the notice of deficiency belies 
a determination with respect to the taxpayer presumably will be few and far 
between.  Nonetheless, taxpayers have not been deterred from frequently 
invoking the Scar decision as a basis for contending that a notice of 
deficiency is invalid.76             
 
b. Deficiency Notice 
 
Once the Commissioner determines a deficiency, the Code authorizes 
the Commissioner to send a notice thereof to the taxpayer by either 
certified or registered mail.77  The notice advises the taxpayer that the 
Commissioner intends to assess a deficiency against the taxpayer and 
provides an opportunity to have the determination reviewed by the Tax 
Court before assessment.78  The notice of deficiency, frequently referred to 
as a “90-day letter,” derives its popular name from two distinct attributes.  
First, the taxpayer is allowed 90 days (unless the notice is addressed to a 
taxpayer outside the United States)79 after the notice is mailed to file a 
petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiency.80  
Second, the Commissioner’s power to assess and collect an asserted tax 
deficiency is suspended for the 90-day period or, if the taxpayer files suit, 
until a final decision of the court with respect to the deficiency.81  Thus, in 
                                                     
74 See Campbell v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 110, 113 (1988). 
75 Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing the Tax 
Court’s opinion in Campbell for the proposition that “[o]nly where the notice of 
deficiency reveals on its face that the Commissioner failed to make a determination 
is the Commissioner required to prove that he did in fact make a determination”).   
76 See, e.g., Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993); Cross v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-344, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 750; Freedman v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-155, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 43.   
77 I.R.C. § 6212(a). 
78 Bauer v. Foley, 404 F.2d 1215, 1220 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on other grounds, 
408 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 240 (6th Cir. 
1951). 
79 In this situation the period is 150 days.  I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff’d, 424 
U.S. 614 (1976); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 26 (1926). But see I.R.C. § 7485(a). 
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general, the Commissioner cannot assess or collect a deficiency without first 
issuing a notice of deficiency.82 
The statute does not describe the notice of deficiency in detail.  This 
vagueness has fostered litigation regarding the scope, form and content of 
the notice, the address to which it must be mailed, and whether, to be valid, 
the notice must be received by the taxpayer.  With respect to the scope of 
the notice, one problem that has arisen involves the combination in a single 
notice of an over-assessment and a deficiency.  Since enactment of the 
Revenue Act of 1926, it has been clear that each taxable year is independent 
so far as jurisdiction of the Tax Court is concerned.83  Therefore, if the 
Commissioner determines in a single notice a deficiency for one year and an 
over-assessment of tax for another year, there is no offsetting of one 
amount against the other, and the court has jurisdiction over the year for 
which a deficiency is determined.84  The problem is more complicated if a 
notice of deficiency contains, for the same year, both an over-assessment 
with respect to one tax and a deficiency with respect to another.  In this 
situation, determinations with respect to separate taxes of the same type 
generally are offset and Tax Court jurisdiction is available only if a net 
deficiency exists.  In this regard, all income taxes are considered to be of the 
same type and therefore subject to netting.  For example, in one case 
involving the Revenue Act of 1936, a deficiency of normal corporate tax 
and an over-assessment of undistributed profits tax resulted in a net over-
assessment.  Consequently, the Board had no deficiency jurisdiction with 
respect to either tax.85  Similarly, under the 1939 Code, an over-assessment 
in income tax was netted against additions to tax determined as a result of 
nonpayment, because both taxes were imposed under the income tax 
chapter.86  A net over-assessment resulted and Tax Court jurisdiction was 
denied.87 
                                                     
82 I.R.C. § 6213(a).  The general rule does not, however, apply to jeopardy and 
termination assessments.  I.R.C. §§ 6851(b), 6861(b); see infra notes 339–540 and 
accompanying text. 
83 Cornelius Cotton Mills, 4 B.T.A. 255 (1926). 
84 Id. 
85 Union Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 152 (1940). 
86 Myers v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 12 (1957). 
87 Organizational changes in the 1954 Code removed the additions to tax 
provision from the income tax subtitle.  However, a statutory provision required 
continuation of this netting procedure with respect to a tax subject to deficiency 
procedures. See I.R.C. § 6659 (prior to repeal in 1989); Granquist v. Hackleman, 
264 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1959) (interpreting former I.R.C. § 6659).  Section 6665 
currently addresses this issue by providing that additions to tax, additional amounts, 
and penalties imposed by Chapter 68 of the Internal Revenue Code generally shall 
be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes.   
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 On the other hand, taxes of different types are treated independently, 
and each may be the subject of Tax Court deficiency jurisdiction.  For 
example, the Revenue Act of 1934 subjected both income tax and excess 
profits tax to Board deficiency jurisdiction;88 yet, because these two taxes 
were imposed by different titles of the Revenue Act, they were treated 
separately for jurisdictional purposes.  A single deficiency notice containing 
both a deficiency determination with respect to one and an over-assessment 
with respect to the other entitled the taxpayer to deficiency jurisdiction over 
the one tax for which a deficiency had been determined regardless of the 
net determination.89 
 
(1)   Content of Notice 
 
Because the statute provides no particular form for the deficiency 
notice,90 a second type of dispute has arisen involving the adequacy of a 
communication from the Service as a basis for the filing of a petition.  The 
Commissioner occasionally seeks dismissal of a case on the ground that the 
letter sent to the taxpayer was not a deficiency notice and consequently the 
taxpayer was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court.91  
However, cases questioning the sufficiency of a notice do not always 
involve attacks by the Commissioner on the notice.  In early years, the 
Board itself occasionally raised the issue and dismissed a case for lack of 
jurisdiction.92  In other cases, the taxpayer in effect challenges his right to 
file a petition with the court.  He may have any one of several motives.  
These include a desire to invalidate the determination thereby avoiding an 
                                                     
88 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 272, 702(b), 48 Stat. 741, 771. 
89 Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1295 (1950), rev’d on other grounds, 189 
F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951); Will County Title Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1396 
(1938). 
90 I.R.C. § 6212(a). 
91 Lerer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 358 (1969) (granting the Commissioner’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that a “Form 7900” letter 
sent by ordinary mail to a bankrupt was not a deficiency notice); Estate of 
Schmalstig v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 433 (1941) (granting the Commissioner’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the rationale that a letter sent to 
executors of an estate advising that their claim for refund was rejected was not a 
valid deficiency notice).  
92 American Bag Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 774 (1929) (dismissing the 
case on Board initiative on the rationale that a letter was not a statutory deficiency 
notice); F. H. Moyer, 1 B.T.A. 75 (1924) (determining a letter received by the 
taxpayer to be simply the results of a preliminary audit by the collector’s office and 
not a valid deficiency notice). 
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immediate adjudication on the merits,93 an attempt to escape the usual 
burden of proof placed upon the petitioner,94 and, frequently, an attempt to 
negate the tolling of the statute of limitations otherwise occasioned by the 
issuance of a valid notice of deficiency (which, if successful, often will result 
in the expiration of the limitations period for assessing the disputed tax).95 
  Because of the variety of forms the notice may take, its sufficiency 
must be judicially determined on a case-by-case basis from the specific 
language used in the letter.96  To start, the letter need not be in a particular 
form,97 and no mention must be made of the right to appeal.98  In the 
absence of specific statutory requirements, courts were left to define the 
minimum information necessary for a statutory notice of deficiency to be 
valid.  Case law established the following requirements:  the communication 
must identify the taxpayer and the taxable year or years involved, indicate 
that a deficiency has been determined, and specify the amount of the 
deficiency.99     
The minimal requirements of the statutory notice of deficiency often left 
taxpayers without a sufficient understanding of the grounds for the 
Commissioner’s adjustment, and this informational deficit rendered the 
formulation of responsive strategies more difficult.  As early as 1924, the 
suggestion was made that the statute be amended to require the 
Commissioner to set forth in the notice each adjustment and a 
                                                     
93 Brown v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 859, 867 (1930) (rejecting taxpayers’ 
argument that the Commissioner’s notice was not a valid determination because 
not sufficiently definite).   
94 Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 348–49 (1966) (rejecting taxpayer’s 
contention “that the statutory notice of deficiency was so vague and indefinite that 
it did not constitute a determination, and that therefore no burden of proof was 
placed upon” the taxpayer).   
95 See, e.g., Ventura Consol. Oil Fields v. Rogan, 86 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1936) 
(finding that, because the Commissioner’s letter was not a valid deficiency notice, 
the period of limitations had expired and assessment of any deficiencies for the 
period at issue was foreclosed).  
96 Estate of Schmalstig v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 433, 438 (1941). 
97 Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner, 889 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The 
statute does not specify the form or content of the notice.”); Abrams v. 
Commissioner, 787 F.2d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1986); Ventura Consol. Oil Fields, 86 F.2d 
at 153; see also Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937) (providing that 
the purpose of the statutory notice “is only to advise the person who is to pay the 
deficiency that the Commissioner means to assess him; anything that does this 
unequivocally is good enough”). 
98 Ventura Consol. Oil Fields, 86 F.2d at 153. 
99 See Estate of Yaeger, 889 F.2d at 35; Donley v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 383, 
384 (5th Cir. 1986).   
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corresponding rationale.100  Congress finally responded in 1988 by enacting 
the predecessor to § 7522(a).101  This provision, effective for notices issued 
after January 1, 1990, requires the notice of deficiency not only to identify 
the amounts of any tax, interest, additional amounts, additions to tax, and 
penalties alleged to be due, but also to “describe the basis for” such 
adjustments.  The conference report accompanying the legislation indicated 
the perhaps obvious intention of the provision to improve taxpayer 
understanding of the Commissioner’s determinations:  “The conferees 
believe that all correspondence should be sufficiently clear to enable a 
taxpayer to understand an IRS question about a tax return as well as any 
adjustments or penalties applied to a tax return.”102  Although Congress 
directed the Service to be more descriptive in the notice, it failed to supply a 
consequence for the Service’s failure to do so.  Indeed, perhaps anticipating 
routine challenges to the validity of statutory notices on these grounds, 
Congress specifically provided that an inadequate description would not 
operate to render a notice invalid.103  The Tax Court, however, refused to 
interpret the Government’s failure to comply with the § 7522(a) directive as 
being devoid of consequence altogether.  In the court-reviewed opinion of 
Shea v. Commissioner,104 the court held that if the notice of deficiency fails to 
describe the basis for the deficiency determination and the basis for the 
determination requires the admission of additional evidence (that is, 
evidence different than that necessary to resolve the deficiency 
determinations that were adequately described in the notice), the 
Commissioner would bear the burden of proof with respect to the new 
basis.105  The court found the situation sufficiently analogous to the 
Commissioner’s assertion of a new matter not initially raised in the notice 
of deficiency to incorporate the same burden-shifting consequences under 
Tax Court Rule 142(a)(1).106   
                                                     
100 Milton W. Dobrzensky, Practitioners Criticize 30-Day and 90-Day Letters as 
Vague and Non-Specific, 7 J. TAX’N 34 (1957).   
101  See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§ 6233(a), 102 Stat. 3341, 3735.   
102  H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 219 (1988).   
103  See I.R.C. 7522(a) (“An inadequate description .  . . shall not invalidate the 
notice.”).   
104  112 T.C. 183 (1999).  
105  Id. at 197.  The Service issued a nonaquiescence to this aspect of the Shea 
decision.  I.R.S. Action on Decision 2000-08 (Oct. 30, 2000).    
106  See id. at 190–97.  This approach was earlier suggested by Judge Raum in 
Ludwig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-518, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 961.  Raising the 
question of what remained of the Commissioner’s obligation to describe the basis 
for the deficiency determination under § 7522(a) in light of the statutory directive 
that failure to do so would not invalidate the notice, the opinion posited the 
following:  “Perhaps this Court could fashion some sort of remedy for the 
taxpayer, such as imposing the burden of proof, or at least the burden of going 
284           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
Congress most recently addressed the content of the notice of 
deficiency as part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.107  
Concerned with the harsh consequences faced by taxpayers who failed to 
file a petition for redetermination on a timely basis (namely, the Tax Court’s 
absence of jurisdiction that generally foreclosed a pre-payment forum), 108 
Congress directed the Service to assist the taxpayer with the calculation of 
the petition filing deadline.  Specifically, through an uncodified provision in 
the broader legislation, Congress required the Service to specify in the 
notice of deficiency the last day on which the taxpayer could file a timely 
petition with the Tax Court.109  Contemplating the possibility that the 
Service could miscalculate such date, Congress permitted the taxpayer to 
rely on the Service’s calculation.  Through the addition of a fourth sentence 
to § 6213(a), Congress provided that any petition filed by the taxpayer on or 
before the date specified in the notice of deficiency as the last date for 
timely filing would be treated as having been timely filed—even if that date 
otherwise fell outside of the § 6213(a) filing window.110   
Although Congress addressed the consequences of a miscalculation of 
the last date for filing a petition with the Tax Court, it did not address the 
consequences resulting from the Service’s failure to provide any filing date 
on the notice of deficiency as statutorily directed.111  Not surprisingly, the 
Service issued notices of deficiency that simply failed to include the last date 
for timely filing of the petition in the period immediately following the 
                                                                                                                       
forward, on the Government.”  Id. at 963.   However, because the disputed 
adjustment favored the taxpayers, the opinion left the matter open for later 
resolution.   
107  Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).     
108  See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 90 (1998).   
109  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 3463(a), 112 Stat. 685, 767 (1998).   That provision reads as follows: 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary’s 
delegate shall include on each notice of deficiency under section 6212 of the 
Internal Revenue Code 1986 the date determined by such Secretary (or 
delegate) as the last day on which the taxpayer may file a petition with the 
Tax Court. 
110  Id. § 3463(b), 112 Stat. at 767 (amending I.R.C. § 6213(a)).  Note that this 
provision operates only to the benefit of the taxpayer.  If the Service miscalculates 
the last date for filing a petition with the Tax Court by understating the term of the 
filing period, that miscalculation does not serve to shorten the filing period 
prescribed by law.  See Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-200.  
111  On the other hand, Congress did not expressly state that the failure to 
comply with the statutory mandate would not be a basis for invalidating the notice 
of deficiency, as it did under § 7522 with respect to that statute’s requirement that 
the notice of deficiency describe the basis for the deficiency.  See I.R.C. § 7522(a) 
(“An inadequate description under the preceding sentence shall not invalidate such 
notice.”).   
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effective date of the 1998 legislation.  Taxpayers attempted to seize upon 
this defect as grounds for invalidating the notice, but to no avail.  In the 
first such case, Smith v. Commissioner,112 the taxpayers filed their petition 
within the 90-day period provided by § 6213(a) (as generally described in 
the notice of deficiency) notwithstanding the Service’s failure to provide the 
last possible filing date in the original notice. 113  The Tax Court rejected the 
taxpayers’ contention that failure of the notice to include the filing date 
rendered the notice invalid under these circumstances, citing the absence of 
prejudice to the taxpayers.114   
 The holding of the Smith case left open the question of whether the 
Service’s failure to provide the last date for filing a Tax Court petition could 
render a notice invalid where the taxpayer’s petition was not timely filed.  
The Tax Court addressed this more difficult scenario through a reviewed 
decision in Rochelle v. Commissioner.115  The taxpayer in Rochelle filed his 
petition 56 days after expiration of the 90-day period provided by § 6213(a).  
In resolving the taxpayer’s first contention that the Service’s failure to 
provide the filing date rendered the notice invalid, the court stressed that 
Congress sought to address the severe consequences resulting from a 
taxpayer’s miscalculation of the 90-day filing period when it required the 
Service to include such date in the notice.116  Because the taxpayer did not 
contend that the filing of his petition over 50 days after the expiration of 
the 90-day filing period resulted from a miscalculation thereof, the court 
determined that the statutory directive provided in the 1998 legislation did 
not require invalidating the notice under those circumstances.     
The taxpayer in Rochelle alternatively argued that the amendment to 
§ 6213(a)—treating as timely any petition filed on or before the date 
specified by the Service in the notice of deficiency—operated to excuse his 
late filing.  Under the taxpayer’s theory, the failure of the notice to specify 
the last date for filing a petition with the Tax Court would render any 
petition timely, regardless of when filed.  The court rejected this alternative 
argument on both textual and policy grounds.  As a textual matter, the 
                                                     
112  114 T.C. 489 (2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2001). 
113  Although the original notice of deficiency left the date for filing the Tax 
Court petition blank, the Service subsequently issued a notice to the taxpayers 
providing the filing date approximately one month before expiration of the filing 
period.  Id. at 490. 
114  Id. at 491–92; see also Smith v. Commissioner, 275 F.3d 912, 915 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (stating that even in the absence of a petition date, “the relevant inquiry 
is whether the error prejudiced the taxpayer.”); Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d 
1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (similarly refusing to invalidate a notice of deficiency that 
failed to include the last date for filing a petition on grounds that the taxpayer, who 
filed a timely petition, suffered no prejudice).      
115  116 T.C. 356 (2001), aff’d, 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2002).   
116  Id. at 360–61.  
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remedial amendment to § 6213(a) requires the actual specification of a filing 
date with which the taxpayer complied, and the notice contained no such 
date.117  As a matter of policy, the amendment to § 6213(a) was intended to 
protect taxpayers who detrimentally relied on misinformation provided by 
the Service.  Because the Service simply failed to provide the date for filing 
the petition (as opposed to supplying an incorrect date), no prospect of 
detrimental reliance existed.118  Having found the last sentence of § 6213(a) 
inapposite, the court dismissed the case for want of a timely filed petition.   
The Service in Rochelle ultimately suffered no consequence from failing 
to comply with its statutory obligation to calculate the last date for filing the 
petition for redetermination.  While this result may seem less than 
satisfactory, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision by adopting the opinion 
of the Tax Court majority below.119  Nonetheless, because both the trial 
level and appellate opinions stressed the length of the taxpayer’s 
delinquency in filing the petition, these decisions do not necessarily 
foreclose a taxpayer who genuinely miscalculates the last date of the filing 
period in the absence of the statutorily required guidance from obtaining 
some measure of relief. 120  
Also as part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress 
amended § 6212(a) to require the notice of deficiency to inform the 
taxpayer of the taxpayer’s right to contact a local office of the taxpayer 
advocate and to provide the location and phone number of such office.121  
As in the case of the required provision of the last date for timely filing a 
Tax Court petition, the statute does not address the consequence of the 
notice not containing the requisite information concerning the taxpayer 
advocate.  Hence, the Tax Court was left once again to address a taxpayer’s 
argument that failure to provide statutorily required information rendered 
the notice invalid.  In John C. Hom & Associates, Inc.,122 the notice of 
deficiency at issue contained the requisite notice of the taxpayer’s right to 
contact the local office of the taxpayer advocate.  However, in lieu of 
providing the location and phone number of such office, the notice of 
deficiency instead directed the taxpayer to a website where such 
information could be obtained.  On these facts, the taxpayer contended that 
the notice of deficiency was statutorily deficient.  The Tax Court disagreed.  
                                                     
117  Id. at 362.    
118  Id. at 363.    
119  Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2002).   
120 See, e.g., Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 360–61 (Chabot, J., 
dissenting) (“All this leaves for another day the question of what to do with the 
case of a late filing pro se lay petitioner, who might be suffering from cognitive 
deficit, dyscalculia, or other disability.”).   
121 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 1102(b), 112 Stat. 685, 703 (1998).   
122  140 T.C. 210 (2013).   
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In addition to stressing the “minor and technical” nature of the error at 
issue,123 the court emphasized the absence of prejudice to the taxpayer.124 
 
(2)  Mailing of Notice 
 
Another area of controversy concerns the mailing of the notice of 
deficiency.  The purpose of the mailing requirement is to prescribe a 
procedure that will ordinarily result in the taxpayer’s timely receipt of the 
notice.  Nonetheless, the language of the statute sometimes precludes 
disputes from being resolved in accord with this purpose. 
Since 1958, the Code has authorized the notice to be mailed to the 
taxpayer’s last known address by either registered or certified mai1.125  Prior 
thereto, the only authorized method was by registered mail.  The Tax Court 
considered registered mail a jurisdictional necessity and held letters invalid 
that were sent by unregistered mail or delivered manually.126  This view, 
however, was not accepted by all the courts of appeals.127 
The last known address has been interpreted to mean the last address 
known to the Treasury128—that is, the address that the Service reasonably 
believes the taxpayer wishes it to use.129  Ordinarily, the last known address 
is that shown on the taxpayer’s return, even if it is erroneous, if the Service 
has not been informed by the taxpayer in writing of another permanent 
address or a temporary address of a definite duration to which all 
communications should be sent.130 
                                                     
123  Id. at 214.  
124 The taxpayer never alleged that he attempted to contact the taxpayer 
advocate, and the court determined that he easily could have obtained the 
appropriate contact information through the website link.  Id. at 215.   
125 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 89(b), 72 Stat. 
1665 (amending I.R.C. § 6212(b)).  
126 Hamilton v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 747, 749 (1949); Roger J. Williams, 13 
T.C. 257, 258–59 (1949); John A. Gebelein, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 605, 
606 (1938); Day v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 161, 163 (1928). 
127 Berger v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 668, 673 (3d Cir. 1968); Cohn v. United 
States, 297 F.2d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 1962); Boren v. Riddell, 241 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 
1957). 
128 Berafeld v. Campbell, 188 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Tex. 1959), aff’d, 290 F.2d 
475 (5th Cir. 1961). 
129 Sorrentino v. Ross, 425 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1970); Butler v. District 
Director, 409 F. Supp. 853, 856 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Kennedy v. United States, 403 
F. Supp. 619, 623 (W.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d mem., 556 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1977). 
130 In Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019 (1988), the Tax Court held that “a 
taxpayer’s last known address is that address which appears on the taxpayer’s most 
recently filed return, unless [the Commissioner] has been given clear and concise 
notification of a different address.”  Id. at 1035; see also Delman v. Commissioner, 
384 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir. 1967); De Welles v. United States, 378 F.2d 37, 40 (9th 
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In most cases, the concept of last known address is construed strictly 
against the taxpayer.  Thus, a properly addressed 90-day letter sent by 
registered or certified mail is valid even though never received or returned 
unclaimed.131  In this regard, it is important to note that there is no 
statutory requirement that the notice actually be received by the taxpayer.132  
Conversely, an improperly addressed notice that never reaches the taxpayer 
or is not timely received is clearly invalid.133  However, a deficiency notice 
that is actually received by the taxpayer without prejudicial delay generally 
will be valid even though the address used by the Service was not exactly 
the last known address.134  Thus, 90-day letters that were actually received 
by taxpayers have been held valid despite the fact that they were mailed to 
the wrong house number or wrong street address, or were sent without 
specific authorization to the taxpayer’s attorney instead of to the taxpayer’s 
                                                                                                                       
Cir. 1967); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 102, 106 (1971), aff’d, 527 F.2d 
754 (9th Cir. 1975); McCormick v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 138, 141–42 (1970).  
Revenue Procedure 2010-16, 2010-19 I.R.B. 664, provides guidance on how the 
Service determines a taxpayer’s last known address and what notices are sufficient 
to change it.  As a general rule, the Service determines the taxpayer’s last known 
address by reference to the address reflected on the most recently filed and 
properly processed return.  Rev. Proc. 2010-16, § 2.02.  A taxpayer may change 
this address by providing “clear and concise notification of a different address,” see 
id., and the Service has promulgated Form 8822 for this purpose.    
131 Pfeffer v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1959); Cataldo v. 
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 524 (1973), aff’d per curiam, 490 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 
1974); Helfrich v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 404 (1955). 
132 I.R.C. § 6212; Bauer v. Foley, 287 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other 
grounds, 404 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir. 1968), opinion supplemented, 408 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 
1969). 
133 Kennedy v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d mem., 
556 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1977); O’Brien v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 543, 549–50 
(1974); Wilson v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1280, 1288 (1929); Walter G. Morgan, 
5 B.T.A. 1035, 1038 (1927). 
134 See Patmon & Young Prof’l Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216, 217 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Borgman v. Commissioner, 888 F.2d 916, 917 (1st Cir. 1989); Pugsley v. 
Commissioner, 749 F.2d 691, 692–93 (11th Cir. 1985); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 
527 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1975); Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 241 (6th 
Cir. 1951); Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 818, 823 (1973). In these instances, 
courts are divided on whether the 90-day period for filing a petition for 
redetermination with the Tax Court commences with the mailing of the notice of 
deficiency or the date on which the taxpayer obtains actual notice of the deficiency 
determination.  See, e.g., Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1967) 
(determining that the period for filing a petition runs from the time of the date of 
mailing); Gaw v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that the 
period for filing a petition runs from the date taxpayer receives actual notice of the 
determination); see also Terrell v. Commissioner, 625 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(describing the circuit split on this issue).   
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last known address.135  In this regard, it also should be noted that other 
types of errors that do not result in prejudice to the taxpayer do not 
generally result in invalidating the notice.  Thus, taxpayers have lost 
challenges to 90-day letters based on an incorrect spelling of the taxpayer’s 
name and on an issuance of the notice by an Internal Revenue Service 
official other than the appropriate district director.136 
 
(3)  Rescission of Notice 
 
Once a notice of deficiency has been issued, the Service may rescind the 
notice with the consent of the taxpayer.137  A formal rescission is required 
for this purpose, meaning that the mutual consent of the parties to the 
rescission must be objectively apparent.138  Further consideration of the 
taxpayer’s case, coupled with the Commissioner’s concession of a portion 
of the previously determined deficiency, is not sufficient to effect a 
rescission.139   
As a general matter, a rescinded notice of deficiency is treated as a 
nullity by way of § 6212(d).  A taxpayer may not petition the Tax Court for 
a redetermination based on a rescinded notice; a rescinded notice does not 
implicate the limitations regarding credits, refunds, and assessments 
provided by §§ 6213(a) and 6512(a); and a rescinded notice does not 
implicate the restrictions on the issuance of a subsequent notice under 
§ 6212(c)(1).  However, a rescinded notice of deficiency maintains 
significance in one important respect:  The running of the period of 
limitations on assessment is suspended under § 6503 for the period during 
                                                     
135 Whitmer v. Lucas, 53 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1931), vacated per curiam, 285 U.S. 
529 (1932) (notice of deficiency addressed to incorrect house number but actually 
delivered to correct address); Brzezinski v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 192 (1954) 
(notice of deficiency sent by registered mail to taxpayers in care of their attorney). 
136 Wessel v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 273 (1975); Pendola v. Commissioner, 50 
T.C. 509 (1968); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382 (1965), aff’d, 373 F.2d 
45 (10th Cir. 1967). 
137  See I.R.C. § 6212(d) (applicable to notices issued after December 31, 1986). 
The Service announced its procedures for rescinding a notice of deficiency and the 
instances in which it will do so in Revenue Procedure 98-54, 1998-2 C.B. 531.        
138  See Powell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-108, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994; 
Hesse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-333, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 180; Slattery v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-274, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2953.   Parties generally 
reflect their mutual consent to the rescission of a notice of deficiency through the 
use of Form 8626, captioned “Agreement to Rescind Notice of Deficiency.”          
139  See Hesse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-333, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 180; 
Powell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-108, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994; Mullings 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-114, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2186.        
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which the rescinded notice was outstanding.140  Congress inserted this 
express directive into § 6212(d) in 1988,141 providing the following 
example in the legislative record: 
 
[A]ssume that six months remain to run on the statute of limitations 
with respect to a return when the IRS issues a statutory notice of 
deficiency. Issuance of this notice suspends the statute of limitations. 
If the IRS and the taxpayer agree to rescind the statutory notice, then 
as of the date the notice is rescinded, the statute of limitations again 
begins to run and (in this example) six months remain until the 
statute expires.142 
 
Accordingly, a rescinded notice of deficiency will not operate to the 




Timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer is the third procedural 
requisite of deficiency jurisdiction.143  Evaluating this requirement 
necessitates the determination of the following four important factors: (1) 
the date that commences the filing period; (2) the date that terminates the 
filing period; (3) whether the document is filed within the applicable period; 
and (4) whether the document filed is adequate as a petition to initiate the 
appeal.  Little controversy has surrounded determination of the date that 
commences the filing period.  Since 1924, the statute has expressed this 
date with reference to the date that the notice is mailed.144  Utilization of 
the word “received” in place of “mailed” was considered initially but was 
rejected on the ground that it would have created a situation in which the 
Bureau would be compelled to prove that the addressee actually received 
the deficiency notice.145  The definition of the word mailed was settled by 
the Board in 1925 by reference to the dictionary meaning; accordingly, the 
                                                     
140  I.R.C. § 6212(d) (“Nothing in this subsection shall affect any suspension of 
the running of any period of limitations during any period during which the 
rescinded notice was outstanding.”). 
141  Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§ 1015(m), 102 Stat. 3342, 3572 (1988), 1988-3 C.B. 1, 232.       
142  H.R. REP. NO. 100-795, at 364–65 (1988).   
143 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
144 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297 (now I.R.C. § 6213(a)). 
145 65 CONG. REC. 2969 (1924). Today it is established that mailing of the 
notice can be proved using evidence of standard mailing procedure combined 
with evidence that such procedure was followed in the situation at issue.  Cataldo 
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 524 (1973).  
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filing period commences on the actual date of mailing and not the postmark 
that the letter bears.146 
Identification of the termination of the filing period has been more 
controversial.  Under the 1924 Revenue Act, the filing period expired 60 
days after the mailing of the deficiency notice.147 Almost immediately, cases 
arose that tested the Board’s willingness to liberally construe the statute.  
Taxpayers argued that if the sixtieth day fell on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal 
holiday, then the period should be extended to compensate for the 
contraction of the filing period.148  The statute, however, did not expressly 
extend the filing period in such an event, and the Board strictly construed 
the statute to preclude such a result.149  The harshness of these holdings was 
called to the attention of Congress, and the Revenue Act of 1926 provided 
for a one-day extension if the filing period terminated on a Sunday.150  
Eight years later, at the urging of the American Bar Association,151 
Congress granted a similar one-day extension in the case of legal holidays.152  
Additionally, the basic filing period was expanded to 90 days.153  The extra 
30 days was considered necessary to accommodate taxpayers who resided 
long distances from Washington.  Moreover, Congress hoped that the 
longer period would reduce the number of litigated cases, as the parties 
                                                     
146 United Tel. Co., 1 B.T.A. 450, 451 (1925). 
147 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 237, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297; see also United Tel. 
Co., 1 B.T.A. 450, 452 (1925); CHARLES D. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE 
BEFORE THE U.S. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 86 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 
HAMEL]; Willis W. Ritter, Pitfalls in Practice Before the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L 
INC. MAG. 297, 298 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ritter]. 
148 E.g., Southern Cal. Loan Ass’n, 4 B.T.A. 223, 226 (1926); Sam Satousky, 1 
B.T.A. 22, 24 (1924). 
149 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297; Southern Cal. Loan 
Ass’n, 4 B.T.A. 223, 226 (1926); Sam Satousky, 1 B.T.A. 22, 24 (1924). 
150 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 55; Hearings on Revenue 
Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 
(1925) (statement of the New York Society of C.P.A.’s).  The Senate favored 
excluding Sundays and legal holidays completely from the computation of the 
filing period, but this proposal was rejected.  See H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 39 
(1925). 
151 A.B.A. Federal Tax Recommendations, 11 TAXES 340, 343 (1933). 
152 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 501, 48 Stat. 755.  To extend the statutory 
period, the legal holiday had to be a legal holiday in the District of Columbia.  The 
current list of such holidays includes the following:  New Year’s Day, Birthday of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inauguration Day, Washington’s Birthday, District of 
Columbia Emancipation Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, 
Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. See TAX 
CT. R. 25(b). 
153 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 501, 48 Stat. 755. 
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would have more time to reconcile their differences.154  The 90-day period 
remained intact until 1942, when Congress extended the period to 150 days 
if the deficiency notice was addressed to a taxpayer located outside the 
United States.155  The exigencies of World War II, especially with respect to 
taxpayers in Hawaii, supplied the rationale for the 60-day extension, which 
was deemed necessary to afford all taxpayers an equivalent opportunity to 
invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.156  In 1945, Congress once again 
liberalized the filing period by providing an extension if the filing period 
                                                     
154 H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 34 (1933). 
155 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 168, 56 Stat. 876.  The Tax Court initially 
gave a very limited interpretation of the phrase, “[i]f the notice is addressed to a 
person outside the States of the Union,” by holding that the 150-day filing period 
would only apply to individuals “who were so outside the area designated on some 
settled business and residential basis, and not on a temporary basis.”  Hamilton v. 
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 747, 753 (1949).  The Second Circuit, in Mindell v. 
Commissioner, 200 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1952), disagreed with the Tax Court and 
held that temporary absence outside the designated area was sufficient to obtain 
the benefit of the extended filing period.  Subsequently, the Tax Court, in Estate of 
Krueger v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 667, 668 (1960), modified its earlier holding in 
Hamilton and followed the approach of the Second Circuit.  See generally Jim R. 
Carrigan, Tax Crimes–Statute of Limitations–Tolling Provision, 11 TAX L. REV. 137, 148 
(1956). 
156 See S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 154 (1941); Letter from E.R. Cameron to 
Board of Tax Appeals, Aug. 3, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Jurisdiction: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Letter from Presiding Judge Murdock to 
Randolph Paul, Aug. 18, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Jurisdiction: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Letter from Presiding Judge Murdock to Colin 
Stam, Aug. 18, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Jurisdiction: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.”  Now that Hawaii and Alaska are states, taxpayers there are no 
longer allowed the extra 60 days as previously allowed under Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6213-1(a)(1) (1959). 
The Revenue Act of 1942 also provided relief for Americans who were 
involved in the war effort, by providing a continuous extension of the filing 
period for persons outside the Americas. They were given 90 days from the date 
when they were no longer considered to be continuously outside the Americas to 
file a petition.  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 507(a), 56 Stat. 961. See S. REP. 
NO. 77-1631, at 252 (1941); see also Report of the Special Comm. on Taxpayers 
Affected by Enemy Activities, ABA TAXATION SECTION 79, 80 (1942).  Prior to 
passage of the Revenue Act of 1942, the Board of Tax Appeals had been 
considering numerous proposals for preserving the rights of these taxpayers to file 
a petition.  See Memorandum from Bolon B. Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, to 
the Rules Comm., c. 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, 1942]; Memorandum from Bolon 
B. Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, to the Rules Comm., Dec. 15, 1942, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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terminated on a Saturday.157  The Board’s hesitancy to extend, without 
specific statutory authorization, the filing period when the last day fell on a 
weekend or holiday was mirrored by its reluctance to treat the timely 
mailing of a petition as the equivalent of timely filing.  In this regard, the 
Board soon adopted a rule requiring that a petition actually be received 
during business hours on or before the final day of the filing period to be 
considered timely.158  As a result, petitions not actually received within the 
jurisdictional period would be dismissed even though the taxpayer could 
show that they had been mailed in adequate time to reach the Board within 
the prescribed period.159  The harsh results in these cases occasionally led 
appellate courts to reverse dismissals for lack of jurisdiction.  These 
reversals generally were based on a presumption that petitions timely mailed 
were received by the addressee in the ordinary course of the mail.160  This 
presumption enabled the appellate courts to examine the reason for the 
untimely receipt of the petition.  If the untimely receipt could be attributed 
to the employees of either the Board/Tax Court or the Postal Service, then 
the appellate courts were more willing to find a timely filing.  In the few 
cases that held the Board/Tax Court had improperly dismissed the petition, 
the usual explanations of the result were either that the negligence of 
governmental employees could not deprive taxpayers of their right to file a 
petition,161 or that there was a constructive filing because the governmental 
employees were acting as agents of the Board/Tax Court.162 
The relief afforded by the appellate decisions was sporadic, and petitions 
generally would be considered filed only on receipt.  This result was 
criticized on policy grounds as creating risks that were beyond taxpayers’ 
control and as discriminating against those located long distances from 
Washington.163  Accordingly, recommendations that Congress provide a 
                                                     
157 Act of Dec. 29, 1945, ch. 652, § 203, 59 Stat. 673. 
158 B.T.A. RULES 5–6 (July, 1924 ed.).  See DiProspero v. Commissioner, 176 
F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir. 1949); Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23 F.2d 972, 974 
(D.C. Cir. 1927); Estate of Stebbins v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 613, 615 (1939), 
aff’d, 121 F.2d 892 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Sam Satousky, 1 B.T.A. 22, 23 (1924). 
159 Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 
1937); Poyner v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1936); Chambers v. 
Lucas, 41 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Estate of Stebbins v. Commissioner, 40 
B.T.A. 613, 615 (1939), aff’d, 121 F.2d 892 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
160 Detroit Automotive Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 
1953); Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1952); 
Arkansas Motor Coaches v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1952). 
161 Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 902, 904–05 (6th Cir. 1952); 
Arkansas Motor Coaches v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1952); see 
also Palcar Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 210, 213 (8th Cir. 1942). 
162 McCord v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
163 Tobias Weiss, When is a Petition “Filed” in the Tax Court?, 8 TAX L. REV. 473 
(1953). 
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uniform filing event that would eliminate the hazards of the mail were 
advanced.164  Congress responded in 1954 by declaring that the United 
States postmark date stamped on the cover of the mailing envelope would 
be deemed the date of filing if the petition was received at the Tax Court 
subsequent to the statutory period.165  Four years later Congress refined the 
procedure to provide relief in two other situations.166  If the petition was 
lost in the mail, registration or certification was deemed prima facie 
evidence of delivery.167  If the envelope did not contain a postmark, the 
date of registration or certification was deemed the postmark date.168   
Congress has since modernized these provisions.  In 1996, Congress 
directed that certain private delivery services shall be treated in the same 
manner as United States mail, with the date recorded or marked by the 
private delivery service being treated as a postmark by the United States 
Postal Service.169  Additionally, Congress authorized the Treasury to treat 
delivery by private service carriers as equivalent to mailing by registered or 
certified mail.170      
The strict approach of the Board/Tax Court to the question of when 
the petition must be filed has not generally carried over into the area of 
what constitutes a petition.  The policy in the latter situation has been to 
accept “almost any type of paper indicating a protest of or dissatisfaction 
with the respondent’s determination that a deficiency is due.”171  In cases in 
which a petition is jurisdictionally adequate but otherwise defective, the 
court generally issues an order to show cause directing the taxpayer to cure 
the defects, usually within 60 days.172  In the absence of such an order, an 
                                                     
164 Id.  The American Bar Association formally recommended that Congress 
amend the statute to provide that timely mailing by registered mail is equivalent to 
timely filing. Report of the Comm. on Tax Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION 
SECTION 80 (1951).  The ABA defended the proposal by claiming that because the 
deficiency notice was sent by registered mail, the law should permit the taxpayer 
to file a petition in the same manner.  Id. 
165 I.R.C. § 7502.  In Cespedes v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 214 (1959), the Tax 
Court held that a foreign postmark would not satisfy the statutory standard. 
166 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 89, 72 Stat. 
1665 (amending I.R.C. § 7502(c)). 
167  I.R.C. § 7502(c)(1)(A). 
168  I.R.C. § 7502(c)(1)(B). 
169  I.R.C. § 7502(f)(1) (added by Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-
168, § 1210, 110 Stat. 1452, 1474 (1996)).   
170  I.R.C. § 7502(f)(3) (added by Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-
168, § 1210, 110 Stat. 1452, 1474 (1996)).   
171 Turner, 1942, supra note 156, at 4.  See generally HAMEL, supra note 147, at 
91; Ritter, supra note 147, at 297.  
172 Carstenson v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 542 (1972); Howard P. Locke, 
Motions and Certain Other Procedures in the Tax Court of the United States, 41 TAXES 391, 
400–01 (1963).  Board policy in this regard was expressed as follows: “after 
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amended petition may be filed as a matter of course any time prior to the 
filing of the Commissioner’s answer.173  After the answer is filed, however, 
the taxpayer must obtain either the Commissioner’s consent or leave of the 
court to file an amended petition.174 
The policy of accepting defective petitions for jurisdictional purposes 
proved troublesome in two areas.  In several cases the amended petition 
raised issues that were not included in the original petition.175  Few 
difficulties arose in this connection if the amended petition was filed within 
the original filing period.176 The question was more difficult if the amended 
petition was filed subsequent to the termination of the filing period.177  The 
Board/Tax Court accepted jurisdiction over these amended petitions on the 
theory that the filing date of the amended petition related back to the filing 
date of the original petition.178  However, if the amended petition contained 
                                                                                                                       
advising the taxpayer or his counsel of the requirement as to form of a proper 
petition, [the Board] has permitted the perfection of the petition long after the 
expiration of the statutory period on which jurisdiction is based.”  Turner, 1942, 
supra note 156. 
In the Board’s early years, petitions were divided into separate categories for 
administrative purposes.  Imperfect timely petitions were duly docketed, and the 
taxpayer was given an opportunity to perfect.  When an imperfect and untimely 
petition was received, there was no “hard and fast rule” to be followed, but the 
policy was to docket all questionable appeals and let the jurisdictional issue be 
raised by motion.  If an otherwise proper petition was addressed to the 
Commissioner rather than the Board, and subsequently was delivered untimely to 
the Board by the Commissioner, it was sent back to the Service “because the 
burden of explaining to the taxpayer why papers may not have been filed on time 
ought to be carried by the Commissioner and not the Board.”  Finally, proper 
petitions were docketed and filed.  Memorandum from Chairman Hamel to Mrs. 
Howard, Jan. 22, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
173 Compare B.T.A. RULE 17 (Jan. 1, 1935 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 41(a) (July 6, 
2012 ed.); see also Kruegar Broughton Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 
1270 (1930); Peruna Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1180 (1928). 
174 Compare B.T.A. RULE 17 (Jan 1, 1935 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 41(a) (July 6, 
2012 ed.). 
175 E.g., Citizens Mut. Inv. Ass’n v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 48 (1942); 
Thompson v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 57, 60–61 (1928); Wald v. Commissioner, 
8 B.T.A. 1003, 1005 (1927). 
176  If the amended petition was filed within the original filing period, any 
issues raised in the amended petition were timely. 
177 E.g., Fletcher Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 35, 39–41 (1975); 
Estate of Archer v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 228 (1942).  
178 See Fletcher Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 35, 39–41 (1975); 
Estate of Archer v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 228 (1942); Citizens Mut. Inv. Ass’n 
v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 48 (1942). 
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allegations relating to taxes179 or years180 not assailed in the original petition, 
the Board/Tax Court, although accepting jurisdiction generally, refused to 
entertain the new issues.181 
The second difficulty involved the filing of eleventh hour telegraphic 
and cable communications.182  Although the members of the Board 
generally did not question the basic policy of accepting defective petitions 
for jurisdictional purposes, several favored a re-examination of the 
application of the policy to these last-minute petitions.183  The occasion for 
re-examination was provided by the decision in McCord v. Commissioner,184 in 
which the Board’s dismissal of an untimely telegraphic petition was reversed 
due to the Board’s customary method of handling such petitions.  Western 
Union had Board instructions to send all telegraphic petitions over the 
government wire service.  Because that service was occupied with higher 
priority messages, the petition in McCord was not timely received.  Under 
these circumstances, the appellate court held the petition timely filed.185 In 
response, the Board discontinued accepting such petitions for even 
jurisdictional purposes.186 
                                                     
179  Estate Archer v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 228 (1942); Citizens Mut. Inv. 
Ass’n v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 48 (1942). 
180 O’Neil v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 105 (1976): Fletcher Plastics, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 35, 39 (1975); Krome v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 
782 (1948), vacating Krome v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 413 (1948); I. Frank 
Sons v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 40, 41 (1931); Thompson v. Commissioner, 10 
B.T.A. 57, 60–61 (1928); Wald v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1003, 1005 (1927); J. W. 
Teasdale & Co. v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 1244, 1246 (1927). 
181  The 1974 rules expressly prohibited including years and taxes in the 
amended petition which are different from those contested in the original petition.  
TAX CT. R. 41(a) and accompanying Rules Comm. Note (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  The 
current rule is stated more generally, providing that “[n]o amendment shall be 
allowed after the expiration of the time for filing the petition . . . which would 
involve conferring jurisdiction on the Court over a matter which otherwise would 
not come within its jurisdiction under the petition as then on file.”  TAX CT. R. 
41(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.) 
182  See McCord v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Estate of 
Stebbins v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 613 (1939), aff’d, 121 F.2d 892 (D.C. Cir. 
1941); Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1256 (1936), aff’d 
93 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1937); Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 618 (1935); 
Statler v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 342 (1932). 
183  Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1256, 1257 (1936) 
(Leech concurring); id. at 1257 (Turner, dissenting). 
184 123 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
185 Id. 
186 B.T.A. RULE 7 (June 1, 1942 ed.); Memorandum from Tracy, Board 
Secretary, to Chairman Murdock, Feb. 17, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
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A problem that potentially implicates the issues surrounding validity of a 
deficiency notice and those concerned with proper filing of the petition 
arises when a taxpayer receives a seemingly defective 90-day letter.  A 
taxpayer who wishes to test the validity of a deficiency notice may do so by 
utilizing one of three procedures.  The first two procedures concern the 
Tax Court.  The taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court on a timely 
basis and then move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.187  This approach 
carries the risk that the Tax Court will conclude that the taxpayer waived 
any defects in the notice by filing a timely petition.188  However, timely 
filing does not operate as a blanket waiver of all defects in a statutory 
notice; the taxpayer may obtain a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction upon a 
showing that there is a defect of sufficient magnitude.189  If the taxpayer 
wishes to avoid the prospect of waiver, a second approach is to file the 
petition after expiration of the relevant filing period and then move for 
dismissal based on an invalid notice.190  Although two grounds exist for 
dismissal in this setting, the Tax Court will first address the validity of the 
notice of deficiency and dismiss on that ground (in favor of the taxpayer) if 
the notice is found to be defective.191  This approach represents something 
                                                     
187 See, e.g., Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 818 (1973).   
188 See Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1951); Olsen v. 
Helvering, 88 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1937); Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 818 (1973); 
Kay Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 753 (1930), aff’d, 53 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 
1931); Whiting v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-142, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1334.   
189  Bernie v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 861, 862 (1951); Walter G. Morgan, 5 
B.T.A. 1035 (1927). 
190  See, e.g., Mulvania v. Commissioner, 769 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).  In 
Mulvania, the Service mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency on the final day of 
the period of limitations on assessment.  The notice was not addressed properly, 
and the notice was returned to the Service as undeliverable.  On the same day the 
Service mailed the notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, it mailed a copy to the 
taxpayer’s accountant.  The accountant informed the taxpayer of the notice within 
the 90-day period for filing a petition for redetermination.  However, believing the 
notice to be invalid, the taxpayer did not originally seek to invoke the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction.  Roughly two years later, the taxpayer reconsidered and filed a petition 
for redetermination with the Tax Court, contesting that the Service failed to issue a 
valid notice of deficiency prior to the expiration of the period of limitations on 
assessment.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s 
determination that the notice was invalid.  The appellate court concluded that the 
Service “is not forgiven for its clerical errors or for mailing notice to the wrong 
address unless the taxpayer, through his own actions, renders the Commissioner’s 
errors harmless.”  Id. at 1380.    
191 See Pietanza v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 729, 735–36 (1989), aff’d without 
published opinion, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that, “if jurisdiction is 
lacking because of respondent’s failure to issue a valid notice of deficiency, we will 
dismiss the case on that ground, rather than for lack of a timely filed petition”).     
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of a gamble.  If the defect in the notice does not warrant invalidation, the 
taxpayer will be foreclosed from litigating on a prepayment basis.  The third 
approach is to wait for collection activity and then to seek an injunction in 
district court against assessment and collection on the ground that no valid 
deficiency notice has been issued.192  If the taxpayer takes either of the latter 
two options but is not successful, the taxpayer, having not invoked the 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court, may sue for a refund in the Federal district 
court or in the Court of Federal Claims after the deficiency has been 
assessed and collected.193 
 
3. Jurisdiction to Restrain Premature Assessment and Collection 
 
If a taxpayer invokes the jurisdiction of the Tax Court through the 
timely filing of a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency in tax that is 
subject to the procedures of § 6213(a), the Service may not assess the 
deficiency or institute collection proceedings until the decision of the Tax 
Court becomes final.194  Although statutory exceptions exist to permit the 
Service to assess the deficiency when collection of the underlying tax 
appears in jeopardy,195 the Service occasionally proceeds with assessment 
and collection on a premature basis in instances where those statutory 
exceptions are not implicated.  Originally, a taxpayer aggrieved by the 
Service’s violation of the prohibition on assessment and collection under 
§ 6213(a) was forced to seek injunctive relief before the Federal district 
court.196  Depending on the reviewing court, a taxpayer may have been 
required to establish more than a violation of § 6213(a) to obtain injunctive 
relief.  Certain courts required the taxpayer to establish additionally the 
traditional prerequisites to injunctive relief—that is, the prospect of 
irreparable injury and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.197   
                                                     
192 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  This approach also carries risk, as the district 
court may not agree that the notice is defective.  If the court finds the 
notice to be valid and the taxpayer did not file a timely petition, access to 
Tax Court deficiency jurisdiction will have been lost. 
193 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
194 Id. 
195 Specifically, § 6213(a) provides exceptions for termination assessments 
under §§ 6851 and 6852, and jeopardy assessments under § 6861.   
196 See Kamholz v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 11, 15 (1990), action on dec., 1991-20 
(Aug. 5, 1991), acq. in part, 1991-2 C.B. 1. 
197 See Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313–14 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(showing of an irreparable injury necessary to avail injunctive relief under § 
6213(a)); Gunn v. Mathis, 157 F. Supp. 169, 178 n.4 (W.D. Ark. 1957) (showing of 
an irreparable injury unnecessary because § 6213(a) does not require it as a 
prerequisite for injunctive relief). 
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Believing that both taxpayers and the Government would benefit from 
litigating related issues in the same forum,198 Congress amended § 6213(a) 
in 1988 to provide the Tax Court with concurrent jurisdiction to enjoin the 
premature assessment and collection of any tax that is the subject of a 
timely filed petition pending before the Tax Court.199  The penultimate 
sentence of § 6213(a) establishes the limits of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in 
this context.  The court is authorized to enjoin an assessment or collection 
action only if a timely petition for the redetermination of a deficiency has 
been filed.  Even then, the deficiency that the Service has prematurely 
assessed or attempted to collect must serve as the subject of the petition for 
redetermination.200  However, the statute is silent on the finer aspects of the 
Tax Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this setting.  Specifically, the statute 
does not designate which party bears the burden of establishing a violation 
of § 6213(a) necessary for the court to restrain assessment or collection, nor 
does the statute address the standard of proof that must be satisfied by the 
party carrying the burden.   
The Tax Court first addressed the exercise of its jurisdiction to restrain 
assessment and collection of a deficiency under § 6213(a) in the 1990 case 
of Kamholz v. Commissioner.201  After noting the dearth of guidance 
concerning the burden and standard of proof, the court set out to resolve 
these issues even though they were not raised by the parties.202  The court 
declined to follow the general practice of placing the burden of proof on 
the taxpayer, noting that two justifications for this approach were absent in 
this setting.  First, unlike the regular deficiency setting in which the taxpayer 
possesses superior knowledge of facts relating to his tax liability, in this 
setting the Service possessed superior access to the facts central to the 
court’s determination.  Specifically, the Service was in the best position to 
                                                     
198 S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 16 (1988). 
199 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§§ 6226, 6243(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3730, 3749 (1988) (providing Tax Court 
jurisdiction under § 6213(a) as part of the Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights).  The 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction took effect on November 11, 1988.  Id. § 6243(c), 102 Stat. 
at 3750.  The court’s ability to order a refund of any amount collected within the 
prohibited period was provided by Congress a decade later, taking effect on July 22, 
1998.  See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 3464(a), (d), 112 Stat. 685, 767 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 105-174, 
at 91 (1998). 
200  I.R.C. § 6213(a); TAX CT. R. 55; see also Kamholz v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 
11, 15 (1990) (holding no jurisdiction over deficiencies for years that are not the 
subject of timely filed petitions pending before the court).  
201 94 T.C. 11 (1990).  In so doing, the court relied heavily on its decision in 
Williams v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 920 (1989), in which the court examined these 
issues in the context of the court’s expanded jurisdiction to review the Service’s 
determination to sell seized property under § 6863(b)(3)(C).     
202  Kamholz, 94 T.C. at 15–16. 
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determine if the deficiency it proposed to assess and collect served as the 
subject of the deficiency proceeding before the court.203  Second, the 
Service was not operating under exigent circumstances, as the challenged 
assessment was not made pursuant to the available jeopardy procedures.204  
Accordingly, the court determined that if the taxpayer’s motion to restrain 
assessment and collection under § 6213(a) satisfies a minimal threshold of 
establishing grounds that are “plausible and believable,” the Service bears 
the burden of proving that the assessments it intends to collect are not the 
subject of the deficiency proceedings before the court.205  The Service must 
carry this burden by a preponderance of the evidence.206  With these ground 
rules established, the court concluded that the Service failed to carry its 
burden of establishing that the tax it prematurely assessed and intended to 
collect did not serve as the subject of the relevant deficiency proceeding. 
Having determined that the Service violated the prohibition on 
assessment provided in § 6213(a), the Tax Court in Kamholz next addressed 
whether the violation alone served as a sufficient basis to grant the 
requested injunctive relief.207  Specifically, the court considered whether the 
taxpayer must also establish the prospect of irreparable injury and the 
absence of an adequate legal remedy for the injunction to be issued.  
Notwithstanding the permissive language employed by the statute,208 the 
court concluded that those traditional requirements for injunctive relief 
were inapposite in this setting.  Reasoning that the taxpayer selected a legal 
remedy by virtue commencing an action with the court to redetermine the 
asserted deficiencies, the court characterized the issue of whether the 
taxpayer would suffer irreparable injury if collection were not enjoined as 
“irrelevant.”209  Emphasizing the unambiguous statutory directive 
precluding collection actions until a decision of the Tax Court becomes 
final, the court found the Service’s failure to prove that the assessments to 
be collected were not the subject of cases pending before the court to be 
“sufficient grounds” for issuing an injunction.210   
 
                                                     
203  Id. at 16.   
204  Id.   
205  Id. at 16–17.   
206  Id. at 17.   
207  Id. at 19.   
208 Id. (noting that § 6213(a) provides that the Tax Court “may” enjoin 
assessment and collection). 
209 Id. 
210 Id.  Because it believes that Congress did not intend for a taxpayer always to 
be required to prove an irreparable injury and an absence of an adequate legal 
remedy before the Tax Court could issue an injunction, the Service has 
acknowledged the court’s discretion to grant injunctive relief under § 6213(a).  
I.R.S. Action on Decision 1991-20 (Aug. 5, 1991). 
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B. Refund Jurisdiction 
 
Under the 1924 Act, the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals 
generally was restricted to redetermining deficiencies in tax.211  No 
provision was made for the Board to declare a taxpayer’s entitlement to a 
refund of taxes already paid.  Initially, this restriction seemed sensible in 
view of the principal consideration that formed the basis of the Board’s 
jurisdiction—providing an opportunity for independent review without 
requiring payment of the disputed tax.212  Because remedies already existed 
for taxpayers who believed they had overpaid their taxes,213 there was no 
manifest necessity to provide refund jurisdiction to the Board. 
With the beginning of operations by the Board, however, it became 
apparent that strict adherence to the deficiency jurisdiction limitation 
produced unfortunate results in at least two distinct situations.  The first 
resulted from a Board ruling that it lost jurisdiction of an appeal if the 
asserted deficiency was paid prior to the rendition of its decision.214  
Payment of the disputed tax eliminated the deficiency.  Because Board 
jurisdiction was limited to redetermining deficiencies, such payment made 
the controversy nonjusticiable.  In one respect this ruling was advantageous 
to the taxpayer, because it permitted the taxpayer to defeat unilaterally the 
Board’s jurisdiction at any time prior to a decision.  Thus, if a taxpayer 
anticipated an unfavorable Board decision, which would be prima facie 
evidence in further judicial proceedings to recover amounts paid pursuant 
to the Board’s decision,215 the taxpayer could pay the asserted deficiency 
and thereby foreclose the prospect of an adverse ruling on the merits.  On 
the other hand, the ruling operated against the taxpayer who wished to 
litigate before the Board but also desired to pay the deficiency to forestall 
the running of interest.  So long as the tax was paid before the decision of 
the Board, the opportunity for Board review was lost, even if such payment 
was made after the filing of a proper petition or after a Board hearing. 
The second problem with strict limitation of deficiency jurisdiction was 
that it prevented full resolution of tax disputes by the Board, even in cases 
in which its jurisdiction was properly invoked.  For example, the 
Commissioner might determine a deficiency in tax based on excessive 
depreciation deductions.  The taxpayer, on the other hand, might believe 
                                                     
211  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(a)–(b), 308(a)–(b), 900(e), 43 Stat. 
297, 308, 337.  In addition to its deficiency jurisdiction, the Board also had 
jurisdiction under the 1924 Act to allow or disallow claims in abatement with 
respect to jeopardy assessments.  Id. §§ 279(b), 312(b), 900(e), 43 Stat. 300, 316, 
337. 
212 H.R. REP. NO 68-179, at 7–8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 8–9 (1924). 
213 See Part I, notes 142–197 and accompanying text.  
214 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925).  
215 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337.  
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that the depreciation he originally claimed for the year was too small.  
Under the 1924 Act, if the taxpayer chose to petition the Board, he would 
be entitled only to an adjudication as to whether the depreciation originally 
claimed was excessive.  Even if a necessary implication of the Board ruling 
was that the taxpayer claimed too little depreciation, the Board could not 
determine that there had been an overpayment of tax or that the taxpayer 
was entitled to a refund.216  To obtain such an adjudication, the taxpayer 
would have to commence a separate refund proceeding.  Thus, not 
permitting the Board to consider fully the tax liability with respect to tax 
years properly before it could have the dual effect of discouraging some 
taxpayers from appealing to the Board, and requiring others, who did 
choose to litigate before the Board, to bring separate proceedings to obtain 
full relief. 
Although early proposals to give the Board full refund jurisdiction217 and 
to restrict the availability of other forums to resolve tax disputes were 
rejected,218 the Revenue Act of 1926 did eliminate the major problems that 
had resulted from strict limitation of the Board’s jurisdiction to deficiency 
disputes.  The two provisions were of major importance.  First, the Act 
provided for limited refund jurisdiction. If a taxpayer petitioned the Board 
to redetermine a deficiency assertion, and the Board found that no 
deficiency existed, it also could determine that the taxpayer had made an 
overpayment of tax for the year in question.219  In such a case, the statute 
directed that, when the decision of the Board became final, the amount of 
the overpayment “shall . . . be credited or refunded to the taxpayer . . . .”220  
Second, provision was made permitting a taxpayer to waive the restrictions 
on assessment and collection that were imposed during the pendency of a 
Board proceeding, and to pay all or any part of the asserted deficiency.221  
Such payment would stop the running of interest on any deficiencies 
ultimately determined by the Board.222 
In combination, the two provisions were designed to permit the 
payment of the deficiency assertion prior to the rendition of a Board 
decision, without the loss of Board jurisdiction that had resulted under the 
1924 Act.  Although this purpose clearly emerges from the legislative 
                                                     
216 Everett Knitting Works, 1 B.T.A. 5 (1924). 
217 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 849 (1925) (testimony of D. A. Smith, American Paper and 
Pulp Ass’n) [hereinafter cited as 1925 Hearings]. 
218 See Part III, notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
219 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 284(e), 319(c), 44 Stat. 67, 84 (now 
codified at I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1)). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. § 274(d), 44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6213(d)). 
222 Id. § 274(j) (now codified at I.R.C. § 6601(a), (c)) 
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history of the 1926 Act,223 some confusion in the application of these 
provisions arose during the ensuing decade with respect to payments made 
by the taxpayer after the filing of the petition.  Some members of the Board 
believed that in such a case, if the Board ultimately determined that the 
original deficiency was erroneous, a decision of overpayment would be 
inappropriate because the overpayment did not exist at the time that the 
petition was filed; in their view, only a decision of no deficiency would be 
proper in such circumstances.224  As a result, some taxpayers, who were 
inclined to pay the deficiency during the pendency of the Board proceeding 
failed to do so, fearing that, should they ultimately prevail, the Board 
decision would not determine an overpayment.225  Accordingly, in the 
Revenue Act of 1938, Congress reaffirmed its original intention by adding 
statutory language clearly indicating that a determination of overpayment 
was proper even if the overpayment was made after the filing of the 
petition to the Board.226 
The grant of overpayment jurisdiction was tied closely to the broader 
purpose of the 1926 Act to provide the Board with plenary power to 
redetermine tax liability for any tax year properly before it.227  Thus, in 
addition to giving the Board jurisdiction to determine an overpayment, the 
1926 Act also provided it with the corollary power to determine a 
deficiency greater than that originally asserted by the Government if a claim 
for the increased amount was made by the Commissioner at or before the 
Board hearing or rehearing.228  Other 1926 amendments also served to 
assure that the Board remedy, once invoked, would be exclusive.  In this 
connection, the Commissioner generally was barred from determining 
additional deficiencies with respect to a tax over which the Board had 
jurisdiction.229  The Commissioner therefore could not issue further 
deficiency notices but was limited to submitting a claim to the Board as 
                                                     
223 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 27 (1926); H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 40 (1926). 
224 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 49 (1938); Hearings on Revision of Revenue Laws, 
1938, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 449 (1938) 
(statement of the American Bar Ass’n) [hereinafter cited as 1938 Hearings]. 
225 1938 Hearings, supra note 224, at 449. 
226 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 322(d), 52 Stat. 545.  
227 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 37–38 (1934). 
228 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(e), 308(e), 44 Stat. 56, 75 (now 
codified at I.R.C. § 6214(a)).  There was some uncertainty as to whether the Board 
had this power under the 1924 Act, which made no specific reference to the 
problem.  Compare HAMEL, supra note 147, at 65 with Latham, supra note 60, at 
217–18. 
229 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(f), 44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6212(c)).  The only exceptions to this rule were in cases of fraud, of additional 
deficiencies asserted to the Board at or before the hearing or rehearing, and of 
jeopardy assessments. Id. 
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mentioned above.230  Once the Board hearing or rehearing was complete, 
no further deficiencies could be asserted.231  Conversely, the taxpayer also 
was bound by Board decisions by virtue of a provision that generally 
precluded refunds, credits or suits therefor with respect to a tax over which 
the Board had jurisdiction, except to the extent that the Board determined 
an overpayment.232 
The provisions of the 1926 Act dealing with the jurisdiction of the 
Board with respect to overpayments and additional deficiencies and with 
regard to the exclusivity, once invoked, of the Board remedy provided a 
generally equitable and workable framework for tax litigation.  Nevertheless, 
several aspects of this jurisdiction have attracted varying degrees of 
attention over the years. 
 
1. Statute of Limitations on Overpayment Determinations 
 
Most of the legislative activity dealing with overpayment jurisdiction has 
concerned the question of whether, if an overpayment exists, credit or 
refund of such overpayment is barred by the statute of limitations.  Two 
statutory changes in this arena bear note.  The 1926 Act mandated credit or 
refund only if filing of claim therefor or filing of the petition to the Board 
(whichever was first) occurred within the generally applicable statute of 
limitations period for refunds.233  In this connection, the Board soon held 
that its jurisdiction was limited to determining overpayments; it could 
neither order the Commissioner to credit or refund taxes, nor determine 
whether the overpayment claim was timely.234  Thus, even after the Board 
had determined an overpayment, the taxpayer could not be assured of 
receiving credit or refund.  The Bureau could refuse credit or refund if it 
concluded the credit or refund was time barred.235  Moreover, even if no 
                                                     
230 See supra note 228. 
231 See supra note 229 and the exceptions noted therein.  
232 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(d), 44 Stat. 67 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6512(a)).  The only exceptions to this rule were in the cases of amounts collected 
in excess of the determination of the Board and amounts collected after the 
applicable period of limitations had expired.  Id. 
233 Id. § 284(e) (now codified at I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)). 
234 E.g., Dickerman & Englis, Inc., 5 B.T.A. 633 (1926). This implicit 
limitation on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction proved longstanding.  In Morse v. United 
States, 494 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1974), the appellate court interpreted the absence of 
express authority under § 6512(b)(1) to order payment of a refund as implying that 
such authority did not exist.  See id. at 879 (“[T]he Tax Court has no jurisdiction to 
order or to deny a refund.”) (citing United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. 
Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 542 (1937); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 275, 279 (1969); Rosenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1970-201, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 888).   
235 National Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 1011 (Ct. Cl. 1931). 
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time bar existed, refund could be denied if the taxpayer had outstanding 
liabilities against which the overpayment would be credited.236  In unusual 
cases, both credit and refund might be denied by the Bureau on the basis of 
equitable considerations.237  The Board had no jurisdiction over any of 
these matters, and if disputes arose between a taxpayer and the Bureau, the 
taxpayer’s only recourse was to pursue a refund suit in district court or the 
Court of Claims.238  The Board’s lack of jurisdiction to determine questions 
of time limitations with regard to overpayments was anomalous in light of 
its ability to consider the effect of the statute of limitations on deficiency 
questions.  In hearings on the Revenue Bill of 1928, the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York called attention to this peculiarity in the law 
and proposed that the statute be amended to extend Board jurisdiction to 
determine whether the right to credit or refund was time barred.239  The 
1928 legislation did not adopt this proposal, but it later was incorporated 
into the Revenue Act of 1934240 when Treasury came out in favor of the 
revision.241  The amendment, however, made no change in the Board’s 
inability to order a credit or refund.  In this regard, the Board’s jurisdiction 
remained limited to determining an overpayment that was not time 
barred.242  If the Commissioner insisted on crediting (rather than refunding) 
an overpayment, or refused to do either on the basis of equitable 
considerations, judicial review could be obtained only in the federal 
courts.243   
 Related to the question of the Board’s power to determine questions 
under the statute of limitations was the more fundamental problem of 
whether any limitation period should be applied to overpayment 
                                                     
236 Empire Ordinance Corp. v. Harrington, 249 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
237 United States v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540 (1937); Empire Ordinance Corp. 
v. Harrington, 249 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
238 In this connection, it has been held that an action for mandamus generally 
will not be entertained, because a refund suit provides an adequate remedy. See 
supra note 237. 
239 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1927–28, Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, Interim 69th–70th Cong. 468–69 (1927).  
240 Ch. 277, § 322(d), 48 Stat. 751. 
241 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1934, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1934) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Hearings]. 
242 Rosenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-201, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 
888, 891–92, aff’d, 450 F.2d 529 (l0th Cir. 1971); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 275, 279 (1969); Jones v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 280 
(1936). 
243 See supra note 237; see also Morse v. United States, 494 F.2d 876, 879 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 275, 279 (1969); 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 231, 1988-3 C.B. 473, 721 (“[I]f the IRS fails to 
refund or credit an overpayment determined by the Tax Court, the taxpayer must 
seek relief in another court.”). 
306           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
determinations.  In congressional hearings in 1932 and 1934, the American 
Bar Association argued that it was inequitable to condition the granting of a 
credit or refund on any statutory period whatsoever.244  Its reasoning was 
based on a comparison to the additional deficiency provision that permitted 
the Board to determine such additional amounts so long as a claim therefor 
was asserted by the Commissioner at or before the Board hearing or 
rehearing.245  Because the statute of limitations on assessment and 
collection of deficiencies tolled during the Board proceeding, if the original 
deficiency notice were timely there would be no time bar applicable to any 
additional deficiencies determined by the Board.246  The ABA contended 
that if no time bar existed on additional deficiencies, none should be placed 
on credit or refund of overpayments; once the Board’s jurisdiction was 
properly invoked, no statute of limitations should restrict its authority. 
Congress proved to be unreceptive to this suggestion, and in time the 
ABA position, as a result of later court decisions, evolved into a more 
modest proposal.  If a Board petition was filed before a claim for refund, 
the time of filing the petition controlled the time bar.247  Thus, in such 
cases, a vital question was when the petition was filed, and in this regard the 
courts had adopted a rule requiring reference to the time of filing of the 
petition which first alleged an overpayment.248  This interpretation of 
“petition” for purposes of overpayment was predicated on a Supreme 
Court decision holding that, for statute of limitations purposes, an amended 
claim for refund asserting a new and unrelated ground did not relate back to 
the date of filing of the original claim.249  Thus, even if the taxpayer’s 
original petition was filed within the statutory period for refund or credit, 
no such allowance would be made if the assertion of an overpayment first 
was made in an amended petition filed after the expiration of the limitations 
period.  Again reasoning from rules applicable to additional deficiencies, the 
ABA argued that since the Commissioner could amend his pleadings to 
claim more taxes through the time of trial, the taxpayer should have the 
same privilege, with the overpayment claim relating back to the date of 
filing of the original petition.250  In 1942, Congress agreed with the ABA 
                                                     
244 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1932, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 354, 360, 362–63 (1932) (testimony of Richard Doyle) 
[hereinafter cited as 1932 Hearings]; 1934 Hearings, supra note 241, at 194–95. 
245 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
246 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(a), 277(b), 44 Stat. 55, 58. 
247 Id. § 284(d), 44 Stat. 67. 
248 E.g., Denholm & McKay Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 986 (1940), rev’d 
on other grounds, 132 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1942).  
249 United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U.S. 528 (1938); United States v. 
Andrews, 302 U.S. 517 (1938). 
250 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1941, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 466–67 (1941) (testimony of George Morris); Hearings on 
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objective, and the statute was amended to allow credit or refund if the 
mailing of the deficiency notice that resulted in the Board proceeding was 
within the statutory period of the overpayment.251  Thus, whether or not 
the original petition claimed an overpayment, a claim therefor would not be 
time barred if such claim could have been validly made at the time of 
mailing of the deficiency notice.252 
The overall goal of coordinating the limitations period on overpayment 
claims in the Tax Court with that of other refund fora became problematic 
in the context of late filed returns.  In situations where the taxpayer does 
not file a refund claim prior to the mailing of the notice of deficiency and 
the taxpayer seeks an overpayment of tax paid before such date, 
§ 6512(b)(3)(B) limits the amount of any overpayment determined by the 
Tax Court to the amount the taxpayer could have obtained through 
traditional refund litigation.  Although the statute provides that the 
overpayment is determined as if the taxpayer had filed a claim for refund on 
the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency, this rule begged the 
question of what look-back period applied under § 6511—the amount of 
tax paid three years prior to the hypothetical refund claim (assuming the 
taxpayer subsequently filed a return) under § 6511(b)(2)(A), or the amount 
of tax paid two years prior to the hypothetical refund claim under 
§ 6511(b)(2)(B)?  The Tax Court consistently held that the two-year 
lookback period applied,253 and most circuit courts of appeals agreed.254  
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lundy v. Commissioner255 
reversed the Tax Court by holding that the three-year look-back period 
applied because the taxpayer ultimately filed a tax return claiming the 
refund.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting 
circuit court conflict, and it subsequently reversed the Fourth Circuit by 
reinstating the Tax Court’s application of the two-year look-back period.256  
The Supreme Court grounded its decision in a textual analysis of § 6511(b).  
If the taxpayer failed to file a tax return prior to the mailing of the notice of 
deficiency, it was not possible to determine if the taxpayer’s hypothetical 
                                                                                                                       
Revenue Revision, 1942, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 168 (1942) (testimony of Morton Fisher) [hereinafter cited as 1942 
Hearings].   
251 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 169(b), 56 Stat. 877. 
252 I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3)(B). 
253  See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 475 (1992); Galuska v. 
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 661 (1992); Berry v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 339 (1991). 
254 Richards v. Commissioner, 37 F.3d 587 (10th Cir. 1994); Allen v. 
Commissioner, 23 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 1994); Davison v. Commissioner, 9 F.3d 1358 
(2d Cir. 1993); Galuska v. Commissioner, 5 F.3d 195 (7th Cir. 1993). 
255  45 F.3d 856 (4th Cir. 1995), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1993-278, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 
3011.   
256  Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996).   
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claim for refund (occurring upon the mailing of the notice of deficiency) 
was filed within three years of the filing of the tax return so as to trigger the 
three-year look-back period under § 6511(b)(2)(A).  Simply put, there was 
no reference point (filing of the return) for determining if the predicate to 
the three-year look-back period had been satisfied.  With the three-year 
look-back period under § 6511(b)(2)(A) foreclosed, only the two-year look-
back period provided by § 6511(b)(2)(B) remained as an option.      
The Supreme Court’s holding in Lundy had the unfortunate practical 
effect of precluding a taxpayer invoking the Tax Court’s overpayment 
jurisdiction from obtaining a refund of certain taxes (namely, those paid in 
the third year preceding the mailing of the notice of deficiency) that the 
taxpayer could have pursued by filing the return and then pursuing refund 
litigation outside the Tax Court.  As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997, Congress amended § 6512(b) by adding flush language to address the 
Lundy anomaly.  The statute now provides that if the taxpayer failed to file a 
return prior to the mailing of the notice of deficiency and the notice of 
deficiency is mailed during the third year after the due date of the tax 
return, the look-back period for determining the amount of the 
overpayment determination shall be three years.257        
 
2. Resolution of Potential Concurrent Overpayment Jurisdiction  
 
Another problem occasioned by the Board’s power to determine 
overpayments resulted from the overlapping jurisdiction of the Board with 
that of the district courts and the Court of Claims.  Because the district 
courts and the Court of Claims also possessed authority to determine 
overpayments of tax, it was theoretically possible for the same tax dispute 
to be adjudicated by both the Board and a district court or the Court of 
Claims.  However, the problem of overlapping jurisdiction was limited.  
Once a petition with respect to a tax was filed with the Board, no action 
could thereafter be instituted for credit or refund except with respect to 
overpayments determined by the Board.258 
Occasionally, however, the Commissioner issued a deficiency notice 
with respect to a tax that was already the subject of refund litigation.  No 
provision of law barred the assertion of such deficiencies, and the statute 
did not, in such cases, limit the taxpayer’s right to appeal to the Board.259 In 
fact, if the taxpayer did not appeal to the Board, the deficiency could be 
assessed and collected after the expiration of the period for petitioning the 
                                                     
257  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1282(a), 111 Stat. 788, 
1037 (1997) (amending I.R.C. § 6512(b)).   
258 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 284(d), 44 Stat. 67.  See supra note 232 and 
accompanying text.   
259 See id. § 274, 44 Stat. 55. 
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Board.260  Moreover, until 1954, the statute did not limit the authority of the 
Board, the district courts, or the Court of Claims to pursue the litigation to 
its conclusion.  As a result, it was theoretically possible for both the Board 
and another court to render decisions not only with respect to the same tax, 
but also, if an overpayment was alleged to the Board on the same basis as 
the refund action, with respect to the same issue. 
The potential for confusion resulting from this concurrent jurisdiction 
was minimized by two factors.  First, in the event of separate proceedings 
with respect to the same tax liability, either tribunal could properly stay its 
proceedings until the conclusion of proceedings in the other.261 Second, it 
was suggested that the decision of the tribunal to first decide the case 
would, presumably on the basis of res judicata, bind the other.262  However, 
these factors were not a total solution to the problem.  Although either 
tribunal could stay its proceedings until the conclusion of proceedings in 
the other, it was held that such stays were a matter within the discretion of 
each body.263  Thus, duplicative proceedings could be carried on 
contemporaneously in both tribunals.  Moreover, it was not clear whether 
the first decision would control the second in all cases.  Prior to 1942, the 
courts had held that decisions in refund suits against collectors of internal 
revenue were not res judicata in later proceedings involving either the 
United States or the Commissioner.264  Thus, if a refund suit against a 
collector, involving a tax already the subject of a Board proceeding, was 
decided first, the Board presumably would not be bound by the earlier 
decision, and it was possible to have conflicting decisions by the Board and 
the district court with respect to the same tax on the same taxpayer.  
Congress corrected this situation in the Revenue Act of 1942, and res 
judicata now applies to determinations involving the same tax regardless of 
the technical difference of the party assuming the position of the 
Government.265 
                                                     
260 See id. § 274(a). 
261 Camp v. United States, 44 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1930). 
262 Id. 
263 Morris Plan Indus. Bank of New York v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 976 (2d 
Cir. 1945); Ellis v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 484 (1950). 
264 United States v. Nunnally Inv. Co., 316 U.S. 258 (1942); Bankers 
Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932); Sage v. United States, 250 
U.S. 33 (1919); see also William T. Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of 
Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L. REV. 685, 693 (1947).  Curiously, if the case involving 
the United States or the Commissioner was decided first, it would be res judicata 
in later proceedings involving the collectors. Id. 
265 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 503, 56 Stat. 956 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7422(c)). 
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The possibility for concurrent jurisdiction problems to arise was 
substantially reduced by a provision included in the 1954 Code revision.266  
The amendment applies only if a refund proceeding in district court or the 
Court of Federal Claims is pending but has not yet proceeded to trial by the 
time of issuance of a deficiency notice with respect to the same tax at issue 
in the refund action.  In such a case, the refund action is stayed upon 
mailing of the notice of deficiency for the period of time in which the 
taxpayer can petition the Tax Court and for 60 days thereafter.  If the 
taxpayer petitions the Tax Court, then the district court or the Court of 
Federal Claims, as the case may be, automatically loses jurisdiction of the 
refund action to the extent jurisdiction over that dispute is acquired by the 
Tax Court.  On the other hand, if no petition is filed with the Tax Court, 
the Government is permitted to counterclaim in the refund action within 
the period of the stay, even though the normal period for asserting a 
counterclaim may have expired.  In the event of such a counterclaim, the 
taxpayer has the burden of proof on all issues except fraud. 
Several features of the 1954 provision bear note.  First, it applies only if 
the refund action has not proceeded to trial by the time of issuance of the 
notice of deficiency.  Since the Commissioner may issue a deficiency notice 
at any time during the course of the refund action, and since the taxpayer is 
privileged to file a petition to the Tax Court in response thereto, the 
possibility for concurrent jurisdiction still exists.267  However, this 
possibility is now far more limited, and with the application of res judicata 
to the first judgment, should not prove troublesome.  Second, whether or 
not the Government counterclaims in the refund action, if the taxpayer fails 
to petition the Tax Court, the deficiency may be assessed and collected.268  
Thus, the taxpayer’s exercise of his option to pursue a remedy in either the 
refund action or the Tax Court will have an important effect on the 
assessment and collection of the tax.  Finally, in rare cases, different burden 
of proof rules may apply depending on whether the taxpayer takes the case 
to the Tax Court or continues the refund proceeding.  The statute provides 
that in the event that the Government interposes a counterclaim, the 
burden of proof on the issues raised will be on the taxpayer, “except as to 
the issue of whether the taxpayer has been guilty of fraud with intent to 
evade tax.”269  The 1954 committee reports indicate a congressional 
intention to provide the same burden of proof rules in the refund 
proceeding as would have applied had the taxpayer petitioned the Tax 
Court.270  However, at least two types of issues, other than fraud, exist with 
                                                     
266 I.R.C. § 7422(e). 
267 See Zeeman v. United States, 395 F.2d 861, 865–66 (2d Cir. 1968). 
268 Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 400 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1968). 
269 I.R.C. § 7422(e). 
270 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A431 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 610–11 
(1954). 
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respect to which the Government normally bears the burden of proof in 
both Tax Court and refund proceedings.  These are the issue of the illegality 
of bribes, kickbacks, or other payments for purposes of denying deductions 
for payments against public policy,271 and the issue of whether a foundation 
manager has “knowingly” participated in activities subjecting him to certain 
taxes applicable to private foundations.272  Additionally, both of these 
special burden of proof rules were introduced after 1954,273 and a difficult 
question of statutory interpretation would be presented by a counterclaim 
raising these issues in circumstances to which the special concurrent 
jurisdiction statute is applicable.274 
 
3. Authority to Order Refund of Overpayment 
 
Recognizing the additional burden faced by taxpayers who were required 
to seek enforcement of Tax Court overpayment determinations in alternate 
fora,275 Congress remedied the shortcoming in the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.276  
Through the enactment of § 6512(b)(2),277 Congress supplied the Tax Court 
with supplemental jurisdiction to order the refund of an overpayment, 
together with interest thereon.278  The court’s jurisdiction to order payment 
                                                     
271 I.R.C. § 162(c)(1)–(2). 
272 I.R.C. § 7454(b). 
273 The special burden of proof rules for nondeductible illegal payments 
resulted from amendments made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue 
Act of 1971.  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b), 83 Stat. 710; 
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 310(a), 85 Stat. 525.  The foundation 
manager provision originated in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.  Tax Reform Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(j)(57), 83 Stat. 532. 
274  Section 7491 also operates to shift the burden of proof to the Government 
in certain situations.  However, this provision applies to “any court proceeding,” see 
I.R.C. § 7491(a)–(c), and thereby avoids any conflict with the 1954 provision by 
trumping it.   
275  See S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 17 (1988) (“The committee believes that if the 
Tax Court determines that a taxpayer is due a refund and the IRS fails to issue that 
refund, the taxpayer should not have to incur the additional time, trouble, and 
expense of enforcing the Tax Court’s decision in another forum.  Rather, the 
taxpayer should be able to enforce the decision in the court that entered the 
decision.”).  
276 Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342.   
277 Id. § 6244(a), 102 Stat. at 3750.   
278  The underlying “overpayment” determined under § 6512(b)(1) may include 
payments of interest in excess of that owed.  See Estate of Baumgardner v. 
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 445, 452 (1985).  However, the “interest” referenced under 
§ 6512(b)(2) is that owed with respect to the determined overpayment.  The Tax 
Court’s authority under § 6512(b)(2) to order the refund of interest owed on a 
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of a refund does not arise unless the Commissioner fails to refund the 
overpayment within 120 days following the date on which the Tax Court’s 
decision becomes final.279  At that point, the taxpayer may invoke the Tax 
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction by motion.  In this manner, the 
enactment of § 6512(b)(2) enhanced the judicial economy of overpayment 
litigation before the Tax Court.   
Congress clarified certain aspects of the Tax Court’s authority to order 
refund payments through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.280  To start, 
Congress addressed the appellate review of a Tax Court order disposing of 
a motion to refund an overpayment under § 6512(b)(2).  Through the 
addition of the second sentence to the statute, Congress specified that a Tax 
Court order in this setting is reviewable in the same manner as a decision of 
the Tax Court.281 
Additionally, Congress clarified that the Tax Court’s authority under 
§ 6512(b)(2) does not extend to reviewing the merits of any credit or offset 
that reduces the amount of the refund paid to the taxpayer.282  Through the 
enactment of § 6512(b)(4), Congress expressly denied the Tax Court 
jurisdiction to review or restrain any credit or offset to the amount of a 
determined overpayment made by the Commissioner pursuant to § 6402(a).   
The interaction of § 6512(b)(2) and (b)(4) appears relatively 
straightforward.  The Tax Court may order payment of a determined 
refund, but the Commissioner may apply the refund against other 
outstanding liabilities of the taxpayer free from Tax Court review.  
However, these two provisions do not always operate in such clean 
fashion—particularly when the liability the Commissioner seeks to apply as 
a § 6402(a) offset falls within the potential scope of the Tax Court’s 
overpayment jurisdiction under § 6512(b)(1).  The Tax Court faced this 
conundrum in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner.283 
Following the entry of the Tax Court’s initial decision in the Estate of 
Smith litigation determining a deficiency in estate tax, the taxpayer-estate 
remitted payment of the deficiency plus an amount intended to cover 
estimated underpayment interest.  Years later, the case was back before the 
Tax Court on remand following the first appeal in the case.  The Tax Court 
then issued a final decision determining an “overpayment in estate tax” of 
                                                                                                                       
§ 6512(b)(1) overpayment is somewhat curious, given that the Tax Court lacks 
jurisdiction to determine the interest owed on such an overpayment.  See Harrison 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-614, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1438, 1441 (“[W]e are 
unable to enter a decision for interest on an overpayment.”).     
279 See Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-213, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 486, 
487 (denying petitioner’s motion to order refund of overpayment as premature).   
280 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. 
281  Id. § 1451(a), 111 Stat. at 1054.   
282  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 732 (1997), 1997-4 C.B. (vol. 2) 1457, 2202.   
283  123 T.C. 15 (2004).   
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$238,847, which was based on the parties’ stipulated computation submitted 
pursuant to Rule 155 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.284  
The stipulated estate tax liability provided in the Rule 155 computation was, 
in turn, based on the allowance of an estate tax deduction for 
underpayment interest that had not yet been paid by the estate.  However, 
the parties did not take the estate’s outstanding interest obligation into 
account in arriving at the bottom-line $238,847 overpayment.  Evidently, 
the customary practice at that time was to address only overpayments of the 
subject tax as part of the Rule 155 computation, with interest obligations 
being later determined by reference to this amount.285 
Following entry of the Tax Court’s decision adopting the Rule 155 
computation, the Commissioner first offset $85,337 of assessed but unpaid 
interest against the $238,847 overpayment and remitted only the $153,510 
balance to the estate.  The estate objected to the offset and invoked the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction under § 6512(b)(2) to enforce the Tax Court’s 
determination of a $238,847 overpayment under § 6512(b)(1).   
At first glance, resolution of the case appeared clear.  The 
Commissioner possessed the authority to offset the estate’s outstanding 
interest liability against the refund owed to the estate pursuant to § 6402(a), 
and § 6512(b)(4) precluded the Tax Court from restraining or reviewing this 
offset.  However, the estate argued that the “overpayment . . . of estate tax” 
determined by the Tax Court under § 6512(b)(1) necessarily included any 
interest due on the estate tax liability, based in part on the directive in 
§ 6601(e) that the term “tax” is to include interest thereon.286  In this regard, 
the Tax Court had previously held in Estate of Baumgardner v. Commissioner 
that its jurisdiction to determine an overpayment in tax pursuant to 
§ 6512(b)(1) extended to underpayment interest paid in excess of that 
properly owed.287  Hence, the estate argued that because the Tax Court’s 
determination of an overpayment of estate tax under § 6512(b)(1) 
encompassed the taxpayer’s assessed but unpaid interest obligations, any 
attempt by the Commissioner to apply the $238,847 determined 
overpayment against the estate’s outstanding interest liability undermined 
the court’s express authority to order a refund of the overpayment pursuant 
to § 6512(b)(2).  
In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court sided with the taxpayer-estate.  
The majority found §§ 6402(a) and 6512(b)(4) inapposite in this context, 
                                                     
284  Id. at 17.  
285 See id. at 48 (Goeke, J., dissenting) (noting a “longstanding practice, 
followed by parties in many of our cases, to submit agreed computations of 
overpayments without interest”); id. at 56 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
IRS had developed “an almost-unbroken custom of using Rule 155 to reach 
agreement on the amount of tax (rather than tax plus interest) owed”).  
286  See 123 T.C. at 22.     
287   85 T.C. 445 (1985).   
314           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
reasoning that these provisions apply only to the application of an 
overpayment to tax liabilities other than those that served as the subject of 
the overpayment decision.288  Agreeing that the estate’s assessed but unpaid 
interest obligation should have been factored into the Rule 155 
overpayment computation, the majority reasoned that permitting the 
Commissioner to reduce the refund by the outstanding interest obligation 
would effectively allow the Commissioner “to disregard the amount of the 
overpayment in our final decision.”289 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed in favor of the Commissioner.290  
From a definitional standpoint, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Tax 
Court’s determination of an “overpayment” of tax under § 6512(b)(1) need 
not always include underpayment interest due on the underlying tax 
liability291—even though the Tax Court may determine an overpayment of 
interest as part of its § 6512(b)(1) overpayment jurisdiction in certain 
situations.292  The appellate court supported its holding by referring to 
§ 7481, which permits the Tax Court to determine overpayments or 
underpayments of interest after the court has first determined an 
overpayment in the underlying tax pursuant to § 6512(b)(1).293  Hence, the 
statutory scheme suggests that not all interest determinations need be 
addressed in the initial § 6512(b)(1) overpayment determination. 
From a factual standpoint, the Fifth Circuit found that the Tax Court’s 
overpayment determination did not extend to the estate’s unpaid interest 
liability, because the parties did not factor this liability into the Rule 155 
stipulation incorporated into the Tax Court’s judgment.294  Hence, whereas 
the Tax Court effectively treated the $238,847 overpayment as 
encompassing all items that fell within its § 6512(b)(1) overpayment 
jurisdiction (which it interpreted as including assessed but unpaid interest), 
the Fifth Circuit viewed the Tax Court’s determination as extending only to 
those items actually addressed in the parties’ overpayment stipulation.  
Because the parties’ Rule 155 calculation of the estate tax overpayment 
failed to account for the estate’s unpaid interest obligation, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the Tax Court exceeded its authority under § 6512(b)(2) by 
attempting to restrain the Commissioner from offsetting the interest liability 
                                                     
288  Id. at 26.   
289  Id. at 27.   
290  429 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2005).   
291  Id. at 538.   
292  Id. at 538–39 (citing Estate of Baumgardner v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 445 
(1985)).  Although not explicit, the Fifth Circuit appeared to draw the line at 
interest that may be incorporated into an overpayment determination to interest 
that had been assessed and paid at the time of the overpayment calculation.    
293  Id. at 538 (citing I.R.C. § 7481(c)(1) and (c)(2)(B)).  For a discussion of the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7481, see Part VII.D.  
294  Id. at 539.   
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against the refund due.  Rather, the court determined that § 6512(b)(4) 
specifically barred the Tax Court from restraining the Commissioner’s 
offset.   
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the Tax Court in Estate of Smith does not 
necessarily resolve the potential conflict between § 6512(b)(2) and (b)(4) in 
future cases.  While the Tax Court must observe the decision in cases 
appealable to the Fifth Circuit under the Golsen rule, the court is free to 
follow its precedent in cases appealable to other circuit courts of appeals.295     
 
4. Proposals to Expand Refund Jurisdiction 
 
As discussed above, the boundaries of the Board/Tax Court’s limited 
refund jurisdiction were established early and have changed relatively little 
over the years.  Nevertheless, starting in 1924 proposals have been made to 
grant full refund jurisdiction to the Board/Tax Court,296 and these 
                                                     
295 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Estate of Smith points to a means of avoiding 
the potential conflict between § 6512(b)(2) and (b)(4) altogether, by limiting the 
Tax Court’s overpayment determination under § 6512(b)(1) to those liabilities 
actually addressed by the parties in their Rule 155 computation—rather than 
extending the determination to all items that the parties could have (and perhaps 
should have) addressed in their stipulation.  On the other hand, the Tax Court’s 
reviewed opinion in Estate of Smith certainly encourages the Commissioner to 
include all assessed interest obligations (and other assessed additions to tax) in the 
Rule 155 computation to avoid the prospect of effectively waiving collection of 
those obligations.    
296 E.g., Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 388–89 (1924) (statement of Frank Lowson, American Institute of 
Accountants, arguing for refund jurisdiction on the ground that it would provide a 
speedy and inexpensive forum for adjudicating refund claims that was not 
otherwise available); 1925 Hearings, supra note 217, at 849 (testimony of D.A. 
Smith, American Paper and Pulp Ass’n, arguing that taxpayers who had already 
paid a disputed tax should have the same right of appeal to the Board as those who 
were contesting an asserted deficiency); 1932 Hearings, supra note 244, at 363–64 
(statement of Comm. on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Ass’n, arguing that 
the Board’s lack of refund jurisdiction resulted in unnecessary duplicative 
litigation); 1942 Hearings, supra note 250, at 95 (testimony of Randolph Paul, Tax 
Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury); Hearings on S. 1973, S. 1974, S. 1975, S. 
1976, S. 1977, S. 1978, S. 1979, Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 194–95 (1969) 
(testimony of Bruce S. Lane, Chairman, Comm. on Court Procedure, Tax Section, 
American Bar Ass’n) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. 
During consideration of the Revenue Act of 1924, Senator McKellar proposed 
an amendment that automatically would have given jurisdiction to the Board of all 
refund claims in excess of $10,000.  See Part II, notes 151–154 and accompanying 
text.  Senator McKellar persisted for several years in making the proposal, which 
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proposals have persisted to the present time as part of the broader 
controversy over restructuring the entire system of tax litigation.  Although 
none of these proposals has been adopted, several bear mention as 
important phases in the evolution of attitudes towards tax administration 
and litigation in general, and the Board/Tax Court in particular.  
Probably the most serious attention given to the full refund jurisdiction 
proposal came in 1942, as a result of testimony before the Ways and Means 
Committee by Randolph Paul, then Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals is limited to 
proceedings arising under a deficiency letter issued by the 
Commissioner.  While the Board has authority to find an 
overpayment in certain cases, it does not possess any general 
authority to hear refund claims.  The Board is a tribunal specially 
skilled in tax matters and there is no sound reason for denying to 
taxpayers the opportunity to present their refund claims to such a 
forum.  As the great bulk of tax cases are presently tried before the 
Board of Tax Appeals, the addition of refund jurisdiction will not 
unduly burden the Board.  It is therefore suggested that an 
appropriate procedure be devised under which the Board may hear 
refund cases if the taxpayer desires to utilize that forum instead of 
the district courts or the Court of Claims.297 
 
The refund jurisdiction proposal was not new in 1942.  The American 
Bar Association among others for years had been making the same 
recommendation.298  Moreover, Treasury had been considering the proposal 
for several years.  In 1938, Stanley Surrey, then an attorney at Treasury, 
authored a memorandum proposing broad changes in the entire structure 
of judicial review of tax controversies.299 Among his proposals was that the 
Board of Tax Appeals should be given exclusive jurisdiction of tax litigation 
at the trial level, with respect to both deficiency and refund disputes.300  In 
his view, the relatively small amount of tax litigation before the district 
courts and the Court of Claims did not justify their continued role in such 
                                                                                                                       
never gained substantial support.  See 1932 Hearings, supra note 244, at 355–56 
(testimony of Richard S. Doyle, American Bar Ass’n). 
297 1942 Hearings, supra note 250, at 95. 
298 E.g., 1932 Hearings, supra note 244, at 363 (statement of Comm. on Federal 
Taxation of the American Bar Ass’n). 
299 Memorandum from Stanley S. Surrey entitled “Proposed Changes in 
Method of Judicial Review of Income, Estate and Gift Tax Cases,” Sept. 13, 1938, 
filed in the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treas. Dep’t [hereinafter cited 
as Surrey]. 
300 Id. at 2–3. 
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cases.  Unlike the other forums, the Board was established as an expert 
body to deal with disputes under the highly involved tax laws; the 
development of refund litigation in the district courts in particular had led 
to unnecessary procedural complexity; and the numerous trial forums 
hindered the development of a uniform body of precedents and permitted 
forum shopping by taxpayers.  Jury trials were not available in the Board, 
but this was not perceived as a difficulty; in 1936 and 1937 there were only 
six jury trials in refund actions.301  Sound arguments could be advanced in 
favor of the Surrey proposal, but there were obvious political problems 
with its adoption.  Although the organized bar had for several years 
supported refund jurisdiction for the Board, it would be unlikely to agree to 
a change that would reduce taxpayers’ flexibility in seeking the most 
receptive forum.302  Moreover, the elimination of refund actions in district 
court and the Court of Claims would undoubtedly precipitate a struggle 
between the Justice and Treasury Departments for control of trial level tax 
litigation.303 
The Paul recommendation contemplated concurrent jurisdiction of 
refund litigation in the Board, the district courts, and the Court of Claims, 
and therefore did not suffer to the same degree from the political problems 
raised by the Surrey proposal.  The Board, the staff of the Joint Committee 
on Internal Revenue Taxation, and bar groups all supported the proposal,304 
and Treasury set to work drafting legislation to embody concurrent 
jurisdiction.305  It was apparently during the drafting process that the 
problem emerged which was to prove the undoing of the proposal.  This 
was the question of recoupment.306  Since 1926, the tax laws had provided 
that the Board in determining tax liability for a year with respect to which a 
deficiency notice was issued could consider facts relating to other years, but 
had no jurisdiction to determine whether the tax for other years was 
                                                     
301 Id. at 3. 
302 See infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
303 For a description of this struggle in connection with proposals to 
incorporate the Board/Tax Court into the federal judiciary, see Part IV, notes 193–
207, 301–332 and accompanying text. 
304 Letter from Chairman Murdock to Randolph Paul, Feb. 14, 1942, filed in 
the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treas. Dep’t; Memorandum from Mr. 
Graves to Mr. Wales, Apr. 10, 1945, filed in the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, 
U.S. Treas. Dep’t [hereinafter cited as Graves]. 
305 Memorandum entitled “Proposal to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Board of 
Tax Appeals to Refund Cases Involving Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes,” Apr. 7, 
1942, filed in the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Treas. Dep’t [hereinafter 
cited as Memorandum]. 
306 Id. at 8–9; Graves, supra note 304, at 1–2. 
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underpaid or overpaid.307 Accordingly, the Board had no power to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable recoupment, which would permit parties to offset 
tax liability from time barred years against the liability determined by the 
Board for the year properly before it.308  On the other hand, no such 
statutory provision applied in district court or Court of Claims refund 
actions, and under limited circumstances recoupment was permitted. 
If the Board was not permitted to invoke the doctrine of recoupment, 
taxpayers would be given the “whip hand.”309  That is, in circumstances in 
which they believed themselves entitled to recoupment they could take their 
refund actions to district court or the Court of Claims.  On the other hand, 
if the Government had a recoupment claim, taxpayers could bring their 
refund suit in the Board.  Obviously, such an option for the taxpayer could 
not be sympathetically regarded by Treasury.  The alternative was to amend 
the statute to permit the Board to apply recoupment in the same 
circumstances that the doctrine was permitted to be invoked in district 
court and the Court of Claims.  Several reasons were advanced against this 
solution, the principal one being that it would be inappropriate to grant the 
Board power to invoke recoupment since it did not have full judicial 
status.310  
The recoupment problem led to the removal of the refund proposal 
from the 1942 legislation at an early stage of consideration.311  The proposal 
was revived within Treasury in 1945, but even though it then was pointed 
out that the recoupment problem was insubstantial, there apparently was 
insufficient interest to generate any explicit legislative proposals.312 
A quarter of a century after Randolph Paul expressed Treasury’s support 
for full refund jurisdiction for the Board, the proposal again surfaced as 
part of a general debate concerning the entire structure of tax litigation.  In 
1967, bills were introduced in the House and Senate that proposed 
incorporation of the Tax Court into the federal judiciary as an article III 
                                                     
307 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(g), 44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6214(b)). 
308 See Section D.3.a of this Part.   
309 Memorandum, supra note 305, at 8. 
310 Id. at 8–9.  The evolving history of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to apply the 
doctrine of equitable recoupment, resolved by the express grant of recoupment 
jurisdiction in 2006, is recounted in Section D.3.a of this Part.   
311 Graves, supra note 304, at 1–2. 
312 It was argued that the severity of the recoupment problem was exaggerated 
since Tax Court jurisdiction was limited to determining overpayments.  It could not 
order refunds—such an order could only be made by a district court or the Court 
of Claims, and in such a proceeding the Government would be free to raise the 
recoupment question.  Id. 
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court.313  Senator Joseph Tydings, chairman of a subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, convened hearings on the Senate bill, which 
made no change in the court’s limited jurisdiction to determine 
overpayments for years with respect to which a deficiency notice was 
issued.314  Although the purpose of the hearings initially was limited to the 
question of Tax Court status, the focus soon changed as a result of a 
proposal by the Justice Department that legislation regarding the Tax Court 
also should address fundamental problems of tax litigation.315 
For many years a variety of critics had questioned the means by which 
tax disputes were settled.316  A taxpayer confronted with an adverse Service 
position had the choice of several trial forums.  He could petition the Tax 
Court for redetermination of deficiency assertions of the Commissioner, 
and if he did so he would not be required to pay the disputed tax until 
completion of the Tax Court proceeding.  Alternatively, the taxpayer, if he 
first paid the tax, could sue for refund in either district court or the Court 
of Claims.  If he chose district court, the taxpayer would have a local forum 
with jury trial available; on the other hand, the Court of Claims was similar 
to the Tax Court in that it was a national forum headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. that could not provide a jury trial.  Different rules of 
procedure obtained in the three forums, and commentators noted different 
proclivities in the application of substantive rules of tax law.317  Thus, the 
taxpayer had considerable latitude in selecting the most hospitable forum.  
                                                     
313 H.R. 10100, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2041, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967).  This development is discussed at length in Part IV, at text accompanying 
notes 303–334.   
314 Hearings on S. 2041 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
1967 Hearings]; Hearings on S. 2041 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as 1968 Hearings]; 1969 Hearings, supra note 296. 
315 1967 Hearings, supra note 314, at 40–46 (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, 
Ass’t Att’y Gen., Tax Division, Dep’t of Justice). 
316 See, e.g., Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IOWA 
L. REV. 312 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson]; Surrey, supra note 299. 
317 See, e.g., Walter T. Beaman, When Not to go to the Tax Court: Advantages and 
Procedures In Going to District Court, 7 J. TAX’N 356 (1957); William H. Bowen, 
Discovery in Tax Court: Why Not Follow the Federal Rules?, 44 A.B.A. J. 129 (1958); 
Marvin J. Garbis, Choosing Your Forum in Civil Tax Litigation, 15 PRAC. LAW. 41 
(1968); Marving J. Garbis & Robert L. Frome, Selecting the Court for the Optimum 
Disposition of a Tax Controversy, 27 J. TAX’N 216 (1967); Max J. Hamburger, Choice of 
Forum for Litigation: The United States Tax Court, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 
1315 (1974); Max J. Hamburger, The Trial of a Tax Court Case: Some Practical 
Reflections, 30 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED TAX’N 1 (1972); Lester M. Ponder, Trial Court 
Litigation—Tax Court, Court of Claims and District Court—A Practicing Lawyer’s View, 
21 U.S.C. TAX INST. 117 (1969). 
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This system of trial litigation was criticized as unnecessarily complex and 
unfair to both the Government and the taxpayer.  The numerous trial 
forums were not bound by the precedents of the others, and conflicting 
rules frequently emerged that hindered the uniform application of the tax 
laws.  Moreover, the interest of predictability, vital in tax planning, was 
undermined.  Forum shopping by taxpayers was permitted to the prejudice 
of the Government, but the forum shopping privilege was discriminatory, 
as only those who could afford to pay the tax in advance of litigation could 
choose a forum other than the Tax Court.  The appellate structure also had 
attracted considerable controversy.318  Eleven different courts of appeals 
reviewed decisions of the Tax Court and the district courts, and their 
decisions periodically were in conflict with each other as well as with the 
Court of Claims, the decisions of which at the time were only reviewable, as 
were the decisions of the courts of appeals, by the Supreme Court.  The 
Supreme Court took few tax cases, and many issues that had received 
extensive judicial attention in the lower courts remained unresolved for 
many years. 
Obviously, these problems were far broader than the issue of refund 
jurisdiction for the Tax Court.  Nevertheless, refund jurisdiction did play a 
role in various broad reform proposals.  In its report to the Tydings 
committee, the Justice Department suggested the possibility of eliminating 
multiple trial forums.319  In this regard, Justice seemed to favor exclusive tax 
jurisdiction in the district courts, but it also raised the possibility of giving 
such exclusive jurisdiction to the Tax Court.320  A concomitant of removing 
tax jurisdiction from the district courts and the Court of Claims, under this 
approach, would be to accord full refund jurisdiction, as well as deficiency 
jurisdiction, to the Tax Court.  On the other hand, tax practitioners and the 
American Bar Association opposed the elimination of multiple trial forums, 
and instead endorsed the concept of full concurrent jurisdiction among the 
forums.321 As with the Justice view, this would mean adding full refund 
jurisdiction to deficiency jurisdiction in the case of the Tax Court.  In the 
case of the district courts and the Court of Claims, the bar proposal would 
entail adding deficiency jurisdiction to the extant refund jurisdiction.  The 
Treasury view differed from that of both Justice and the private tax bar.  
Treasury believed that the Tax Court was the most important forum for 
resolving tax disputes and establishing a workable and uniform body of tax 
precedents.322  Thus, it opposed any alternative which would lead to the 
elimination of the Tax Court or the reduction of its influence.  Obviously, 
                                                     
318 See Part XI.H.   
319 1968 Hearings, supra note 314, at 120–23. 
320 Id. at 122–23. 
321 See Part IV, notes 321–323 and accompanying text. 
322 See Part IV, notes 324–330 and accompanying text.  
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the Justice preference for exclusive district court jurisdiction was 
unacceptable to Treasury.  Moreover, Treasury opposed the proposal for 
full concurrent jurisdiction because, in its view, such a system would 
inevitably lead to the transfer of much tax litigation to the district courts.  
In this connection, Treasury argued that the additional refund cases that 
would come to the Tax Court would not nearly offset the loss of deficiency 
litigation to the district courts and the Court of Claims.  Most refund 
litigation did not result from unwitting overpayments of tax, but rather was 
the consequence of conscious decisions by taxpayers to pay deficiency 
assertions to bring their case in district court or the Court of Claims.323  
Although there could be no accurate prediction of the number of taxpayers 
who would prefer to litigate deficiency disputes in district court or the 
Court of Claims, Treasury believed their number to be substantial.324 
The Tydings committee deliberations ended on a non-conclusive note, 
and no changes in the tax litigation structure were enacted.325 In effect, the 
Treasury view favoring retention of the status quo prevailed.  Although the 
organized bar continued to support full concurrent jurisdiction,326 
subsequent years have witnessed little legislative activity either to expand 
the Tax Court’s refund jurisdiction or to introduce deficiency jurisdiction to 
the district courts or the Court of Federal Claims. 
The most recent proposal of significance touching on the refund 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court was that advanced by the Federal Courts 
Study Committee in 1990.  This 15-person committee, the composition of 
which was determined by the Chief Justice of the United States pursuant to 
authorization contained in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act,327 was organized to comprehensively investigate issues plaguing the 
federal court system and to make recommendations for improvement.328  
The committee issued tentative recommendations near the end of 1989,329 
followed by final recommendations in early 1990.330    
With respect to the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, the committee 
recommended that the vast majority of federal tax litigation be consolidated 
before this body.  Disturbed by the availability of three separate trial fora in 
                                                     
323 See 1969 Hearings, supra note 296, at 476–78 (statement of K. Martin 
Worthy, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service).  
324 Id. 
325 See Part IV, notes 301–332 and accompanying text.  
326 Report of Comm. on Court Procedure, reprinted in 23 TAX LAW. 706 (1970). 
327  Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).   
328  Id. at §§ 102, 103, 102 Stat. at 4644.  For further details on the composition 
of the Federal Courts Study Committee, see Part IV.E. 
329  Federal Courts Study Committee, Tentative Recommendations for Public 
Comment (Dec. 22, 1989) [hereinafter FCSC Tentative Recommendations]. 
330  Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study 
Committee (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC Final Report].   
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which to litigate a dispute over tax liability and, in particular, the forum-
shopping such a regime fostered, the committee recommended that the Tax 
Court serve as the exclusive trial level forum for disputes concerning tax 
liability—whether originating in the deficiency or refund posture.331  The 
proposal would have constrained the jurisdiction of the Federal district 
courts over tax matters considerably, leaving those courts with jurisdiction 
over criminal tax cases and enforcement actions only.332  By implication, the 
jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court in the federal tax arena would 
have been abolished altogether.    
Of the various articulated benefits of the proposal, the committee found 
the prospect of increasing the quality and uniformity of tax adjudication 
most compelling.333  The proposed restructuring of the federal tax 
controversy landscape served as a vote of confidence in the Tax Court.  
The committee observed that the Tax Court was the only available forum 
that possessed “the time and sufficiently substantial volume of tax litigation 
to develop expertise in one of the most specialized and technically 
demanding fields in American jurisprudence.”334 However, the committee’s 
proposed reform of the federal tax adjudication landscape did not enjoy 
unanimous support.  A dissenting statement touted the benefits of the 
existing regime.  In particular, the dissenting group found the “genius” of 
the existing regime to rest in the effective blending of specialist and 
                                                     
331  Id. at 70.  As discussed more fully in Part IV.E., the tentative 
recommendations of the committee envisioned the newly constituted Tax Court as 
an article III tribunal.  FCSC Tentative Recommendations, supra note 329, at 30.  
Proposed article III status for the trial level of the Tax Court, however, did not 
survive to be included in the committee’s final recommendations. FCSC Final 
Report, supra note 330, at 70. 
332  Id.    
333  The committee touted the following benefits of the proposed reforms in 
the following terms: 
These changes . . . would rationalize federal tax adjudication, reduce forum-
shopping, relieve workload pressures on the existing Article III appellate 
courts, and reduce the pressure on the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
tax cases to resolve intercircuit conflicts.  Above all, they would increase the 
quality and uniformity of tax adjudication by shifting it from overworked 
judges sitting in a large number of diverse courts to a single court of highly 
trained specialists.   
Id. 
334  Id. The proposals of the Federal Courts Study Committee in this setting and 
the articulated justifications for such proposals are remarkably consistent with an 
article proposing restructuring of the civil tax litigation system published by Tax 
Court Judge Dawson expressing his individual views.  See Howard A. Dawson, Jr., 
Should the Federal Civil Tax Litigation System Be Restructured?, 40 TAX NOTES 1427 
(1988).  
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generalist elements, which it found to be efficient and “perceptively fair.”335  
Indeed, this group of committee members appeared heavily influenced by 
how the proposed reforms would be received by the public, expressing 
grave concern that the centralization of tax litigation in a specialized court 
“would leave the American taxpayers with the impression that the judicial 
system is remote and unresponsive.”336  To bolster its position, the 
dissenting group highlighted the opposition of institutional segments of the 
tax bar to the proposals, including the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Treasury Department, the Claims Court, and the American Bar 
Association—and even the Tax Court itself.337   
The concerns articulated by the dissenting faction of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee evidently prevailed.  The implementing legislation 
proposed by Congress did not include any of the committee’s proposals 
concerning the litigation of federal civil tax disputes.338  Accordingly, the 
landscape of federal tax adjudication remains in central respects largely 
consistent with the compromise reached by Congress in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969.   
 
C. Jeopardy Jurisdiction 
 
In the great majority of disputes between the taxpayer and the Internal 
Revenue Service, collection of contested tax revenues will not be 
endangered by the administrative and judicial remedies ordinarily employed 
to reach a resolution in the matter.339  If administrative procedures do not 
result in a settlement, the Government typically sends a notice of deficiency 
                                                     
335  FCSC Final Report, supra note 330, at 72. 
336  Id.  
337  FCSC Final Report, supra note 330, at 71.  The attribution of opposition to 
the Tax Court as a body appears to have been an overstatement.  To start, it is 
doubtful that the Tax Court would have articulated an institutional position on the 
matter.  Furthermore, at the time, Judge Dawson had recently expressed his private 
support for the consolidation of trial-level adjudication of tax disputes before the 
Tax Court and for the creation of a national court of tax appeals.  See Dawson, 
supra note 334.  However, around the same period, Judge Sterrett expressed his 
disapproval of a national court of tax appeals.  See Michael S. Moriarty & R. Eliot 
Rosen, An Interview with Former Tax Court Chief Judge Sterrett, 41 TAX NOTES 910 
(1988).    
338  See Federal Courts Study Group Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. 5381, 
101st Cong. (1990).  For that matter, none of the implementing legislation became 
law.  Although the bill passed the House of Representatives, the Senate failed to 
take action on the legislation.   
339 See Note, Jeopardy Terminations Under 6851: The Taxpayer’s Rights and Remedies, 
60 IOWA L. REV. 644 (1975); Note, Jeopardy Assessments: The Sovereign’s Stranglehold, 55 
GEO. L.J. 701 (1967). 
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to the taxpayer.340  The deficiency notice informs the taxpayer that a final 
determination of additional tax liability has been made,341 and that the 
Internal Revenue Service will assess and begin collection procedures in 90 
days.342 During the subsequent 90-day period, however, the Internal 
Revenue Service is barred from assessing the deficiency,343 and if the 
taxpayer petitions the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency, the 
ban on assessment and collection is extended until the court renders its 
decision.344  If the taxpayer waives the right to litigate on a prepayment 
basis before the Tax Court by not acting within the 90-day period, but fails 
to pay the tax, the Service then may issue a notice of assessment and 
demand for payment.  Ten days after issuance of such notice and demand, 
the Service may levy upon the taxpayer’s property.345 
There are, however, situations in which the collection of tax revenues 
would be jeopardized by use of the procedures outlined above.  For 
example, the taxpayer may contemplate leaving the country or disposing of 
his assets before the usual deficiency procedures have been instituted or 
completed.346  These situations may arise in respect of either past or current 
tax years.347 
                                                     
340 I.R.C. § 6212(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-1(a).  
341 I.R.C. §§ 6211, 6212(a).  A deficiency is defined as: 
the amount by which the tax imposed by Subtitle A or B, or Chapter 41, 42, 
43, or 44 exceeds the excess of— 
    (1) the sum of  
        (A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a 
return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the tax by 
the taxpayer thereon, plus 
        (B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) 
as a deficiency, over— 
  (2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection (b)(2),  made.  
I.R.C. § 6211.  
342 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
343 I.R.C. § 6213(a), (c).  If assessment is made prior to the time that the 
taxpayer has to appeal to the Tax Court, suit may be brought in a district court to 
enjoin the assessment and collection of the assessment.  I.R.C. § 6213(a).  The 
provisions of I.R.C. § 7421 are necessarily inapplicable. 
344 I.R.C. § 6213(a).  If assessment is made prior to the decision of the Tax 
Court, the taxpayer may sue to enjoin such assessment.  Id. 
345 I.R.C. §§ 6213(c), 6331(a). 
346 I.R.C. §§ 6851, 6861, 6862, 6871. 
347 I.R.C. § 6851; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 364 (1976); see also Laing v. 
United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976); Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 121 (5th Cir. 
1975); Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974); Schreck v. 
United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969). 
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Accordingly, the power immediately to assess and collect jeopardized tax 
revenues has been given to the Internal Revenue Service.348  In situations in 
which the Commissioner believes that jeopardy of tax exists for a year 
(either current or past) with respect to which a return is not yet due, he is 
authorized to make an immediate assessment of tax for such year and such 
tax is made immediately due and payable.349  This procedure is referred to 
as a termination assessment.350  If the Commissioner believes that jeopardy 
of tax exists for a prior year for which a return has been filed or is past due, 
the usual prohibition against assessment and collection until completion of 
normal deficiency procedures is waived.351  The Internal Revenue Service 
immediately may, upon determining that a deficiency exists, assess and 
collect the deficiency.352  This procedure is referred to as a jeopardy 
assessment.353 
The relationship of these provisions to the jurisdiction of the 
Board/Tax Court has been the subject of conflicting judicial interpretation 
and statutory amendment.354  Originally, jurisdiction of the Board to hear an 
appeal in respect of a jeopardy assessment was invoked by a complicated 
                                                     
348 For completed tax years in which a return has been filed, or a return is past 
due, the procedures set out in § 6861 are controlling.  For current years or years in 
which a return is not yet due, assessment is provided by § 6851.  See infra notes 
478–544 and accompanying text.  This text will not deal with jeopardy assessments 
under § 6862, as such assessments are not within the jurisdictional purview of the 
Tax Court.  In addition, assessments under § 6871, concerning claims for income, 
estate, and gift taxes in bankruptcy and receivership proceedings will not be 
discussed. 
349 I.R.C. § 6851(a). 
350 Id. 
351 I.R.C. § 6861(a). I.R.C. § 6863(a) provides: 
When an assessment has been made under section 6851, 6852, 6861, or 
6862, the collection of the whole or any amount of such assessment may be 
stayed by filing with the Secretary, within such time as may be fixed by 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, a bond equal to the amount as to 
which the stay is desired . . . . 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6863-1(a)(1)–(2) provides that a bond may be made at any time 
before collection is authorized by levy under § 6331(a) or after authorization under 
§ 6331(a) but prior to actual collection, or in the discretion of the district director, 
after any such levy has been made. 
352 I.R.C. §§ 6861, 6331.  Unlike the normal assessment procedures, where ten 
days must pass before collection, in the jeopardy situation, the usual ten-day waiting 
period for payment can be waived and the Service can simultaneously, with the 
assessment, levy and collect the assessment.  I.R.C. § 6331(a). 
353 I.R.C. § 6861. 
354 E.g., compare Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938) 
with Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976); see also Schreck v. United States, 
301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969).  
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procedure of claim in abatement and bond.355  Numerous difficulties with 
respect to the abatement procedure led to its abandonment in 1926.356  In 
its place was substituted a simpler procedure.  A taxpayer against whom a 
jeopardy assessment had been made would be able to appeal to the Board 
in the same manner as the regular deficiency taxpayer.  To effect such a 
procedure, the Commissioner was required to send the taxpayer a 
deficiency notice within 60 days of the making of the assessment.357  
Although this procedure has remained essentially unchanged to the 
present,358 several issues have confronted the court in the application of this 
provision.  Among these have been the court’s jurisdiction to review the 
propriety of the Commissioner’s action in making a jeopardy assessment,359 
the validity of a jeopardy assessment if a deficiency notice is not mailed 
within 60 days,360 the amount of a deficiency notice based upon a jeopardy 
assessment if a prior deficiency notice has been mailed,361 and whether a 
deficiency notice issued in connection with an invalid jeopardy assessment 
may form the basis of Tax Court jurisdiction.362 
The jurisdiction of the Board/Tax Court to redetermine termination 
assessments was, until 1976, unsettled.363  The early provision permitting 
the Commissioner to terminate a taxpayer’s taxable year and to declare a tax 
immediately due and owing, made no provision with respect to either 
assessment or issuance of a deficiency notice that would be required for 
Tax Court review.364  
The few early cases applying the termination provision turned on the 
question of whether the termination assessment authority was derived 
under the general assessment provision or the jeopardy assessment 
provision.365  Resolution of this question depended on whether a tax due 
upon a terminated year constituted a deficiency.366  If the terminated tax 
                                                     
355 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 279(a), 43 Stat. 300. 
356 See infra notes 392–412 and accompanying text. 
357 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279, 44 Stat. 59 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6861). 
358 Compare Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279, 44 Stat. 59 with I.R.C. § 6861. 
359 See California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1924).  Substantial 
changes in taxpayer remedies in respect of review of the Commissioner’s decision 
to make a jeopardy assessment were expected in 1976.  See infra notes 429–437 and 
accompanying text. 
360 See infra notes 460–464 and accompanying text. 
361 See infra notes 467–471 and accompanying text. 
362 See infra notes 454–459 and accompanying text. 
363 See infra notes 483–518 and accompanying text. 
364 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084; Revenue Act of 1921, 
ch. 138, § 250(g), 42 Stat. 267; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 282, 42 Stat. 302; 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 285, 44 Stat. 59. 
365 See Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938). 
366 See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976). 
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was considered a deficiency, the jeopardy provision that required the 
mailing of a deficiency notice would have to be complied with for the 
termination assessment to be valid.367  A wide range of judicial 
interpretation, culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Laing v. United 
States,368 and an increased use of termination assessments, particularly in an 
antinarcotics program,369 led to a major revision of the termination 
provision in 1976.370 
 
1. Jeopardy Assessments 
 
Prior to 1921, the right to pre-assessment review of a disputed tax was 
unavailable to the taxpayer.371  If the Bureau determined that an additional 
tax was due, the tax was assessed, and the taxpayer could attack the 
assessment only by paying the tax and bringing a subsequent suit for 
refund.372  Because taxpayers were not permitted to contest the tax prior to 
payment, there was no need for a jeopardy assessment procedure.373 
Dissatisfaction with the harshness of a “pay first, litigate later” regime 
led Congress, in 1921, to authorize an administrative procedure within the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue by which taxpayers could question disputed 
deficiencies in taxes before assessment.374 However, if the Bureau believed 
that future collection of the deficiency would be prejudiced by the delay 
that would result from the use of the pre-assessment procedure, it was 
permitted to circumvent the procedure.375 In such event, assessment could 
be made at any time without the necessity of the review procedure.376 
Various difficulties with the administrative remedy authorized in 1921 
prompted Congress in 1924 to make a number of important changes in 
taxpayer prepayment remedies.377  The Revenue Act of 1924 provided that 
“if, in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determined that there 
                                                     
367 Id. 
368 Id.  See infra notes 511–518 and accompanying text. 
369 See Stephen E. Silver, Terminating the Taxpayer’s Taxable Year: How IRS Uses It 
Against Narcotics Suspects, 40 J. TAX’N 110 (1974). 
370 See infra notes 519–540 and accompanying text. 
371 See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), (d)–(e), 40 Stat. 1083; Revenue 
Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 9(a), 39 Stat. 763; H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 14–15 (1921). 
372 See Part I, notes 142–197 and accompanying text. 
373 See id. 
374 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 138, § 250, 42 Stat. 264.  For discussion of this 
material, see Part I.B.3. 
375 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265. 
376 Id. 
377 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 7–8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 8–9 (1924); 
Albert L. Hopkins, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 12 A.B.A. J. 466, 466–67 
(1926); Clarence A. Miller, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 169 
(1925). 
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was a deficiency” in the tax imposed by the Revenue Act, the 
Commissioner would be required to mail a notice of that determination to 
the taxpayer.378  Within 60 days of mailing of the notice, the taxpayer would 
be entitled to file an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals.379  If the 
taxpayer petitioned the Board for review of the Commissioner’s 
determination, assessment and collection of the tax would be stayed, 
pending the Board’s final determination of tax liability.380 
There were situations, however, in which pre-assessment review might 
endanger future collection of tax deficiencies.381 Accordingly, the jeopardy 
assessment procedure, established three years earlier, was continued and the 
Commissioner thereby was permitted to assess and collect a deficiency 
immediately—bypassing the procedure set out for the ordinary assessment 
and collection of a deficiency.382  In recognition of the fact that a jeopardy 
situation could arise at different times during regular deficiency procedures, 
the Act provided that a jeopardy assessment could be made before or after 
the mailing of a deficiency notice, during the pendency of Board litigation, 
or at any time prior to the time that the Board’s decision became final.383  
The jeopardy assessment could vary in amount from a deficiency notice 
sent prior to the jeopardy determination.384 
A taxpayer confronted by a jeopardy assessment could contest the 
assessment in one of two ways.  First, he could pay the assessment and 
institute refund procedures.385  Alternatively, if the taxpayer desired Board 
review, a complicated abatement procedure was available.386  The taxpayer 
could file a claim in abatement with the Bureau, accompanied by a 
satisfactory bond in an amount up to twice the assessment.387  Collection of 
the tax would be stayed pending Bureau consideration of the claim.  
Notification of the Bureau’s decision was required, and if the claim was 
denied in whole or part, the taxpayer could petition the Board to review the 
Commissioner’s action within 60 days of the denial.388 Collection of the tax 
would be stayed further until the Board’s decision.389  Board review would, 
                                                     
378 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297. 
379 Id. §§ 274, 900(a)–(h), 43 Stat. 297, 336. 
380 Id. § 274. 
381 Id. §§ 274(a), 279, 43 Stat. 297, 300.  See ROBERT HIESTER MONTGOMERY, 
INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 284 (1926); Latham, supra note 228. 
382 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297.  
383 Id. §§ 274(d), 279, 43 Stat. 300. 
384 Id. § 274(d). 
385 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 281(a), 1011–1012, 1014, 43 Stat. 301, 
342, 343. 
386 Id. § 279(a), 43 Stat. 300. 
387 Id. 
388 Id. § 279(b). 
389 Id. § 279(a). 
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therefore, be based upon the denial of the claim in abatement, and not 
upon an appeal from a deficiency notice.390  In any event, whether the 
taxpayer pursued the refund or the Board’s abatement procedure, the 
jeopardy assessment provisions achieved their objectives—payment, either 
voluntarily, by collection, or guaranteed by bond, prior to any independent 
review.391 
Certain difficulties arose in respect of the claim in abatement procedure.  
If the jeopardy assessment was made prior to the mailing of a deficiency 
notice, Board jurisdiction could result only from a denial of a claim in 
abatement.392  A taxpayer who was unable to secure the appropriate amount 
of a bond, which was required to accompany the claim in abatement, would 
be deprived of a hearing before the Board.393  If the Bureau collected by 
distraint or levy prior to the filing of a claim in abatement, the taxpayer also 
would be deprived of Board review.394  Moreover, if the taxpayer voluntarily 
paid the assessment, no hearing before the Board was possible under the 
1924 Act because the Board could not determine overpayments or order 
refunds.395 
A more confusing situation arose if a deficiency notice had been mailed 
prior to the making of a jeopardy assessment.  Under the provisions of the 
1924 Act, the Board had jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies but had no 
power to determine overpayments.396  If an action was pending before the 
Board, and a jeopardy assessment was made with respect to that deficiency, 
the assessment of the deficiency would, under a strict reading of the statute, 
terminate whatever deficiency existed and thus deprive the Board of 
jurisdiction based upon the earlier deficiency notice.397 Voluntary payment 
or collection by distraint or levy was theoretically not necessary to terminate 
the Board’s jurisdiction.398  Thus, the Bureau could succeed in terminating 
Board jurisdiction, if an action were pending, or potential Board 
jurisdiction, if a deficiency notice had been mailed and a petition had not 
been filed, merely by making a jeopardy assessment.399 
                                                     
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
392 Id. §§ 274(d), 279. 
393 Id.; National Tank & Export Co., 3 B.T.A. 1217, 1220 (1926); Clois L. 
Greene, 2 B.T.A. 148, 149 (1925); California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251, 
1252 (1925). 
394 Latham, supra note 228, at 219.  But see California Associated Raisin Co., 1 
B.T.A. 314, 315 (1925); Oakdale Coal Co., 1 B.T.A. 773, 774 (1925). 
395 California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 314, 315 (1925); ROBERT 
HIESTER MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 503 (1926). 
396 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274, 900(a)–(h), 43 Stat. 297, 336. 
397 Id. §§ 273–274, 279, 43 Stat. 296–297, 300. 
398 Latham, supra note 228, at 212–14. 
399 Id. 
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The Board, however, was unwilling to permit such unilateral action on 
the part of the Bureau to destroy Board jurisdiction after a deficiency notice 
had been mailed and the taxpayer had petitioned the Board for review.400  
Some taxpayers might be unable to secure the bond necessary for the 
abatement procedure, and if a jeopardy assessment could prevent the Board 
from completing action on a case already before it, the purpose for which 
the Board was created would be subverted.401  Accordingly, the Board, in an 
early decision, stated in dictum that once Board jurisdiction was invoked by 
a timely petition appealing from a deficiency determination, the Board’s 
jurisdiction could not be terminated by a unilateral Bureau jeopardy 
assessment unless the taxpayer voluntarily paid the tax.402 This position 
defied the clear import of the statutory definition of a deficiency and would 
have resulted in an extension of the Board’s jurisdiction beyond its limited 
deficiency jurisdiction.  The dictum, however, never figured in the 
disposition of a case.  In the two-year period between 1924 and 1926, the 
situation was not presented to the Board, and 1926 legislation radically 
altered the procedure.403 
Apart from the jurisdictional problems that confronted the court, the 
claim in abatement procedure failed to achieve its objective—a prompt 
review of the underlying deficiency.  First, if a jeopardy assessment was 
made after the conclusion of a Board hearing but prior to a final decision, it 
was possible that two hearings might result; the first hearing to determine 
the deficiency and the second to review the denial of a claim in 
abatement.404  This was possible because the Commissioner could assert a 
jeopardy assessment before the Board’s decision became final.  Further, 
since the Commissioner already had determined that a jeopardy assessment 
was necessary, the requirement that the taxpayer first seek Bureau review of 
the jeopardy determination was repetitive.405 
In response to the difficulties generated by the jeopardy assessment 
provisions of the 1924 Act, a less complicated and more streamlined system 
                                                     
400 See California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 314 (1925), rev’d and dismissed, 
California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925); ROBERT HIESTER 
MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 493 (1926). 
401 California Associated Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 314, 316 (1925). 
402 Id.; see also Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925). 
403 In the original California Raisin case, the Board had applied its holding to 
maintain jurisdiction after a jeopardy assessment was made. 1 B.T.A. 314, 315.  In a 
subsequent decision, 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925), the Board, although indicating its 
approval of its earlier legal holding, reversed and dismissed for want of jurisdiction 
because the facts indicated that the petitioner had never received a deficiency 
notice on which proper jurisdiction could be based.  Id. at 1251–52. 
404 See S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 26–27 (1926). 
405 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 279, 43 Stat. 300. 
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was substituted by the Revenue Act of 1926.406  Under the revised rules, if a 
jeopardy assessment was made prior to the issuance of a deficiency notice, 
the Commissioner was required to mail a deficiency notice in respect of the 
assessment within 60 days.407  The taxpayer then could file a petition with 
the Board based on that notice, in the same manner as a regular deficiency 
determination.408  The Board then would determine the tax liability for the 
year in question.  If, however, the jeopardy assessment was made 
subsequent to the mailing of a deficiency notice, the assessment would not 
serve to terminate Board jurisdiction based on the original notice.409  
Whether the jeopardy assessment was made prior to the mailing of the 
deficiency notice or subsequent thereto, the taxpayer had the option of 
paying the assessment or staying collection by filing a satisfactory bond.410  
In neither case would the taxpayer lose his right of appeal to the Board.411  
In effect, if the assessment was paid, the Board action would become one 
for refund.412 
Although the need to protect revenues provided ample justification for 
the jeopardy assessment procedure, the potential for abuse remained ever 
present.  First, the possibility always existed that the Commissioner might 
err either in the computation of the deficiency or in the determination of 
jeopardy.  Another problem sometimes encountered was the use of 
jeopardy assessments to toll the statute of limitations; the same tolling of 
the statute could be effected by the issuance of a deficiency letter, but the 
Service occasionally used the more drastic jeopardy procedure for this 
purpose.413 
The difficulties engendered by misuse of the jeopardy procedure were 
compounded by the Bureau’s position that once a jeopardy assessment was 
made, it could not be abated except by judicial determination that there had 
been an over-assessment of tax.414 Thus, if subsequent facts indicated that 
the assessment had been improperly made or new facts came to light  that 
                                                     
406 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279, 44 Stat. 59 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§§ 6861, 6863). 
407 Id. § 279(b). 
408 Id. §§ 274(a), 279(c). 
409 Id. § 279(c). 
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411 Id. § 279. 
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413 See Veeder v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929); Foundation Co. v. 
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dispelled any belief that jeopardy of revenues was imminent, the Bureau 
would not abate the assessment.  The Bureau maintained this position even 
after 1938, when an amendment to the jeopardy provision was adopted that 
seemed to authorize administrative abatement.415  In 1954, congressional 
intent with regard to jeopardy assessment abatement was clarified by a 
provision that authorized the Commissioner to abate a jeopardy assessment, 
or any unpaid portion thereof, to the extent that he believed the assessment 
to be excessive in amount.416 The statute was silent, however, as to the 
method by which a taxpayer could secure such abatement.  Experience with 
the provision indicates that taxpayer use of the provision had been minimal, 
probably due to the lack of a delineated procedure.417 
In view of the difficulties of securing abatement of jeopardy 
assessments, many believed that some form of expedited judicial review of 
the propriety of such assessments was necessary.418  The Board, however, in 
one of its earliest decisions, held that it was without power to adjudicate 
whether the circumstances upon which the Commissioner acted were such 
as to denote jeopardy and justify his belief.419  This position was supported 
by the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1926.420  Thereafter, in 1928 
Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee, many tax practitioners 
urged that the Board be given jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the 
Commissioner’s determination of jeopardy was proper.421  Such proposals 
were not adopted.422 
Continued attempts by taxpayers to have the Board and other courts 
examine the underlying factual basis for the jeopardy determination met 
with failure;423 in 1931, the Supreme Court implicitly approved the 
                                                     
415 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 819(e), 52 Stat. 580, amending Revenue Act 
of 1926, ch. 27, § 279(f), 44 Stat. 59.  
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417 Id.  See Note, Jeopardy Assessments: The Sovereign Stranglehold, 55 GEO. L.J. 701, 
707 (1967); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1(e). 
418 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 302–03 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 
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70th Cong., 1st Sess. 466–67, 530–32, 543–44, 547 (1928) (statement of H. 
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421 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1928, Before Comm. on Ways and Means, 70th 
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Before the Senate Finance Comm., 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 298–99, 338 (1928). 
422 See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791. 
423 See, e.g., Darnell v. Thomlinson, 220 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1955); Human Eng’r 
Inst. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 61, 65 (1973); Continental Prod. Co., 20 B.T.A. 818, 
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constitutionality of the jeopardy assessment procedure in Phillips v. 
Commissioner.424  The primary reason offered by the courts and the Board for 
their refusal to review the propriety of a jeopardy determination was that 
adequate remedies, in both the Board and federal courts, were ultimately 
available to review the underlying deficiency.425  In addition, three other 
considerations undoubtedly prompted courts to decline such review.  First, 
the taxpayer could initiate abatement procedures before the Bureau.426 
Second, injunctive relief against assessments traditionally had been strictly 
limited.427  Third, the availability of pre-assessment review in non-jeopardy 
situations was a privilege accorded certain taxpayers and did not require all 
taxpayers to be subject to favored treatment.428 
Fifty years of continued judicial affirmation of administrative discretion 
came to an end in 1976.  In Commissioner v. Shapiro,429 the Supreme Court 
rejected the Government’s position that “it has no obligation to prove that 
the seizure has any basis in fact no matter how severe or irreparable the 
injury to the taxpayer and no matter how inadequate his eventual remedy in 
the Tax Court.”430 
Prompted by the Shapiro decision, Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, changed the jeopardy procedure under § 7429 to require the 
Commissioner to send the taxpayer a written statement of the information 
upon which the Service relies in making the assessment within five days of 
the making of that assessment.431  Within 30 days after the statement is 
furnished to the taxpayer, the taxpayer may request the Service to determine 
if the making of the assessment is reasonable and if the amount assessed is 
appropriate.432  In making these determinations, the Service is required to 
                                                     
424 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
425 See, e.g., Salisbury v. United States, 356 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lloyd v. 
Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957); Adler v. Nicholas, 70 F. Supp. 514 (D. 
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consider information obtained after the assessment.433 If the Service finds 
the assessment inappropriate, it may abate the assessment in whole or in 
part.434  If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the Service’s determination, the 
taxpayer may, within 30 days after notification by the Service, bring an 
action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination.435   
As originally enacted, judicial review of agency determinations under 
§ 7429 was limited to the Federal district courts.  The decision to place 
expedited review under the jurisdiction of the district courts and not the 
Tax Court was based in large part on a belief that taxpayers would find it 
more convenient to bring such an action in their local district courts.436  
Speedy review of the propriety of jeopardy assessments in the Tax Court 
would require either the taxpayer to come to Washington or the court to 
make extraordinary arrangements for a circuit hearing.437 
However, the exclusivity of district court jurisdiction in this setting did 
not prove long lasting.  As part of the Technical and Miscellaneous 
Revenue Act of 1988,438 Congress granted the Tax Court concurrent 
jurisdiction to review determinations concerning jeopardy assessments and 
levies in limited circumstances.  If a taxpayer has already invoked the 
deficiency jurisdiction of the Tax Court for a tax year that serves as the 
subject of a subsequent jeopardy assessment or levy, the taxpayer is 
permitted to seek judicial review of the assessment or levy by motion filed 
in the underlying deficiency proceeding.439  If the Tax Court is available as a 
forum, its jurisdiction to review a jeopardy assessment or levy is subject to 
the same terms and limitations as that of the district court, which are 
described below. 
Within 20 days of commencement of the action, the reviewing court 
must make an independent, de novo determination as to the issues 
considered by the Internal Revenue Service.440  That is, the court must 
determine whether the assessment or levy is reasonable under the 
                                                     
433 S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 365 (1976). 
434 See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 364 n.5 (1976). 
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440 I.R.C. § 7429(b)(2). 
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circumstances and, with respect to assessments, whether the amount 
assessed is appropriate under the circumstances.441  In such proceedings, 
the Government has the burden of proving that the making of the 
assessment is reasonable,442 and the taxpayer has the burden of proving that 
the amount of the assessment is unreasonable.443  In this regard, the 
Government is required to provide a written statement containing any 
information relating to its determination of the amount assessed.444  The 
standard by which “reasonableness” in this setting must be determined is 
unavoidably imprecise.  However, the Tax Court has articulated certain 
parameters for evaluating this standard, explaining that reasonableness must 
be established by a standard of proof that is something more than “not 
arbitrary or capricious” but something less than “substantial evidence.”445     
In determining whether the assessment is appropriate, the court is not 
expected to pass on ultimate tax liability; the determination of the propriety 
of the assessment will have no effect on the determination of correct tax 
liability in a subsequent proceeding.446  Accordingly, the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction to make a determination under § 7429(b) has no effect on the 
determination of the tax liability that serves as the subject of the underlying 
deficiency proceeding.447          
If the court finds in favor of the taxpayer, it may order the Secretary to 
release the levy, to abate the assessment, or to redetermine the amount 
assessed.448 In addition, the court is provided broad authority to “take such 
further action as the court finds appropriate.”449  The court’s determination 
in this setting is final; no appellate review is permitted.450   
Judicial review under § 7429(b) is not open ended.  Rather, the taxpayer 
may commence a judicial proceeding to review a jeopardy assessment or 
levy only within the following window:  the earlier of (1) 90 days after the 
Service notifies the taxpayer of its determination concerning its 
administrative review of the assessment or levy, or (2) the 16th day after the 
                                                     
441  I.R.C. § 7429(b)(3).   
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taxpayer requested the administrative review be undertaken.451  These filing 
requirements are central to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and 
they may not be waived—even with the consent of the Service.452  Hence, 
the failure of the Service to promptly respond to the taxpayer’s request for 
an administrative review of the jeopardy assessment or levy does not serve 
to extend the period for judicial review of the matter.453   
With the exception of the provisions supplying judicial review of the 
propriety of a jeopardy assessment, the procedures established in 1926 have 
remained essentially unchanged.454  However, various jurisdictional 
questions have arisen, particularly with respect to the procedural regularity 
of the assessment and its relation to the notice of deficiency and Tax Court 
proceedings.  A prerequisite for the making of a jeopardy assessment is a 
final determination that a deficiency exists.455  If such determination is not 
made, the assessment is a nullity and may be enjoined by a district court.456 
The application of this doctrine in the Tax Court, however, is problematic.  
Since a jurisdictional prerequisite to review by the Tax Court is the sending 
of a deficiency notice, the taxpayer will not be in a position to request that 
the Tax Court invalidate an assessment until he is in receipt of a deficiency 
notice based on that assessment.457  If a final determination is made 
subsequent to the jeopardy assessment but prior to the issuance of the 
deficiency notice, the assessment may be held invalid, but the deficiency 
notice will stand independent of the assessment and the taxpayer will be 
subject to a court determination of the deficiency.458  In the event the court 
finds the assessment improper, the Commissioner is empowered to make a 
new assessment, so the net effect will be a continuation of the old 
assessment.459 
Assuming that the jeopardy assessment is based upon a final 
determination of deficiency, such assessment can be made prior to the 
institution of regular deficiency procedures.460  In such event, the Code 
requires the mailing of a deficiency notice within 60 days after 
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457 See I.R.C. §§ 6211–6213, 6851, 6861. 
458 See Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 223, 226–27 (1963). 
459 I.R.C. § 6861(a); see also Berry v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 301, 314 
(1952). 
460 I.R.C. § 6861(b). 
Foundational Parameters of the Court’s Jurisdiction             337 
 
assessment.461  If the deficiency notice is not mailed, the assessment is a 
nullity and the taxpayer may sue in a district court to enjoin collection.462  
Obviously, the failure to send a deficiency notice will block any appeal to 
the Tax Court.463  If the deficiency notice is sent subsequent to the 60-day 
period, the assessment may be invalid, but the deficiency notice will be 
valid, and such notice provides the necessary prerequisite for ordinary 
deficiency jurisdiction.464 
Jurisdictional questions also may arise with respect to the use of 
jeopardy assessments near the time that the period of limitations on 
assessment and collection is about to expire.  If the assessment is made 
within 60 days of the date on which the period of limitations runs, and the 
deficiency notice thereupon is not mailed until after the period has expired 
but prior to the expiration of 60 days from the date of assessment, the 
assessment is valid and the Tax Court will have jurisdiction to redetermine 
the deficiency.465  If the assessment is made within 60 days of the date on 
which the period of limitations expires and the deficiency notice is not 
mailed until after the period has expired and after 60 days from the date of 
the assessment, the assessment is invalid.  Because the period of limitations 
has expired, judgment must be entered for the taxpayer.466 
The jeopardy assessment also may be made subsequent to the sending 
of a deficiency notice.467  In that event, the Code provides that the 
assessment may be for a greater or lesser amount than the original 
deficiency notice.468  If the jeopardy assessment is greater in amount than 
the original deficiency on which it is based, the second deficiency notice, 
required to be mailed within 60 days of the assessment, cannot exceed the 
amount stated in the original deficiency notice, provided the taxpayer 
already has petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the original 
deficiency.469  Any increase in the deficiency that the Commissioner wishes 
to assert must be made at the hearing before the court.470 This approach 
                                                     
461 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-l (c). 
462 Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976); Harris v. United States, 412 F. 
Supp. 24 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nev. 
1973). 
463 See Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1954). 
464 Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 223, 226–27 (1963). 
465 See Brown-Wheeler Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 755 (1930); American 
Felt Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 509 (1929). 
466 E.g., Cornwell v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1309 (1929); Reese v. 
Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1261 (1929). 
467 I.R.C. § 6861(c). 
468 Id. 
469 I.R.C. §§ 6212(c), 6214(a). 
470 Id. 
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appropriately places the burden of proof in respect to the additional 
deficiency on the Government.471 
If the jeopardy assessment is made subsequent to the decision of the 
court, the assessment cannot be for an amount greater than the 
determination of the court.472  Had the Government asserted a jeopardy 
assessment prior to the court’s decision, the Government would have been 
required to abate its jeopardy assessment to the amount of deficiency finally 
determined.473 
If the decision of the Tax Court has become final, either by the passage 
of 90 days from the date of decision or by exhaustion of appeal rights, a 
jeopardy assessment will not be permitted.474  Since immediate assessment 
is permissible, there is no need for a jeopardy provision to insure revenue 
collection.475 Similarly, no jeopardy assessment may be made during the 
pendency of an appeal from a Tax Court decision.476  Rather, in such 
instances, the taxpayer must file a bond securing payment of the ultimate 
liability to forestall assessment and collection of a deficiency determined by 
the court.477 
 
2. Termination Assessments 
 
The termination provision first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1918.478  
It permitted the Bureau to terminate a taxpayer’s current tax year before its 
completion and to declare taxes, for the abbreviated period, immediately 
due and payable.  Similarly, such an assessment could be made for any 
preceding year for which a return was not yet due.  To make such a 
determination, the Bureau had to conclude that there existed certain 
prejudicial activity by the taxpayer that threatened the future collectability of 
taxes.479  The termination provision did not specifically authorize the 
Commissioner to assess the taxes for the terminated year.  Rather, 
assessment authority was derived from the general assessment provision, 
which applied to both terminated and normal tax years.480  In the event of 
                                                     
471 TAX CT. R. 142 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  For an analysis of the burden of proof in 
respect of increased deficiencies asserted at trial, see Part X.C.3.   
472 I.R.C. § 6861(d). 
473 I.R.C. § 6861(f). 
474 I.R.C. § 6861(e). 
475 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
476 I.R.C. § 6861(e). 
477 I.R.C. § 7485; TAX CT. R. 192 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
478 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6851). 
479 Id. 
480 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 3176, 40 Stat. 1147 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6201). 
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an assessment, the taxpayer was required to pay the tax and institute refund 
procedures if the taxpayer believed that such assessment was erroneous.481  
No pre-assessment review was available in the case of a normal or 
terminated tax year assessment.482 
The termination provision continued unchanged through the Revenue 
Acts of 1921, 1924, and 1926,483 which effected major changes in taxpayer 
pre-assessment remedies and in jeopardy assessments.484 The termination 
provision was theoretically similar to the jeopardy assessment, but no cross-
reference between the statutes existed.485  If the termination taxes were to 
be assessed within the jeopardy assessment provision, then the Board, by 
virtue of the requirement that a deficiency notice be mailed within 60 days 
of assessment, could have jurisdiction to review the termination 
determination.  If such provision did not apply, Board review would be 
precluded, and the taxpayer would be forced to pursue available refund 
remedies.  In determining whether the jeopardy assessment provision 
applied, a threshold question had to be answered:  Were the taxes due upon 
a terminated tax year the equivalent of a deficiency?486  If the taxes were a 
deficiency, the jeopardy assessment provision would apply.  If the taxes 
were not a deficiency, then the jeopardy assessment provision, which 
required the determination of a deficiency as a necessary prerequisite for the 
making of an assessment, was inapplicable.487 
Little if any use of the termination provision was made immediately 
subsequent to the enactment of the 1926 legislation.488  As a result, the 
Board and other courts were not confronted with this issue until 1938.489  
In Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner,490 the taxpayer had received a 
                                                     
481 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1083. 
482 See Part I.B.2. 
483 Compare Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(g), 42 Stat. 266 with Revenue 
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 282, 43 Stat. 302 and Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 285, 44 
Stat. 68. 
484 Compare Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 138, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265 with Revenue 
Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 279, 400, 43 Stat. 300, 316 and Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 
27, §§ 274, 279, 1000, 44 Stat. 55, 59, 109. 
485 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(d), 282, 43 Stat. 297, 302; 
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274, 279, 285, 44 Stat. 55, 59, 68; see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 68-179 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398 (1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-844 (1925); S. 
REP. NO. 69-52 (1926); H.R. REP. NO. 69-356 (1926). 
486 See I.R.C. § 6211. 
487 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(a), 279, 282, 44 Stat. 55, 59, 68. 
488 See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1276 (D. Md. 1969); 
Thomas L. Kummer, Code Section 6851 – “Termination of Taxable Year” – Application 
and Function Within the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 
382 (1973).  
489 37 B.T.A. 840 (1939). 
490 Id. 
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notice of termination and demand for the payment of taxes.  The taxpayer 
immediately appealed to the Board, basing jurisdiction on the notice of 
termination, which the taxpayer believed to be equivalent to a deficiency 
notice.  The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.491  The Board recognized that both the termination provision 
and the jeopardy assessment provision were concerned with the collection 
of jeopardized revenues.  However, the Board viewed the termination 
situation “as presupposing a more exigent situation of jeopardy” than that 
governed by the jeopardy assessment provision.492  In the absence of an 
explicit statutory mandate, the Board concluded that the taxes due upon a 
termination were not the equivalent of a deficiency and that, therefore, the 
deficiency notice procedure did not apply.493  Without the necessity of a 
deficiency notice, the jeopardy assessment provision, with its Board review 
and procedural safeguards, was inapplicable.  Implicit in the Board’s 
opinion was the belief that the termination provision itself provided the 
basis for assessment.494  The decision in Littauer was reaffirmed by the Tax 
Court in 1951 in Puritan Church–The Church of America v. Commissioner.495 
Use of the termination provision in the 30 years subsequent to Littauer 
was infrequent.496  In fact, by 1969, there existed only seven reported cases 
dealing with the termination provision.497  In most of these cases, the 
question presented to the Board in Littauer was not at issue.498  In that year, 
however, major changes were foreshadowed by the decision in Schreck v. 
United States.499  Unlike the situation in Littauer, in which the taxpayer sought 
redetermination of a “deficiency” before the Board, the taxpayer in Schreck 
requested a district court to enjoin collection of a termination assessment 
because of the Service’s failure to provide a deficiency notice under the 
jeopardy assessment provision.500  Emphasizing the clear congressional 
                                                     
491 Id. at 840. 
492 Id. at 841. 
493 Id. at 842. 
494 Id. 
495 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 485, 494 (1951), aff’d per curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (1953). 
496 See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1276 (D. Md. 1969). 
497 United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967); Carlo v. United 
States, 286 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1961); Rogan v. Mertens, 153 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1946); 
Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Fancher v. United States, 10 
A.F.T.R.2d 5925 (D.S.D. 1962); United States v. Johansson, 8 A.F.T.R.2d 6001 
(S.D. Fla. 1961), aff’d in part and rem’d in part, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964); Puritan 
Church–The Church of America, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 485 (1951), aff’d per curiam, 209 
F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
498 E.g., Rogan v. Mertens, 153 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1946) (taxpayers voluntarily 
paid the termination assessment and merely sued for a refund). 
499 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969). 
500 Id. at 1267.  If the Commissioner follows the procedures established under 
normal deficiency or jeopardy situations, no injunction against assessment or 
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policy of providing the normal taxpayer with an opportunity to litigate prior 
to assessment, and providing the jeopardy taxpayer with substantial 
procedural safeguards, as well as an opportunity for Tax Court review, the 
court concluded that the power to assess a termination deficiency arose 
under the general jeopardy provision.501  Accordingly, collection was 
enjoined.502 
Shortly after the taxpayer victory in Schreck, the Internal Revenue Service 
instituted a program to disrupt the distribution of narcotics through the 
rigorous enforcement of all available tax statutes.503  As part of this 
program, the Service made expanded use of the termination provision.504  
Under this procedure, the Service was able to effectively tie up a taxpayer’s 
assets for many months.505  In addition, a taxpayer subject to a termination 
assessment had to pay the assessment to prevent seizure of assets in the 
collection process.  Unlike the situation with respect to jeopardy 
assessments, the Government was able to sell the seized assets prior to any 
judicial determination of the liability for the terminated tax period.506 
The increased use of the termination provision in combating the 
narcotics trade led to a large number of taxpayer challenges to the 
                                                                                                                       
collection may be instituted. I.R.C. § 7421.  If the Commissioner fails to send a 
deficiency notice within 60 days of making a jeopardy assessment, the prohibition 
against injunctive relief is not applicable.  I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 686l(b). 
501 301 F. Supp. at 1280.  The court was particularly concerned over the lack of 
safeguards for seized property under a § 6851 termination; the slowness of refund 
procedures; the lack of review of the propriety of the termination; and the lack of 
the power to abate the termination.  Id. at 1279–81. 
502 Id. at 1284.  The court, in enjoining collection, held that the termination 
taxpayer was entitled to a deficiency notice when his tax year was terminated 
pursuant to the termination provision.  Id.  The court, in examining the legislative 
development of the termination and jeopardy provision, rejected the Government’s 
argument that the termination provision provided independent assessment 
authority.  Id. at 1271. 
503 See generally Silver, supra note 369; Thomas L. Kummer, Comment, Code 
Section 6851 — “Termination of Taxable Year” — Application and Function Within the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 382 (1973); Note, 
Jeopardy Terminations Under Section 6851, 60 IOWA L. REV. 644, 645 (1975); John 
McQuagge Fite, Narcotic Offenders and the Internal Revenue Code: Sheathing the Section 
6851 Sword, 28 VAND. L. REV. 363 (1975). 
504 See Silver, supra note 369. 
505 See supra note 503. 
506 Prior to the amendments of § 6851 in 1976, assets seized by the Service 
were subject to immediate sale.  I.R.C. § 6851(a) (prior to amendment by Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1525, 1696).   
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termination procedures employed by the Commissioner.507  Following the 
approach taken by the taxpayer in Schreck, these challenges took the form of 
suits in district court to enjoin collection.508 Since such relief was available 
in situations in which the Commissioner was required to send a deficiency 
notice but had failed to do so,509 the question whether a termination tax was 
a deficiency arose once again.  The proliferating litigation brought forth a 
variety of arguments on both sides of the question, as well as a divergence 
of judicial opinions.510  The Supreme Court resolved these differences 
through its 1976 decision in Laing v. United States.511 The Court held that the 
tax due upon a terminated tax year constituted a deficiency.  Accordingly, 
the tax was assessable under the jeopardy assessment provisions and subject 
to Tax Court review.512 
The language of the statute defining a deficiency, the Court concluded, 
did not limit a deficiency to the completion of a normal tax year.513  Rather, 
a deficiency could arise whenever a tax year was terminated and the tax was 
declared due.514  Termination brought the tax year to a close and was the 
equivalent, for all practical purposes, of the end of a normal tax year.515  
The taxpayer was required to file a return upon termination,516 and in the 
absence of a return, the tax declared due was a deficiency.517  The 
termination deficiency, being a tax in jeopardy, was assessable under the 
jeopardy assessment provision.  The Court found further support for this 
conclusion in the absence of any legislative history indicating that Congress 
intended harsher treatment for taxpayers subject to termination assessments 
than for those subject to jeopardy assessments.518 
                                                     
507 See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 469 (D. Vt. 1973), aff’d, 496 
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974); Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972), 
aff’d, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974). 
508 See supra note 507.  Because the Tax Court took the position with respect to 
termination assessments that the notice of termination did not amount to a 
deficiency notice, jurisdiction before the court could not be invoked.  See Jones v. 
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 1 (1974). 
509 I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
510 See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974); Hall v. United 
States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974); Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th 
Cir. 1974); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973). 
511 423 U.S. 161 (1976). 
512 Id. at 183–84. 
513 Id. at 175. 
514 Id. 
515 Id.; see also Sanzoqano v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 321 (1973). 
516 I.R.C. § 443(a).  If the taxpayer failed to file a return, the Service would 
prepare a return for the taxpayer pursuant to § 6020(a). 
517 423 U.S. at 175. 
518 Id. at 183. 
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Increased utilization of termination assessments in combating narcotics 
traffic and the resulting divergent judicial views on this trend had focused 
congressional attention on the inadequacies of the termination procedure.519  
As a result, and prior to the Supreme Court decision in Laing, the Ways and 
Means Committee approved legislation to provide an expedited judicial 
review of the propriety of a termination assessment (as opposed to the 
accuracy of the amount assessed) and to prevent the Internal Revenue 
Service from selling any seized property before or during the pendency of 
such review.520  The Committee believed that such expedited review would 
be more appropriate than a requirement that the taxpayer receive a 
deficiency notice because, under the latter requirement, the Tax Court 
might have to make multiple determinations for a single year.521  Such 
difficulties would arise in situations in which the taxpayer received income 
subsequent to a termination, since, under existing law, the Service was not 
permitted to reopen a taxable year until its normal end.522  Additionally, 
with the provision for expedited review of the propriety of the termination, 
the judicial remedy in the refund procedure was viewed as adequate.523 
After the bill had passed the House and while it was before the Senate 
Finance Committee, the Supreme Court in Laing held that following a 
termination assessment, the Service had to send a deficiency notice within 
60 days and follow the procedures specified for jeopardy assessments.524  
The Senate Finance Committee was disturbed by the implications of 
Laing,525 believing the case would create the procedural difficulties that the 
House had attempted to avoid.526  In addition, the requirement of multiple 
short tax years could create serious administrative problems for the Service 
and could result in detriment to taxpayers whose income tax liability might 
be greater because of the multiple years.527  Nevertheless, although the 
Finance Committee subscribed to the general objectives of the House bill, it 
did not completely agree with its mechanics.528  Thus, the bill made certain 
changes in the operation of the expedited review procedure.529  In addition, 
it was deemed necessary to amend the termination provision if the Laing 
                                                     
519 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 302 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 362 (1976). 
520 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 303 (1975).  The procedure was to be applicable 
to both jeopardy and termination assessments.  Id.  
521 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 303 (1975). 
522 Id. at 304. 
523 I.R.C. § 7422. 
524 423  U.S. 161 (1976). 
525 S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 366 (1976). 
526 Id. 
527 Id. at 366–67. 
528 Id. at 366. 
529 Id.  See infra notes 530–538 and accompanying text for a discussion of those 
changes. 
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decision was not to be followed.530  In accordance with the Committee’s 
version of the bill,531 the Senate amended the termination provision to 
provide independent assessment authority.532  Second, it was provided that 
the making of a termination assessment did not terminate a taxable year, 
create a deficiency, or require the Service to issue a notice of deficiency 
within 60 days of assessment.533  Third, the statutory language relating to 
the reopening of a taxable year was eliminated.534  Thus, the taxable year 
would continue until its normal end.535  These changes apparently were 
intended to have the effect of treating amounts assessed and collected in a 
manner similar to estimated taxes.536 
The Senate, however, decided to allow a taxpayer who had been subject 
to a termination assessment to contest the ultimate issue of tax liability in 
the Tax Court at the end of his normal tax year.537  Thus, under the Senate 
bill, the Service would have been required to send the taxpayer a notice of 
deficiency within 60 days of the due date of a tax return for the full year or 
the date on which the return was filed.538  The Senate amendments to the 
House bill were accepted in conference539 and were subsequently enacted as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.540 
Because the procedures governing termination assessments have been 
brought into line with those governing jeopardy assessments, these 
assessment procedures are subject to the same regime of judicial review.  
Hence, the Tax Court theoretically possesses concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Federal district courts to review the propriety of the termination 
assessment as well as the amount so assessed pursuant to § 7429(b)(2)(B).541  
However, because the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this setting is predicated 
upon a petition for redetermination having been filed before the 
termination assessment, the court’s jurisdiction likely constitutes a null set.  
A termination assessment applies only to the current or preceding taxable 
                                                     
530 S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 367 (1976). 
531 Id. at 366–67. 
532 I.R.C. § 6851(a). 
533 Id. 
534 Id. 
535 S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 367 (1976). 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
538 I.R.C. § 6851(b). 
539 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, at 485 (1976). 
540 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1204(b)(1)–(2), (d), 90 Stat. 
1696–99.   
541  Note that § 7429(b)(2)(B) refers to judicial review of an assessment or levy 
that is subject to the review procedures of § 7429 in general, which includes 
termination assessments under § 6851.   
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year,542 and the Service is required to mail the notice of deficiency for the 
full taxable year within 60 days of the later of the due date of the taxpayer’s 
return for such year or the date on which the return for such year was 
filed.543  Hence, the mailing of the notice of deficiency in this setting 
therefore will follow the making of the termination assessment, negating the 
condition to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  The Tax Court’s rules envision 
jeopardy assessments alone; the rules do not address the court’s review of a 
termination assessment.544  
 
3. Review of Proposed Sale of Property Obtained Through Jeopardy or 
Termination Assessment 
 
If the Service makes a jeopardy or termination assessment of tax under 
§ 6851 (termination assessment), § 6852 (termination assessment based on 
political expenditures of § 501(c)(3) organizations), or § 6861 (jeopardy 
assessment) in advance of the issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency, 
the Service is prohibited from selling property seized in connection with the 
assessment until a notice of deficiency for the assessed tax is issued and the 
period for filing a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court 
expires.545  If the taxpayer files a petition with the court, the prohibition on 
the sale of seized property is extended until the decision of the court 
becomes final.546  In this manner, sale of property obtained in connection 
with a jeopardy or termination assessment generally is stayed during the 
period during which assessment would have been prohibited under the 
normal procedures.  However, exceptions exist to the prohibition on sale.  
Pursuant to § 6863(b), the Service may sell the seized property during this 
period if the taxpayer consents to the sale, if the Service determines that the 
cost of conserving and maintaining the property will greatly reduce the 
proceeds of the sale, or if the property is perishable or otherwise likely to 
greatly decline in value if kept on hand.547    
Prior to 1989, a taxpayer who sought to challenge the Service’s 
determination that property seized in connection with a jeopardy or 
                                                     
542  I.R.C. § 6851(a). 
543  I.R.C. § 6851(b),   
544  See TAX CT. R. 56 (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
545  See I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(A)(ii).  In the context of a jeopardy assessment, the 
Service must issue the notice of deficiency within 60 days of the assessment.  I.R.C. 
§ 6861(b).  In the context of a termination assessment, the Service must issue the 
notice of deficiency within 60 days of the due date of the return for the year to 
which the assessment relates or the date on which the taxpayer files such return, 
whichever occurs later.  I.R.C. § 6851(b).  
546  See I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(A)(iii).   
547  See I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(B) (incorporating in part property described in 
§ 6336).   
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termination assessment could be sold pursuant to one of the § 6863(b) 
exceptions was forced to seek redress in Federal district court.548  This was 
the case even though the underlying tax liability was pending before the Tax 
Court.549  Additionally, the prospect of obtaining relief through the district 
courts was complicated by the § 7421 prohibition on suits to restrain the 
assessment or collection of tax.550  Recognizing the difficulties that 
taxpayers faced in this context and believing that both taxpayers and the 
Service would benefit from the availability of an additional forum for 
review,551 Congress supplied an avenue for Tax Court review of 
§ 6863(b)(3)(B) determinations as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous 
Revenue Act of 1988.552  Through the enactment of § 6863(b)(3)(C), 
Congress provided the Tax Court with jurisdiction to review the 
Commissioner’s determination that property seized in a jeopardy or 
termination assessment could be sold pursuant to the exceptions contained 
in § 6863(b)(3)(B), provided the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review the 
underlying tax liability giving rise to the jeopardy or termination assessment 
had already been properly invoked.   
The statutory guidance on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this setting is 
scant.  Interestingly, the statute provides that either party—the taxpayer or 
the Service—may invoke the court’s jurisdiction to review the Service’s 
determination that a sale of seized property is permitted under 
§ 6863(b)(3)(B).553  Hence, in addition to providing an avenue for taxpayers 
to stay a sale of seized property, § 6863(b)(3)(C) provides the Service with a 
means of seeking judicial approval of its determination that an exception 
permitting the sale is available.  Apart from this point, the statute merely 
provides that an order disposing of a motion under § 6863(b)(3)(C) shall be 
reviewed in the same manner as a decision of the Tax Court.554  In this 
manner, Congress left the finer points of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this 
setting to be resolved by the court itself.  
                                                     
548  See Miravalle v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 65, 68–69 (1995).  If disinclined to 
contest the Service’s determination, taxpayers could stay the sale of seized property 
by posting bond pursuant to § 6863(a).   
549 See id.   
550  See, e.g., Smith v. Flinn, 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958), modified and reh’g denied, 
264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959); Zion Coptic Church v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 35 
(S.D. Fla. 1980). 
551  S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 17–18 (1988). 
552  Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§§ 6226, 6245(a), 102 Stat. 3730, 3750–51 (adding subsection (b)(3)(C) to § 6863 as 
part of the Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights).  The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to stay 
sales of seized property under § 6863(b)(3)(C) took effect on February 8, 1989, 90 
days after the date of the enactment of the legislation.  Id. § 6245(b), 102 Stat. 3752. 
553  I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(C).   
554  Id.   
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The Tax Court’s first opportunity to explore the bounds of its 
jurisdiction under § 6863(b)(3)(C) came shortly after the effective date of 
the provision in the 1989 case of Williams v. Commissioner.555  Through a 
reviewed opinion without dissent, the court in Williams tackled a number of 
issues not directly addressed by the statute.  To start, the court interpreted 
review of the Service’s determination under § 6863(b)(3)(B) as including the 
authority to issue a temporary stay of the sale if appropriate.556  Finding that 
courts possess inherent authority to issue orders deemed necessary and 
prudent to the proper resolution of cases within their jurisdiction, the court 
reasoned that the ability to stay a proposed sale temporarily—to allow the 
parties to present evidence and submit written arguments—was essential to 
the Tax Court’s exercise of authority to review the determination that a sale 
was permitted.557  The Williams court’s articulation of authority inherent in 
its jurisdiction to review a § 6863(b)(3)(B) determination is currently 
reflected in Rule 57 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
which permits the court to issue a temporary stay of the sale to provide 
adequate time to consider the motion, to stay the sale for a specific period 
or until a specific date, to stay the sale until appropriate safeguards are 
implemented, and to provide “such other temporary, extended, or 
permanent relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.”558   
The court in Williams next addressed three issues of critical practical 
importance in the disposition of motions seeking review of § 6863(b)(3)(B) 
determinations:  the allocation of the burden of proof in this setting; the 
standard of review to be employed by the court in reviewing the 
Commissioner’s determination; and the scope of evidence the court may 
consider as part of its review.  Contrasting this scenario to that of the 
deficiency setting (where the taxpayer possesses knowledge of the 
information on which the tax liability rests), the court noted that the 
Commissioner occupied the dominant position in this setting.  Among 
other factors, the court noted that the Commissioner maintains physical 
possession or control of the seized property, initiates the sale of the 
property, and determines the scheduling and condition of sale.  The 
taxpayer, on the other hand, may have little time to develop evidence to 
support his position.559  As a result of these unique factors, the court 
reasoned that if a taxpayer requests a stay of a proposed sale on grounds 
                                                     
555  92 T.C. 920 (1989), action on dec., 1992-07 (Dec. 16, 1991), nonacq., 1991-2 
C.B. 1 n.7.   
556  Id. at 932.   
557  Id.   
558  TAX CT. R. 57(g)(1)(A) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  However, the Tax Court in 
Williams was careful to warn taxpayers that temporary stays could not be expected 
as a matter of right.  See Williams, 92 T.C. at 933 (“Temporary stays will not be 
granted automatically.  We will be selective as warranted by the circumstances.”).  
559  Id. at 934–35.    
348           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
that are “plausible and believable,” the Commissioner bears the burden of 
proving that the determination to sell the seized property was proper by a 
preponderance of the evidence.560   
With respect to the standard of review to be employed in reviewing the 
Commissioner’s determination that a sale of the seized property is 
permitted under § 6863(b)(3)(B), the Tax Court in Williams dismissed the 
contention that it could take action only upon finding that the 
Commissioner’s determination rose to the level of an abuse of discretion.561  
The court supported its holding by pointing to the objective standards set 
out by Congress in § 6863(b)(3), standards that provided the Commissioner 
little in the way of discretion.562  Although the court in Williams did not 
explicitly make this point, presumably the court’s review of a 
§ 6863(b)(3)(B) determination is undertaken on a de novo basis.563   
As a final matter, the court in Williams addressed the appropriate scope 
of review.  Noting that nothing in the statute serves to limit the range of 
evidence the court may consider in undertaking its review of the 
Commissioner’s determination in this setting, the court curtly held that it 
could consider all affidavits, appraisals, and other appropriate 
information.564  Hence, the court’s review in this setting is not limited to the 
evidence contained in the administrative record.  This broad scope of 
review is now reflected in Rule 57.565   
The potential time-sensitive nature of the Tax Court’s review of a 
§ 6863(b)(3)(B) determination necessitates prompt action by the parties if 
the court is to have a meaningful opportunity to conduct its review.  
Section 6863(b)(3)(C) is silent on temporal requirements and other 
procedural matters in this context.  As described below, Rule 57 fills this 
gap.   
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this regard is commenced by filing a 
motion in the underlying deficiency proceeding.  The Commissioner may 
                                                     
560  Id. at 935.   
561  Id. at 936.   
562  Id. at 937.   
563  The Service has since reaffirmed its position that the appropriate standard 
of review in this context is one of abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Service 
contends that a taxpayer requesting a stay of the sale of seized property carries the 
burden of proving that the Service abused its discretion in determining that the sale 
is authorized pursuant to § 6863(b)(3)(B).   I.R.S. Action on Decision 1992-07 
(Dec. 16, 1991). 
564  Williams, 92 T.C. at 937. 
565  See TAX CT. R. 57(g)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (“[T]he Court may consider such 
appraisals, affidavits, valuation reports, and other evidence as may be appropriate, 
giving due regard to the necessity of acting on the motion within a brief period of 
time.”).   
Foundational Parameters of the Court’s Jurisdiction             349 
 
file at any time if a date for the proposed sale has not been scheduled.566  If 
a date for the proposed sale has been scheduled, the movant must file 
within a prescribed period of no less than 15 days before the date of the 
proposed sale and no more than 20 days after receiving the § 6335(b) notice 
of sale.567  If the motion is filed outside of the prescribed period, it will be 
considered dilatory unless the movant shows good reason for not filing 
within the period.568  To discourage gamesmanship attributable to the 
intentional delay of a motion to review a § 6863(b)(3)(B) determination, 
Rule 57 makes clear that the dilatory nature of the motion will be taken into 
consideration in disposing of the motion.569  On this note, the Tax Court in 
Williams warned that “eleventh-hour filing will not be allowed by the Court 
. . . absent special circumstances, such as late notice to petitioner.”570  After 
a motion is filed, the opposing party must respond within a brief 10-day 
window from the date on which the motion was received by the court.571 
 
D. Scope of Judicial Powers 
 
The legal status of the Tax Court has been described extensively in a 
previous chapter.572  The Board of Tax Appeals was created in 1924 as an 
independent agency in the executive branch of the Government.573  In 
1942, its name was changed to the Tax Court of the United States, but its 
location in the executive branch remained unchanged.574  Finally, in 1969 
the court was removed from the executive branch and made a court of 
record under article I—a legislative court.575  Despite the delay of Congress 
in formally recognizing the court as a judicial body, the Board/Tax Court 
has throughout its history operated as a court, not an executive agency.  It 
has never rendered advisory opinions, nor has it ever functioned in an 
administrative, investigative, regulatory, or policymaking capacity.  
                                                     
566  TAX CT. R. 57(a)(2)(A) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
567  TAX CT. R. 57(a)(2)(B)(i) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
568  TAX CT. R. 57(a)(2)(B)(ii) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
569  TAX CT. R. 57(g)(4); see also Williams v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 920, 932 
(1989) (“[L]ast-minute filing effectively prevents orderly review of legal and factual 
issues raised by the parties unless a temporary stay is issued.”).   
570  Williams, 92 T.C. at 932. 
571  TAX CT. R. 57(d)(2). 
572 See Part IV. 
573 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), (k), 43 Stat. 336, 338. 
574 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957. 
575 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7441).  In its 1991 opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), 
the Supreme Court confirmed that, following the 1969 legislation, the Tax Court is 
“independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches.”  Id. at 891.  The Freytag 
case is discussed in detail in Part V.   
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Moreover, since 1926, its decisions have been accorded the finality of 
judicial bodies, with appeals permitted only to the federal courts.576 
Nevertheless, the functional judicial character of the Board/Tax Court 
did not mean that all its attributes were judicial.  Questions regarding 
powers that were thought of as inherently judicial were especially 
troublesome.  Could the court enforce its own judgments or hold parties in 
contempt?  As an independent agency of the executive branch, could the 
court rule on the validity of statutes that the executive branch was charged 
with enforcing?  Did the court have power to grant equitable remedies such 
as equitable recoupment?  The Tax Court’s ability to apply equitable 
principles to matters within its jurisdiction was significantly bolstered by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag v. Commissioner,577 in which the Court 
observed that the Tax Court exercises its judicial power  
“in much of the same ways as federal district courts exercise theirs.”578 In 
addition to describing legislative developments with respect to equitable 
recoupment, this section traces the evolving understanding of the Tax 
Court’s broader equitable powers.   
 
1. Enforcement Powers 
 
The legislation creating the Board of Tax Appeals gave it a number of 
procedural powers, including those permitting it to administer oaths, 
examine witnesses, take depositions, and require the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence.579  The statute, 
however, did not give the Board many other important powers typically 
accorded a judicial body.  Foremost among these was the power to render 
final judgments. Decisions of the Board would be accepted only as prima 
facie evidence in subsequent judicial proceedings,580 but neither party was 
precluded from further de novo litigation as a result of a Board 
proceeding.581  Other judicial powers were withheld as well.  These included 
powers to enforce subpoenas,582 to hold witnesses and others in 
contempt,583 to order depositions before an action was instituted,584 to grant 
                                                     
576 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 1005(a)(1), 44 Stat. 109, 110. 
577  501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
578  Id. at 891.  Perhaps even more profoundly, in resolving the Appointments 
Clause challenge before it, the Supreme Court in Freytag declared that the Tax 
Court exercises “a portion of the judicial power of the United States.”  Id.  The 
Freytag decision is analyzed in Part V.   
579 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(i), 43 Stat. 338. 
580 Id. § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337. 
581 Part II, notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
582 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 217, at 913 (testimony of James Ivins). 
583 See id. 
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relief from final judgments,585 to utilize the office of the United States 
Marshall,586 and to otherwise compel compliance with its rules.587  Thus, in 
1924, although the Board could receive evidence and make findings 
thereon, it had no power to apply a remedy or enforce either its process or 
decisions. 
The Revenue Act of 1926 significantly expanded the powers of the 
Board by according finality to its decisions.588  No longer could Board 
decisions be reviewed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or collaterally 
attacked in the federal courts.  Unless a Board decision was appealed 
directly to the federal courts of appeals, it would bind the parties.589 
But despite this expansion of Board jurisdiction, no change was made by 
the 1926 Act with respect to the other disabilities mentioned above.  These 
remained for more than four decades and were a constant irritant to the 
Board/Tax Court.590 
The most significant of these disabilities was the Board’s lack of power 
to enforce its own subpoenas through the contempt power.  In the 1927 
decision in Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co.,591 the Supreme Court had upheld 
the Board’s power to issue subpoenas.  However, enforcement of the 
subpoena in that case was effected in federal court, not in the Board.  This 
was in accordance with the general understanding that the statute did not 
permit the Board to compel compliance with its own process.592  The lack 
of this power resulted from the Board’s exclusion from status as a federal 
                                                                                                                       
584 Louisville Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 
1961). 
585 Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 
1027 (1957). 
586 See 1967 Hearings, supra note 314, at 60 (joint statement of Charles Davis, 
Rupert Gresham, H. Brian Holland, Hart Spiegel, and Laurens Williams). 
587 Id. 
588 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 1005(a)(1), 44 Stat. 109, 110. 
589 See, e.g., United States v. Bottenfield, 442 F.2d 1007, 1008 (3d Cir. 1971). 
590 Although for most purposes the Board was without enforcement powers, 
exceptions did exist.  A type of reverse enforcement power was sustained in 
MacRae v. Riddell, 350 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1965), in which the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Tax Court could cancel a subpoena, although it could not independently 
enforce it.  Moreover, since 1926, the Board/Tax Court has had statutory authority 
to impose damages of up to $500 in cases of appeals brought merely for purposes 
of delay.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 109, amending Revenue Act 
of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6673).  The damage 
provision was suggested by James Ivins as a means of reducing the Board’s 
workload by discouraging frivolous appeals.  James Ivins, What Should Congress Do 
with the Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391, 410 (1925). 
591 275 U.S. 220. 
592 See, e.g ., 1925 House Hearings, supra note 217, at 913 (testimony of James 
Ivins). 
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court.  Had such status been accorded, the contempt power would have 
existed even without statutory authority because it is a power that is 
inherent in courts.593 
Obviously, a procedure that required resort to another tribunal for 
enforcement was cumbersome, particularly when the matter related to such 
“housekeeping” concerns as were necessary for the orderly disposition of 
cases.  Of course, the occasions when resort to enforcement powers would 
be helpful were relatively rare.  However, they did occasionally arise, as in 
the famous Mellon594 case, in which the Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh 
refused to comply with a Board subpoena, causing a delay of seven months 
in the proceedings while the Government sought and obtained enforcement 
in district court.595  Granting the Board/Tax Court enforcement powers 
would tend to reduce the delay and inconvenience necessitated by resort to 
the district courts.  Moreover, it could be argued that the mere existence of 
such powers would stimulate parties to comply with process without 
compulsion.596 
In addition to the direct benefits of enforcement powers, there was also 
the fact that such powers generally are associated with judicial bodies.597  
Most if not all courts had such powers, and their denial to the Board/Tax 
Court, at least slightly, diminished its judicial attributes. 
For these reasons, the Board/Tax Court and those supporting the view 
that it should be treated as a court, generally referred to its lack of power to 
enforce subpoenas as something that required legislative change, preferably 
by full incorporation of the court into the federal judiciary.598  These views 
were expressed as early as 1926 and continued to be pressed in connection 
with legislation dealing with the Board/Tax Court.599  Nevertheless, it was 
not until 1969, when the court was established as an article I court, that it 
was finally given the same enforcement powers as those accorded district 
                                                     
593 E.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924). 
594 Mellon v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 977 (1937). 
595 Memorandum from Chairman Murdock in re Changing from “Board” to 
“Court” the name of the United States Board of Tax Appeals, Feb. 1942, at 6, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1942: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
596 Id. at 7. 
597 The contempt power, for example, has long been thought to be an inherent 
power of courts.  See, e.g., RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 9–25 
(1963). 
598 One notable exception to this was Senator Russell Long, who was generally 
a supporter of measures to enhance the prestige and efficiency of the court.  
Although Senator Long favored granting the court contempt powers, he opposed 
its full incorporation into the federal judiciary because that would necessitate the 
granting of life tenure to its judges.  See Part IV, notes 15–34, 97–99, 162–168, 
275–300 and accompanying text. 
599 Id. 
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courts in regard to contempt and the carrying out of its writs and orders.600  
The availability of such powers further enhanced the court’s status as a 
judicial body. 
 
2. Power to Review Constitutionality of Laws 
 
The power to review the constitutionality of congressional acts is 
frequently thought of as the quintessential judicial function.  Since the 
Board/Tax Court was formally at least a part of the executive branch until 
1969,601 the question could be raised as to its authority to refuse to apply a 
statute it believed to be unconstitutional.  The same question might even be 
raised now that the court is established under article I.602  
On the other hand, the Board/Tax Court has never functioned as an 
administrative or legislative body.  Rather, it has always performed solely 
judicial duties.  In the case of other judicial bodies, such duties invariably 
comprehend the power to refuse to apply a statute that violates the 
Constitution.  In view of the actual nature of the Board/Tax Court, should 
the theoretical objection to constitutional review by an executive or 
legislative body preclude it from performing this judicial function?  Since 
the earliest days of the Board, the answer to this question has been a 
cautious “no.” 
One would expect that cases involving constitutional questions would 
be among the first decided by the Board.  Actually, however, it would 
appear that the Board did not face any such questions until a little more 
than two years after its formation.  In that instance the Board, prior to the 
preparation of an opinion in the case involved, faced the question of 
whether it could refuse to apply a statute that it was convinced was 
unconstitutional.  By a vote of nine to five, the Board in conference decided 
that it could, notwithstanding the argument of the minority that an agency 
of the executive branch could not declare an action of Congress invalid.603  
Ultimately, however, it developed that the Board was premature in 
considering the question of its power to pass on constitutionality, because 
when the opinion in the particular case was written there was no necessity 
of considering the validity of any of the statutes involved.604 
In the next case in which a constitutional issue was raised, the Board 
also was able to dispose of the matter without addressing the question of its 
                                                     
600 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 956, 83 Stat. 732 (adding 
I.R.C. § 7456(d)).  The court first exercised this power in Ryan v. Commissioner, 67 
T.C. 212 (1976), aff’d, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977). 
601 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7441). 
602 Id. 
603 B.T.A. Conference Minutes, Sept. 8, 1926. 
604 Una Libby Kaufman, 5 B.T.A. 31 (1926). 
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power of review.605  The case concerned transferee liability under section 
280 of the Revenue Act of 1926,606 which provided that such liability 
should be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as deficiencies 
in tax.  Because the statute under attack by the petitioners was jurisdictional, 
the Board was able to dispose of the case on the ground that a party could 
not be heard to attack the validity of a statute invoked by that party to be 
heard.607 
Several months later, however, the Board was confronted with a case in 
which the validity of a tax statute was squarely presented.  The case of 
Independent Life Ins. Co. of America v. Commissioner608 involved the question of 
whether an income tax could apply to the rental value of property owned 
and occupied by the taxpayer.  Both the Government and the taxpayer 
urged the Board to consider the constitutionality of the statute609 (the 
Government argued in favor of its validity, the taxpayer against), and the 
Board, over three dissenting members, agreed to make the consideration.610  
Upon examination, the Board concluded that the provision was 
unconstitutional since rental value was not income within the meaning of 
the sixteenth amendment.  This finding was affirmed in the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals611 and reversed in the Supreme Court.612  Neither 
appellate court directly passed on the propriety of the Board’s action in 
reviewing the constitutionality of the provision, although the Sixth Circuit 
mentioned the problem indirectly: 
 
The court is not concerned with whether the Board of Tax Appeals 
was authorized to pass upon the constitutionality of these 
enactments.  A decision by us upon that question would not decide 
this case.  We are, however, required to consider and determine 
whether the decision of the board that respondent had overpaid its 
income taxes for the years involved was “in accordance with law.”  
In the discharge of this duty the court is called upon to determine for 
itself whether section 245(b) . . . was a valid enactment.  If it was not, 
the finding of the board, which may be construed as a finding that 
no additional tax was due, would obviously have been correct, 
                                                     
605 Cappellini v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1269 (1929). 
606 Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 61. 
607 14 B.T.A. at 1272, citing inter alia Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 
124 U.S. 581, 598–99 (1888).  But see Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
358 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1966). 
608 17 B.T.A. 757 (1929) aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933), rev’d, 292 U.S. 371 
(1934). 
609 17 B.T.A. at 764, 765. 
610 17 B.T.A. at 765. 
611 67 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933). 
612 Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 292 U.S. 371 (1934). 
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regardless of the power of the board to pass upon the 
constitutionality of the act of Congress.613 
 
Since the decision in Independent Life Ins. Co., the Board/Tax Court never 
has refused to consider the question of the validity of statutes involved in 
cases before it.  As with other judicial bodies, however, rules of 
construction have evolved to limit strictly the cases in which congressional 
enactments will be held invalid.  Thus, if a statute may be interpreted in 
different manners, an interpretation will be adopted that makes it 
constitutional in preference to one that makes it unconstitutional.614  
Moreover, a presumption of validity attaches to any congressional act that 
must be countered by a party seeking to overturn it.615  Further, a party 
cannot take advantage of a statute and then be heard to question its 
validity.616  Finally, questions of constitutionality must be clearly and 
specifically raised; a general attack on the validity of a statute will not be 
entertained.617  In addition to these rules of construction, which have in 
some form been adopted by courts in general,618 the Board, recognizing its 
status as an agency in the executive branch, fashioned another rule of 
construction. 
 
While the Board will consider [the issue of constitutionality] . . . the 
unconstitutionality of any provision of the tax law must clearly 
appear before the Board, as part of the executive branch of the 
Government, would be justified in holding that it should not be 
enforced. If after consideration there remains a substantial doubt, the 
law should be followed until the doubt is dispelled by a court 
decision.619 
 
Of course, even as limited, the prospect of an agency of the executive 
branch reviewing the validity of acts of the legislative branch was 
troublesome to some, and the Board’s early decisions in this regard were 
                                                     
613 Commissioner v. Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 67 F.2d 470, 471 
(6th Cir. 1933) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 292 U.S. 371 (1934). 
614 Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 17 B.T.A. 757, 764 (1929), aff’d, 67 
F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1933), rev’d on other grounds, 292 U.S. 371 (1934). 
615 Id. at 767–68. 
616 Cappellini v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1269, 1272 (1929). 
617 Dillon v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 690, 691 (1930).  
618 E.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (presumption of 
constitutionality); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1936) 
(interpretation in favor of constitutionality); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 
316–17 (1925) (accepting benefits estops challenge); Stanhurf v. Sipes, 335 F.2d 
224, 228–29 (8th Cir. 1964) (pleading of challenge). 
619 See, e.g., O’Shaughnessy v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1046, 1049 (1930). 
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not unanimous.620  However, the practice was soon accepted without 
dissent. 
There can be little doubt that the Board/Tax Court’s position with 
regard to its power of constitutional review is correct.  Its basic work, 
determining the correctness of deficiency assertions, cannot be 
accomplished by simply examining the tax statutes in a vacuum.  To 
properly interpret these statutes, resort must be made to case law, 
administrative interpretations, and congressional policy as evidenced by 
legislative history.  Examination of these sources is fully consistent with the 
duties of judicial bodies in general.  Moreover, just as a correct evaluation of 
the merits of a deficiency demands judicial techniques of statutory 
interpretation, it also requires, in appropriate cases, consideration of 
whether the law that a party invokes is valid.  A deficiency cannot be 
correct if it is predicated on an invalid statute.  That a non-article III 
tribunal may exercise judicial functions cannot now be questioned, even 
though the exercise of such functions in a particular instance may result in a 
decision unfavorable to the executive or legislative branch.621  Little reason 
supports circumscribing these functions to encompass only statutory 
interpretation. 
The structure of tax litigation lends further support to the court’s power 
of constitutional review.  Since 1926, any party aggrieved by a Board/Tax 
Court decision has been accorded an absolute right of appeal to the federal 
courts of appeals, and from there, on certiorari, to the Supreme Court.622  
Regardless of whether the Tax Court may review the constitutionality of 
legislation, it seems clear that the appellate courts may do so.623  Thus, the 
Tax Court will never necessarily be the final arbiter of constitutionality in 
any particular case.  Yet, if the Tax Court was barred from considering such 
an issue, an adequate trial and factual record might be unavailable to the 
appellate court, making its decision, as a practical matter, difficult or 
impossible. 
In view of the potent arguments favoring constitutional review in the 
Tax Court, its unusual status as a non-article III court has not, since the 
early days of the Board of Tax Appeals, been seriously advanced as a 
                                                     
620 Independent Life Ins. Co. of America v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 757, 775 
(1929) (members Marquette, Morris and Van Fossan, dissenting), aff’d, 67 F.2d 470 
(6th Cir. 1933), rev’d on other grounds, 292 U.S. 371 (1934); Cappellini v. 
Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1269, 1280, 1282 (1929) (members Marquette, Phillips 
and Siefkin, concurring). 
621 See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 
279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
622 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003, 44 Stat. 110 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7482). 
623 See Commissioner v. Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 67 F.2d 470, 
471 (6th Cir. 1933), rev’d on other grounds, 292 U.S. 371 (1934). 
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justification for limiting its powers in this regard.  Since its change in status 
to a court established under article I, the Tax Court has continued to 
entertain constitutional objections to the laws without comment on its 
power to do so as a part of the legislative branch.624  No appellate decision 
has ever questioned the practice, and little occasion for such criticism has 
arisen.  On that note, following the decision in Independent Life Ins. Co., the 
Board/Tax Court has not found any act of Congress to be unconstitutional. 
 
3. Equitable Powers 
 
As with all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, the Tax Court 
is a statutory creation with a specified jurisdiction.625  However, because of 
its status as an article I court and its prior history as an independent agency 
within the executive branch, there have been some inconsistencies 
regarding the court’s judicial attributes—attributes which other courts need 
not be specifically granted by statute but which are inherent in judicial 
status.  Thus, for example, as has been pointed out, the Board of Tax 
Appeals/Tax Court originally was not regarded as having the inherent 
judicial contempt power626 but has exercised since its earliest days the 
power to review the constitutionality of tax laws.627  This tension between 
judicial and non-judicial attributes also exists in the area of equitable 
jurisdiction. 
Statutes dealing with the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court have 
never directly specified whether it could exercise equitable powers as a 
general proposition.  The question has, however, arisen in several contexts.  
In some instances the request for equitable relief is obviously groundless, as 
in the case of a taxpayer who urged the court to promulgate an equitable 
deduction for the cost of home improvements to offset a required inclusion 
in gross income of a prize awarded on the basis of such improvements.628  
The court has consistently rejected arguments of this sort, which in reality 
                                                     
624 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000) (addressing 
challenge to constitutionality of the application of the gift tax); Byrd Investments v. 
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1 (1987) (addressing challenge to application of TEFRA 
partnership procedures as violating Fifth Amendment Due Process protections); 
Allum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-177, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (addressing 
challenge to § 104(a)(2) as unconstitutionally vague); Cole v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1975-144, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 680, 682 (1975) (addressing argument that 
limitations on dependency deductions violated constitutional protections). 
625 The Constitution provides for “one supreme Court, and . . . such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1. 
626  See supra notes 591–600 and accompanying text. 
627  See supra notes 601–624 and accompanying text. 
628  See Paxman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 567, 576 (1968). 
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represent pleas for remedial legislation.629  Requests for the application of 
equitable doctrines traditionally applied by other courts have had more 
substance.  The subjects that have occasioned the most interest in this 
regard are equitable recoupment and equitable estoppel.  The Tax Court’s 
experience with these two remedies has shaped the bounds of the Tax 
Court’s equitable jurisdiction.   
 
a. Equitable Recoupment 
 
Equitable recoupment, a doctrine developed and applied by both the 
courts of common law and equity,630 permits one party (usually the 
defendant) to reduce a claim against it by asserting a claim in its favor 
related to the same transaction on which its adversary seeks judgment.  
With respect to tax litigation, by far the most important aspect of 
recoupment is that it permits the revival of a claim otherwise barred by an 
expired statutory limitation period.  However, the doctrine’s exception to 
the statute of limitations is narrow in scope.  The tax to be recouped must 
relate to the same transaction, item, or event as that before the court for the 
open year, and the otherwise stale claim may serve only to offset the liability 
resulting from the related and timely claim.  The primary purpose of the 
recoupment doctrine’s deviation from the strong interest represented by the 
statute of limitations is to avoid inequitable windfalls that otherwise would 
result from the inconsistent tax treatment of a common transaction.631   
Equitable recoupment in the tax context traces its origins to the 1935 
Supreme Court decision in Bull v. United States.632  The Bull case concerned 
the estate of a decedent who was a member of a service partnership.  The 
partnership agreement provided that the estate of a deceased partner was 
entitled to receive that partner’s proportionate share of profits for the 
balance of the year in which the partner died.  The Commissioner 
determined that the decedent’s gross estate included the post-mortem share 
of earnings paid to the estate, and the estate paid the resulting estate tax 
deficiency.  Years later, the Service further determined that the post-
mortem share of earnings also constituted income to the estate.  After 
paying the resulting income tax, the estate sued to have this amount 
                                                     
629  E.g., Hays Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 436 (1963), aff’d, 331 F.2d 422 
(7th Cir. 1964). 
630  See David N. McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal Taxation, 28 
VA. L. REV. 577, 579–84 (1942). 
631  See Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 552 (1993) (reviewing 
contours of the recoupment doctrine).   
632  295 U.S. 247 (1935).     
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refunded, contending that the overpayment of estate tax should serve as a 
credit against the income tax liability.633   
Agreeing that the Government had mistakenly collected more estate tax 
than was properly due, the Court reasoned that retention of the excess tax 
would be “against morality and conscience,”634 later reiterating that the 
“unjust retention” of amounts collected by mistake “is immoral and 
amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.”635  Having framed the 
matter in these terms, the Court unsurprisingly sidestepped the 
Commissioner’s invocation of the statute of limitations on refund claims.  
The Court first reasoned that the estate tax overpayment would have 
provided a defense to the Government’s attempt to pursue an income tax 
deficiency: 
 
If the claim for income tax deficiency had been the subject of a suit, 
any counter demand for recoupment of the overpayment of estate 
tax could have been asserted by way of defense and credit obtained, 
notwithstanding the statute of limitations had barred an independent 
suit against the government therefor. This is because recoupment is 
in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the 
transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded. Such a 
defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the 
main action itself is timely.636 
 
Having articulated the affirmative defense of equitable recoupment in the 
deficiency setting, the Court determined that the remedy should not be lost 
simply due to the differing procedural posture of the case.  Recoupment 
therefore permitted the taxpayer-estate in Bull to credit a time-barred 
overpayment of estate tax against the income tax liability arising out of the 
                                                     
633 The underlying inconsistency in tax treatment at issue in Bull—that is, 
inclusion of post-mortem profits in both the estate tax and income tax bases—is 
curious when viewed in hindsight.  Under current law, a decedent’s gross estate for 
estate tax purposes includes the fair market value of the decedent’s vested right to 
receive a future payment of income, see Rev. Rul. 55-123, 1955-1 C.B. 443, and this 
amount also is included in the gross income of the party who collects it (reduced by 
the marginal estate tax attributable to the item).  See I.R.C. § 691(a), (c).  Indeed, the 
Commissioner in Bull argued that there existed no inconsistency in the tax 
treatment of the post-mortem profits.  The Court disagreed, apparently troubled by 
the inclusion of the same nominal figure in both tax bases (without reduction for 
the tax liability attributable to either).  See Bull, 295 U.S. at 257.  The Court 
ultimately agreed that the estate’s entitlement to the post-mortem profits paid in 
respect of the decedent’s interest was not properly subject to estate taxation.     
634  Id. at 260.   
635  Id. at 261.   
636  Id. at 262.   
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same transaction, yielding a refund of income tax that, standing alone, had 
not been overpaid. 
Subsequent case law refined the doctrine of equitable recoupment in the 
tax setting.  In Stone v. White,637 the Supreme Court permitted recoupment 
of a time-barred deficiency in income tax owed by beneficiaries on account 
of trust distributions against the trustee’s claim for a refund of income tax 
paid in error with respect to the distributed amounts.  The case therefore 
demonstrates not only that equitable recoupment can benefit taxpayer and 
Government alike, but also that the doctrine can be invoked by or asserted 
against related taxpayers affected by a common transaction.  In contrast to 
the expansive application of recoupment in Stone, the Court in Rothensies v. 
Electric Storage Battery Co.638 attempted to cordon the breadth of the doctrine.  
After characterizing the Bull and Stone decisions as evidencing the limited 
scope of the recoupment doctrine in the tax setting,639 the Court explained 
that recoupment did not permit the tax consequences of one transaction to 
be offset against another—an interpretation the Court warned “would 
invite a search of the taxpayer’s entire tax history for items to recoup.”640  
Rather, the Court explained that the doctrine permitted only a single 
transaction to be examined in all respects, to facilitate a judgment “that 
does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole.”641 
In its most recent formulation, the doctrine of equitable recoupment 
requires the party invoking its application to establish the following 
elements:  (1) the overpayment or deficiency for which recoupment is 
sought by way of offset is barred by the expiration of the period of 
limitations; (2) the time-barred overpayment or deficiency arose out of the 
same transaction or is attributable to the same item or taxable event as the 
matter properly before the court; (3) the transaction, item, or taxable event 
has been subject to two taxes; and (4) if the transaction, item, or taxable 
event involves more than one taxpayer, there is a sufficient identity of 
interest among the taxpayers to permit their treatment as one.642  If these 
elements are satisfied, the doctrine permits the time-barred overpayment or 
deficiency to be applied as an offset to the sought after payment.  
Consistent with its purpose of preventing windfalls resulting from 
inconsistent tax treatment, equitable recoupment does not permit the 
                                                     
637  301 U.S. 532 (1937).   
638  329 U.S. 296 (1946).   
639  Id. at 299.   
640  Id. at 302.   
641  Id. at 299.  Accordingly, the Court did not permit the taxpayer to offset a 
time-barred refund for excise tax in prior years against the income tax attributable 
to the taxpayer’s timely prosecution of excise tax refunds in later years.   
642  Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 54, 62–63 (2008) (citing, among 
other authority, United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1990)).    
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invoking party to recover the excess, if any, of the time-barred claim 
remaining after application of the offset.643   
The authority of the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court to 
consider claims of equitable recoupment has a long history, one marked 
both by evolving judicial interpretation and statutory responses.  Courts 
struggled in grafting the equitable remedy into the statutory jurisdiction of 
the Board and Tax Court, which generally was limited to determining 
deficiencies or overpayments of taxes that were the subject of the taxpayer’s 
petition for redetermination.  Although Congress affirmatively addressed 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over equitable recoupment in 2006,644 the 
development in the case law leading to the statutory clarification provides 
insight into the larger question of the extent of the court’s equitable powers 
in general.   
The Revenue Act of 1924 expressed the jurisdiction of the Board in 
terms of determining deficiencies,645 a formulation that implied the lack of 
power to consider tax liabilities other than those disputed with respect to 
the particular tax at issue.  Nevertheless, a case soon arose that indicated the 
Board’s attitude that recoupment fell within its province.  In Barry v. 
Commissioner,646 the Commissioner had determined an income tax 
overpayment of $805 for the year 1920 and a deficiency of $12,149 for 
1921.  The taxpayer petitioned the Board and sought to reduce the amount 
of the 1921 deficiency by showing that the Commissioner had not allowed 
the taxpayer sufficient depreciation deductions for 1920 and 1921.  The 
Commissioner argued that the Board could not consider the amount of the 
overpayment for 1920, if any, because no deficiency notice had been issued 
with respect to that year.  The Commissioner fashioned the taxpayer’s 
position as a claim for a refund—a claim that was clearly beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Board.  Without specifically referring to the doctrine of 
recoupment, the Board concluded that because the Commissioner was 
authorized to credit the overpayment for 1920 against the 1921 liability 
(and, in fact, had done so with respect to the overpayment of $805),647 the 
question of the taxpayer’s deficiency for 1921 comprehended the question 
of whether the overpayment for the earlier year was in fact greater than that 
                                                     
643  See O’Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1049 (7th Cir. 1985).   
644  See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 858, 120 Stat. 
1020. 
645  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a)–(b), 43 Stat. 297 (now codified at 
I.R.C. §§ 6214–6215). 
646  1 B.T.A. 156 (1924); see also Henry Myer Thread Mfg. Co., 2 B.T.A. 665 
(1925); Fort Orange Paper Co., 1 B.T.A. 1230 (1925); R.A. Tuttle Co., 1 B.T.A. 
1218 (1925); Banna Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. 1037 (1925); Hickory Spinning Co., 1 
B.T.A. 409 (1925). 
647  Id. at 158 (noting the Commissioner’s authority under the Revenue Act of 
1918, § 252, 40 Stat. 1085). 
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determined by the Commissioner.  The Board’s opinion did not mention 
whether a claim for refund for 1920 would have been time-barred and 
therefore did not consider the effect of such a fact on its jurisdiction. 
Although the Barry case did not assert the Board’s power to consider a 
claim for recoupment in express terms, such a power was implied in its 
holding.648  Movement in this direction, however, was expressly terminated 
by the Revenue Act of 1926. Section 274(g) of the legislation provided: 
 
The Board in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable 
year shall consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other 
taxable years as may be necessary correctly to redetermine the 
amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction 
to determine whether or not the tax for any other taxable year has 
been overpaid or underpaid.649 
 
The committee reports accompanying the 1926 Act do not disclose 
whether Congress intended to withdraw the power of equitable recoupment 
from the Board.650  However, that was the effect of the provision.  In 1926, 
the Board expressly recognized that Barry had been overruled by statute,651 
and thereafter the Board refused to entertain taxpayers’ invocations of the 
recoupment doctrine—even while noting that it found the equitable 
arguments compelling.652  In denying recoupment, the Board repeatedly 
cited the statutory prohibition on determining overpayments or 
underpayments for any year other than that with respect to which the 
                                                     
648  But see Gress Mfg. Co., 3 B.T.A. 977 (1926) (holding that Board lacks 
jurisdiction to examine tax year not audited by Commissioner for purposes of 
determining possible existence of refund to be applied against claimed deficiency). 
649  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(g), 44 Stat. 56 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6214(b)). 
650  The only reference to the provision was in the report of the Ways and 
Means Committee:  
Subdivision (g) [of section 274] limits the jurisdiction of the Board in 
determining a deficiency to the taxable year with respect to which the 
deficiency is claimed, and provides that while the Board shall consider any 
facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years that may be necessary 
to correctly redetermine the amount of the deficiency, the Board shall have 
no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for any other taxable 
year has been overpaid or underpaid. 
H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 11 (1925). 
651  See Cornelius Cotton Mills, 4 B.T.A. 255, 256 (1926) (noting that, pursuant 
to intervening legislation, “the Board no longer has the jurisdiction exercised in the 
Barry appeal”).  
652  See Heyl v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 223, 226–28 (1936). 
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deficiency notice was issued.653  Without such a determination, the Board 
could not conclude that an amount existed to be recouped.   
The Supreme Court first addressed the Board’s jurisdiction over claims 
of equitable recoupment in Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner.654 
The Commissioner in Gooch Milling determined that the taxpayer had 
overvalued its inventory as of the close of its 1935 tax year.  The revaluation 
yielded a deficiency for 1936 and an overpayment for 1935.  As refund on 
the overpayment was barred by the statute of limitations, the taxpayer 
petitioned to have the 1935 overpayment offset against the 1936 deficiency.  
The Eighth Circuit reversed the Board’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to 
grant such relief.655 Narrowly interpreting the 1926 provision, the circuit 
court held that justice required the use of recoupment.656  The court’s 
opinion hinted that even if the Board lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
recoupment claims, the appellate court was not so limited.657   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the original Board 
ruling.658  Declaring that “[t]he Internal Revenue Code, not general 
equitable principles, is the mainspring of the Board’s jurisdiction,”659 the 
Court focused its analysis on the Board’s statutory grant of jurisdiction.  
The Board could determine a deficiency or overpayment only for the year 
for which the taxpayer petitioned for review of a proposed deficiency 
assessment.  And although the predecessor of § 6214(b) permitted the 
Board to consider facts from other years to correctly redetermine the tax 
liability for the year before it, the provision denied the Board jurisdiction to 
determine whether tax for any other such year had been overpaid or 
underpaid.  In light of this “clear and unambiguous” legislative pattern,660 
the Court viewed resolution of the taxpayer’s recoupment claim under these 
provisions as a straightforward matter.661  The Court observed that no 
aspect of the taxpayer’s 1935 tax year was relevant to determining the 
                                                     
653 See Gould-Mersereau Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1316, 1328 (1931); 
Pederson v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1089, 1119 (1929); B.T. Couch Glue Co. v. 
Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1321, 1325 (1928); Anderson v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 
1111, 1137 (1928); Dickermann & Ellis, Inc., 5 B.T.A. 633, 635 (1926); Cornelius 
Cotton Mills, 4 B.T.A. 255, 256 (1926); R.P. Hazzard Co., 4 B.T.A. 150, 151 (1926). 
654 10 B.T.A.M. (Prentice Hall) ¶ 41,563 (1941), rev’d, 133 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 
1943), rev’d, 320 U.S. 418 (1943). 
655 133 F.2d at 138. 
656 Id. at 136–37. 
657  Id. at 138.  As discussed in infra note 663, the prospect of an appellate court 
granting relief not available to the Tax Court while sitting in review of a Tax Court 
decision was first implicitly and later explicitly foreclosed by the Supreme Court.     
658  320 U.S. 418 (1943). 
659  Id. at 422. 
660  Id. at 420.   
661  Id. (“The Board’s want of jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of equitable 
recoupment is manifest from these statutory provisions.”).   
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taxpayer’s 1936 deficiency that was before the Board.  The taxpayer’s 
attempt to employ the 1935 overpayment as an affirmative defense to the 
1936 deficiency necessitated a determination of whether an overpayment 
for 1935 existed in the first place, and the court found this preliminary 
determination to be foreclosed by the “absolute and unequivocal language” 
of the proviso contained in the predecessor of § 6214(b). 662  The Court 
therefore concluded that permitting the Board to apply equitable 
recoupment in this instance would contravene the express will of 
Congress.663     
Subsequent to the Gooch Milling decision, the Tax Court, during its initial 
phase as an executive agency, maintained the position that it lacked 
authority to apply equitable recoupment.  While the primary justification 
continued to rest in the statutory scheme governing its jurisdiction, 
including the prohibition contained in the 1926 legislation on determining 
an overpayment or underpayment in tax for periods not before the court,664 
the failure of Congress to accord the court equitable jurisdiction provided 
an additional but less frequently cited ground.665   
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 reconstituted the Tax Court as an article I 
court,666 and arguments existed to support the proposition that legislative 
courts may be invested with the same judicial powers as are provided to 
                                                     
662  Id. at 421. 
663  Id.  By reversing the circuit court’s ruling in Gooch, the Supreme Court not 
only clarified the extent of the Board’s limited jurisdiction, but also implicitly 
established that the circuit courts were similarly restricted in hearing Board appeals.  
Subsequent to the Gooch decision, two circuit courts expressly held that they were 
bound by the Tax Court’s limited jurisdiction in this arena.  See Taylor v. 
Commissioner, 258 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1958); Vanderberge v. Commissioner, 147 
F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1945).  The Supreme Court resolved this matter definitively 
in Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 6 (1987), where it held that an appellate court 
sitting in review of a decision of the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to decide an issue 
that was not the subject of the Tax Court proceeding or to grant relief that was 
beyond that available to the Tax Court. 
664  See Estate of Van Winkle v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 994, 999–1000 (1969); 
Vandenberge v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 321, 327–28 (1944), aff’d, 147 F.2d 167 (5th 
Cir. 1945); see also Rothensies v. Electric Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946) 
(citing Gooch Milling for the proposition that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
claims of equitable recoupment).    
665  See Miller v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 940, 953 (1963), aff’d, 333 F.2d 400 (8th 
Cir. 1964); Estate of Stein v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 945, 956 (1962); Estate of 
Garber v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 646, 650–51 (1958), aff’d, 271 F.2d 97 
(3d Cir. 1959); Vandenberge v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 321, 328 (1944), aff’d, 147 
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1944). 
666  Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730. 
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article III courts, including equitable powers.667  However, the Tax Court 
initially did not use its reconstituted status as an article I court as grounds to 
reconsider its equitable jurisdiction.668 Rather, the court continued to adhere 
to the holding of Gooch Milling that it lacked jurisdiction to apply the 
recoupment doctrine.669 The court’s steadfast position was understandable 
given the statutory bar to determining overpayments or underpayments for 
years other than those covered by the deficiency notice.670  Indeed, in light 
of the Supreme Court’s reliance on this ground in Gooch Milling, Professor 
                                                     
667  See Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and its Effect 
on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 161 (1962); Note, The Judicial Power of 
Federal Tribunals Not Organized Under Article Three, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 747–48 
(1934); Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 677, 680–81 (1933); see also David F. Shores, Article I Status for the Tax Court, 25 
TAX LAW. 335, 340–41 (1972).  Although the issue of equitable powers was not 
explicitly raised in Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935), the Supreme Court 
therein applied equitable recoupment in a case originating in the Court of Claims.  
The decision in Bull came two years after Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 
(1933), in which the Supreme Court held the Court of Claims to be a legislative 
court. 
668  Perhaps the Tax Court’s failure to do so reflected the prevailing view that 
the transformation of its status to an article I court did not affect its equitable 
jurisdiction.  In Continental Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1977), 
the Fifth Circuit addressed the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain claims of 
equitable recoupment and provided the following assessment of the change in the 
court’s status from executive agency to legislative court: 
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Tax Court 
did not possess equity jurisdiction. . . .  
[T]here is no evidence in the text of the Act that Congress meant to 
expand the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to encompass equitable claims.  We 
cannot believe that Congress would modify the powers of the Tax Court in 
such a significant way without mentioning what it was doing. . . . 
It does not follow from the fact that the Tax Court is now an Article I 
“legislative court” that it possesses or was intended to possess the full 
judicial power, extending to “all cases, in law and equity,” that is vested in 
“constitutional courts” created by Congress under Article III, which it had 
not possessed before.  
Id. at 83–84 (footnotes and citations omitted).  Yet as discussed in text 
accompanying infra notes 702–712, the Tax Court and other appellate courts later 
would adopt a more expansive view of the Tax Court’s judicial power as an article I 
court.     
669  See Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 568, 570 (1989); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885, 888–90 (1989); Poiner v. 
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 478, 490–91 (1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 898 F.2d 
917 (3d Cir. 1988). This view was shared by the Service.  Rev. Rul. 71-56, 1971-1 
C.B. 404, 405 (“[T]he Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a plea of equitable 
recoupment.”).   
670  I.R.C. § 6214(b).         
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Dubroff reasonably predicted in the 1979 preliminary edition of this text 
that “it is unlikely that any change will be made in the Tax Court’s view 
with respect to recoupment.”671 
While the question of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to apply the 
recoupment doctrine appeared definitively resolved in the negative, the Tax 
Court continued to grapple with the scope of its authority to exercise 
equitable powers in other contexts.  The court’s reviewed opinion in Woods 
v. Commissioner672 supplied the most thorough examination of this broader 
issue, and the case later would prove instrumental in the court’s 
reconsideration of its authority to entertain equitable recoupment claims.        
The taxpayer’s invocation of the statute of limitations on assessment as 
an affirmative defense provided the procedural framework for the court’s 
decision in Woods.  The court found as a factual matter that the parties’ 
private agreement to extend the statute of limitations (which, on its face, 
was ineffective in doing so) reflected a mutual mistake.  The Tax Court 
therefore proposed to reform the agreement to accurately reflect the 
intentions of the parties. Yet, because reformation constitutes an equitable 
remedy, the Tax Court in Woods first considered whether it possessed 
jurisdiction to exercise equitable powers in this manner.   
The court in Woods began its analysis by citing numerous instances in 
which it had applied equitable principles or theories to decide matters over 
which it possessed jurisdiction.  The list included waiver, duty of 
consistency, estoppel, substantial compliance, abuse of discretion, laches, 
and the tax benefit rule.673  In light of this historical review, the court 
surmised that it was empowered to apply equitable principles to dispose of 
cases properly before it.674  At the same time, the court in Woods recognized 
the Supreme Court’s prior statement in Commissioner v. McCoy that the Tax 
Court “is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable 
powers.”675  However, the Tax Court in Woods did not interpret this 
statement as prohibiting its exercise of equitable powers across the board.  
Rather, the court interpreted the absence of general equitable authority as 
simply meaning that it could not expand its statutorily prescribed 
jurisdiction on equitable grounds.676  The following observation by Judge 
Hamblen, quoted by the court in Woods, succinctly captures the court’s 
interpretation of its equitable jurisdiction:  “‘While we cannot expand our 
jurisdiction through equitable principles, we can apply equitable principles 
                                                     
671 HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT:  AN HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS 487–88 (1979). 
672  92 T.C. 776 (1989).   
673  Id. at 784. 
674  Id. at 784–85.   
675  484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987).   
676 Woods, 92 T.C. at 785.   
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in the disposition of cases that come within our jurisdiction.’”677  On these 
terms, the court’s application of reformation in Woods was proper.  The 
exercise of reformation was necessary to resolve the taxpayer’s affirmative 
defense to an estate tax deficiency over which the court possessed 
undisputed jurisdiction.678     
The Tax Court in Woods further supported its authority to exercise 
equitable powers to resolve matters within its jurisdiction by reference to 
the statutory scheme articulated in §§ 7422(e), 6512(a), and 7481.  
Characterizing these provisions as serving “to channel tax litigation into the 
Tax Court, to make our decisions binding, and to preclude relitigation of 
the same issues in another forum,” the court concluded that Congress did 
not intend to restrict the court’s application of equitable principles to 
resolve cases absent an express limitation to that effect.679   
The Tax Court’s affirmation of its limited authority to exercise equitable 
powers in Woods may have appeared to conflict with the then-prevailing 
view that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain claims of equitable recoupment.  
The two positions, however, were not inconsistent.  The Board of Tax 
Appeals, the Tax Court, and the Supreme Court all had interpreted 
§ 6214(b) (or its predecessor) as a statutory prohibition on the court’s 
application of equitable recoupment.  While the Tax Court’s want of 
jurisdiction over the equitable recoupment remedy appeared settled even in 
light of Woods, the Supreme Court shortly thereafter conveyed an apparent 
willingness to reconsider the issue through its 1990 decision in United States 
v. Dalm.680   
The taxpayer in Dalm served as the executor of a decedent’s estate, 
receiving commissions for her services.  In addition to these commissions, 
the taxpayer received considerable sums by way of gift from the decedent’s 
brother on which the taxpayer paid the resulting gift tax.  The Service later 
determined that the purported gifts constituted additional fees for the 
taxpayer’s services as executor, and asserted a resulting income tax 
deficiency.  The taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination, 
and the parties reached a settlement reflecting reduced income tax 
deficiencies for the years at issue.   
Immediately after settling the income tax dispute, the taxpayer in Dalm 
filed a refund claim seeking recoupment of the gift tax paid with respect to 
the transfers.  However, the limitations period for prosecuting a refund of 
the gift tax had long expired.  The district court agreed with the 
                                                     
677  Id. at 784–85 (quoting Berkery v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 259, 270 (1988) 
(Hamblen, J., concurring)).   
678 Under this analysis, the extent of the Tax Court’s supplemental jurisdiction 
turns on the scope of issues that may be raised as an affirmative defense to the 
imposition of a tax over which the court possesses jurisdiction to review.     
679  Id. at 788–89.   
680  494 U.S. 596 (1990).   
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Commissioner’s denial of the claim based on expiration of the limitations 
period, explaining that the recoupment doctrine could not support the 
maintenance of an independent suit to recover a time-barred refund of the 
very tax to be recouped.   
After the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of the refund claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reinstated the district court’s disposition of the case.  In so doing, the Court 
carefully explained why its decision in Bull v. United States did not support 
the taxpayer’s position:  equitable recoupment operated only to permit a 
time-barred claim to offset a separate tax over which the reviewing court 
possessed jurisdiction.681  The separate tax in this case—the taxpayer’s 
income tax deficiencies—had been resolved in the Tax Court proceeding 
prior to the filing of the time-barred claim for refund of the gift tax.  
Hence, the district court was not asked to review any tax other than that for 
which the taxpayer sought recoupment.  The Supreme Court noted that it 
had not previously allowed recoupment to serve as “the sole basis for 
jurisdiction,”682 and the Court rejected the taxpayer’s invocation of 
recoupment as a stand-alone exception to the bar posed by the expiration 
of the limitations period on refund claims.   
The Court’s holding in Dalm was consistent with the limited scope of 
the recoupment remedy and, hence, not particularly remarkable.  The 
surprising aspect of the decision came in the Court’s statements regarding 
the taxpayer’s handling of her recoupment claim.  The Court observed that 
the taxpayer chose to litigate the income tax deficiency before the Tax 
Court, where she did not attempt to recoup her gift tax liability.683  Of 
course, the taxpayer’s failure to raise her recoupment claim before the Tax 
Court did not stem from oversight but instead from recognition of the 
court’s then-established lack of jurisdiction to hear such claims.684  Yet 
rather than conceding the inability of the Tax Court to consider the 
taxpayer’s claim of recoupment, the Court dropped the following disclaimer 
in a footnote:  “We have no occasion to pass upon the question whether 
Dalm could have raised a recoupment claim in the Tax Court.”685  This 
somewhat dry statement intimated the existence of ambiguity concerning 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over recoupment.   
                                                     
681  Id. at 606–07.   
682  Id. at 608.   
683  Id. at 611.   
684  Justice Stevens’ dissent notes that the taxpayer’s counsel believed that no 
recoupment claim could be had in the Tax Court.  Id. at 615 n.3 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  The Commissioner shared this view, contending that the taxpayer had 
effectively waived her recoupment claim by choosing to litigate the matter before 
the Tax Court.  See id. at 615 (quoting the Government’s reply brief).   
685  Id. at 611 n.8.   
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Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens took the question of the Tax Court’s 
potential jurisdiction a step further.  After commending the majority for 
reserving the issue of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over recoupment claims, 
Justice Stevens contemplated the prospect of the Tax Court possessing 
such jurisdiction: 
 
Of course, if this Court were eventually to decide the reserved issue 
by holding that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear an equitable 
recoupment claim, today’s decision would become a complete dead 
letter.  No taxpayer would have any reason to litigate the deficiency 
and the recoupment issues separately, and in any event a judgment 
upon the former would bar a subsequent suit upon the latter under 
the doctrine of res judicata.686  
 
Hence, the Court appeared to retreat considerably from the certainty of its 
prior determination in Gooch Milling that the Tax Court’s statutory 
jurisdiction unequivocally foreclosed consideration of recoupment claims.   
To the extent the Court’s decision in Dalm could be interpreted as an 
invitation for the Tax Court to revisit its jurisdiction to address claims of 
equitable recoupment, the Tax Court accepted the invitation in Estate of 
Mueller v. Commissioner.687  In a prior proceeding in Estate of Mueller, the court 
had determined a deficiency in estate tax based on an increase in the value 
of shares of a closely held company included in the decedent’s gross estate.  
Faced with this deficiency, the estate amended its petition to raise a time-
barred overpayment of income tax by the legatee of the stock as an 
affirmative defense.  Reconsidering its jurisdiction to address recoupment 
claims “in light of Dalm,”688 the court determined that it possessed authority 
to consider equity-based defenses—including equitable recoupment—to a 
claim over which the court possessed jurisdiction.689  
In a reviewed opinion, the court explained that consideration of the 
taxpayer’s equitable recoupment claim did not require the exercise of 
jurisdiction beyond the statutory grant to redetermine the estate tax 
deficiency before it.  The court reasoned that the recoupment claim, as an 
affirmative defense to the estate tax deficiency, was “part of the entire 
action over which we have jurisdiction,”690 relying heavily on its then-recent 
decision to this effect in Woods v. Commissioner.  Yet despite the strength of 
                                                     
686  Id.  Justice Stevens raised the prospect of distinguishing the Court’s prior 
decision in Gooch Milling on the ground that the opinion considered recoupment 
only in the context of a time-barred overpayment relating to a year other than the 
year in dispute.        
687  101 T.C. 551 (1993).   
688 Id. at 553. 
689  Id. at 557.   
690  Id. at 556.   
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the Woods precedent, the court in Estate of Mueller nonetheless had to 
contend with the question of whether § 6214(b) constituted a statutory 
denial of such jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court in Gooch Milling had 
previously determined.  The court resolved this point by revisiting the 
circumstances surrounding the 1926 legislation introducing the predecessor 
of § 6214(b)—in particular, the Board’s decision in Barry v. Commissioner.691  
The court explained that although the Board in Barry had granted the 
taxpayer’s request to apply a time-barred overpayment as a setoff to the 
deficiency before it, the Barry case did not concern or address the doctrine 
of equitable recoupment.  The time-barred overpayment at issue in Barry 
was attributable to depreciation deductions that bore no relation to the 
deficiency the taxpayer petitioned the Board to review.692  After clarifying 
the circumstances of the Barry decision, the court in Estate of Mueller found 
nothing in the 1926 legislative response to Barry or in the legislative 
materials accompanying its passage to indicate congressional intent to deny 
the Board jurisdiction over equitable recoupment.693  In light of this 
background, the court essentially concluded that subsequent decisions 
construing § 6214(b) or its predecessor as foreclosing Tax Court 
consideration of equitable recoupment claims—including the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gooch Milling—had misconstrued the statute.694 
Alternatively, the Tax Court found Gooch Milling inapposite on grounds that 
§ 6214(b) literally does not apply to the redetermination of an estate tax 
deficiency.695  Although the court’s treatment of Supreme Court precedent 
in Estate of Mueller may appear surprising when considered in isolation, the 
court undoubtedly was emboldened to re-examine its equitable recoupment 
jurisdiction by the apparent willingness of the Supreme Court to do the 
same in Dalm.   
                                                     
691  1 B.T.A. 156 (1924).  For discussion of the Barry decision, see supra notes 
646–653 and accompanying text.    
692   Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 559 (1993).   
693   Id.   
694  The Tax Court did not do so directly.  Instead, after noting that the 
Supreme Court in Gooch Milling had determined that the Board lacked jurisdiction 
to allow a time-barred overpayment of income tax to be offset against a related 
income tax deficiency (in other words, equitably recouped), the court interpreted 
Gooch Milling as “not preventing the Tax Court from considering the affirmative 
defense of equitable recoupment when it is properly raised in a timely suit for 
redetermination of a tax deficiency over which we have jurisdiction.” Id. at 560.   
695  Id.  However, even while attempting to continue the distinction where the 
taxpayer sought to recoup an estate tax overpayment against an income tax liability, 
the Tax Court later conceded that it had determined in Estate of Mueller that 
equitable recoupment would be available “in any event”—that is, even if the literal 
terms of § 6214(b) could not be avoided—in a common transaction scenario.  See 
Estate of Bartels v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 430, 434 (1996). 
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The Tax Court’s reconsideration of its jurisdiction to entertain claims of 
equitable recoupment in Estate of Mueller was not well received by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Reviewing the court’s consideration of the 
taxpayer’s recoupment claim on the merits and its determination that the 
remedy was not available,696 the Sixth Circuit technically affirmed.  
However, the circuit court did so on the basis that the Tax Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the recoupment claim in the first place.697  In the 
court’s view, § 6214(b) made it “abundantly clear” that the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction was limited to determining only the deficiency before it, a 
proposition the court found to be additionally supported by § 6512(b).698  
The court further cited the Tax Court’s want of general equitable powers as 
precluding the extension of its statutory jurisdiction to address equitable 
remedies such as recoupment.699  In short, the Sixth Circuit restated the 
analysis of the Supreme Court in Gooch Milling in updated form.700  The 
court was not timid in its assessment of the Tax Court’s newly found 
jurisdiction, contending that it “fl[ew] in the face of unambiguous statutory 
language as well as 50 years of Supreme Court precedent.”701       
The Tax Court did not allow the initial and emphatic appellate rejection 
of its equitable recoupment jurisdiction to shake its stance.  Applying the 
Golsen rule, the court affirmed its position in Estate of Mueller in three cases 
that were appealable to different circuit courts.  The first case was Estate of 
Bartels v. Commissioner,702 a case appealable to the Seventh Circuit.  Although 
the taxpayer in Estate of Bartels asserted a time-barred overpayment of estate 
                                                     
696  107 T.C. 189 (1996).  The court denied the recoupment claim because, even 
though the value of the decedent’s stock originally yielded an estate tax deficiency 
against which the estate sought to recoup the related income tax overpayment, the 
Commissioner subsequently allowed a credit for tax on prior transfers that yielded 
an estate tax overpayment.  Because the recoupment claim could no longer offset a 
claim for tax due, the court determined the remedy to be inapposite.   
697  153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998).   
698   Id. at 305.   
699   Id.   
700  Id. at 306.  Whereas the Tax Court had attempted to distinguish Gooch 
Milling based on the failure of § 6214(b) to reference estate taxes, the Sixth Circuit 
found the reasoning of the case to be “just as applicable to the determination of 
estate tax deficiencies as it is to the determination of income tax deficiencies.”  Id.   
701   Id. at 307.  For a modern evaluation of the Tax Court’s equitable jurisdiction 
advancing a similarly narrow interpretation, see Leandra Lederman, Equity and the 
Article I Court:  Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. 
TAX REV. 357 (2001).     
702  106 T.C. 430 (1996).  Specifically, the court emphasized the words “the tax” 
in the portion of § 6214(b) providing that the Tax Court “shall have no jurisdiction 
to determine whether or not the tax for any other year or calendar quarter,” and 
interpreted this reference as restricting application of the phrase to determinations 
of income tax or gift tax for other periods.     
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tax as an offset to a related income tax deficiency (as opposed to the inverse 
scenario in Estate of Mueller), the court nonetheless continued to find 
§ 6214(b) inapposite.  The court explained that the jurisdiction-limiting 
proviso of § 6214(b) referred only to the income tax or gift tax that served 
as the subject of the court’s primary determination in the statute’s opening 
clause.703  However, the Court did not rest its decision on this narrow 
interpretation of § 6214(b) alone.  The court observed that it previously had 
reasoned in Estate of Mueller that equitable recoupment would apply “in any 
event”—that is, even if the tax to be recouped consisted of income tax or 
gift tax from a time-barred period—if those taxes arose in a same-
transaction scenario,704 and endorsed this broader view of its recoupment 
jurisdiction.705      
The Court’s next opportunity to affirm its authority to apply equitable 
recoupment came in Estate of Branson v. Commissioner,706 a case consisting of 
facts paralleling those of Estate of Mueller.  In addition to restating points 
made in prior decisions, the Tax Court in Estate of Branson noted that the 
Sixth Circuit, in reaching a contrary result, failed to consider that Gooch 
Milling interpreted the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals—not that 
of the Tax Court as an article I court.707  The court then quoted the 
Supreme Court’s observation in Freytag v. United States that the Tax Court 
“‘exercises its judicial power in much the same way as the federal district 
courts exercise theirs.’”708 Based on this statement and the court’s holding 
in Woods, the court asserted that the Tax Court “should be properly viewed 
as exercising full judicial power within its limited subject matter 
jurisdiction.”709  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed this view, 
affirming the Tax Court’s decision and declaring that the Tax Court could 
exercise the “full range of equitable principles generally granted to courts 
that possess judicial powers” within the sphere of its statutorily defined 
                                                     
703  Id. at 434.   
704  Id.  
705  Although the Estate of Bartels decision was not reviewed by the Seventh 
Circuit, the decision of that circuit court in Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. 
Commissioner, 165 F.3d  572 (7th Cir. 1999), suggests that any such review would 
have been favorable.  That case, which concerned the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to 
apply equitable estoppel, declared any contention that the Tax Court lacked 
authority to do so because of its status as a court of limited jurisdiction to be 
“fatuous.”  Id. at 578.  Instead, the Seventh Circuit observed that the present day 
Tax Court operates “pretty indistinguishably” from a Federal district court with 
respect to cases within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  Id.   
706  113 T.C. 6 (1999), aff’d, 264 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).   
707  Id. at 10–11.   
708  Id. at 11 (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991)).   
709  Id. at 11.   
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jurisdiction.710  In addition to noting the parallels between the judicial 
power of the Tax Court and that of a Federal district court,711 the circuit 
court went on to stress the practical ramifications of its decision.  If the Tax 
Court were determined to lack jurisdiction over recoupment claims, less 
affluent taxpayers who found it necessary to litigate in the court’s exclusive 
prepayment forum effectively would be required to waive any recoupment 
claims for the privilege of doing so.712   
The Tax Court’s final opportunity to affirm its jurisdiction to apply 
equitable recoupment came in Estate of Orenstein v. Commissioner. 713  Because 
the case was appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, the Golsen rule required the 
court to address Continental Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner,714 a decision of the 
former Fifth Circuit (which, at the time, included what is now the Eleventh 
Circuit).  The taxpayer in Continental Equities contended that the Tax Court 
should have addressed its plea to recoup time-barred overpayments of 
income tax by related corporations stemming from the Commissioner’s 
adjustment of interest deductions under § 482.  The Fifth Circuit dispensed 
with this argument through the following:   
 
[T]he conclusion that the 1969 Tax Reform Act did not grant the 
Tax Court equitable jurisdiction is inescapable. The courts that have 
addressed the issue are in agreement without [sic] conclusion that the 
Tax Court still does not possess jurisdiction over equitable claims.715 
 
Although Continental Equities appeared to foreclose the court’s proposed 
application of equitable recoupment in Estate of Orenstein, the Tax Court was 
not convinced that the case constituted binding precedent on appeal.  The 
court cited the factual dissimilarities of the cases, the staleness of the 
Continental Equities decision in light of the passage of two decades in which 
views of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction evolved, and, most significantly, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Bokum v. Commissioner.716  The 
circuit court in Bokum affirmed the Tax Court’s authority to apply the 
                                                     
710  264 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2001).     
711 See id. at 911 (observing that the Tax Court, “within its specialized 
jurisdiction, ‘operates pretty indistinguishably from a federal district court,’” 
quoting Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 572, 578 
(7th Cir. 1999)). 
712  Estate of Branson, 264 F.3d at 911.  The Ninth Circuit noted the related 
analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 
1993), that taxpayers would be put to a similar inequitable election if the Tax Court 
were determined to lack jurisdiction to exercise equitable estoppel.  Id. at 911–12.   
713  T.C. Memo. 2000-150, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1971.   
714  551 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1977).   
715  Id. at 84 (citations omitted).  
716 992 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993).   
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doctrine of equitable estoppel and, in so doing, endorsed the distinction 
that the Tax Court possessed authority to apply equitable principles in cases 
properly before it even though it lacked authority to expand its statutory 
jurisdiction on equitable grounds.717  Because the Eleventh Circuit had 
essentially adopted the Tax Court’s conception of its equitable jurisdiction 
in this manner, the Tax Court in Estate of Orenstein determined itself to be 
unbridled by precedent in its continued application of equitable 
recoupment.  The Tax Court’s decision in Estate of Orenstein was not 
appealed.    
Against this backdrop of developing and conflicting judicial 
interpretations of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain claims of 
equitable recoupment, Congress attempted to bring clarity to the field.  Its 
first attempt consisted of a provision in the Senate version of the Technical 
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 providing that the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction would extend to “any counterclaim, set-off, or equitable 
recoupment against (or for) the taxpayer.”718  However, Congress dropped 
this provision at the conference level without explanation.719  
As part of the Taxpayer Relief and Refund Act of 1999,720 Congress 
offered a more circumscribed provision.  Through a provision captioned 
“Confirmation of Authority of Tax Court To Apply Doctrine of Equitable 
Recoupment,” Congress proposed the addition of the following sentence to 
§ 6214(b): 
 
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the Tax Court may apply 
the doctrine of equitable recoupment to the same extent that it is 
available in civil tax cases before the district courts of the United 
States and the United States Court of Federal Claims.721 
 
However, the legislation did not survive a presidential veto made for 
reasons unrelated to the Tax Court.   
                                                     
717   Id. at 1140. 
718  S. 2238, 100th Cong., § 785 (1988).  The conference committee report 
describes the Senate amendment as follows:   
The Tax Court is granted jurisdiction over tax refund actions against the 
IRS where there is already pending and awaiting submission for disposition 
by a judge a deficiency action in the Tax Court, and where the issue in the 
refund action is related by subject matter to the deficiency action or the 
result in either of the two actions will affect the amount in controversy in 
the related action. 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 234 (1998).   
719  Id.   
720  H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. (1999). 
721  Id. § 1343(a).   
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Congress returned in 2006 with an identical proposed amendment to 
§ 6214(b) raised in light of the split that had then developed among the 
circuit courts of appeals.722  This time, the amendment was enacted as part 
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.723  The legislative history 
accompanying the amendment indicates that Congress enacted the 
provision both to resolve the existing conflict among the circuit courts over 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction and to provide simplification benefits to both 
taxpayers and the IRS (that presumably would follow from the Tax Court’s 
ability to address recoupment claims).724   
The Tax Court had occasion to interpret the scope of its jurisdiction 
under § 6214(b), as amended, in Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner.725   In an earlier 
proceeding, the Tax Court in Menard determined income tax deficiencies on 
grounds that compensation paid to its chief executive officer and principal 
shareholder was not reasonable and constituted disguised dividends.  In 
response to this determination, the taxpayer corporation sought to recoup 
the hospital insurance tax paid by the corporation and the officer-
shareholder under §§ 3101(b) and 3111(b) with respect to amounts 
originally characterized as compensation.  By the time the Tax Court 
considered the taxpayer’s recoupment claim, the period of limitations for 
filing a refund claim of the hospital insurance tax had expired.   
The Commissioner did not dispute the amount by which the taxpayers 
had overpaid the hospital insurance tax.  Nonetheless, the Commissioner 
contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
recoupment claim on the basis that the court generally lacks jurisdiction to 
determine a deficiency or overpayment of hospital insurance tax.726  As a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the Commissioner contended that the 
                                                     
722  See S. REP. NO. 109-336, at 97 (2006) (noting the conflict between the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of Mueller and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Estate of Branson). 
723  Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 858(a), 120 Stat. 1020 (2006).  The amendment was 
effective for any matter pending before the Tax Court for which the decision had 
not become final (within the meaning of § 7481) as of the August 17, 2006 date of 
enactment.  Id. § 858(b).  Although Congress fashioned the amendment as a 
confirmation of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction and the legislative history supports the 
confirmation motivation, see S. REP. NO. 109-336, at 97 (2006), a literal reading of 
the “notwithstanding” clause of the addition to § 6214(b) suggests the existence of 
a contrary directive in the statute in its prior form.   
724  S. REP. NO. 109-336, at 97 (2006).  
725  130 T.C. 54 (2008).   
726 Id. at 58.  The court conceded that it lacked original jurisdiction over the 
hospita l insurance tax, and that any possible secondary jurisdiction to determine 
the amount of this tax under § 7436 was not available due to the absence of a 
determination regarding worker classification. Id. at 60–61.  For a discussion of the 
Tax Court’s secondary jurisdiction over hospital insurance tax and other 
employment taxes under § 7436, see Part VII.B.   
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second sentence of § 6214(b) (providing Tax Court jurisdiction over 
equitable recoupment) served only as an exception to the first sentence, 
which denied the Tax Court jurisdiction to determine an overpayment or 
underpayment in tax otherwise within the court’s jurisdiction for a period 
not before the court.  In short, the Commissioner did not read the second 
sentence of § 6214(b) as permitting consideration only of time-barred 
claims relating to taxes otherwise within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.   
The Tax Court was not persuaded.  As a textual matter, the court found 
the Commissioner’s restricted interpretation of the second sentence of 
§ 6214(b) contrary to the statutory text confirming “in the broadest of 
terms” the court’s authority to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment 
to the same extent the remedy is available in civil tax cases before the 
Federal district courts and the Court of Federal Claims.727  The court 
further explained that a literal interpretation of the statutory text—one that 
confirmed the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain recoupment claims 
based on all internal revenue taxes—advanced the legislative goals of the 
amendment by offering “clarity and a meaningful measure of simplification 
in that both parties can be confident that the Court may provide a complete 
remedy for a given taxable year.”728  In this manner, the court in Menard 
held that there existed no condition to the court’s application of the 
doctrine of equitable recoupment that it possess original or subject matter 
jurisdiction over the tax that the Commissioner or the taxpayer seeks to 
recoup.   
As interpreted by the Tax Court in Menard, the statutory “confirmation” 
of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain claims of equitable recoupment 
contained in § 6214(b) actually served to expand the court’s recoupment 
jurisdiction.  The provision not only clarified that the court could address 
claims relating to periods outside those covered by the statutory notice of 
deficiency for recoupment purposes, the provision further allowed the 
court to determine the taxpayer’s liability for a tax outside of the court’s 
original jurisdiction.   
Although the 2006 amendment to § 6214(b) proved expansive in its 
grant of recoupment jurisdiction, the accompanying legislative history did 
not provide a ringing endorsement of the Tax Court’s equitable jurisdiction 
in general terms.  The Senate Report provided the following qualifier in its 
explanation of the provision:  “No implication is intended as to whether the 
Tax Court has the authority to continue to apply other equitable principles 
in deciding matters over which it has jurisdiction.”729  Thus, at a minimum, 
                                                     
727  Id. at 66.   
728  Id. at 67.   
729  S. REP. NO. 109-336, at 97 (2006). 
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Congress passed on the opportunity to affirm the Tax Court’s broader 
articulation of its equitable jurisdiction in Woods.730   
 
b. Equitable Estoppel 
 
Cases in which parties have invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
provide a cleaner framework for examining the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court because, unlike equitable 
recoupment, no statute exists to potentially restrict the court’s jurisdiction 
to entertain these claims.731  Instead, the scope of the court’s jurisdiction to 
address claims grounded in equitable estoppel and related theories has been 
determined through judicial exploration alone.   
Generally speaking, a once restrictive view of the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction has given way to a general acceptance of the court’s ability to 
address claims grounded in estoppel.  A 1964 article addressing the 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court (prior to its reconstitution as an article I court) 
reflected the once-restrictive view of the court to adjudicate claims of 
estoppel by closing its discussion of the matter with the following 
admonition:  “The moral is clear.  Other factors being equal, a case 
involving these issues in a dominant manner should not be brought to the 
Tax Court.”732  However, the prevailing view of the court’s jurisdiction in 
                                                     
730  On the other hand, the inference the legislative history cautions against may 
not be a positive one regarding the Tax Court’s equitable jurisdiction.  The Tax 
Court had determined that it possessed jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment 
in cases over which it had jurisdiction in Estate of Mueller based in large measure on 
its holding in Woods.  Hence, the amendment to § 6214(b) expressly granting the 
court equitable recoupment jurisdiction could be interpreted as a determination 
that the reasoning in Woods did not adequately support the court’s exercise of such 
jurisdiction.  From a broader standpoint, any statutory grant of equitable 
jurisdiction to the Tax Court reinforces the view that the court may not exercise 
equitable powers outside of the statutory sphere.  See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 
701, at 398 (“[I]f the Tax Court is going to apply equitable principles, it must find a 
specific source of the power to do so.”).  While the statement that the legislation is 
not intended to have any implication for the Tax Court’s authority to continue to 
apply other equitable principles could be interpreted as protecting the Tax Court’s 
non-statutory equitable jurisdiction, the qualifier in the legislative history 
accompanying the amendment to § 6214(b) does not convey this sense of 
affirmation.   
731  As discussed in text accompanying supra notes 647–671, § 6214(b) and its 
predecessor at one point were interpreted as a statutory bar to the ability of the 
Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court to entertain claims of equitable 
recoupment.  However, that view no longer prevails. 
732  Theodore S. Lynn & Mervyn S. Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion 
as Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX L. REV. 487, 
520 (1964).    
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this area has changed considerably.  The Tax Court in numerous instances 
has addressed claims of equitable estoppel without questioning its 
jurisdiction to do so, while at other times doing so after first affirming its 
jurisdiction.  Similarly, several Circuit Courts of Appeals have assumed the 
Tax Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate estoppel claims, while others 
have expressly confirmed the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this arena.   
This section traces the major developments in the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court to entertain claims of equitable 
estoppel.  Yet before doing so, this section reviews the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel and related claims in the tax setting for context.   
The application of the doctrine ordinarily involves a decision not to 
follow general principles of the tax law because of the equities in a 
particular case.  Courts therefore are cautious in its use.  As is the case with 
recoupment, the doctrine of estoppel has its roots in both law and equity 
and has been applied by both types of courts.733 The Pomeroy treatise 
defines equitable estoppel as: 
 
the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights 
which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of 
contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good 
faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change 
his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some 
corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.734 
 
The treatise goes on to enumerate the elements generally required for its 
application: (1) conduct amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment 
of a material fact; (2) actual or imputed knowledge of the misrepresentation 
by the party to be estopped; (3) absence of knowledge of the facts by the 
party in whose favor estoppel is applied; (4) intention or expectation of the 
party to be estopped that the representation or concealment will be acted 
upon by the other party; (5) reliance by the party seeking the estoppel; and 
(6) detriment to the party seeking the estoppel resulting from his reliance.735  
The elements of classical estoppel are obviously closely related to fraud; 
some courts in fact have required a fraudulent intention to apply 
                                                     
733  3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (5th ed. by 
Spencer S. Symons 1941) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY].  
734  Id. § 804. 
735  Id. § 805; see also Graff v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 761 (1980) (citing 
these “traditional elements” of equitable estoppel), aff’d, 673 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 
1982); Illinois Addressograph Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 498, 504–05 
(1934) (Murdock, J., concurring) (citing estoppel factors from earlier edition of 
Pomeroy treatise); 15 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60:03 
(2003 ed.) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS] (listing the same six factors for estoppel).      
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estoppel.736  But even without such a requirement, the basic elements 
themselves are so restrictive that if the doctrine was limited to these 
circumstances it would be applicable only in rare cases against taxpayers and 
virtually never against the Government.737 
Nevertheless, cases arise in which one or more of the above elements 
are absent, but in which “equitable” considerations dictate the application 
of some form of estoppel to prevent a party from deriving an 
unconscionable benefit from his adversary’s reliance on a 
misrepresentation.  As a result, the courts from time to time have 
recognized a doctrine related to traditional estoppel, but in which one or 
more of the traditional elements have been relaxed or eliminated.738  
Nomenclature reflecting the modified doctrine includes pseudo-estoppel,739 
quasi-estoppel,740 duty of consistency,741 abuse of discretion,742 and 
waiver.743  An exposition of the varied circumstances in which the doctrine 
has been recognized is beyond the scope of this work.  Suffice it to say that 
the principal relaxation of traditional estoppel requirements concerns 
knowledge of the misrepresentation by the person against whom the 
estoppel is invoked.744   
                                                     
736  POMEROY, supra note 733, at § 805. 
737  Lynn & Gerson, supra note 732, at 488.   
738  MERTENS, supra note 735, at § 60:05; Lynn & Gerson, supra note 732, at 
488–89. 
739  Schwartz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 191, 193 (1963).  
740  Eagan v. United States, 80 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1996); Lewis v. 
Commissioner, 18 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 89 (1971), aff’d per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). 
741  Eagan v. United States, 80 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1996); Herrington v. 
Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988); Orange Sec. Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942); Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 
109 T.C. 290, 297 (1997); LeFever v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 525, 543 (1994), aff’d, 
100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 
89 (1971), aff’d per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972); Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 
T.C. 25, 29 (1970).   
742  Gold Nugget Inc. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 28, 42–43 (1984); Automobile 
Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957); Lesavoy Foundation v. 
Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1956); Stevens Bros. Foundation v. 
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 93, 106–08 (1962), modified, 324 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1963).   
743  Aero Rental v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 331, 338 (1975); Eisenstadt Mfg. Co., 
28 T.C. 221, 233–34 (1957).   
744  See Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988); Wichita 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1946); Underwood 
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 468, 477–78 (1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 88 (1971), aff’d per curiam, 456 
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of Kingdon v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 838, 844 
(1947); 10 MERTENS, supra note 735, at §§ 60:11 to 60:17.  But see Wobber Bros. v. 
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Because of the difficulty of discussing estoppel in the abstract in tax 
cases, it may be useful to give illustrations of cases in which the doctrine 
has been applied.  In Bartel v. Commissioner,745 the taxpayer and his controlled 
corporation had in prior years treated corporate payments to the taxpayer as 
loans.  In a later year, in connection with the liquidation of the corporation 
and when the earlier years apparently were closed by the statute of 
limitations, the taxpayer sought to recharacterize these payments as 
compensation, which would reduce the tax upon the liquidation.  On the 
basis of equitable considerations, the Tax Court applied a duty of 
consistency to the taxpayer to estop him from maintaining that the 
payments were in substance anything other than loans. 
The modified doctrine of equitable estoppel frequently has been applied 
against taxpayers.746 However, courts are far more reluctant to apply the 
doctrine against the Government, particularly in the tax setting.747  In Estate 
of Emerson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court explained that “[a]lthough the 
doctrines of estoppel and quasi-estoppel are applicable against the 
Commissioner, it is well established that these doctrines should be applied 
against him with utmost caution and restraint.”748  With respect to the 
application of estoppel against the Government in general, the Supreme 
Court has explained that precluding the Government from enforcing the 
law based on the conduct of its agents would undermine “the interest of the 
                                                                                                                       
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 890, 892 (1938) (innocent mistake on tax return does not 
serve as basis for estoppel against taxpayer).   
745  54 T.C. 25 (1970). 
746  See Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 152 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 
1946); Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1942); Ryan v. 
Alexander, 118 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. New York Trust Co., 
54 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1931); Specialized Systems, Inc. v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 
577 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Erickson v. United States, 309 F.2d 760 (Ct. Cl. 1962); 
Sangers Home for Chronic Patients, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 105 (1979); 
Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 25 (1970); Benoit v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 656 
(1955), rev’d, 238 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1956); Flynn v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1064 
(1937).     
747 Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (1992); Schuster v. 
Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962); see also United States v. Asmar, 827 
F.2d 907, 911 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (detailing the various standards for applying 
equitable estoppel against the Government by the Circuit Courts of Appeals).  It is 
recognized generally that application of estoppel against the Government is less 
frequent than application of the doctrine against taxpayers. See 10 MERTENS, supra 
note 735, at § 60:18.   
748  67 T.C. 612, 617 (1977); see also Kronish v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684, 695 
(1988); Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214–15 (1981), aff’d, 310 F.2d 209 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Graff v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 761 (1980), aff’d 673 F.2d 
784 (5th Cir. 1982).  
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citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law.”749  As applied to the 
Commissioner in particular, estoppel could jeopardize the public interest in 
preserving the fisc through the efficient collection of revenue.750   
While instances of estoppel against the Government are unusual, they 
do exist.  In Schuster v. Commissioner,751 transferee liability was asserted by the 
Commissioner against a bank on the basis of the includibility of an inter 
vivos trust, of which it had been trustee, in the gross estate of the settlor.  
The Service, after being fully apprised of the existence and terms of the 
trust originally had taken the position on audit that the trust was not 
includible in the settlor’s gross estate, and on the basis of that 
representation, the bank had distributed the assets of the trust.  The 
Government subsequently changed its position with respect to the 
includibility of the trust assets in the gross estate, but the statute of 
limitations barred assessment and collection of additional tax from the 
estate.  Accordingly, the Government sought recovery against, among 
others, the bank as transferee.  The Ninth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, 
applied estoppel against the Government to preclude collection of any 
additional tax because of the strength of the “[b]ank’s equitable interest”752 
and the unwarranted loss it would suffer if the Government were allowed 
to prevail.  Estoppel was applied absent a knowing misrepresentation by the 
Government,753 and in a case in which the misrepresentation was arguably 
one of law rather than fact.  While it is firmly established that estoppel can 
be applied only to misrepresentations of fact (and not law),754 the well-
                                                     
749 Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (not adopting 
but also not foreclosing an absolute rule barring estoppel against the Government); 
see also Shuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962) (“Congress’s 
legislative authority should not be readily subordinated to the action of a wayward 
or unknowledgeable administrative official.”); Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 
1040, 1148 (1928) (explaining that the application of estoppel against the 
Commissioner would cause individual tax liabilities to turn on conduct of a 
particular Government officer rather than on the uniform law prescribed by 
Congress). 
750 See Reynolds v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1988); Shuster, 
312 F.2d at 317.   
751 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962), modifying First W. Bank & Trust Co., 32 T.C. 
1017 (1959). 
752 312 F.2d at 318. 
753 A finding of knowledge or imputed knowledge would have been required 
for application of the traditional doctrine of estoppel.  See supra note 735 and 
accompanying text. 
754  Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Beer 
v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 1984); Estate of Vitt v. United States, 
706 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1983); Graff v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, aff’d, 673 
F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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known difficulty of isolating these elements, especially as to questions of 
mixed law and fact, renders the scope of the doctrine uncertain.755   
The application of equitable estoppel and its variants by the Board of 
the Tax Appeals and the Tax Court has been somewhat uncertain over the 
years. The court has applied the doctrine to taxpayers in several cases,756 
and it has entertained claims of estoppel against the Government but found 
the necessary elements lacking.757  However, in two decisions predating the 
Tax Court’s reconstitution as an article I court, the court rejected the 
taxpayer’s invocation of estoppel against the Government on grounds that 
it lacked equity jurisdiction.758  In the latter of these cases, Schwartz v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gooch 
Milling in rejecting the taxpayer’s claim of pseudo-estoppel: 
 
We cannot adopt such an assertion here.  This Court is a statutory 
body of limited jurisdiction, and we do not have the powers of a 
court of equity. . . . We cannot and do not adopt the asserted 
doctrine of pseudoestoppel.759 
 
                                                     
755  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT ch. 30 (3d ed. 
1972). 
756  E.g., Graff v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743 (1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 784 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 25 (1970); Hollman v. Commissioner, 
38 T.C. 251, 260 (1962); Bialock v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 649 (1961); Benoit v. 
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 656 (1925), rev’d, 238 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1956); Flynn v. 
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1064 (1937). 
757  Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209 (1981), aff’d, 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612 (1977); Schwager v. 
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 781, 788–89 (1975); Underwood v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 
468, 477–78 (1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976); Fortugno v. Commissioner, 
41 T.C. 316, 323–24 (1963), aff’d, 353 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965); Saigh v. 
Commissioner, 36 T.C. 395, 423–24 (1961); Diggs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1959-99, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 443, 445, aff’d, 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1960); Kenyon 
Instrument Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 732, 739–40 (1951); South Chester Tube 
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1229, 1235 (1950); Agricultural Sec. Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1103, 1114 (1939), aff’d, 116 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1941); 
Stein-Bloch Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1162, 1166–68 (1931); United States 
Trust Co. of New York v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 1074, 1077–78 (1928); 
Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1151 (1928); Hayes v. Commissioner, 7 
B.T.A. 936, 944–45 (1927). 
758  See Schwartz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 191, 193–94 (1963); Lorain Ave. 
Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141, 164 (1958); see also Stevens Bros. Foundation, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 93, 108 (1962) (expressly avoiding jurisdictional 
question by finding elements of estoppel lacking), modified, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 
1963). 
759  Schwartz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 191, 193 (1963) (citations omitted).   
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However, the determination that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain claims based on equitable estoppel and related theories absent 
specific statutory authorization is suspect.  Congress has supplied the court 
with jurisdiction to, among other things, redetermine deficiencies in tax.760  
The redetermination contemplated clearly comprehends a judicial format, 
and in this context it seems entirely appropriate that in exercising its 
authority, absent some specific statutory bar, the Tax Court should apply 
the same doctrines and rules of construction as would any other court. 
Among other cases, the Tax Court in Schwartz relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner,761 in which 
the Court held that the Board could not apply the doctrine of equitable 
recoupment because it was a creature of statute and “[t]he Internal Revenue 
Code, not general equitable principles, is the mainspring of” its 
jurisdiction.762  However applicable Gooch Milling may at first appear to be to 
the estoppel problem, there are important distinctions that can be drawn.  
Gooch Milling involved a specific jurisdictional provision barring the Board 
from applying recoupment.763  No similar provision exists with respect to 
estoppel.  Additionally, the provision prohibiting recoupment was in the 
nature of a limitation on the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction, precluding 
the determination of overpayments or underpayments for any year other 
than the one for which a deficiency notice was issued.  Such restrictions on 
jurisdiction of the federal courts traditionally have been scrupulously 
observed as limitations on judicial power, regardless of equitable 
considerations.764  Application of estoppel, on the other hand, neither 
extends nor contracts subject matter jurisdiction; it is simply a doctrine 
employed to decide a case already properly before the court.  Finally, even if 
Gooch Milling should be read as generally limiting the Board’s power to 
exercise equitable powers, the present applicability of such a restriction is 
now open to considerable doubt.  Since 1969 the Tax Court has been a 
legislative court organized under article I of the Constitution,765 and it has 
been recognized in several instances that legislative courts have inherent 
power to exercise judicial functions.766  
The Tax Court’s rare expressions of its lack of jurisdiction to address 
claims of equitable estoppel no longer reflect the prevailing view.  As 
mentioned above, subsequent to those decisions, the court has repeatedly 
                                                     
760  I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 7442. 
761  Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943). 
762  Id. at 422. 
763  See supra notes 648–649 and accompanying text supra. 
764  See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (3d ed. 
1976). 
765  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7441). 
766  See supra note 667 and accompanying text. 
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entertained invocations of estoppel by the taxpayer and Government alike, 
merely assuming rather than examining its jurisdiction to do so.767  
Appellate courts adopted a similar approach of presuming the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction in this context.768  Later, appellate courts expressly endorsed the 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court to address estoppel related arguments.  In 
Reynolds v. Commissioner,769 the Sixth Circuit cited the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a basis for finding that the 
court was empowered to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel against the 
Government.  Shortly thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit in Bokum v. 
Commissioner reasoned that the Tax Court “must have the power to consider 
an equitable estoppel claim, if considering the claim is necessary to the 
appropriate disposition of the claim before it,”770 noting that the taxpayer 
would be unable to litigate an estoppel claim on a deficiency basis if the 
case were otherwise.771   
However, the Seventh Circuit in Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. 
Commissioner772 supplied the most definitive and extensive assertion of the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction to address claims grounded in equitable estoppel.  
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner placed considerable emphasis on the 
judicial nature of the Tax Court following its transformation from an 
executive agency to a legislative court: 
 
The argument that the Tax Court cannot apply the doctrines of 
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel because it is a court of 
limited jurisdiction is fatuous.  All federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.  We are given no reason to suppose that statutes of 
limitations are intended to be administered differently in the Tax 
Court than in the federal district courts, which share jurisdiction in 
federal tax cases with the Tax Court.  It is true that the predecessor 
                                                     
767  See id.   
768  See Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Young v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1083, 1090 (11th Cir. 1991); Graff v. 
Commissioner, 673 F.2d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1982); Warner v. Commissioner, 526 
F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1975); Estate of Geiger v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 221, 224, 230 
(8th Cir. 1965)).   
769  861 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988).  The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Reynolds 
confirming the ability of the Tax Court to apply both equitable estoppel and 
judicial estoppel is noteworthy in comparison to that court’s decision in Estate of 
Mueller v. Commissioner, 153 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1998), holding that the Tax Court is 
without jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment.  These two 
decisions can be reconciled on the basis that § 6214(b)—prior to its amendment in 
2006—supplied a statutory bar to the Tax Court’s recoupment jurisdiction.   
770  992 F.2d 1136, 1140 (11th Cir. 1993).   
771  Id. at 1140–41.   
772  165 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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bodies to the Tax Court, such as the Board of Tax Appeals, were 
administrative agencies having more limited powers than a regular 
court.  But the present Tax Court operates pretty indistinguishably 
from a federal district court.  It differs in some respects—it has 
specialized jurisdiction, obviously, and its judges are not Article III 
judges.  But none of the differences bear on whether the court is 
empowered to recognize defenses to the statute of limitations. In 
context, the Supreme Court’s dictum in Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 
U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam), that the Tax Court lacks “general 
equitable powers” means only that the Tax Court is not empowered 
to override statutory limits on its power by forgiving interest and 
penalties that Congress has imposed for nonpayment of taxes—but 
then no court is, unless the imposition would be unconstitutional.   
Without citing McCoy or United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 611 
and n.8 (1990), which reserves the issue of the Tax Court’s equitable 
powers, the Supreme Court in Freytag v. Commissioner, supra, 501 U.S. 
[868] at 891 [(1991)], pointed out that the Tax Court has been given 
injunctive and other equitable powers; and numerous cases affirm 
the Tax Court’s power to enforce equitable principles, such as 
contract reformation and judicial estoppel, without express 
congressional authorization.  We are at a loss to understand why 
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel shouldn’t be among the 
equitable principles applicable to proceedings in the Tax Court.  
Bokum v. Commissioner, [992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 1993)], 
holds that they are among them.  The overlap between the district 
court’s jurisdiction over refund suits and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
over deficiency suits—both jurisdictions exclusive, but the taxpayer 
allowed to choose between them—makes it anomalous and 
confusing to multiply distinctions between the doctrines in the two 
types of courts.773       
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion supplies the most definitive word on the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain estoppel related claims and, for that 
matter, the Tax Court’s equitable jurisdiction in general.  In short, the Tax 
Court as a judicial body may entertain equitable claims arguments that arise 
in the course of resolving cases that fall within its statutory grant of 
jurisdiction, unless specifically precluded from doing so by statute.  
Accordingly, taxpayers no longer need avoid the Tax Court to preserve 
their equitable arguments.   
                                                     
773  Id. at 578 (citations omitted).  But see Lederman, supra note 701, at 398, 411–
12 (contending that judicial economy does not provide an adequate basis for 
extending the equitable jurisdiction of the Tax Court beyond that expressly 
authorized by Congress).    
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ENHANCING THE EFFICIENCY OF TAX ADJUDICATION: 
INNOVATION IN REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES 
  
The Tax Court’s traditional jurisdiction over deficiencies and 
overpayments continues to make up the bulk of its workload.  However, 
recognizing that taxpayers at times had pressing disputes with the Service 
that did not result in an immediate increased tax liability, Congress 
established and has periodically expanded the jurisdiction of the Tax Court 
to issue declaratory judgments.  In addition to providing new spheres of 
Tax Court jurisdiction, Congress has taken a number of steps to improve 
the efficiency of tax adjudication.  These improvements often took the 
form of procedural enhancements, as in the case of the unified partnership 
audit procedures enacted in 1982.  Other measures have conferred 
supplemental jurisdiction to the Tax Court, permitting taxpayers to resolve 
issues relating to both the underlying tax liability and the resulting interest 
obligations in one proceeding before the court—obviating the need for the 
taxpayer to resort to an alternate forum to resolve disputes over interest.  
This Part addresses expansions of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction and 
alterations to its procedures aimed at improving the tax adjudication regime.     
 
A. Declaratory Judgments 
 
With the important exception of the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction, 
Congress traditionally has been unwilling to provide judicial tax remedies 
other than for refund of taxes already paid.  Thus, the tax laws generally bar 
suit to restrain assessment or collection of taxes,1 and consistent with this 
goal, the courts have refused to entertain refund litigation in the absence of 
full payment of the disputed tax.2  These limitations are based on the policy 
that unlimited judicial remedies for aggrieved taxpayers could unduly 
hamper the orderly collection of government revenues.3 
With the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934,4 the 
question arose whether the policy against liberal remedies in tax disputes 
had been eroded.  The broad statutory language was soon interpreted to 
permit declaratory judgments with respect to tax matters even though 
                                                     
1 I.R.C. § 7421(a). 
2 E.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). 
3 See id. at 175. 
4 Ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. 
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injunctive relief continued to be unavailable.5  Given the similarity of 
declaratory and injunctive relief, Congress, at the suggestion of the Justice 
Department, fairly promptly amended the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
preclude its application “with respect to Federal taxes.”6 
 
1. Early Subjects of Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
 
The bar on declaratory relief in tax controversies was rigidly observed 
for nearly four decades.7  However, it became apparent as years passed that, 
in certain cases, existing remedies were inadequate to afford taxpayers a 
practical judicial remedy.  These matters typically involved situations in 
which taxpayers were reluctant to proceed with planned activities in the 
absence of advance approval of the Service.  For example, the benefits 
available with respect to qualified pension and profit-sharing plans were not 
by statute dependent on advance approval of the Service.8  However, the 
statutory provisions governing these plans were complex and open to 
divergent interpretations, and the risks involved in implementing and 
funding a plan without such approval were great.  If the Service chose to 
contest a plan’s qualification, judicial review was available; but if the Service 
ultimately prevailed, the tax benefits would be lost.  Moreover, even if the 
taxpayer ultimately prevailed, delays and expense incurred in administrative 
and judicial litigation would offset the tax advantages of instituting the plan.  
As a consequence, most taxpayers tailored their plans to meet Service 
requirements, whether or not they agreed that such requirements were in 
accordance with law.  The problem was compounded since the absence of 
litigation resulted in little in the way of judicial interpretations, which made 
Service pronouncements even more important.  Additionally, the traditional 
remedies failed to provide employees with an opportunity to support or 
challenge the qualification of a plan.  Although employees were directly 
affected by such plans, a deficiency or refund dispute generally would 
involve only the employer; employees lacked standing to participate in such 





                                                     
5 Penn v. Glenn, 10 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ky. 1935), appeal dismissed, 84 F.2d 
1001 (6th Cir. 1936). 
6 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 405, 49 Stat. 1027; 6A MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 57.18 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MOORE’S]. 
7 See M. Carr Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IOWA 
L. REV. 312, 325 (1963). 
8 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 105 (1974).  
9 Id. at 106. 
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a. Qualification of Retirement Plans 
 
As a result of these concerns, Congress, in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974,10 provided the Tax Court with authority to 
issue declaratory judgments with regard to controversies arising from 
Internal Revenue determinations or Internal Revenue failure to make 
determinations, as to the initial and continuing qualification of employee 
retirement plans.11  In the instance of a controversy surrounding an Internal 
Revenue determination, the Tax Court proceeding must be initiated by 
filing a pleading before the 91st day following the day after the mailing of 
the disputed determination.12  Conversely, if the controversy results from 
the failure of Internal Revenue to make a determination, the Tax Court 
proceeding cannot be commenced before the expiration of 270 days 
following the request for such determination.13  The legislation provides 
that an action for a declaratory judgment may be commenced in the Tax 
Court by the employer, the plan administrator, an employee who is an 
“interested party,” or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.14  To 
assure that interested party employees are given the opportunity to 
participate in both administrative and judicial proceedings regarding plan 
qualification, the statute further provides that the court may hold a petition 
to be “premature” unless the petitioner has complied with notice 
provisions, provided by Treasury regulation, for such parties.15  Tax Court 
decisions generally are appealable to the court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the employer’s principal place of business, principal office or agency 
is located.16 
In general, the declaratory judgment provision with respect to 
retirement plans is similar to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.17  It 
provides for a judicial determination of rights in situations in which the 
traditional monetary remedy is inadequate.  To preclude adjudication of 
disputes that do not constitute cases or controversies within the meaning of 
the Constitution, the 1974 legislation, as is the case with the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, expressly makes the procedure applicable only in cases of an 
                                                     
10 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
11 Id. § 1041(a), 88 Stat. 949 (adding I.R.C. § 7476). 
12 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(5). 
13 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(3). 
14 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1). 
15 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(2). 
16 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(C).   
17 The committee report of the Ways and Means Committee states that “[i]t is 
anticipated that the normal rules of the Federal courts as they relate to declaratory 
judgments are to be applicable under the Tax Court declaratory judgment 
procedure.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 108 (1974). 
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“actual controversy.”18  This requirement is incorporated in the statute by a 
provision barring maintenance of the action unless the disputed plan has 
been put into effect.19  The procedure is also identical to the Declaratory 
Judgment Act in specifying that declaratory relief “may” be provided.20  In 
connection with the Declaratory Judgment Act, the permissive “may” has 
been interpreted to allow the denial of declaratory relief, otherwise within 
the jurisdiction of the court, if in the exercise of its discretion the court 
finds such relief to be inappropriate.21  Reasons for denying relief have been 
based on several grounds; among these are that a better alternative remedy 
exists,22 that declaratory relief will neither settle the issue in dispute nor 
terminate the controversy giving rise to the action,23 and that the procedure 
is being employed as a method of procedural fencing.24  Although the 
legislative history of the 1974 enactment and the Tax Court rules are silent 
on the significance of “may,” presumably the same interpretation given the 
Declaratory Judgment Act will be applied to the Tax Court provision.25 
Despite the basic similarity with the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 
several aspects of the Tax Court’s declaratory judgment jurisdiction in this 
setting are peculiar to the Tax Court.  The first of these concerns is the 
necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite for 
obtaining declaratory relief.  Unlike the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 
which is broadly stated and contains no explicit reference to the doctrine of 
exhaustion,26 the Tax Court provision specifically precludes the issuance of 
a declaratory judgment unless the petitioner has exhausted the available 
remedies within the Internal Revenue Service.27  In case of Service inaction, 
the statute requires the expiration of 270 days from the time of the ruling 
                                                     
18 I.R.C. § 7476(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
19 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(4).  Softening this requirement somewhat, the statute 
provides that “[a] plan or amendment shall not be treated as not being in effect 
merely because under the plan the funds contributed to the plan may be refunded if 
the plan (or the plan as so amended) is found to be not qualified.”  Id. 
20 I.R.C. § 7476(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
21 See generally MOORE’S, supra note 6, at ¶ 57.08. 
22 Cunningham Bros. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969); Larson v. General 
Motors Corp., 134 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1943); Gregory v. United States Bd. of Parole, 
308 F. Supp. 258 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1935). 
23 EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 299 (2d ed. 1941).  
24 See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Cunningham 
Bros. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969); Independent Tape Merchants Ass’n v. 
Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Pa. 1972).  
25 With regard to the court’s unwillingness to grant declaratory relief in the case 
of a better alternative remedy, see infra notes 101–104 and accompanying text.  
26 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. 
27 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(3). 
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request before exhaustion of remedies can be found to exist.28  Although 
the exhaustion doctrine is applied to cases arising under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, the doctrine in these cases is based on equitable principles.29  
Courts have held on this basis that the exhaustion doctrine may be waived30 
or that proceedings may be stayed pending completion of administrative 
remedies.31  Because the Tax Court provision is statutory and expressed in 
mandatory language, the court has interpreted it to require exhaustion as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite for maintenance of a proceeding.32  In connection 
with satisfaction of this requirement, the committee reports indicate that 
the petitioner must have availed himself of all appeal rights within the 
Internal Revenue Service and have complied with all Service requirements 
for obtaining a ruling such as supplying information necessary for the ruling 
process.33  In the case of a petition by an employee who did not receive 
initial notice of the Service’s determination procedure, the exhaustion 
requirement will be satisfied if the employee exhausts all remedies available 
after receiving such notice of the determination proceeding.34 
A second aspect peculiar to the Tax Court declaratory judgment 
procedure in this setting involves the nature of the evidence that may be 
adduced for purposes of the proceeding.  Although the statute is silent on 
this point, the Tax Court rules generally provide that the court’s 
determination is to be based on the administrative record before the 
Service.35  Although the rules provide that the court may permit a party to 
introduce evidence outside of this administrative record “for good cause 
shown,”36 the court’s explanation of this exception indicates that it will be 
interpreted narrowly.   The court envisioned the exception applying only to 
permit the introduction of disputed facts necessary to establish the court’s 
                                                     
28 Id.  The statute is phrased in the negative: 
A petitioner shall not be deemed to have exhausted his administrative 
remedies with respect to a failure by the Secretary to make a determination 
with respect to initial qualification or continuing qualification of a 
retirement plan before the expiration of 270 days after the request for such 
determination was made.  
Id.  No implication is intended that the expiration of the 270 day period will be the 
equivalent of exhaustion.  Even after such expiration, exhaustion will not have 
occurred if the petitioner did not otherwise satisfy the requirements of exhaustion.   
H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at l09 (1974). 
29 See MOORE’S, supra note 6, at ¶ 57.16. 
30 Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U.S. 228 (1927). 
31 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). 
32 TAX CT. R. 210(c)(4) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 109 (1974). 
34 Id. 
35 TAX CT. R. 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
36 Id.   
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jurisdiction.37  By contrast, the procedure under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act does not contain any general rule limiting evidence to the administrative 
record; rather, evidence ordinarily receivable at any trial is permitted to be 
introduced.38 The more restrictive approach in the Tax Court is predicated 
on language in the committee reports indicating that the court’s function in 
declaratory judgment proceedings is simply to review the accuracy of 
Service determinations and not generally to inquire into the qualification of 
retirement plans.39  Thus, the administrative record and the reasons 
advanced by the Service for its position generally mark the boundaries of 
the proceeding, and it is assumed that these cases will be resolved without 
the necessity of a trial.40   
The general approach of resolving these disputes based on the 
administrative record, however, does not apply to cases involving the 
revocation of qualified status of a retirement plan or, as later described, 
cases involving the revocation of exempt status of an employee trust, the 
valuation of a gift, or the eligibility of an estate to pay the estate tax on an 
installment basis.41  In those cases, a disposition will be made on the basis 
of the administrative record alone only if the parties agree that the record 
developed before the Service contains all facts relevant to the resolution of 
the case and such facts are not in dispute.42  
A third noteworthy item with regard to declaratory judgment 
proceedings in the Tax Court involves the question of burden of proof.  
The Senate version of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
provided special statutory burden of proof rules for declaratory judgment 
proceedings.43  Generally, the burden of proof would be on the petitioner, 
                                                     
37 In promulgating this exception, the court explained that there did not appear 
at the time “any circumstances under which a trial will be held except as to disputed 
jurisdictional facts or to resolve the disagreement between the parties as to the 
contents of the administrative record.”  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 217(a) 
(July 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1048.  Hence, the exception was inserted “merely out of 
an abundance of caution to provide for the possibility of a trial on other facts or 
the presentation of evidence in the event that a situation not now contemplated 
might arise in which a trial would be appropriate.”  Id.   
38 See FED. R. CIV. P. 57. 
39 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 108 (1974); see also Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 
210(a) (July 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1048.  
40 See TAX CT. R. 217(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
41 TAX CT. R. 210(b)(8), 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).    With respect to proceedings 
involving revocations, the exception exists because such determinations usually are 
made on the basis of the Service’s independent investigation rather than on the 
basis of information furnished by the applicant for the determination.  Rules 
Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 217(a) (July 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1048.   
42 TAX CT. R. 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
43 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 331 (1974); S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 116 (1973). 
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as is the case in most Tax Court proceedings.44  However, the burden 
would be on the Commissioner with respect to grounds that were not 
advanced in the Commissioner’s determination.45  Thus, if the 
Commissioner changed the grounds of the determination, or if 
Commissioner had not issued a determination, the Commissioner would, at 
least partially, bear the burden of proof.  The House bill eliminated the 
statutory burden of proof passed by the Senate, and left the formulation of 
burden of proof rules to the Tax Court.46  The House provision ultimately 
prevailed, and no reference to burden of proof is contained in the 
legislation as enacted.47 
Tax Court rules originally promulgated pursuant to the declaratory 
judgment provision contained rather elaborate burden of proof provisions 
that generally followed the policy of the Senate bill.48 In all cases the burden 
of proof rested on the petitioner with respect to establishing the elements 
of jurisdiction.49  Thus, the petitioner had to establish that a petition was 
filed within the statutory period, that the disputed plan was in effect, and 
that administrative remedies had been exhausted.50  The remaining 
application of the burden of proof depended upon whether the 
Commissioner had issued a determination on which the proceeding was 
based.  If such a determination had been issued and it concluded that a plan 
did not qualify, the burden of proof was placed on the party challenging 
such determination as to any ground specified in the determination.51  If a 
determination that a plan did not qualify was defended on a ground not 
specified in such determination, the party seeking to defend the 
determination bore the burden of proof as to the new ground.52  If the 
Commissioner had determined that a plan did qualify, any party challenging 
such determination bore the burden of proof on every ground on which the 
Commissioner relied to establish that the plan did not qualify.53  If the 
Commissioner had not issued a determination, any party, including the 
Commissioner, seeking to establish that the plan did not qualify, bore the 
burden of proof on every ground relied on to establish such 
nonqualification.54 
                                                     
44 See supra note 43. 
45 Id. 
46 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 331 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 108 (1974). 
47 I.R.C. § 7476; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 331 (1974). 
48 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
49 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1)(i) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
50 TAX CT. R. 210(c) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
51 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1)(i) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
52 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1)(ii) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
53 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1)(i) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
54 TAX CT. R. 217(c)(1)(i)(B) (July 1, 1977 ed.). 
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The Tax Court deleted the burden of proof provisions applicable to this 
and other areas of its declaratory judgment jurisdiction in 2003.55  The court 
did so out of an abundance of caution, recognizing that the burden of proof 
provisions introduced through the enactment of § 7491 in 199856 could 
apply to declaratory judgment actions. Whether this is in fact the case is not 
readily clear.  On one hand, the scope of the general rule under § 7491(a) 
appears broad enough to encompass declaratory judgment proceedings 
before the Tax Court, as it applies to “any court proceeding.”57  However, 
the provision has potential effect only if the taxpayer produces credible 
evidence with respect to a factual issue “relevant to ascertaining the liability 
of the taxpayer” for income taxes or for estate and gift taxes.58  As a 
declaratory judgment does not bear, at least immediately, on the tax liability 
of the taxpayer, an argument exists that § 7491 is inapposite in this setting.  
Indeed, to date, the court has managed to avoid squarely addressing 
whether § 7491(a) applies to declaratory judgment proceedings.59  
Nonetheless, stating that it did not “wish to suggest by Rule that [§ 7491] 
does not apply” in this context,60 the court deleted the burden-of-proof 
regime under former Rule 217(c) altogether.       
Even assuming § 7491 applies to declaratory judgment proceedings 
before the Tax Court, the provision does not purport to resolve all burden 
of proof questions.  Rather, the general provision of § 7491(a) places the 
burden of proof on the Commissioner if the taxpayer first produces 
“credible evidence” with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining 
the taxpayer’s liability for any income tax or estate and gift tax,61 and even 
then only if a series of limitations does not apply.62 Section 7491(a) 
therefore does not purport to articulate a broadly applicable general rule 
                                                     
55 See 120 T.C. 639–41 (2003) (amending Tax Court Rule 217 with a general 
effective date of June 30, 2003).   
56 See Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3001(a), 112 Stat. 726–27 (enacting I.R.C. § 7491).  The scope and 
application of § 7491 is addressed in Part X.C.4.  
57 I.R.C. § 7491(a).   
58 Id.   
59 In a retirement plan qualification proceeding, the court in Hollen v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-2, 101 T.C.M. 1004, stated that it “need not decide 
whether § 7491(a) applies to declaratory judgment actions such as this,” citing the 
taxpayer’s failure to argue the applicability of the provision.  Id. at 1005 n.3.  
Similarly, in an action concerning an organization’s  ability to receive deductible 
contributions, the court similarly avoided the question.  See South Community 
Ass’n v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-285, 90 T.C.M. 568, 570 n.5 (“We need 
not and do not decide whether sec. 7491(a)(1) applies in the setting of a declaratory 
judgment action such as we have here.”). 
60 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 217 (June 30, 2003 ed.), 120 T.C. 641.    
61 I.R.C. § 7491(a). 
62 See I.R.C. § 7491(b).   
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regarding the placement of the burden of proof.  In declaratory judgment 
actions following the elimination of Tax Court Rule 217(c) concerning a 
challenge to an adverse agency determination, the court has placed the 
burden of proof on the taxpayer (as was the case under former Tax Court 
Rule 217(c)(1)(i)) under general principles.63 Accordingly, the burden-of-
proof regime established under former Rule 217(c) may prove persuasive in 
resolving future questions regarding the default allocation of the burden of 
proof in declaratory judgment proceedings, should the allocation prove 
critical to the disposition of the case.   
 
b. Qualification of Tax Exempt Organizations and Classification of 
Private Foundations 
 
The exception to the general bar on declaratory judgments in tax 
matters was further broadened by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.64  This 
legislation added to the permissible subjects of declaratory judgment action 
disputes concerning the status of certain tax exempt organizations to which 
contributions are deductible.65  The purpose for and the pattern of the 1976 
legislation closely resemble those involved in the earlier provision 
authorizing declaratory judgments in the case of retirement plans. 
The purpose of the exempt organization provision is virtually identical 
to that for retirement plans.  Although the statute generally does not require 
prior administrative approval of tax exempt status, most organizations seek 
such determinations to assure themselves and their contributors that 
donations to the organization will be tax deductible.66  Moreover, because 
of the extremely unfavorable consequences that attend the denial or 
revocation of exempt status, most organizations accede to Service views 
with regard to their organization and operation.  As is true with retirement 
plans, these considerations have resulted in comparatively little judicial 
litigation and an absence of precedent to guide both taxpayers and the 
                                                     
63 See Hollen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-2, 101 T.C.M. 1004, 1005; 
South Community Ass’n v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-285, 90 T.C.M. 568, 
570.   
64 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. 
65 I.R.C. § 7428. The legislation also provided declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
for disputes concerning the taxability of certain transfers of property from the 
United States.  The provision, formerly codified in § 7477, was repealed for 
transfers and exchanges after 1984.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-369, § 131(e)(1), 98 Stat. 664.  A detailed analysis of this former provision is 
provided in the original edition of this text.  See HAROLD DUBROFF,  THE UNITED 
STATES TAX COURT:  AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 465–67 (1979).   
66 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 283 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 585 (1976). 
I.R.C. § 508(a) requires most § 501(c)(3) organizations, organized after Oct. 9, 
1969, to apply for Service approval of exempt status. 
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Service.  Difficulties occasioned by these problems have attracted the 
critical comment of both the Supreme Court67 and the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue.68 
In several respects the procedures for declaratory judgments for exempt 
organizations are identical to those for retirement plans.  Thus, the time 
limits for commencing the proceeding are the same for both types of 
proceedings—within 91 days following the day after the mailing of a 
determination69 or, if the Service makes no determination, no earlier than 
270 days after the filing of the original determination request.70  
Additionally, each provision states that the court “may” make a declaration 
with regard to the dispute71 and thus leaves open the exercise of discretion 
in cases in which a declaratory judgment, although authorized under the 
letter of the law, would be inappropriate.  In each type of proceeding, 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite for 
commencing suit,72 and the same provision permitting flexible use of 
special trial judges is applicable to each type of proceeding.73 
In other respects the two procedures have minor differences that mainly 
reflect the various types of substantive issues involved.  Thus, the category 
of permissible petitioners in exempt organization proceedings is limited to 
the organization the status of which is in question.74  The necessity of an 
actual controversy is common to both types of proceedings, but the 
requirement is satisfied differently in each.  In the case of retirement plans, 
the statute requires that the plan be adopted;75 for exempt organizations, 
the organization in question must be in existence.76  The general limitation 
of evidence to the administrative record also is common to both 
procedures.  The primary exception to the limitation is that extrinsic facts 
may be introduced with respect to the question of the court’s jurisdiction.77  
Also excepted in the case of retirement plans is evidence with respect to the 
revocation of a plan’s qualified status and revocation of exempt status of an 
                                                     
67 Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774 (1974) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749–50 (1974).  
68 Randolph W. Thrower, I.R.S. Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on 
Exempt Organizations, 34 J. TAX’N 168 (1971). 
69 I.R.C. §§ 7428(b)(3), 7476(b)(5), 7477(b)(4). 
70 I.R.C. §§ 7428(b)(2), 7476(b)(3), 7477(b)(2). 
71 I.R.C. §§ 7428(a), 7476(a), 7477(a). 
72 I.R.C. §§ 7428(b)(2), 7476(b)(3), 7477(b)(2). 
73 I.R.C. §§ 7476(c), 7477(c). 
74 I.R.C. § 7428(b)(1). 
75 I.R.C. § 7476(b)(4). 
76 I.R.C. § 7428(b)(1); TAX CT. R. 210(c)(2)(C) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
77 TAX CT. R. 217(a) and accompanying Rules Comm. Note (July 1, 1977 ed.), 
68 T.C. 1048.  
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employee’s trust.78  In the case of exempt organizations, new evidence may 
be introduced in connection with a determination that revokes exempt 
status, or that determines status as a private foundation or as a private 
operating foundation.79   
Although the two provisions have many areas of similarity, some 
differences remain.  One area of difference, at least partially necessitated by 
the different nature of the substantive disputes, is the subject matter of the 
court’s review.  With respect to retirement plans, the court may review: (1) 
the Service’s determinations with respect to the initial or continuing 
qualification of a plan;80 and (2) the Service’s failure to make determinations 
with respect to the initial or continuing qualification of a plan, but only if 
the dispute concerning continuing qualification arises from a plan 
amendment or termination.81  In the case of exempt organizations, the 
court may review: (1) the Service’s determinations with respect to the initial 
or continuing qualification of an organization as a charitable organization, a 
private foundation, or a private operating foundation;82 and (2) the Service’s 
failure to make determinations with respect to such initial or continuing 
qualification.83  Although the language of the provisions in this regard 
appears to be quite similar (taking into account the different substantive 
issues involved), a dispute emerged concerning one aspect of the retirement 
plan provision.  In a 1976 decision, Sheppard & Myers, Inc. v. Commissioner,84 
the Tax Court held that the 1974 statute gave it no jurisdiction to review a 
determination by the Commissioner that revoked the qualified status of a 
retirement plan.  The court’s decision was based on committee reports 
accompanying the legislation, which indicated that the court’s jurisdiction 
was limited to controversies arising from initial qualification of a plan, plan 
amendments, and plan terminations. 85  The revocation in Sheppard & Myers 
did not result from any of these matters.  However, committee reports on 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which authorized declaratory judgments with 
respect to exempt organizations,86 provided as follows: 
       
As is the case regarding retirement plans (under sec. 7476) the courts are 
to have jurisdiction to determine whether the Service has correctly 
concluded that a previously exempt organization has lost its 
                                                     
78 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
79 TAX CT. R. 210(b)(10), 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
80 I.R.C. § 7476(a)(1). 
81 I.R.C. § 7476(a)(2). 
82 I.R.C. § 7428(a)(1). 
83 I.R.C. § 7428(a)(2). 
84 67 T.C. 26 (1976). 
85 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 343 (1974).   
86 See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306, 90 Stat. 1520 (adding I.R.C. § 7428).    
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charitable donee status because of changes in operation, changes in 
the governing law, changes in the governing instrument, etc.87 
 
Thus, the committee reports indicated a congressional intent that both the 
retirement plan and exempt organization provisions permit review of 
Internal Revenue Service determinations revoking favorable treatment.  The 
court in Sheppard & Myers did not note these committee reports, even 
though the 1976 legislation was enacted at approximately the same time as 
the promulgation of the case. 88  Whether this was because of oversight or 
because the court did not accept the committee’s interpretation of the 1974 
legislation is unknown. 
Not long after the decision in Sheppard & Myers was issued, Congress 
signaled its disapproval of the Tax Court’s narrow interpretation of its 
jurisdiction.  Citing the committee reports accompanying the 1976 
legislation excerpted above, the Senate Finance Committee in 1978 
explained that Congress intended for the Tax Court to possess jurisdiction 
over cases concerning the revocation of a prior favorable determination by 
the Service in the retirement plan setting.89 Although the technical 
corrections bill proposing to make this grant of jurisdiction express in light 
of Sheppard & Myers was not enacted, Tax Court rules issued subsequent to 
the enactment of the 1976 legislation nonetheless indicate that the court 
recognizes its jurisdiction over revocation disputes in general.90    
In addition to differences with regard to the subject matter and scope of 
review of the declaratory judgment provisions governing retirement plan 
actions and exempt organizations, the procedure with regard to the latter 
has three other distinct characteristics.  First, unlike retirement plans, the 
Tax Court’s primary jurisdiction to review determinations with regard to 
exempt organizations is not exclusive.  Proceedings seeking declaratory 
judgments with regard to these matters may be initiated as well in either the 
Court of Claims or the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.91  A degree of consistency in the procedural rules applied by the 
three fora is expected since the committee reports provide that the burden 
of proof rules in all declaratory actions regarding exempt organizations 
                                                     
87 S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 589 (1976) (emphasis supplied); H.R. REP. NO. 94-
658, at 286 (1975).   
88 The opinion in Sheppard & Myers was filed on Oct. 6, 1976.  The Tax Reform 
Act was enacted on Oct. 4, 1976.  
89 See S. REP. NO. 95-745, at 65–66 (1978), accompanying the Technical 
Corrections Act of 1978, H.R. 6715, 95th Cong. (1977).  The bill passed the House 
of Representatives and then was reported to the Senate out of the Senate Finance 
Committee. Thereafter, no action was taken on the bill.   
90 TAX CT. R. 210(b)(10), 212, 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX 
CT. R. 213(a), 217(a) (July 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1042–43, 1048.   
91 I.R.C. § 7428(a). 
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should conform, to the extent practicable, to those adopted by the Tax 
Court for retirement plan actions.92 
A second unique aspect of the exempt organization provision deals with 
interim relief for such organizations in connection with charitable status.  
The Service maintains a list of those organizations that it has determined 
are eligible to receive deductible contributions, and the Service now makes 
this list available to the public in an electronically searchable format.93  A 
contributor to such an organization can be assured of the deductibility of 
contributions so long as the Service’s determination is not publicly revoked 
or suspended.94  Since the Service’s revocation or suspension of an 
organization’s tax-exempt status is an administrative action that may be 
judicially overridden, Congress provided in the 1976 legislation that, in 
certain circumstances, donors may be assured of the deductibility of 
contributions to an organization even though the Service revokes or 
suspends its advance assurance of deductibility.95  In order to be eligible for 
the continued assurance of charitable status, the organization must institute 
the declaratory judgment proceeding within the statutory period.96  If it 
does so, then even if the court determines that the Service determination 
was correct, deductible contributions of up to $1,000 per taxpayer (treating 
husband and wife as one taxpayer) will be permitted during the pendency of 
litigation.97  The provision may only apply to individual contributors98 who 
do not share any responsibility for the revocation of charitable status.99 
Naturally, if it is judicially determined that the Service determination was 
incorrect, the $1,000 limitation will not apply.100 
A final area of interest that may or may not be unique to exempt 
organizations deals with the issue of duplicative litigation. To illustrate, 
suppose that at the same time the Commissioner issues a determination 
revoking an organization’s exempt-charitable status the Commissioner also 
asserts a deficiency in income tax based on the withdrawal of such status.  
The taxpayer commences an action for a declaratory judgment that the 
                                                     
92 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 285–86 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 588 (1976).  
93 The Internal Revenue Service no longer publishes Publication 78, Cumulative 
List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.  Rather, the 
Service now provides this information through an on-line search tool entitled 
“Exempt Organizations Select Check,” available at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-
Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Select-Check.  
94 Rev. Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 C.B. 818. 
95 I.R.C. § 7428(c). 
96 I.R.C. § 7428(c)(1)(B). 
97 I.R.C. § 7428(c)(2)(A). 
98 Id. 
99 I.R.C. § 7428(c)(3). 
100 H.R. REP. NO. 94-648, at 287 n.8 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 589 n.8 
(1976). 
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revocation of favorable status was incorrect and also either files a petition 
with the Tax Court contesting the deficiency determination or pays the 
deficiency and initiates a refund action to recover the tax paid.  Because of 
the choice of forum with regard to exempt organization declaratory 
judgments, these actions may be in the same or in different courts.  The 
issue of exempt status probably will be the same in both the declaratory 
judgment and deficiency or refund proceeding, and the question arises 
whether both proceedings should proceed simultaneously or whether one 
proceeding should be stayed or dismissed pending completion of the other.  
The problem, similar to that which could formerly occur if the 
Commissioner issued a deficiency notice with respect to a year for which a 
refund proceeding had already been instituted,101 is addressed in the 
committee reports under the 1976 Act:  
 
This provision is intended to facilitate relatively prompt judicial 
review of the specified types of exempt organization issues; it is not 
intended to supplant the normal avenues of judicial review 
(redetermination of a deficiency or suit for refund of taxes) where 
those normal procedures could be expected to provide opportunities 
for prompt determinations.  Consequently, it is expected that the 
courts will not entertain a declaratory judgment suit with regard to a 
period for which a notice of deficiency has already been issued, 
except upon a showing by the organization that the declaratory 
judgment route is likely to substantially reduce the time necessary to 
attain a final judicial review of the Service’s determination.  Also, it is 
expected that in general a court which has accepted pleadings in a 
declaratory judgment proceeding will yield to a court which has 
accepted pleadings in a redetermination of deficiency or a tax refund 
suit, unless the proceedings in the declaratory judgment suit are so 
far along that it would facilitate interests of prompt justice for the 
latter court to yield to the former.  The committee’s decisions are not 
to be permitted to create conflicting determinations on the parts of 
different trial courts with regard to any of the questions that may be 
determined in a declaratory judgment suit; nor are the committee’s 
decisions to operate so as to require duplication of effort on the part 
of parties, witnesses, or courts.102 
 
The committee reports thus generally require that the actual tax 
controversy (whether it be in the form of a deficiency or refund 
proceeding) take precedence over the declaratory judgment action.  
Although the directive in the committee reports is not reflected specifically 
                                                     
101 See Part VI.B.2. 
102 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 286 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 588–89 (1976). 
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in the statute, no technical problems should be presented to the court 
acting in accordance with congressional desires inasmuch as the statute 
leaves ample room for judicial discretion in providing that the court “may” 
issue a declaratory judgment.103 
Because the legislative history with regard to multiple actions expressly 
deals only with exempt organization declaratory judgments,104 a question 
remains as to the treatment of this issue in connection with proceedings 
involving retirement plans.  In the case of retirement plans, the possibility 
of dual actions would exist in a case in which an employer implements a 
plan in an unqualified manner and then seeks a favorable ruling.  A denial 
of qualified status by the Service could be accompanied by an assertion of a 
deficiency based on disallowance of deductions to the employer or taxation 
of trust income.  Theoretically, both a declaratory judgment and a 
deficiency or refund proceeding could be commenced.   
 
c. Tax-Exempt Status of Certain Government Obligations 
 
The Tax Court’s declaratory judgment jurisdiction arose in the 1970s, 
and the last grant of jurisdiction during this period provided the Tax Court 
with authority to determine if interest paid on prospective obligations 
issued by State and local governments would be excluded from the gross 
income of the recipient pursuant to § 103.105  The need for this declaratory 
judgment procedure provided by § 7478 is perhaps obvious.  Although the 
exclusion from gross income will inure to the benefit of the bondholder, 
the availability of the exclusion determines the nominal interest rate 
provided under the instrument (thereby allowing the bond issuer to capture 
at least a portion of the benefit of the gross income exclusion).  Simply put, 
the bond cannot be adequately priced until the tax-exempt status is 
established, and any lack of clarity concerning the tax treatment of the bond 
interest would make placement of the bonds difficult if not impossible.106  
The § 7478 procedure therefore allows the prospective issuer of the 
                                                     
103 I.R.C. § 7428(a).  See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra note 102. 
105  See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 336(a), 97 Stat. 2763, 2841 
(adding § I.R.C. 7478).  In its original form, the statute authorized the Tax Court to 
determine if prospective obligations were “described in section 103(a).”  Congress 
amended the statute in 1988 to be more precise, identifying the issue to be whether 
the interest on such obligations would be “excludable from gross income under 
section 103(a).”  See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-647, § 1013(a)(42)(A)–(B), 102 Stat. 3544–45.     
106 See S. REP. NO. 95-1263, at 150 (1978) (noting that the uncertainty 
surrounding the potential determination that the bond interest could not be 
excluded from gross income “invariably makes it impossible to market the bonds”).   
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bonds—the only party permitted to invoke the procedure107—to litigate the 
proper tax treatment of the bond interest prior to the bonds being issued.  
Following issuance, the bond issuer is no longer permitted to litigate the tax 
treatment of the interest paid to the bondholders.108  The Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction under § 7478 is permissive.109  As in other areas of declaratory 
relief, the court requires the existence of an actual controversy before 
exercising its jurisdiction under this provision.  In this context, the Tax 
Court requires at a minimum the prospective issuer to have adopted a 
resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds under State or local law 
prior to commencing a proceeding under § 7478.110   
 As a procedural matter, a prospective bond issuer may not commence a 
proceeding under § 7478 until the Service has made a determination 
concerning the tax treatment of the interest to be paid under the 
prospective bond or has failed to make such a determination.111  
Additionally, the court is precluded from issuing a declaratory judgment 
under the provision unless it determines that the issuer has exhausted all 
available administrative remedies within the Service.112  The issuance of an 
adverse notice of determination generally indicates that the prospective 
bond issuer has exhausted all available administrative remedies.113  In that 
case, the issuer must commence the proceeding under § 7478 within 90 
                                                     
107  See I.R.C. § 7478(b)(1).  Additional parties may not be joined in this context.  
See TAX CT. R. 215(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
108  The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under § 7478 to review the tax treatment 
of interest paid under state or local municipal bonds that already have been issued.  
Village of Brown Deer v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 59 (1986).   In 1988, the Senate 
proposed to amend § 7478 to permit the declaratory judgment procedure to be 
invoked by issuers of outstanding bonds (in addition to prospective bond issuers). 
See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 52–53 (1998).  This provision was dropped at the 
conference committee, however, in lieu of a directive to the Service to amend its 
administrative procedures to permit bond issuers to appeal adverse determinations 
with respect to existing bonds to the IRS Office of Appeals as a matter of right.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 248 (1998).  
109  The statute provides that the court “may” make a declaration concerning 
the tax treatment of the interest to be paid under the bond.  I.R.C. § 7478(a) (flush 
language) (“the court may make a declaration . . .”); see also I.R.C. §§ 7428(a), 
7476(a) (each employing permissive language).   
110  TAX CT. R. 210(c)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
111  I.R.C. § 7478(a)(1), (2).   
112  I.R.C. § 7478(b)(2).  Revenue Procedure 88-32, 1988-1 C.B. 833, provides 
guidance on the steps an issuer must take to obtain a ruling from the Service in this 
setting.  In general terms, the issuer must request a determination that is 
accompanied by a “complete and detailed statement” of all facts relating to the 
prospective obligations.  Id. § 3. 
113  Id. § 6.02(1).   
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days of the mailing of the notice of determination.114  If the Service fails to 
make a determination, the issuer generally will be considered to have 
exhausted all available administrative remedies upon the expiration of 180 
days after the request for a determination was made,115 provided the issuer 
has taken “all reasonable steps to secure such determination.”116  
Accordingly, the prospective bond issuer cannot manufacture Tax Court 
jurisdiction through dilatory conduct that deprives the Service of the 
information necessary to make the requested determination.  Once the 180-
day period has expired, the bond issuer may commence a proceeding under 
§ 7478 at any time.   
Whereas resolution of declaratory judgment proceedings concerning the 
qualification of retirement plans and the tax exempt status of organizations 
is presumptively limited to the administrative record,117 the Tax Court 
contemplates a broader scope of review in the § 7478 setting.  In 
disposition of a government obligation proceeding, the Tax Court Rules 
anticipate that the administrative record will be “augmented by additional 
evidence to the extent the Court may direct.”118   
One distinguishing characteristic of declaratory judgment actions 
concerning the tax treatment of interest paid under State and local 
government bonds concerns the appeal of a Tax Court decision in this 
setting.  Appeal in these cases does not rest with the circuit court of appeals 
in which the prospective issuer resides; rather, all appeals of actions 
maintained under § 7478 are reviewable only by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia. 119   
 
2. Expansions of Declaratory Judgment Relief 
 
Following the establishment and expansion of the Tax Court’s 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the 1970s, the court’s jurisdiction on 
this front remained fairly stable for the next two decades.120  However, 
Congress significantly expanded the court’s declaratory judgment 
                                                     
114  I.R.C. § 7478(b)(3).   
115  Rev. Proc. § 88-32, § 6.02(2). 
116  I.R.C. § 7478(b)(2).   
117  See TAX CT. R. 217(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
118  Id. 
119  I.R.C. § 7482(b)(3).  
120  The most significant change in the declaratory judgment arena during this 
period related to the elimination of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning the taxability of certain transfers of property from the United States.  
The provision, formerly codified in § 7477, was repealed for transfers and 
exchanges after 1984.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 131(e)(1), 98 Stat. 664. 
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jurisdiction through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.121  This legislation 
provided the court with declaratory judgment jurisdiction over the valuation 
of gifts, the qualification of a decedent’s estate to pay tax on a deferred 
basis under § 6166, and adjustments to an “oversheltered” tax return that 
did not operate to increase the taxpayer’s current tax liability.  The first two 
areas of expanded jurisdiction are addressed below.  As adjustments to 
oversheltered returns arise in connection with distributive shares of losses 
from business entities taxed as partnerships, this material will be addressed 
later in this Part under the broader topic of innovations in the partnership 
procedures.122   
 
a.  Declaratory Judgments Concerning Gift Tax Valuations 
 
 Prior to the enactment of § 7477, donors of property often lacked 
recourse to challenge the Service’s determination concerning the gift tax 
value of transferred property.  Specifically, any increase in the tentative gift 
tax resulting from a determined increase in the value of transferred property 
would be absorbed by application of the donor’s unified credit against the 
gift tax—that is, until the donor’s cumulative lifetime taxable gifts exceeded 
the considerable amount of transfers shielded by the credit.123  Until the 
donor reached that limit, the absence of a deficiency in gift tax precluded 
the Tax Court’s general deficiency jurisdiction, and the donor could not 
invoke the refund jurisdiction of federal courts to recover a tax that was 
never paid.  However, this is not to suggest that the Service’s determination 
of an increase in the value of a gift was immaterial.  Once the period of 
limitations expired, the increased value would be binding upon the taxpayer 
for purposes of determining the tax consequences of the donor’s future 
gifts124 as well as the estate tax liability due in the donor’s estate.125   
                                                     
121  Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).   
122  Declaratory relief in the context of an oversheltered return is discussed in 
Section C.4 of this Part.    
123  See I.R.C. § 2505(a).  When § 7477 was enacted in 1997, the prevailing 
unified credit for gift tax purposes permitted a transferor to make $600,000 of 
taxable gifts (that is, gifts in excess of the annual gift tax exclusion under § 2503(b)) 
over the donor’s lifetime without the payment of gift tax.  At that time, however, 
the credit was scheduled to increase incrementally to shield gift tax on lifetime 
taxable gifts of $1 million.  Under current law in 2013, the amount of cumulative 
lifetime gifts that are shielded from gift taxation by the unified credit stands at 
$5.25 million.   
124  See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (donor’s annual gift tax determined by calculating the 
difference between (a) the gift tax on all of the donor’s current and prior year gifts 
and (b) the gift tax on the donor’s prior year gifts), § 2504(c) (valuing gifts made in 
prior years at their value as finally determined for gift tax purposes).  
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 As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress addressed the 
above-described anomaly through the enactment of § 7477.126  If an actual 
controversy exists regarding the Service’s determination of the value of a 
gift and the determination does not result in a deficiency or an increased 
payment of tax, the Tax Court may make a declaration of the contested 
value.127  The Tax Court’s declaration of gift tax value carries the force and 
effect of a regular Tax Court decision, and is reviewable in the same 
manner.128   
 The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to do so may be invoked only by the 
donor,129 and then only if the donor satisfies certain conditions. To start, 
the donor must invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in a timely manner.  
Once the Service sends the donor a notice of determination concerning the 
value of a gift,130 the donor must petition the Tax Court before the 91st day 
following the date of mailing.131  In addition to this procedural requirement, 
§ 7477 precludes the Tax Court from entering a declaratory judgment until 
the donor has exhausted all available administrative remedies.132  While the 
statute does not elaborate on what is required of the taxpayer in this regard, 
presumably the condition requires the taxpayer to pursue a protest of the 
determined gift tax value with the IRS Office of Appeals, as outlined in the 
§ 7477 regulations.133   
 
b. Declaratory Judgments Concerning Qualification for Section 
6166 Elections 
 
 Although payment of federal estate tax generally is due nine months 
following the death of the decedent, Congress recognized that prompt 
payment of estate tax could pose an economic hardship on estates holding 
interests in closely held businesses.  Through § 6166(a), Congress has 
authorized an estate to elect to pay the estate tax on a deferred, installment 
                                                                                                                       
125  See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (including a decedent’s adjusted taxable gifts in the tax 
base for estate tax purposes), § 2001(f) (valuing gifts to be included in tentative 
estate tax base at their value as finally determined for gift tax purposes). 
126  Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 506(c), 111 Stat. 788, 855–56 (1997).   
127  I.R.C. § 7477(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7477-1(a) (interpreting the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction as being predicated on an adjustment in value that will not 
result in a gift tax deficiency or a refund of gift tax).   
128  I.R.C. § 7477(a).   
129  I.R.C. § 7477(b)(1).  Joinder of additional parties is not permitted.  TAX CT. 
R. 215(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
130   The Service typically provides its determination through the issuance of a 
Letter 3569.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7477-1(b)(2).   
131  I.R.C. § 7477(b)(3); see also TAX CT. R. 210(c)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
132  I.R.C. § 7477(b)(2); see also TAX CT. R. 210(c)(4) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
133  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7477-1(b)(1).   
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basis if the value of the closely held business exceeds 35 percent of the 
value of the adjusted gross estate.  If the estate qualifies for the election, it 
can defer the initial installment of tax for five years past the due date, and 
the estate can spread the succeeding installments over ten years.134   
 Prior to the enactment of the declaratory judgment procedure provided 
in § 7479 in 1997,135 an estate had little recourse if the Service determined 
that the estate was ineligible to pay the estate tax on an installment basis 
under § 6166.  The Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Service’s 
determinations concerning the estate’s qualification under § 6166, 136 leaving 
the estate to pay the tax on a present basis and to pursue a refund of such 
payment.137  This approach, however, required the estate to incur the 
hardship resulting from its relative illiquid position—the very problem that 
Congress sought to ameliorate through the enactment of § 6166.138   
 Accordingly, Congress provided the Tax Court with jurisdiction under 
§ 7479(a) to make a declaratory judgment regarding an estate’s qualification 
to make an election under § 6166 or an estate’s continued qualification to 
defer payment pursuant to § 6166 in the case of an actual controversy 
involving the Service’s determination (or failure to make a determination) of 
those issues.  The court’s declaratory jurisdiction may be invoked only by 
                                                     
134  See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3).   
135  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 505(a), 111 Stat. 788, 
854 (1997).  Congress contemplated providing the Tax Court with jurisdiction to 
issue declaratory judgments concerning an estate’s qualification to pay the estate tax 
on a deferred basis under § 6166 through proposed legislation in 1981, see H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-201, at 182–83 (1981), but the provision did not survive to enactment.   
136  See Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 523 (1984) (holding that the 
Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Service’s determination that an estate was 
not eligible to make a § 6166 election); Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 
560 (1985) (following Estate of Sherrod even though the Service’s denial of the 
estate’s § 6166 election resulted in increased estate tax attributable to the denial of 
an administrative expense deduction attributable to the interest owed on the would-
be installments).     
137  The estate’s ability to pursue refund litigation in this context was by no 
means clear, as certain courts determined that the action was foreclosed by the 
Anti-Injunction Act of § 7421(a).  See Bauersfeld v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d 
6598 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding challenge to denial of § 6166 election barred by Anti-
Injunction Act).  But see Parrish v. Loeb, 558 F. Supp. 921 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (suit to 
challenge Service’s reversal of the estate’s § 6166 eligibility not barred by Anti-
Injunction Act, based in part on estoppel grounds).     
138  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 358 (1997); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, JCS-
23-97, at 74 (1997) (explaining that Congress enacted § 7479 to provide estates 
“access to the courts to resolve disputes over an estate’s eligibility for the section 
6166 election, without requiring potential liquidation of the assets the installment 
provisions of section 6166 are designed to protect”).   
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the estate or any person who has assumed the obligation to make the 
§ 6166 installment payments of tax.139  The petitioner must invoke the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction by filing a petition before the 91st day following the 
Service’s mailing of the notice of determination concerning the estate’s 
qualification under § 6166.140   
 Even if the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is invoked in a timely manner, the 
court may not make a declaration unless it first determines that the 
petitioner has exhausted all available administrative remedies.141  The statute 
presumes the petitioner has done so if the Service fails to make a 
determination within 180 days after the petitioner requested such 
determination be made, provided the petitioner has taken all reasonable 
steps in a timely manner to secure the determination.142  Beyond this 
statutory presumption, Revenue Procedure 2005-33143 provides guidance on 
the steps a taxpayer-estate must take to be considered to have exhausted all 
available administrative remedies.  Most significantly, if the Service makes a 
preliminary determination that the estate does not qualify for the § 6166 
election, the estate must request a conference with the IRS Office of 
Appeals.  The request must be submitted in writing within 30 days of the 
mailing of the preliminary determination.  Furthermore, the estate must 
“participate fully” in the Appeals conference, which includes providing all 
information relevant to the § 6166(a) election that is requested by the 
Service.144  In the event the Service does not issue a preliminary 
determination or if the Service does not hold the requested Appeals 
conference, a taxpayer-estate that receives a final notice of determination 
will be considered to have exhausted its administrative remedies without 
participating in the Appeals conference.145   
 The Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7479 has been most extensively 
analyzed by the court in Estate of Roski v. Commissioner.146 In that case, the 
Service had denied the estate’s § 6166(a) election through the application of 
a bright-line rule that a § 6166(a) election would not be granted unless the 
estate posted a § 6165 bond or agreed to a special lien under § 6324A as a 
means of securing the estate’s payment obligation.  The Commissioner 
contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review its determination 
to impose a bond or lien requirement in the case, arguing that the court’s 
declaratory jurisdiction was limited to examining whether the estate satisfied 
                                                     
139  I.R.C. § 7479(b)(1); see also TAX CT. R. 210 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (setting forth 
procedure for declaratory judgment actions before the Tax Court).    
140  I.R.C. § 7479(b)(3).   
141  I.R.C. § 7479(b)(2).   
142  Id.   
143  2005 C.B. 1231.   
144  Id. § 4.01(b)(2), 2005 C.B. at 1232.   
145  Id. § 4.03, 2005 C.B. at 1233.   
146  128 T.C. 113 (2007).   
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the conditions to make the election under § 6166(a) or whether the grounds 
for termination of the election under § 6166(g) were implicated.  The court 
rejected this narrow interpretation of its declaratory judgment jurisdiction, 
holding instead that its jurisdiction extended to reviewing the Service’s 
broader determination that the estate was not entitled to § 6166 relief—for 
any reason.147  Having asserted its jurisdiction to review the Service’s 
determination, the court set aside the Service’s determination on the basis 
that the bright-line application of a bonding requirement that was not 
included in the statute constituted an arbitrary abdication of agency 
discretion.148   
 
B. Review of Worker Classification Determinations 
 
Similar to the expansion of the Tax Court’s declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction, Congress provided the court with jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes concerning the classification of service providers for federal 
employment tax purposes as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.149  
Pursuant to § 7436(a), the Tax Court may review a determination by the 
Secretary that (1) one or more individuals providing services to the taxpayer 
constitute employees for federal employment tax and income tax 
withholding purposes,150 or (2) that the taxpayer is not entitled to the 
beneficial tax treatment provided by § 530(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 
1978 with respect to such individuals.151  The Tax Court’s review of the 
                                                     
147  See id. at 123–24.   
148  Id. at 130–31.   
149  Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1454(a), 111 Stat. 788, 1055 (enacting I.R.C. § 7436).   
150  As a general rule, the determination of whether a service provider 
constitutes an employee for federal tax purposes as opposed to an independent 
contractor is made with reference to common law principles for determining the 
presence of an employer-employee relationship.  See I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (defining 
employee for FICA tax purposes as an individual who has the status of an 
employee “the usual common law rules in determining the employer-employee 
relationship”); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (detailing common law factors to be 
considered in determining whether a worker is an employee for federal income tax 
withholding purposes); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, PRESENT 
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION FOR FEDERAL 
TAX PURPOSES, JCX-26-07, at 2–5 (2007) (describing common law analysis).  For a 
list of 20 factors identified by the Service as relevant under the common law test, 
see Revenue Ruling 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.       
151  As explained by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 
150, at 5–6, § 530 of the Tax Reform Act of 1978 (§ 530) generally permits a 
taxpayer to treat a service provider as not being an employee for employment tax 
purposes regardless of the status of the service provider under the prevailing 
common law analysis unless the taxpayer has no reasonable basis for treating the 
service provider as an independent contractor.  See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub L. 
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Secretary’s determination proceeds on a de novo basis,152 and a 
determination by the Tax Court is reviewed in the same manner as a 
decision of the Tax Court.153     
The jurisdiction of the Tax Court in this context is predicated upon the 
making of a worker classification determination by the Service and, if notice 
of the determination is sent by certified or registered mail, the taxpayer’s 
filing of a petition with the court within 90 days of such mailing.154  Once 
the determination has been made and notice has been mailed to the 
taxpayer, § 7436 generally extends the benefits of deficiency litigation to the 
federal employment tax arena.  The Service is precluded from assessing or 
collecting the employment tax attributable to an adverse worker 
classification determination until the period for seeking a determination by 
the Tax Court expires or, if the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is invoked, until the 
court’s decision in the matter becomes final.155   
Section 7436 contains a few context-specific provisions.  To start, the 
only party permitted to file a petition with the Tax Court for a 
determination of worker classification is the person for whom the relevant 
services were performed.156  The putative employee or other potentially 
affected party therefore is precluded from disputing the determination 
before the Tax Court.  Additionally, § 7436 bars consideration of 
subsequent changes to the taxpayer’s employment tax treatment of the 
service provider.  Specifically, if during the pendency of the § 7436 
proceeding the taxpayer changes the federal employment tax treatment of a 
service provider whose employment tax status is involved in the proceeding 
                                                                                                                       
No. 95-600, § 530(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2885.  For years after 1978, relief under § 530 is 
available only if (1) all federal returns required to be filed by the taxpayer with 
respect to the service provider for the relevant period have consistently treated the 
service provider as not being an employee and (2) the taxpayer and any predecessor 
has not treated any individual holding a position substantially similar to the service 
provider as an employee for employment tax purposes for periods after 1977.  
Section 530 originally was enacted as a short-term measure to provide Congress 
sufficient time to legislatively address issues relating to worker classification.  
However, the provision was extended indefinitely in 1982.  See Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 , § 269(c), 96 Stat. 552–53.   
152  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 734 (1997) (explaining the Tax Court’s review 
is not limited to the administrative record).   
153  I.R.C. § 7436(a).   
154  I.R.C. § 7436(b)(2); see also TAX CT. R. 290(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
155  See I.R.C. § 7436(d)(1) (incorporating principles of § 6213(a) into § 7436 
proceedings).  Prior to the enactment of § 7436, judicial review of the Service’s 
assessment of employment taxes necessitated the payment of the tax in dispute 
followed by a refund proceeding in the Federal district court or the Court of 
Federal Claims.  See Henry Randolph Consulting v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 1, 3 
n.2 (1999).   
156  I.R.C. § 7436(b)(1).   
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or that of a person holding a similar position, the Tax Court may not take 
such change into account in determining whether the Commissioner’s 
worker classification determination is correct.157 
The taxpayer may elect, with the Tax Court’s consent, to apply the small 
case procedures under § 7463 to the worker classification proceeding, 
provided that the employment tax in dispute does not exceed $50,000 for 
each calendar quarter involved.158  In that event, the chief judge may assign 
the proceeding to be heard by a special trial judge of the court.159  A 
determination by the Tax Court in a § 7436 proceeding that is heard under 
the small case procedures is not reviewable by any other court, and such a 
determination has no precedential value.160 
As originally enacted, § 7436 limited the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to 
reviewing the relevant worker classification determinations made by the 
Secretary.161  In Henry Randolph Consulting v. Commissioner,162 the court 
determined that its jurisdiction under § 7436(a) did not extend to 
determining the amount of employment tax owed by the taxpayer.  Congress 
corrected this defect in 2000, retroactively extending the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction under § 7436(a) to determine the proper amount of 
employment tax that results from the worker classification determination.163  
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to determine the amount of the taxpayer’s 
employment tax obligations is, in a sense, ancillary.  The court does not 
possess jurisdiction to determine employment tax liabilities as a stand-alone 
matter; rather, the court first must possess jurisdiction to review the 
                                                     
157  I.R.C. § 7436(b)(3).  This provision is reminiscent of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 407, barring the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures.   
158  I.R.C. § 7436(c)(1).   
159  I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(5) (as added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-280, § 857(a), 120 Stat. 1020).   
160  I.R.C. § 7436(c)(2).   
161  In Neely v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 287 (2000), the Tax Court on its own 
motion addressed whether the original grant of jurisdiction under § 7436(a) 
extended to determining whether the Commissioner’s determination of worker 
classification status was barred by the § 6501 statute of limitations on assessment.  
The court resolved this question in the affirmative, reasoning that its jurisdiction to 
review worker classification determinations necessarily extended to any affirmative 
defense the taxpayer may properly raise (such as the limitations period) in response 
to the worker classification determination.   
162  112 T.C. 1 (1999). 
163  I.R.C. § 7436(a), as amended by the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 314(f), 114 Stat. 2763A–643.  The 2000 amendment 
was made retroactive to the original August 5, 1997 effective date of the statute.  Id. 
§ 314(g).   
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Secretary’s worker classification determination.164  However, in Evans 
Publishing, Inc. v. Commissioner,165 the Tax Court reasoned that it possessed 
jurisdiction to determine the employment tax obligations attributable to a 
worker classification determination made by the Commissioner in an 
answer filed in the § 7436 proceeding relating to service providers whose 
status was not addressed in the original worker classification determination 
notice.  Citing the incorporation of the principles of § 6214(a) into the 
§ 7436 arena by § 7436(d)(1), the court analogized the subsequent additional 
worker classification determination to the Commissioner’s assertion of a 
deficiency greater than that asserted in the statutory notice.166  Accordingly, 
the issuance of a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification from 
the Commissioner does not necessarily serve to cap the taxpayer’s 
employment tax exposure for the periods at issue.   
 
C. Innovations in Partnership Proceedings 
 
Perhaps no one field of tax law has seen a greater level of procedural 
innovation in pursuit of greater adjudicative efficiency than the income 
taxation of partnerships.  As described below, as part of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),167 Congress implemented an 
ambitious procedural framework for adjusting tax items generated at the 
partnership level that flow through to be reported at the partner level.  The 
intricate framework, in turn, led Congress to provide an alternative 
streamlined procedure for “electing large partnerships.”168  Additionally, 
operation of the TEFRA partnership procedures gave rise to the need for 
another arena of declaratory judgment jurisdiction for the Tax Court, this 
                                                     
164  See Menard v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 54, 60–61 (court lacked jurisdiction 
to redetermine Medicare tax liability due to absence of a determination concerning 
worker classification); Salazar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-7, 91 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 659 (court lacked jurisdiction to redetermine employment tax liabilities due 
to absence of a valid notice of determination concerning employment status).   
165  119 T.C. 242 (2002). 
166 Id. at 247.  However, similar to deficiencies asserted in excess of that 
contained in the statutory notice, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof with 
respect to worker classification determinations for service providers not addressed 
in the original determination letter.  Id. at 245 (Commissioner conceding that he 
bears burden of proof); see also TAX CT. R. 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).    
167 Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71 (adding I.R.C. 
§§ 6221–6232); see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 714(p)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 964 (adding I.R.C.  § 6233 to the partnership provisions); 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§ 1941(b)(1), 102 Stat. 1107, 1323 (repealing I.R.C. § 6232, dealing with the 
application of the TEFRA rules to windfall profits tax). 
168  This alternative reporting and audit regime is discussed below in Section C.3 
of this Part.   
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one governing proposed adjustments to a partner’s tax return that would 
not generate a deficiency in tax due to the partner’s distributive share of 
partnership losses or deductions (which create an “oversheltered return”).169  
This Section discusses the TEFRA partnership procedures and subsequent 
procedural developments spawned by this framework.   
 
1. Uniform Partnership Proceedings Under TEFRA170 
  
Prior to the procedural changes enacted as part of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),171 the Service faced an often 
difficult task in determining the tax liability of partners.172  Because there 
was no requirement of consistency between the partnership and its 
partners’ returns, adjustments in the tax liability of partners were made 
while the Service was auditing each individual partner rather than during an 
audit of the partnership as a whole. 
A significant burden was placed on the Service by requiring it to audit 
each partner independently.173  The statutory period within which the 
Service could assess a tax against a partner was measured by reference to 
the filing of the partner’s income tax return.174  If the Service identified a 
questionable partnership item on a particular partner’s return, and if the 
Service desired to extend the statutory period for assessing a tax regarding 
that item on the returns of all the partners, the Service would have to obtain 
a waiver from each partner; the partnership had no authority to execute 
such a waiver.175  Obtaining the necessary waiver was particularly difficult in 
cases involving large partnerships whose partners were located in many 
                                                     
169  The aspect of Tax Court’s declaratory judgment jurisdiction is discussed 
below in Section C.4 of this Part.   
170 This Section represents a condensed and slightly modified version of 
Professor Dubroff’s prior extensive analysis of the TEFRA partnership procedures 
and the Tax Court rules implementing them.  See Harold Dubroff & Charles M. 
Greene, Recent Developments in the Business and Procedures of the United States Tax Court; 
Part Six:  Partnership Proceedings, 52 ALB. L. REV. 163 (1987).   
171 Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71 (adding I.R.C. 
§§ 6221–6232); see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 714(p)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 964 (adding I.R.C.  § 6233 to the partnership provisions); 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§ 1941(b)(1), 102 Stat. 1107, 1323 (repealing I.R.C. § 6232, dealing with the 
application of the TEFRA rules to windfall profits tax). 
172 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 
1982, at 268 (1982) [hereinafter JCT Explanation]. 
173 JCT Explanation, supra note 172, at 267–68; John B. Palmer, III, TEFRA 
Treats Partnerships as Separate Entities Under its New Rules, 58 J. TAX’N 34, 34 (1983).   
174 JCT Explanation, supra note 172, at 267. 
175 Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 173, at 34. 
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jurisdictions, a difficulty exacerbated by the fact that Service efforts were 
frequently impeded by inadequate and erroneous data on partnership 
returns.176  Consequently, the period of limitations could expire with regard 
to some partners while others would have to pay an additional tax.177 
In addition to the substantial administrative burden created by the 
requirement of independent audits, the Service could also become involved 
in separate judicial proceedings with respect to the partners, with each such 
proceeding generally being conclusive only with respect to the partners who 
were parties to the litigation.178  Any partner who disagreed with the 
administrative determination of a partnership item could select separately 
among three trial-level courts in which to litigate.179  Taxpayers found that 
settlements on partnership issues were sometimes difficult to obtain.  
Unless an agreement could be reached that allowed the Service to treat 
partnership items uniformly for all partners, the Service had little incentive 
to settle with one partner when it might be forced to litigate the same issue 
with others.180  Thus, the determination of partnership tax liability often 
resulted in the unnecessary duplicate expenditures of manpower as well as 
administrative and judicial resources.181 
With the rise of large tax-shelter partnerships in the 1970s, the Service’s 
burden intensified.182  Encouraged by the problems encountered by the 
Service in organizing effective audits, many promoters of tax-shelter 
partnerships took aggressive reporting positions.183  The Service increased 
its efforts to audit these partnerships but contended that partnership-level 
proceedings were needed as a solution to its problems.184   
Through TEFRA, Congress sought to ease the burdens arising from the 
determination of the tax liability of partners by providing, with certain 
exceptions,185 for unified administrative and judicial proceedings at the 
                                                     
176 Palmer, supra note 173, at 34.   
177 JCT Explanation, supra note 172, at 268. 
178 Id. at 267; see also Palmer, supra note 173, at 34. 
179 Tax litigation may be initiated by the taxpayer in either the Tax Court, the 
Federal district court, or the Court of Federal Claims.  
180 JCT Explanation, supra note 172, at 268.  
181 Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 173, at 34.  
182 Palmer, supra note 173, at 34. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 An exception exists, for example, in the case of a partner whose 
“partnership items” have become “nonpartnership items.”  In such a case, the tax 
liability of the partner would be determined apart from any partnership proceeding.  
See infra notes 62–78 and accompanying text. 
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partnership level.186 The unified procedures apply generally to 
partnerships187 and, through 1996, they applied to S corporations as well.188   
Under TEFRA, the partnership is treated as a distinct entity for 
determining the tax liability of its partners.  By providing for uniform audits 
and judicial proceedings in regard to “partnership items,”189 Congress 
hoped to prevent the inconsistent treatment of partners with respect to the 
same item and to avoid the duplicative use of administrative and judicial 
resources.190  The TEFRA procedures provide that a representative partner, 
referred to as the tax matters partner (TMP), will guide the partnership 
through consolidated administrative and judicial proceedings.  This benefits 
the individual partners, who need not participate in the proceedings unless 
they so choose but who may nonetheless take part in any favorable 
settlement.  It also benefits the Service by permitting it, in general, to bind 
every partner to the result in a single administrative and judicial proceeding 
that directly involves only one or a limited number of partners.  The 
following discussion explores many of the details governing administrative 
and judicial review of the tax liability of partners as established by TEFRA. 
 
                                                     
186 I.R.C. § 6221 (1982).   
187 I.R.C. §§ 6221, 6231(a)(1) (1982).  Certain small partnerships are excluded 
from the TEFRA  provisions unless they elect to have the procedures apply to 
them.  I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1)(B).   
188  Sections 6241 through 6245 formerly provided that the partnership 
administrative and judicial procedures applied to S corporations, except to the 
extent modified or made inapplicable by regulations.  However, Congress repealed 
these provisions through the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.  See Pub. 
L. No. 104-188, § 1307(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1755, 1781 (1996).  The repeal took effect 
for tax years beginning after December 31, 1996.  As discussed in Section C.2 
below, a simplified S corporation procedure was enacted in its place.  Given the 
demise of the mass-marketed tax shelter industry, the need for the TEFRA audit 
procedures in the partnership setting may too have passed.  See Steve R. Johnson, 
Reforming Federal Tax Litigation:  An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 205, 258–64 (2013) 
(contending that the TEFRA procedures are no longer necessary and, indeed, are 
counterproductive as a result of their complexity).   
189 The statute defines “partnership item” in the following manner:   
the term “partnership item” means, with respect to a partnership, any item 
required to be taken into account for the partnership’s taxable year under 
any provision of subtitle A to the extent regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary provide that, for purposes of this subtitle, such item is more 
appropriately determined at the partnership level than at the partner level. 
I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3).  
190 JCT Explanation, supra note 172, at 268. 
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a. Statute of Limitations 
 
Generally, the period for assessing any partner with a tax attributable to 
partnership items is no less than three years from the date the partnership 
return is filed or, if later, the last day for filing the return.191  By executing 
an agreement with the Service, any partner may, prior to the expiration of 
the statutory period, extend such period in regard to himself.192  By 
executing an agreement with the Service, the TMP may extend the statutory 
period with respect to all partners.193  Accordingly, a partner subject to the 
TEFRA provisions may be subject to different statutes of limitations as to 
partnership and nonpartnership items with respect to the same tax year. 
 
b.  Administrative Proceedings 
 
In the absence of an inconsistency with the partnership return194 or a 
mathematical or clerical error195 on the partnership return, the Service 
generally is precluded from assessing any deficiencies against a partner with 
respect to a partnership item until partnership-level administrative 
proceedings are completed.196  The Service is required to mail notice of the 
beginning and completion of the proceedings to each partner whose name 
                                                     
191 I.R.C. § 6229(a).  If the partnership items of any partner become 
nonpartnership items before the expiration of the statutory period applicable to 
partnership items, the period of limitations will not expire before one year from the 
date the items become nonpartnership items.  I.R.C. § 6229(f). 
192 I.R.C. § 6229(b)(1)(B). 
193 Id.   
194 A partner is required to either: (1) treat partnership items on his return 
consistently with their treatment on the partnership return; or (2) notify the Service 
of any inconsistency.  I.R.C. § 6222(a), (b).  If the partner fails to notify the Service 
of an inconsistency on his return, the Service may, without an administrative 
proceeding, adjust the partner’s return to make the returns consistent.  I.R.C. 
§ 6222(c).  Failure to observe the consistency requirement may subject a partner to 
an addition to tax.  See I.R.C. § 6222(d). 
195 The Service may adjust a partner’s return to correct a mathematical or 
clerical error without a partnership-level proceeding unless that partner files, within 
60 days of the mailing of the notice of the correction, a request that the correction 
not be made.  I.R.C. § 6230(b). 
196 I.R.C. § 6225(a).  Section 6225 prohibits the Service from assessing any 
asserted deficiency against a partner before the expiration of 150 days after mailing 
of the “final partnership administrative adjustment” (FPAA), or if a proceeding is 
commenced in the Tax Court, until the decision of the court has become final.  In 
addition, § 6223(a) requires that the Service mail notice to specified partners of the 
beginning of an administrative proceeding and a FPAA “resulting from any such 
proceeding:”  I.R.C. § 6223(a). 
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and address has been furnished to it.197  An exception to the notice 
requirement exists for partners with less than one percent interest in a 
partnership that has more than 100 partners, unless a group of such 
partners with an aggregate of five percent or more interest in the 
partnership profits combine for the purpose of notice.198  In this event, the 
“5-percent group”199 must designate one of their members to receive 
notice, and the Service is required to send notice to that partner.200 
All partners possess the right to participate in administrative 
proceedings,201 and any partner may enter into a separate settlement with 
the Service.202  If the Service enters into a settlement agreement with a 
partner in regard to partnership items, it must also settle on “consistent”203 
terms with any other partner who so requests.204  Generally, a settlement 
agreement between the Service and one partner does not bind any other 
partners who were not party to the agreement.205  However, partners who 
are not entitled to notice may be bound by the TMP if the TMP expressly 
                                                     
197 I.R.C § 6223(a).  Notice of the beginning of a partnership proceeding must 
be mailed at least 120 days before a FPAA is mailed to the tax matters partner 
(TMP).  I.R.C. § 6223(d)(1).  Generally, the Service will use the names, addresses, 
and profit interest shown on the partnership return.  I.R.C. § 6223(c)(1).  A partner 
is not entitled to notice unless the Service has received, at least 30 days before 
notice is mailed to the TMP, sufficient information to enable the Service to 
determine that such partner is entitled to notice and to provide such notice to the 
partner.  I.R.C. § 6223(a). 
198 I.R.C. § 6223(b). 
199 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(11) (defining a “5-percent group” as a group of partners 
who collectively possessed an interest in partnership profits of five percent or 
more). 
200 I.R.C. § 6223(b)(2). 
201 I.R.C. § 6224(a). 
202 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(1). 
203 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6224(c)-3(b)(1) (providing 
guidance on what constitutes a consistent settlement).   
204 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(2).  The TMP presumably would inform the other partners 
of any separate settlement agreement entered into between the Service and an 
individual partner.  Since there does not appear to be any general requirement that 
either the Service, or a partner with whom it settles, notify the TMP of such 
settlement, it may be difficult to charge the TMP with a duty to notify partners of 
all settlements with the Service.  In cases docketed in Tax Court, Rule 248(c) 
requires the Service to notify the TMP within seven days of any settlement 
agreement with a partner.  TAX CT. R. 248(c)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
205 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(1).  The TMP may enter into a stipulated decision with the 
Service after a petition is filed with the Tax Court and all partners will be bound by 
the decision.  The signature of the TMP serves as a certification that no partner 
with an interest in the outcome of the action objects to entry of the decision.  TAX 
CT. R. 248(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
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states that the agreement shall bind the other partners,206 and if such 
partners have not filed a statement denying the TMP’s authority to bind 
them 30 days prior to the agreement between the TMP and Service.207  
Because the TMP is generally required to keep all partners informed of the 
progress of administrative proceedings, 208 presumably such partners would 
be aware of any agreement entered into between the Service and the TMP 
prior to the time it was made.  Whether such partners would learn of the 
agreement 30 days before the day on which the agreement is entered into is 
unclear.  To protect themselves from being bound by a settlement between 
the TMP and the Service, non-notice partners may file a statement denying 
the TMP’s authority to bind them at the beginning of administrative 
proceedings. 
 
c. The Tax Matters Partner 
 
Generally, a tax matters partner serves as the representative of the 
partnership in administrative and judicial proceedings.209  The TMP may be 
designated by the partnership in accordance with the regulations.210  In the 
absence of such a designation, the statute provides that the general partner 
having the largest interest in the partnership will be considered the TMP.211  
If no TMP is designated by the partnership and the Service concludes that 
it is impracticable for the largest-interest general partner to be designated as 
the TMP, the Service may designate a partner of its choice to represent the 
partnership.212  The regulations require that the person designated as the 
TMP for a taxable year have been a general partner during that taxable year 
or at the time the designation is made.213 
The TMP is required to keep all partners informed of the progress of 
administrative and judicial proceedings.214  This includes informing partners 
not entitled to notice from the Service of the beginning of administrative 
proceedings.215  It also includes informing both notice and non-notice 
partners with respect to a closing conference with the examiner, proposed 
                                                     
206 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(3)(A). 
207 I.R.C. § 6224(c)(3)(B). 
208 See I.R.C. § 6223(g). 
209 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6223(g), 6225(a), 6226(a), (b), 6227(b), 6228(a); Rev. Proc. 
88-16, 1988-1 C.B. 691.  
210 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7)(A).   
211 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7)(B).   
212 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7) (flush language); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(7)-1(o) 
(providing conditions under which it is impracticable for the largest-interest general 
partner to be designated as the TMP).   
213 Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(7)-1(b)(1). 
214 I.R.C. § 6223(g). 
215 Treas. Reg. § 301.6223(g)-1(a)(1). 
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adjustments, appeal rights, protest requirements, scheduling information 
regarding an appeals conference, Service acceptance of any settlement offer, 
any consent binding all partners to the extension of the period of 
limitations, the filing of any request for administrative adjustment on behalf 
of the partnership, the filing by any partner of a petition for judicial review, 
and any appeal and final judicial determination.216  However, the failure of 
the TMP to provide any required notice does not affect the validity of any 
administrative or judicial determination.217 
 
d. Partnership and Nonpartnership Items 
 
Only “partnership items” are determined at the partnership level and 
therefore subject to partnership-level proceedings.218 Partnership items are 
those income tax items designated by regulations as more appropriately 
determined at the partnership level, rather than the partner level.219  Also 
treated as partnership items are factors affecting the determination of a 
partnership item, such as the partnership’s accounting practices and the 
legal and factual bases of the partnership items.220  Partnership items 
include the partnership aggregate and each partner’s share of income, credit, 
gain, loss, and deductions of the partnership; expenditures that are 
nondeductible in computing taxable income; tax-exempt income; 
partnership liabilities; and contributions to and distributions from the 
partnership.221 
Certain nonpartnership items may be affected by partnership items, and 
the tax treatment of such “affected items”222 will thus depend on a 
partnership-level determination.223  The Tax Court has identified two types 
of affected items: (1) those that are affected items only because of a 
computational adjustment that cannot be made until a partnership-level 
proceeding is completed; and (2) those that require a factual determination 
at the partner level.  In the former case, the Service may make a 
“computational adjustment”224 necessary to reflect items determined in the 
                                                     
216 Treas. Reg. § 301.6223(g)-1(b)(1).  
217 I.R.C. § 6230(f).   
218 I.R.C. § 6221. 
219 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3). 
220 Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(b). 
221 Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a)(1), (4). 
222 An “affected item” is “any item to the extent such item is affected by a 
partnership item.”  I.R.C. § 6231(a)(5).  
223 See N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741 (1987); Maxwell 
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783 (1986).  
224 A computational adjustment is “the change in the tax liability of a partner 
which properly reflects the treatment under this subchapter of a partnership item.”  
I.R.C. § 6231(a)(6).  The usual procedures associated with assessing a tax deficiency 
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partnership-level proceeding, without issuing a notice of deficiency.225  In 
the latter case, the Service must mail a notice of deficiency to the partner 
determining any deficiency attributable to “affected items.”226  If a notice of 
deficiency has already been mailed to a partner for the particular taxable 
year in issue, the Service is not precluded from mailing a second notice with 
respect to affected items for that taxable year.227 
If treating certain items as partnership items will interfere with the 
effective and efficient enforcement of the tax laws, the Service may treat 
those partnership items as nonpartnership items.228  The circumstances 
under which such authority may be exercised are termination assessments, 
jeopardy assessments, criminal investigations, indirect methods of proof of 
income, foreign partnerships, and other areas determined by regulation to 
present special enforcement concerns.229  Other situations in which 
partnership items may or will be considered nonpartnership items occur 
when the Service has entered into a settlement agreement with a partner 
with respect to such items,230 or fails to provide required notice to a partner 
of the beginning or termination of partnership-level administrative 
proceedings.231   
The Service may mail a partner notice that the partnership items of that 
partner will be considered nonpartnership items if (1) such partner has 
notified the Service that there is an inconsistency between that partner’s 
return and the partnership return, and (2) such partner has not, as of the 
                                                                                                                       
do not apply to the assessment or collection of a computational adjustment.  I.R.C. 
§ 6230(a)(1).  Excepted from this general rule is any deficiency attributable to (1) 
“affected items which require partner level determinations”; or (2) “items which 
have become nonpartnership items and are described in section 6231(e)(1)(B).”  
I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2). 
225 I.R.C. § 6230(a)(1). 
226 I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(B). 
227 I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(C). 
228 I.R.C. § 6231(c)(2). 
229 I.R.C. § 6231(c)(1).    
230 I.R.C. § 6231(b)(1)(C). 
231 I.R.C. §§ 6223(e), 6231(b)(1)(D).  Section 6223(e) governs generally the 
effect of the failure of the Service to provide required notice.  If the partnership 
proceedings are finished at the time the Service mails notice of the administrative 
proceedings, the partner may elect to have any adjustment or court decision apply 
to him or he may participate in any settlement.  I.R.C. § 6223(e)(2).  If he does not 
so elect, the partnership items of such partner will be considered nonpartnership 
items.  Id.  If the proceedings are still going on at the time the partner receives 
untimely notice, the partner will be a party to the proceeding unless he elects to 
settle or to have his partnership items treated as nonpartnership items. I.R.C. 
§ 6223(e)(3). 
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date such notice is mailed, filed a request for administrative adjustments 
that would make the items consistent.232 
If a partnership item becomes a nonpartnership item before the 
expiration of the period of limitations for assessing a tax imposed with 
respect to that item on the affected partner, the period for assessing a tax 
attributable to such item will not expire before one year from the date the 
item becomes a nonpartnership item.233 
 
e. Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment and Petition for 
Readjustment 
 
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement during administrative 
proceedings, the Service is required to mail to those partners entitled to 
notice a final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) resulting from 
the proceedings.234  The FPAA is the equivalent of a “notice of deficiency” 
and is a prerequisite to the assessment of a tax attributable to partnership 
items.235  The Service is precluded from assessing a deficiency against a 
partner for 150 days following mailing of the FPAA or, if an action is 
brought in the Tax Court, until a final decision.236  In the absence of fraud, 
malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact, only one FPAA may 
be mailed to a partner for a partnership taxable year.237 
During the 90 days immediately subsequent to the mailing of the FPAA, 
the TMP, and only the TMP, may commence an action to review the FPAA 
by filing a “petition for readjustment” in the Tax Court, the Court of 
Federal Claims, or the district court for the district in which the 
                                                     
232 I.R.C. § 6231(b)(2)(A).  Notice that the partnership items will be treated as 
nonpartnership items must be mailed before notice of the beginning of 
administrative proceedings is mailed to the TMP.  I.R.C. § 6231(b)(3). 
233 I.R.C. § 6229(f).   
234 I.R.C. § 6223(a)(2). 
235 See I.R.C. § 6212.  As explained by the Tax Court,   
The FPAA is to the litigation of partnership items and affected items 
pursuant to the partnership audit and litigation provisions of section 6221 et 
seq., what the statutory notice of deficiency is to tax controversies before 
this Court that involve respondent’s determination of a deficiency, i.e., it is 
the notice to affected taxpayers that respondent has made a final 
administrative determination for particular tax years.  Issuance of a FPAA is 
a prerequisite to an assessment arising out of partnership items or affected 
items. 
Clovis I v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 980, 982 (1987) (citation omitted).  
236 I.R.C. § 6225(a). 
237 I.R.C. § 6223(f).  Cf. I.R.C. § 6212(c) (similar restriction on deficiency 
letters). 
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partnership’s principal place of business is located.238  Any partner with an 
interest in the outcome may participate in the action.239 
If the TMP does not file a petition to review a FPAA during the 90-day 
period immediately subsequent to its mailing, any “notice partner”240 or 
“5-percent group”241 may file a petition in the above-mentioned forums 
within the next 60 days.242  Even if the TMP fails to file a petition for 
readjustment within the 90-day period following the mailing of a FPAA, he 
may, as a “notice partner,” file a readjustment petition during the 
succeeding 60-day period.243  If several actions are commenced in different 
forums during the 60-day period, the first action brought in the Tax Court 
will have priority.244  If one or more actions are commenced but none are 
brought in the Tax Court, the first action brought will proceed.245  Even 
though the TMP fails to bring an action during the 90-day period, the TMP 
may nonetheless intervene in any action brought by another partner.246 
As a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a “petition for readjustment” in a 
district court or the Court of Federal Claims, the partner filing, including 
the TMP, must deposit with the Service an amount equal to that partner’s 
increased tax that would result from treating the FPAA as correct.247  In the 
case of a petition filed by a 5-percent group, the deposit requirement applies 
to each member of the group.248  If the TMP does not petition for a 
readjustment during the 90-day period following mailing of the FPAA, and 
if during the succeeding 60-day period a petition is filed in the district court 
or the Court of Federal Claims, the deposit required by such petition will be 
refunded on request of the taxpayer if during the 60-day period a petition is 
also filed in the Tax Court.249  The refund is allowed because only the Tax 
Court proceeding will go forward.250  If, however, the 150-day period 
expires and either no readjustment action is commenced or a readjustment 
action proceeds in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims, the 
                                                     
238 I.R.C. § 6226(a). 
239 I.R.C. § 6226(c)(2). 
240 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(8).   
241 I.R.C. § 6231(a)(11).   
242 I.R.C. § 6226(b)(1). 
243 See Barbados #6 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 900 (1985) (court-reviewed 
opinion holding that even though the TMP failed to file a petition during the 
90-day period, it qualified as a notice partner and was not precluded from filing a 
petition in that capacity during the remainder of the 150-day period).   
244 I.R.C. § 6226(b)(2).  
245 I.R.C. § 6226(b)(3). 
246 I.R.C. § 6226(b)(6).   
247 I.R.C. § 6226(e)(1).   
248 Id. 
249 I.R.C. § 6226(e)(2). 
250 Id. 
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Service may not only apply the deposited amounts against the deficiency of 
the depositor, but may assess and collect deficiencies from the other 
partners while a decision on the merits is pending.251  Essentially, then, a 
petition for readjustment of a FPAA is converted into a refund action if 
brought in the district court or the Court of Federal Claims.  Thus, the Tax 
Court, which was created to provide a forum for the taxpayer to contest a 
tax deficiency asserted by the Service prior to paying the tax, remains the 
only forum in which a taxpayer may challenge an alleged tax deficiency 
before paying it. 
All partners who have an interest in the outcome of the litigation will be 
bound by a decision of the court, whether the action is commenced by the 
TMP, a notice partner, or a 5-percent group.252  A decision of the court will 
not apply, however, to (1) a partner who has previously settled with the 
Service, (2) a partner who has received notice that partnership items for a 
taxable year will be treated as nonpartnership items in regard to that 
partner, or (3) a partner to whom the Service has failed to provide required 
notice of the proceeding before a final decision of the court.253 
 
f. Requests for Administrative Adjustment and Petition for 
Adjustment 
 
Essentially, the request for an administrative adjustment (RAA) is a 
formal request that the Service make the requested adjustment or 
commence a partnership-level proceeding to determine the proper 
treatment of the items in issue.254  Generally, a partner is not allowed to 
commence an action for refund of an overpayment attributable to a 
partnership item unless such partner has filed a RAA in respect of such 
item with the Service.255  However, if an overpayment is attributable to 
                                                     
251 I.R.C. § 6225(a). 
252 I.R.C. § 6226(c)(1).  The dismissal of an action brought under the 
partnership provisions will be considered as a decision by the court that the FPAA 
is correct.  I.R.C. § 6226(h).  An exception is provided if the case is dismissed on 
the grounds that an action in another court has priority. 
253 I.R.C. §§ 6226(d)(1)(A), 6231(b)(1), 6223(e)(2).   
254 See John B. Palmer, III, How the TEFRA Partnership Procedures Affect Partners’ 
Adjustments and Limitations, 58 J. TAX’N 74, 74 (1983) [hereinafter Palmer Part II].  
Any partner, including the TMP, may file a request for an administrative 
adjustment of partnership items, provided that it is filed within three years after the 
later of either the date on which the partnership return was filed or the last day for 
doing so.  I.R.C. § 6227(a)(1).  No bar exists on filing a RAA during administrative 
proceedings.  Palmer Part II, supra, at 74.  However, a partner may not file a RAA 
after a FPAA has been mailed to the TMP.  I.R.C. § 6227(a)(2). 
255 I.R.C. § 7422(h); see also Palmer Part II, supra note 254, at 74. 
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certain types of erroneous computations by the Service,256 or to a failure by 
the Service to make a previously determined refund,257 a partner may file a 
claim for refund without filing a RAA. 
Although any partner may file a RAA with the Service,258 only the TMP 
may do so on behalf of the partnership.259  If the TMP requests that the 
treatment shown on the RAA be substituted for the treatment of 
partnership items on the partnership return, the Service may treat the 
changes shown on the RAA as corrections of mathematical or clerical 
errors without holding a partnership-level proceeding.260  These 
adjustments, however, do not apply to any partner who within 60 days after 
notice of the correction of error is mailed files a request that the 
adjustments not be made.261  In such a case, the Service would probably be 
forced to hold partnership-level proceedings in regard to the requested 
changes.262 
If the Service does not treat a RAA filed by the TMP as a substituted 
return, it may, without conducting any partnership proceeding, make all the 
requested adjustments resulting in credit or refund to partners.263  In this 
event, the adjustments will not apply to a partner whose partnership items 
are being treated as nonpartnership items.264  The Service may also conduct 
a partnership proceeding in response to a RAA filed by the TMP,265 or, if it 
chooses, take no action at all on the request.266  If the Service decides to 
hold a partnership-level proceeding in regard to a RAA filed by the TMP, it 
must provide notice to all those partners entitled to notice of the beginning 
                                                     
256 I.R.C. §§ 6230(c)(1)(A), 7422(h).  The erroneous computational adjustments 
referred to are those necessary to (1) conform the partner’s return to the 
partnership return, and (2) apply a settlement, a FPAA or a court decision to the 
partner. 
257 I.R.C. §§ 6230(c)(1)(B), 7422(h).  The refunds referred to are those resulting 
from a settlement, a FPAA or a court decision. 
258 I.R.C. § 6227(a). 
259 I.R.C. § 6227(c).  Cf. Palmer Part II, supra note 254, at 74 (suggesting that 
the TMP may only file a RAA on behalf of the partnership). 
260 I.R.C. §§ 6227(c)(1), 6230(b). 
261 I.R.C. § 6230(b)(2). 
262 See Palmer Part II, supra note 254, at 74. 
263 I.R.C. § 6227(c)(2)(A)(i).   
264 I.R.C. § 6227(c)(2)(B).  One difference between treating a RAA as a 
substituted return and simply providing the requested refund or credit is that, in the 
case of the former alternative, the Service may assess any additional tax appearing 
on the RAA without issuing a FPAA, simply by treating the adjustment as the 
correction of a mathematical or clerical error. See I.R.C. §§ 6225(a), 6227(c)(1), 
6230(b)(1). 
265 I.R.C. § 6227(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
266 I.R.C. § 6227(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
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and completion of the administrative proceedings.267  Although only the 
TMP may file a RAA on behalf of the partnership, any other partner, 
apparently including the TMP,268 may file a RAA on his own behalf.269  
When a RAA is filed on behalf of an individual partner, the Service may (1) 
process the request in the same manner as a claim for credit or refund of 
items that are not partnership items, (2) assess any additional tax resulting 
from the requested adjustment, (3) provide notice to the requesting partner 
that all partnership items to which the request relates will be treated as 
nonpartnership items, or (4) conduct a partnership proceeding.270 
If all or part of a RAA filed on behalf of the partnership by the TMP is 
not allowed by the Service, the TMP, and only the TMP, may file a petition 
for an adjustment of the partnership items in the Tax Court, the Court of 
Federal Claims, or the district court for the district in which the 
partnership’s principal place of business is located.271  Generally, this 
petition may be filed during the 18-month period commencing six months 
after filing the RAA,272 but the TMP may not petition for judicial review of 
a RAA after the Service has mailed notice of the beginning of 
administrative proceedings in regard to the partnership year to which the 
petition relates.273 
A petition for adjustment may not be filed after a FPAA has been 
mailed to the TMP.274  Moreover, if the Service mails a FPAA to the TMP 
after a petition for review of a RAA has been filed but before the hearing of 
that petition, then the petition will be treated as one for readjustment of the 
FPAA, rather than a review of the adjustments requested in the RAA.275  In 
                                                     
267 I.R.C. § 6223(a). 
268 See I.R.C. § 6227(c).  Because the TMP acts as a fiduciary, see Computer 
Programs Lambda, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 198, 205 (1987), a TMP filing 
such a request on his own behalf to the detriment of the partnership (for example, 
if the period of limitations for filing by other partners expires) presumably could be 
subject to damages. 
269 I.R.C. § 6227(a), (d). 
270 I.R.C. § 6227(d). 
271 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(1). 
272 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(2)(A); see also TAX CT. R. 249 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (action for 
adjustment of partnership items will be treated as an action for readjustment of 
partnership items).  The TMP and the Service can agree to extend this time period. 
I.R.C. § 6228(a)(2)(D).  If the Service mails notice of the beginning of 
administrative proceedings before two years expires following filing of the RAA, 
but fails to mail a FPAA before the three-year limitation for assessing an additional 
tax expires, see I.R.C. § 6229(a), then the period for filing a petition for review of a 
RAA will be extended at least six months beyond the period prescribed for making 
assessments of tax.  I.R.C. § 6228(a)(2)(C). 
273 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(2)(B). 
274 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(3)(A). 
275 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(3)(B). 
Innovation in Remedies and Procedures                     425 
 
this event, the deposit otherwise required in the district court or the Court 
of Federal Claims Court for review of a FPAA is not required.276 
If the TMP files an adjustment petition on behalf of the partnership, all 
partners with an interest in the outcome will be considered parties to the 
action and, thus, will be bound by a decision of the court.277  Any partner 
wishing to participate in the action must be allowed to do so by the court 
with jurisdiction over the case.278 
Judicial review of the RAA is limited to those disallowed partnership 
items that were included in the RAA and items that the Service may have 
asserted as offsets to the adjustments requested by the TMP.279  In a 
situation in which the RAA petition is converted into a hearing on a FPAA 
mailed prior to the RAA hearing, judicial review includes any issues raised 
in the FPAA.280  There are no provisions prohibiting the filing of multiple 
RAAs or petitions in regard to the RAAs—the statute provides that no 
judicial determination with respect to a partnership item raised in a RAA 
filed by the TMP will be a bar to any adjustment in any other partnership 
item.281  
Any partner, other than the TMP acting on behalf of the partnership, 
seeking to petition for judicial review of all or any part of a RAA that was 
disallowed by the Service must follow the usual refund procedures pursuant 
to § 7422.282  Thus, a refund action based on a RAA filed by a partner other 
than the TMP, or filed by the TMP on his own behalf, may not be brought 
in the Tax Court, but must be brought in district court or Court of Federal 
Claims, and all the partnership items at issue will be treated as 
nonpartnership items.283  Such an action is barred after a partnership 
proceeding has begun,284 and is subject to the same time limits as an 
adjustment petition filed on behalf of the partnership by the TMP.285 
If the Service mails notice to a partner that all partnership items to 
which a RAA relates will be treated as nonpartnership items, judicial review 
is available in a refund action under § 7422 within two years of mailing of 
the notice.286  It appears that a partner to whom such notice is mailed may 
bring a refund action, even if the Service subsequently initiates partnership 
                                                     
276 Id. 
277 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(4)(A)(i). 
278 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
279 I.R.C. § 6228(a)(5). 
280 See I.R.C. § 6228(a)(3)(B), (a)(5). 
281 I.R.C. § 6231(e)(2); see also Palmer Part II, supra note 254, at 75 . 
282 I.R.C. § 6228(b)(2)(A)(i). 
283 I.R.C. § 6228(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
284 I.R.C. § 6228(b)(2)(C). 
285 I.R.C. § 6228(b)(2)(B). 
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proceedings or the TMP files a RAA and an adjustment petition with 
respect to the RAA.287 
 
g. Relationship Between Partnership Proceedings and Regular 
Proceedings 
 
The legislative history of the uniform partnership audit and litigation 
procedures indicates that Congress intended that proceedings regarding 
partnership and nonpartnership tax deficiencies remain separate.288  In 
some cases, however, the procedures for assessing personal tax deficiencies 
and the procedures for assessing deficiencies attributable to partnership 
items may necessarily interact.  For example, if the partnership items of a 
partner become nonpartnership items, then any tax deficiency attributable 
to those must be determined in regular deficiency proceedings.289 
As a prerequisite to assessing and collecting taxes attributable to 
nonpartnership items (regular proceedings), the Service is required to mail a 
notice of deficiency informing the taxpayer of the administrative 
determination of tax liability.290 Following the mailing of such notice, the 
taxpayer has 90 days in which to petition the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of the deficiency.291  The Service may not assess or collect 
the alleged deficiency until the 90-day period has expired or, if a petition is 
filed with the Tax Court, until a final decision of the Court.292 
If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court during the 
90-day period and the Service subsequently collects the tax, the taxpayer 
may commence an action for refund in a district court or the Court of 
Federal Claims, provided he has first filed a refund claim with the Service.293  
Here lies a significant difference between partnership and regular 
proceedings.  Following the mailing of a FPAA, the partners have only one 
opportunity for judicial review of the partnership items—the 150-day 
period provided by § 6226.294  For partners other than the TMP, only the 
                                                     
287 See Palmer Part II, supra note 254, at 75. 
288 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 409, 611 (1982). 
289 I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
290 See I.R.C. §§ 6211(a), 6212(a). 
291 I.R.C. § 6213(a).  If the notice of deficiency is addressed to a taxpayer 
outside the United States, the period for petitioning the Tax Court is extended to 
150 days.  Id. 
292 Id.  Exceptions to the restrictions on assessment of a deficiency are 
provided in the case of termination assessments of income tax, I.R.C. § 6851(a), 
and jeopardy assessments of income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes, I.R.C. 
§ 6861(a). 
293 I.R.C. § 7422(a). 
294 See I.R.C. § 6226(a), (b)(1).  This premise assumes (1) that the Service has 
held administrative proceedings and provided notice of the beginning and 
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last 60 days of the 150-day period are available for filing a petition for 
readjustment.295  If no petition for readjustment is filed during the 150-day 
period, the Service may collect the tax and, with limited exceptions, the 
partners may not thereafter seek a refund or otherwise petition for judicial 
review.296 
 
h. The Problem of Affected Items 
 
Unique questions of interaction between the regular deficiency 
procedures and the partnership procedures occur in the case of “affected 
items.”297  The final resolution of disputes over affected items have to await 
a partnership-level determination.298  In some cases, the Service may merely 
make a computational adjustment conforming the tax treatment of the 
affected item with that of the affecting partnership item.299  In others, the 
Service must issue a notice of deficiency to resolve questions regarding the 
affected item at the partner level.300  Ordinarily, if the Service has mailed the 
taxpayer a notice of deficiency and the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax 
Court for a particular tax year, the Service is prohibited from determining 
any additional deficiency for such year.301  However, if the treatment of an 
affected item depends on a partnership-level determination, the Service is 
authorized to issue an additional notice of deficiency with respect to such 
item at the partner level.302  It is not difficult to hypothesize a case in which 
a taxpayer might receive a first notice of deficiency, a FPAA (in effect, itself 
a notice of deficiency), and a second notice of deficiency covering affected 
items—all related to the same taxable year and all subject to separate 
judicial proceedings.  Moreover, if the taxpayer is a partner in more than 
one partnership, there may be separate FPAAs, and separate notices of 
deficiency for affected items, related to each partnership. 
The Tax Court examined the interaction between partnership-level 
proceedings and regular proceedings in cases involving “affected items” in 
                                                                                                                       
completion of the proceedings to the partners entitled to notice, and (2) that the 
partnership items of a partner have not become nonpartnership items.  See generally 
I.R.C. §§ 6223(a), 6228(b)(1). 
295 I.R.C. § 6226(b)(1). 
296 See I.R.C. § 7422(h).    
297 An “affected item” is defined as “any item to the extent such item is 
affected by a partnership item.”  I.R.C. § 6231(a)(5).  
298 See N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741, 744–45 (1987); 
Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783 (1986).  
299 N.C.F. Energy Partners, 89 T.C. at 744.  
300 Id. at 745.  
301 I.R.C. § 6212(c).  
302 I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(C). 
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Maxwell v. Commissioner,303 a case reviewed in conference.  Mr. and Mrs. 
Maxwell and eleven others were partners in VIMAS, LTD. (VIMAS), a 
limited partnership with Mr. Maxwell as the general partner and the 
TMP.304  In February 1985, the Service began a partnership-level audit of 
VIMAS; the requisite notice of the beginning of the administrative 
proceedings was properly mailed to the notice partners.305 Subsequently, in 
April 1985, before a FPAA was mailed to VIMAS but after partnership-level 
proceedings regarding partnership items of VIMAS were commenced, the 
Service mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to the Maxwells determining 
deficiencies and additions to tax for their 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 
taxable years.306  The 1982 deficiency was partially attributable to the 
disallowance of the Maxwell’s distributive share of the loss and investment 
tax credit claimed by VIMAS for 1982.307  The 1979 and 1980 deficiencies 
resulted from disallowance of investment tax credit carryback from 1982.308  
The Service also determined additions to tax against the Maxwells for the 
deficiency years.309  Since the Service had not yet mailed a FPAA 
determining partnership items of VIMAS, the Tax Court had no jurisdiction 
to readjust the VIMAS partnership items, and the Service was precluded 
from assessing a tax attributable to these items until a FPAA was issued.310 
The Maxwells filed a timely petition for the redetermination of the 
deficiencies determined against them, and the Service promptly moved to 
strike from the petition the deficiencies and additions to tax arising from 
the adjustment of the VIMAS items, alleging that they were, in fact, 
partnership items and the Tax Court thus lacked jurisdiction for 
readjustment.311  The Service’s posture amounted to a concession that it 
was not justified in including the partnership items in the notice of 
deficiency.  Its motion to strike may have been motivated by the fact that 
Mr. Maxwell, as TMP, had consented to extend the statute of limitations as 
to VIMAS subsequent to the mailing of the notice of deficiency.312 
The Tax Court stated that “[t]his case presents the dichotomy between, 
on the one hand, the procedures applicable to the determination and 
redetermination of deficiencies and, on the other hand, the procedures 
applicable to the administrative adjustment and judicial readjustment of 
                                                     
303 87 T.C. 783 (1986) (court reviewed). 
304 Id. at 785. 
305 Id. at 786. 
306 Id. at 785. 
307 Id.  
308 Id. 
309 Id.  
310 Id. at 789; I.R.C. § 6225(a). 
311 Maxwell, 87 T.C. at 784, 786. 
312 Id. at 786. 
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partnership items.”313 In TEFRA, Congress intended to separate partnership 
audit and litigation procedures from proceedings regarding nonpartnership 
tax matters.314  Application of this policy was central to the court’s 
disposition of the Service’s motion to strike. 
First, the Tax Court held that the loss and the investment tax credit 
claimed for 1982 were partnership items and were thus outside the 
jurisdiction of the court until a FPAA was mailed.315 Second, the court held 
that, 
 
[a]lthough the existence or amount of the carryback cannot be 
determined without reference to the VIMAS, LTD. investment tax 
credit to which VIMAS, LTD. partners were entitled for 1982, the 
amount of credit to be carried back is not a “partnership item” 
because a partnership does not take into account any carryback for 
any taxable year.  Rather, the carryback is peculiar to each partner’s 
own tax posture.316 
 
The court further held, however, that the carryback was an “affected item” 
because “its existence or amount is ‘affected by’ the investment tax credit 
that is a partnership item.”317  Since affected items depend on partnership-
level determination, those items could not be tried as part of the personal 
tax case, and had to await the outcome of the partnership proceeding.318 
Third, the court considered whether the additions to tax for the 
deficiency years should be considered partnership or nonpartnership 
items.319  The court noted that the additions to tax asserted against the 
petitioners for negligence would, if sustained, apply to the entire 
deficiencies for the year and could be attributable either to a negligent 
partnership reporting position or to the partner’s own negligent reporting 
                                                     
313 Id. at 787 (emphasis in original). 
314 Id.  Legislative history provides the following guidance: 
Existing rules relating to administrative and judicial proceedings, statutes of 
limitations, settlements, etc., will continue to govern the determination of a 
partner’s tax liability attributable to nonpartnership income, loss, 
deductions, and credits.  Neither the Secretary nor the taxpayer will be 
permitted to raise nonpartnership items in the course of a partnership 
proceeding nor may partnership items, except to the extent they become 
nonpartnership items under the rules, be raised in proceedings relating to 
nonpartnership items of a partner. 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 611 (1982). 
315 Maxwell, 87 T.C. at 790.   
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position.320  In order to conform to congressional intent that partnership 
tax issues be resolved without hindering, or being hindered by, the 
resolution of nonpartnership tax issues, the Tax Court announced that it 
would “treat[] as an ‘affected item’ (1) any addition to tax for negligence 
found in the partnership action or (2) where negligence is found in the 
personal case, any increased addition to tax on a deficiency resulting from 
partnership adjustments.”321 The court held: 
 
As an “affected item,” the addition to tax for negligence resulting 
from partnership reporting positions cannot be an issue joined in a 
partner’s personal tax case because a deficiency determined by 
reference to such an affected item requires a partnership level 
determination—i.e., whether the partnership reported partnership 
items negligently.  Such affected items cannot be considered in the 
course of deciding petitioners’ personal case without trespassing the 
line of demarcation drawn by Congress between the audit and 
litigation of partnership tax matters and the resolution of all other 
tax items of the partner.  Any other principle would inextricably tie 
the two together and remove the statutory dichotomy whenever an 
addition to tax affected by partnership items has been determined by 
respondent.322 
 
The 90-day letter mailed by the Service was thus invalid as to the VIMAS 
items, and the Tax Court dismissed those items for lack of jurisdiction.323 
In Maxwell, the dichotomy existing between the partnership procedures 
and the procedures for determining deficiencies in a taxpayer’s personal tax 
case worked to the detriment of the taxpayer.  The striking of the 
partnership items and affected items from the petition resulted in the 
collapse of a settlement that the petitioners believed they had 
constructed.324 In some cases, however, the dichotomy described above 
may work to the advantage of the taxpayer.  If, for example, the Service 
fails to mail notice of the beginning or end of partnership-level 
administrative proceedings to a partner entitled to notice, that partner has 
the option of participating on consistent terms in any settlement between 
the Service and the other partners, accepting the terms of the FPAA, or, if a 
final court decision is reached in regard to the partnership items, applying 
such decision.325  Alternatively, such a partner may elect to have the 
partnership items to which the proceedings relates treated as 
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nonpartnership items.326  In such a case, any deficiency attributable to these 
items will have to be determined in regular deficiency proceedings, and such 
a partner may be able to achieve a more advantageous settlement overall 
than would have otherwise been possible. 
In N.C.F. Energy Partners, Bingham Petroleum, Inc. v. Commissioner,327 the Tax 
Court was again presented with a motion by the Service to strike affected 
items from a petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Here, however, the motion 
was submitted in the context of a partnership proceeding.328  The Service 
argued that additions to tax determined in regard to partnership 
adjustments were “affected items” that could not be determined in 
partnership proceedings but only in subsequent partner-level 
proceedings.329  On the other hand, the petitioner, asserting that the Service 
erred in determining the additions to tax, contended that, although the 
additions to tax were “affected items,” Congress intended that questions 
regarding partnership adjustments be resolved in a single partnership-level 
proceeding “even though the computation of the amounts due from each 
partner cannot be made at the partnership level.”330  If the motion to strike 
the additions to tax were granted, the petitioner argued, the result would be 
the unnecessary and duplicate litigation that Congress intended to 
prevent.331  The Tax Court disagreed.332 
The court identified two types of affected items: (1) items that are 
affected items simply because a computational adjustment is required after 
the partnership-level proceeding is completed; and (2) items that require 
additional factual determinations at the partner level following the 
partnership proceeding.333  Both types of affected items require adjustments 
subsequent to a partnership proceeding and cannot be tried either as part of 
the partnership proceeding or a prior personal tax case.334 
 
Petitioner’s contention that resolving all issues relating to the 
partnership in a single proceeding effectuates Congress’ intent is . . . 
erroneous.  Congress enacted the partnership audit and litigation 
procedures . . . to provide a unified proceeding for determination of 
the tax treatment of items of partnership income, loss, deductions, 
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and credits.  A partnership proceeding is designed to resolve only 
disputes over the proper treatment of partnership items.  Congress, 
moreover, recognized the need to preserve this rule by providing 
separately for determining deficiencies attributable to nonpartnership 
items or to affected items. 
. . . .  
We appreciate petitioner’s concern for avoiding repetitive 
litigation.  We doubt, however, that the litigation will be repetitive; it 
has been organized by statute to avoid chaotic and disparate results. 
Any future litigation will not be repetitive of the partnership level 
proceeding. The doctrine of res judicata will apply to preclude the 
parties from relitigating any issue already resolved in the partnership 
proceeding . . . .335 
 
As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,336 Congress fundamentally 
altered the handling of penalties under the TEFRA audit procedures and, in 
the process, overturned the result reached by the Tax Court in N.C.F. 
Energy Partners.  In particular, Congress amended § 6221 to expressly 
provide that “the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional 
item which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item” shall be 
determined along with all partnership items in a partnership-level 
proceeding.337  Consistent with this approach, Congress precluded the Tax 
Court from considering penalties and similar items in a partner-level 
deficiency proceeding.338  Instead, the 1997 amendments left the individual 
partner to raise any partner-level defense through a claim for refund.339  The 
report of the House Ways and Means Committee explained the justification 
for these changes as follows: 
 
                                                     
335 Id. at 746–47 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
336  Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 787.  The Tax Court provided a thorough 
explanation of the 1997 amendments to the penalty jurisdiction of the Tax Court in 
the TEFRA  unified audit procedures setting in Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. 
Commissioner, 138 T.C. 67, 88–93 (2012).     
337 Id. § 1238(a), 111 Stat. at 1026 (amending I.R.C. § 6221).  Congress 
correspondingly expanded the scope of judicial review following the filing of a 
petition for review of a final partnership administrative adjustment to include “the 
applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which relates to 
an adjustment of a partnership item.”  Id. § 1238(b)(1), 111 Stat. at 1026 (amending 
I.R.C. § 6226(f)).   
338  Id. § 1238(b)(2), 111 Stat. 1026–27 (amending I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i)).    
339 Id. § 1238(b)(4), 111 Stat. 1027 (addition I.R.C. § 6230(c)(1)(C), which 
permits a partner to file a claim for refund on the grounds that Secretary 
“erroneously imposed any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which 
relates to an adjustment of a partnership item”).    
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Many penalties are based upon the conduct of the taxpayer.  With 
respect to partnerships, the relevant conduct often occurs at the 
partnership level.  In addition, applying penalties at the partner level 
through deficiency procedures following the conclusion of the 
unified proceeding at the partnership level increases the 
administrative burden on the IRS and can significantly increase the 
Tax Court’s inventory.340   
 
In this manner, Congress proved receptive to the judicial economy points 
asserted by the taxpayer in the N.C.F. Energy Partners case.   
 
2. Tax Treatment of Subchapter S Items 
 
Prior to their repeal by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,341  
§§ 6241 to 6244 provided a corporate-level audit regime for subchapter S 
corporations similar to the TEFRA uniform audit procedures that apply in 
the partnership context.  The repeal of these procedures in the S 
corporation context became effective for corporate tax years beginning 
after December 31, 1996. 342 Congress’ stated justification for repealing the 
S corporation audit procedures was its belief that the TEFRA-like 
provisions should not apply to entities with a limited number of owners.343   
In lieu of the repealed audit procedures applicable to S corporations, 
Congress enacted § 6037(c) to require shareholders of an S corporation to 
treat any “subchapter S item”344 in a manner consistent with the treatment 
of such item on the corporation’s informational return.345  The shareholder 
is relieved of this consistency requirement only if the shareholder files a 
statement with the Service that identifies the inconsistency.346   
 
                                                     
340  H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 594 (1997).   
341  Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1307(c)(1),  110 Stat. 1755, 1781 (1996).   
342  Id. § 1317, 110 Stat. at 1787. 
343  H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 87 (1996).  By way of reference, the 1996 
legislation increased the maximum number of shareholders of an S corporation 
from 35 to 75.  Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777. 
344  A “subchapter S item” is defined as any tax item of an S corporation to the 
extent that regulations provide that the tax treatment of such item is more 
appropriately determined at the corporate level.   
345  I.R.C. § 6037(c)(1).   
346  I.R.C. § 6037(c)(2)(A).   
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3. Electing Large Partnership Provisions 
 
Also as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,347 Congress created a 
simplified informational reporting and audit regime for “electing large 
partnerships”—that is, entities classified as partnerships for purposes of 
subchapter K with more than 100 owners in the prior taxable year that elect 
to be subject to the modified procedures.348  The primary theme of these 
modifications was to tilt further toward the entity treatment of partnerships, 
recognizing that investments in large partnerships often are 
indistinguishable from those made in corporate stock.349  On the 
informational reporting side, the modified procedures provided in §§ 771 
through 777 significantly reduced the number of tax items that the 
partnership must separately report to its partners.  This simplified regime 
was intended to reduce the reporting burden placed on partners while 
assisting the Service in matching partnership items on partners’ individual 
returns.350  As discussed below, the statutory departure from the TEFRA 
audit procedures for electing large partnerships also was intended to reduce 
the administrative burden imposed on partners, while enhancing the 
Service’s ability to effectively audit partnerships having numerous owners.  
The audit procedures governing electing large partnerships are contained 
in §§ 6240 through 6255.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 
modified regime relates to the consistency of reporting required by the 
partnership and its owners.  Under the TEFRA audit procedures, a partner 
may take a reporting position inconsistent with that of the partnership so 
long as the partner provides the Service with a statement identifying the 
inconsistency.351  This option is not available to partners of an electing large 
partnership.  Rather, partners are required to treat each partnership item in 
a manner consistent with the reporting of that item on the partnership 
return, and the Service may treat any failure to do so as a mathematical or 
clerical error on the part of the partner.352   
The modified audit procedures that apply to electing large partnerships 
severely constrain the participation of partners in the audit process.  
Whereas a partner is entitled to notice of partnership-level proceedings 
                                                     
347 Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 1221–1224, 111 Stat. 788, 1001–19 (1997).  These 
provisions took effect for partnerships having taxable years ending on or after 
December 31, 1997.  Id. § 1226, 111 Stat. at 1020.   
348 See I.R.C. § 775 (providing definition of an electing large partnership for 
purposes of the subchapter K flow-through regime); I.R.C. § 6255 (incorporating 
the definition of an electing large partnership under § 775 for purposes of the 
modified audit procedures).   
349 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 571.   
350 See id. at 571–72.   
351 I.R.C. § 6226(a), (b)(1).     
352 I.R.C. § 6241(a), (b).   
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under the TEFRA audit procedures, the Service is not required to notify a 
partner of an electing large partnership that a partnership-level 
administrative proceeding has been commenced or that a final 
administrative adjustment has been made.353  Additionally, a partner of an 
electing large partnership lacks the right to participate in settlement 
conferences concerning the partnership-level proceeding,354 and the partner 
may not seek an administrative adjustment or a refund of the partner’s 
separate tax liability—both of which represent departures from the TEFRA 
model.  The electing large partnership provisions therefore envision an 
administrative proceeding between the Service and the partnership alone 
that can achieve conclusive results.   
The adjustments resulting from the partnership-level administrative 
proceedings are designed to minimize the effect at the partner level.  Under 
the TEFRA procedures, any adjustment relating to a partnership item must 
be taken into account at the partner level for the taxable year to which the 
adjustment relates.  In contrast, the electing large partnership provisions 
adopt an integration model that generally operates on a going-forward basis.  
Rather than incorporating the adjustment on the partners’ returns for the 
taxable year to which the adjustment relates, an adjustment made in the 
course of an electing large partnership proceeding is taken into account at 
the partner level for the taxable year in which the adjustment “takes 
effect.”355  In other words, the adjustment is treated as a partnership item 
arising in the year of the adjustment.356   
The choice to take partnership-level adjustments into account at the 
partner level on a going-forward basis under the electing large partnership 
                                                     
353 I.R.C. § 6245(b)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 673 (1997); cf. I.R.C. 
§ 6223(a) (requirement that Service provide partners notice of partnership-level 
proceedings under TEFRA audit procedures). 
354 H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 671 (1997); cf. I.R.C. § 6224(a) (right of partner 
to participate in partnership-level proceedings under TEFRA audit procedures).  
355 I.R.C. § 6242(a)(1).  As a general rule, a partnership-level adjustment in this 
context takes effect in the taxable year in which the adjustment is made or is finally 
determined.  I.R.C. § 6242(d)(2).  If the partnership-level adjustment triggers an 
adjustment in a taxable year following the one to which the adjustment relates but 
prior to the year of the adjustment (e.g., disallowance of deduction in favor of 
capitalization, which in turn gives rise to cost recovery deductions), only the net 
adjustment is considered to take effect in the year of the adjustment.  I.R.C. 
§ 6242(a)(3).   
356 I.R.C. § 6242(a)(1).  An exception exists in the event the adjustment relates 
to the relative distributive shares of the partners.  An alteration of a partner’s 
distributive share of partnership tax items under § 704(b) (e.g., one made because 
the allocation provided in the partnership agreement lacks substantial economic 
effect and is not otherwise consistent with the partners’ interests in the partnership) 
must be taken into account by the partner for the taxable year to which the 
adjustment relates.  I.R.C. § 6241(c)(2)(A).   
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provisions creates the possibility for a partner to benefit from the adjusted 
items without facing the consequence of the adjustment.  To do so, the 
partner must exit prior to the year in which the partnership-level adjustment 
takes effect—an outcome that is altogether plausible given the protracted 
nature of administrative proceedings conducted at the partnership level.  
Conversely, partners who have joined the entity in the interim may suffer 
the detriment of a partnership-level adjustment without ever enjoying the 
original tax benefit.   
To avoid highlighting the consequence at the partner level, an electing 
large partnership may elect to not take the adjustment into account as a 
partnership item for the year of adjustment and instead pay an imputed tax 
resulting from the adjustment.357  The downside of centralizing the effect of 
the adjustment at the entity level is the forfeiture of the marginal tax rate 
profile of the partners.  The imputed tax is calculated based on the highest 
marginal rate in effect under § 1 (individual rates) or § 11 (corporate rates) 
for the year of the adjustment.358  Whereas the partnership may elect to pay 
an imputed tax attributable to the adjusted item, the partnership is required 
to pay any interest or penalties that relate to the adjustment.359  The 
partnership’s exposure to penalties is determined by treating the partnership 
in the same manner as an individual.360  In this manner, the electing large 
partnership procedures avoid the confusion over whether defenses to the 
assertion of penalties must be raised and resolved in the partnership 
proceeding or at the partner level—an issue that at one point caused a 
considerable level of consternation under the regular TEFRA audit 
regime.361    
An electing large partnership may contest a proposed partnership 
adjustment either before the Tax Court, the Federal district court, or the 
                                                     
357 I.R.C. § 6242(a)(2)(A).   
358 I.R.C. § 6242(b)(4)(A).   
359 I.R.C. § 6242(b)(1).  The payment of interest or penalties by the partnership 
will not give rise to a deduction.  I.R.C. § 6242(e).  
360 I.R.C. § 6242(b)(3).  
361 See, e.g., Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 67 (2012); 
Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-42, 103 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1769.  The Supreme Court eliminated any ambiguity in the regular TEFRA 
audit procedures on this issue in United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013).  In 
Woods, the Court explained that the trial court possessed jurisdiction under 
§ 6226(f) to determine the applicability of the valuation misstatement penalty (and, 
indeed, any penalty) that could result from the adjustment of a partnership item, 
even if imposing the penalty also would require determining affected or non-
partnership items such as a partner’s basis in the partnership interest.  Id. at 564.  
The court noted that this approach avoided duplicative proceedings and the 
potentially inconsistent results of partner-level determinations of an issue that 
applied equally to all of the partners.  Id. at 564–65.     
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Court of Federal Claims.362  In keeping with the theme of limiting partner 
involvement in the proceedings, only the partnership may petition for such 
judicial review; unlike the TEFRA audit procedures, a judicial proceeding to 
review the partnership-level adjustment may not be commenced by a 
partner alone.  Pursuant to § 6247(a), the partnership must file a petition for 
readjustment within 90 days of the mailing of the notice of partnership 
adjustment by the Service.  This period of limitations on the filing of a 
petition serves as the only jurisdictional prerequisite for Tax Court 
review.363  However, to litigate before the Federal district court or Court of 
Claims, the partnership also must deposit with the Service a good faith 
estimate of the imputed tax under § 6242(b) attributable to the partnership 
item adjustment, together with any interest and penalties resulting from 
such adjustment, on or before the date on which the petition for 
readjustment is filed.364  Accordingly, the Tax Court serves as the sole 
judicial forum in which to challenge a partnership-level adjustment on a 
pre-payment (technically, pre-deposit365) basis.  Once a court acquires 
jurisdiction to review a partnership-level adjustment, the reviewing court 
may review all partnership items to which the notice of adjustment relates, 
even if those items are not contested by the partnership.366  Additionally, 
the court may review the allocation of partnership items among the partners 
for that year, as well as the applicability of any penalty or addition to tax.367   
The electing large partnership provisions also provide a procedure for a 
partnership to pursue a refund attributable to a partnership item.  Pursuant 
to § 6251, a partnership may request an administrative adjustment of 
partnership items within three years after the later of the date the 
partnership return was filed or the date the return was due (determined 
without regard to extensions), provided the Service has not first issued the 
partnership a notice of adjustment.368  If the Service disallows any part of 
the requested administrative adjustment, the partnership may seek judicial 
review in the Tax Court, the federal district court, or the Court of Federal 
Claims.369  The petition for adjustment under § 6252 is not timely unless it 
is filed after six months from the date on which the request for 
administrative adjustment was filed with the Service, but before two years 
of such date.370  A benefit of invoking judicial review through the § 6252 
                                                     
362 I.R.C. § 6247(a).   
363 See TAX CT. R. 300(c)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
364 I.R.C. § 6247(b)(1).   
365 I.R.C. § 6247(b)(2) (clarifying that the required deposit is not treated as a 
payment of tax).   
366 I.R.C. § 6247(c).    
367 Id.   
368 I.R.C. § 6251(a), (c)(1). 
369 I.R.C. § 6252(a); see also TAX CT. R. 300(c)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
370 I.R.C. § 6252(b).   
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refund procedure is that the scope of the court’s review is limited to the 
adjustment requested by the partnership that is not allowed by the Service, 
as well as any items the Service asserts as an offset to the requested 
adjustment.  Unlike a petition for readjustment of partnership items, the 
reviewing court may not consider all partnership items for the year to which 
the predicate notice of adjustment relates.  The partnership’s ability to limit 
the scope of judicial review is forfeited if the Service issues the partnership 
a notice of adjustment under § 6245(b) before a hearing is held on the 
partnership’s petition for adjustment under § 6252(a).  In that case, the 
§ 6252 petition filed by the partnership is retroactively converted to a 
petition for readjustment of partnership items under § 6247,371 which in 
turn expands the scope of judicial review.   
 
4. Declaratory Judgments Relating to “Oversheltered” Returns 
 
The TEFRA partnership-level audit procedures created a potential trap 
for the Government with respect to its ability to assess a deficiency in tax 
relating to a taxpayer’s nonpartnership items.  Because a taxpayer’s 
distributive share of loss from a partnership subject to the TEFRA 
procedures is not subject to adjustment until the conclusion of the TEFRA 
proceeding, a proposed adjustment in tax relating to the taxpayer’s 
nonpartnership tax items could prove meaningless in isolation.  That is, any 
additional taxable income resulting from the adjustment of nonpartnership 
items could continue to be fully offset by the amount of the partnership 
loss claimed on the return, negating any deficiency in tax.  If the proposed 
adjustments to the nonpartnership items later proved meaningful as a result 
of a reduction in the distributive share of loss achieved through the 
successful prosecution of a TEFRA proceeding, assessment of the resulting 
deficiency likely would be barred by the expiration of the period of 
limitations on assessment.   
Prior to 1989, the Service left itself exposed to the incongruent 
application of the TEFRA partnership procedures and the normal 
deficiency procedures through its practice of assuming the propriety of all 
TEFRA partnership items when examining a taxpayer’s return.  However, 
in the 1989 case of Munro v. Commissioner, 372 the Service attempted to shift 
this risk of loss to the taxpayer.  The Service in Munro took the position 
that, in determining a deficiency in tax at the individual level, it could 
assume that its proposed adjustments to partnership items subject to the 
TEFRA proceedings were correct for “computational purposes” only.373  In 
                                                     
371 I.R.C. § 6252(c)(2).  
372 92 T.C. 71 (1989).   
373 Id. at 73.   
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this manner, the Service determined the deficiency in tax at the individual 
level based on its best-case resolution of the TEFRA litigation.   
The Tax Court was not willing to indulge the Commissioner to this 
extent, holding that TEFRA partnership adjustments proposed by the 
Commissioner could not be taken into account in the deficiency 
proceeding.374  Nonetheless, the Tax Court’s resolution of this issue in 
Munro remained largely favorable to the Service.  Stressing the statutory 
directive that partnership items are to be kept separate from the taxpayer’s 
individual proceeding and resolved solely at the partnership level, the court 
reasoned that deficiency proceedings relating to the taxpayer must address 
nonpartnership items exclusively.  Accordingly, the court held that 
partnership items subject to the TEFRA procedures were to be ignored in 
their entirety in the deficiency proceeding.375  In the context of a taxpayer 
claiming a distributive share of loss from a partnership, the Tax Court’s 
approach in Munro prevented the Service’s adjustment of nonpartnership 
items from being “sheltered” by a partnership loss claimed on the return.376   
Congress did not react favorably to the approach adopted by the Tax 
Court in Munro.377  As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,378 Congress 
enacted § 6234 to “overrule” Munro and to allow the Service to reinstate its 
original practice of computing a taxpayer’s deficiency by assuming that all 
partnership items whose tax treatment had not been finally determined in a 
TEFRA proceeding were correctly reported on the taxpayer’s return.379  
However, in doing so, Congress supplied a mechanism to prevent the 
Service from being whipsawed by the expiration of the period of limitations 
in cases where the tax treatment of partnership items on the taxpayer’s 
return did not withstand scrutiny.  Section 6234 does so by creating a 
declaratory judgment procedure in the Tax Court pertaining to an 
“oversheltered return”—that is, a return that shows no taxable income for 
                                                     
374 Id. at 74.   
375 Id. (“[P]artnership items must be ignored in deficiency proceedings, which 
relate exclusively to nonpartnership items.”).   
376 While the mutually exclusive treatment of partnership and nonpartnership 
items in Munro would generally favor the Service, the conference committee report 
accompanying the enactment of § 6234 explains that the approach could operate to 
the detriment of the Service if the partnership items consisted of income items 
rather than losses.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 585–86 (1997).    
377 In particular, Congress viewed the prospect of a taxpayer having to pay a 
deficiency attributable to nonpartnership item adjustments that later would be 
offset by partnership losses that were upheld in a TEFRA proceeding (generating a 
refund for the taxpayer) as effectively denying the taxpayer the ability to litigate the 
partnership items on a prepayment basis.  Id. at 586.   
378 Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1231, 111 Stat. 788, 1020–23 (1997).   
379 H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 586 (1997).    
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the taxable year while also showing a net loss from partnership items.380  
Pursuant to this procedure, if the Service proposes an adjustment with 
respect to the nonpartnership items of a taxpayer that would have given rise 
to a deficiency in the absence of partnership items reported on the 
taxpayer’s return that are subject to the TEFRA partnership proceedings, 
the Service may issue a “notice of adjustment” to reflect its 
determination.381   
In many respects, the notice of adjustment is subject to the same 
restrictions and triggers the same procedures as a notice of deficiency.382  In 
particular, the notice must be mailed prior to the expiration of the period of 
limitations on assessment of a deficiency,383 and the taxpayer has the same 
period (generally 90 days) to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of 
the proposed adjustments.384  If the taxpayer files a petition for review, the 
Tax Court has jurisdiction to make a “declaration” with respect to the 
taxpayer’s nonpartnership items for the taxable year to which the notice of 
adjustment relates.385  The Tax Court’s declaration in this context has the 
same force and effect as a decision of the court and is subject to appellate 
review in the same manner.386    
Adjustments to the nonpartnership items of a taxpayer that are obtained 
through the § 6234 declaratory judgment procedure do not trigger an 
immediate tax liability.  Rather, these adjustments are preserved to be taken 
into account upon the resolution of the TEFRA partnership-level 
proceeding.  The heart of the § 6234 response to the whipsaw problem 
                                                     
380 I.R.C. § 6234(b).  The procedural details of § 6234 declaratory judgment 
proceedings are addressed in Rules 310 through 316 of the Tax Court Rules of 
Practice and Procedure.   
381 I.R.C. § 6234(a).   
382 Indeed, in certain situations, a notice of adjustment issued under § 6234 will 
be treated as a notice of deficiency under § 6212.  This conversion occurs if, 
following the mailing of the notice of adjustment but prior to the expiration of the 
period for petitioning the Tax Court for review, the treatment of any partnership 
item for the taxable year is finally determined or the item ceases to be a partnership 
item and a deficiency can be determined with respect to the items that serve as the 
subject of the notice of adjustment.  I.R.C. § 6234(g)(3).  Additionally, if the Service 
mistakenly issues a notice of adjustment pursuant to § 6234 in lieu of a notice of 
deficiency under § 6212 and vice versa, the mistakenly issued notice shall be treated 
as the type of notice that should have been issued.  See I.R.C. § 6234(h).    
383 I.R.C. § 6234(e)(1). 
384 I.R.C. § 6234(c).  The Service is barred from making an assessment of the 
deficiency during this filing period and, if a petition is filed with the Tax Court, 
until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final.  I.R.C. § 6234(e)(3).   
385 I.R.C. § 6234(c).  If the taxpayer fails to invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
to review the notice of adjustment, the determination made by the Service set forth 
in the notice shall be considered correct as a general rule.  I.R.C. § 6234(d)(1).     
386 I.R.C. § 6234(c).   
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identified in Munro lies in § 6234(g), which permits the adjustments with 
respect to nonpartnership items to be taken into account upon resolution 
of the partnership-level proceedings free of any restriction otherwise 
imposed by the statute of limitations on the assessment of a deficiency. 
Because the issuance of a notice of adjustment does not lead to the 
imposition of an immediate tax liability (and, indeed, may never lead to an 
additional tax liability if the taxpayer’s claimed treatment of partnership 
items is sustained through the partnership-level proceedings), a taxpayer 
does not have an immediate financial incentive to contest the Service’s 
determination reflected in the notice of adjustment.  If the taxpayer fails to 
petition the Tax Court for redetermination of the items addressed in the 
notice of adjustment, the determinations reflected in the notice are deemed 
to be correct as a general rule.387  However, in recognition of the 
diminished incentive for the taxpayer to invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
in this context,388 this general rule does not apply if the taxpayer pursues a 
claim for refund of the tax attributable to the items that were adjusted in 
the § 6234 proceeding.389  In this manner, the taxpayer is permitted to take a 
wait-and-see approach with respect to the determination concerning 
nonpartnership items reflected in the notice of adjustment.  The price for 
such hindsight, however, is the forfeiture of a prepayment forum in which 
to later contest that determination.    
  
D. Supplemental Tax Court Jurisdiction 
 
Through legislation originally enacted in 1988, Congress responded to 
two anomalies in proceedings before the Tax Court relating to interest on 
an underlying tax liability.     
Through the enactment of § 7481(c), Congress expanded the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction to provide the court with jurisdiction over 
determinations of interest relating to a deficiency determination made by 
the court.  The goal of this legislation was to permit a taxpayer who had  
previously invoked the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the taxpayer’s 
resulting liability for interest without having to resort to another forum.  
Through the enactment of § 7481(d), Congress addressed a conundrum 
arising from interest paid on payments of estate tax deferred pursuant to 
§ 6166.  Because interest could not be deducted as an administrative 
expense for estate tax purposes in advance of actual payment, the court in 
                                                     
387 I.R.C. § 6234(d)(1).   
388 H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 587 (1997) (“Although a refund claim is not 
generally permitted with respect to a deficiency arising from a TEFRA proceeding, 
such a rule is appropriate with respect to a defaulted notice of adjustment because 
taxpayers may not challenge such a notice when issued since it does not require the 
payment of additional tax.”).    
389 I.R.C. § 6234(d)(2).   
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§ 6166 cases was essentially forced to keep the estate tax case open until the 
last installment of estate tax had been paid.  Section 7481(d) provides a 
procedure tailored to address this issue, one that permits the court to enter 
a decision and then subsequently modify it solely on account of later 
payments of interest.  
These two areas of supplemental jurisdiction are addressed below.   
 
1. Post-Decision Interest Determinations 
 
 The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies does not 
authorize the court to make determinations concerning interest, as the 
definition of a deficiency does not extend to interest thereon.390  Beyond 
this definitional matter, interest is not assessable by the Commissioner with 
respect to a deficiency until the Tax Court’s redetermination decision 
becomes final.391  Hence, the question of interest owed on a deficiency does 
not ripen until the Tax Court concludes its jurisdiction over the matter.392  
In the refund setting, the Tax Court possesses jurisdiction under § 6512(b) 
to determine if the taxpayer has made an overpayment, and interest may be 
part of an overpayment if the interest was paid prior to the time the 
overpayment was claimed.393  However, the overpayment jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court does not extend to the determination of interest owed upon an 
overpayment once determined.394 
 Recognizing the absence of Tax Court jurisdiction over interest 
determinations in the deficiency setting, Congress attempted to address the 
defect through the enactment of § 7481(c) as part of the Technical and 
                                                     
390 See I.R.C. § 6211(a).   
391 See Commissioner v. Estate of Kilpatrick, 140 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1944) (in a 
deficiency proceeding, “interest is assessable under the statute only after the Board 
has acted”).  As explained by the Tax Court in Estate of Baumgardner v. Commissioner, 
85 T.C. 445, 452 (1985), interest under § 6601 does not accrue on a deficiency but 
rather on an underpayment, and an underpayment of tax does not arise until a 
deficiency is assessed or assessable.  Where the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction 
has been invoked, § 6213(a) restrains assessment of a deficiency until the Tax Court 
decision becomes final.        
392 Congress provided the following explanation of the prevailing landscape 
prior to the introduction of § 7481(c) in 1998: 
Following a decision by the Tax Court, the IRS assesses the entire amount 
redetermined as the deficiency by the Tax Court and adds to the deficiency 
interest computed at the statutory rate.  If the taxpayer disagrees with the 
IRS’ interest computation, however, the Tax Court does not have 
jurisdiction to resolve that dispute.   
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104 at 232 (1998).    
393 Estate of Baumgardner, 85 T.C. at 452.   
394 Id. at 453 (“[W]e remain unable to enter a decision for interest upon an 
overpayment.”).   
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Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.395  In its original form, § 7481(c) 
permitted the taxpayer to file a subsequent petition with the Tax Court for a 
determination that the interest assessed by the Commissioner under § 6215 
with respect to a deficiency exceeded the amount of interest properly due.  
To invoke the court’s jurisdiction in this subsequent proceeding, the 
taxpayer first had to pay the entire amount of the deficiency plus the 
interest claimed by the Commissioner, and the taxpayer then had to file a 
petition within one year of the date on which the original decision of the 
Tax Court became final.  In that event, the Tax Court possessed jurisdiction 
solely to determine whether the taxpayer had made an overpayment of 
interest.396 
 As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress streamlined and 
clarified the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c).397  Rather than 
requiring the taxpayer to file a subsequent petition with the Tax Court, 
Congress fashioned the court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c) as supplemental 
to the original proceeding that the taxpayer could invoke by motion.398  
Additionally, Congress clarified that the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under 
§ 7481(c) extended not only to interest determinations made with respect to 
a deficiency in tax (where the taxpayer had first paid the deficiency and all 
interest claimed by the Commissioner) but also to interest determinations 
arising in the context of refund litigation under § 6512(b).399  Section 
7481(c) therefore authorizes the Tax Court to determine if the taxpayer has 
overpaid interest on a deficiency or if the Secretary has underpaid interest 
on an overpayment.  If the court finds either scenario implicated, the 
                                                     
395 Pub. L. No. 100-67, § 6246(a), 102 Stat. 3751 (enacting § 7481(c)).  Section 
7481(c) applied to the assessment of deficiencies redetermined by the Tax Court 
after the November 10, 1988 effective date of the legislation.   
396 I.R.C. § 7481(c) (prior to amendment by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997).   
397 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1452(a), 111 Stat. 1452–
53.  The amendment had an effective date of August 5, 1997, but that effective date 
did not refer to a particular action.  See id. § 1452(b), 111 Stat. 1453.  In Hallmark 
Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 266, 270 (1998), the court reasoned that the 
statute as amended “undoubtedly” applied to motions to redetermine interest filed 
after the effective date of the amendment.    
398 I.R.C. § 7481(c)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-148 at 638 (1997) (“A 
motion, rather than a petition, is a more appropriate pleading for relief in these 
cases.”).     
399 I.R.C. § 7481(c)(2)(B).  Congress couched this amendment as a 
“clarification” of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c).  See H.R. REP. NO. 
105-220, at 732–33 (1997) (“The House bill also clarifies that the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction to redetermine the amount of interest under section 7481(c) does not 
depend on whether the interest is underpayment interest or overpayment 
interest.”).  However, the clarification was more in the nature of an expansion, as 
the statute prior to its amendment made no mention of overpayment interest.    
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court’s determination is treated under § 6512(b) as a determination of an 
overpayment of tax.400   
 The Tax Court does not serve as the exclusive forum to resolve disputes 
regarding the determination of underpayment or overpayment interest.401  
Yet, once invoked, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c) to 
redetermine interest becomes exclusive—just as it does in other areas.402  
Similarly, the court may not decline to exercise its jurisdiction to 
redetermine interest once its supplemental jurisdiction has been properly 
invoked.403  In Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 404 the taxpayer sought to 
dismiss its motion for a redetermination of interest under § 7481(c) 
following the issuance of adverse Tax Court authority in another case.  
Pointing to the specific reference in § 6512(a) to a petition to redetermine 
interest under § 7481(c), the court reasoned that Congress intended for a 
motion under § 7481(c) to have the same effect as the filing of a petition to 
redetermine a deficiency.  Accordingly, the court denied the taxpayer’s 
motion to withdraw on grounds that the court was obligated to dispose of 
the matter on the merits.405   
Ordinarily, a proceeding to redetermine interest under § 7481(c) can be 
resolved on the record supporting the Tax Court’s final decision in the 
case.406  Nonetheless, Tax Court Rule 261(d) contemplates the possibility of 
a “bona fide factual dispute” that will require an additional evidentiary 
hearing.  The court therefore may accept new facts to resolve interest 
determination disputes, provided the substance of the court’s final decision 
concerning the underlying deficiency or overpayment remains 
unchanged.407  In that regard, the court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c) is not 
limited to determining the applicable interest rates for the relevant 
                                                     
400 I.R.C. § 7481(c)(3).  The Tax Court’s redetermination of interest under 
§ 7481(c) is reviewable in the same manner as a decision of the Tax Court.  Id.   
401 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 99, 110 (2011).  
402 See I.R.C. §§ 6512(a), 7422(e).   
403 Cf. § 7459(d) (decision of Tax Court dismissing proceeding for 
redetermination of deficiency considered its decision that the deficiency is that 
determined by the Secretary); see also Coninck v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 495, 498 
(1993) (“This Court . . . is not free to ‘deny its jurisdiction’ once it has attached by 
means of a valid petition.”).   
404 111 T.C. 266 (1998).   
405 Id. at 272 (citing Estate of Ming v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 519 (1974) 
(denying taxpayer’s motion to withdraw petition for redetermination of deficiency 
without prejudice) and Dorl v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 720 (1972) (denying 
taxpayer’s motion to remove case from the Tax Court to the U.S. District Court)).   
406 See TAX CT. R. 261(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (making this observation).   
407 See Bankamerica Corp. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 1, 8–9 (1997) (“[W]e 
note that the existence of a final decision does not tie our hands in this case. . . . 
[A]s long as we do not change the substance of the final decision, we are free to act 
under section 7481(c).”). 
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periods—a position advanced by the Commissioner in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Commissioner408 to no avail.  The court in Exxon Mobil explained that 
determining the amount of interest under § 7481(c) requires the court to 
analyze not only the applicable interest rate but also the relevant principal 
amount and length of time such amount remained outstanding.  The court’s 
jurisdiction under § 7481(c) therefore necessarily extends to resolving the 
various items that factor in the interest determination.409   
 The Tax Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil also addressed the extent to 
which the Tax Court may consider facts relating to years that are not before 
the court in the § 7481(c) proceeding.  The taxpayer in Exxon Mobil invoked 
the court’s jurisdiction under § 7481(c) to determine interest netting under 
§ 6221(d) for overpayment years before the court in the § 7481(c) 
proceeding based on prior underpayments in years not before the court.  
The Tax Court resolved the matter by analogizing to § 6214(b).  Section 
6214(b) authorizes the court to consider facts relating to taxable years not 
before the court in redetermining a deficiency for a year over which the 
court possesses jurisdiction, while making clear that the ability to consider 
facts from other years does not extend the court’s jurisdiction to those 
years.  The Tax Court in Exxon Mobil incorporated the § 6214(b) rule into 
the § 7481(c) arena, explaining that merely considering the underpayments 
of tax in years prior to those before the court in the § 7481(c) proceeding 
did not require the court to disturb the determination of those 
underpayments.  Accordingly, the factual record available to the Tax Court 
in redetermining interest under § 7481(c) is not necessarily limited to the 
taxable years over which the court possesses § 7481(c) supplemental 
jurisdiction.     
          
2. Continuing Jurisdiction Over Estate Tax Cases 
 
If an estate is entitled to defer payment of estate tax under § 6166(a), the 
deferred tax payments accrue interest under § 6601.410  The estate’s future 
interest obligation created a hurdle to the Tax Court entering a final 
decision in an estate tax deficiency case, as highlighted in Estate of Bailly v. 
Commissioner.411  The estate in that case had elected to defer payment of the 
estate tax under § 6166(a) and sought to deduct its future interest expense 
under § 6601 as an administrative expense for estate tax purposes.  In a 
prior proceeding, the Tax Court determined that the estate could deduct 
this interest only as the interest was paid.  However, if the Tax Court had 
entered a final decision in the proceeding, the estate would be precluded 
                                                     
408 136 T.C. 99 (2011).   
409 Id. at 114.   
410 See I.R.C. § 6166(f).   
411 81 T.C. 949 (1983).   
446           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
under § 6512(a) from pursuing a refund of estate tax resulting from 
deductions attributable to future interest payments.  To avoid the harsh 
result of the estate forfeiting administrative expense deductions, the court 
in Estate of Bailly agreed to postpone entry of its decision in the case until 
the final § 6166 installment payment was due or paid, whichever occurred 
first.412   
In reaching this resolution of the conundrum raised in Estate of Bailly, the 
Tax Court remarked that a congressional solution was required.413  
Congress obliged by introducing § 7481(d) as part of the Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.414  Pursuant to § 7481(d), the Tax 
Court is authorized to enter a decision regarding an estate tax deficiency 
and later reopen the case upon the taxpayer’s motion solely to modify the 
court’s decision to reflect the estate’s entitlement to an administrative 
expense deduction under § 2053 on account of the estate’s payment of 
interest on the deferred estate tax obligation.   
To invoke this special procedure, the taxpayer estate must file a motion 
with the court after the entry of decision but before that decision becomes 
final requesting that the court retain its official case file.415  Thereafter, the 
taxpayer estate may move the court to modify its decision to reflect the 
consequences of a later interest payment by filing a proposed form of 
decision along with its motion.416  If the Service disagrees with the estate’s 
motion, it must file a response along with its proposed form of decision 
within 60 days.417  Motions to modify a decision pursuant to § 7481(d) 
generally are resolved without an evidentiary hearing, unless one is required 
due to the existence of a bona fide factual dispute.418  
The practical effect of the § 7481(d) procedure has been limited 
significantly by subsequent estate tax legislation.  In 1997, Congress 
amended § 2053 to disallow an administrative expense deduction for 
interest accruing on payments of federal estate tax that are deferred 
pursuant to § 6166.419  Hence, the problem that gave rise to the § 7481(d) 
congressional remedy has been eliminated.  Nonetheless, payments of 
interest attributable to deferred payments of estate, inheritance, or 
succession taxes levied at the state or local level may give rise to subsequent 
administrative expense deductions that necessitate the § 7481(d) procedure.  
The provision therefore has lasting, albeit limited, relevance. 
                                                     
412 Id. at 958.   
413 See id. 
414 Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6247(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3751–52 (1988).   
415 TAX CT. R. 157 (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
416 See TAX CT. R. 262(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
417 TAX CT. R. 262(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
418 TAX CT. R. 262(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
419 See I.R.C. § 2053(c)(1)(D), added by The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-34, § 503(b)(1), 111 Stat. 788, 853 (1997).   





TAX COURT PROMINENCE IN JUDICIAL  
REVIEW OF TAXPAYER RIGHTS 
  
Congress has steadily expanded the jurisdiction of the Tax Court beyond 
its traditional province to determine deficiencies and overpayments 
following the Government’s issuance of a notice of deficiency.  The court’s 
expanded jurisdictional reach at times stems from Congress seeking to 
provide a greater degree of oversight of administrative action.  The Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction to restrain premature assessments under § 6213(a) and 
to review jeopardy assessments under § 7429, previously discussed in 
connection with the court’s deficiency jurisdiction,1 present two such 
examples.  More often, the court’s jurisdiction has been expanded in 
connection with the creation of new taxpayer rights, a series of which have 
been introduced in recent decades.  Having created the right, Congress 
often is not content to entrust the administration of the right to the Service 
alone.  Congress therefore typically provides for the availability of judicial 
review of agency determinations and, increasingly, the Tax Court is 
designated as the forum for such review.  The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to 
review denials of innocent spouse relief, determinations made in response 
to a collection due process hearing, denials of requests for reimbursement 
of costs incurred in contesting the Service’s position at the administrative 
level, and determinations of whistleblower awards all fall within this 
category.  This Part will explore these and other provisions that fall within 
the broad umbrella of taxpayer rights, detailing the remedy provided by 
Congress and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to enforce it.   
 
A. Disclosure Actions 
 
Since enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in 1967,2 increasing 
attention has focused on Internal Revenue Service policies with regard to 
the confidentiality of its rulings.3  Except for a small minority of rulings that 
are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (and which are, in published 
form, devoid of reference to the specific taxpayer and transaction involved), 
these interpretations at one point had been treated as confidential by the 
                                                     
1 These provisions are discussed in Part VI.A. and VI.C., respectively.   
2 Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977)). 
3 See Fruehauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), 
vacated, 429 U.S. 1085 (1977); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Serv., 
505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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Service.4  Justification for confidentiality was based on the fact that public 
disclosure of the identity of taxpayers and their transactions would 
discourage taxpayers from seeking rulings5 and might violate provisions of 
the Code prohibiting publication of tax returns.6  Additionally, even if 
private rulings were sanitized by removal of references to the taxpayer and 
transaction involved, publication would be inappropriate because the great 
number of such rulings precluded the type of careful review that would 
justify their use as precedent.  Although the Service generally treats the 
specific transaction giving rise to a private ruling in accordance with its 
determination,7 it does not feel constrained to maintain a consistent 
position with regard to other taxpayers or even other transactions involving 
the same taxpayer.8 
Several questions emerged with regard to ruling confidentiality.  First, it 
was maintained that the private ruling procedure operated unfairly since, 
despite Service precautions, sophisticated tax practitioners frequently knew 
the position adopted by the Service in these determinations.9  Such a system 
of privileged access to government pronouncements did not bolster public 
confidence in the equity of the tax laws.  Second, the secrecy surrounding 
private rulings led to suspicions that the tax laws were not being 
administered uniformly as to all taxpayers.10 These suspicions, whether or 
not well-founded, also had disturbing implications for public confidence.  
Finally, questions were raised with regard to the legality, under the Freedom 
of Information Act, of barring public access to administrative 
interpretations of the tax laws.11  Courts began to hold that statutory 
provisions barring the publication of tax returns did not justify withholding 
public access to private rulings under the Freedom of Information Act.12 
To address these problems, Congress enacted § 6110 as part of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976,13 providing a comprehensive legislative scheme 
prescribing procedures for Internal Revenue Service disclosure of rulings. 
Additionally, the legislation created specific judicial remedies for persons 
objecting to Service action with regard to disclosure.14  In this regard, 
                                                     
4 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 312 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 303 (1976). 
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 317 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 309 (1976).  
6 I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213. 
7 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5). 
8 Treas. Reg.  § 601.201(l)(1), (6). 
9 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 314 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 305 (1976). 
10 See supra note 9. 
11 See supra note 3. 
12 Fruehauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), 
vacated, 429 U.S. 1085 (1977); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Serv., 
505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
13 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1660 (1976). 
14 Id. 
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remedies are provided for those objecting to disclosure15 as well as for 
those seeking additional disclosure.16 
Pursuant to § 6110, the Commissioner is required to make available for 
public inspection written determinations as well as so-called “background 
file documents.”17  The latter consist of communications, written or 
otherwise, between the Service and others, regarding a determination; they 
include the ruling request, materials submitted in support of the request, 
and other communications from the taxpayer and others.18 
The statute provides various exceptions to the general directive of 
disclosure.19  Of primary importance, the Commissioner is directed to 
excise from the public record the name, address, and other identifying 
details of any person identified in the determination or background file 
documents.20  Also excepted from disclosure is certain material dealing with 
foreign policy and national defense,21 material excepted from disclosure by 
specific statutory provision not contained in title 26,22 trade secrets,23 
material “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy,”24 certain material connected with agencies 
responsible for the supervision of financial institutions,25 and geological 
material concerning wells.26  Codifying earlier practice, the statute also 
provides that rulings will have no precedential weight unless otherwise 
provided by the Service.27 
The procedure for disclosure of determinations is automatic. Upon 
issuance of a determination, the Service is required to mail notification of 
its intention to disclose to the person to whom the determination pertains.28  
As indicated above, the statute requires that portions of the determination 
be excised from that which is made public.29  Pursuant to statutory 
directive, procedures must be established by the Service under which 
disputes regarding the excisions may be resolved administratively within a 
                                                     
15 See I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3). 
16 See I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3),(f)(4). 
17 I.R.C. § 6110(a). 
18 I.R.C. § 6110(b)(2). 
19 I.R.C. § 6110(c). 
20 I.R.C. § 6110(c)(1).  This exception does not apply to persons identified as 
third-party contacts.  I.R.C. § 6110(c)(1), (d)(1).  See infra notes 37–40 and 
accompanying text. 
21 I.R.C. § 6110(c)(2).  
22 I.R.C. § 6110(c)(3). 
23 I.R.C. § 6110(c)(4). 
24 I.R.C. § 61l0(c)(5). 
25 I.R.C. § 61l0(c)(6). 
26 I.R.C. § 6110(c)(7). 
27 I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3). 
28 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(1). 
29 See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.  
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60-day period from the mailing of notice.30  If the person to whom the 
determination pertains does not commence suit in the Tax Court within the 
60-day period to restrain disclosure,31 the determination is made available 
for public inspection between 75 and 90 days after mailing of the notice of 
intention to disclose.32  If disputes regarding disclosure cannot be resolved 
administratively and a Tax Court suit to restrain disclosure is commenced, 
the determination will be made available for public inspection, in 
accordance with the court’s decision, within 30 days after that decision 
becomes final.33 
The procedure for disclosure of background file documents parallels 
that for determinations with one exception.  Instead of automatic initiation 
of the disclosure procedure as accompanies the issuance of a determination, 
background file documents will not be made available for inspection unless 
a written request is made therefor.34  Upon the receipt of such request, the 
Service must mail notification of an intention to disclose to any person to 
whom the determination pertains,35 and from that point on the procedure 
for disclosure is the same as that for determinations.36 
As a protection against impropriety and undue influence in the ruling 
procedure, special disclosure rules are provided for so-called third party 
contacts.37  The statute requires that a written notation be made on the 
determination open to public inspection of any communication with the 
Service by any person, other than the taxpayer or his representative, with 
regard to the determination.38 Such notation identifies the contacting party 
by category only (e.g., congressional, White House, Treasury, trade 
association, etc.), and not by name.39  Despite this limitation and the usual 
limitations on disclosing the names of those involved in a determination, 
the statute requires the Service to disclose the identity of third party 
contacts as part of the background file documents.40 
In connection with the disclosure provisions, Congress authorized three 
distinct judicial proceedings.  The first of these, mentioned above, provides 
for actions to restrain disclosure.41  The Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
                                                     
30 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(2)–(3). 
31 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3). 
32 I.R.C. § 6110(g)(1)(A). 
33 I.R.C. § 6110(g)(1)(B). 
34 I.R.C. § 6110(e), (f)(1); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 310 (1976). 
35 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(1). 
36 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3), (g). 
37 I.R.C. § 6110(d). 
38 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(1). 
39 Id.; S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 308 (1976). 
40 I.R.C. § 6110(a), (b)(2), (c); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 308 (1976). 
41 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3). To aid the Service in complying with § 6110, a request for 
a private letter ruling must be accompanied by a statement (a “deletions 
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of these actions, which may be initiated by any person “to whom a written 
determination pertains . . . or who has a direct interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of any such written determination or background file 
document” and who disagrees with a Service refusal to make deletions in 
material to be opened to public inspection.42  Such an action must be 
instituted within 60 days after the mailing by the Service of a notice of 
intention to disclose.43 
A second category of proceeding authorizes actions to obtain additional 
disclosure.44  Initial jurisdiction for these actions is in either the Tax Court 
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and they 
may be commenced by any person who seeks additional disclosure with 
respect to any determination or background file document.45  Such an 
action must be instituted within three years after any portion of the 
determination is opened for public inspection.46 
A final action is authorized in connection with the special provisions 
dealing with third-party contacts.47  As stated above, the existence of a 
third-party contact must be noted on any determination made public with 
the category of the contacting party.48  Additionally, the Code requires that 
the name of the contacting party be made available on request as part of the 
background file documents.49  A further provision authorizes a court action 
to compel disclosure of the identity of any person to whom the 
determination pertains.50  Such an action may be brought by any person in 
either the Tax Court or the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.51  Disclosure of identity will be ordered if the court concludes 
that evidence exists “from which one could reasonably conclude that an 
impropriety occurred or undue influence was exercised . . . by or on behalf 
                                                                                                                       
statement”) of the items that should be redacted from the version of the ruling to 
be made public.  See Rev. Proc. 2007-4, § 9.02(9), 2007-1 C.B. 118, 133.    
42 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A). However, this remedy does not authorize a taxpayer to 
enjoin public disclosure of a determination in its entirety.  See Anonymous v. 
Commissioner, 134 T.C. 13 (2010) (rejecting taxpayer argument that the 
Administrative Procedure Act permitted the Tax Court to enjoin publication of a 
private letter ruling).  
43 Id.  
44 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4). 
45 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(A). 
46 The three-year statute of limitations is not provided for in the statute.  Id  
Rather, this restriction is found only in the accompanying legislative materials.  See 
S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 314 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 324 (1975). 
47 I.R.C. § 6110(d). 
48 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
49 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
50 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3). 
51 Id. 
452           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
of” the person whose identity is sought.52  The court also may order the 
disclosure of other deleted material if it finds such material to be in the 
“public interest.”53  This type of action must be commenced within three 
years after the determination is initially opened for public inspection.54 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies figures in two of 
the three proceedings.  The statute requires the establishment of 
administrative procedures with regard to disclosure,55 and specifically 
requires the exhaustion of remedies for actions to restrain disclosure56 and 
actions to obtain additional disclosure.57  The Tax Court rules specify that 
exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing these types of 
actions.58  The statute does not, however, provide for the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in the case of third-party contact actions.  The 
court apparently has not adopted the position that, in these cases, 
exhaustion is necessary,59 or even desirable.60 
A question may be anticipated with regard to exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in actions to restrain disclosure.  The statute clearly 
requires exhaustion, but it also requires that the Tax Court action be 
commenced within 60 days after the Commissioner mails the notice of 
intention to disclose.61  This relatively short period may be incompatible 
with the time required for full exhaustion of administrative remedies, and 
the court may have to adopt a liberal policy with regard to the exhaustion 
requirement in order not to bar the institution of Tax Court proceedings. 
Although the objectives of the three proceedings differ, in several 
respects they parallel one another.  For example, one aspect common to all 
three actions is that they may involve the interests of persons other than 
those who figure directly in the initiation of the proceedings.  Thus, an 
action to restrain disclosure may be commenced by any person to whom a 
determination pertains or who has a direct interest in preserving the 
                                                     
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(4). 
55 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(2). 
56 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A)(iii). 
57 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(A). 
58 TAX CT. R. 220(c)(1), (2)(C) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
59 See TAX CT. R. 220(c)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
60 The petition in a third-party contact action need not contain a statement that 
the petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies.  TAX CT. R. 221(e) (July 6, 
2012 ed.). Cf. Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 221(d)(6) (Aug. 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 
1055 (indicating that a statement of exhaustion of remedies is necessary in some 
circumstances, not relating to third-party contact actions, even if the statute does 
not require such exhaustion as a condition of suit). 
61 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A). 
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confidentiality of the determination or background file documents.62  To 
preserve the rights of all such parties and reduce the potential for multiple 
suits, the statute requires the Commissioner, within 15 days of receiving a 
petition in an action to restrain disclosure, to mail notice of the 
commencement of the action to any person to whom the determination 
pertains (other than the petitioner in the action).63  Any person to whom 
such notice is given may intervene in the proceeding but may not thereafter 
institute an independent action to restrain disclosure with respect to any 
determination or background file document that is the subject of the 
original action.64 
Similar notice and intervention provisions are applicable to actions to 
obtain additional disclosure and third-party contact actions.  In the case of 
an action to obtain additional disclosure, the Commissioner, within 15 days 
after service of notice of the petition, is required to mail notice of the filing 
of the petition to any person who is identified by name and address in any 
determination or background file document that is the subject of the 
petition.65  Any person so notified may intervene in the proceeding.66  
Failure to intervene carries significant risk, as the statute relieves the 
Commissioner of the responsibility of defending the action if such notice is 
sent.67  As a result, the additional disclosure can be obtained without 
objection.  If the Commissioner elects not to defend the action, Tax Court 
rules require the Commissioner to give notice thereof to every person 
notified of the filing of the petition, who may intervene within 30 days after 
mailing of the notice of the Commissioner’s election.68  The notice and 
intervention provisions applicable to actions to obtain additional disclosure 
are incorporated by reference into third-party contact actions, with the 
requirement that notice be given to both the person whose identity is 
subject to disclosure and the person who made the third-party contact.69  
The statute is unclear as to the effect of giving the notice on the 
Commissioner’s duty to defend this type of action, but the Tax Court 
                                                     
62 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(A)(i). 
63 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(3)(B). 
64 Id.   
65 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(B).  The statute does not require notification of persons 
just identified by name.  One wonders whether this is consistent with the purpose 
to permit parties to demonstrate the need for confidentiality.  Obviously, 
notification would be a hardship for the Commissioner if no address is given, but 
query whether this is a burden that the Commissioner ought to shoulder to protect 
rights to anonymity. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 TAX CT. R. 225(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
69 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3). 
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apparently has taken the position that the Commissioner must defend the 
action even if notice is given.70 
A unique aspect, insofar as the Tax Court is concerned, of the disclosure 
procedures has to do with the anonymity of parties and the confidentiality 
of court proceedings and documents.  Since 1924, the statute has provided 
that the proceedings of the court and evidence adduced before it are to be 
open to the public.71  Such openness has been regarded as important in 
assuring public confidence in the fairness of the court’s decisions.72  In the 
case of disclosure actions, however, the ultimate issue for decision is 
whether certain material should be kept confidential.  Obviously, the 
proceedings to determine that question cannot be fully public without 
defeating the very purpose of the litigation.  Accordingly, the statute 
provides that intervenors in actions to obtain additional disclosure and in 
third-party contact actions, and petitioners and interveners in actions to 
restrain disclosure, may proceed anonymously if appropriate.73  Although 
there is no specific indication in either the statute or the Tax Court rules as 
to the meaning of “appropriate” for this purpose,74 the issue should not 
prove troublesome in light of the statutory purpose to preserve 
confidentiality in the absence of either an uncontested Service 
determination or a final court decision. 
The Tax Court rules provide that a party who proceeds anonymously 
shall be designated as “Anonymous.”75  Such party is required to submit a 
separate paper, accompanying his initial pleading, stating his name and 
address and the basis for anonymity.76  Consistent with the prospect of 
proceeding anonymously, the statute authorizes the court to adopt rules 
providing for the confidentiality of disclosure proceedings.77  In this 
connection, court rules require that petitions and all other papers submitted 
to the court in a disclosure action are to be kept in a confidential file and 
not opened for public inspection unless specifically permitted by the 
court.78  Additionally, the rules provide for the issuance of court orders 
                                                     
70 Cf. TAX CT. R. 225(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (suggesting that only in actions to 
obtain additional disclosure may the Commissioner elect not to defend). 
71 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§§ 7458, 7461); see also Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914, 917 
(1985) (“As a general rule, common law, statutory law, and the United States 
Constitution support the proposition that official records of all courts, including 
this Court, shall be open and available to the public for inspection and copying.”). 
72 See 65 CONG. REC. 8133 (1924) (remarks of Sen. Jones). 
73 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3), (f)(3)(B), (f)(4)(B). 
74 See TAX CT. R. 227 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
75 TAX CT. R. 227(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
76 Id. 
77 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(6). 
78 TAX CT. R. 228(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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barring public access to the hearings, testimony, evidence, and reports 
involved in a disclosure case.79  The court has recognized that most 
disclosure cases will involve related material, some of which may be public 
and other of which may be in dispute.80  The court generally expects to 
keep all such material confidential during the course of an individual 
litigation, because of the difficulty of maintaining an ongoing two-file 
system.81  However, once litigation is completed, the court contemplates 
establishing such a system by court order that would divide the material 
into two separate files, one of which would be available to the public.82 
In general, the statute and Tax Court rules adopt burden of proof rules 
that favor disclosure.  Thus, in actions to restrain disclosure, the burden of 
proof is on the party seeking restraint.83 In actions to obtain additional 
disclosure, the burden of proof is on the party (the Commissioner or an 
intervenor) who opposes additional disclosure.84  An exception to this bias 
in favor of disclosure applies in third-party contact actions seeking 
disclosure of the identity of the person to whom a determination pertains.  
Likely due to the drastic nature of the remedy sought (identification of the 
person involved in a ruling)85 and the serious charge of misconduct that 
must necessarily be involved in the case,86 the burden rests on the petitioner 
to establish the reasonable conclusion of an impropriety or undue influence 
by or on behalf of the person sought to be identified.87  No rule has yet 
been expressed with regard to the burden of proof in third-party contact 
actions that seek disclosure of material other than the identity of the person 
to whom the ruling pertains.88  The statute provides that the court may 
order such disclosure if it is in the “public interest.”89  Notes to the Tax 
Court rules expressly reserve decision on this matter.90 
                                                     
79 TAX CT. R. 228(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
80 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 228 (Aug. 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1060. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 324 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 313 (1976); TAX 
CT. R. 229(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see also I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(A). 
84 I.R.C. § 6110(f)(4)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 325 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-
938, at 314 (1976); TAX CT. R. 229(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
85 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3). 
86 Id. 
87 TAX CT. R. 229(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
88 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 229 (Aug. 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1061.   
89 I.R.C. § 6110(d)(3).      
90 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 229 (Aug. 1, 1977 ed.), 68 T.C. 1061 (noting 
that the absence of a specific rule in this context of disclosures in furtherance of 
the public interest “is not to be taken as indicative of where the burden of proof 
lies in respect of such issue”).  Nonetheless, under the articulated general rule, the 
burden of proof would appear to rest on the petitioner seeking disclosure.  See TAX 
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A final feature common to all three types of disclosure proceedings 
involves appellate review.  Generally, decisions in all types of actions may 
be appealed only to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.91  
This applies to both decisions of the Tax Court and the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia.92  According to the committee 
reports, an exception to this rule applies in appeals from the Tax Court if, 
in the words of these reports, the Commissioner and “the person involved 
[agree] to review by another court of appeals (sec. 7482(b)).”93   
 
B. Relief from Spousal Joint and Several Liability 
 
Section 6013(a) permits married couples to file a single tax return 
reporting their income on a joint basis.94  While joint reporting of income 
by spouses can yield considerable tax savings through the application of 
broadened marginal rate brackets,95 the filing of a joint return carries a 
potentially significant practical disadvantage.  Pursuant to § 6013(d)(3), each 
spouse bears joint and several liability for the tax attributable to the couple’s 
combined income.  The imposition of joint and several liability upon 
spouses to a joint return can prove particularly inequitable at times, such as 
when one spouse was unaware of income generated by the other that was 
not disclosed on the return.96  In cases where the “consenting” spouse did 
                                                                                                                       
CT. R. 229 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (incorporating the approach under Rule 142 unless an 
exception applies). 
91 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1) (providing appellate venue for appeals from the Tax 
Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (providing appellate venue for appeals from the United 
States district courts). 
92 See supra note 91. 
93 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 324–25 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 313–14 
(1976). 
94 Congress first introduced the joint return in 1918.  See Revenue Act of 1918, 
§ 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074.  Following disputes concerning the extent of each 
spouse’s liability, Congress subsequently clarified that spouses to a joint return bore 
joint and several liability for the resulting tax 20 years later.  See Revenue Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476. 
95 The income tax savings from the application of a beneficial rate structure did 
not originate as a trade-off for the imposition of joint and several liability.  Rather, 
the beneficial marginal rate structure for married couples filing jointly was not 
introduced until 1948, ten years after the statutory imposition of joint and several 
liability.  See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114; see 
also Bryan T. Camp, The Unhappy Marriage of Law and Equity in Joint Return Liability, 
108 TAX NOTES 1307 (2005) (detailing origins of joint income tax reporting).   
96 See S. REP. NO. 91-1537, at 2 (1971) (noting instances of “grave injustice” 
where “the innocent spouse has been deserted by her husband and the funds 
gained by embezzlement or theft have been squandered and spent by the 
wrongdoer”).  
Prominence in Judicial Review of Taxpayer Rights           457 
 
not know or have reason to know of the couple’s true combined income, 
that spouse necessarily lacked knowledge of the financial exposure the 
spouse assumed by signing the joint return.   
Prior to 1971, relief from joint and several liability was afforded on 
extremely narrow grounds that pertained to the propriety of the joint return 
itself.  For instance, a spouse who signed a joint return under duress97 or by 
mistake98 could be exempted from joint and several liability on the theory 
that no joint return had been effectively filed.  In 1971, Congress 
introduced the first remedial doctrine aimed at absolving a spouse of joint 
and several liability through the enactment of § 6013(e).99  Commonly 
referred to as “innocent spouse” relief, § 6013(e) primarily required the 
consenting spouse to establish the existence of a substantial understatement 
of income attributable to the other spouse of which the consenting spouse 
lacked knowledge or reason to know.  Accordingly, a spouse could seek 
§ 6013(e) relief only as an affirmative defense in a deficiency proceeding. 
 Congress restructured and expanded the innocent spouse provisions 
through the enactment of § 6015 as part of the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998.100  First, Congress modified and restated the relief 
formerly provided by § 6013(e) through § 6015(b).  Congress then provided 
an additional avenue for obtaining relief from joint and several liability 
relating to a deficiency.  Through § 6015(c), a spouse whose marriage has 
ended—not only legally but also functionally through the failure to maintain 
a common household—may elect to have a separate determination of that 
spouse’s liability for the deficiency.  In addition to these remedies in the 
deficiency setting, Congress provided an open-ended remedy from joint and 
several liability that extends to self-reported but unpaid taxes.  Pursuant to 
§ 6015(f), the Service may determine that it is inequitable to hold a 
requesting spouse liable for any portion of a deficiency or tax liability based 
on the facts and circumstances of the case.   
In addition to clarifying and expanding the innocent spouse relief 
provisions, Congress expressly addressed the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this 
context through § 6015(e).  This Section first outlines the evolution of the 
innocent spouse provisions before examining the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
to determine a requesting spouse’s entitlement to relief.   
 
                                                     
97 Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958).  Current law 
continues to treat a return filed under duress as not constituting an effective joint 
return.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(d). 
98 Payne v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957).  
99 Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971).  
100 Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 734 (1998).   
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1. Relief Under Former Section 6013(e) 
  
The first innocent spouse statute, § 6013(e), applied from 1971 until it 
was superseded by the enactment of § 6015 in 1998.  Prior to 1984, 
§ 6013(e) provided relief from joint and several liability only in cases where 
the deficiency was attributable to an omission from gross income.  
Congress amended § 6013(e) in 1984 to expand the scope of available relief 
to deficiencies resulting from erroneous claims of deduction, credit, or 
basis.101  In its post-1984 form, § 6013(e) provided relief from joint and 
several liability resulting from the filing of a joint return where the following 
conditions were satisfied: (1) there existed a “substantial understatement” of 
tax on the return that was attributable to “grossly erroneous items” of the 
other spouse; (2) the requesting spouse established that, in signing the 
return, he did not know and did not have reason to know of the existence 
of the substantial understatement; and (3) it was inequitable to hold the 
requesting spouse liable for the deficiency in tax attributable to the 
substantial understatement.102  If the requesting spouse carried his burden 
of establishing these elements,103 he was entitled to relief from joint and 
several liability for the tax attributable to the substantial understatement 
only.104  The statute did not provide a remedy for joint and several liability 
of unpaid tax attributable to items reported on the joint return.  
The definition of a “substantial understatement” turned on the basis for 
the understatement. With respect to omissions from gross income, an 
understatement was substantial if it exceeded $500.105  However, if the 
understatement was attributable to an erroneous deduction, credit, or 
statement of basis, the understatement had to exceed a stated percentage of 
the requesting spouse’s gross income for the preadjustment year—generally 
25 percent.106  The innocent spouse remedy therefore was not only limited 
to deficiencies in tax, but often to deficiencies of considerable amounts. 
A “grossly erroneous item” attributable to the non-requesting spouse 
referred to an unreported item of gross income or a claim of deduction, 
credit, or basis for which there existed “no basis in fact or law.”107  Given 
that a spouse could seek relief under § 6013(e) only in the course of a 
deficiency proceeding, this requirement placed a consenting spouse in an 
                                                     
101 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 
801–03 (1984).      
102 I.R.C. § 6013(e), as amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801–03 (1984).      
103 See Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1986).   
104 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1984).   
105 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (1984).    
106 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) (1984).  The 25 percent figure applied if the spouse’s 
adjusted gross income for the pre-adjustment year exceeded $20,000.    
107  I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) (1984).     
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awkward litigating position.  The requesting spouse was effectively forced 
to choose between contesting the underlying deficiency on the merits (an 
approach surely favored by the other spouse) or conceding the deficiency 
and pursuing § 6013(e) relief.  Advancing both theories in the alternative 
would undermine the latter, as any argument that the contested item of 
gross income, deduction, credit, or basis did not give rise to a deficiency 
necessarily undermined the § 6013(e) condition that no basis in law or fact 
existed to support the position.  
Litigation under § 6013(e) frequently turned on whether the requesting 
spouse possessed knowledge or reason to know of the substantial 
understatement in signing the joint return.  From the outset, the requesting 
spouse’s failure to comprehend the tax consequences of a transaction did 
not serve as a basis for establishing the absence of knowledge of the 
understatement.108  The knowledge contemplated by § 6013(e) did not 
pertain to “knowledge of the tax consequences of the transaction but rather 
knowledge of the transaction itself.”109  Knowledge of the transaction 
giving rise to the substantial understatement therefore was tantamount to 
knowledge of the understatement for innocent spouse relief purposes.110  
The Tax Court applied this same “knowledge of the transaction” standard 
to all innocent spouse cases, regardless of whether the substantial 
understatement was attributable to an omission of income or an erroneous 
deduction.111  Certain courts of appeals, however, adopted a more lenient 
standard in the context of erroneous deduction cases.  For example, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Price v. Commissioner112 explained that any 
knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the deduction did not alone 
preclude innocent spouse relief.113  Rather, according to this view, the 
relevant inquiry was whether the spouse knew or had reason to know “that 
                                                     
108 See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1975); McCoy v. 
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972).   
109 Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1975).    
110 Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 115 (2002) (citing Purcell v. 
Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 473–74 (6th Cir. 1987)).  Other courts viewed 
knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the deficiency as supplying constructive 
knowledge of the substantial understatement as opposed to actual knowledge.  See, 
e.g., Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that “if a 
spouse knows virtually all of the facts pertaining to the transaction” giving rise to 
the substantial understatement, then “she is considered as a matter of law to have 
reason to know of the substantial understatement”).  The difference is a matter of 
semantics, however, as either actual or constructive knowledge of the substantial 
understatement was sufficient to preclude innocent spouse relief.   
111 See Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 151 (1990); see also Park v. 
Commissioner, 25 F.3d 1289 (5th Cir. 1994).    
112 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989).   
113 Id. at 963 n.9.   
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the deduction would give rise to a substantial understatement.”114  Intimate 
knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the erroneous deduction could 
supply knowledge that the claimed deductions were not proper; superficial 
knowledge of the transaction did not.   
If the requesting spouse was sufficiently unaware of the transaction that 
gave rise to the substantial understatement, the inquiry turned to whether 
the spouse “had reason to know” the return contained the understatement.  
Courts approached this inquiry from the standpoint of an objective third 
party.  That is, a spouse possessed the prohibited constructive knowledge if 
“a reasonably prudent person in her position at the time she signed the 
return could be expected to know that the return contained the substantial 
understatement.”115  The following factors informed the constructive 
knowledge inquiry:  (1) the requesting spouse’s level of education, (2) such 
spouse’s involvement in the couple’s business and financial affairs, (3) the 
presence of lavish or out-of-the ordinary consumption patterns, and (4) the 
level of evasiveness and deceit perpetrated by the other spouse concerning 
the couple’s finances.116 
In the context of substantial understatements attributable to erroneous 
deductions, courts articulated an additional basis for constructive 
knowledge of the understatement.  Even if the requesting spouse did not 
possess reason to know of the understatement under the factors outlined 
above, the spouse may have known sufficient facts to put him on notice 
that the understatement existed.  This “on notice” element of the 
constructive knowledge inquiry generally was triggered by the sheer size of 
the claimed deduction.117  If a reasonably prudent person would have 
questioned the legitimacy of the deduction, the spouse was charged with 
whatever knowledge such an inquiry would reveal.118   
                                                     
114 Id. at 963; see also Reser v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 
1997); Resser v. Commissioner, 74 F.3d 1528, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996) (each following 
Price).   
115 Price, 887 F.2d at 965.  
116 See, e.g., Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989).   
117 See Levin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-67, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 6, 8–9 
(explaining that a spouse cannot qualify for innocent spouse relief “simply by 
turning a blind eye to—by preferring not to know of—facts fully disclosed on the 
return, of such a large nature as would reasonably put such spouse on notice that 
further inquiry would need to be made”).  A requesting spouse could not avoid the 
duty to inquire by failing to know the extent of the deductions by failing to review 
the return.  Rather, the spouse was charged with knowledge of the items reflected 
on the return. See Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993).    
118 See Reser v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d 1258, 1267–68 (5th Cir. 1997).  A 
requesting spouse could satisfy the duty to inquire by questioning the other spouse 
about the accuracy of the relevant item and receiving a plausible explanation.  See, 
e.g., Estate of Killian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-365, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1438, 1441. 
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The final hurdle to § 6013(e) relief rested in the evaluation concerning 
the equity of imposing joint and several liability for the substantial 
understatement on the requesting spouse.  Certain of these factors 
overlapped with the constructive-knowledge inquiry—that is, whether the 
requesting spouse benefitted significantly from the understatement through 
consumption patterns that exceeded customary support.119  Other equitable 
considerations included in the spouse’s well-being at the time relief was 
sought, such as whether the spouse had been deserted by the other spouse 
and whether the spouse would suffer economic hardship in the absence of 
relief.120     
 
2. Section 6015(b) Relief 
 
As part of the IRS Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Congress 
enacted § 6015 to address relief from spousal joint and several liability in a 
more comprehensive fashion.  The statute, which superseded § 6013(e), 
applies to taxes that arose after June 22, 1998, and to tax liabilities 
attributable to a prior period that remained unpaid as of such date.  
Generally speaking, Congress intended the enactment of § 6015 to make 
innocent spouse relief more broadly available.121   
The first avenue to relief under § 6015 represents a modified version of 
the relief formerly offered under § 6013(e).  Pursuant to § 6015(b), relief 
from joint and several liability is available if:  (1) an “understatement” of tax 
attributable to “erroneous items” of one individual filing the joint return 
existed on the return; (2) the other spouse filing the return, in signing the 
return, did not know and had no reason to know of the understatement; 
and (3) taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax 
attributable to the understatement.122   
While the terms of § 6015(b) largely mirror those of former § 6013(e), 
the statutory replacement contains slight modifications designed to expand 
                                                     
119 See Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 242 (1986) (noting that, under 
regulations then in effect, the presence of a significant benefit beyond normal 
support served as a factor to be considered in weighing the equities), aff’d, 826 F.2d 
470 (6th Cir. 1997).   
120 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (prior to removal by T.D. 9003 (July 18, 2002), 
2002-2 C.B. 294); see also Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1173 (1979) 
(desertion); Estate of Klein v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 585, 593 (1975) (economic 
hardship); Michaels v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-294, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 
3056, 3060 (1995) (economic hardship).   
121 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, pt. 1, at 60–62 (“The bill generally makes 
innocent spouse status easier to obtain.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 53 
(1998); S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 65, 68 (1998).      
122 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1).   
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the availability of relief.  For instance, § 6015(b) potentially applies to any 
understatement of tax attributable to the other spouse;123 the 
understatement no longer need be “substantial” as formerly required by 
§ 6013(e).124  Additionally, § 6015(b) dropped the requirement that the 
understatement related to “grossly erroneous” items of the other spouse.  
Instead, the understatement need only relate to “erroneous” items, which 
eliminates this additional restriction as a practical matter.125   
The remaining conditions to relief under § 6015(b) match those of 
former § 6013(e), with the most significant being the requirement that the 
requesting spouse have neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the 
understatement in signing the return.  In issuing regulations under 
§ 6015(b), the Treasury Department explained that the standards for 
determining knowledge or reason to know that were developed under 
§ 6013(e) were to apply in interpreting § 6015(b).126  In Cheshire v. 
Commissioner,127 the Tax Court reasoned that the constructive knowledge 
inquiry applicable under former § 6013(e)(1)(C) extended to § 6015(b)(1)(C) 
in the context of an omission of income.  Accordingly, the taxpayer’s 
knowledge of the transaction that gave rise to the omitted income 
precluded § 6015(b) relief.128  In affirming the Tax Court decision, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that cases interpreting the knowledge or 
reason to know standards under § 6013(e)(1)(C) remain instructive for 
purposes of § 6015(b).129   
                                                     
123 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C) (cross referencing the definition of an 
understatement under § 6662). 
124 The requirement that the understatement be substantial under § 6013(e) 
posed a meaningful constraint in the context of omitted income cases due to the 
percentage floor (generally 25 percent).  Additionally, the requirement imposed an 
administrative burden upon the requesting spouse through the necessity of 
calculating such spouse’s adjusted gross income for the pre-adjustment year for 
purposes of determining the baseline against which the understatement would be 
measured.  
125 An “understatement” in tax presumably will be attributable to an 
“erroneous” item of income that should have been correctly stated on the return.   
126 See T.D. 9003 (July 18, 2002) (preamble to final regulations interpreting 
§ 6015); see also Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 283 (2000) (“[C]ases 
interpreting old section 6013(e) remain instructive as to our analysis of whether a 
taxpayer ‘knew or had reason to know’ of an understatement pursuant to new 
section 6015(b).”).   
127 115 T.C. 183 (2000).   
128 This approach is confirmed by the regulations.  See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6015-
2(c), 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(A).  Regulation § 1.6015-2(c), which addresses knowledge of 
an “understatement,” incorporates the actual knowledge standard of Regulation 
§ 1.6015-3(c)(2), which clarifies when a requesting spouse possesses actual 
knowledge of an erroneous “item” giving rise to a deficiency.     
129 Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 333 n.15 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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The regulations articulate a different standard for determining when a 
requesting spouse possessed knowledge of an understatement in tax 
attributable to an erroneous deduction or credit.  Knowledge of the 
deduction or credit giving rise to the understatement alone is not sufficient.  
Instead, the spouse must possess knowledge of the facts pertaining to the 
claimed deduction or credit that render the item not allowable as a legal 
matter.130  Note that this standard does not raise ignorance of the law as a 
permissible defense for the requesting spouse.  Instead, the inquiry focuses 
on whether the spouse knew sufficient facts that, if he also possessed 
adequate knowledge of prevailing law, would have led him to determine 
that the deduction or credit was not proper.  
The regulations articulating the standard for constructive knowledge of 
an understatement incorporate themes that prevailed in case law 
interpreting § 6013(e).  Relevant factors include the requesting spouse’s 
educational background and business experience, the extent of the 
requesting spouse’s participation in the activity that resulted in the 
erroneous item, the couple’s financial condition, and whether the erroneous 
item represented a departure from patterns established in prior years.131  Yet 
the regulations also incorporate aspects of the “on notice” element of 
constructive knowledge that developed under § 6013(e) in the context of 
erroneous deduction cases.  On this front, relevant factors include the 
amount of the erroneous item in relation to other items and whether the 
requesting spouse failed to inquire, at or before signing the return, about 
items on the return or omitted from the return that a reasonable person 
would question.132   
Knowledge or reason to know of a substantial understatement under 
former § 6013(e) constituted an all-or-nothing proposition.  Actual or 
constructive knowledge of any portion of the understatement presumably 
was sufficient to deny relief to the requesting spouse.  Section 6015(b) 
provides an avenue of limited relief in this setting.  If the requesting spouse 
would have qualified for relief but for the requirement that he not know or 
have reason to know of the understatement, the spouse may be entitled to 
partial relief from joint and several liability if he established that he did not 
know or have reason to know of the full extent of the understatement.133 In 
that case, the spouse will be relieved of joint and several liability for the tax 
attributable to the portion of the understatement of which he lacked actual 
                                                     
130 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6015-2(c), 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(B)(1).  If the claimed deduction 
was fictitious or inflated, innocent spouse relief is prohibited if the spouse actually 
knew that the expenditure was not incurred or not incurred to the inflated extent.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(B)(2).  
131 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(c). 
132 Id. 
133 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2).         
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or constructive knowledge, together with interest and penalties attributable 
to that portion of the understatement.134     
 
3. Section 6015(c) Relief 
 
Congress broadened the availability of innocent spouse relief when the 
Service sought to collect from one spouse a deficiency in tax attributable to 
an erroneous item of the other spouse at a point when the marriage had 
dissolved.  If the requesting spouse is no longer married to or is legally 
separated from the spouse with whom he filed a joint return, or if two 
spouses were not members of the same household at any point during the 
prior 12 months, the requesting spouse could elect to limit his liability to 
the portion of the deficiency properly allocable to him.  In short, the 
requesting spouse could elect separate reporting for the item giving rise to 
the deficiency.135  Considerations of equity in holding the requesting spouse 
jointly and severally liable for the deficiency are not relevant under 
§ 6015(c); rather, they are presumed satisfied in the context of dissolved 
marriages.   
The statute phrases the relief afforded by § 6015(c) as a matter of right.  
However, the requesting spouse is not entitled to make the apportionment 
election if the Service demonstrates that the requesting spouse had actual 
knowledge, at the time the requesting spouse signed the joint return, “of 
any item giving rise to a deficiency” not allocable to the requesting 
spouse.136  This standard reflects two significant deviations from the 
knowledge standard of § 6015(b).  First, whereas § 6015(b) requires the 
requesting spouse to establish the absence of actual or constructive notice, 
§ 6015(c) places the burden on the Commissioner to demonstrate that the 
requesting spouse possessed actual knowledge of the erroneous item.  
Constructive knowledge is not relevant under § 6015(c).  Second, the 
subject of the prohibited knowledge under § 6015(c) differs from that under 
§ 6015(b), at least linguistically.  Under § 6015(b), the requesting spouse 
may not possess actual or constructive knowledge of the “understatement” 
of tax.  However, the subject of the actual knowledge inquiry of § 6015(c) is 
the “item that gives rise to the deficiency.”  Before regulatory guidance was 
issued under § 6015(c), the Tax Court wrestled with whether Congress 
intended the linguistic distinction to be substantive.  
In the court-reviewed opinion in Cheshire v. Commissioner,137 the majority 
effectively equated the knowledge standards of § 6015(b) and (c) by 
                                                     
134 Id.   
135 Section 6015(d) sets forth the mechanism for determining the portion of 
the deficiency allocable to the requesting spouse for this purpose.   
136 I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C).   
137 115 T.C. 183 (2000).   
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interpreting knowledge of an “item giving rise to a deficiency” under the 
latter as requiring “an actual and clear awareness . . . of the existence of an 
item which gives rise to the deficiency.”138  The primary dissenting opinion 
contended that actual knowledge of an “item giving rise to a deficiency” 
necessitated knowledge that the treatment of the item on the return was 
incorrect, an interpretation that found support in statements contained in the 
legislative record.139  For example, the report of the Senate Finance 
Committee accompanying the enactment of § 6015(c) provided that “if the 
IRS proves that the electing spouse had actual knowledge that an item on a 
return is incorrect, the election will not apply to the extent any deficiency is 
attributable to such item.”140  The majority opinion of the Tax Court 
viewed this legislative explanation as merely providing an example of when 
§ 6015(c) relief was not appropriate, rather than establishing a heightened 
knowledge requirement to be satisfied in this context.  The majority’s 
interpretation of § 6015(c) was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit,141 and later 
regulatory guidance adopted the same approach of equating the standards 
for actual knowledge under § 6015(b) and (c).  
 
4. Section 6015(f) Relief 
 
Congress intended to make innocent spouse relief more widely available 
through the enactment of § 6015, and perhaps the most significant relief-
expanding provision is provided by § 6015(f).  This provision represents a 
relief mechanism of last resort.  To the extent relief is not available to a 
requesting spouse under § 6015(b) or (c), Congress empowered the 
Secretary to grant discretionary relief from joint and several liability 
resulting from the filing of a joint return if, taking into account all the facts 
and circumstances, the Secretary determined that it was inequitable to hold 
the requesting spouse liable for “any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any 
portion of either).” Hence, the discretionary innocent spouse relief 
authorized by § 6015(f) applies not only to deficiencies in tax, but also to 
taxes on self-reported income that remain unpaid.  
The Service has articulated standards to guide the exercise of its 
discretion in Rev. Proc. 2013-34,142 a revenue procedure providing guidance 
for a requesting spouse seeking relief under § 6015(f).  Among other things, 
the Service announced that it will make streamlined determinations 
concerning the  grant of discretionary relief under § 6015(f) if the following 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the requesting spouse is divorced, legally 
                                                     
138 Id. at 195.   
139 Id. at 203 (Colvin, J., dissenting).  
140 S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 59 (1998).   
141 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).   
142 2013-43 I.R.B. 397 (Sept. 16, 2013) (superseding guidance formerly 
contained in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296).   
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separated, or has not shared the same household with the other spouse for 
12 months on the date relief is sought; (2) the requesting spouse will suffer 
economic hardship if relief is not granted; and (3) the requesting spouse had 
no knowledge or reason to know that there was an understatement or 
deficiency on the joint return, or that the other spouse would not or could 
not pay the underpayment of tax shown on the joint return.143  The Service 
also articulated a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the exercise of 
administrative discretion under § 6015(f) in situations where streamlined 
relief was not available.  In addition to the three factors mentioned above, 
the list of considerations also includes: (1) if relief is sought for a deficiency 
in tax, whether the spouse knew or had reason to know of the deficiency 
(clarifying that actual knowledge of the deficiency will no longer be 
weighted more heavily than any other factor); (2) whether the 
nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation to pay the outstanding liability 
under a divorce decree or agreement; (3) whether the requesting spouse 
received significant benefit beyond normal support from the unpaid tax or 
item giving rise to the deficiency; and (4) whether the requesting spouse 
made a good faith effort to comply with the tax laws in later years.  
Additional factors that weigh only in favor of relief include: (1) whether the 
nonrequesting spouse abused the spouse requesting relief, and (2) whether 
the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health at the point of 
signing the return or requesting relief.   
 
5. Procedure for Requesting Innocent Spouse Relief 
 
To seek relief from joint and several liability, a requesting spouse must 
file a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (And Separation of 
Liability and Equitable Relief).  To the extent the Service requires additional 
information to evaluate the claim, the Service will request that the spouse 
complete Form 12510, Questionnaire for Requesting Spouse.  To speed 
resolution of the claim, a requesting spouse may file both forms together.   
If a spouse who has made a claim for § 6015 relief dies prior to its 
resolution, the estate of such spouse may step into the decedent’s shoes and 
pursue the request for relief.  In addition, the executor of a spouse’s estate 
may file the initial claim for innocent spouse relief on the spouse’s behalf, 
provided the decedent had satisfied all of the conditions for eligibility at the 
time of his death.144  
If the requesting spouse seeks relief under § 6015(b) or (c), the Service 
will evaluate the claim under the other avenues of relief provided by § 6015.  
However, if the requesting spouse seeks innocent spouse relief under 
§ 6015(f) alone, the Service will not expand its evaluation of the claim 
                                                     
143 Id. § 4.02.     
144 See Rev. Rul. 2003-36, 2003-1 C.B. 849.   
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beyond the consideration of the merits of discretionary relief on equitable 
grounds.145  For that reason, the requesting spouse is well advised to 
advance all potential bases for § 6015 relief in a single claim.  
A spouse’s claim for relief under § 6015 can be disregarded as premature 
and disallowed as untimely.  A spouse must wait until the spouse receives a 
notification of an audit or a letter or notice from the Service indicating the 
potential existence of an outstanding liability for that year.146  Hence, a 
requesting spouse need not wait until the issuance of a statutory notice of 
deficiency to pursue his § 6015 remedies.  Yet, the spouse cannot wait 
indefinitely to pursue innocent spouse relief either.  The statute expressly 
limits claims for relief under § 6015(b) and (c) to those made within two 
years after the date on which the Secretary begins collection activities.147  
Although the Service originally incorporated the same two-year statute of 
limitations to claims for equitable relief under § 6015(f) by regulation,148 the 
Service ultimately relented following extensive litigation concerning the 
validity of this regulatory approach.149  Through publication of Notice 
2011-70,150 the Service expanded the period within which individuals could 
request equitable relief pursuant to § 6015(f) to encompass any period for 
                                                     
145 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-1(a)(2).   
146 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(5); see also I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(B) (spouse may make 
election under § 6015(c) “at any time after a deficiency for such year is asserted 
. . .”).     
147 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B).  
148 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1).   
149 The Commissioner’s administrative incorporation of the two-year statute of 
limitations for perfecting a claim for relief under § 6015(b) and (c) to claims for 
equitable relief under § 6015(f) was not well received by the Tax Court.  In Lantz v. 
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), a divided court determined that the requirement 
of Regulation § 1.6015-5(b)(1) that a requesting spouse file a claim for relief under 
§ 6015(f) no later than two years after the date of the first collection activity 
represented an invalid interpretation of the statute.  The Court interpreted the 
failure of Congress to a limitations period under § 6015(f) as intentional, which in 
turn foreclosed the imposition of a limitations period by regulation.  Lantz, 132 
T.C. at 138–41.  Additionally, the court determined that the adoption of a statute of 
limitations for claims under § 6015(f) that was no more lenient than the limitations 
period applicable to claims under § 6015(b) and (c) ran counter to the express 
intention of Congress to more liberal relief through the former.  Id. at 144. 
The Tax Court’s critical view of the regulatory two-year statute of limitations on 
commencing claims for equitable relief under § 6015(f) was not shared by a number 
of circuit courts of appeals.  The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Lantz, 
see Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), and others circuits followed 
suit.  See Jones v. Commissioner, 642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2011); Mannella v. 
Commissioner, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’g 132 T.C. 196 (2009).   
150 2011-32 I.R.B. 135.   
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which the statute of limitations on collection remained open.151  
Accordingly, if the Service can collect the disputed tax, a spouse can request 
§ 6015(f) equitable relief.   
The Commissioner’s failure to uphold its statutory obligation to provide 
a taxpayer with notice of his rights under § 6015 may serve to toll equitably 
the statute of limitations for requesting relief under that section.  Through a 
non-codified provision of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998,152 Congress required the Service to include a notice of an individual’s 
rights under § 6015 as part of any collection-related notices.  In McGee v. 
Commissioner,153 the Tax Court addressed the ramifications of the Service’s 
failure to do so.  The Service in McGee had offset a refund owed to the 
taxpayer against taxes that remained unpaid under a joint return filed by the 
taxpayer with her husband.  The Service sent the taxpayer two notices of 
the offset, neither of which informed the taxpayer of her right to seek relief 
under § 6015.  The taxpayer ultimately filed a claim for discretionary relief 
under § 6015(f) in response to a notice of a federal tax lien, but the claim 
was filed more than two years after the taxpayer received the notices of 
offset.  Finding that the refund offset constituted a collection action that 
commenced the filing period, the Tax Court nonetheless determined that 
the Service was estopped from treating the taxpayer’s claim for relief under 
§ 6015(f) as untimely on account of its own failure to timely inform the 
taxpayer of her rights.154 
 
6. Tax Court Jurisdiction  
 
The Tax Court possesses jurisdiction to determine whether a requesting 
spouse is entitled to relief from joint and several liability under § 6015 
through a number of avenues.  Consistent with historic practice, a spouse 
may raise § 6015 relief as an affirmative defense in a petition for 
redetermination of a deficiency.155  A taxpayer also may raise “appropriate 
                                                     
151 If the requesting spouse seeks a refund of tax, a claim for relief under 
§ 6015(f) can be brought at any time within the period of limitations on refunds 
provided by § 6511.  Id.    
152 See Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3501(b), 112 Stat. 734, 770 (1998).   
153 123 T.C. 314 (2004).   
154 See id. at 319–20. 
155 Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 287–88 (2000); see also TAX CT. R. 39 
(July 6, 2012 ed.) (requiring taxpayers to specifically plead any matter constituting 
an avoidance or affirmative defense to the Commissioner’s determination of a 
deficiency).  The availability of statutory relief under § 6015 also may be raised as 
an affirmative defense in a petition filed under § 6404(h)(1) to review the 
Commissioner’s failure to abate interest.  See Estate of Wenner v. Commissioner, 
116 T.C. 284, 287–88 (2001).    
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spousal defenses” as part of a collection due process hearing.156  In addition 
to these standard vehicles for Tax Court review and consistent with the 
purpose of making innocent spouse relief more accessible, Congress created 
a procedure by which the Tax Court could address § 6015 relief in a stand-
alone proceeding.  Pursuant to § 6015(e)(1), a spouse may petition the Tax 
Court for a determination of the “appropriate relief available” under § 6015 
in either of the following two instances: (1) a deficiency has been asserted 
against the spouse and the spouse elects relief under § 6015(b) or (c), or (2) 
the spouse requests equitable relief under § 6015(f).157    
To invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to determine the availability of 
statutory relief under § 6015 in a stand-alone proceeding, a spouse generally 
must wait until the Commissioner mails the spouse a notice of final 
determination of relief.158  However, if the spouse has elected relief under 
§ 6015(b) or (c) or has requested equitable relief under § 6015(f) and the 
Commissioner fails to act within six months, the spouse may petition the 
Tax Court after the expiration of the six-month period.159  Once either of 
these conditions to Tax Court jurisdiction has been satisfied, the requesting 
spouse has until 90 days following the mailing of the notice of final 
determination to invoke the court’s jurisdiction under § 6015(e) through the 
filing of a petition.160   
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review agency denials of relief under 
§ 6015(f) has a storied history of its own.  In its original form, 
§ 6015(e)(1)(A) provided that “[i]n the case of an individual who elects to 
have subsection (b) or (c) apply . . .[t]he individual may petition the Tax 
Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the 
                                                     
156 See I.R.C. §§ 6320(c) (incorporating terms of hearing set forth in § 6330(c)), 
6330(c)(2)(A)(i) (permitting the taxpayer to raise “appropriate spousal defenses” in 
collection due process hearing).  The collection due process protections are 
discussed below in Section D of this Part.   
157 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A).  The terms of the grant of jurisdiction indicate that 
the Tax Court is not limited to reviewing the Commissioner’s determination 
regarding relief from joint and several liability.  Rather, once invoked, the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction under § 6015 allows the court to render a decision regarding the 
requesting spouse’s rights under § 6015.  As discussed in detail below, this suggests 
that the Tax Court’s standard of review in this context is de novo.  Consistent with 
this approach, remand of an innocent spouse determination under § 6015 to the 
Commissioner for further consideration or development is not permissible.  See 
Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005).     
158 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I).   
159 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II).   
160 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(ii).  Tax Court Rules 320 through 325 provide the 
procedural framework that governs stand-alone proceedings under § 6015(e). 
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appropriate relief available to the individual under this section . . . .”161  In 
Fernandez v. Commissioner,162 the taxpayer requested relief under § 6015(b), 
(c), and (f), all of which the Commissioner denied.  The taxpayer petitioned 
the Tax Court for a determination of her joint and several liability through a 
stand-alone proceeding commenced under § 6015(e).  The Commissioner 
contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of 
relief under § 6015(f) on the basis that the predicate for filing the petition 
(that is, the taxpayer elects the benefits of § 6015(b) or (c)) limited the 
court’s jurisdiction to these potential grounds for relief.  The court rejected 
this interpretation, reasoning that the statutory directive to determine relief 
available to the petitioning spouse “under this section” encompassed all 
avenues of relief provided by § 6015.163  In this regard, Fernandez reaffirmed 
the holding of Butler v. Commissioner,164 a decision issued by the court earlier 
in the same year in which the court declared, “We find nothing in section 
6015(e) that precludes our review of respondent’s denial of equitable relief 
to petitioner.”165 
Not long after the issuance of the Fernandez and Butler decisions, 
Congress amended the predicate of § 6015(e)(1) to read “[i]n the case of an 
individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have 
subsection (b) and (c) apply . . . .”166  The Tax Court confronted the 
amended statute in Ewing v. Commissioner,167 a case in which the requesting 
spouse invoked the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 6015(e) to review the 
Commissioner’s denial of equitable relief under § 6015(f) for a self-reported 
but unpaid tax.  The majority of a divided court in Ewing noted that 
Congress intended the statutory amendment merely to clarify the proper 
timing of a request for relief for an under-reported tax–specifically, that the 
taxpayer need not wait until an assessment or a formal notice of deficiency 
but instead could pursue relief at any time after which a deficiency in tax 
was asserted (which could occur as early as the examination process).168  
Finding that Congress did not intend to limit the court’s jurisdiction over 
claims for equitable relief under § 6015(f), the majority in Ewing determined 
that it possessed jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s denial of 
                                                     
161 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (prior to amendment by the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G, § 313, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-641 to 643.) 
162 114 T.C. 324 (2000).   
163  See id. at 331. 
164 114 T.C. 276 (2000).   
165 Id. at 289.   
166 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G, 
§ 313, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-641 to 643 (2001) (emphasis added).   
167 118 T.C. 494 (2002).  
168 See id. at 504–05 (analyzing H.R. REP. NO. 106-1033, at 1023 (2000)).   
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§ 6015(f) relief even in the absence of an asserted deficiency.169  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected this reading of the statute.  In 
fairly short order, the appellate court reasoned that the Tax Court’s 
interpretation of § 6015(e)(1) could not be reconciled with the “plain 
language” of the statute requiring both the assertion of a deficiency against 
the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s filing of an election under § 6015(b) or 
(c).170 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the Tax Court in Ewing, the 
status of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review denials of equitable relief 
under § 6015(f) was uncertain at best.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position in Bartman v. Commissioner,171  and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Maier v. Commissioner172 openly 
questioned the Tax Court’s position even before the Ninth Circuit reversal.  
Recognizing the adverse appellate landscape and stressing the desirability 
for geographic-neutral interpretation of the law, the Tax Court abandoned 
its position in Ewing through the 2006 decision in Billings v. Commissioner.173  
In the process, the Tax Court noted the anomaly resulting from the 
apparently unintentional limitation on the court’s jurisdiction to hear 
§ 6015(f) cases in stand-alone proceedings brought under § 6015(e).  
Fortunately, this point was not lost on Congress.  Shortly after the Billings 
decision was issued, Congress amended § 6015(e)(1) to provide 
unequivocally that the Tax Court possesses jurisdiction in stand-alone 
proceedings where the requesting spouse seeks relief under § 6015(f) 
alone.174      
If either spouse filing the joint return commences a suit for a refund, the 
Tax Court is immediately divested of jurisdiction to determine the scope of 
available innocent spouse relief under § 6015(e) to the extent the district 
court or the Court of Federal Claims acquires jurisdiction over the taxable 
years that serve as the subject of the refund action.175  In that case, 
                                                     
169 Id. at 505.  Interestingly, the Tax Court’s interpretation of § 6015(e)(1) was 
supported both by the taxpayer and by the Commissioner at this stage of the 
litigation.   
170 Ewing v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).  The 
Commissioner abandoned its prior interpretation of the statute, arguing against the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.     
171 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2006).   
172 360 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2004).   
173 127 T.C. 7 (2006).     
174 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. C, § 408, 
120 Stat. 2922, 3061 (2006) (amending § 6015(e)(1) to provide jurisdiction “[i]n a 
case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to 
have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in the case of an individual who requests 
equitable relief under subsection (f)”). 
175 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(3). 
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jurisdiction over the § 6015(e) petition would transfer to the refund court, 
consolidating the litigation in one proceeding.  
 
7. Standard and Scope of Review 
 
With respect to a requesting spouse’s election to obtain relief from joint 
and several liability under § 6015(b) or (c), the Tax Court reviews the 
Commissioner’s determination under a de novo standard—a standard of 
review consistent with the determination of the existence and extent of a 
deficiency.176  The court originally concluded that the Commissioner’s 
exercise of discretion under § 6015(f) was entitled to greater deference 
owing to the discretionary nature of § 6015(f) itself.  Accordingly, the court 
reviewed denials of § 6015(f) relief for abuse of discretion,177 which 
obligated the requesting spouse to establish that the denial was arbitrary, 
capricious, or without sound basis in law or fact.178  However, the Tax 
Court revisited the issue of the appropriate standard of review to be applied 
in reviewing denials of § 6015(f) equitable relief in light of Congress’ 2006 
amendments to § 6015(e) through the case of Porter v. Commissioner.179  
Noting that Congress expressly provided the Tax Court with jurisdiction 
“to determine the appropriate relief available” under § 6015 when the 
taxpayer had sought and been denied equitable relief under § 6015(f),180 the 
court reasoned that a de novo standard of review was consistent with the de 
novo standard of review exercised by the court to “determine” the 
existence of any overpayment under § 6512(b) or to “redetermine” a 
deficiency under §§ 6213(a) and 6214(a).181  The court further stressed that 
nothing in § 6015(e) limits the standard of review to one of an abuse of 
discretion, a limitation that Congress expressly imposed in other contexts.182  
                                                     
176 See Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531 
(2008).   
177 See Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 198 (2000).     
178 Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002); see also Alt v. 
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 311 (2002) (requesting spouse bears burden of 
proof).  But see Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 
227 (abuse of discretion standard not warranted where notice of determination 
failed to provide analysis or cite factual determinations capable of review).   
179 132 T.C. 203 (2009).  Concurring opinions issued in a prior decision in the 
Porter case devoted to the scope of the Tax Court’s review under § 6015(f) raised 
the prospect that § 6015(f) determinations should not be reviewed under an abuse-
of-discretion standard.  See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 142–44 (Goeke, 
J., concurring) & 144–46 (Wherry, J., concurring) (2008).    
180 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).   
181 Porter, 132 T.C. at 208.   
182 Id. (noting statutory amendment to § 6404(e) granting Tax Court 
jurisdiction to determine whether the Commissioner’s failure to abate interest 
constituted “an abuse of discretion”).   
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Accordingly, the Tax Court concluded that it would apply the same de novo 
standard of review in determining the rights of a requesting spouse to relief 
under § 6015, regardless of the specific form of § 6015 relief at issue.   
Apart from determining the level of deference to be afforded to the 
Commissioner’s determination (standard of review), the appropriate scope 
of review—that is, what evidence the Tax Court could consider in making 
its determination in a § 6015(e) proceeding—also warranted judicial 
attention.  The Tax Court at all times applied a de novo scope of review 
that permitted consideration of evidence beyond the administrative record 
in determining the availability of relief under § 6015(b) or (c).183  However, 
with respect to determinations considering the availability of equitable relief 
under § 6015(f), the Commissioner contended that the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)184 operated to limit the scope of Tax Court review to 
evidence contained in the administrative record. The Tax Court rejected 
this restriction in its second divided opinion in Ewing v. Commissioner,185 and 
the court later reaffirmed this position in the first divided opinion in Porter 
v. Commissioner.186  The court first highlighted that the APA did not govern 
the Tax Court in its jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency under §§ 6213 
and 6214(a) or to determine an overpayment of tax under § 6512.  In each 
of these contexts, the Tax Court conducts trials on a de novo basis at which 
the court may consider all relevant evidence—not just that developed in the 
administrative record.  Citing the similarity of the grant of jurisdiction under 
§ 6015(e)(1)(A) to “determine” the scope of relief available to the 
requesting spouse under § 6015, the court concluded that Congress 
intended the court to provide the same trial de novo in making its 
determinations under § 6015(e).187  In this manner, the Tax Court adopted a 
uniform scope of review with respect to all forms of relief under § 6015.  
This approach was subsequently endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 188   
In 2013, the Service conceded both the standard of review and the 
scope of review issues.  A notice issued by the Office of Chief Counsel 
provided that attorneys representing the Service no longer would contend  
that (1) the Tax Court should review administrative denials of requests for 
innocent spouse relief under § 6015(f) only for an abuse of discretion, or (2) 
the Tax Court should limit the scope of its review to evidence contained in 
                                                     
183 See Porter, 132 T.C. at 210 (noting this practice). 
184 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.   
185 122 T.C. 32 (2004).   
186 130 T.C. 115 (2008). 
187 See Ewing, 122 T.C. at 37–39; Porter, 130 T.C. at 117–19.   
188 Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1276 (11th Cir. 2009).  
474           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
the administrative record.189  Hence, both aspects of the Tax Court’s 
decision in Porter have prevailed.190 
 
8. Rights of the Nonrequesting Spouse 
 
If a claim for relief from joint and several liability is made under § 6015, 
the Service must provide notice of the claim to the other spouse to the joint 
return to allow that spouse to provide information bearing on the merits of 
the requesting spouse’s claim.191  As the nonrequesting spouse will remain 
jointly and severally liable for the entire tax liability attributable to the joint 
return, this notice provides the nonrequesting spouse with the opportunity 
to oppose the effective increase in his individual exposure for the liability 
attributable to the joint return.  In addition to notifying the nonrequesting 
spouse of the existence of a § 6015 claim on behalf of the other spouse, the 
Service also must notify the nonrequesting spouse of any determination 
rendered with respect to the claim.192  
If a spouse makes an election for relief under § 6015(b) or (c) or 
requests equitable relief under § 6015(f), the Tax Court is obligated to 
provide the nonrequesting spouse with adequate notice of the action and an 
opportunity to intervene in the matter.193  With respect to stand-alone 
proceedings commenced by the requesting spouse under § 6015(e), Tax 
Court Rule 325 implements this directive.  The rule obligates the 
Commissioner to provide notice of the filing of the petition under § 6015(e) 
within 60 days of the service of the petition and to file with the court a copy 
of the notice with an attached certificate of service.194  The Commissioner’s 
notice must advise the nonrequesting spouse of his intervention rights and 
the period within which they must be exercised, which is 60 days from the 
date the notice is served on the nonrequesting spouse.195  
In Corson v. Commissioner,196 the Tax Court concluded that the rights 
afforded to the nonrequesting spouse under § 6015(e)(4) were not limited 
to stand-alone proceedings commenced by the requesting spouse under 
§ 6015(e).  Reasoning that the rights of the nonrequesting spouse should 
not differ based on the procedural route by which the requesting spouse 
                                                     
189  Chief Counsel Notice 2013-011, at 1 (June 7, 2013).   
190  Consistent with the Tax Court’s holding that denials of requests for 
innocent spouse relief under § 66015(f) are subject to a de novo standard and scope 
of review, the court has declined to remand such cases to the Service for further 
administrative development.  See Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005).   
191 I.R.C. § 6015(h)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-6(a)(1).   
192 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-6(a)(2).   
193 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(4).   
194 TAX CT. R. 325(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
195 TAX CT. R. 325(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
196 114 T.C. 354 (2000).   
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pursued innocent spouse relief, the court permitted the nonrequesting 
spouse to contest the grant of § 6015(c) relief that the requesting spouse 
raised as an affirmative defense in a deficiency proceeding against both 
spouses.  The Tax Court followed this approach in a slightly different 
context in King v. Commissioner,197 where the requesting spouse raised § 6015 
relief as an affirmative defense in a deficiency proceeding against her 
individually.  The court in King clarified that the nonrequesting spouse is 
entitled to notice and an opportunity to intervene to challenge the grant of 
innocent spouse relief in any case where a spouse requests relief under 
§ 6015, regardless of its procedural origin.198 
The Tax Court in Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner199 faced an interesting 
question not likely contemplated by Congress in enacting § 6015(e)(4):  
What if the nonrequesting spouse desired to intervene to support the grant of 
innocent spouse relief?  Noting the absence of any posture-related 
limitation in § 6015 and the neutrality of the terms of Tax Court Rule 325, 
the court allowed the nonrequesting spouse to be heard in support of his 
former wife.200 
 
C. Jurisdiction to Review Denials of Interest Abatement 
 
Interest on an underpayment of tax accrues from the last date 
prescribed for payment at statutorily defined rates, compounded daily.201  
Given the length of time necessary to resolve tax disputes, the interest owed 
on the disputed tax liability can pose a considerable financial burden.  Prior 
to 1986, the Service lacked the authority to abate the assessment of interest 
in situations where an error on its part caused the taxpayer to incur 
additional interest charges.  Instead, a reduction in the interest charge could 
be accomplished only through a compromise of the underlying tax liability.  
Recognizing the need to provide the Service with a measure of discretion in 
this area, Congress enacted § 6404(e) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986.202  In its original form, § 6404(e)(1) granted the Service discretion to 
abate the assessment of interest on any deficiency “attributable in whole or 
in part to any error or delay by an officer or employee of the Internal 
Revenue Service . . . in performing a ministerial act.”203  Congress did not 
envision that the provision would be used “routinely” to avoid the payment 
                                                     
197 115 T.C. 118 (2000).  
198 Id. at 124.   
199 123 T.C. 135 (2004). 
200 Id. at 141. 
201  I.R.C. § 6601(a); see also I.R.C. §§ 6621(a)(2) (interest rate on 
underpayments), 6622(a) (interest compounded on a daily basis).   
202  See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1563(a), 100 Stat. 2762 (1986).   
203  I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1), as originally enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1563(a), 100 Stat. 2762 (1986).    
476           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
of interest; rather, Congress intended the remedy to be employed “in 
instances where failure to abate interest would be widely perceived as 
grossly unfair.”204   
Taxpayers who saw their requests for interest abatement under § 6404(e) 
denied by the Service understandably sought judicial recourse, but originally 
to no avail.  Courts consistently held that § 6404(e)(1) vested the Secretary 
with complete discretion to abate the assessment of interest and that the 
exercise of this discretion was not subject to judicial review.205  Against this 
backdrop, Congress in 1996 supplied the Tax Court with jurisdiction to 
determine whether the Secretary’s failure to abate interest under § 6404 
constituted an abuse of discretion through what is now designated 
§ 6404(h).206  If the Tax Court finds the requisite abuse of discretion, it is 
authorized to order an abatement; to the extent the taxpayer has previously 
paid the abated interest, the Tax Court possesses jurisdiction to determine 
an overpayment.207  The jurisdictional grant extends to all requests for 
abatement made after the July 30, 1996 effective date of the legislation, 
which the Tax Court interpreted as including any requests for interest 
abatement pending with the Service that had not been denied by such 
date.208  Consistent with the terms of § 6404(h), the Supreme Court has 
determined that the Tax Court constitutes the exclusive judicial forum for 
review of adverse interest abatement determinations.209      
                                                     
204  H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 844 (1985); S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 208 (1986).    
205 In Selman v. United States, 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded “that the language, structure and legislative history of 
I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) indicate that Congress meant to commit the abatement of 
interest to Secretary’s discretion.” Id. at 1064.  Accordingly, the court determined 
that the Administrative Procedure Act precluded judicial review. Id.; see also 
Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994); Bax v. Commissioner, 
13 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993); Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 548, 
554 (11th Cir. 1991); 508 Clinton Street Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 352, 356 
(1987).   
206 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 302(a), 100 Stat. 1457–58 
(1996) (enacting I.R.C. § 6404(g)).  Section 6404(g) was redesignated first as 
§ 6404(i) by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 3305(a), 3309(a), 112 Stat. 743, 745, and subsequently as 
§ 6404(h) by the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-34, 
§ 112(d)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 2435 (2002). 
207 I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1), (h)(2)(B) (incorporating rules similar to those of 
§ 6512(b)). 
208 See Banat v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 92, 94–95 (1997).  The interpretation 
of the effective date provision in Banat sensibly protected taxpayers who did not 
file a subsequent and apparently superfluous request with the Service.   
209 See Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501 (2007).  The Court rejected the 
argument that the articulation of a standard for reviewing the Service’s denial of 
interest abatement in § 6404(h) (the absence of which prior courts had cited as a 
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Section 6404(h) imposes a host of conditions to the jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court.  From a procedural standpoint, Tax Court jurisdiction is 
predicated upon (1) the issuance of a final notice of determination not to 
abate interest, and (2) the taxpayer’s filing of a petition for review within 
180 days of the mailing of such notice.210  Similar to the statutory notice of 
deficiency, the notice of determination under § 6404(h) has been described 
as the taxpayer’s “ticket” to the Tax Court.211   Note that the taxpayer’s 
access to Tax Court review in this setting could be denied if the 
Commissioner simply fails to issue the notice of determination.  Whereas 
Congress anticipated this possibility in the innocent spouse context by 
permitting the requesting spouse to file a petition with the Tax Court once 
six months had passed from the filing of the administrative request for 
relief,212 no such stop-gap means in invoking Tax Court review is provided 
under § 6404(h).    
Given the central role the determination letter occupies in the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction to review denials of interest abatement requests, the 
scope of written communications from the Service that constitute a final 
determination for § 6404 purposes has been a source of dispute.  In Bourekis 
v. Commissioner,213 the Tax Court declined to treat a notice of deficiency 
issued under § 6213(a) as a final notice of determination for § 6404 
purposes where the taxpayer had not made a formal request for interest 
abatement and where the Commissioner did not intend for the statutory 
notice to address interest abatement matters.214  In Wright v. Commissioner,215 
the Tax Court similarly determined that a petition to review a final notice of 
determination issued in the context of a collection due process proceeding 
under § 6330 did not provide the court with jurisdiction to review the 
Commissioner’s denial of interest abatement.  However, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed.216  Because the taxpayer in Wright had raised the 
                                                                                                                       
basis for concluding that interest abatement determinations under § 6404(e) were 
immune from judicial review) operated to supply other federal courts with 
jurisdiction to review § 6404 interest abatement determinations.   
210 I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1); see also TAX CT. R. 280(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).    
211 See Bourekis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 20, 26 (1998).  By statutory 
directive, rules similar to those of § 6213 apply for purposes of determining the 
date of mailing of the final notice of determination.  I.R.C. § 6404(h)(2)(A).  Hence, 
the final notice of determination is valid if mailed to the taxpayer’s last known 
address; actual receipt of the notice by the taxpayer is immaterial.  See Gati v. 
Commissioner, 113 T.C. 132, 134 (1999)   
212 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II).     
213 110 T.C. 20 (1998).   
214 The Bourekis decision effectively serves as a confirmation that the Tax 
Court’s deficiency jurisdiction generally does not extend to the determination of 
interest under § 6601.     
215 T.C. Memo. 2006-273, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 525.   
216 571 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2009).   
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prospect of interest abatement under § 6404(e) in the course of the 
collection due process hearing, the Second Circuit reasoned that the notice 
of determination under § 6330—which did not grant the requested interest 
abatement—necessarily constituted a final notice of determination not to 
abate interest.  And because the taxpayer had filed his petition for review of 
the collection due process determination within the 180-day period 
specified in § 6404(h)(1), the Second Circuit concluded that the procedural 
prerequisites to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review § 6404 
determinations had been satisfied.   
Beyond these procedural requirements, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to 
review denials of interest abatement under § 6404 is available only to those 
taxpayers who satisfy the net worth requirements of § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) as of 
the date of the filing of the Tax Court petition.217  Generally speaking, this 
provision limits Tax Court review under § 6404 to individuals whose net 
worth does not exceed $2 million and to business entities having a net 
worth not exceeding $7 million.218 Responding to the taxpayer’s argument 
that the net worth limitation on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 6404 
violated the equal protection standard of the Fifth Amendment, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress may have 
imposed the limitation because it determined that taxpayers with a greater 
net worth would be better positioned to avoid the accrual of interest 
charges by making an advance payment or posting a cash bond during the 
course of the controversy.219  
Once the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 6404(h) has been properly 
invoked, the court is authorized to determine whether the Service’s failure 
to abate interest under § 6404 constitutes an abuse of discretion.220  Yet 
before reviewing the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion under 
§ 6404(e), the Tax Court first must determine if the prerequisites to interest 
abatement under that provision are satisfied.  Specifically, the taxpayer must 
                                                     
217 I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1).   
218 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) (incorporating the net worth requirements of 
§ 2412(d)(2)(B)).     
219 Estate of Kuntze v. Commissioner, 233 F.3d 948, 954–55 (7th Cir. 2000). 
220 Although the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review interest abatement denials 
typically is associated with requests made under § 6404(e), the grant of Tax Court 
jurisdiction permits it to review the Secretary’s failure to abate interest “under this 
section.”  I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1).  The Tax Court in Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 
19, 22–23 (1999), therefore held that its jurisdiction under § 6404(h) is not limited 
to reviewing cases arising under § 6404(e) but instead extends to reviewing the 
Commissioner’s failure to abate interest under all subsections of § 6404.  As a 
result, the court in Woodral determined that it possessed jurisdiction to determine 
whether the Commissioner’s failure to abate interest under § 6404(a) constituted an 
abuse of discretion.     
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demonstrate the existence of an unreasonable error or delay by an employee 
of the Service in performing a ministerial or managerial act.   
A “ministerial” act for this purpose constitutes a procedural or 
mechanical act that does not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion 
and that occurs during the processing of a taxpayer’s case after all 
prerequisites to the act, such as conferences and review by supervisors, 
have taken place.221  A ministerial act does not include a decision 
concerning the proper application of federal tax law or other federal or state 
law. 222  Additionally, the mere passage of time alone does not establish 
error or delay in performing a ministerial act. 223   
As part of The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Congress expanded the ranges 
of unreasonable errors or delays potentially giving rise to § 6404(e) interest 
abatement to include “managerial” as well as “ministerial” acts.224  A 
“managerial act” means an administrative act that involves a temporary or 
permanent loss of records or the exercise of judgment or discretion relating 
to personnel management during the processing of a taxpayer’s case.225  
Additionally, a managerial act for this purpose does not extend to a general 
administrative decision, such as the Service’s decision on how to organize 
the processing of tax returns or its delay in implementing an improved 
computer system.226  Legislative history suggests that an unreasonable error 
or delay from a managerial act would include the loss of records by the 
Service, personnel transfers, extended illnesses, extended personnel training, 
or extended leave. 227 
Assuming the existence of an unreasonable error or delay in the 
performance of a ministerial or managerial act, interest abatement is 
available only if no significant aspect of such error or delay is attributable to 
the taxpayer.228  Even then, the error or delay will not be taken into account 
until after the Service contacted the taxpayer in writing with respect to the 
deficiency or payment.229  If the taxpayer is successful in establishing the 
                                                     
221 Hull v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-36, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1203 
(citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-2(b)(2)).   
222 See Corson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 202, 207 (2004).       
223 See Cosgriff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-241, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 156, 
158.   
224 See Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 301(a) (1996), 110 Stat. 1457.   
225 Paneque v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-48, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1301 
(citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-2(b)(1)).     
226 Id.     
227 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 27 (1996).   
228 I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (flush language).     
229 Id.  The limitation has been applied to deny interest abatement for any 
period preceding the receipt of notification from the Service.  See, e.g., Krugman v. 
Commissioner, 112 T.C. 230, 239 (1999); Matthews v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2008-126, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1486, 1490; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 844 
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requisite error or delay, the taxpayer also must establish a correlation 
between the error or delay and a specific period for which interest 
abatement is sought.230   
Only if the Tax Court finds that the various conditions to the abatement 
of interest under § 6404(e)(1) are satisfied will the court proceed to examine 
whether the Commissioner’s failure to abate interest constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  To prevail under this standard of review, the taxpayer must 
establish that the Commissioner exercised his discretion “arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or law.”231  While the 
Commissioner’s determination is afforded considerable deference, the 
Commissioner is not entitled to complete latitude in this context.  In Jacobs 
v. Commissioner,232 the Tax Court explained that the Commissioner must 
explain the basis for the exercise of his discretion: 
 
If we were to uphold the Commissioner’s determination not to abate 
interest where the Commissioner has not clearly explained the basis 
for the exercise of that discretion, we would be condoning a review 
framework that would encourage the Commissioner to provide as 
little information as possible about the handling of cases during the 
period of the abatement request and about the inquiry in response to 
that request.  We do not believe that Congress had that kind of 
review process in mind when it enacted section 6404 and provided 
this Court jurisdiction . . . to review, for abuse of discretion, the 
Commissioner’s determination not to abate interest.233 
 
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s failure to provide support for his 
determination alone may constitute the requisite abuse of discretion that 
permits the Tax Court to reverse the denial of interest abatement.   
                                                                                                                       
(1985) (“The provision applies only to failures to perform ministerial acts that 
occur after the taxpayer has been contacted by the IRS.”).  Note that, through the 
enactment of § 6404(g), Congress now requires the Secretary to suspend the 
imposition of interest if (1) the taxpayer files a timely return and (2) the Secretary 
fails to provide notice to the taxpayer specifically stating the taxpayer’s liability and 
the basis therefor within 36 months of the later of the date on which the return is 
filed or the due date for filing the return (determined without regard to extensions).   
230 See Mekulsia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-138, 85 T.C.M. 1303, 
1309.   
231 See Lee v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 145, 149 (1999); Woodral v. 
Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).  The burden of proof rests on the taxpayer.  
TAX CT. R. 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
232 Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-123, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1835, 
1840.   
233 Id. at 1841; see also Bucaro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-247, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) 388, 393.   
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D.  Review of Determinations in Collection Due Process Proceedings 
 
The grant of jurisdiction to review administrative determinations made 
in the course of collection due process proceedings constitutes one of the 
most significant modern developments in the operation of the Tax Court.  
Since the creation of the collection due process regime as part of the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,234 the Tax 
Court has seen the volume of cases arising in the collection due process 
context increase to roughly five percent of its overall docket.235  Given the 
number of division opinions concerning the court’s jurisdiction in the 
collection due process setting and, in particular, the number of these cases 
yielding court-reviewed divided opinions, the perceived portion of the 
court’s resources allocated to these cases perhaps exceeded this statistical 
evidence.  As discussed below, the wealth of division opinions in this 
context was predictable in light of the scant statutory framework.  The 
court’s exploration of its collection due process jurisdiction reveals the 
difficulties the court faced in reconciling this new role with its tradition of 
conducting de novo proceedings in the deficiency setting.  
 
1. The Government’s Summary Collection Powers 
   
 Prior to the enactment of the seminal 1998 legislation, the Service could 
exercise its administrative collection remedies without the prospect of 
judicial oversight or intervention.  The Service’s administrative collection 
procedures are summarized as follows:  Within 60 days of assessing a tax, 
the Service must provide the taxpayer with written notice stating the 
amount of the unpaid liability and demanding payment of same.236  If the 
taxpayer fails to make payment following demand, a lien on all of the 
taxpayer’s property—real and personal—arises in favor of the Service.237 
The lien is effective retroactively from the date of assessment,238 and no 
further action is required on the part of the Service to establish its interest 
in the taxpayer’s property.  However, if the Service intends for its lien to be 
effective against a wide range of creditors, including third-party purchasers 
for value and judgment lien creditors, the Service must record a formal 
Notice of Federal Tax Lien.239  If the taxpayer fails to make payment of the 
                                                     
234  Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 747–50 (1998).     
235  This estimate is based on statistical information provided by the Tax Court 
for years 2006 to 2012.     
236  I.R.C. § 6303(a).   
237  I.R.C. § 6321.   
238  I.R.C. § 6322.   
239  I.R.C. § 6323(a), (f).  Given the potential economic hardship imposed on 
the taxpayer resulting from the recording of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, the 
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tax within ten days of the notice and demand for payment, the Service may 
proceed to levy against the property subject to the tax lien.240  However, 
prior to levying on the taxpayer’s property, the Service must provide the 
taxpayer with 30 days advance notice of its intent to do so.241  The notice of 
intent to levy must convey a litany of statutorily enumerated information, 
including the procedures relating to the proposed levy and alternatives the 
taxpayer may pursue to avoid it.242  Compliance with these procedures 
would allow the Service to seize the taxpayer’s property and to sell it 
through a public sale for the purpose of satisfying the taxpayer’s 
outstanding obligation.243  
 The Service’s administrative collection procedures outlined above were 
not subject to judicial review.  In the 1931 case of Phillips v. Commissioner, 244 
the Supreme Court explained that “summary proceedings to secure prompt 
performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been 
consistently sustained,” so long as opportunity for a later judicial 
determination of the taxpayer’s rights is afforded.245  Hence, once the 
Service exercised its broad collection powers, the taxpayer was relegated to 
prosecuting a suit for a refund of the collected tax.246   
 After conducting public hearings in 1997 and 1998 at which witnesses 
recounted sensational tales of governmental abuse in the exercise of its 
administrative collection powers,247 Congress was determined to recalibrate 
                                                                                                                       
Service does not do this automatically.  Rather, the Service will endeavor to work 
out a payment arrangement with the taxpayer, and the Service will inform the 
taxpayer of the negative consequences that the notice will have on the taxpayer’s 
business operations and credit rating.  See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. 
MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 561 (3d ed. 2009).   
240  I.R.C. § 6331(b).   
241  I.R.C. § 6331(d)(2).  
242  I.R.C. § 6331(d)(4).  
243 I.R.C. § 6331(b); see also I.R.C. § 6335 (providing procedures for 
administrative sale of seized property).   
244 283 U.S. 589 (1931).  
245 Id. at 595 (cited in Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455, 458 (8th Cir. 
2006)); see also Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935) (noting that a 
taxpayer’s recourse for unjust administrative action is a suit for restitution).   
246 See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 26–31 
(2004) (detailing the breadth of the Government’s collection powers and noting the 
limited remedy available to taxpayers prior to enactment of the 1998 legislation).  
247 See IRS Oversight:  Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 
(1998); Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service:  Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997).  Professor Bryan Camp recounts the 
sensational nature of these hearings, which included witnesses testifying behind 
screens and with the aid of voice disguising technology.  See Camp, supra note 246, 
at 81.  Much of the testimony offered at these hearings concerning governmental 
Prominence in Judicial Review of Taxpayer Rights           483 
 
the balance of power in the tax collection setting.  In particular, Congress 
sought to provide taxpayers with rights against the Service similar to those 
one would possess in dealing with a private creditor.248  Congress did so by 
introducing the collection due process procedures as part of the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act.249  As described below, the procedures 
provide taxpayers the opportunity for a pre-deprivation administrative 
hearing (commonly referred to as a “collection due process hearing”) to 
contest the proposed collection action,250 with the resulting administrative 
determination being subject to judicial review.   
 
2. The Pre-Deprivation Administrative Hearing 
 
 Two avenues exist to a collection due process hearing.  If the Service 
files a Notice of Federal Tax Lien with respect to the taxpayer’s property, 
the Service is required under § 6320 to notify the taxpayer within five days 
of doing so of the taxpayer’s right to request a collection due process 
hearing.  Whereas the notice of collection due process rights required by 
§ 6320 follows the filing of the tax lien, § 6330 requires the Service to 
provide the taxpayer with advance notice of the right to a collection due 
process hearing prior to proceeding with a levy.  The Service is prohibited 
from levying on the taxpayer’s property during the period in which the 
taxpayer may request the collection due process hearing.251  If the taxpayer 
requests a hearing in a timely manner, the prohibition on the proposed levy 
generally extends until the hearing is conducted, and the period for judicial 
review expires.252  
 The window for requesting a collection due process hearing is fairly 
narrow—generally, 30 days from the issuance of the collection due process 
notice.253  If the taxpayer makes a timely request for a hearing,254 the 
                                                                                                                       
abuse of its administrative collection powers was later discredited.  Id. (citing 
General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Comm. on Finance, U.S. 
Senate, Tax Administration:  Investigation of Allegations of Taxpayer Abuse and 
Employee Misconduct ¶ 2 (1999)).   
248 See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998).   
249 Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 747–50 (1998).   
250 For a thorough discussion of the nature of the collection due process 
hearing, see Danshera Cords, How Much Process is Due? I.R.C. Sections 6230 and 6330 
Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51 (2004).   
251 I.R.C. § 6330(a)(2).   
252 I.R.C. § 6330(e)(1).  If the underlying tax liability is not in dispute and if the 
court determines that the Service has shown good cause not to suspend levy, the 
prohibition will be lifted during the appeal of the determination in the collection 
due process hearing.  I.R.C. § 6330(e)(2).     
253 I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3)(B).  If the taxpayer’s collection due process notice is 
issued in response to the filing of lien notice under § 6320, the 30-day period for 
requesting a hearing does not start until the expiration of the five-day period in 
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taxpayer is entitled to a hearing at the IRS Office of Appeals before an 
impartial officer who has had no prior involvement with respect to the 
uncollected tax.255   
Section 6330(c) outlines the parameters of a collection due process 
hearing.  The taxpayer may raise “any relevant issue” relating to the unpaid 
tax or the proposed levy at the hearing, and the statute specifically 
references appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness 
of the collection actions, and possible collection alternatives (including, 
among other things, installment agreements and offers in compromise) as 
possible considerations.256  As a general rule, the taxpayer may not use the 
collection due process hearing as an opportunity to contest the underlying 
tax liability.257  However, this general rule does not apply if the taxpayer did 
not receive a notice of deficiency or if the taxpayer did not “otherwise have 
an opportunity to dispute” the underlying tax liability.258  The Tax Court 
had the occasion to interpret this latter exception in Montgomery v. 
Commissioner.259  
The taxpayers in Montgomery reported considerable income resulting 
from the exercise of stock options on their joint return.  However, the 
taxpayers failed to remit payment of this liability in full, due in part to the 
drastic decline in the value of the stock that gave rise to the option-exercise 
                                                                                                                       
which the Service is required to provide the taxpayer with notice of the lien.  I.R.C. 
§ 6320(a)(3)(B).   
254 If the taxpayer fails to request a hearing in a timely manner, the Service 
nonetheless will conduct an “equivalent hearing.”  See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-
1(i)(1), 301.6330-1(i)(1).  However, the granting of an equivalent hearing does not 
operate as waiver of the 30-day filing requirement.  See Kennedy v. Commissioner, 
116 T.C. 255, 262 (2001).  Accordingly, collection action is not required to be 
suspended during the pendency of the equivalent hearing.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-
1(i)(2), Q&A I4, 301.6330-1(i)(2), Q&A I4.     
255 I.R.C. §§ 6320(b)(3), 6330(b)(3).   
256 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2).   
257 An offer in compromise based on doubt as to the taxpayer’s liability for the 
underlying tax constitutes a challenge to the underlying tax liability itself.  See Baltic 
v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 178 (2007). Hence, the failure of an Appeals officer to 
consider such an offer does not constitute an abuse of discretion when the 
underlying tax liability is not properly at issue in the collection due process hearing.   
258 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(2) Q&A E2 
(providing guidance on the meaning of “opportunity to dispute”).  If a taxpayer 
receives a notice of deficiency and fails to petition for Tax Court review, the 
taxpayer is precluded from contesting the underlying deficiency in the collection 
due process hearing pursuant to § 6330(c)(2)(B).  See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 
T.C. 176, 183–84 (2000).  The willingness of an Appeals officer to receive evidence 
concerning the underlying tax liability does not operate as a waiver of the 
jurisdictional bar.  See Behling v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 572, 579 (2002).   
259 122 T.C. 1 (2004).  
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income.   The Service summarily assessed the self-reported tax pursuant to 
§ 6201(a)(1) and eventually pursued collection by means of levy.  In 
advance of the taxpayers’ pre-levy collection due process hearing, the 
taxpayers indicated that they intended to file an amended return 
recalculating the stock option income and reflecting the taxpayers’ 
entitlement to a refund for the year at issue.  Interestingly, the Appeals 
officer responded that the taxpayers would be able to contest the 
underlying tax liability at the hearing, given that the taxpayers had not 
received a notice of deficiency and did not otherwise have the opportunity 
to dispute the tax.260  However, after the taxpayers failed to file the 
amended return within a reasonable time, the Appeals officer issued a 
notice of determination permitting the levy to proceed.  Prior to appealing 
to the Tax Court, the taxpayers filed the amended return claiming 
entitlement to a refund.  The Tax Court in Montgomery therefore had to 
determine if the ability to contest the underlying tax liability in the course of 
a collection due process proceeding under § 6330(c)(2)(B) extended to self-
reported obligations.    
The Commissioner viewed the taxpayers’ argument that they should be 
permitted to contest self-reported obligations in the collection due process 
setting as “nonsensical.”261  In the Commissioner’s view, § 6330(c)(2)(B) 
was intended to permit a taxpayer to challenge a tax liability asserted by the 
Government that the taxpayer had not had the ability to contest—not 
amounts the taxpayers originally conceded were owed.  The majority of the 
Tax Court, however, was not persuaded.  Interpreting the statute according 
to its plain language, the court determined that the taxpayers in Montgomery 
had not been afforded “a prior administrative or judicial opportunity” to 
challenge the amounts assessed by the Service.262  Hence, the second 
alternative condition to the application of § 6330(c)(2)(B) was satisfied.  
From a policy perspective, the majority found nothing wrong with 
providing taxpayers the opportunity to correct self-inflicted reporting errors 
at the collection due process stage.263  The Service came around to this 
view, first acquiescing in the Montgomery decision264 and later adopting its 
holding by regulation.265   
As a narrow matter of statutory interpretation, the holding of Montgomery 
may not appear remarkable.  However, the larger effect of the decision was 
significant.  Traditionally, taxpayers who over-reported their income tax 
liability were forced to pay the self-reported tax and then pursue a refund 
before the federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims.  Although 
                                                     
260 Id. at 3.  
261 Id. at 6–7. 
262 Id. at 8–9.   
263 Id. at 9–10.   
264 A.O.D. 2005-03 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
265 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(1).   
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the Tax Court possessed jurisdiction to determine an overpayment, that 
jurisdiction was ancillary to and predicated upon the court’s deficiency 
jurisdiction.  The court’s interpretation of § 6330(c)(2)(B) in Montgomery 
fundamentally altered these prevailing norms by permitting the taxpayer to 
contest a self-reported liability on a pre-payment basis before the Tax 
Court.266  Of course, a taxpayer seeking this procedural advantage must 
wade into the Government’s administrative collection process to obtain it.   
Turning to the mechanics of the collection due process hearing itself, 
the statutory guidance is best described as sparse.  Section 6330(c)(1) 
provides the lone statutory charge to the Appeals officer, which is to verify 
that the Service has satisfied the requirements “of any applicable law or 
administrative procedure.”267  The statute does not elaborate on the 
verification that must be obtained, but the legislative history provides that 
the Appeals officer is expected to verify that: 
 
(1) the revenue officer has verified the taxpayer’s liability;  
(2) the estimated expenses of the levy and sale will not exceed the 
value of the property to be seized;  
(3) the revenue officer has determined that there is sufficient 
equity in the property to be seized to yield net proceeds from sale to 
apply to the unpaid tax liabilities; and  
(4) with respect to the seizure of assets of a going business, the 
revenue officer recommending the collection action has thoroughly 
considered the facts of the case, including the availability of 
alternative collection methods, before recommending the collection 
action.268   
 
The list of verifications supplied by the legislative history was not 
intended to be exhaustive.  Additional items to be verified include the 
issuance of the notice of deficiency (if appropriate), an internal record of 
the tax assessment, the timely issuance of the notice and demand for 
payment, and the provision of Notice of Intent to Levy.269  The Appeals 
officer is not required to rely on a particular document to satisfy the 
§ 6330(c)(1) verification obligation.270  On that note, the Tax Court has held 
                                                     
266 The Tax Court addressed its ability to order a refund in the collection due 
process setting in Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1 (2006).  See infra notes 
345–352 and accompanying text.   
267 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).   
268 S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 68 (1998).   
269 See Trout v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 239, 257–62 (2008) (Marvel, J., 
concurring) (quoting Chief Counsel Notice CC-2006-019 for the proposition that 
the appeals officer must verify “those things that the Code, Treasury Regulations, 
and the IRM require the Service to do before collection can take place”).   
270 See Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002).   
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that reliance on Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and 
Other Specified Matters, to verify that a valid assessment occurred does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion where there exists no evidence of 
irregularity in the assessment process.271  The verification obligation of 
§ 6330(c)(1) does not create a right to discovery in the taxpayer, as the Tax 
Court has held that the Appeals officer is not obligated to provide a copy of 
the verification to the taxpayer.272   
Congress expected that the Appeals officer would issue a written 
determination at the conclusion of the hearing.273  Section 6330(c)(3) 
outlines the grounds on which the determination must be based.  The first 
two relate to matters to be addressed at the hearing:  (1) the verification of 
compliance with applicable law and administrative procedures that the 
Appeals officer is required to obtain under § 6330(c)(1);274 and (2) any 
relevant issue relating to the proposed collection action (such as spousal 
defenses, appropriateness of collection actions, and alternatives to 
collection) or, if appropriate, the underlying tax liability pursuant to 
§ 6330(c)(2).275  The third ground, however, is the most intriguing, as it 
introduces a subjective balancing test that necessitates consideration of the 
effect of collection on the taxpayer.  Specifically, the Appeals officer must 
consider whether the proposed collection activity “balances the need for 
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that 
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”276  
Prior to the promulgation of administrative guidance, the Tax Court was 
tasked with resolving practical questions concerning the nature of the 
collection due process hearing that the statute fails to address.  In Davis v. 
Commissioner,277 the court determined that the collection due process hearing 
constituted an informal proceeding, one consistent with historical practice 
of the IRS Office of Appeals prior to the enactment of the collection due 
process procedures.278  Accordingly, the court held that a collection due 
                                                     
271 See Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 121 (2001) (reliance on Form 
4340 by Appeals officer did not constitute an abuse of discretion). 
272 See Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002).   
273 H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998) (“The conferees expect the appeals 
officer will prepare a written determination addressing the issues presented by the 
taxpayer and considered at the hearing.”).   
274  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(A). 
275 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(B). 
276 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C); see also Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. 
United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This final balancing factor is 
novel in American tax law and injects into the calculus an equitable consideration 
for the taxpayer and his concerns.”).  
277 115 T.C. 35 (2000).  
278 Id. at 41.   
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process hearing does not entitle the taxpayer to subpoena witnesses to 
provide testimony under oath.279   
Consistent with its informal nature, the collection due process “hearing” 
does not necessarily relate to a single proceeding before the IRS Office of 
Appeals.  Rather, the hearing may consist of several meetings or other 
communications between the Appeals officer and the taxpayer, whether 
oral or in writing.280  Indeed, a face-to-face meeting is not required in all 
cases.  In Katz v. Commissioner,281 the taxpayer was offered the opportunity 
for a face-to-face collection due process hearing at the nearest location of 
the IRS Appeals Office.  The taxpayer declined to make the approximately 
one-hour commute, contending that he was entitled to have the hearing 
held in the city where he resided and where his witnesses were located.  
Citing the informal nature of the collection due process hearing and the 
taxpayer’s failure to establish that the necessary travel would engender 
hardship, the court concluded that the telephonic communications between 
the taxpayer and the Appeals officer satisfied the hearing requirement.282  
Shortly thereafter, the Tax Court in Lundsford v. Commissioner283 extended the 
holding of Katz by providing that a taxpayer who raises only frivolous 
arguments is not entitled to a face-to-face hearing.284   
 
3. Judicial Review  
 
 Given that the collection due process protections of the IRS Reform 
and Restructuring Act were aimed at precluding perceived abuses in the 
Government’s exercise of its administrative collection powers, Congress 
was not content in supplying an additional administrative hearing alone.  
Rather, Congress subjected the administrative hearing to judicial review.  As 
originally proposed by the Senate Finance Committee, the Tax Court was to 
serve as the exclusive forum for appeals from collection due process 
hearings.285  However, this provision was modified by the Conference 
                                                     
279 Id. at 41–42.   
280 See Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 88, 92 (2008).   
281 115 T.C. 329 (2000).   
282 Id. at 336–37.   
283 117 T.C. 183 (2001).   
284 Id. at 189 (refusing to remand case back to IRS Office of Appeals for a 
hearing when the taxpayer intended to raise only frivolous arguments that the Tax 
Court had previously rejected).  For a critique of the Tax Court’s willingness to 
excuse the Service’s failure to provide or conduct a collection due process hearing, 
see Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due?  I.R.C. § 6320 and 6330 Collection Due 
Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51 (2004).   
285 See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 68 (1998) (“The taxpayer may contest the 
determination of the appellate officer in the Tax Court by filing a petition within 30 
days of the date of the determination.”).   
Prominence in Judicial Review of Taxpayer Rights           489 
 
Committee, which provided that judicial review would lie with the federal 
district court “where appropriate.”286  In its original form, § 6330(d) split 
judicial review of collection due process determinations between the two 
courts based on whether the Tax Court normally possessed jurisdiction 
over the underlying tax liability.287  In the event the taxpayer petitioned the 
incorrect court for review, Congress authorized the taxpayer to re-file with 
the proper court within 30 days after the original court determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction.  This provision, intended to protect taxpayers who may 
not have been well versed in the traditional jurisdiction of the Tax Court, 
quickly became the subject of abuse.  Taxpayers seeking to delay collection 
activity would intentionally file in the improper court, gaining the time it 
took for that court to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction plus the 30-day 
grace period for re-filing.288  To avoid confusion relating to the mutually 
exclusive appellate fora and to avoid the intentional exploitation of this 
regime, Congress revised § 6330 in 2006 to vest the Tax Court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of collection due process 
determinations—regardless of the underlying tax liability at issue.289 
 To invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court in the collection due process 
setting, the taxpayer must file a timely petition for review of the notice of 
                                                     
286 H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998).   
287 While this was the effect of the original provision, the language Congress 
employed to accomplish the demarcation of these jurisdictional boundaries was not 
quite so clear.  Section 6330(d)(1) in its original form is reproduced below: 
The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, 
appeal such determination— 
(A) to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with 
respect to such matter); or 
(B) if the Tax Court  does not have jurisdiction of the underlying tax 
liability, to a district court of the United States.   
If a court determines that the appeal was to an incorrect court, a person 
shall have 30 days after the court determination to file such appeal with the 
correct court.   
I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) (1998); see also Moore v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 171, 175 
(2000) (“[W]e interpret section 6330(d)(1)(A) and (B) together to mean that 
Congress did not intend to expand the Court’s jurisdiction beyond the types of 
taxes that the Court may normally consider.”).   
288 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, JCX-53-03, 
at 88 (2003) (“Some taxpayers intentionally file in the wrong court, which creates a 
further delay.”).   
289 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-208, § 855(a), 120 Stat. 
780, 1019 (amending I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1)).  The statute as amended eliminated the 
grace period following a filing in an improper court.  Id.     
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determination issued as a result of the collection due process hearing.290  To 
be timely, the petition generally must be filed by the taxpayer within 30 days 
of the determination.  However, if the taxpayer appeals the determination 
based on the claimed availability of innocent spouse relief under § 6015, the 
taxpayer has 90 days from the determination to pursue Tax Court review.291  
 Turning to the notice of determination, the Tax Court explained in 
Offiler v. Commissioner that “[t]he notice of determination provided for in 
section 6330 is, from a jurisdictional perspective, the equivalent of a notice 
of deficiency.”292  While § 6330 refers to a determination to be issued by the 
Appeals officer in connection with the due process hearing, Treasury 
Regulations clarify that Appeals must issue a “Notice of Determination” to 
each person who makes a timely request for a collection due process 
hearing.293   
 The caption of the document does not control whether its contents 
constitute a determination for purposes of § 6330.  For instance, in Craig v. 
Commissioner,294 the Appeals officer issued a “Decision Letter” to the 
taxpayer in connection with an equivalent hearing provided to the taxpayer 
based on the belief that the taxpayer failed to submit a timely request for a 
collection due process hearing.  However, the Service improperly proceeded 
down the equivalent hearing path, because the taxpayer’s request for a 
collection due process hearing was in fact timely.  Under these facts, the 
Tax Court determined that the decision letter constituted a determination 
under § 6330 sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction.295  The Tax Court in 
Wilson v. Commissioner296 addressed the inverse scenario of that raised in 
Craig.  The Service in Wilson issued a document captioned “Notice of 
Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 
and/or 6330” following an equivalent hearing held in response to an 
untimely request for a collection due process hearing.  The court in Wilson 
                                                     
290 I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1); see also Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000) 
(“The Court’s jurisdiction under section 6330 is contingent on the issuance of a 
valid notice of determination and a timely petition for review.”).     
291 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A).  However, pursuing an innocent spouse objection 
to the notice of determination does not extend the petition period for all claims.  
That is, if the taxpayer’s petition is filed after the 30-day period provided by 
§ 6330(d)(1), the Tax Court may review only the claims that relate to innocent 
spouse relief under § 6015.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A F2.   
292 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000).   
293 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(1).   
294 117 T.C. 252 (2002).  Normally, a decision letter issued in response to an 
equivalent hearing provided in response to an untimely request for a collection due 
process hearing is not sufficient to invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  See 
Moorhous v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 263, 270 (2001).     
295 Id. at 259.   
296 131 T.C. 47 (2008).   
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concluded that the taxpayer’s failure to make a timely request for a 
collection due process hearing precluded a determination under § 6330, 
regardless of the caption of the document.297  As a result, the Tax Court 
lacked jurisdiction in the case.298   
 The Tax Court originally vacillated on the degree of deference to be 
afforded to a notice of determination issued in the collection due process 
context.  In Meyer v. Commissioner,299 the court concluded that the notice of 
determination issued to the taxpayer was invalid on the basis that the 
taxpayer had not been offered an opportunity for a hearing prior to 
issuance of the determination.300  However, roughly a year later, a divided 
Tax Court in Lundsford v. Commissioner301 determined that it was improper to 
“look behind” the notice of determination in this manner.302  Instead, the 
court imported into the collection due process arena the well-settled rule of 
not looking behind the notice of deficiency necessary to invoke the Court’s 
deficiency jurisdiction.303  The court’s decision to overrule its prior decision 
in Meyer also was based on the “unjustified delay” that approach had 
engendered in the resolution of collection due process cases.304  Rather than 
considering evidence bearing on the quality of the collection due process 
hearing provided to the taxpayer for the purpose of determining whether 
the predicate to its jurisdiction (a notice of determination) was satisfied, the 
court reasoned that such evidence was best considered in reviewing the 
determination on the merits.  The court in Lundsford therefore held that a 
notice of determination would be respected as a jurisdictional prerequisite 
provided that nothing on the face of the notice raised a question 
concerning its validity.305       
 
a. Standard of Review 
 
 The statute does not articulate a standard of review to be applied by the 
Tax Court in reviewing collection due process determinations.  However, 
legislative materials accompanying the 1998 enacting legislation addressed 
this issue.  As originally proposed in the Senate Finance Committee, the 
                                                     
297 Id. at 52.   
298 Note that the holding of Wilson constitutes a mere application of the well-
settled principle that the Tax Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived by the parties.     
299 115 T.C. 417 (2000).   
300 Id. at 422–23.   
301 117 T.C. 159 (2001).   
302 Id. at 163 (“Our analysis in Meyer improperly required us to look behind the 
notice of determination.”).   
303 Id. at 163–64.  
304 Id. at 164.  
305 Id. at 164–65.   
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Tax Court was expected to review the determination of the Appeals officer 
for abuse of discretion.306  However, the Conference Committee addressed 
the appropriate standard of review in § 6330(d) cases at greater length, 
articulating a two-tier approach based on the subject of the officer’s 
determination: 
 
Where the validity of the tax liability was properly at issue in the 
hearing, and where the determination with regard to the tax liability 
is part of the appeal, no levy may take place during the pendency of 
the appeal.  The amount of the tax liability will in such cases be 
reviewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis.  Where the 
validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the 
taxpayer may challenge the determination of the appeals officer for 
abuse of discretion.  In such cases, the appeals officer’s 
determination as to the appropriateness of collection activity will be 
reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard of review.307     
 
The Tax Court quickly adopted the approach outlined in the conference 
agreement, essentially treating it as a statutory directive.308  When the 
underlying tax liability is properly at issue in a lien and levy proceeding, the 
court applies its traditional de novo standard of review that prevails in the 
court’s deficiency jurisdiction.  For matters not relating to the underlying 
tax liability, the court reviews the Appeals officer’s determination for an 
abuse of discretion, which the court has explained occurs when the officer 
acts “arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or law.”309   
 
b. Scope of Inquiry 
 
 As a general rule, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction under §§ 6230 and 6330 is 
limited to determining if the filing of the lien or the proposed levy action is 
proper.310  Accordingly, a taxpayer’s failure to raise an issue during a 
                                                     
306 S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 68 (1998).   
307 H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998). 
308 See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. 
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000).  For a discussion of how the Tax Court’s 
abuse of discretion review in collection due process proceedings is unique when 
compared to traditional judicial review of agency action, see Leslie Book, The 
Collection Due Process Rights:  A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1145, 1194–1202 (2004).   
309 Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23, (1999).  
310  See Chocallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-152, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1432 (declining to entertain taxpayer’s request that sanctions be imposed against 
the Service for attempting to collect a deficiency for which the Service failed to 
issue a notice of deficiency).    
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collection due process hearing generally will bar consideration of that issue 
by the Tax Court.311   
 The Tax Court addressed the ability of the taxpayer to raise additional 
challenges to the proposed collection action post hearing in Giamelli v. 
Commissioner.312  At the collection due process hearing, the taxpayer 
informed the Appeals officer that he desired to enter into an installment 
agreement to satisfy his tax liability.  The Appeals officer concluded that the 
installment agreement could not be consummated due to the taxpayer’s 
failure to remain compliant with the estimated tax obligations for later 
years.  The officer therefore issued a notice of determination to proceed 
with the proposed collection action.  After filing a timely petition for review 
that raised the prospect of paying the tax liability on an installment basis, 
the taxpayer and the Service reached a settlement under which the Service 
agreed to accept the taxpayer’s installment obligation and the taxpayer 
agreed to execute the appropriate decision document to submit to the 
court.  However, before doing so, the taxpayer died in a car accident.  The 
taxpayer’s estate stepped into his shoes and sought to introduce evidence 
contesting the validity of the underlying tax liability.   
 In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s claim as 
falling outside of its § 6330 jurisdiction.  The court based its holding in 
Giamelli primarily on the text of the statute.  Because the court is charged 
with reviewing the determination rendered by the Appeals officer as a result 
of the hearing, any claim or argument not raised at the hearing level could 
not be part of the determination being reviewed.313  The court noted that 
this interpretation of the statute advanced valid policy objectives as well.   
An approach of not constraining Tax Court review to those issues raised at 
the hearing would permit taxpayers to divest the Appeals officer of any 
meaningful influence in the collection review process; in effect, the 
administrative hearing would amount to a procedural formality en route to 
a more encompassing proceeding before the Tax Court.314  Accordingly, 
whereas the court had previously hinted that it could not reverse a 
collection due process determination based on arguments or issues not 
raised at the hearing level,315 the court in Giamelli eliminated any such 
equivocation.  
                                                     
311 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A F3; see also Magana v. 
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002) (“[G]enerally we consider only arguments, 
issues, and other matter that were raised at the collection hearing or otherwise 
brought to the attention of the Appeals Office.”).    
312 129 T.C. 107 (2007). 
313 Id. at 112–13.   
314 Id. at 115.   
315 See Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002) (“[G]enerally it 
would be anomalous and improper for us to conclude that respondent’s Appeals 
Office abused its discretion under section 6330(c)(3) in failing to grant relief, or in 
494           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
 Not long after the Giamelli decision, the court clarified its holding in 
Giamelli through Hoyle v. Commissioner.316  The taxpayer in Hoyle sought to 
challenge the Appeals officer’s determination on the basis that the Service 
failed to comply with applicable law by not issuing the taxpayer a notice of 
deficiency.  Even though the taxpayer did not raise this matter before the 
Appeals officer, the Tax Court determined that it nonetheless could review 
whether the Appeals officer verified compliance with applicable law and 
administrative procedures under § 6330(c) as part of its judicial review.  The 
court’s basis for distinguishing Giamelli rested in the statute governing the 
collection due process hearing.  Pursuant to § 6330(c)(2), the Appeals 
officer is required to consider only those challenges to the proposed 
collection action (or, where appropriate, the underlying tax liability), that are 
raised by the taxpayer.  Hence, the issues raised by the taxpayer at the 
hearing level serve to define the scope of the Appeals officer’s 
determination that is subject to review.  In contrast, § 6330(c)(1) requires 
the Appeals officer to verify compliance with applicable law and 
administrative procedures, regardless of whether the taxpayer presses this 
matter at the hearing level.  Accordingly, subjecting the verification 
requirement to Tax Court review in all cases cannot prejudice the 
Government as a procedural matter.317      
 
c. Scope of Evidentiary Record 
 
 A separate but related inquiry to the range of issues the Tax Court may 
consider in a collection due process hearing is the range of evidence the 
court may entertain.  One of the more vexing questions for the Tax Court 
in resolving its expanded jurisdiction to review administrative 
determinations outside of the deficiency context is whether the court must 
limit the evidence it considers to that presented at the administrative level, 
and this issue has been particularly acute in the collection due process 
context.   
The Service contends that, with limited exceptions, the Tax Court is 
limited to the administrative record in exercising its § 6330(d) jurisdiction.318  
On that note, the Service has described the scope of the administrative 
                                                                                                                       
failing to consider arguments, issues, or other matter not raised by taxpayers or not 
otherwise brought to the attention of respondent’s Appeals Office.”).   
316 131 T.C. 197 (2008).   
317 See id. at 201–02.   
318 See Chief Counsel Notice CC-2006-019, at 46 (Aug. 18, 2006) (“Generally, 
review of the procedural aspects of a CDP hearing is limited to the administrative 
record.”).  However, the Chief Counsel Notice recognizes the need to supplement 
the administrative record in cases where the record does not adequately describe 
the hearing process or where factual disputes exist concerning what occurred at the 
hearing level.  Id.   
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record the Tax Court may consider in reviewing a collection due process 
determination as including the following: 
 
any oral communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s 
authorized representative submitted in connection with the CDP 
hearing, notes made by an Appeals officer or employee of any oral 
communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s authorized 
representative, memoranda created by the Appeals officer or 
employee in connection with the CDP hearing, and any other 
documents or materials relied upon by the Appeals officer or 
employee in making the determination under section 6330(c)(3).319   
 
However, courts have noted problems of limiting review of collection due 
process determinations to the administrative record, as often there is little 
record to speak of.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the 
predicament as follows: 
 
Judicial review of collection due process hearings presents a real 
problem for reviewing courts.  Congress overlaid the Restructuring 
and Reform Act on a previous system that involved very little judicial 
oversight.  The result is a surprisingly scant record, comprised almost 
exclusively of the parties’ appellate briefs and the Notice of 
Determination letter.  No transcript or official record of the hearing 
is required and, accordingly, one rarely exists.320   
 
Whereas federal district courts sitting in review of collection due process 
determinations considered themselves bound under principles of 
administrative law to limit the evidence they considered to the 
administrative record,321 the Tax Court in Robinette v. Commissioner322 
concluded that it was not subject to any such limitation.    
 The taxpayer in Robinette presented an offer-in-compromise to the 
Service that considerably reduced his outstanding tax liabilities on the basis 
of doubt as to collectability.  The Service accepted the offer in 1995 after 
including a host of conditions to the compromised liability, one of which 
obligated the taxpayer to comply with all provisions of the tax laws 
(including submitting returns on a timely basis) for five years from 
acceptance of the offer.  The Service failed to receive a timely filed return 
from the taxpayer for the 1998 year.  After contacting the taxpayer about 
                                                     
319 Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), A-F4.   
320 Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 
(6th Cir. 2005).     
321 See Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005); Living Care 
Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005).   
322 123 T.C. 85 (2004).   
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the missing return, the Service declared the offer-in-compromise in default 
and reinstated the taxpayer’s tax liability in full.  Thereafter, the Service sent 
the taxpayer a Notice of Intent to Levy, from which the taxpayer requested 
a due process hearing.  As part of the telephonic collection due process 
hearing, the taxpayer’s accountant explained that he had prepared the 
taxpayer’s return, caused the taxpayer to sign it, and placed the return in the 
mail with appropriate postage on the filing deadline (a practice purportedly 
followed by the taxpayer and his accountant in prior years).  The Appeals 
officer, however, would consider only a certified or registered mail receipt.  
Accordingly, the officer determined that he could not reinstate the offer-in-
compromise and that the proposed collection activity should proceed.323 
On appeal of the collection due process determination to the Tax Court, 
the taxpayer in Robinette sought to introduce evidence relating to the timely 
filing of his 1998 tax return, including among other things his testimony to 
that effect, evidence concerning the filing of prior years’ returns, and his 
accountant’s records on the date of alleged mailing.  The Commissioner 
sought to exclude all such evidence that was not presented to the Appeals 
officer.  A divided Tax Court sided with the taxpayer, holding that it was 
not bound by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in conducting its 
review of the Appeals officer’s determination and, specifically, that the 
court’s review was not limited to that evidence contained in the 
administrative record.324  The Court justified its conclusion that the APA 
did not govern nor inform its review of collection due process 
determinations on a number of grounds, including but not limited to the 
following:  (1) because the Tax Court’s de novo procedures for reviewing 
actions taken by the Service were well established when the APA was 
enacted, these procedures constituted an “additional requirement . . . 
otherwise recognized by law” that the APA expressly declined to 
override;325 (2) the APA constitutes a statute of general application that 
does not supersede statutory provisions for judicial review, and the Court’s 
jurisdiction is based on a specific statutory framework;326 (3) the legislative 
history accompanying the enactment of the collection due process regime 
failed to suggest that the APA applied to the Tax Court in this context or 
that the court’s review was to be limited to the administrative record; and 
(4) the determination by the Tax Court in other contexts (e.g., innocent 
spouse relief, interest abatement) that its jurisdiction to review IRS 
determinations for abuse of discretion was not governed by the APA.  
Accordingly, the majority of the Tax Court in Robinette permitted 
                                                     
323 Id. at 86–93.   
324 Id. at 95.   
325 Id. at 97 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000)).   
326 Id. at 97–98. 
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consideration of testimony and other evidence that was not presented to 
the Appeals officer in resolving the taxpayer’s appeal.327   
The Tax Court’s assertion of administrative review exceptionalism in 
Robinette did not withstand appeal.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that judicial review of collection due process determinations by 
the Tax Court should be limited to consideration of the evidence contained 
in the administrative record.328  While recognizing that the statute and 
legislative history failed to address the scope of evidence to be considered 
in a § 6330(d) proceeding, the appellate court interpreted this silence as 
suggesting that the APA and general principles of administrative law should 
govern.  In particular, the court was not willing to read much into the Tax 
Court’s tradition of conducting de novo proceedings in the deficiency 
setting: 
 
The Tax Court seemed to believe that because it traditionally has 
conducted de novo proceedings in deficiency proceedings, and because 
Congress did not change that practice when it passed the APA in 
1946, Congress should likewise be presumed to have intended de novo 
proceedings in the Tax Court in connection with the review of 
decisions by an appeals officer under § 6330.  We do not think the 
proposed conclusion follows from history.  Collection due process 
hearings under § 6330 were newly-created administrative proceedings 
in 1998, and the statute provided for a corresponding new form of 
limited judicial review.  The nature and purpose of these proceedings 
are different from deficiency determinations, and it is just as likely 
that Congress believed judicial review of decisions by appeals 
officers in this context should be conducted in accordance with 
traditional principles of administrative law.  Indeed, that Congress 
provided for judicial review in either the Tax Court or a United 
States District Court, depending on the type of underlying tax 
liability involved, indicates that traditional principles of 
administrative law should apply.329 
                                                     
327 For commentary on the Tax Court’s decision in Robinette, see Leslie M. 
Book, CDP and Collections, Perceptions and Misperceptions, 107 TAX NOTES 487 (Apr. 
25, 2005); Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection 
Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 429 (2008); Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax 
Court Exempt From Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 
58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603 (2010); Christine K. Lane, On-the-Record Review of CDP 
Determinations: An Examination of Policy Reasons Encouraging Judges to Stick to the 
Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149 (2007); Nick A. Zotos, Service 
Collection Abuse of Discretion: What is the Appropriate Standard of Review and Scope of the 
Record in Collection Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX LAW. 223 (2008).     
328 Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).   
329 Id. at 461.   
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 The First Circuit in Murphy v. Commissioner330 followed the lead of the 
Eighth Circuit in Robinette, holding that the administrative record rule 
applies to the Tax Court’s consideration of a collection due process appeal.  
Although the Tax Court has not had occasion to revisit the matter in light 
of these appellate reversals, indications suggest that the Tax Court may not 
be willing to abandon its position in cases appealable to other circuits.  In 
2008, the Tax Court held in Porter v. Commissioner331 that it is not limited to 
the administrative record when it determines if a taxpayer is entitled to 
innocent spouse relief under § 6015.  In explaining its holding, the court 
distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Robinette on the basis that the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction to determine a taxpayer’s entitlement to innocent 
spouse relief differed qualitatively from its jurisdiction to review collection 
due process determinations.  However, in the process of distinguishing the 
Robinette reversal, the Tax Court was careful to note that “no inference 
should be drawn that . . . we are changing our position in lien and levy cases 
as expressed in [the original Robinette decision].”332  Hence, for the time 
being, taxpayers may have success in augmenting the administrative record 
when pursuing a collection due process appeal before the Tax Court.   
 The Tax Court addressed a much less controversial aspect of the 
evidentiary record it may consider in collection due process appeals in Freije 
v. Commissioner.333  There, the Tax Court was forced to consider when, if 
ever, it could entertain evidence arising in a year other than the year that 
served as the subject of the notice of determination under review.  The 
taxpayer in Freije remitted a payment to the Service that he intended to be 
applied to his 1997 tax liability, but the Service instead applied the payment 
to the taxpayer’s outstanding liability for 1995.  The taxpayer therefore 
appealed the Service’s determination to proceed with levies to collect his 
unpaid 1997 liability, challenging the determination on the basis there 
remained no unpaid liability for the 1997 year.   
 The Service argued that its application of the taxpayer’s remittance to his 
1995 tax liability fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to review, as 
the taxpayer’s 1995 liability was not the subject of the notice of 
determination.  The court rejected this argument, noting that its jurisdiction 
to review the adverse collection due process determination necessarily 
included the jurisdiction to determine if the tax to be collected had in fact 
                                                     
330 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). 
331 130 T.C. 115 (2008); see also Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 280, 289 
(2010) (declining the Commissioner’s invitation to overrule its prior decision in 
Robinette because resolution of that issue not necessary to disposition of case).    
332 Id. at 120 n.6.  Indeed, the Tax Court has reaffirmed its position in Robinette 
in cases appealable to other circuit courts of appeals.  See Trainor v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2013-14, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1108.   
333 125 T.C. 14 (2005).   
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already been paid—an inquiry that could encompass facts beyond the year 
subject to the notice.  Accordingly, the court held that its jurisdiction under 
§ 6330(d) encompassed consideration of such facts and circumstances in 
nondetermination years as are necessary to determine the correct amount of 
unpaid tax for the determination year at issue.334  The court went on to 
explain that this approach is consistent with the authorization under 
§ 6214(b) to consider facts relating to other years to the extent necessary to 
determine the amount of a deficiency for a tax year before the court.335   
 
d. Possible Outcomes 
 
 The Tax Court may sustain the determination of the Appeals officer on 
the basis that the determination as it relates to collection-related matters did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion or because the taxpayer’s challenge to 
the underlying tax liability lacked merit.  However, § 6330 fails to specify 
what action the Tax Court is to take if it finds the collection due process 
determination deficient.336  For instance, the Appeals officer may have 
failed to perform the verification required by § 6330(c)(1), the officer may 
have not given sufficient consideration to collection-related matters raised 
by the taxpayer pursuant to § 6330(c)(2), or the officer may have failed to 
weigh sufficiently the concern that the proposed collection activity be no 
more intrusive than necessary as required under § 6330(c)(3)(C).  
Furthermore, the record before the Tax Court may not be sufficiently 
developed to permit the court to make these determinations.   
 If the court determines that the proposed levy action is improper, such 
as where the court finds that the verification requirements of applicable law 
have been satisfied was incorrect, the court may simply stay the proposed 
collection action.337  On the other hand, if the court finds that the Appeals 
officer’s determination to proceed with collection constituted an abuse of 
discretion, the court may remand the case to the Office of Appeals for 
                                                     
334 Id. at 27.   
335 Id. at 27–28.  
336 See Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction Over Due Process Collection 
Appeals:  Is it Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 479 (2003) (“Because I.R.C. 
section 6330(d)(1) does not provide for the Tax Court to remand or modify the 
Internal Revenue Service’s determination, the Tax Court may be limited merely to 
stating that the Internal Revenue Service’s proposed collection action is improper, 
with the result that the collection action remains in limbo until the Internal 
Revenue Service itself decides either to correct its procedural error or desist from 
collection altogether.”).   
337 See, e.g., Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 37 (2005) (directing that the 
levy to collect the portion of an assessment for which no notice of deficiency had 
been issued “may not proceed”). 
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reconsideration.338  Presumably the Office of Appeals would heed the Tax 
Court’s guidance and rectify the identified defects in the initial 
determination.  Remand also serves as the appropriate remedy in cases 
where the court finds the record insufficient to enable meaningful review of 
the collection due process determination.339   
Although nothing in § 6330 expressly contemplates the Tax Court’s 
authority to remand a collection due process proceeding to the Office of 
Appeals, courts have operated under the assumption that the right exists.340  
Given the failure of the statute to address the prospect of remand, it is not 
clear if the remanding court retains jurisdiction over the proceeding to 
ensure compliance with its directive.341  However, the Tax Court operates 
on the assumption that it retains jurisdiction over remanded proceedings.  
The Court explained this practice in Wadleigh v. Commissioner342 as follows:   
 
We may under certain circumstances remand a case to the 
Commissioner’s Appeals Office while retaining jurisdiction.  The 
resulting section 6330 hearing on remand provides the parties with 
                                                     
338 See id. at 33, 37 (finding that the Appeals officer’s failure to credit the 
taxpayer’s account with withholding credits and remittances that were improperly 
applied to other years constituted an abuse of discretion and therefore remanding 
determination for reconsideration); Harrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
271, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 378, 379 (remanding case to Appeals officer to enable 
taxpayer to consider installment agreement offered by the officer or to propose 
collection alternatives but prohibiting taxpayers from raising other issues).  
339 See, e.g., Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 280 (remanding case to Office 
of Appeals because administrative record insufficient to properly evaluate whether 
the Appeals officer abused discretion in determining that levy on taxpayer’s 
pension could proceed).  One of the first examples of a court remanding for this 
purpose was Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-7312 (D. Colo. 
2000), wherein the district court remanded the case for development of the 
administrative record and, in particular, clarification of the reasoning behind the 
Appeals officer’s determination that the § 6330(c)(3)(C) balancing test was satisfied.  
However, the Sixth Circuit in Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 
F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005), described the remand in Mesa Oil as “an exception to 
the general practice of reviewing courts showing deference to Appeals Officers’ 
conclusions regarding the [§ 6330(c)(3)(C)] balancing analysis.”   
340 See, e.g., Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001) (“We do not 
believe that it is either necessary or productive to remand the case to IRS Appeals 
to consider petitioners’ arguments.”); see also Danshera Cords, Collection Due Process:  
The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2005) (noting 
practice of courts remanding collection due process cases for further consideration 
by the Appeals officer or further development of record).   
341 See id. (noting the confused state of the Tax Court’s retained jurisdiction 
over remanded collection due process determinations and suggesting legislative 
clarity).   
342 134 T.C. 280 (2010).  
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an opportunity to complete the initial section 6330 hearing while 
preserving the taxpayer’s right to receive judicial review of the 
ultimate administrative determination.343   
 
 When the Tax Court reviews the underlying tax liability as part of the 
§ 6330(d) proceeding, the proceeding very much resembles the de novo 
proceedings the court regularly conducts as part of its deficiency 
jurisdiction.  However, the court’s remedial powers are not the same in the 
two settings.  If a case arrives before the court through a petition for 
redetermination of a deficiency, the court possesses the jurisdiction to 
determine an overpayment for the year at issue and to order the 
overpayment to be refunded.344  The Tax Court considered whether it 
possessed similar powers when sitting in review of collection due process 
determinations in Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner.345  
 Greene-Thapedi concerned the Service’s attempt to collect a taxpayer’s 
outstanding income tax liability for 1992.  Subsequent to the taxpayer’s 
filing of her petition for review of the Appeals officer’s adverse collection 
due process determination, the Service applied an overpayment from the 
taxpayer’s 1999 year to the outstanding 1992 liability pursuant to § 6402(a), 
fully satisfying the 1992 liability.  The Service therefore moved to dismiss 
the § 6330(d) proceeding as moot due to the absence of an unpaid tax 
liability, which the court granted.  The court reasoned that it could not 
review the Service’s application of its offset authority, because the § 6402 
offset does not constitute a levy action that is subject to collection due 
process review.346   
To continue pursuing her challenge to the 1992 deficiency (which served 
as the basis of her initial petition), the taxpayer amended her petition in the 
collection due process proceeding to assert a claim for a refund of amounts 
offset against the 1992 liability.  The court dismissed her claim for lack of 
jurisdiction on grounds that the proposed levy that had given rise to the 
court’s § 6330(d) jurisdiction had been abandoned by the Service.  In a 
divided opinion, the court held that no basis existed for the taxpayer to 
challenge her 1992 income tax liability before the court.347  Accordingly, the 
court dismissed the case as moot.348   
However, before doing so, the majority in Greene-Thapedi explained that 
even if its § 6330 jurisdiction remained open to the taxpayer, the court 
                                                     
343 Id. at 299 (citations omitted); see also Dalton v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 393 
(2010) (reviewing supplemental notice of determination issued as a result of a 
remand of the initial determination).     
344 I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1), (2).   
345 126 T.C. 1 (2006).   
346 Id. at 7–8.   
347 Id. at 8.   
348 Id. at 14.   
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lacked the authority to determine an overpayment or to order a refund in 
the § 6330 context.349  The court recounted the history of its overpayment 
jurisdiction in the deficiency setting, noting that Congress had narrowly 
proscribed its jurisdiction by statute.  Additionally, the court noted that its 
overpayment jurisdiction in the deficiency setting did not carry an ancillary 
power to order the Service to refund the determined overpayment.  Rather, 
this refund power was acquired by legislative grant only decades later, and 
even then the court’s refund power was narrowly defined.350  In light of the 
historical development of the court’s circumscribed overpayment and 
refund jurisdiction in the deficiency setting, the court refused to interpret 
§ 6330 as implicitly conferring upon the Tax Court the authority to 
determine an overpayment for the determination year at issue or the power 
to order the refund of such amount.351  The taxpayer therefore was left to 
pursue refund litigation with respect to the 1992 tax liability in traditional 
refund fora.352    
  
E. Reimbursement of Taxpayer Litigation and Administrative Costs 
 
Section 7430 provides the prospect of a taxpayer obtaining 
reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs and administrative costs 
incurred in tax proceedings.  The section provides the Tax Court with 
jurisdiction to order an award of such costs in docketed cases and, 
furthermore, to review a determination concerning an award at the 
administrative level.  After providing a brief history of the fee-shifting 
landscape prior to the enactment of § 7430, this Section will detail the 
operation of the statutory remedy as well as the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in 
this area.   
 
                                                     
349 Id. at 8–9.   
350 Additionally, the court noted that Congress amended its jurisdiction to 
review the Service’s failure to abate interest under § 6404 by incorporating the 
court’s overpayment jurisdiction through a cross-reference to § 6512(b) under 
§ 6404(h)—further evidence that the court’s overpayment jurisdiction and refund 
powers must be expressly authorized.  See id. at 13.   
351 Id. at 11.   
352  Judge Colvin, agreeing with the result in Greene-Thapedi, wrote separately to 
note the judicial inefficiency of initially providing the court with jurisdiction to 
review the underlying tax liability for the determination only to allow that 
jurisdiction to be undercut through the fortuitous application of an overpayment 
offset.  Id. at 14–15 (Colvin, J., concurring).   
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1. Pre-TEFRA Rules 
 
Under the common law “American rule,” each litigant is ordinarily 
responsible for paying his own costs of counsel.353  This rule is rooted in 
the belief that losing parties should not be penalized for exercising the right 
to litigate, nor should the possibility of paying another party’s attorney’s 
fees hang guillotine-like over the heads of potential litigants so as to 
discourage resort to the courts.354  The rule, however, is not without its 
exceptions. 
Two narrow common law exceptions to the American rule355 allow the 
federal courts to reallocate responsibility for paying the attorneys’ fees of 
prevailing parties.  First, if the losing party “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” the federal courts can assess the 
attorney’s fees of the winning party against the loser.356  Second, if the legal 
action of a successful litigant has conferred a benefit upon a group of 
persons, the attorney’s fees of the prevailing litigant may be recovered from 
the other beneficiaries of the action or from a “common fund” created by a 
successful suit.357  Traditionally, however, absent specific statutory or 
contractual authority, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the 
distinctive language of section 2412 of title 28 of the United States Code,358 
barred the recovery of attorney’s fees from the Government, even in cases 
                                                     
353 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).  
Under the “English rule,” England and many other countries generally award 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.  Id. at 247 n.18; Spencer v. N.L.R.B., 712 
F.2d 539, 543 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and 
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA L. REV. 636, 637 n.3, 639–40 (1974). 
354 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 9 (1980); Comment, supra note 353, at 644. 
355 There are also numerous specific statutory exceptions to the American rule, 
authorizing awards of attorney’s fees in cases commenced under statutes granting 
or protecting various federal rights.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Freedom of 
Information Act); 15 U.S.C. § 15a (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (Securities Act 
of 1933 (as amended)); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), 78r(a) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(as amended)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 8 (listing additional statutory 
authorizations of attorney’s fees). 
356 F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (footnote 
omitted).  Accord Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258–59; Spencer, 712 F.2d at 543. 
357 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391–93 (1970).  Accord Spencer, 
712 F.2d at 543 & n.13; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 8 (1980). 
358 Prior to its amendment in 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 provided as follows:  
“Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as 
enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of 
attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or 
against the United States . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1966) (emphasis added), prior to 
amendment by Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2321, 2327–29 (1980). 
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falling within the well-recognized “bad faith” and “common benefit” 
exceptions to the American rule.359 
The American rule became the subject of increasing criticism in the early 
twentieth century.360  Although a primary purpose of the American rule was 
to prevent excessive costs from discouraging litigation, the rule was “having 
the opposite effect.”361  Often the expected costs of a judicial contest 
exceeded the amount at stake, an anomaly that could preclude the 
commencement of well-founded suits.362  Consequently, the federal courts 
began exercising their equity powers to fashion further exceptions to the 
American rule.363  The most important of these exceptions was the “private 
attorney general” theory, under which successful litigants who aided in the 
enforcement of “important societal rights” could recover their costs of 
counsel.364  Still, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and section 2412 of 
title 28 precluded recovery of attorney’s fees from the Federal 
Government.365 
In 1975, the Supreme Court ordered cessation in the federal courts of 
judicially innovated exceptions to the American rule.366  In Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,367 the Court held that “the circumstances 
under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of 
the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to 
determine.”368  Absent specific statutory authority or unless the case fell 
within the “common benefit” or “bad faith” exceptions, the Supreme Court 
held that federal courts could not shift the costs of counsel away from the 
prevailing party.369  Congress soon responded. 
                                                     
359 Spencer, 712 F.2d at 543–44. 
360 Id. at 544 n.14.  The court listed a number of articles criticizing the 
American rule, including:  William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs:  A 
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO L. REV. 202 (1966); Ewing O. Cossaboom, 
Attorney’s Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 313 (1941); Comment, 
supra note 353, at 648–55; Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 
YALE L.J. 699 (1940). 
361 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 9 (1980). 
362 Id. 
363 See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544; Comment, supra note 353, at 657, 666–70. 
364 Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544; Barry S. Rutcofsky, The Award of Attorney’s Fees 
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 307, 309–10 (1982); 
Comment, supra note 353, at 657, 666–70. 
365 See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 543–44; Comment, supra note 353, at 679 n.255. 
366 See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544. 
367 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
368 Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). 
369 Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 421 U.S. at 247, 
257–60, 271). 
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In 1976, in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alyeska,370 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act,371 
providing for the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties other than 
the United States in civil actions, including tax cases.372  The application of 
this act to tax litigation was limited, however, because it applied only to 
suits brought by or on behalf of the Federal Government.  Because the 
petitioner in the Tax Court is always the taxpayer seeking the 
redetermination of a deficiency asserted by the Service or some other form 
of relief, the 1976 legislation had no effect on Tax Court litigation.373  
Following the American rule, the Tax Court refused to award attorney’s 
fees or costs against the Government in the absence of a specific statutory 
provision conferring such authority.374 
Four years later, Congress again expanded the circumstances in which 
attorney’s fees could be recovered in litigation with the Government.  The 
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),375 enacted in 1980, provided for the 
                                                     
370 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (1976). 
371 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
372 The legislation provided in pertinent part as follows: 
That the Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) is amended by 
adding the following:  “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision 
of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title 
IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on 
behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation 
of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as 
part of the costs.” 
Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641.   
373 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 10 (1981); Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 
T.C. 178 (1977) (concluding that not only did the plain language of the 1976 Act 
exclude its application to the Tax Court, the legislative history of the Act was 
insufficient to support its application to Tax Court litigation), aff’d, 613 F.2d 1306 
(5th Cir. 1980); see also Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 533–34 (1976) 
(holding that the Tax Court was without authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 to award 
costs to prevailing petitioner), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). 
374 See Don Casey Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 847, 857 (1986); Key Buick Co., 
68 T.C. at 178 n.2; Sharon, 66 T.C. at 533–34. 
375 Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2321, 2327–29 (1980) (amending 28 
U.S.C. § 2412).  Both the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and EAJA were 
intended to supplement numerous more specific provisions authorizing awards of 
attorney’s fees in cases commenced under statutes granting or protecting various 
federal rights.  For a list of statutes authorizing awards of attorney’s fees, see supra 
note 355. 
506           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
award of litigation costs in any civil action (except tort cases376) brought by 
or against the United States, unless the position of the Government was 
“substantially justified” or special circumstances made such an award 
unjust.377  Under EAJA,378 which expressly superseded the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act as to tax litigation,379 a party prevailing against 
the United States could recover attorney’s fees and other reasonable costs, 
including “the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, 
test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the 
preparation of the party’s case.”380  No ceiling was placed on the total cost 
awards recoverable under EAJA, although individual items were limited:  
attorney’s fees could not exceed a statutory hourly rate without the court 
finding a special justification, and the rate of expert witness fees could not 
be higher than those paid by the Government.381  Additionally, parties had 
to meet certain economic requirements to be eligible for a litigation award 
under EAJA.382 
                                                     
376 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).  However, the legislative history of the EAJA 
makes clear that it is to apply to cases involving constitutional torts.  H.R. REP. NO. 
96-1418, at 9 (1980); Rutcofsky, supra note 364, at 313. 
377 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(1)(A).  Section 2412(b) authorizes the courts, unless 
prohibited by statute, to award attorney’s fees and other expenses against the 
United States “to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the 
common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such 
an award.”  28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).  Thus, the “bad faith” and “common benefit” 
exceptions are made applicable to the Federal Government. However, 
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) is even more sweeping because of the allowance of fees and 
expenses unless the position of the United States is “substantially justified.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 
378 Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201–208, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325–30 (1980). 
379 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-481, 
§ 205(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2330 (1980). 
380 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 
381 Id. (setting the original reimbursable rate at $75 per hour, prior to 
amendment in 1996).  In 1996, Congress increased the reimbursable hourly rate to 
$125. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-121, § 232(b)(1), 101 Stat. 847, 863 (1996).   
382 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).  As enacted, § 204 of EAJA limited the 
availability of litigation awards by defining a “party” as an individual whose net 
worth did not exceed $1 million at the time the action was filed; the sole owner of 
an unincorporated business, or a partnership, corporation, association, or 
organization (excluding § 501(c)(3) organizations) whose net worth did not exceed 
$5 million or who did not have more than 500 employees at the time the action was 
filed.  Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2329 (1980) (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 
2412).  The dollar amounts of the net worth ceilings for individuals and 
organizations have been raised to $2 million and $7 million respectively.  I.R.C. 
§ 2412(d)(2)(B) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(1), 99 Stat. 183, 185 
(1985)).   
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EAJA also was interpreted as being inapplicable to Tax Court litigation. 
The primary justification was that the legislation, enacted as part of title 28 
of the United States Code concerning Article III courts, had no application 
to a legislative court established under Article I.383  Thus, no matter how 
unreasonable the position of the Service, taxpayers prevailing in Tax Court 
proceedings continued to be unable to recover cost and fee awards, despite 
legislation providing access to litigation awards to taxpayers prevailing in 
cases brought in other federal forums. 
 
2. Taxpayer Rights as Expanded by TEFRA 
 
Believing that taxpayers should be entitled to litigation costs in tax cases 
in which the position of the Service is unreasonable, regardless of the 
forum involved,384 Congress increased the availability of fee and cost 
awards in tax cases in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(TEFRA).385  Section 7430 expressly applies to Tax Court litigation,386 and, 
as originally enacted, provided that a prevailing party387 (not including the 
Government) may recover reasonable litigation costs in any action under 
the Internal Revenue Code brought by or against the United States.388 
                                                     
383 See, e.g., Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 
EAJA inapplicable to Tax Court litigation); McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 
807 (1982) (holding the attorney’s fee provisions of EAJA and section 1988 of the 
Civil Rights Act inapplicable to Tax Court litigation), aff’d, 711 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
384 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 11 (1981). 
385 Pub. L. NO. 97-248, § 292, 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (1982) (amending I.R.C. 
§ 7430).  The EAJA is superseded by TEFRA in actions to which § 7430 applies.  
See id. § 292(c), 96 Stat. at 573 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)). 
386 I.R.C. § 7430(a)(2) (as originally enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 572).  The express reference to litigation before the Tax Court is 
now contained in § 7430(c)(6).   
387 Section 7430 excludes creditors of the taxpayer from the definition of 
“prevailing party.”  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 12 (1981) 
(stating that creditors of a taxpayer would be ineligible for a litigation award under 
§ 7430 in interpleaders, wrongful levy actions, and lien priority cases); see also Miller 
v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (explaining scope of 
creditor exception). 
388 I.R.C. § 7430(a)(1) (as originally enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 572).  Prior to 1996, declaratory judgment proceedings generally 
were excluded from § 7430.  I.R.C. § 7430(b)(3) (prior to amendment in 1996).  As 
part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, this prohibition was removed, effective for 
proceedings after July 30, 1996.  Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 704(a), (b), 110 Stat. 1452, 
1464 (1996).  Congress attributed the change to recognition that it was appropriate 
to treat declaratory judgment proceedings similar to other tax proceedings with 
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A variety of justifications animated the decision of Congress to enable 
prevailing taxpayers to recover attorney’s fees in the Tax Court.  First, 
because the majority of tax litigation occurs in the Tax Court, few taxpayers 
were able to obtain litigation awards under the earlier statutes.389  Second, 
Congress hoped that § 7430 would deter abusive actions by the Service, as 
well as enable taxpayers to resist unjustified tax assertions regardless of their 
economic situation.390  Finally, having different rules apply in the Tax 
Court, the district courts, and the Claims Court was thought to promote 
forum shopping, and Congress intended that one set of rules be applicable 
to litigation awards in all tax cases.391 
In its concern with the then increasing case load of the Tax Court and 
the impact the TEFRA attorney’s fees provisions might have in 
encouraging additional cases to be brought,392 Congress originally limited 
the availability of litigation cost awards to cases in which the position of the 
Government was unreasonable.393  Congress intended that this limitation 
reduce any incentive that might otherwise exist for a party to avoid 
settlement and the informal stipulation process in the hope of winning an 
award of litigation costs.394 
Following the enactment of § 7430 in 1982, Congress made significant 
modifications to the statute through the Tax Reform Act of 1986395 and 
                                                                                                                       
respect to eligibility for reimbursement of costs and fees.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, 
at 38 (1996). 




393 Id.; I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (as originally enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 
97-248, § 292, 96 Stat. 572).  Currently, reimbursement of costs under § 7430 is 
foreclosed if the Government’s position is “substantially justified.”  I.R.C. 
§ 7430(c)(4)(B)(i).  As part of the effort to deter frivolous Tax Court litigation, 
Congress also increased the maximum damage penalty from $500 to $5,000.  I.R.C. 
§ 6673 (as amended by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 574); H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-404, at 11 (1981).  The current ceiling on the § 6673 penalty stands at 
$25,000.  I.R.C. § 6673 (as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7731(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2400–02). 
394 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 11 (1981). 
395 See Pub L. No. 99-514, § 1551, 100 Stat. 2085, 2752–53 (1986).  Perhaps 
most significantly, the 1986 legislation converted § 7430 from a temporary 
provision to a permanent one.  Pursuant to a sunset provision contained in the 
original legislation, the TEFRA rules applicable to attorney’s fees ceased to apply to 
Tax Court proceedings commenced after December 31, 1985.  Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (l982).  The relatively short effective period was 
intended to give Congress time to review the operation and effect of § 7430 before 
deciding under what conditions, if any, it should be extended.  See H.R. REP. NO. 
97-404, at 11 (1981).  In connection with their consideration of the Tax Reform 
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then through the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 
(TAMRA).396  Taken together, these amendments extended the application 
of § 7430 and liberalized its application to administrative proceedings 
before the Service.  In particular, Congress extended the scope of 
recoverable expenses beyond reasonable litigation costs to include 
“reasonable administrative costs,”397 and it directed that the position of the 
United States to be evaluated included the position taken during 
administrative proceedings.398  Perhaps most significantly, Congress 
provided the Service with explicit authority to settle taxpayer’s requests for 
litigation and administrative costs at the administrative level while providing 
for Tax Court review of such administrative determinations.399  The scope 
of relief provided by § 7430 and the various conditions thereto are detailed 
below.  
 
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
 
To qualify for an award of litigation or administrative costs under 
§ 7430, the requesting taxpayers must have exhausted all available 
administrative remedies.400  The term “administrative remedies” is not 
defined in the statute; however, the regulations interpreting § 7430 generally 
require that a taxpayer attempt to resolve the dispute in an Appeals office 
conference prior to filing a petition in the Tax Court.401  The legislative 
history of § 7430 indicates that the requirement to exhaust administrative 
remedies “is intended to preserve the role that the administrative appeals 
process plays in the resolution of tax disputes.”402  A taxpayer who actively 
participates in, and discloses relevant information during, the administrative 
appeals process will be considered to have exhausted available 
administrative remedies.403  The failure to so participate or disclose 
information could render the party ineligible for an award under § 7430.404 
                                                                                                                       
Act of 1986, the House and Senate proposed different amendments to extend 
§ 7430.  These differences were resolved in conference and the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 extended § 7430 indefinitely.  Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551(g), 100 
Stat. 2085, 2753 (1986). 
396 See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6239, 102 Stat. 3342, 3743–46 (1988).  
397 Id. § 6239(a), 102 Stat. 3743–44 (amending I.R.C. § 7430(a)).   
398 Id., 102 Stat. 3745–46 (amending I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7)).   
399 Id. (amending I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B), (f)).   
400 I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1). 
401 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(a), (b).   
402 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 13 (1981). 
403 Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b)(1)(i), (2).   
404 Id.; see also Popham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-652, 49 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 323, 325–26 (assuming for purposes of a motion that taxpayers exhausted 
their administrative remedies because they did engage to some extent in 
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Taxpayers are not required to exhaust administrative remedies if “the 
court determines that, under the circumstances of the case, such 
requirement is unnecessary.”405  The legislative history accompanying the 
enactment of § 7430 provides that it would be inappropriate to require a 
taxpayer to pursue an administrative appeal in a case involving an issue that 
the Service “has identified as one which it will litigate in all cases.”406  
Moreover, if the Service has informed the taxpayer that administrative 
remedies need not be pursued, or if the taxpayer does not receive a 
preliminary notice of deficiency (30-day letter) prior to receipt of the 
statutory notice of deficiency, the administrative remedies generally will be 
considered exhausted for the purposes of § 7430.407 
In Minahan v. Commissioner,408 the Service contended that the prevailing 
petitioners were ineligible for a litigation award under § 7430 on two 
                                                                                                                       
conferences with the Appeals office, but did not allow recovery of litigation costs 
as taxpayers did not meet the statutory definition of “prevailing party”). 
405 Phillips v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 529, 533 n.6 (1987) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-404, at 13 (1981)), rev’d, 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  In Phillips, the 
petitioner, who had been issued a preliminary notice of deficiency, did not request 
an Appeals office conference prior to the issuance of the statutory notice of 
deficiency.  The Service contended that the petitioner was ineligible for an award of 
attorney’s fees because he had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies 
available to him.  Id.  Although the court noted that the Appeals office conference 
is a “necessary and important administrative remedy,” the failure to request an 
Appeals office conference was not fatal to the petitioner’s request for a litigation 
award in this case because the sole issue tried in the case (whether the petitioner 
was entitled to file a joint return) was not raised by the Service until after the case 
was docketed.  Id. at 532.  Additionally, the court took into consideration the 
Service’s disregard for the petitioner’s many attempts to negotiate prior to trial, and 
the disregard by the Service of the procedures it had announced it would follow in 
a Revenue Ruling.  Id. at 533.  See Award of Attorney’s Fees in Tax Cases: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 21–22 (1985) (statement of Jim Keightley, Associate Chief Counsel 
for Litigation, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
406 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 13 (1981).  
407 See Popham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-652, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 
(citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(f)(1), (2)); see also Vasquez v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2007-6, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 660 (applying Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(f)(2) in 
situation where the taxpayer did not receive a 30-day letter).  In these 
circumstances, the Service’s failure to require exhaustion must not be due to action 
of the taxpayer, and the taxpayer must agree to participate in an Appeals office 
conference after the case is docketed.  See Swanson v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 76, 
98–99 (citing predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(f)(2)).  Once the Tax Court 
case has been docketed, the taxpayer does not have to affirmatively request an 
Appeals office conference to exhaust administrative remedies; rather, the taxpayer 
simply must not refuse to participate in such conference.  Id.  
408 88 T.C. 492 (1987). 
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grounds:  first, the petitioners failed to participate in an Appeals office 
conference; and second, the petitioners refused to extend the time for 
assessment of tax.409 In a reviewed opinion, the court addressed the first 
argument by explaining that § 7430 “does not speak in terms of 
administrative remedies in the abstract, but rather focuses on ‘the 
administrative remedies available to such party [the prevailing party] within 
the Internal Revenue Service.’”410  Because the Service did not make an 
Appeals office conference available, the court held that it “was not an 
administrative remedy available to these petitioners” and, consequently, was 
not a remedy they had failed to exhaust.411 
The second argument of the Service was submitted in reliance on 
regulations interpreting § 7430, which at the time provided that the 
administrative remedies of a taxpayer would not be considered exhausted in 
cases in which a taxpayer refused to extend the time in which to assess the 
tax.412  The court rejected this argument as well, noting that “an extension 
of time for assessment is not an administrative remedy at all.”413  Noting 
that the Service could not use the regulations to add a restriction to § 7430 
that was unsupported by the statute or its legislative history,414 the court 
determined the regulations to be invalid to the extent they imposed consent 
to an extension of the statute of limitations as a condition to eligibility for 
an award of litigation costs.415 
Almost a decade after Minahan, Congress believed a clarification of the 
court’s decision in that case was necessary.416  In 1996, Congress added the 
final sentence of § 7430(b)(1),417 directing that any failure to agree to an 
extension of time for the assessment of tax not be taken into account in 
determining whether a taxpayer has exhausted administrative remedies 
available to him.418   
 
b. Prevailing Party 
 
A recovery of costs and fees under § 7430 is available only if the 
taxpayer qualifies as a “prevailing party” in the proceeding.419  To be 
                                                     
409 Id. at 503. 
410 Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (1986)) (emphasis added by court). 
411 Id. (emphasis in original). 
412 Id. at 501–02; see Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b)(1)(i)(B), (f)(2)(i) (1985).   
413 Minahan, 88 T.C. at 503.  
414 Id. at 503, 505–08.   
415 Id. at 508.  
416 H.R. REP. NO.104-506, at 37–38 (1996). 
417 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 703(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 
1464 (1996).   
418 I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b)(4).  
419 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A).   
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considered a prevailing party, the taxpayer must substantially prevail with 
respect to the amount in controversy or must substantially prevail with 
respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented.420  In 1998, 
Congress supplied an alternate route for a taxpayer to be considered a 
prevailing party—generally, if the taxpayer’s liability turns out to be equal to 
or less than the amount provided in a “qualified offer” presented to and 
rejected by the Government.421  Under either approach, the taxpayer must 
file a timely motion for the award of costs and must satisfy certain financial 
eligibility requirements designed to limit the remedy to those lacking 
sufficient financial resources.422  While these conditions relate to the 
taxpayer, the Government, through the manner in which it prosecutes the 
proceeding, can prevent the taxpayer from being considered a prevailing 
party for purposes of the statute.  If the Government establishes that its 
position in the proceeding was “substantially justified,” the taxpayer will not 
be considered a prevailing party for purposes of the statute.423  
If the taxpayer requests reimbursement of costs under § 7430 in 
connection with the trial of the underlying tax issue, the court determines 
whether the taxpayer constitutes a prevailing party under the statute.424  
However, this determination will be made by the Service if the final 
determination with respect to the underlying liability for tax, interest, or 
penalty is made at the administrative level.425  The determination made by 
the Service in the latter scenario is subject to Tax Court review.426   
 
(1)  Taxpayer Substantially Prevails 
 
Generally, Congress intended that the decision on the amount in 
controversy be determinative as to whether a party has substantially 
prevailed in the proceeding.427  To substantially prevail as to the amount in 
controversy, the taxpayer must establish that the deficiency is substantially 
less than the amount originally proposed, with no precise percentage 
                                                     
420 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
97-404, at 15 (1981).   
421 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E). This provision was enacted as part of the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.  See Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3101(e)(1), 112 Stat. 685, 728–29 (1998).   
422 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) (incorporating filing requirements and net worth 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) and (d)(2)(B), respectively).   
423 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B).  
424 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(C)(ii).  
425 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(C)(i).  
426 I.R.C. § 7430(f)(2).  
427 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 15 (1981).  
Prominence in Judicial Review of Taxpayer Rights           513 
 
governing this determination.428  In Andrews v. Commissioner,429 the court 
addressed an apparent close case based on the reduction in asserted 
deficiency alone—the Service had determined a deficiency of $13,214.49 
and the parties entered into a stipulated decision in the amount of 
$7,737.42.  The court’s resolution of the case demonstrates that the 
underlying dollar amounts cannot be divorced from the issues presented in 
the proceeding.  The court in Andrews held that the petitioners were clearly 
not the prevailing party with respect to the amount in controversy because 
even though the petitioners had succeeded in reducing the amount of 
income for employer-provided housing, the Service prevailed on the more 
important issue of whether those amounts constituted additional income.430 
Congress recognized that a single case often involves several unrelated 
issues and that the most significant issue may involve a lesser dollar 
amount.431  Thus, § 7430 provides that a party can also qualify as a 
prevailing party if he prevails on the most significant issue or set of issues 
presented.432 An issue or set of issues that concerns a lesser dollar amount 
in the proceeding nonetheless may represent the most significant issue or 
set of issues if it objectively is viewed as such by the taxpayer or the Service.  
This could be the case when the issue or set of issues has significant 
implications for the taxpayer in other tax years or on other transactions, or 
if the issue or set of issues has a significant effect on related parties.433  
  
(2) Government’s Position Not Substantially Justified 
 
As originally enacted, § 7430 permitted reimbursement of the taxpayer’s 
litigation expenses only if the Government’s position in the civil proceeding 
                                                     
428 See Dixson Int’l Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 708 (1990) (taxpayer 
substantially prevailed when asserted deficiencies reduced from $850,000 to 
$15,000); Cassuto v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 256 (1989) (taxpayers substantially 
prevailed when asserted deficiencies of $49,000 were settled for $4,600); Hall v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-187, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 232 (taxpayers 
substantially prevailed when final settlement represented 17 percent of asserted 
deficiency).  But see Bragg v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 715 (1994) (taxpayers did not 
substantially prevail when court upheld more than 70 percent of asserted 
deficiency).   
429 T.C. Memo. 1985-559, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1404.   
430 Id. at 1405–06.  
431 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 15 (1981). 
432 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) (added by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (1982), and amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752).   
433 See McCauley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-44 (citing Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7430-5(e)).    
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was “unreasonable.”434  Whether the Government’s position violated this 
standard of reasonableness was to be made “based upon all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the proceeding,”435 and the taxpayer carried the 
burden of proof on this issue.436  If the taxpayer failed to carry this burden, 
he was not considered a prevailing party for purposes of the statute.   
In connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1986,437 Congress amended 
§ 7430 by changing the requisite standard concerning the Government’s 
position in the proceeding.  Instead of the Government’s position being 
“unreasonable,” Congress adopted the standard of “not substantially 
justified.”438  The amendment resulted in conforming § 7430 more closely 
to the standard for recovery in other civil actions involving the 
Government.  This change in phrasing, however, did not effect a 
considerable change in substance.   
In determining whether the position of the Service was unreasonable 
under TEFRA, the Tax Court looked to cases under EAJA, which requires 
that the Government’s position be “substantially justified” if it is to avoid 
the payment of attorney’s fees and other litigation costs in cases in which it 
does not prevail.439  Some courts in EAJA litigation have considered the 
tests of “reasonableness” and “substantial justification” to be the same.440  
Others, however, have held that the language “substantially justified” 
                                                     
434 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i), as enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 12 (1981) 
(describing the “unreasonable” standard as adopted by TEFRA).  For a thorough 
discussion of the “unreasonable” standard under § 7430 as originally enacted and 
the interpretation of this standard by courts, see Harold Dubroff & Charles M. 
Greene, Recent Developments in the Business and Procedures of the United States Tax Court; 
Part Three: Reimbursement of Taxpayer Litigation Costs, 52 ALB. L. REV. 87, 98–101 
(1987).   
435 Baker v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 822, 828 (1984). 
436 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i), as enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (1982); see also Frisch v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 838, 
840 (1986); DeVenney v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 927, 930 (1985). 
437 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
438 Id. § 1551(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2752.  However, as discussed in Section E.2.b.(3) 
below, the burden of proof remained on the taxpayer to establish that the 
Government’s position was not substantially justified. 
439 See Rutana v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1329, 1333 (1987); Don Casey Co. v. 
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 847, 858–60 (1986); Baker v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 822, 
828 (1984), vacated on other grounds, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
440 See Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir. 1984); Foster v. 
Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1983); S & H Riggers & Erectors, 
Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 672 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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provides for a somewhat more liberal standard of recovery than would be 
required by an ordinary reasonableness standard.441 
Although, recognizing “possible differences” between the “substantially 
justified” and “reasonableness” standards, the Tax Court has approved a 
formulation barring recovery of costs under either standard if the 
Government’s “case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact.”442  The 
“substantially justified” standard does not require that the Government’s 
case be based on a “substantial probability of prevailing.”443  Moreover, the 
Tax Court has stated that “[b]ecause the ‘substantially justified’ standard is 
not a departure from the ‘reasonableness standard,’” the TEFRA legislative 
history remains an important source “for guidelines in evaluating 
respondent’s position.”444   
Reflecting the relevance of reasonableness to the inquiry concerning 
whether the Government’s position is substantially justified, the Tax Court 
has recently articulated the following standard for evaluating the Service’s 
position:  “The Commissioner’s position is substantially justified if it has a 
reasonable basis in both fact and law and is justified to a degree that could 
                                                     
441 See Spencer v. N.L.R.B., 712 F.2d 539, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983); American 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D.D.C.), vacated in part, 
594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984).  The Spencer court considered the test under a 
“substantially justified” standard to be more liberal for recovery, in part, because 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act the language “reasonably justified” was 
rejected in favor of “substantially justified.”  See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 558. 
442 Don Casey Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 847, 859–60 (1986) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11 (1980)); see also Cox v. Commissioner, 121 F.3d 390, 393 
(8th Cir. 1997) (adopting the same standard); Barton v. United States, 988 F.3d 58, 
59 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).  
443 Don Casey Co., 87 T.C. at 859–60 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11 
(1980)).   
444 Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 84 (1987), aff’d, 861 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 
1988); Hubbard v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 792, 798 (1987).  The House report on 
§ 7430, as originally enacted, provided as follows:  
The Committee intends that the determination by the court on this issue is 
to be made on the basis of the facts and legal precedents relating to the case 
as revealed in the record.  Other factors the committee believes might be 
taken into account in making this determination include, (1) whether the 
government used the costs and expenses of litigation against its position to 
extract concessions from the taxpayer that were not justified under the 
circumstances of the case, (2) whether the government pursued the 
litigation against the taxpayer for purposes of harassment or 
embarrassment, or out of political motivation, and (3) such other factors as 
the court finds relevant. 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 12 (1981) (quoted in Sher, 89 T.C. at 84–85). 
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satisfy a reasonable person.”445  This determination is made in light of the 
available facts and controlling law that formed the basis of the 
Government’s position.  Hence, the Government’s position, although 
reasonable when established, may become unreasonable when additional 
facts and changed circumstances arise.446  Additionally, where the 
determination of the Service concerns an exercise of discretion (such as 
whether the taxpayer’s method of accounting clearly reflects income), a 
finding that the Service abused its discretion does not necessarily mean that 
the Service’s position was not substantially justified.447  Lastly, the Service 
generally is not subject to an award of costs under § 7430 where the 
underlying issue represents one of first impression.448   
Prior to 1998, the Government remained “free by law to relitigate prior 
lost issues in other circuits.”449  Concerned that the freedom to continue 
litigating issues previously resolved in favor of the taxpayer by other circuit 
courts of appeals placed an undue burden on taxpayers who were required 
to continue resisting the Government’s position,450 Congress acted to 
disincentivize this practice in 1998.451  The statute now requires a reviewing 
court to take into account whether the Government has lost in courts of 
appeal for other circuits on “substantially similar issues” in evaluating 
whether the Government’s position is substantially justified.452   
As originally enacted by TEFRA, § 7430 did not specify the point at 
which the “position of the United States” to be evaluated under the statute 
took shape.  Specifically, did the position of the Government include the 
position it took in administrative proceedings before commencement of the 
case, or was judicial consideration of the Government’s position under 
§ 7430 limited to the posture assumed during the litigation?453 In Baker v. 
Commissioner,454 the court relied on the specific language of the statute to 
support its conclusion that a taxpayer could not base recovery under § 7430 
                                                     
445 Dalton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-136, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1653, 
1656; see also Hubbard, 89 T.C. at 798 (explaining the “substantially justified” inquiry 
to be “essentially a test of reasonableness”). 
446 See Lippitz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-293, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 330. 
447 See Mid-Del Therapeutic Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-
383, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 894. 
448 See Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 391 (1994).   
449 Allbritton v. Commissioner, 37 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994).    
450 S. REP. NO. 104-174, at 48 (1998). 
451 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 3101(d), 112 Stat. 685, 728 (1998).  
452 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii).   
453 For a thorough discussion of this former issue, see Dubroff & Greene, supra 
note 434, at 106–13.   
454 83 T.C. 822 (1984), vacated on other grounds, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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on an unreasonable administrative position taken by the Service.455  At the 
time, the statute required that the “position of the United States in the civil 
proceeding” be unreasonable for the costs and fees of a prevailing taxpayer to 
be shifted to the Service.456  According to Baker, “Congress clearly 
distinguished a civil proceeding from an administrative proceeding by 
including the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies in 
section 7430(b)(2) before an award may be made of costs incurred in the 
subsequent civil proceeding.”457 
Congress rejected the approach taken by the Tax Court in Baker by 
amending § 7430 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to permit a 
taxpayer to recover litigation costs incurred because of an unreasonable 
position taken by the Service during certain administrative stages of the 
dispute.458  In its current form, the statute provides that the “position of the 
United States” for purposes of § 7430 includes the position taken by the 
Government in a judicial proceeding and the position taken by the 
Government in any administrative proceeding.459  However, the position in 
the latter context is to be determined as of the earlier of the issuance of a 
notice of decision from the IRS Office of Appeals, or the date of the notice 
of deficiency.460  Hence, not all conduct at the administrative level will serve 
                                                     
455 Baker, 83 T.C. at 827; see Wasie v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 962, 967 (1986) 
(holding that costs awarded under section 7430 are . . . measured by looking at the 
reasonableness of respondent’s position from the time of the filing of a petition”). 
456 Baker, 83 T.C. at 826; (quoting I.R.C. § 7430) (emphasis added by court). 
457 Id. at 827 (emphasis added by court). 
458 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551(e), 100 Stat. 2085, 2753 (1986).  Section 
7430(c)(4) as amended in 1986 provided that the term “position of the United 
States” includes “any administrative action or inaction by the District Counsel of 
the Internal Revenue Service (and all subsequent administrative action or inaction) 
upon which [the civil] proceeding is based.”  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B) (1986).   
The Tax Court opposed the amendment because of its concern that the already 
overcrowded Tax Court docket would be further burdened.  Letter from Chief 
Judge Sterrett to Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 
(Oct. 9, 1985) (filed at U.S. Tax Court in Rules Committee: Litigation Costs).  Chief 
Judge Sterrett argued that allowing the taxpayer to recover costs traceable to 
administrative proceedings would require the court to “go behind the statutory 
notice,” and determine whether the Service had acted unreasonably when it first 
decided against the taxpayer.  Id.  The Tax Court had refused to inquire into the 
Service’s actions prior to the filing of the petition and, according to Chief Judge 
Sterrett, requiring it to do so would “reverse the existing law of our Court which 
tries all cases before it as a de novo proceeding.  Id. 
459 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7).  The court may consider the administrative and litigating 
positions of the Government together if the Commissioner maintains the same 
position throughout both stages of the proceedings.  Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 108 T.C. 430, 442 (1997).   
460 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7)(B).   
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as grounds for a § 7430 award of costs.  Hence, positions taken by the 
Service at the examination phase and when the matter is before the IRS 
Office of Appeals (prior to the issuance of a notice of decision) remain 
outside of the scope of the statute.   
 
(3)  Burden of Proof 
 
As originally enacted, § 7430 placed the burden on the taxpayer to 
establish that it was the prevailing party, i.e., that it had substantially 
prevailed in regard to the amount in controversy or a significant issue and 
that the position of the Government was unreasonable.461 Some 
commentators questioned placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer 
since the benefit of the provision would thus tend to be limited to cases in 
which the Service exhibited “egregious misconduct or bad faith.”462  In 
addition, such a standard was more stringent than that applicable in other 
civil actions involving the Government.  Under EAJA, the burden rests on 
the Government to show that its position was substantially justified if it is 
to avoid the payment of costs and fees in cases in which it does not 
prevail.463  Arguably, it would not be difficult for the Service to justify a 
position it has legitimately taken, because it has readily available the tax 
returns, audit reports, and other information on which its position was 
based.464  Taxpayers, however, might be forced to resort to lengthy and 
expensive discovery procedures to obtain information demonstrating that 
the position of the Service was unjustified.  Imposing the burden of proof 
would needlessly and inappropriately hinder efforts to obtain justifiable 
litigation awards. 
                                                     
461 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i), as enacted by TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 
§ 292(a), 96 Stat. 324, 572–74 (1982); see also Frisch v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 838, 
840 (1986); DeVenney v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 927, 930 (1985). 
462 I. Paul Mandelken, Recovering Attorney’s Fees in Tax Court Cases after TEFRA, 
57 FLA. B.J. 707, 710 (1983); see Louise L. Hill, Attorneys’ Fees Under the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 C A Reevaluation, 29 TAX NOTES 203, 204–05 
(1985). 
463 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10.  However, EAJA also makes the “bad faith” 
exception to the “American rule” statutory, see Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 
Stat. 2321, 2328 (1982) (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2)), and the party 
seeking recovery of litigation costs bears the burden of proof on the issue of bad 
faith.  See Mary Ann Link, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax Litigation, 19 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 153, 172 (1985).  Thus, parties seeking attorneys’ fees under EAJA usually 
allege that the position of the Government was not substantially justified, rather 
than alleging bad faith.  Id. at 172–73.  
464 The Government has taken the opposite position arguing that important tax 
records are often in the hands of the taxpayer. See House Hearings, supra note 405, 
at 29 (statement of Glen L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Attorney General, Tax Division, Dep’t 
of Justice). 
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The Service and the Tax Court, however, were concerned that 
transferring the burden of proof from the taxpayer would interfere with the 
orderly operation of tax litigation.465  First, because the matter at issue is 
usually a taxpayer’s private financial transaction, the taxpayer has ready 
access to the facts that can illuminate and lead to the resolution of the 
questions surrounding the transaction.466  Second, the Service and Tax 
Court expressed concern that placing the burden of justifying its position 
on the Service would tend to reduce taxpayer willingness to stipulate and 
settle cases; the greater likelihood of recovery that would result from a 
shifting of the burden of proof to the Service could prove to be a lure to 
taxpayers that might discourage pre-trial settlements and increase the 
burden on the court.467  Despite Senate proposals to allocate the burden of 
proof to the Service,468 Congress retained pre-existing law imposing the 
burden on the taxpayer through the Tax Reform Act of 1986.   
Congress revisited the matter in 1996.  Believing that it was appropriate 
for the Service to demonstrate that it was substantially justified in 
maintaining its position when the taxpayer substantially prevails,469 
Congress shifted the burden of proof on this issue to the Government.470  
Congress further believed that the Service should be required to follow 
published guidance and private guidance provided to taxpayers.471  
Accordingly, in addition to shifting to the Government the burden of 
proving that its position was substantially justified, Congress created a 
rebuttable presumption that the Government’s position lacked substantial 
justification if it did not adhere to published guidance provided to the 
public (including regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, 
information releases, notices, and announcements) or private guidance 
                                                     
465 See House Hearings, supra note 405, at 14–15 (statement of Roscoe L. 
Egger, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service); see also Letter from Chief 
Judge Sterrett to Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy 
(Oct. 9, 1985) (filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Litigation Costs”).  
466 See supra note 464. 
467 See id.  If the taxpayer establishes facts supporting allegations that the 
Government has acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the burden will shift to the 
Government to prove its case.  See House Hearings, supra note 405, at 10 
(statement of Chief Judge Sterrett). 
468 H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 541(b), 132 CONG. REC. S8817, S8850 
(daily ed. June 26, 1986) (subsequently deleted in conference); S. REP. NO. 313, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 198–99 (1986) (reporting on Senate Finance Committee 
proposed amendments to section 541 of H.R. 3838, subsequently enacted as the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085). 
469 H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 37–38 (1996).   
470 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 701(b), 110 Stat. 1463–64 
(1996) (enacting I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i)).   
471 H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 37–38 (1996).   
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(including private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and 
determination letters) issued to the taxpayer seeking § 7430 relief.472  
 
(4)  Qualification as Prevailing Party Through Qualified Offer 
 
Believing that settlement of tax cases should be encouraged whenever 
possible, Congress looked to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to craft an incentive for the Service to settle cases for 
appropriate amounts.473  This exercise led Congress to enact the qualified 
offer provisions of § 7430 as part of the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.474  These provisions supply an 
alternate, less precarious route by which taxpayers may qualify as a 
prevailing party entitled to relief under the statute.  In this context, whether 
the taxpayer substantially prevailed in the proceeding and whether the 
Service’s position was substantially justified are immaterial.   
Pursuant to § 7430(c)(4)(E), if a taxpayer makes a “qualified offer” to 
the Service to settle the tax dispute which the Service rejects, the taxpayer 
will be treated as a prevailing party if the Service later obtains a judgment 
equal to or less than the tax liability specified in the offer (disregarding 
interest).475  A “qualified offer” is defined in § 7430(g) as a written offer to 
the United States made during a defined period beginning on the date the 
Service issues the first letter of proposed deficiency that permits the 
taxpayer to seek a conference before the IRS Office of Appeals and ending 
on the date 30 days in advance of the date the taxpayer’s case is first set for 
trial.476  The offer must specify the amount of the taxpayer’s liability 
(determined without regard to interest).  To put the Service on notice of the 
potential implications, the offer must be designated as a “qualified offer” 
under § 7430 at the time the offer is made.  Finally, in order to give the 
Service sufficient time to evaluate the offer, the offer must remain 
outstanding for 90 days after the offer was made or until the date the trial in 
the case commences, whichever occurs first.477     
                                                     
472 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 701(b), 110 Stat. 1463–64 
(1996) (enacting I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii)).   
473 See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 48 (1998).     
474 Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3101(e), 112 Stat. 685, 728–29 (1998).       
475 A judgment for this purpose does not any judgment issued pursuant to a 
settlement, or a judgment issued in any proceeding in which the amount of tax 
liability is not at issue (such as a declaratory judgment action).  I.R.C. 
§ 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii).  A taxpayer’s subsequent settlement of the case therefor 
precludes recovery of administrative or litigation costs pursuant to the qualified 
offer provisions of § 7430.         
476 I.R.C. § 7430(g)(2).         
477 I.R.C. § 7430(g)(1)(D).  The Service’s rejection of the offer operates to close 
the period the qualified offer must remain open.  Id.  Accordingly, nothing in the 
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To the extent the qualified offer provisions of § 7430 offer taxpayers a 
streamlined means of recovering administrative and litigation costs, the 
streamlined procedure comes at a cost.  In this context, recoverable 
administrative and litigation expenses are limited to those incurred on or 
after the date of the qualified offer.478  This limitation encourages taxpayers 
to make qualified offers as early as possible in the proceeding, in keeping 
with the legislative goal of encouraging settlement of these cases.   
 
c. Protraction of Proceedings 
 
An award of reasonable administrative or litigation costs under § 7430 
to which the taxpayer otherwise would be entitled is precluded to the extent 
attributable to any period during which the taxpayer “unreasonably 
protracted” the proceeding.479  The taxpayer bears the burden of proving 
the absence of unreasonable protraction.480  As a practical matter, this 
means that the taxpayer must include a statement in the motion for costs 
that the taxpayer did not unreasonably protract the proceedings,481 and then 
defend against any such contention by the Service.   
 
d. Financial Requirements 
 
In contrast to EAJA,482 § 7430 as enacted by TEFRA did not base a 
party’s eligibility for an attorney’s fee award on net worth.  Rather, TEFRA 
                                                                                                                       
qualified offer provisions entitles to Service to later accept a qualified offer that it 
previously rejected.         
478 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E)(iii)(II).        
479 I.R.C. § 7430(b)(3); see also Mearkle v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1256 (1988) 
(finding that taxpayer unreasonably protracted proceedings by refusing to accept 
full concession by the Service four months before trial); Nordvick v. 
Commissioner, 67 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding determination that 
taxpayers unreasonably protracted proceedings by failing to promptly review the 
Service’s calculations of their tax liability upon receipt after judgment).  But see 
Mason v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-400, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 805 (holding 
that failure to sign proposed settlement document due to failure to reach agreement 
over litigation costs did not constitute unreasonable protraction of proceedings). 
480 See Swanson v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 76, 85 (1996); TAX CT. R. 232(e) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.).   
481 See TAX CT. R. 231(b)(6) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
482 As enacted, EAJA provided: 
(B) “party” means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed 
$1,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, (ii) a sole owner of an 
unincorporated business, or a partnership, corporation, association, or 
organization whose net worth did not exceed $5,000,000 at the time the 
civil action was filed, except that an organization described in section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 exempt from taxation 
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limited the amount recoverable under § 7430 to $25,000,483 presumably 
providing a disincentive for wealthy persons to pursue litigation with the 
Government in the hopes of winning a litigation award.  Apparently, 
Congress declined to include the economic eligibility requirements of EAJA 
in the TEFRA provisions because of the apprehension that such a 
requirement might create factual disputes which would further burden the 
courts.484  
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress revised § 7430 by 
eliminating the cap on reimbursable costs; in its place, Congress based the 
eligibility of parties for an award of costs under § 7430 on their net 
worth.485  This amendment sought to further congressional policy of 
conforming the standards for recovery of attorney’s fees in tax and non-tax 
cases.486  Under current levels, an award of costs under § 7430 generally is 
not available to individuals whose net worth exceeds $2 million or to 
businesses or organizations whose net worth exceeds $7 million and which 
have more than 500 employees at the time the action was commenced.487  A 
taxpayer must supply proof of net worth when making a request for 
reimbursement of costs under § 7430, 488 and the failure to do so can cause 
the request to be denied.489   
The net worth limitations under § 7430 created confusion concerning 
their application to estates of deceased taxpayers490 and to individuals who 
filed joint returns.491  Seeking to clarify the application of the net worth 
                                                                                                                       
under section 501(a) of the Code and a cooperative association as defined in 
section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, may be a party regardless of 
the net worth of such organization or cooperative association, or (iii) a sole 
owner of an unincorporated business, or a partnership, corporation, 
association, or organization, having not more than 500 employees at the 
time the civil action was filed . . . . 
Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2329 (1980) (amended 1985). 
483 I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (1982). 
484 House Hearings, supra note 405, at 33 (statement of Glen L. Archer, Jr., 
Asst. Attorney General, Tax Division, Dep’t of Justice). 
485 Pub L. No. 99-514, § 1551(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (1986).    
486 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1298–99 (Comm. Print 1987).   
487 See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) (incorporating net worth requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)).  Organizations that are tax exempt pursuant to § 501(c)(3) 
are exempted from the net worth limitation.  28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).    
488 See TAX CT. R. 231(b)(4).   
489 See Dixson Int’l Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 708 (1990). 
490 See, e.g., Boatman’s First Nat’l Bank v United States, 723 F. Supp. 163, 169 
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding the $7 million limit applicable to organizations governed 
the estate’s qualification for a § 7430 award).   
491 See, e.g., Hong v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 88 (1993) (applying the $2 million 
limitation separately to each spouse).     
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requirements of § 7430 so as to avoid “needless litigation over procedural 
issues,”492 Congress enacted § 7430(c)(4)(D) as part of the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997.493  This provision clarifies that an estate of a deceased 
individual must satisfy the $2 million net worth limitation as of the date of 
the decedent’s death.494  A trust also must satisfy the $2 million net worth 
limitation, as determined on the last day of the taxable year involved in the 
proceeding. 495 With respect to spouses filing joint returns, the amending 
legislation clarified that the $2 million limitation would be applied separately 
to each spouse.496  Accordingly, if one spouse possesses a net worth in 
excess of $2 million but the other does not, an award of costs under § 7430 
will be available for the qualifying spouse only.  The 1997 legislation did not 
address the application of the net worth and size limitations under § 7430 to 
partnership actions brought under the TEFRA unified audit and litigation 
procedures,497 and confusion persists as to whether the net worth 
limitations should be applied at the entity or partner level.498    
 
e. Reimbursable Costs 
 
(1)  Reasonable Litigation Costs 
 
In its original form, § 7430 limited a taxpayer’s recovery to “reasonable 
litigation costs.”  Reimbursable litigation costs include the following:  court 
fees; attorneys’ fees; expenses of expert witnesses; and the costs of any 
study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project necessary to preparation 
of the taxpayer’s case.499   
Perhaps the most significant of these litigation costs is attorneys’ fees.  
This category encompasses not only the rates charged by licensed attorneys 
representing the taxpayer, but also expenses attributable to paralegals and 
law clerks.500 The fees charged by non-attorney representatives authorized 
to practice before the Tax Court also are recoverable under this category.501  
The statutory rate for recoverable attorney’s fees is set at $125 per hour, as 
                                                     
492 H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 638–39 (1993). 
493 Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1453(a), 111 Stat. 788, 1055 (1997).   
494 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).   
495 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(II). 
496 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(ii). 
497 See I.R.C. §§ 6226, 6228. 
498 See Foothill Ranch Co. Partnership v. Commission, 110 T.C. 94 (1998) 
(reasoning that the net worth limitations were to be applied at the partner level in 
this context). 
499 I.R.C. § 7430(c))(1).     
500 See O’Bryon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-379, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 
859.   
501 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(3)(A).   
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adjusted for increases in the cost of living from 1995.502  As of 2013, the 
inflation-adjusted hourly rate stood at $190. 503    
The showing of a special factor by the taxpayer may serve to increase 
the rate for fees of a representative.504  The limit on recoverable fees does 
not apply to a representative who qualifies as a “specially qualified 
representative” under the regulations.505  A specially qualified representative 
is narrowly defined as a representative possessing distinctive knowledge or a 
unique and specialized skill that is necessary for adequate representation of 
the taxpayer in the proceeding.506  The regulations clarify that knowledge of 
tax law and experience representing taxpayers before the Service do not 
constitute distinctive knowledge or a specialized skill set in this setting, 
while citing knowledge of patent law or international law as two examples 
of distinctive knowledge or skill sets that do qualify.507   
For costs incurred before January 18, 1999, only one special factor was 
included in the statutory language of § 7430:  the limited availability of 
qualified attorneys for the proceeding.508  In 1998, Congress added two 
considerations that it believed justified the payment of higher hourly rates 
when determining reasonable costs:  the difficulty of the issues presented in 
the case or the limited local availability of tax expertise.509  To avail the 
special factor adjustment, a taxpayer must show that no specially qualified 
representative was available at the statutory rate.  The taxpayer may do so 
by submitting an affidavit by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s counsel that a 
specially qualified representative who practices within a reasonable distance 
from the taxpayer’s principal residence or office would normally charge a 
client similar to the taxpayer at a rate higher than the statutorily prescribed 
amount.510 
Believing that the value of legal services rendered in pro bono 
representation of taxpayers should be recognized and that pro bono 
representation should be encouraged, and, further, that the Service should 
not be relieved of its obligation to bear reasonable administrative and 
litigation costs because representation was provided to the taxpayer on a 
                                                     
502 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii), (c)(1)(B) (flush language).   
503 Rev. Proc. 2012-41, § 3.25, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539.   
504 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).  
505 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(2)(ii). 
506 Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(2)(ii). 
507 Id.; see also Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(special factor justifying increased hourly rate requires nonlegal or technical 
abilities). 
508 See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). 
509 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206 § 3101(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 727–28 (1998) (amending I.R.C. 
§ 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, at 58 (1997). 
510  Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(3)(iii)(C). 
Prominence in Judicial Review of Taxpayer Rights           525 
 
pro bono basis,511 Congress expanded the scope of reimbursable costs 
under § 7430 into the pro bono arena.512  Pursuant to § 7430(c)(3)(B), a 
court may award reasonable attorney’s fees in excess of fees paid or 
incurred if the fees are less than the reasonable attorney’s fees because an 
individual is representing the prevailing party for no fee or a nominal fee.513  
The exception for pro bono representation does not extend to attorneys 
who represent themselves in tax proceedings; the opportunity cost of the 
taxpayer-attorney’s services remains unrecoverable.514   
 
(2)  Reasonable Administrative Costs 
 
Passage of TAMRA in 1988 expanded the scope of expenses subject to 
a § 7430 award to include reasonable administrative costs.515  In addition to 
administrative fees or similar charges imposed by the Service, the scope of 
reimbursable administrative expenses encompasses the same scope of 
professional fees (attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, etc.) that are capable 
of being reimbursed in the litigation setting, and the reasonableness of such 
administrative costs are determined in the same manner as that of litigation 
costs.516   
The scope of reimbursable administrative costs is limited to those 
incurred on or after the earliest of (1) the date the taxpayer receives the 
notice of decision from the IRS Office of Appeals, (2) the date of the 
notice of deficiency, or (3) the date the Service sends the first letter of 
proposed deficiency that allows the taxpayer an opportunity to seek a 
conference with the IRS Office of Appeals (the 30-day letter).517  For 
purposes of determining whether the Service’s position in the 
                                                     
511  H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, at 58 (1997). 
512  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 3101(c), 112 Stat. at 728 (1998). 
513  Any award pursuant to this exception must be paid to the individual who 
rendered the services or such individual’s employer.  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(3)(B).   
514  Frisch v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 838 (1986).   
515  Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6239, 102 Stat. 3743–46 (1988) (enacting I.R.C. 
§ 7430(c)(2)).  
516  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(B); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 225 (1988). 
517 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2).  The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 added the third option (30-day letter) for costs incurred more 
than 180 days after July 22, 1998.  Prior to that amendment, administrative costs 
could only be reimbursed from the earlier of the date of the notice of deficiency or 
the date the taxpayer received a decision from the IRS Office of Appeals. See Estate 
of Gillespie v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 395, 396–98 (1994).  The lack of the third 
demarcation point had been criticized by practitioners as not truly affording most 
taxpayers the opportunity to receive any administrative costs. See Taxation Section 
Los Angeles County Bar Association, Legislative Recommendation to Amend the Internal 
Revenue Code Section 7430, 89 TAX NOTES TODAY 127–24 (May 1, 1989). 
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administrative setting was substantially justified, the Service’s position is 
established as of the earlier of either the date the taxpayer receives notice of 
decision from the IRS Office of Appeals, or the date of the notice of 
deficiency.518   
A taxpayer may seek reimbursement for the costs of resolving the 
controversy and the costs to seek such reimbursement.519  To do so, a 
taxpayer must submit an application with the Service for administrative 
costs within 90 days of the Service’s final decision as to the tax, interest, or 
penalty.520  As discussed below, the Service’s determination in this setting is 
subject to Tax Court review.521   
 
3. Tax Court Jurisdiction 
 
a. Review of Agency Determinations Concerning Administrative 
Costs 
 
A taxpayer who seeks reimbursement from the Service of administrative 
costs pursuant to § 7430(b)(4) may seek Tax Court review of the resulting 
determination § 7430(f)(2).  If the Service sends a notice of decision 
concerning the request for administrative expenses to the taxpayer by 
registered or certified mail, the taxpayer must file a petition for Tax Court 
review within 90 days of such mailing.522  If the Service does not respond to 
a taxpayer’s request for administrative costs within six months of its filing, 
the Service’s failure to respond is deemed a decision denying such 
request.523  The taxpayer may then petition the Tax Court for review, but is 
not subject to the 90-day limitations period for invoking the court’s 
jurisdiction.  
The court conducts its review generally in accordance with small tax 
case procedures of § 7463, except that the monetary limitations imposed by 
§ 7463 do not apply.524  Any decision of the court disposing of a petition 
for review of a determination concerning administrative costs is appealable 
in the same manner as a decision of the court.525  Accordingly, unlike small 
                                                     
518  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7).     
519  Maggie Management Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 430, 440 (1997) (“A 
motion for litigation costs may seek an award for certain expenses connected with 
the filing and prosecution of the motion . . . .”).   
520  I.R.C. § 7430(b)(4).   
521  I.R.C. § 7430(f)(2).   
522  Id.   
523  See Bent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-146, 97  T.C.M. (CCH) 1825 
(citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-2(c)(6)). 
524  I.R.C. § 7430(f)(2); see also TAX Ct. R. 274 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
525  I.R.C. § 7430(f)(3). 
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tax cases, the decision in a petition for administrative costs will not be 
issued as a summary opinion.526 
Relatively few opinions have addressed taxpayer claims for 
administrative costs brought pursuant to § 7430(f)(2).  And in those cases, 
taxpayers have largely proven unsuccessful at pursuing their claims.  One 
particularly difficult aspect of these claims is that the “position of the 
United States” that must be substantially justified does not include the 
Service’s position at every stage of the administrative process.  Rather, the 
position cannot exist prior to the earlier of the date the IRS Office of 
Appeals issues a notice of decision or the date the Service issues a notice of 
deficiency.527  The taxpayers in Rathburn v. Commissioner528 encountered this 
problem.  The taxpayers never received a notice of deficiency, and the 
communication they received from an Appeals Officer did not rise to the 
level of a notice of decision contemplated by § 7430.  Accordingly, the 
Service never took a position in the taxpayers’ case, which in turn precluded 
the taxpayers from qualifying as prevailing parties under the statute.529   
 
b. Motions to Recover Litigation or Administrative Costs in 
Docketed Cases 
 
If the Tax Court’s jurisdiction has been invoked in a proceeding 
concerning the underlying tax liability, a taxpayer seeking reimbursement of 
litigation and administrative costs under § 7430 does so by filing a written 
motion with the court.530  The motion must be filed within 30 days of 
service on the parties of either an opinion resolving the substantive issues, 
or a transcript of the oral findings of fact and opinion.531  If the parties have 
settled all other issues in the case, but do not agree on an award for 
reasonable administrative costs, then a motion for those costs must 
accompany the stipulation of settlement.532  
It is important to emphasize that a claim for litigation or administrative 
costs under § 7430 “is to be made only after all of the other issues in the 
                                                     
526  See TAX Ct. R. 274 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
527  See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7).   
528  125 T.C. 7 (2005).     
529  Id. at 14; see also Florida Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 73 
(2004) (similarly holding that the taxpayer was not a prevailing party due to the 
failure of the Service to take a § 7430 position in the administrative proceeding); 
Kwestel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-135, 93 T.C.M. 1288 (same).   
530  See TAX CT. R. 231(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
531  TAX CT. R. 231(a)(2)(A), (B) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
532 TAX CT. R. 231(a)(2)(C) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  For fully settled cases, including 
where the parties agree to the award of reasonable litigation and administrative 
costs, the parties include the amount of administrative costs in their stipulated 
decision filed with the court.  TAX CT. R. 231(a)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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case have been either settled by the parties or determined by the Court.”533  
A claim for litigation or administrative costs which is included in the 
petition, or otherwise made before the decision on the merits of the case, 
will not be considered.534   
The Tax Court addressed the ripeness of the taxpayer’s claim for 
litigation and administrative expenses in McWilliams v. Commissioner.535  The 
Service in that case had made a jeopardy assessment and levy against the 
taxpayer while his case was pending before the court.  After finding that the 
Service failed to prove that the jeopardy assessment and levy was reasonable 
and pursuant to taxpayer’s motion under § 7429, the court ordered the 
assessment abated and the levy released.536  The taxpayer filed his motion 
for costs under § 7430 within 30 days of the decision concerning the § 7429 
matter.  However, several other issues related to the deficiency proceeding 
remained, none of which had been decided when the taxpayer filed his 
motion.  The court reasoned that the jeopardy assessment decision was 
separate from the deficiency proceeding, and that its order concerning the 
jeopardy assessment and levy did not constitute an interlocutory ruling.537  
Consequently, the taxpayer’s motion for costs attributable to the § 7429 
proceeding was not premature.538  
Following service of a motion for litigation or administrative costs, the 
Commissioner must file a written response within 60 days.539  After the date 
for filing the Commissioner’s response, the Service and the taxpayer are 
required to confer and attempt to reach an agreement regarding each of the 
allegations by the parties.540  Nonetheless, once the Commissioner’s 
response is received, the court may take action on the motion.541  
Ordinarily, the court will dispose of the motion without a hearing, unless 
there appears to exist a “bona fide factual dispute” that cannot be resolved 
                                                     
533 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 231, 79 T.C. 1155 (1982); see also  Stevenson 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-207, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, 1061–62 n.14 
(rejecting litigation cost claims included in petition); Roth v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1986-20, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 287, 289 n.6 (same). 
534 Tax Court Rules provide that “[a] claim for reasonable litigation costs shall 
not be included in the petition.”  TAX CT. R. 34(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see also Failla v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-39, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 355, 365 (1986) (“In 
general, the time for making such claims is after the substantive issues have been 
resolved.  Should petitioners desire to pursue this matter, they must comply with 
Rules 230 and 231.”) 
535  104 T.C. 320 (1995). 
536  Id. at 321. 
537  Id. at 325–26. 
538  Id. at 326. 
539  TAX CT. R. 232(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
540 TAX CT. R. 232(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
541 TAX CT. R. 232(a)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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otherwise.542 The disposition of the motion for litigation costs will be 
included in the court’s decision,543 and an order which grants or denies a 
motion for a litigation award is subject to appeal in the same manner as a 
decision or judgment.544   
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to resolve a party’s motion for reasonable 
litigation or administrative expenses under § 7430 following the court’s 
dismissal of the underlying proceeding for lack of jurisdiction presents an 
interesting issue.  In the 1986 case of Fuller v. Commissioner,545 the Tax Court 
refused to entertain a motion for an award of litigation costs after dismissal 
of a case for lack of jurisdiction due to an invalid statutory notice.546  The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently adopted a corresponding 
view when affirming an order of the Tax Court, holding that the court had 
no jurisdiction to hear a motion for an award of litigation costs when it did 
not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.547 
The Fuller decision did not prove long lasting.  The Tax Court overruled 
it a year later in Weiss v. Commissioner.548  The Service in Weiss moved to 
dismiss because of its failure to comply with the TEFRA partnership 
provisions.549  The motion was granted and the petitioners moved for an 
award of litigation costs.550  Although the Tax Court reserved judgment on 
whether the petitioner qualified for a litigation award, the court concluded 
that it had the authority to grant a motion for a litigation award if 
appropriate.551  The court, in rejecting its prior position, stated that it had 
previously failed to properly consider the language “in any civil proceeding” 
that then appeared in the statute.552  A case commences with the filing of a 
petition with the Tax Court and “[i]t is axiomatic that a case properly 
commenced is a civil proceeding.”553  According to Weiss, dismissal of an 
action “does not nullify the proceeding or void the petition,” and the 
dismissal has binding legal effect to preclude assessing the deficiency 
                                                     
542 TAX CT. R. 232(a)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
543 I.R.C. § 7430(f)(1); TAX CT. R. 232(f) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
544 I.R.C. § 7430(f)(1).  
545 T.C. Memo. 1986-33, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 336.  In Fuller, the notice of 
deficiency was invalid because it attempted to determine a deficiency for 
partnership items outside the procedures prescribed by §§ 6221–6233.   
546 Id. at 337–38. 
547 Sanders v. Commissioner, 813 F.2d 859, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1987).  
548 88 T.C. 1036 (1987). 
549 Id. at 1037.   
550 Id. at 1037. 
551 Id.   
552 Id. at 1039–40 (analyzing I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1986)). The statute now refers to 
“court proceeding” that means “any civil action” brought in a court of the United 
States.  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(6).  
553 Weiss, 88 T.C. at 1039. 
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previously determined.554  Having reasoned that a case does not lose its 
nature as a civil proceeding following dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the 
court held that it had the authority under § 7430(a)(2) to award reasonable 
litigation costs.555  The Tax Court’s holding in Weiss was examined and 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sponza v. Commissioner. 556   
 
F. Review of Whistleblower Award Determinations 
 
The ability of the Service to pay awards to informants who provide 
information concerning violations of the tax laws has a long history, with 
the origins of the whistleblower program tracing back to 1867.557  Prior to 
2006, the whistleblower program as reflected in § 7623 essentially amounted 
to a legislative grant of agency discretion.558  The Service decided whether 
payment of an award was appropriate and, subject to relatively modest 
dollar-denominated statutory caps, the amount of any such award.559  A 
disappointed informant possessed little if any recourse.  Judicial review was 
thought to rest with the Court of Federal Claims, yet that court repeatedly 
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review denials of awards on 
grounds that the statute and implementing guidance did not create a 
                                                     
554 Id. 
555 Id. 
556 844 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1988).   
557  For a historical perspective on the IRS Whistleblower Program, see Internal 
Revenue Service, History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program (2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/History-of-the-Whilstleblower-Informant-Program; see 
also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 
360–68 (2008).   
558  Prior to the amendment of the statute in 2006, § 7623 provided as follows: 
The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized 
to pay such sums as he deems necessary for— 
  (1)   detecting underpayments of tax, and  
  (2) detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of 
violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at the same,  
in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided by law.   
Any amount payable under the preceding sentence shall be paid from the 
proceeds of amounts collected by reason of the information provided, 
and any amount so collected shall be available for such payments.   
I.R.C. § 7623 (prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1) (2006)).   
559  See Sarcena v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“It is clear . 
. . that the District Director has complete discretion in the first instance to 
determine whether an award should be made and, in the second, to fix what, in his 
judgment, amounts to adequate compensation.”); see also Ventry, supra note 557, at 
362 (noting that § 7623 awards were capped at $2 million under prior law, with the 
cap standing at $50,000 as late as 1989).   
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substantive right to monetary damages.560  If the Government decided to 
pay a discretionary award to an informant, the amount of the award would 
not be disturbed unless the determination lacked a rational basis.561         
Following the release of a report by the Treasury Inspector General for 
Tax Administration detailing shortcomings in the Whistleblower 
Program,562 Congress overhauled § 7623 as part of the Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006.563  Preserving the prior discretionary program in a 
slightly modified form in § 7623(a), the legislation introduced a non-
discretionary award program through § 7623(b).  Pursuant to this new 
provision, if the Commissioner proceeds with administrative or judicial 
action based on information provided by an informant, the informant is 
entitled to a minimum award of 15 percent of the collected proceeds—
including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and other additional 
amounts—resulting from the action or from any settlement reached in 
response to the action.564  While these awards are subject to a statutory cap 
of 30 percent of collected proceeds,565 whistleblower awards under 
§ 7623(b) are not subject to an absolute dollar-figure ceiling.     
The non-discretionary whistleblower award program under § 7623(b) is 
not available across the board.  The amount in dispute between the 
Government and the taxpayer to whom the disclosed information relates 
must exceed $2 million.566  Furthermore, if the disclosed information 
pertains to an individual, the individual’s gross income for the year at issue 
                                                     
560 In Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit explained that the existence of the whistleblower statute and 
administrative guidance concerning its application did not operate to create an 
implied-in-fact contract obligating the Government to pay an informant.  Rather, a 
contractual obligation would arise only once the Government agreed to pay the 
informant a specific sum for the disclosed information.  Id. at 1309; see also 
Destefano v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 291 (2002); Confidential Informant v. 
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1 (2000) (both holding that § 7623 did not constitute a 
money-mandating statute).     
561 See Saracena v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (placing 
burden on plaintiff to establish the absence of a rational basis to support the 
Government’s determination of amount of award); see also Krug, 168 F.3d at 1310 
(suggesting that the Government’s exercise of discretion to determine an award 
may not be subject to review at all based on administrative law norms).     
562 See Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, The Informants’ 
Rewards Program Needs More Centralized Management Oversight, 2006-30-092 
(June 6, 2006).   
563 Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 2958–60 (2006).   
564  I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).  This provision applies to information provided by the 
informant on or after the December 20, 2006 effective date of the amending 
legislation.  Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2960.   
565  Id.   
566 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5)(B).   
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must exceed $200,000.567  For cases that fail to satisfy these thresholds, the 
pre-existing discretionary award program of § 7623(a) remains available. 
The amount of a non-discretionary award under § 7623(b) is subject to a 
host of potential reductions.  In cases where the informant’s disclosure 
constitutes a “less substantial contribution”568 due to the Government’s 
access to the information through other means, the Service may reduce the 
amount of the award (presumably to zero), and the award is subject to a 
considerably reduced cap of 10 percent of the collected proceeds.569  
Additionally, the informant’s participation in the disclosed activity may 
adversely affect the amount of the award.  The Commissioner is authorized 
to reduce any non-discretionary award under § 7623(b) upon a 
determination that the informant planned or initiated the actions that led to 
the underpayment of tax or violation of the tax laws.  If the informant is 
criminally convicted for this behavior, the Commissioner must deny the 
award altogether.570 
In addition to strengthening the rights of informants to monetary 
awards for their disclosures, the 2006 amendments to § 7623 addressed the 
prevailing absence of judicial review of award determinations.  Pursuant to 
§ 7623(b)(4), an informant may appeal any determination affecting a non-
discretionary award under § 7623(b) to the Tax Court within 30 days of 
such determination.571  In somewhat redundant fashion, the statute 
parenthetically affirms the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to entertain such an 
appeal.  Although the statute does not limit judicial review to the Tax Court 
in literal terms, the Court of Federal Claims has interpreted the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction as exclusive in this context.572  The court justified this 
interpretation by pointing to the statute’s singular provision of an appeal 
right to the Tax Court against the prevailing backdrop of the absence of 
judicial review of whistleblower award determinations.573   
                                                     
567 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5)(A).   
568 A “less substantial contribution” concerns a disclosure based on allegations 
“resulting from a judicial or administrative hearing, from a government report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media.” I.R.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A).   
569  Id.   
570 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(3).   
571  Tax Court review is available only for appeals from determinations that 
relate to information provided by the informant after the December 20, 2006 
effective date of the amending legislation.  Wolf v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2007-133, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1273.    
572  See Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549 (2008).   
573  The Court of Federal Claims in Dacosta relied heavily on the Supreme Court 
decision in Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501 (2007), in which the Court reasoned 
that the grant of jurisdiction to the Tax Court to review the Secretary’s 
determinations concerning the abatement of interest under § 6404(e) was exclusive.        
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The Tax Court’s jurisdiction under § 7623(b)(4) is predicated upon a 
determination by the Commissioner “regarding” a non-discretionary award 
under § 7623(b), followed by the filing of a petition within 30 days of such 
determination.574  The issue of what constitutes a determination by the 
Commissioner in this setting therefore assumes critical importance.  The 
2006 legislation directed the Secretary to issue guidance concerning the 
operation of a Whistleblower Office to be administered by the Service.575  
The Commissioner did so through the issuance of Notice 2008-4576 which, 
among other things, provides that the Whistleblower Office will send 
written correspondence to the informant once a final determination 
regarding the informant’s claim has been made.577  In most cases, this item 
of correspondence will serve as the predicate to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
in this setting.      
The Commissioner initially took the position that a determination giving 
rise to Tax Court jurisdiction under § 7623(b)(4) referred to a determination 
by the Service to make an award to the informant after the Whistleblower 
Office undertook administrative or judicial action in response to the 
disclosed information.578  Under this interpretation, Tax Court review under 
§ 7623(b)(4) would be limited to examining the amount of any award the 
Commissioner decided to issue.  A decision to deny a § 7623(b) award 
altogether, on the other hand, would continue to escape judicial scrutiny.579  
The Tax Court rejected this narrow interpretation of a § 7623(b) 
                                                     
574 The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure governing review of 
whistleblower award determinations are contained in Rules 340 to 344.  In a press 
release accompanying the issuance of these provisions, the Tax Court explained 
that, generally applicable statutory provisions, Tax Court Rule 103, and related case 
law provide authority for a petitioner seeking review of a whistleblower award 
determination to request to proceed anonymously and to seal the record in 
appropriate circumstances.  See United States Tax Court, Press Release, Oct. 3, 
2008, at 5.     
575 Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(b)(1), 120 Stat. 2959 (2006).   
576 2008-1 C.B. 253; see also Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 25.2.2 (Dec. 30, 
2008) (providing procedural guidance on the processing of whistleblower claims).    
577 2008-1 C.B. at 256.  Note that the determination of an informant’s award 
may be made well in advance of payment, as awards are paid only out of collected 
proceeds.   
578 See Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70, 75 (2010); see also Friedland v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-90, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1422, 1423.    
579 Pursuant to internal guidance, whistleblower claims will be denied if the 
information supplied by the claimant does not (1) identify a federal tax issue upon 
which the Service will act; (2) result in the detection of an underpayment of tax; or 
(c) result in the collection of proceeds.  See Internal Revenue Manual pt. 
25.2.2.12(2) (Dec. 30, 2008).   
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determination in Cooper v. Commissioner,580 noting that the breadth of the 
jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court encompasses appeals of a 
determination to deny an award.   
Borrowing from other areas of its expanded non-deficiency jurisdiction, 
the court in Cooper further explained that the form of the Service’s 
determination was not dispositive.  A determination with respect to a 
§ 7623(b) award sufficient to implicate Tax Court review need only 
constitute a final administrative decision concerning the informant’s 
whistleblower claim issued pursuant to established administrative 
procedures.581        
The Tax Court examined the nature of the 30-day period for filing an 
appeal of a § 7623(b) award determination in Friedland v. Commissioner.582   
The petitioner in Friedland received four letters from the IRS Whistleblower 
Office in response to his claim.  The first letter denied the petitioner’s 
claim, providing generic justifications for the denial of whistleblower 
awards and asserting the absence of legal authority to provide a more 
specific explanation for the denial of the petitioner’s claim.  The subsequent 
three letters simply reaffirmed the initial denial determination and were 
issued in response to later inquiries from the petitioner concerning the 
denial or the petitioner’s provision of additional information.  One of these 
subsequent letters informed the petitioner that he could challenge the 
decision of the Whistleblower Office by writing “to the U.S. Court of Claim 
(sic)” in Washington, DC.  The petitioner thereafter filed a complaint in the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which that court subsequently dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Approximately three weeks after this 
dismissal but over seven months after the Commissioner’s issuance of the 
initial determination to deny a § 7623(b) award, the petitioner filed a 
petition to appeal the Commissioner’s determination to the Tax Court.  
Recognizing that the petitioner “may have relied on the erroneous advice of 
the Whistleblower Office” and expressing its sympathy for the petitioner, 
the Tax Court determined that it lacked the authority to provide equitable 
relief.583  The court found compliance with the 30-day filing period to be a 
                                                     
580  135 T.C. at 70, 75 (2010) (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 6408, THE “TAX RELIEF AND HEALTH CARE 
ACT OF 2006,” at 89 (2006), which explained that an individual could appeal both 
the amount and the denial of an award to the Tax Court); see also Friedland v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-90, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1422, 1423 (standing by 
holding in Cooper).     
581 135 T.C. at 76.  While this approach potentially expands the range of 
documents that can serve as the predicate to Tax Court review, this approach also 
necessarily expands the range of documents that can operate to commence the 30-
day limitations period for invoking the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. 
582  T.C. Memo. 2011-90, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1422.   
583 Id.  
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prerequisite to its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Accordingly, the 
petitioner’s failure to file his petition within the 30-day period following the 
Government’s determination—however justified that failure may have 
been—deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.   
Apart from establishing the predicate to and limitations period for 
pursuing an appeal of a § 7623(b) determination, the statute is silent on 
important aspects of the Tax Court’s review in this setting.  Specifically, the 
statute fails to address the level of deference the Tax Court should afford to 
the Commissioner’s determination (standard of review), as well as the 
evidence the court may consider in fulfilling its appellate function (scope of 
review).  One would expect determinations that are not the product of 
agency discretion under § 7623(b) (e.g., whether the information provided 
by the petitioner led to administrative or judicial action that resulted in the 
collection of tax so as to warrant a minimum award under § 7623(b)(1); 
whether the information provided constituted a “less substantial 
contribution” within the meaning of § 7623(b)(2)(A) warranting a reduced 
ceiling on the award percentage; whether the petitioner planned or initiated 
the actions that led to the underpayment of tax or violation of tax laws so as 
to warrant a reduction in the award under § 7623(b)(3)) will be reviewed by 
the Tax Court on a de novo basis.  On the other hand, to the extent a 
determination under § 7623(b) rests in the discretion of the Commissioner 
(e.g., the determination concerning the particular percentage award to be 
paid within the 15 percent and 30 percent parameters of § 7623(b)(1); the 
appropriate amount of reduction in the amount of the award pursuant to 
§ 7623(b)(2) or (b)(3)), a more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review would appear appropriate.   
With respect to the proper scope of the Tax Court’s review, the court 
announced its expectation that this issue would be resolved through case 
law when it issued the procedural rules governing whistleblower award 
review cases.584  While decisions addressing the scope of the court’s review 
in other contexts involving the expansion of the court’s non-deficiency 
jurisdiction undoubtedly will prove relevant,585 the breadth of issues 
                                                     
584 See United States Tax Court, Press Release, Oct. 3, 2008, at 5 (noting the 
absence of “specific statutory direction” concerning whether whistleblower actions 
are to be decided based on the administrative record).     
585 See, e.g., Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the Tax Court was limited to the administrative record in considering a 
taxpayer’s “appeal” of a collection due process determination under § 6330(d)), rev’g 
123 T.C. 85 (2004); Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the Tax Court, in exercising authority to “determine” appropriate innocent 
spouse relief pursuant to § 6015(e), may conduct trial de novo); Porter v. 
Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008) (concluding that a determination of whether a 
spouse is entitled to equitable relief from joint and several liability is to be made 
based on a trial de novo).  On this note, the fashioning of the Tax Court’s 
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potentially affecting awards under § 7623(b)—which could include facts 
concerning the taxpayer to whom the supplied information relates—will 
complicate the scope of review determination in this setting.  
In Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Commissioner,586 the Tax Court addressed a 
taxpayer’s request to maintain the confidentiality of his identity as he 
prosecuted an appeal of the Commissioner’s denial of a whistleblower 
award.  The petitioner in that case moved for a protective order requesting 
that the record in the case be sealed or, alternatively, that he be granted 
anonymity throughout the proceeding, fearing professional ostracism and 
harassment if his identity became known to his current employer.587  As 
noted by the Tax Court in the case, § 7623 does not expressly address the 
privacy interests of whistleblowers or the parties to whom the 
whistleblower claims relate.588  Shortly after revamping the whistleblower 
program in 2006, the House and the Senate approved legislation that would 
permit the Tax Court to seal portions of the record in these cases.589  This 
provision was not enacted, however, as the larger legislative package failed 
to survive a presidential veto.  Nonetheless, in promulgating the rules of 
practice and procedure to govern whistleblower cases, the court noted its 
ability to permit a petitioner to proceed anonymously and to seal the record 
when appropriate.590  The Commissioner opposed the petitioner’s request 
to preserve the confidentiality of his identity, contending that 
relinquishment of confidentiality was a natural consequence of the 
petitioner’s decision to pursue judicial review of the adverse 
determination.591    
                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction under § 7623(b) to entertain an “appeal” of a whistleblower 
determination award as opposed to making its own “determination” of the 
appropriate award may prove relevant to the evidence the court may consider in 
reviewing whistleblower award determinations.   
586 137 T.C. 183 (2011).   
587 See id. at 185.  The petitioner’s whistleblower claim related to his former 
employer.     
588 See id. at 191.   
589 As passed by the Senate on March 29, 2007, the U.S. Troop Readiness, 
Veterans’ Health, and Iraq Accountability Act contained the following provision: 
Publicity of Appeals—Notwithstanding sections 7458 and 7461, the Tax 
Court may, in order to preserve the anonymity, privacy, or confidentiality of 
any person under this subsection [section 7463(b)], provide by rules 
adopted under section 7453 that portions of filings, hearings, testimony, 
evidence, and reports in connection with proceedings under this subsection 
may be closed to the public or inspection by the public.    
H.R. 1591, 110th Cong., § 543(c).   
590 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 340, 130 T.C. 586 (2008) (citing 
authority under “generally applicable statutory provisions, Rule 103, and related 
caselaw”).     
591 See Whistleblower 14106-10W, 137 T.C. at 205.  
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In ruling on the petitioner’s motion, the court balanced the petitioner’s 
legitimate privacy interest as a confidential informant592 together with the 
nature and severity of the specific harm alleged to result from disclosure of 
the petitioner’s identity against the harm to relevant social interests favoring 
publicity of the court’s proceedings.593  In evaluating the potential harm 
suffered by the petitioner through disclosure, the court noted that the 
absence of anti-retaliatory provisions in § 7623 made the prospect of harm 
particularly acute.  Even though the petitioner’s information related to a 
former employer, the court was persuaded that revealing the petitioner’s 
identity could severely damage his standing in the professional community 
through which petitioner derived his livelihood.594  Finding the competing 
social interests to be mixed,595 the court specifically rejected the 
Commissioner’s “take-it-or-leave-it” approach to confidentiality as likely 
having a chilling effect on claimants seeking judicial review of whistleblower 
award determinations as being at odds with the congressional purpose of 
promoting public confidence in the whistleblower program through the 
availability of judicial oversight.596  Accordingly, the court ordered that any 
information that would tend to reveal the petitioner’s identity be redacted 
from the record, as well as any information that would identify the subject 
of petitioner’s whistleblower claim.597  Believing these steps to be sufficient 
to address the petitioner’s concerns, the court denied the more drastic 
remedy of sealing the entire record. 598   
The opinion in Whistleblower 14106-10W was reviewed by the court 
without dissent.  However, a concurring opinion stated the view that the 
court will not automatically grant anonymity merely because the petitioner 
raises the prospect of resulting employment discrimination.599  Accordingly, 
claimants seeking judicial review of adverse whistleblower award 
determinations must still weigh the imprecise prospect of identity disclosure 
in connection with invoking the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this setting.  
 
 
                                                     
592 The court noted that the Service’s policy to treat tax whistleblowers as 
confidential informants.  See id. at 202 (citing relevant portions of the Internal 
Revenue Manual).   
593 Id. at 203. 
594 Id. at 203–04.  The court noted that the Service’s policy to treat tax 
whistleblowers as confidential informants.  See id. at 202 (citing relevant portions of 
the Internal Revenue Manual).  
595 Id. at 205. 
596 Id. at 206. 
597 Id. 
598 Id. at 207. 
599 Id. at 208 (Halpern, J., concurring).  
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On July 17, 1924, one day after the original Board of Tax Appeals 
members were sworn in, the Board undertook its first order of business, the 
drafting of its procedural rules.  In view of its essentially judicial character, 
the adversarial nature of the proceedings over which it would preside, and 
the clear legislative intent that a court-like procedure be employed, the 
Board had little choice but to adopt generally formal procedural rules.  
Within this framework, however, Congress had given broad discretion to 
the Board to specify the particulars of the rules it would follow. 
In formulating its rules regarding pretrial procedure, the Board was 
undoubtedly mindful of several important considerations.  First, procedures 
had to be adopted to provide a documentary basis for the appeal.  Both 
taxpayer and Government needed to be responsible for stating their 
respective positions in writing in a manner that would apprise the adverse 
party and the Board of the nature of the controversy.  In this connection, 
the Board had to balance the interest of simplicity and brevity, which were 
important congressional goals in creating the Board procedure, with the 
conflicting interest in favor of a comprehensive statement of the case that 
would conform to judicial standards of pleading. 
Second, the Board had to consider the time limits to be allotted to 
complete the various stages of the pretrial procedure.  Important in this 
regard was the extent to which the Board should limit the time available to 
the parties to complete the various preliminary stages of the proceeding to 
ensure the expeditious preparation of a case for trial.  Additionally, these 
rules needed to discourage use of the Board procedure simply for purposes 
of delay. 
Third, it was essential that the Board’s procedures encourage, to the 
extent practicable, pretrial settlements.  The anticipation of a heavy caseload 
made such settlements critical. 
Fourth, public concern with impartiality dictated that the Board quickly 
establish a reputation for even-handedness in its procedure, as well as its 
decisions.  In both form and substance, the burdens and benefits of pretrial 
procedure had to be equitably apportioned. 
Finally, the Board was required to conform its procedures to its 
jurisdictional limitations.  Jurisdictional provisions required a timely appeal 
from the Commissioner’s assertion of a deficiency. 
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Out of this blend of concerns, the Board’s first rules of practice and 
procedure emerged on July 27, 1924, a product of an “almost continuous 
session”1 since the members took office ten days earlier.  Although these 
first rules covered the most important areas of pretrial concern, they were 
hardly the last word on Board procedure.  From the outset, the Board 
demonstrated a willingness to consider suggestions for change.2  In that 
regard, major efforts occasionally have been made to improve and refine 
the procedures under which the Board, and later the Tax Court, has 
operated.  One such effort was initiated in 1937, with the creation of a joint 
committee composed of members of the Board and representatives of 
Treasury for the purpose of studying the Board’s procedure and 
recommending improvements.3  The conclusions of the joint committee 
were felt in a number of important areas.  In 1974, the Tax Court adopted a 
comprehensive rules revision which substantially modified many of its rules 
of practice and procedure.  Since then, the court has undertaken substantial 
revisions to its procedural rules, once in 2003,4 and, not long thereafter, in 
2008.5  Hence, the initial willingness of the Board to consider changes to its 
procedural rules has proved long lasting.   
In broad outline, pretrial procedure before the Tax Court is similar to 
that applicable in most trial courts.  The opportunity for court review is 
initially provided by the Commissioner’s issuance of a deficiency notice, 
which asserts that additional tax is due.  This, in effect, provides the 
gravamen on which the cause of action is based.  Within a statutory time 
period, the taxpayer has an opportunity to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
court by filing a petition.  The pleading stage of the proceedings generally 
terminates with the Commissioner’s responsive pleading, the answer, but 
occasionally the taxpayer may be required to reply to allegations in the 
answer.  In addition to the pleadings, an aspect of Board/Tax Court pretrial 
procedure that traditionally has been of great importance is the stipulation.  
Stipulation of factual matters serves to narrow the issues in controversy, 
thereby saving time and expense for both the parties and the court as well 
as providing a basis for the settlement of many cases.  The Tax Court 
                                                     
1 Press Release accompanying issuance of the Board’s first rules of practice and 
procedure, July 28, 1924, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Organizing the Board.” 
2 Id. 
3 The original members of the joint committee were members Arundell, 
Morris, and Murdock of the Board, and P.C. Alexander, Russell Ryan, and Stanley 
S. Surrey of Treasury.  Treas. Dep’t Press Release, May 11, 1937, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence;” REPORT OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS AND CHIEF COUNSEL’S 
OFFICE, Dec. 17, 1937, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petition: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report]. 
4 See 120 T.C. 479–786 (2003). 
5 See 130 T.C. 345–614 (2008).   
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adopted rules for pretrial discovery somewhat reluctantly in the 1970s, and 
those provisions had a somewhat controversial historical development.  
These, the most significant aspects of pretrial procedure in the Tax Court, 
will be described in detail below. 
 
A. The Deficiency Notice 
 
The Code defines a deficiency as the excess of the sum of tax liability 
plus rebates over the sum of the amount shown as due on the return and 
previously assessed deficiencies.6  If a deficiency exists with respect to taxes 
subject to the deficiency procedure, the Commissioner is authorized to send 
the taxpayer a notice of deficiency by registered or certified mail.7  The 
notice serves several distinct purposes.  First, it informs the taxpayer of the 
Commissioner’s determination that additional tax is due.8  Second, it 
suspends the Commissioner’s assessment power for 90 days, or until a final 
decision of the Tax Court with respect to the deficiency, whichever comes 
later.9  Third, it represents the taxpayer’s “ticket to the Tax Court,”10 since 
issuance of the deficiency notice is, in most cases, a prerequisite to Tax 
Court jurisdiction.11  Additionally, within the context of Tax Court 
                                                     
6 I.R.C. § 6211(a). 
7 The taxes subject to the deficiency procedure are the income, estate, gift, 
public charity, private foundation, retirement plan and real estate investment trust 
taxes.  I.R.C. § 6212(a).  The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 
85-866, § 89(b), 72 Stat. 1665, amended § 6212(a) to authorize the Commissioner 
to send deficiency notices by either certified or registered mail.  Prior thereto, the 
only authorized method was by registered mail, and the Tax Court considered 
registered mail a jurisdictional necessity.  Hamilton v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 747, 
749 (1949); Williams v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 257, 258 (1949); John A. Gebelein, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 605 (1938).  In Boren v. Riddell, 241 F.2d 670 (9th 
Cir. 1957), however, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.  The court held that authorizing 
registered mail did not preclude other methods that adequately informed the 
taxpayer.  Accord Berger v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 668, 673 (3d Cir. 1968); Cohen 
v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 1962); Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 
818, 823 (1973).  Contra Samuel Brodsky, Adequacy of Notice of Deficiency, 18 N.Y.U. 
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 997, 1005 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Brodsky]. 
8 E.g., Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir. 1967); 
Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. New 
York Trust Co., 54 F.2d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1931).  See generally Note, Incorrectly 
Addressed 90 Day Letters, 7 TAX L. REV. 250 (1952). 
9 I.R.C. § 6213(a).   
10 Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967); Corbett v. Frank, 
293 F.2d 501, 502 (9th Cir. 1961). 
11 I.R.C. § 6213(a); TAX CT. R.13 (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
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litigation, another facet of the deficiency notice emerges, the role of the 
deficiency notice in pretrial Tax Court procedure. 
This latter role was molded in the Board’s early years by numerous 
confrontations between the Commissioner and taxpayers.12  In these 
disputes the Board generally sided with the Commissioner, who regarded 
the deficiency notice as independent of the Board’s pleading rules and 
beyond its power to control.13  In an effort to reshape the role of the 
deficiency notice, countless complaints have been lodged that describe the 
deficiency notice as uninformative, demonstrate how the litigation 
procedure is adversely affected by these notices, and advocate numerous 
proposals for change.14  Although these efforts have generally failed to 
                                                     
12 See generally, e.g., Gossett v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1279, 1284 (1931), aff’d, 
59 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1932); Carnrick v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 12, 21 (1930); 
Coughlin v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 515, 520 (1929); Levine Brothers Co. v. 
Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 689 (1926); Clois L. Greene, 2 B.T.A. 148 (1925); 
Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 1 B.T.A. 87 (1924). 
13 See generally DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
March 31, 1948, at 10, 11, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Deficiency Notice: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as D.C. Bar Report]; Randolph 
E. Paul, A Plea For Better Tax Pleading, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 507 (1933) [hereinafter 
cited as Paul]; Letter from A. Graupner to Board Chairman Black, May 25, 1937, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Deficiency Notice: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Graupner]. 
14 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE ADMINISTRATION, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13, 48 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report]; Report of the 
Comm. on Court Procedure, 19 ABA BULLETIN TAXATION SECTION 54 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as ABA 1966]; Report of Comm. on Court Procedure, ABA 
TAXATION SECTION 114 (1957) [hereinafter cited as ABA 1957]; Report of Comm. 
on Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 122 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 
ABA 1956]; Report of Comm. on Bureau Practice and Procedure, ABA TAXATION 
SECTION 106 (1954) [hereinafter cited as ABA 1954]; Report of Comm. on Bureau 
Practice and Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 105 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 
ABA 1953]; Report of Comm. on Tax Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 
ll2 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ABA 1947]; Robert Ash, Factors in Selecting the Forum 
in Which to Litigate, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 935, 938 (1954) [hereinafter 
cited as Ash]; Adam Y. Bennion, Equivalents of Pre-Trial and Discovery Procedure in Tax 
Court of United States, 11 U.S.C. TAX INST. 405, 409 (l959) [hereinafter cited as 
Bennion]; William H. Bowen, Discovery in the Tax Court:  Why Not Follow the Federal 
Rules?, 44 A.B.A. J. 129 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Bowen]; Samuel Byer, Limitation 
of Issues in Tax Litigation, 18 N.Y.U. INST ON FED. TAX’N 1035 (1960) [hereinafter 
cited as Byer]; Arthur Groman and Hilbert P. Zarky, Rules of Evidence in Tax Court of 
United States, 10 U.S.C. TAX INST. 603, 610 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Groman]; 
Michael P. Oshatz, Procedural Aspects of Practice Before the Tax Court:  Including Small 
Claims Division, When and How to Use It, 31 N.Y.U. INST ON FED. TAX’N 1471 (1973) 
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produce a more informative deficiency notice,15 they have influenced the 
development of other procedures that tend to ameliorate the problem. 
Under the statute, the deficiency notice has only a negligible connection 
with the Tax Court pleading structure.  Issuance of the deficiency notice is, 
in most cases, a condition precedent to Tax Court jurisdiction, but it is not 
a pleading.16  It neither confers jurisdiction nor commences the 
proceeding.17  In fact, the notice is considered part of the administrative 
procedure of assessment and collection of revenues and, to that extent, its 
preparation is entirely within the province of the Internal Revenue 
Service.18  For this reason, only the amount of the deficiency, as reflected in 
the adjustments, is essential to the pleadings.19  The courts have consistently 
held that the Commissioner is not obligated to develop in the deficiency 
                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter cited as Oshatz]; Paul, supra note 13; Lester M. Ponder, Trial Court 
Litigation—Tax Court, Court of Claims and District Court: A Practicing Lawyers Views, 21 
U.S.C. TAX INST. 117, 126 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ponder]; Greater Attention to 
Procedural Safeguards Necessary to Protect Taxpayers, 7 J. TAX’N 359 (1957); Practitioners 
Criticize 30-day and 90-day Letters as Vague and Non-Specific, 7 J. TAX’N 34 (1957); D.C. 
Bar Report, supra note 13, at 10–11; Graupner, supra note 13; see also Letter from 
John Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary, to Edward C. Rustigan, Attorney, July 10, 
1973, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Deficiency Notice: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Hall]. 
15 In 1988, Congress finally responded to complaints concerning the relative 
dearth of information required of a valid deficiency notice. As part of the Technical 
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Congress enacted the predecessor to 
§ 7522(a).  See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6233(a), 102 Stat. 3341, 3735.  This 
provision, effective for notices of deficiency issued after January 1, 1990, requires 
the statutory notice of deficiency not only to identify the amounts of any tax, 
interest, additional amounts, additions to tax, and penalties alleged to be due, but 
also to “describe the basis for” such adjustments.  For further discussion of this 
provision, see Part VI.A.2.b.(1).   
16 Berger v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 668, 673 (3d Cir. 1968); Delman v. 
Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967).  See Groman, supra note 14, at 
610; Paul, supra note 13, at 512–13; Arnold Raum, Tax Court Litigation, 9 U.S.C. 
TAX INST. 631, 640 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Raum]. 
17 E.g., Berger v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 668, 673 (3d Cir. 1968); Delman v. 
Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967). 
18 Levine Brothers Co., 5 B.T.A. 689, 691–92 (1926); Southern California Loan 
Ass’n, 4 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1926); I.R.C. § 6212(a).  This is further demonstrated by 
the Board/Tax Court’s reluctance to promulgate rules regulating the content of the 
deficiency notice.   
19 See TAX CT. R. 34(b)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 64 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1933); Luke v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1964-76, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1022 (1964), aff’d, 351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965); 
Bair v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 90, 98 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1952); 
Coughlin v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 515, 520 (1929). 
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notice his rationale for the adjustments.20  Although Congress in 1988 
statutorily required the Commissioner to “describe the basis” for each 
adjustment in the notice of deficiency, Congress indicated that the failure to 
do so would not invalidate the notice.21  In a similar vein, any theory of 
liability expressed in the deficiency notice will not necessarily constitute or 
confine the issues.22  Despite the limited substance required of a valid 
deficiency notice, the Commissioner’s deficiency determination is generally 
presumed by the Tax Court to be correct.23  In many respects, the 
                                                     
20 Commissioner v. Forest Glen Creamery Co., 98 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1938); 
Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 973, 998, (1941), aff’d, 129 F.2d 363 
(7th Cir. 1942); Carnrick v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 12, 21 (1930). 
21 See I.R.C. § 7522(a) (enacted by Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6233(a), 102 Stat. 3341, 3735).  In Shea v. Commissioner, 
the Tax Court in a reviewed opinion determined that if the if the notice of 
deficiency fails to describe the basis for the deficiency determination and the basis 
for the determination requires the admission of additional evidence (that is, 
evidence different than that necessary to resolve the deficiency determinations that 
were adequately described in the notice), the Commissioner would bear the burden 
of proof with respect to the new basis.  112 T.C. 183, 197 (1999).  The original 
edition of this text contained a thorough discussion of the tension between 
taxpayers’ desire for additional information to be provided in the notice of 
deficiency and the minimalist requirements of the notice required under the statute, 
as upheld by the Board of  Tax Appeals and the Tax Court.  See HAROLD 
DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 223–31 
(1979).   
22 Bair v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 90, 98 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 
1952); Gossett v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1279, 1284 (1931), aff’d, 59 F.2d 365 
(4th Cir. 1932); Crowell v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 849, 851 (1930), aff’d, 62 F.2d 
51 (6th Cir. 1932); Carnrick v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 12, 21 (1930);  Coughlin v. 
Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 515, 520 (1929).  Although the theory of the deficiency 
notice will not prevent the Commissioner from raising other issues or theories after 
the taxpayer files a petition, the Commissioner may be required to affirmatively 
plead the issues in his answer if the new matter is inconsistent with the theory of 
the deficiency notice.  See infra notes 239–294 and accompanying text. 
23 E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Albino v. Commissioner, 
273 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1960); Eagle v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1957).  
In many instances, the burden of proof is placed upon the Commissioner either by 
statute or Tax Court rule.  For example, the Commissioner has the burden of proof 
if the deficiency notice pertains to fraud (I.R.C. § 7454(a)), transferee liability 
(I.R.C. § 6902(a)), deductions against public policy (I.R.C. § 162(c)), accumulated 
earnings tax (I.R.C. § 534(a)), increased deficiencies asserted after the petition is 
filed, affirmative defenses, and new matter pleaded in the answer (TAX CT. R. 
142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.)).  Additionally, Congress has provided that the general 
burden of proof can be shifted to the Commissioner in certain instances pursuant 
to § 7491(a).  See Part X.C.4.    
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deficiency notice is a distinctive procedural device lacking a counterpart in 
the pleading structure of other forums. 
Notwithstanding the limited theoretical significance of the deficiency 
notice, in practice it can play a vital role in the pleadings by informing the 
taxpayer why a deficiency has been determined.24  Although the ultimate 
issue is tax liability, the decisive issues for pleading and trial purposes are 
the factual and theoretical foundations supporting the deficiency notice.  
Furthermore, in the great majority of cases, the Commissioner’s rationale 
for determining a deficiency marks the boundaries of the conflict.  
Consequently, supplying this information in the deficiency notice, as 
required under § 7522(a), provides the taxpayer an opportunity to 
objectively evaluate the decision to contest the deficiency.25  If the taxpayer 
elects to pursue litigation, the same information will aid in drafting the 
petition and in preparing for the trial of the case.26 
 
B. The Petition 
 
For matters within the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction,27 the 
Commissioner’s issuance of a deficiency notice forces the taxpayer to 
determine whether the Commissioner’s determination is warranted.28  A 
decision to contest the deficiency requires the taxpayer to choose between 
the alternative methods and forums.29  The taxpayer’s basic choice is 
whether to appeal to the Tax Court prior to payment of the deficiency, or 
to pay the tax, file a claim for refund and, following disallowance of the 
claim, sue for refund in either a Federal district court or the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims.30  If the former route is taken, the taxpayer must file a 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., ABA 1966, supra note 14, at 56; Paul, supra note 13, at 517; Joint 
Committee Report, supra note 3.  
25 E.g., Ash, supra note 14, at 938; Graupner, supra note 13, at 3.  
26 E.g., Groman, supra note 14, at 611; Paul, supra note 13, at 519; Ponder, supra 
note 14, at 126. 
27 The scope of the Tax Court’s deficiency jurisdiction is described in Part VI.A.   
28 See I.R.C. §§ 621l, 6212, 6213; TAX CT. R. 13 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  See note 11 
supra, for instances in which a deficiency notice is not a condition precedent to Tax 
Court jurisdiction. 
29 Cusack, Federal Tax Procedure:  Refund Claims and Suits, 12 THE PRAC. LAW. 45 
(Oct., 1966) [hereinafter cited as Cusack]; Marvin Joseph Garbis, Choosing Your 
Forum in Civil Tax Litigation, 15 THE PRAC. LAW. 41 (Jan., 1969) [hereinafter cited as 
Garbis]; Lester M. Ponder, Trial Court Litigation–Tax Court, Court of Claims, and 
District Court–A Practicing Lawyer’s Views, 21 U.S.C. TAX INST. 117 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Ponder]; Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Choice of Forum in Tax Litigation, 
19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reitze]. 
30 See generally Cusack, supra note 29; Ponder, supra note 29; Reitze, supra note 29. 
546           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
petition with the Tax Court.31  The petition has several important aspects.32  
First, the filing of a petition within the statutory period operates to confer 
jurisdiction on the court to redetermine the deficiency and precludes, 
during the pendency of the proceeding, assessment or collection of the 
deficiency by the Service.33  Second, the petition is a pleading designed to 
provide the Tax Court and the Commissioner with “notice of the matters in 
controversy and the basis for . . . [the taxpayer’s position].”34  Finally, the 
petition has been important in efforts by the court over the years to reduce 
its backlog of cases.  By helping to weed out those appeals which are 
meritless or filed for purposes of delaying the assessment of tax, the 
petition has reduced the court’s workload. 
 
1. Content of the Petition 
 
In its role as a pleading, the petition has presented few problems.  The 
Board’s primary objective in promulgating a rule governing the contents of 
the petition was to assure that the pleading adequately informed the Board 
and the respondent of the issues in controversy.35  To achieve this 
objective, the Board required that the petition be divided into five parts:  
jurisdictional allegations, assignments of error, factual allegations, 
propositions of law, and petitioner’s verification.36  During the period 1924 
to 1926, the original rule was revised to require that the petition disclose 
                                                     
31 I.R.C. § 6213(a).  The Revenue Act of 1924, which established the Board of 
Tax Appeals, did not provide a name for the taxpayer’s pleading.  Rather, the 
legislation simply referred to the pleading as an appeal.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 
234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297.  The Board settled on the name petition in its first rules 
of practice and procedure, B.T.A. RULE 5 (July, 1924 ed.), and Congress 
incorporated this terminology in the subsequent Revenue Acts.  Compare Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 55, with I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
32 See CHARLES D. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE U.S. 
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 89 (1938) [hereinafter cited as HAMEL]. 
33 I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7442.  The current Tax Court rules specifically list the 
jurisdictional requirements.  See TAX CT. R. 13 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  In 1948, the Tax 
Court received a recommendation that the court adopt a rule which informed the 
taxpayer of the jurisdictional requirements.  However, the court rejected the 
proposed rule because it was “largely educational, rather than a subject for a rule.  
Rules can’t tell people how to practice law.”  Memorandum to Judge Murdock, 
Rules Comm. Chairman, from V. Mersch, Tax Court Clerk, July 30, 1948, at 2, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petition: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Mersch, 1948]. 
34 TAX CT. R. 31(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
35 B.T.A. RULE 5 (July, 1924 ed.). 
36 Id. 
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both the amount of the deficiency as determined by the Commissioner37 
and approximately what amount of the deficiency was in controversy.38  A 
further modification served to conform the petition with the pleadings in 
other forums by excising the requirement of stating a proposition of law 
and adding a requirement of a prayer for relief.39 
With the foundation of the rule firmly established by 1926, the Board 
left the principal components of the rule intact for nearly 50 years.  The 
only revisions between 1926 and 1974 that did anything more than clarify 
or expound upon these original elements arose in response to specific 
legislation.  For example, the Revenue Act of 1928 shifted the burden of 
proof from the taxpayer to the Commissioner in fraud and transferee 
liability cases.40  Accordingly, the Board amended its rules to provide that 
the taxpayer need not state the facts sustaining an assignment of error if the 
Commissioner had the burden of proof.41  Subsequent misinterpretation of 
this provision led to a revision emphasizing that an assignment of error by 
the petitioner was necessary to raise an issue, even though the 
Commissioner shouldered the burden of proof.42 
Although the requirements for a proper petition seem clear enough, the 
Board/Tax Court has been continually plagued with petitions that fail to 
meet the specified standards.  Perhaps the court’s inclination to permit the 
curing of defective petitions for jurisdictional purposes removed what 
potentially could have been the strongest incentive to comply with the 
rule.43  But the concern with providing taxpayers every opportunity to 
                                                     
37 B.T.A. RULE 5 (Jan. 1, 1925 ed.).  In addition, the rule directed taxpayers to 
append a copy of the deficiency notice to the petition.  Id.  
38 Id. 
39 B.T.A. RULE 5(f) (April 1, 1926 ed.). 
40 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 601, 602, 45 Stat. 872 (now codified at 
I.R.C. §§ 7454, 6902(a)). 
41 B.T.A. RULE 5(c) (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
42 B.T.A. RULE 5(d) (July 1, 1935 ed.).  See TAX CT. R. 34(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); 
Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 34(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  The rule was also revised 
in 1967, to require that individual taxpayers include their legal residence, and that 
corporate taxpayers include their principal place of business in the petition.  TAX 
CT. R. 7(c)(4)(B)(1) (Jan. 1, 1967 ed.).  This change was prompted by legislation 
which placed venue for review of Tax Court decisions in the appropriate circuit 
court of appeals depending upon the legal residence of the taxpayer.  Act of 
November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 1109 (amending I.R.C. 
§ 7482(b)).  See Memorandum to the Judges from Judge Raum, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, Dec. 22, 1966, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence.” 
43 The decision to permit an amended petition depended upon the type of 
defect as well as the timeliness of the amended petition.  Rules Comm. Note, TAX 
CT. R. 34(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).   
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exercise their statutory right to have the deficiency reviewed prior to 
payment presumably convinced the Board/Tax Court to take a less 
demanding view of the situation.  Nevertheless, there was considerable 
dissatisfaction on the Board/Tax Court with the number of petitions that 
failed to comply with the rule.  An illustration of this dissatisfaction can be 
found in the Board’s introductory comment to its 1938 rules edition: 
 
Attention is called to the following:  Many petitions filed with this 
Board are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to comply 
with the Rules of Practice.  It is therefore of great importance to 
petitioners that petitions be prepared and filed properly in 
accordance with statutory requirements and the provisions of the 
Rules of Practice.44 
 
Naturally, most taxpayer representatives were generally aware that a 
petition should meet certain minimum standards.  As a result, there was a 
steady stream of inquiries from taxpayers and, to a lesser extent, from 
Internal Revenue seeking information and advice about various aspects of 
the rule.45  Because the Tax Court was a forum of national jurisdiction with 
                                                     
44 B.T.A. RULES, Introductory Comment (July 1, 1938 ed.). 
45 See Letter to Judge Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, from John W. 
Edwards, Acting Division Counsel, Internal Revenue Bureau, Aug. 15, 1946, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Edwards]; Mersch, 1948, supra note 33, at 1; Memorandum to the Judges 
from Presiding Judge Murdock, Oct. 14, 1948, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1948]; 
see also Memorandum to Judge Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, from Howard 
Locke, Tax Court Clerk, March 13, 1959, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Locke].  
On one occasion, John W. Edwards, Acting Division Counsel for the Bureau, 
wrote Judge Murdock requesting him to:  
[p]lease inform this office of the effective date of the amendment of Rule 
6(d) of the Rules of Practice before the Board of Tax Appeals by the 
addition of this sentence:  “Issues in respect of which the burden of proof is 
by statute placed upon the Commissioner will not be deemed to be raised 
by the petitioner in the absence of assignments of error in respect thereof.” 
Edwards, supra. 
Judge Murdock, noted for his wit, responded: 
Dear Office: 
I never wrote to an office before and I can’t say that I enjoy it.  Just 
some dingy dismal old room with no heat or life on Saturdays and Sundays!  
Just one of the drawers in the bureau!  “Please inform this office” sounds so 
impersonal, sort of imperious. 
If some real live friendly flesh and blood person came upon the 
interesting question of when a certain sentence became a part of the Rules 
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its offices in Washington, D.C., many of the taxpayers making inquiries 
were forced to rely on telephonic and mail communications.  The format of 
the rule apparently made precise inquiries difficult which, in turn, required 
that the court’s response be exceedingly detailed and tedious.46  
Accordingly, an entreaty from the chief clerk culminated in the Tax Court’s 
final attempt at making the rule more understandable.47  The rule was 
restructured with separately numbered subparagraphs so that taxpayers 
would be better able to pinpoint the provision in question and the Clerk 
could respond more definitively to the question.48  
In 1974, the Tax Court comprehensively revised its rules of procedure.  
The petition rule, however, remained basically unchanged with one notable 
exception: the petitioner’s verification requirement was eliminated.49  Until 
then, verification, which originally had been required in the Board’s first 
rules of practice,50 had been one of the more controversial aspects of the 
petition.  If taxpayers were not questioning a particular application of the 
verification rule,51 they were questioning the basic need for the procedure 
itself.52 
An early expression of the Board’s attitude towards verification was 
contained in its response to a practitioner’s request that the verification 
requirement be waived in view of his special circumstances.  His clients 
                                                                                                                       
of Practice and would really appreciate being advised as to the correct 
answer, it would be in the Rules revised to July 1, 1935, as part of Rule 5(d).  
But just some cold old office—Ugh!  I can’t bring myself to answer. 
            Sorry 
Letter from Presiding Judge Murdock to “Office,” Aug. 20, 1946, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
46 Mersch, 1948, supra note 33, at 1.  See TAX CT. R. 7 (Nov. 3, 1947 ed.). 
47 Mersch, 1948, supra note 33, at 1. 
48 Id.; Murdock, 1948, supra note 45.  Compare TAX CT. R. 7 (Nov. 3, 1947 ed.), 
with TAX CT. R. 7 (Dec. 15, 1948 ed.).  Apparently, restructuring the rule did not 
produce the desired result because eleven years later the court clerk recommended 
that the subparagraphs in the rule be eliminated.  Locke, supra note 45. 
49 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 34(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); TAX CT. R. 34(b) 
(Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  See generally Laurence Goldfein and Richard A. Levine, Tax Court 
Proposes Far Reaching Changes in its Rules of Practice and Procedure, 37 J. TAX’N 66, 67 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldfein]; J. Earl Epstein, Proposed Rules of the Tax Court: 
A Panel Discussion, 26 TAX LAW. 377, 379 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Panel 
Discussion]. 
50 B.T.A. RULE 5(f) (July, 1924 ed.). 
51 E.g., Letter to Chief Judge Tietjens from Donald Libert, attorney, January 11, 
1965, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Libert]. 
52 E.g., Report of the Comm. on Tax Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 81 
(1951) [hereinafter cited as ABA, 1951]. 
550           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
were scattered members of an Osage Indian tribe who had little or no 
knowledge of the pertinent facts of their case, and their verification would 
have been difficult to obtain.  The Board’s denial of the request emphasized 
that the purpose of the rule was to afford the Board some measure of 
assurance that the taxpayer, and not the taxpayer’s representative, had made 
the decision to appeal.53  Subsequently, however, the rigors of the 
verification rule were somewhat relaxed. 
In 1931, the verification requirement was eased to permit a duly 
appointed attorney in fact to verify the petition, provided that the attorney 
in fact acted pursuant to an unrevoked power of attorney and that the 
petitioner was absent from the United States.54  The purpose of this 
relaxation was to ease the burden in those situations in which 
communications between the taxpayer and his counsel took place by mail 
and therefore satisfaction of the timely filing requirement would be 
difficult.55 
A second, seemingly insignificant change in the verification rule, which 
also occurred in 1931, later proved troublesome as it led to a controversy 
concerning the interaction between verification and the Board’s jurisdiction 
with regard to fiduciaries.  The revision permitted a petition filed by a 
fiduciary to be verified by only one fiduciary so long as it was signed by a 
majority of the other fiduciaries.56  Seven years later, in 1938, the Board’s 
dismissal of a petition for not complying with the rule was reversed in 
Baldwin v. Commissioner.57  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded 
that Congress had contemplated providing each executor with a separate 
right to file a petition since each executor was individually liable for any 
deficiency.  The court refused to allow the Board to condition the exercise 
                                                     
53 Letter to Chairman Hamel from T. Leahy, attorney, Feb. 17, 1925, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence;” Letter to T. 
Leahy, attorney, from Chairman Hamel, Feb. 21, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
54 B.T.A. RULE 5(g) (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
55 See Letter to the Board from Samuel Ansell, Aug. 22, 1924, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
56 B.T.A. RULE 5(g) (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.); see also B.T.A. RULE 5(g) (Feb. 1, 1932 
ed.); Memorandum to Members Black, Matthews, and Tramell, from Member 
Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, May 19, 1931, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence;” Memorandum to Member Murdock, 
Rules Comm. Chairman, from Chairman Morris, May 5, 1931, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence;” Memorandum to the 
Board from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, June 3, 1931, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
57 94 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1938). 
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of the right by requiring a majority of executors to sign or verify the 
petition.58 
The Board’s reaction to the decision was mixed.  Some members 
disagreed with the appellate court’s opinion that if two or more executors 
were involved each had a separate right to file a petition.59  Furthermore, 
they contended that since this was the first case in which the rule was 
seriously challenged, the Board should postpone any revision until it was 
certain of the necessity for such action.60  Others generally agreed with the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision61 and recommended the rule be revised along lines 
which would require taxpayers to proffer a satisfactory explanation for a 
majority of the fiduciaries failing to join in the petition.62  A third faction, 
which ultimately prevailed, took a middle course.  They recognized that the 
general purpose of the rule, which was to promote orderly procedure by 
refusing to entertain a petition if “a majority of the fiduciaries are unwilling 
to commit themselves to the proceeding,”63 was a worthwhile objective.  
However, they believed that this objective could be accomplished without 
the necessity of having a majority of the fiduciaries either sign or verify the 
petition.  Their recommendation, which was adopted, was to substitute a 
                                                     
58 Id. at 356–57.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 308, 44 Stat. 75 (now codified 
at I.R.C. §§ 6212(a), 6213(a)), authorized the Commissioner to send a notice to “the 
executor” and, in turn, gave “the executor” the right to appeal to the Board.  The 
fact that all statutory references were in the singular could give rise to an inference 
that an executor could file an appeal whether his co-executor consented or not. 
59  Memorandum to Members of the Board from Member Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, Jan. 4, 1939, at 3, 4, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1939]; 
Memorandum to Members of the Board from Member Murdock, April 4, 1938, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Murdock, April, 1938]; Memorandum to Members of the Rules 
Comm. from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, March 30, 1938, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Murdock, March, 1938]. 
60 Murdock, April, 1938, supra note 59, at 2, 3. 
61 Memorandum to Members of the Board from Member Harron, April 5, 1938, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Harron, 1938]; Memorandum to Members of the Rules Comm. 
from Member Harron, Rules Comm. Member, March 30, 1938, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Harron]; see also Murdock, 1939, supra note 59. 
62 Murdock, 1939, supra note 59, at 3. 
63 Id. at 3, 4; Murdock, April, 1938, supra note 59, at 2. 
552           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
requirement that a verification “contain a statement that the fiduciaries 
signing and verifying have authority to act for the taxpayer.”64 
In addition to controversy over the operation of the verification rule, 
the mechanics of verifying a petition frequently proved troublesome.  Until 
1969 the Board/Tax Court was an agency in the executive branch, and 
consequently subject to a statute that precluded a person acting as a notary 
public and counsel in the same case before an executive department.65  It 
was not uncommon for an unwary practitioner to be automatically 
disqualified from continuing to represent his client for notarizing his client’s 
petition.66 
The problems created by the verification requirement ultimately led the 
American Bar Association, in 1951, to recommend that the Tax Court 
eliminate verification.67  This recommendation did not produce any 
immediate change.  However, in 1974, with no fanfare or even official 
explanation, verification was eliminated68 as a “nuisance requirement 
without adequate compensatory benefits.”69 Nevertheless, the Tax Court 
has reserved the right to selectively require verification if, in its discretion, it 
is deemed advisable.70  The elimination of the automatic verification 
                                                     
64 B.T.A. RULE 6(h) (Mar. 1, 1940 ed.); Murdock, 1939, supra note 59, at 3–4.  
Apparently the Board contemplated staying the proceeding until the executor who 
filed the petition without obtaining the signature or verification of a majority of the 
co-executors established his authority in a local court to act for the estate. See 
Memorandum to Member Murdock from the Board Secretary, Jan. 3, 1939, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.”  At the same 
time, the Board added a provision that would require a person filing a petition on 
behalf of a corporation to verify his authority to act for the corporation. B.T.A. 
RULE 6(h) (Mar. 1, 1940 ed.). 
65 Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3616, 34 Stat. 622 (codified at D.C. Code, Title 1, § 
1-501 (1973)).  This statute was subsequently interpreted to apply to all notaries 
who practice before executive departments.  26 Op. ATTY. GEN. 236, 238–39 
(1907).  The Board/Tax Court acknowledged that it was subject to the statute by 
including a restriction to that effect in its rules. TAX CT. R. 7(c)(4)(D) (Sept. 16, 
1968 ed.).  See Memorandum to Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, from 
Leonard Messinger, law clerk, Jan. 22, 1965, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.”  The statute applies to executive 
departments only and, in 1969, § 7441 was amended to change the Tax Court’s 
status to a legislative court.  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 
Stat. 730.  Thereafter, the restriction on notaries acting as counsel in the same case 
was no longer a statutory necessity, but merely required by the Tax Court’s rules.  
TAX CT. R. 7(c)(4)(D) (Jan. 25, 1971 ed.). 
66 Libert, supra note 51. 
67 ABA, 1951, supra note 52. 
68 TAX CT. R. 33(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 33(a), 
34(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
69 Panel Discussion, supra note 49. 
70 TAX CT. R. 33(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
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requirement conformed Tax Court practice to that applicable in district 
courts.71 
 
2. Congestion of Appeals 
 
A problem of continuing concern to the Board/Tax Court has been 
coping with the large number of petitions it receives.72 Within months after 
the Board’s creation, thousands of taxpayers elected to invoke its 
jurisdiction to redetermine the Commissioner’s deficiency determination.  
Although most petitions were filed to obtain an impartial resolution of a 
bona fide dispute, many taxpayers viewed the redetermination procedure as 
a convenient method of delaying the assessment and collection of taxes.73  
Still others filed petitions for tactical reasons, considering such a maneuver 
an integral part of the settlement procedures.74 Taxpayers, however, were 
not solely responsible for the burdensome number of appeals.  The Bureau 
occasionally issued groundless deficiency notices, and this naturally 
increased the number of petitions filed.75  Furthermore, the Bureau was not 
always willing to negotiate settlements in good faith, which meant more 
cases had to proceed to trial.76 
                                                     
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
72 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 892–93, 906 (1925) (statement of George M. Morris), 912 
(statement of James S. Ivins) [hereinafter cited as 1925 House Hearings]; Lyle T. 
Alverson, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed?, 4 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 337 (1926) 
[hereinafter cited as Alverson]; George Maurice Morris, American Bar Association Tax 
Revision Recommendations, 3 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 403, II; George Maurice Morris, 
American Bar Association Tax Revision Recommendations, 3 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 403, 
404 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Morris]; Percy W. Phillips, Possible Methods of 
Eliminating Congestion of Tax Appeals, 5 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 243 (1927) [hereinafter 
cited as Phillips]; Forest D. Siefkin, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed? 5 NAT. INC. 
TAX MAG. 45, 46, 63–64 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Siefkin]; Congestion of Tax Cases 
Before the Board of Tax Appeals, 4 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 303 (1926) [hereinafter cited 
as Congestion]; see also Appendix A (detailing the workload of the Board of Tax 
Appeals and Tax Court in terms of the number of cases docketed, closed, and 
pending in a given year). 
73 Morris, supra note 32, at 404; Congestion, supra note 32, at 304. 
74 Memorandum from Judge Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, to Judge 
Dawson, Sept. 28, 1962, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda 
and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, 1962]. 
75 1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 895, 906 (statement of George M. 
Morris); Morris, supra note 72, at 404; Siefkin, supra note 72, at 46. 
76 E.g., Letter to Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, from Louis Goldberg, 
June 2, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Goldberg]; Letter to Chairman Black from 
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If the Board was to function as an effective forum for tax litigation, 
action was necessary to discourage the issuance of meritless deficiency 
notices and the filing of frivolous appeals, as well as to facilitate the 
disposition of bona fide appeals. Accordingly, over the years, a series of 
legislative measures and rule changes, designed to penalize taxpayers who 
file frivolous appeals and to hasten the disposition of bona fide 
controversies, have been implemented. 
With reference to frivolous appeals, the response was immediate.  In 
1926, Congress authorized the Board to impose a filing fee of up to $10.77  
The Board promptly exercised this authority by imposing the maximum 
filing fee and requiring that it accompany the petition.78  The rule, which 
was successful in reducing the number of appeals,79 was initially interpreted 
to require payment of the filing fee as a jurisdictional necessity.80 In 1927, 
however, the Board’s dismissal of a petition for untimely payment of the fee 
was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weaver v. Blair.81  The 
circuit court held that there was no congressional intent to impose another 
jurisdictional requirement by giving the Board authority to impose a filing 
fee.82  Thereafter, the Board discontinued the practice of returning the 
                                                                                                                       
Byron Harris, May 29, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda 
and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Harris]; Letter to Member Morris, Joint 
Comm. Chairman, from William Johnston, June 10, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Johnston]; Letter to Chairman Black from Walter Liebman, May 17, 1937, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Liebman]; Letter to Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, from M. 
Matlock, May 29, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Matlock]; Letter to Member Morris, Joint 
Comm. Chairman, from S. Racine, May 26, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Racine]. 
77 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 904, 44 
Stat. 106 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7451). 
78 B.T.A. RULE 8 (May 1, 1928 ed.). 
79 See Part III, notes 346–348 and accompanying text.   
80 In John H. Weaver, 5 B.T.A. 1298 (1926), rev’d, 19 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1927), the 
Board interpreted the rule providing that “[n]o such petition may be filed until such 
fee is paid to the Board, nor will the filing of any petition be antedated to a time 
prior to payment of such fee,” as imposing another jurisdictional condition to the 
Board’s consideration of the petition; see also Willis W. Ritter, Jurisdiction of the Board 
of Tax Appeals Under the Act of 1926, 4 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 128 (1926). 
81 19 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1927). 
82 Id.; see also Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Reliance Mfg. v. Blair, 19 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1927); Dwyer v. Commissioner, 18 
B.T.A. 349, 351 (1929).  These decisions were subsequently reflected in the Board’s 
rules.  B.T.A. RULE 8 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  In 1974, the Tax Court further amended 
the rule to expressly reserve the power to waive payment of the fee.  TAX CT. R. 
2(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
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petition to the taxpayer if it was not accompanied by the fee.  Rather, the 
petition was retained and a notice was sent to remit the fee.  If the fee was 
subsequently paid, the petition was deemed filed as of the original date of 
receipt.83  If the fee was not forthcoming, the petition was dismissed.84  In 
1981, Congress raised the permissible fee for filing a petition to $60.85  The 
Tax Court continues to impose the maximum filing fee, unless it grants the 
taxpayer’s application for a waiver.86   
A second legislative effort to discourage frivolous appeals resulted from 
an American Bar Association recommendation which advocated 
authorizing the Board to impose costs of up to $100 on either party if the 
appeal was found to be without merit.87  The plan was aimed at taxpayers 
“who seem to think that [the Board’s] procedure is simply a barricade to get 
behind in order to stop the assessment or the collection of taxes”88 as well 
as defenses “made by the Commissioner which are without merit and where 
the taxpayer’s contention from the evidence in the Commissioner’s files 
should have been conceded.”89  Congress was apparently hesitant, however, 
to impose costs against the Government.90  As a consequence, the Board 
was only authorized to penalize taxpayers “whenever it . . . [appeared] to the 
Board that proceedings before it . . . [had] been instituted by the taxpayer 
                                                     
83 Memorandum to Members of the Board from Chairman Littleton, May 5, 
1927, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
84 Id.  The Board/Tax Court’s practice was to tentatively deem the petition filed.  
However, the petition was not served on the Commissioner until the fee was paid.  
If the fee was never paid, then the proceeding would not be at issue since the 
Commissioner would not have filed an answer to the petition and, therefore, the 
petition would be dismissed.  Bioff v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 942, 944 (1942). 
85 See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 751(a), 95 Stat. 349 
(amending I.R.C. § 7451(a)).   
86 The Tax Court offers a form for the waiver, made available on the court’s 
website at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/forms/Application_for_Waiver_of_Filing_Fee.pdf. 
87 The proposal read as follows: 
VI. Imposition of Costs.—Recommended that power to be given to the 
Board to impose costs upon either party to the proceeding where the appeal 
or defense presented is found to be obviously without merit.  A maximum 
limitation upon such costs should be one hundred dollars. If such costs are 
determined against the taxpayer they should be added to the deficiency 
found.  If such costs are awarded against the Commissioner they should 
constitute a credit or refund to the appellant. 
1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 906. 
88 Id. at 892. 
89 Id. at 906. 
90 See id. at 893.  
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merely for delay.”91 The Board/Tax Court originally  used this power 
sparingly,92 presumably due to fear that excessive use might intimidate 
taxpayers with bona fide disputes who would rather pay the deficiency than 
incur the risk of a penalty.  However, both the frequency and the amount of 
§ 6673 penalties have increased in modern times, as the court has resorted 
to the penalty to combat both frivolous filings and abusive invocation of 
the court’s jurisdiction.93    
For its part, the Board endeavored to discourage frivolous appeals by 
demanding that the taxpayer verify and his counsel sign the petition.94  Such 
actions were deemed a certification that there was good reason to bring the 
appeal and that it was not frivolous or instituted for delay.95  For willful 
violation of the rule, taxpayers were subject to the imposition of costs and 
their representatives were subject to disciplinary action, which included 
suspension and disbarment.96 
                                                     
91 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 911, 44 
Stat. 109 (now codified at I.R.C. § 6673); H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19 (1925); S. REP. 
NO. 69-52, at 36 (1925).  The ambiguous word “proceedings” was presumably used 
to permit an expansive interpretation of the provision, which would enable the 
Board/Tax Court to prevent taxpayers from using any of its rules for delay.  See 
generally 1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 913 (testimony of James Ivins). 
92 See Bateman v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 351, 370–71 (1936); W. E. Beckman 
Baker’s Confectioners’ Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 860, 863–64 (1928).  
The Board did not exercise the power until 1933. Combs v. Commissioner, 28 
B.T.A. 1216 (1933); see also Joe D. Hughes, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 265 (1934).  
Another proposal aimed at decreasing the number of frivolous appeals would have 
required taxpayers to pay the tax or give a bond to secure payment prior to 
appealing to the Board.  Letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, from Secretary of 
the Treasury Morgenthau, c. 1936, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Morgenthau]; Letter to 
Chairman Black from Robert Jackson, Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
Sept. 7, 1935, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” (hereinafter cited as Jackson).  This proposal was not pursued, 
presumably because it was completely inconsistent with the original purpose for 
creating the Board to provide review of the Commissioner’s deficiency 
determination prior to payment of the disputed tax. 
93 The origins of the § 6673 penalty and its expanded reach are addressed in Part 
X.D.   
94 B.T.A. RULE 5 (April 1, 1926 ed.); see also TAX CT. R. 33(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.) 
(providing the current rule) 
95 B.T.A. RULE 5 (April 1, 1926 ed.) 
96 Compare B.T.A. RULE 5 (April 1, 1926 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 2 (April 1. 1926 
ed.).  The current rule expressly states that a willful violation of the rule may result 
in disciplinary action.  Compare TAX CT. R. 33(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 
202 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  To deter practitioners from persistently filing frivolous 
appeals, the American Bar Association recommended that the Board publish a 
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If the appeal embraced a bona fide controversy, the emphasis was on 
encouraging settlement.  If settlement was not feasible, then the goal was to 
decrease the period between filing of the petition and ultimate resolution of 
the appeal.  Congress considered a myriad of proposals for enhancing 
settlement, including a proposal by the Bureau advocating a mandatory 
protest procedure prior to the issuance of a deficiency.97  The plan 
paralleled the Board’s procedure in that the taxpayer would have 90 days to 
file a formal protest to a proposed deficiency.98  Failure to file the protest 
within the allotted time obviated the need for a deficiency notice, and the 
Commissioner could forthwith assess and collect the tax.99  If the taxpayer 
did file a formal protest, then the grounds and evidence in further litigation 
would be restricted to those raised during the protest proceedings unless 
good cause existed for a different result.100 
However, Congress was not receptive to such basic changes in the 
structure of tax litigation,101 and the only legislation to encourage settlement 
was the expansion of the filing period from 60 to 90 days.102  The extra 30 
days was considered helpful if the parties were to have sufficient time to 
reconcile their differences without resort to filing a petition.103 
Implicit in the congressional reticence to dictate the settlement 
procedure has been the recognition that the stimulus for settlement would 
have to come primarily from Internal Revenue and Board/Tax Court 
initiatives.  In the early years of tax administration, settlement did not seem 
to be one of the Bureau’s highest priorities.  The Bureau’s tendency to drag 
its feet during settlement negotiations and the reluctance on the part of 
Bureau personnel to accept responsibility for the settlement decision were 
generally criticized.104  Over the years, the Service’s procedures have been 
extensively revised and refined to enhance the likelihood of settlement.105 
                                                                                                                       
written reprimand to practitioners which would accompany the opinion.  1925 
House Hearings, supra note 72, at 892 (statement of George Morris). 
97 Memoranda to Mr. Oliphant from Morrison Shafroth, Chief Counsel, June 4, 
1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Shafroth]. 
98 Id. at 1, 2. 
99 Id. at 2. 
100 Id. at 3. 
101 See Morgenthau, supra note 92. 
102 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 501, 48 Stat. 755; H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 
34 (1933). 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 34 (1933). 
104 Congestion, supra note 72, at 304–05; Goldberg, supra note 76; Harris, supra 
note 76; Johnston, supra note 76; Matlock, supra note 76; Racine, supra note 76; 
Turner, 1962, supra note 74, at 6. 
105 See generally Rev. Proc. 60-18, 1960-2 C.B. 988; Hugh F. Culverhouse, 
Settlement Procedures Before the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 11 ALA. LAW. 420 (1950); 
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For its part, the Board/Tax Court has been determined to dispose of as 
many appeals as possible by settlement.  This goal has been principally 
advanced by the gradual evolution of a mandatory stipulation procedure, 
which has been credited with either contributing to or actually effectuating 
a settlement rate of approximately 70 percent.106 
Although most petitions are disposed of by settlement, many cases are 
not so resolved.  To deal with these cases, a series of diversified legislative 
and administrative measures aimed at expediting the disposition of bona 
fide appeals have been implemented.  Legislatively, there have been three 
significant changes that, in their inception, were perceived as capable of 
accomplishing the desired goal.  First, under the Revenue Act of 1924, the 
Chairman of the Board was authorized to divide the Board membership 
into divisions consisting of at least three members.107  Admittedly, the use 
of three-member divisions was more efficient than having the Board hear 
every appeal en banc, but it was, nevertheless, an inefficient method of 
handling appeals.  Many commentators were convinced that divisions 
smaller than three Board members would increase the Board’s work 
product,108 and, in 1926, Congress agreed. Accordingly, the Chairman of the 
Board was authorized to create divisions consisting of one or more 
                                                                                                                       
Bruce Donaldson, Techniques in Presenting and Settling a Case Before the Internal Revenue 
Service: District Conference; Appellate Division, 27 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1343 
(1969); Morris R. Friedman, Techniques and Limitations in Dealing with a Conferee, 22 
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 95 (1964); Benjamin H. Neblett, Settlement Procedures in 
the Technical Staff and Division Counsel’s Office, 1 U.S.C. TAX INST. 369 (1949); Irving 
Rosenzweig, Techniques and Limitations in Dealing with the Appellate Division, 22 N.Y.U. 
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 109 (1964); Melvin L. Sears, Revenue Procedure 60-18—New 
Techniques for the Early Consideration and Disposition of Tax Court Cases, 36 WASH. L. 
REV. 373 (1961); Henry C. Stockell, Jr., I.R.S. Presses for Disposition of Tax Court Cases 
Before Trial, 14 J. TAX’N 180 (1961); Henry C. Stockell, Jr., Pre-Session Conference 
Procedures are Increasing Settlements of Tax Court Cases, 18 J. TAX’N 170 (1963); Clifford 
W. Stowe, Audit Informal Conference and Appellate Procedures in the Reorganized Bureau, 94 
J. ACCOUNT. 298 (1952); Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for 
Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes–A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 
1393 (1938); Roger John Traynor & Stanley S. Surrey, New Road Towards the 
Settlement of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW AND CONTEMPT. 
PROB. 336 (1940); James T. Wilkes, Jr., Settlements Before Decision by the Tax Court, 38 
TAXES 827 (1960); H. Brian Holland et al., Treasury Settlement Procedures, A Panel 
Discussion, 50 TAXES 601 (1972).  
106 See Congestion, supra note 72, at 303; Phillips, supra note 72, at 268; Turner, 
1962, supra note 74, at 6. 
107 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337.   
108 1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 887–88, 905–06 (statement of 
George Morris), 912 (testimony of James Ivins), 929–30 (testimony of Charles 
Hamel); Congestion, supra note 72, at 303. 
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members;109 the Chairman immediately exercised such authority by creating 
one-member divisions.110 
A second legislative change designed to increase the Tax Court’s 
productivity was enacted in 1943.111  The presiding judge was authorized to, 
and did, appoint commissioners (later to be designated special trial judges) 
for particular cases who would conduct the hearing and then submit 
proposed findings of fact to the court or the appropriate division.112  If the 
proposed findings of fact were adopted, the judges of the court were 
relieved of the responsibility of conducting the hearing and preparing 
findings of fact.  In this manner, more hearings could be held and more 
appeals resolved. Furthermore, the broadening scope of the special trial 
judge’s duties, which now include presiding over pretrial conferences, 
hearing motions, writing proposed opinions, and entering decisions in 
certain cases,113 has enhanced the Tax Court’s efficiency in handling 
proceedings. 
Finally, for many years commentators recommended that the creation of 
a small claims division would expeditiously dispose of petitions involving 
                                                     
109 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, 
§ 906(a), 44 Stat. 106 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7444(c)). 
110 HAMEL, supra note 32, at 157–59; William H. Bowen, Interview of Tax Court 
Judge Turner, The Tax Court–What Every Tax Man Should Know, 37 TAXES 117, 117–18 
(1959); Phillips, supra note 72, at 244; Siefkin, supra note 72, at 64. 
111 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 503, 58 Stat. 72 (originally codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7456(c); now codified at I.R.C. § 7443A). 
112 Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 34, 71–72 (1943); S. REP. NO. 78-627, at 94 
(1943); see also Memorandum to the Judges from Presiding Judge Murdock, June 7, 
1944, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence”; 
Memorandum to the Judges of the Court from Judge Turner, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, June 7, 1944, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence.” 
After the proposed findings of fact were submitted to the court or a division 
thereof, and served upon both parties, the parties had 20 days to file exceptions 
which, would be considered by the division assigned the case.  TAX CT. R. 48(c) 
(July 1, 1944 ed.).  The parties were allowed 45 days from the filing of the 
Commissioner’s proposed findings of fact to file briefs, and an additional 15 days 
to file reply briefs.  TAX CT. R. 48(d) (July 1, 1944 ed.). 
The idea of appointing commissioners was by no means new, having been 
suggested on numerous previous occasions.  E.g., Harris, supra note 76; Jackson, 
supra note 92; Morgenthau, supra note 92; Phillips, supra note 72, at 244; Joint 
Committee Report, supra note 3, at 28. The Tax Court’s use of commissioners and 
special trial judges is addressed in Part XII.   
113 TAX CT. R. 181–182 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  The scope of the special trial judge’s 
authority, and the procedures to be followed both in cases in which the special trial 
judge may enter the decision and in cases in which the special trial judge may 
preside over the trial but not enter the decision, are detailed in Part XII.C–D.   
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sums below a prescribed threshold.114  As a considerable number of 
petitions involve small amounts, many believed that informal disposition of 
these cases, conducted without the necessity of a formal trial, would 
substantially reduce the backlog of appeals.115  In 1969, following the 
adoption of a special court rule dealing with small cases,116 Congress created 
a small tax case procedure that permitted taxpayers to request, subject to an 
opposing motion by the Commissioner, a less formal resolution of the 
appeal if the amount in dispute was less than $1,000.117  As described in 
more detail in Part XIII,118 Congress has periodically raised the ceiling on 
the amount in dispute in cases subject to the small tax case procedure to its 
current generous level of $50,000.119   
The reasons that motivated Congress to act in 1969, however, were not 
the same reasons that prompted the earlier proposals.  In fact, the small tax 
case procedure was specifically enacted to make the Tax Court more 
accessible to taxpayers with small claims who might not otherwise have a 
practical opportunity to have an impartial tribunal pass upon the merits of 
the Commissioner’s determination.120  The increasing reach of the small tax 
procedure is a testament to the success of this measure in increasing 
taxpayer access to judicial review of adverse administrative 
determinations.121  As a result, the small tax case procedure, which was 
                                                     
114 1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 887, 905 (statement of George 
Morris); Letter to Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, from S. Seidman, June 
29, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Seidman, 1937]. 
115 1925 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 887, 905 (statement of George 
Morris); Seidman, supra note 114. 
116 See Anne S. Davidson, Litigation in the Small Tax Case Division of the United 
States Tax Court–The Taxpayer’s Dream?, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 538, 539 (1972).  
117 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 733 (amending I.R.C. 
§ 7463); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 302 (1969); TAX CT. R. 36 (Dec. 30, 1970 ed.).   
118 The small tax case procedure is detailed in Part XIII.A.     
119 The most recent increase in the amount in dispute was also the most 
significant.  As part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998, Congress increased the prevailing ceiling amount from $10,000 to $50,000.  
See Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3103(a), 112 Stat. 731 (amending I.R.C. § 7463(a)).   
120 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 302 (1969); see also William Drennen, New Status of the 
Tax Court, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1017, 1023–30 (1971); Harold Dubroff, 
Federal Taxation, 1973–74 ANN. SURVEY OF AMER. LAW 265, 265–72 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Dubroff]; Ronald S. Naveen and Lance Eisenberg, Small Cases 
in the Tax Court, 57 A.B.A. J. 1235 (1971); Michael P. Oshatz, Procedural Aspects of 
Practice Before the Tax Court: Including Small Claims Division, When and How to Use It, 31 
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1471, 1480–85 (1973); Samuel B. Sterrett, Small Tax 
Cases, 50 TAXES 624 (1972). 
121  The development and reach of the small tax case procedure provided under 
§ 7463 is addressed in Part XIII.A.    
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originally perceived as a method of eliminating the backlog of appeals, may 
actually be responsible for increasing the number of petitions filed.  
Nevertheless, the streamlined procedures applicable to these cases122 have 
resulted in an overall increase in court efficiency.   
The Board/Tax Court endeavored to complement these legislative 
efforts by gradually developing more efficient and versatile procedures for 
handling appeals.  One cause of delay in the disposition of many appeals 
centered around the Board’s method of placing appeals on trial calendars.123  
Prior to 1938, all proceedings were, as a matter of course, initially placed on 
the Washington trial calendar.124  A subsequent motion by the petitioner, 
which was subject to the Board’s discretion, was necessary to place an 
appeal on a circuit calendar.125  This practice occasioned considerable delay, 
especially in the case of many last minute motions seeking a change from 
one calendar to another.126  The Board received several suggestions to 
revise this procedure127 and, in 1938, substituted a procedure under which 
the petitioner could file with his petition a request to have the petition 
placed upon a particular calendar.128  The Commissioner was likewise given 
an opportunity to file with his answer a request different from the 
taxpayer’s.129  The Board would then determine where the appeal would be 
heard “with due regard to any request filed and in accordance with the 
statutory provision that the time and place of trial shall be fixed ‘with as 
                                                     
122 Dubroff, supra note 120, at 269–72. 
123 See Letter to Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, from Julius Barnard, 
entitled Circuit Hearings, June 10, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Barnard, 1937]; 
Memorandum to Members of the Board, from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, Nov. 12, 1937, at 10–12, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Rules Committee Report]; 
Memorandum entitled “Suggested Changes in Rules of Practice of the Board of 
Tax Appeals,” from Stanley Surrey, c. 1937, at 1, 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Surrey]; 
Memorandum to Chairman Arundell, from Stanley Surrey, Nov. 4, 1937, at 2, 3, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Surrey, 1937]. 
124 B.T.A. RULE 24 (Nov. 1, 1933 ed.); Rules Committee Report, supra note 
123, at 10. 
125 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 4–6; Rules Committee Report, 
supra note 123, at 10–12; Surrey, supra note 123, at 1–2; Surrey, 1937, supra note 
123, at 2–3. 
126 See supra note 125; Barnard, 1937, supra note 123. 
127 See supra note 126. 
128 B.T.A. RULE 26 (July 1, 1938 ed.). 
129 Id. 
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little inconvenience and expense to the taxpayer as is practicable.’”130  Any 
motions to change the place of hearing determined in accordance with the 
above procedure had to be submitted before notice of the time of the 
hearing had been mailed to the parties.131  Subsequently, the procedure was 
further refined to deny the Commissioner the opportunity to file a request 
in his answer, except in cases in which the taxpayer failed to make a request 
with his petition.132  Once a place of trial was designated, either party could 
file a motion to change the designated place of hearing, but such a motion 
had to be based on justifiable grounds.133  The Tax Court deemed this 
change advisable because at these hearings, it was generally the case “that 
the respondent was not particularly concerned in having a place of hearing 
different from that desired by the petitioner.”134  The revised procedure 
removed this needless burden on the motions calendar as the hearing on 
conflicting requests, necessary under the prior procedure, was eliminated in 
many cases.135 
Another potential method of reducing the number of appeals is the joint 
petition.136  By this procedural device, a taxpayer with several deficiency 
notices, or several taxpayers with deficiency notices that present similar 
legal or factual questions, may file a single petition.  Thus, if permitted, joint 
petitions would not only reduce the number of petitions and assure that 
similar cases be tried together, but they would also eliminate the necessity 
of a motion and hearing to consolidate.137  Nevertheless, the Board/Tax 
Court, until recently, has been reluctant to permit joint petitions, for both 
statutory and pragmatic reasons.  The tax laws grant “the taxpayer” the 
right to file a petition.138  The use of the singular noun “taxpayer” raises the 
inference that joint petitions are not within the statutory intendment.139  
                                                     
130 Id.  The statutory reference is to the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(e), 
44 Stat. 108 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7446). 
131 B.T.A. RULE 26 (July 1, 1938 ed.). 
132 TAX CT. R. 26 (Feb. 9, 1943 ed.). 
133 Id.; Memorandum to the Judges from Judge Turner, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, Jan. 15, 1943, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, 1943]. 
134 Turner, 1943, supra note 133.  
135 Id.  The current rule is substantially the same as the 1943 version of the rule.  
Compare TAX CT. R. 26 (Feb. 9, 1943 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 140, 174(a) (July 6, 2012 
ed.); see also Appendix I, Form 5, TAX CT. R. (July 6, 2012 ed.), for a listing of the 
cities where the Tax Court regularly holds circuit hearings. 
136 Letter to Member Morris from Julius Barnard, entitled Consolidated 
Petitions, June 10, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petitions: Memoranda and 
Correspondence.” 
137 Id. 
138 Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297, with INT. REV. 
CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 272(a), 53 Stat. 82, and I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
139 Powers v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 753, 755 (1930).  
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Additionally, joint petitions could create procedural difficulties unless the 
parties could guarantee a continuing identity of issues as the appeal 
progressed.140  The Commissioner’s right to increase the deficiency as to 
any taxpayer, combined with the taxpayers’ right to amend their petitions 
and proceed upon separate and distinct theories, convinced the Board/Tax 
Court to circumscribe the filing of joint petitions carefully.141 
The application of this reasoning, however, depends to a great extent 
upon which type of joint petition is filed.  Generally, there are three 
separate categories of joint petitions.142  The first category includes any 
taxpayer who receives multiple deficiency notices.143  The second category 
is comprised of multiple taxpayers who jointly receive a deficiency notice.144  
The third category consists of multiple taxpayers who receive separate 
deficiency notices.145  Initially, as to each category, the Board steadfastly 
stood by its rule against joint petitions.146  The gradual erosion of the rule 
that subsequently developed was, in part, due to criticism that the practice 
of demanding separate petitions in all cases was unnecessary as well as too 
expensive and time consuming.  Notwithstanding that the Board/Tax 
Court ascribed its relaxation of the rule against joint petitions to benefits 
accruing to taxpayers, the benefits accruing to the Board/Tax Court in 
terms of fewer petitions, joint hearings, and joint opinions were equally 
obvious.  The first relaxation occurred in 1940, when the Board allowed a 
single taxpayer to combine several deficiency notices in one petition.147  The 
Board concluded that this type of petition was no different than a petition 
contesting a single deficiency notice issued with respect to different tax 
                                                     
140 Id. at 757. 
141 It should be noted that, in most cases involving joint petitions, the 
consequences of the Board/Tax Court’s refusal to allow the petition did not 
prejudice the taxpayers.  Generally, the taxpayers were permitted to file separate 
amended petitions and the filing date of these petitions related back to the original 
filing date of the joint petition. See Weisser v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 755, 758–
60 (1935); Sparrow v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 865 (1930); Held v. Commissioner, 
20 B.T.A. 863, 864 (1930); Powers v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 753, 757 (1930). 
142 See TAX CT. R. 34(a), 61 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
143 See Egan v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 204 (1940); TAX CT. R. 34(a). (Jan. 1, 
1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 34(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
144 See Bryant v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 201 (1959); TAX CT. R. 34(a) (Jan. 1, 
1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 34(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
145 See TAX CT. R. 61 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); see generally Randolph F. Caldwell, Jr., 
Tax Court Has New Rules of Practice and Procedure, 59 A.B.A. J. 1301, 1302–03 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Caldwell, 1973]; Goldfein, supra note 49, at 66–67. 
146 See Weisser v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 755, 758–60 (1935); Sparrow v. 
Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 865 (1930); Held v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 863, 864 
(1930); Powers v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 753, 757 (1930). 
147 Egan v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 204 (1940). 
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years.  The revision was of obvious benefit to taxpayers who otherwise 
would be forced to expend time and money drafting separate petitions and 
paying multiple filing fees.148 
The Board/Tax Court was not so liberal in the case of joint petitions in 
the second and third categories, initially refusing to permit these joint 
petitions with one limited exception.  If a deficiency notice was jointly 
issued to separate taxpayers, a joint petition could be filed only if the joint 
recipients were married, had filed a joint return, and presented a joint 
defense.149 
Finally, in 1974, in what was heralded as “a welcome innovation” that 
could result in savings of time and expense for taxpayers and their 
counsel,150 the Tax Court authorized the broad use of joint petitions151 
subject to discretion of the court to sever the claims if deemed 
appropriate.152  In the case of a joint deficiency notice issued to separate 
taxpayers, the rules generally permit the filing of a joint petition.153  If a 
joint petition is filed in connection with the issuance of separate deficiency 
notices to several taxpayers, the Tax Court initially allowed a joint petition 
only if “all or part of each participating party’s tax liability arises out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences and, 
in addition, there is a common question of law or fact relating to those 
parties.”154  However, effective July 1, 1990, the Tax Court eliminated the 
prospect of permissive prepetition joinder of taxpayers who received 
separate notices of deficiency.  Instead, joinder of multiple parties generally 
was limited to instances in which the parties had been issued a single notice 
of deficiency.155  The Tax Court explained its general elimination of 
permissive joinder in terms of administrative ease:   
 
The amendment is intended to alleviate the administrative burden 
that prepetition joinder of petitioners in deficiency and liability cases 
has placed on the Court.  This burden has been particularly acute 
whenever counsel seeks to enter an appearance or withdraw as to 
                                                     
148 Id. at 205.  
149 Bryant v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 201 (1959). 
150 Report of Views of Members of the A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Special 
Subcommittee on Division of Tax Court Rules, Proposed Rules of Practice and Procedure 
of the United States Tax Court, 26 TAX LAW. 393, 394 (1973). 
151 TAX CT. R. 34(a), 61 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  See Caldwell, 1973, supra note 145; 
Goldfein, supra note 49. 
152 TAX CT. R. 34(a), 61(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
153 TAX CT. R. 34(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  This provision has remained 
substantially the same under the current rules.  See TAX CT. R. 34(a) (July 6, 2012 
ed.). 
154 TAX CT. R. 61(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
155  See TAX CT. R. 61(a), 93 T.C. 893 (1989).  
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some, but not all, of the petitioners who have joined in the petition, 
or whenever a settlement has been reached as to some, but not all, of 
the petitioners.156  
 
At the time it eliminated permissive prepetition joinder, the Tax Court 
clarified that a husband and wife who had been issued a notice or notices of 
deficiency in his or her individual capacity could nonetheless file a joint 
petition.157  Hence, absent a single notice of deficiency issued to multiple 
parties, prepetition joinder of parties is now limited to spouses.    
 
C. The Answer 
 
After the taxpayer files a petition the initiative shifts to the 
Commissioner to file his responsive pleading, the answer, which functions 
to define the issues in controversy between the taxpayer and the 
Government.  In the answer, the Commissioner admits or denies the 
petitioner’s allegations and pleads affirmatively to the extent required by 
statute and court rule.  One of the first questions that arose with respect to 
the answer was whether the Board could compel its filing by the 
Commissioner, and in default thereof enter judgment for the petitioner.  
Other questions of a less fundamental nature have also arisen over the years 
which have resulted in the answer being one of the most controversial 
aspects of Board/Tax Court practice.  Important among these have been 
questions involving the Commissioner’s practice of filing general denials 
and the necessity and consequences of affirmative allegations in the answer. 
 
1. Filing Requirements 
 
Originally, the rules of practice provided the Commissioner with 20 days 
to file an answer.158  The Board soon concluded, however, that a longer 
period would be more conducive to informative pleading.159  Consequently, 
in 1925, the period was extended to 60 days.160  Although the original rules 
                                                     
156  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 61(a), 93 T.C. 864 (1989). 
157  See TAX CT. R. 34(a)(1), 93 T.C. 867 (1989); see also Rules Comm. Note, TAX 
CT. R. 34(a)(1), 93 T.C. 867 (1989).     
158 B.T.A. RULE 9 (July, 1924 ed.). 
159 Press Release, United States Board of Tax Appeals, Nov. 24, 1925, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Press Release]. 
160 B.T.A. RULE 9 (Nov. 1, 1925 ed.).  The Board expressed the following 
reasons for the revision: “[T]he time . . . for filing answer has been extended from 
twenty to sixty days in an effort to allow the Commissioner ample opportunity to 
consider the taxpayer’s petition, assemble papers, and, if necessary, communicate 
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neglected to provide for amended pleadings,161 the Board soon issued a 
revision to allow discretionary amendments upon timely motion.162 
Subsequently, the rule was further amended to permit amended answers as 
of right under limited circumstances.163 
                                                                                                                       
with the Collector of Internal Revenue.”  Press Release, supra note 159. Every 
revision since 1925 has provided for a 60-day filing period.  See TAX CT. R. 36(a) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.).  However, in 1931, the 60-day period was suspended in response 
to a request by the Internal Revenue Bureau.  The Bureau claimed, and the Board 
agreed, that a “temporary serious emergency” existed due to the unusually large 
numbers of petitions filed between March 1 and May 31, 1931, and that it would be 
exceedingly difficult to meet the 60-day limitation.  Therefore, the filing period was 
expanded to six months for petitions filed between the two dates.  Order 
suspending Rule 14, April 10, 1931, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive 
Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
161 B.T.A. RULES (July, 1924 ed.). 
162 B.T.A. RULE 13 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.).  The oversight was brought to the 
Board’s attention in a letter responding to a request by the Board for suggestions 
and criticisms of the rules. Letter from William Spalding, attorney, to the United 
States Board of Tax Appeals, Aug. 5, 1924, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Spalding]. 
In 1926, the rule was amended to provide that “[u]pon motion made, the Board 
may, in its discretion, at any time before the conclusion of the hearing, permit a party to a 
proceeding to amend the pleadings to conform to the proofs.”  B.T.A. RULE 18 
(April 1, 1926 ed.) (emphasis added).  The phrase “before the conclusion of the 
hearing” paralleled a statutory provision which permitted the Commissioner to 
claim an increased deficiency “at or before the hearing.”  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 
27, § 273(e), 44 Stat. 56 (now I.R.C. § 6214(a)).  Generally, the Commissioner was 
required to show cause for the amended answer, Behan v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 
1088, 1089 (1935), aff’d, 90 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1937), and, if affirmative relief were 
sought, the rules required a statement of the underlying facts to accompany the 
proposed pleading. Fair v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 866, 875 (1957).  See TAX CT. R. 
14 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  The motions to amend were subject to the Board/Tax 
Court’s discretion.  See Henningsen v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 
1957); Commissioner v. Erie Forge Co., 167 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1948); Gemma v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1967-208, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1967); Fifth Avenue 
Bank of New York v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 701, 704 (1935), aff’d, 84 F.2d 787, 
790 (3d Cir. 1936); Estate of Wickham v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1393, 1398 
(1931), aff’d, 65 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1933); Gilman v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1277, 
1283 (1930), aff’d, 53 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1931); Eagle Dye Works, 1 B.T.A. 638, 640 
(1925). 
163 TAX CT. R. 41(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.), provides in pertinent part: 
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served.  If the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the case has not been placed on a trial 
calendar, then a party may so amend it at any time within 30 days after it is 
served. 
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Alternatively, the Commissioner may file a motion to dismiss the 
petition.  In the first major rules revision, the Board remedied its initial 
failure to afford the Commissioner this option and permitted a motion to 
be filed within 20 days after serving the petition.164  After four years of 
experience under this rule, the Board expanded the filing period to 45 days, 
having concluded that a longer period was necessary for effective and 
efficient pleading.165 
Although moving and answering were presented as alternatives,166 the 
Commissioner could file both simultaneously without jeopardizing his 
rights under the motion if expressly reserved.167  If, on the other hand, the 
Commissioner only filed a motion, the necessity of answering was 
suspended until disposition of the motion,168 after which the Commissioner 
had a “reasonable period, ordinarily 60 days,” to answer.169 
The filing periods described above for moving and answering have 
withstood the test of time and are incorporated into the current rules.170  It 
cannot be inferred, however, that these periods were always adequate.  
Under certain circumstances, extensions of time might be desirable and 
necessary.  Consequently, the filing requirements were complemented by a 
procedure that permitted time extensions “for good and sufficient 
                                                     
164 Compare B.T.A. RULE 9 (July, 1924 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 
ed.). 
165 B.T.A. RULE 14 (May 1, 1928 ed.).  
166 E.g., compare B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 36(a) (Jan. 
1, 1974 ed.). 
167 United States Trust Company, 1 B.T.A. 1086, 1087 (1925). Cf. TAX CT. R. 
31(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.), which provides in pertinent part: 
(c) Consistency.  A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or 
defense alternatively or hypothetically. When two or more statements are 
made in the alternative and one of them would be sufficient if made 
independently, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of 
one or more of the alternative statements.  A party may state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency or the 
grounds on which based. 
168 French & Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 665, 671 (1928). 
169 HAMEL, supra note 32, at 100.  See, e.g., Covert Gear Co., 4 B.T.A. 1025, 
1027 (1926).  B.T.A. RULE 20(b) (Dec. 15, 1948 ed.) formalized the procedure by 
providing: 
If a motion is filed or an order issued in respect to the adequacy of any 
petition, the time prescribed in Rule 14 shall begin to run from the date 
upon which the Court takes final action with respect to the motion or the 
order unless the Court orders otherwise. 
170 TAX CT. R. 36(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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cause.”171  The Commissioner made relatively frequent use of this extension 
procedure in fraud and transferee liability cases,172 and at one point the 
Bureau recommended a general 90-day answering period in these cases.173  
Although the court conceded that an expanded filing period might reduce 
the number of such requests for extensions,174 it declined to amend the rule 
until 1974 when, rather than expanding the answering period, both 
extension and contraction of all time periods were made discretionary with 
the court.175 
On occasion the Commissioner failed to move or answer timely, or after 
an unsuccessful motion, failed to answer timely.  The failure to provide for 
this contingency cannot be attributed to mere oversight.  The Board was 
aware of speculation that, since both the Board and the Bureau were 
agencies in the executive branch and the extent of the Board’s jurisdiction 
over the Bureau was unclear, it might not have the authority to compel an 
answer or to render a decision for the taxpayer on the basis of the 
Commissioner’s failure to answer.176  Presumably for this reason, the Board 
                                                     
171 B.T.A. RULE 12 (July, 1924 ed.).  The motion had to be in writing and state 
the reasons why an extension was requested.  The rule was amended in 1926 to 
provide specifically that it did not apply to the filing of a petition, and that “good 
and sufficient cause” had to be demonstrated.  B.T.A. RULE 20 (April 1, 1926 ed.). 
See generally Shell Company of California v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 1324 (1928); 
Shults Bread Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 268 (1928), aff’d, 37 F.2d 442 (D.C. 
Cir. 1929). 
172 Memorandum from R. Hertzog, to Chief Judge Kern, Aug. 10, 1953, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Hertzog]; Memorandum from Chief Judge Kern, to Judge 
Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, Aug. 14, 1953, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Kern, 1953]. 
173 Hertzog, supra note 172. 
174 Kern, 1953, supra note 172. 
175 TAX CT. R. 25(c) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 25(c) 
(Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). This flexibility has been retained in the current rule.  See TAX CT. 
R. 25(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1), which provides as follows: 
(b) EXTENDING TIME.   
 (1) In General.  When an act may or must be done within a specified 
time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: 
  (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is 
made, before the original time or its extension expires; or  
  (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act 
because of excusable neglect.  
The shorter moving and answering periods in federal district court may have 
also influenced the Tax Court to reserve the power to order shorter filing periods 
in appropriate cases.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12.  
176 Willis W. Ritter, Pitfalls in Practice Before the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT. INC. 
TAX MAG. 297, 299–300 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ritter, 1925]. 
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chose to proceed cautiously rather than risk a confrontation.  For example, 
the original rule which mandated that the Commissioner “shall file an 
answer”177 was soon amended in favor of a more conservative approach 
which provided “the Commissioner shall have 20 days within which” to 
move or answer.178  This change in wording was significant in its implied 
concession that the Board could not compel the Commissioner to answer.  
Additionally, the Board was reluctant, until 1931, to delineate expressly the 
consequences of the Commissioner’s failure to answer.179  Consequently, 
the Board had to improvise on a case-by-case basis when faced with the 
issue.  At first, it seemed satisfied to grant discretionary time extensions that 
were not dependent upon timely motion.180  An orderly procedure, 
however, demanded a less arbitrary and more definitive method of dealing 
with tax controversies.  Furthermore, it was essential, for policy reasons, 
that the Board not only promulgate rules of procedure that fairly allocated 
the burden of pleading, but that the court also uniformly administer the 
rules.181 
The Board received some guidance from the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in its decision in Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex 
rel. Shults Bread Co.,182 which severely restricted the available options.  The 
Board had exercised its discretion to waive the time limitations by allowing 
the Commissioner to submit his pleading on a motion made subsequent to 
the filing period.  In affirming the decision, the court of appeals stressed 
that the Commissioner had a statutory right to be heard,183 and  because 
there was no statutory requirement that the Commissioner file an answer, 
the Board’s procedural rules could not limit that statutory right.184  The 
                                                     
177 B.T.A. RULE 9 (July, 1924 ed.). 
178 B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.). 
179 It is also possible that the Board was reluctant to promulgate a rule 
penalizing the Commissioner, because of the impropriety of anticipating an 
occasional failure to comply with the rules.  See Letter from Judge Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, to E. Griswold, Dec. 11, 1947, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence.” 
180 Board of Tax Appeals v. U.S. ex rel. Shults Bread Co., 37 F.2d 442 (D.C. 
Cir. 1929); Leininger v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 621 (1930), rev’d, 86 F.2d 791 (6th 
Cir. 1931), rev’d, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Baldwin v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 506, 507 
(1928). 
181 See Letter from R. Miller, Chairman, ABA Committee on Federal Taxation, 
to Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, April 22, 1937, p. 2, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Miller]. 
182 37 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1929). 
183 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, amending Revenue Act of 1924, 
§ 907(a), 44 Stat. 107 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7458). 
184 37 F.2d at 443. 
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court concluded that the Commissioner’s failure to answer would, under no 
circumstances, justify a default judgment. 
 
When the petition for redetermination was filed with the Board in 
the present case, the duty was imposed upon the Board to proceed 
with the case.  The objections set forth in the petition to the findings 
of the Commissioner presented issues between petitioner and the 
Commissioner for redetermination by the Board, whether the 
Commissioner answered the petition or not.  The issues thus 
presented by the petition, in the absence of answer, were such as 
must be supported by proof.  In other words, there was not such a 
prima facie case as would authorize or justify a judgment in default.  
The jurisdiction to redetermine forbids such a judgment.185 
 
Shortly thereafter, the Board promulgated a rule consistent with the 
Shults Bread Co. holding which nevertheless encouraged responsive pleading 
by the Commissioner.  The rule stated that “[e]ach and every material 
allegation of fact set out in the petition and not denied in the answer . . . 
shall be deemed to be admitted.”186  On its face, this rule seemed preferable 
to the prior ad hoc procedure in two respects.  First, the Board avoided the 
appearance of partiality towards the Commissioner since the sanctions 
imposed on the Commissioner for failing to answer paralleled the sanctions 
imposed on the petitioner for failing to reply.187  Second, the rule provided 
the necessary element of certainty which was missing under its predecessor.  
Nevertheless, the rule was not particularly suited to the requirements of tax 
practice.  The revenue losses likely to be suffered by the Government if an 
onerous consequence attached to the Commissioner’s failure to answer 
could not be ignored.188  As a result, there was less than vigorous 
enforcement of the rule, which in turn created resentment over the “habit 
of leniency to the Government which prevail[ed] in the Courts of this 
neighborhood.”189  Therefore, the rule was amended in 1938, in favor of a 
show cause procedure.190 
                                                     
185 Id. at 444. 
186 B.T.A. RULE 19 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
187 Id.; Miller, supra note 181. 
188 Miller, supra note 181. 
189 Id.  See generally Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 507 
(1931), aff’d, 62 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1933); Leininger v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 621 
(1930), rev’d, 86 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1931), rev’d, 285 U.S. 136 (1932). 
190 B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.).  The rule resembled a Bureau proposal 
which advocated a show cause hearing prior to the imposition of any penalty for 
failing to answer timely. Memorandum from R. Ryan, Joint Comm. Member, to 
Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, May 14, 1937, at 1–2, filed at the U.S. Tax 
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To invoke the revised rule, the petitioner was required to file a motion 
advising the Board of the undenied factual allegations.  The Commissioner 
then had to demonstrate that good cause existed to receive an extension; 
otherwise, the undenied allegations were deemed admitted.  If the taxpayer 
neglected to file a motion within 45 days after the expiration of the 60-day 
period, the petition’s factual allegations were deemed denied.191  The 
interest in uniform application of the rules was satisfied since the same rule 
was applied in the case of a petitioner’s failure to reply.192  In 1955, the 
Board confined this procedure to the taxpayer’s failure to reply,193 and the 
pre-1938 procedure regarding answers was reinstated.  The reinstated 
procedure provided that undenied factual allegations contained in the 
petition were to be deemed admitted, unless the court permitted a 
discretionary filing extension after a showing of good cause.194 
The 1974 revision witnessed an abrupt departure from the traditional 
approach.  The Tax Court, due to its change in status in 1969 to an article I 
court,195 which presumably released it from the constraints of the Shults 
decision, instituted a procedure based on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.196  The rule now permits the court to hold any party in default 
who has failed to comply with its rules.197  Alternatively, the court may 
decide an issue against any party failing to comply with its rules who has the 
burden of proof, and the decision “shall be treated as a dismissal.”198  The 
effect of a decision “rendered upon a default or in consequence of a 
dismissal” will be an adjudication on the merits,199 subject to being set aside, 
however, upon motion “for reason deemed sufficient by the Court.”200 
 
                                                                                                                       
Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Ryan]. 
191 B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
192 Id. 
193 TAX CT. R. 18 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
194 TAX CT. R. 20 (Aug. 15. 1955 ed.).  The Commissioner satisfied the good 
cause standard if the failure to file was not the result of willful misconduct and did 
not prejudice the taxpayer. Dixon v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 802 (1973); Rea v. 
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 717 (1973); Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 520 
(1973). 
195 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7441). 
196 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 41, 55, with TAX CT. R. 123 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
197 TAX CT. R. 123(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
198 TAX CT. R. 123(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
199 TAX CT. R. 123(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
200 TAX CT. R. 123(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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2. The General Denial 
 
The usual responsive pleading of the Commissioner has been a general 
denial.201  The Commissioner’s continued reliance on this pleading 
technique has aroused considerable criticism among the tax bar.202 
Notwithstanding a consensus that this format of pleading is 
counterproductive, it has persisted for decades.203 
The emergence of the general denial as the Commissioner’s standard 
responsive pleading cannot be attributed to the Board’s failure to provide 
the requisite guidelines.  By 1926, the rules directed the Commissioner to 
prepare an answer that informed the Board and the taxpayer of the nature 
of the defense.204  In an effort to realize this objective, the rules required 
admissions and denials to be specific.205  If strictly observed, this rule could 
have checked the developing trend towards the general denial; but there 
were numerous incentives which encouraged and practically dictated the 
opposite result.206  First, strategies inherent in the adversarial system 
                                                     
201 E.g., Ash, supra note 14, at 938; Paul, supra note 13, at 514; Letter from J. 
Barnard to Member Morris, Joint Comm. Chairman, June 10, 1937, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Barnard].  
202 E.g., Ash, supra note 14, at 938; Paul, supra note 13, at 514; D.C. Bar Report, 
supra note 13, at 9–15. 
203 E.g., Paul, supra note 13, at 514; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 9–15; 
Letter from J. Seidman, to H. Reiling, Assistant General Counsel’s Office, Oct. 30, 
1936, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Seidman, 1936]. See infra note 206. 
204 B.T.A. RULE 14 (April 1, 1926 ed.).  This provision was first incorporated 
into the rules in 1924.  B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.).  The original rules 
merely required the Commissioner to admit or deny the petition’s material factual 
allegations.  B.T.A. RULE 9 (July, 1924 ed.). 
205 B.T.A. RULE 14 (April 1, 1926 ed.). 
206 See Robert Ash, Guides in the Preparation of Protests, Briefs, and Tax Court 
Pleadings, 4 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 243, 258–59 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 
Ash]; Bennion, supra note 14, at 417–19; Randolph F. Caldwell, Jr., Tax Court 
Procedure: Problems But Not Pitfalls, 27 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1435, 1439 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Caldwell]; Martin D. Cohen, Litigation Techniques That 
Increase Your Chances for Success in the Tax Court, 35 J. TAX’N 340 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as Cohen]; Goldfein supra note 49, at 67; Groman, supra note 14, at 611; 
Albert L. Hopkins, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 12 A.B.A. J. 466, 468 
(1926) [hereinafter cited as Hopkins]; Paul, supra note 13, at 514; Homer Sullivan, 
Procedure Before The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 2 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 325, 
326 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan]; Barnard, supra note 201; D.C. Bar Report, 
supra note 13, at 9–15; Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 22–23; Letter from 
Chairman Black to J. Seidman, Jan. 12, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Seidman, 1937]; Seidman, 1936, supra note 203; Letter from M. Teall, attorney, to 
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encouraged the Commissioner to keep the issues as elastic as possible.207  If 
the answer was drafted in general and indefinite terms, it was less likely to 
be inconsistent with the deficiency determination, thus preventing a 
possible shift in the burden of proof.208  Second, many petitions were 
drafted in such a manner “that it [was] difficult, if not impossible, to 
specifically admit or deny the allegations of those petitions without 
substantial prejudice to the Commissioner’s case.”209  Third, the Chief 
Counsel’s Office was understaffed, which made it difficult to allocate the 
time necessary to carefully draft a specific and informative answer.210  
Fourth, due to the internal stratification of the Chief Counsel’s Office, the 
attorneys who drafted the answer were encountering the case for the first 
time.  Their unfamiliarity with the facts211 and lack of personal stake or 
responsibility in the case created pressures that tended to result in the filing 
of a general denial.212  Finally, the Commissioner’s practice of prefacing the 
                                                                                                                       
Chairman Arundell, March 26, 1932, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive 
Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Teall]. 
207 Bennion, supra note 14; Groman, supra note 14.  
208 Bennion, supra note 14; Groman, supra note 14; see also B.T.A. RULE 30 
(April 1, 1926 ed.).  
209 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
210 Id. 
211 D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 11; Paul, supra note 13. 
212 D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 11.  From 1924, to the present, there 
have been several indications that the Commissioner had issued instructions to file 
more informative answers.  Statements in 1926 indicated that the earlier practice of 
filing general denials had been discontinued.  Hopkins, supra note 206.  In 1938, the 
Joint Committee’s Report concluded: “[I]n this connection we are advised that the 
Chief Counsel has recently issued specific instructions to his attorneys to make 
every effort in that direction [improving answer’s quality] and that there has already 
been substantial improvement.”  Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 23.  In 
1971, despite continuous criticism, the Chief Counsel stated his policy as follows: 
It has long been the position of this office that facts alleged in the petition 
which are known to be true by our attorneys should be admitted.  Recently 
we have gone a step further and issued instructions to our trial attorneys 
that errors alleged in the petition to adjustments in the deficiency notice 
giving rise in part to the deficiency should also be admitted in the answer if, 
in fact, the statutory notice makes an incorrect determination as to any of 
the adjustments.  In other words, if the Government was in error as to part 
of the determined deficiency, such error will be admitted in the answer 
rather than wait until the entire case is settled or the case tried as has been 
in the past the usual practice. 
Letter from K. Martin Worthy, Chief Counsel, to M. Cohen, Sept. 8, 1971, in 
Cohen, supra note 206, n.4, at 340–41.  The unending flow of criticism, however, 
makes these statements suspect.  
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general denial with “specifically” was tantamount to technical compliance 
with the rule, which made a successful challenge difficult.213 
The respondent’s failure to plead his position fully in the answer was 
encouraged by the Board’s reluctance to take the requisite corrective 
measures.214  For example, in the first appeal decided by the Board, John H. 
Parrott,215 the petitioner moved to have a more specific answer filed.  The 
Commissioner resisted, arguing that since the deficiency was presumptively 
correct, a general denial of the petition was the only answer necessary.  The 
Board apparently acquiesced in the Commissioner’s position,216 and the 
practice of general denials was thus commenced. In 1924, soon after the 
decision in Parrott, the Board revised the answer rule to require that answers 
“fully and completely . . . advise the taxpayer and the board of the nature of 
the defense.”217  However, little change in actual practice resulted from this 
revision.218  In 1926, the Board introduced the motion for a further and 
better statement of a pleading219 which possessed the potential to arrest this 
trend.  However, its potential went unrealized for almost 30 years.  In the 
words of one disenchanted practitioner, 
 
[T]he rule sounds just dandy, but it does not work as it sounds.  I 
have made numerous attempts to smoke out the Commissioner’s 
position by attempting to invoke the rule, and have yet to succeed.  
And I cannot find any reported Board or Tax Court case which 
indicates the rule has ever helped a taxpayer.220 
                                                     
213 Teall, supra note 206, at 1.  See generally Ash, supra note 206. 
214 Ash, supra note 206, at 258, 259; see also Caldwell, supra note 206, at 1439–41; 
Cohen, supra note 206, at 340–41; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13. 
215 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924).  See Sullivan, supra note 206, at 326. 
216 Sullivan, supra note 206, at 326. 
217 B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.). 
218 E.g., Sullivan, supra note 206, at 326. 
219 B.T.A. RULE 19 (April 1, 1926 ed.).  There is some evidence that the Board, 
prior to this date, entertained such motions with respect to petitions.  Charles D. 
Hamel, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 2 NAT. INC. TAX MAG. 293, 296 
(1926). 
220 Ash, supra note 206, at 259.  The procedure has been used successfully, 
however, especially in net worth fraud cases.  Licavoli v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 862 (1956), aff’d, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958); Gerald J. Mehlman, The 
Motion for a Further and Better Statement in Net Worth Fraud Cases, 10 TAX L. REV. 267 
(1954).  See generally Bennion, supra note 14, at 412–15; Caldwell, supra note 206, at 
1439–40; Herbert S. Mednick, Pre-Trial Strategy in a Tax Case: Techniques and 
Limitations in Dealing with Regional Counsel, 22 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 125, 
135–37 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Mednick]; Edward Pesin, Techniques in Proving a 
Tax Case, 17 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 37, 45 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Pesin]; 
Arnold Raum, Tax Court Litigation, 9 U.S.C. TAX INST. 631, 641–43 (1957) 
[hereinafter cited as Raum]; Herbert L. Zuckerman, Check List of Do’s and Don’ts in 




In the view of many, the prevailing practice with regard to the answer 
had an adverse effect on the conduct of Tax Court proceedings by 
curtailing the necessary exchange of information.221 Prior to 1974, the 
pleadings and stipulations were the primary methods of defining and 
narrowing the issues since discovery and admissions procedures were 
unavailable.222  The general denial not only diminished the informational 
content of the answer, but also compelled the parties to place a heavier 
emphasis on alternate methods of narrowing the issues.223  As a result, 
many taxpayers expended unnecessary time and money proving formal 
facts, facts the Commissioner knew to be true, which many times were 
actually contained in Government files.224  Additionally, the Board/Tax 
Court was burdened with both an increased motion practice as taxpayers 
sought more informative answers, and with lengthier trials if the motion 
was denied and all the facts had to be formally proved.225  Furthermore, the 
general denial had repercussions for the Commissioner who also had to 
devote more time to opposing taxpayer motions as well as participating in 
lengthier trials. 
                                                                                                                       
Handling a Tax Fraud Case, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 987, 1011 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Zuckerman].  However, as a result of the 1974 rules revision, 
the motion for a more definite statement has been restricted to cases in which such 
a statement is necessary in order for a responsive pleading to be framed.  TAX CT. 
R. 51(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  See infra notes 229–232 and accompanying text. 
221 See Paul, supra note 13, at 514; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 10–15; 
Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
222 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70, 71, 72, 73, 90 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
223 Cf. Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 22, 23. 
224 Paul, supra note 13, at 514; Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 22, 23; 
Teall, supra note 206.  The following examples are illustrative: 
In one instance a taxpayer alleged under oath that he was married and had 
four children, all of which was denied.  The petitioner was put to great 
trouble and expense in proving the simple facts by doctor’s certificates, 
marriage certificate, absence of divorce, etc.  In another case the taxpayer 
alleged under oath that he had filed certain tax returns in the Collector’s 
Office of a distant state, which facts were denied.  It required a great deal of 
trouble to prove those facts and it later developed that the Government 
attorney had the returns in his file all the time. 
D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 13.  
225 D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13; Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 
22–23.  To the extent facts were stipulated, however, the taxpayer’s burden of 
proof was eased. 
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Initially, criticism of uninformative answers was directed mainly at the 
Commissioner,226 but as time passed commentary tended to focus on 
proposals to reform Board/Tax Court practice.  One suggestion called for 
verified answers.  The Commissioner would have been required to certify 
that admitted allegations were true, and that denials were specifically 
premised on knowledge, information and belief, or insufficient 
information.227  Another suggestion would have required the Commissioner 
to bear the taxpayer’s cost of proving facts, when the respondent 
unreasonably refused to admit them.228 
                                                     
226 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 13; Letter from J. Barnard to Member Morris, Joint 
Comm. Chairman, June 10, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive 
Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence;” Joint Committee Report, supra note 
3, at 22–23. 
227 Memorandum from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, to 
Members Trammell, Black and Matthews, April 2, 1932, filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda and Correspondence.”  The Board had 
previously rejected the idea on the grounds that the Commissioner had insufficient 
knowledge of the taxpayer’s affairs.  Teall, supra note 206.  If the recommendation 
had been adopted, the following affidavit would have been required: 
COUNSEL’S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I prepared the foregoing answer; that, in course of 
preparation thereof, I made, personally, a careful examination of the file of 
this case in the possession of the General Counsel for the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue; that said answer specifically admits each and every 
allegation of fact of the petition which, from my knowledge or information 
of this case, I believe to be true; that each and every denial of fact in said 
answer made is based upon my belief that the allegation denied is in fact 
untrue, or else upon my own want of information, from said file or 
otherwise, sufficient to enable me to form a belief as to whether the 
allegation denied is in fact true or untrue; and that each and every 
affirmative allegation of fact made in said answer is believed by me to be 
true. 
Teall, supra note 206. 
228 See Paul, supra note 13.  This recommendation was based upon N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. ACT § 323 which provided: 
Admission of facts.  Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than ten 
days before the trial, may call on any other party to admit, for the purposes 
of the cause, matter or issue only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in 
such notice.  In case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days 
after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed 
by the court or a judge, the expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts 
must be ascertained at the trial and paid by the party so neglecting or 
refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter or issue may be, unless at 
the trial or hearing the court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was 
reasonable, or unless the court or a judge, at any time, shall order or direct 
otherwise. Any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be 
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The plethora of criticisms and proposals appeared to fall on deaf ears 
until 1956, when the Tax Court commenced a campaign against 
uninformative answers that gradually proliferated into a multi-faceted 
attack.  The first major breakthrough occurred in Licavoli v. Commissioner,229 
in which the court gave notice that more specific pleading would be 
required.  The Commissioner had failed to comply with a court order 
granting the taxpayer’s motion for a further and better statement of the 
answer, and the court struck those pleadings which were the subject of the 
motion.230  Thereafter, until 1974, a motion for a further and better 
statement was an integral part of taxpayers’ arsenal for challenging general 
denials.231  As a result of the 1974 rules revision, the motion for a further 
and better statement was generally confined to pleadings requiring a 
responsive pleading.232  This change in practice, however, did not signal a 
termination of the Tax Court’s efforts to compel informative answers.233  
Rather, it indicated an emphasis favoring a more diversified approach that 
allowed taxpayers to insist upon specific pleading and to ascertain the 
underlying factual basis of the answer.  In 1974, the answering requirements 
were strengthened in three aspects, and these revisions have been carried 
forward in the present rules.  First, the Commissioner must identify which 
allegations the Commissioner has insufficient information to either admit or 
deny.234  Second, if only part of an allegation is denied, the part admitted 
                                                                                                                       
deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular cause, matter or 
issue, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other 
occasion or in favor of any person other than the party giving the notice.  
The court or a judge, at any time, may allow any party to amend or 
withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just. 
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 36, 37(c). 
229 Licavoli v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 862 (1956), aff’d, 252 F.2d 268 
(6th Cir. 1958). 
230 Id. 
231 See Bennion, supra note 14; Caldwell, supra note 206; Mednick, supra note 
220; Raum, supra note 220; Zuckerman, supra note 220. 
232 TAX CT. R. 51(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 51(a) 
(Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Estate of Allensworth v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 33 (1976). 
233 Compare TAX CT. R. 51(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 36, 70, 71, 72, 
73, 90 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  In Licavoli v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 862, 864 
(1956), aff’d, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958), the Tax Court indicated that one of the 
important considerations in its decision to make the motion for a further and better 
statement more readily available was the absence of discovery procedures.  Now 
that both admission and discovery have been introduced into Tax Court procedure, 
the need for the motion for a further and better statement is diminished. 
234 TAX CT. R. 36(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  See Goldfein, supra note 49, at 67.  The 
allegation of facts which the Commissioner has insufficient information to admit or 
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and the part denied must be specified.235  Third, although verification is not 
generally required, the court, in its discretion, reserves the right to require 
verification of any pleading.236  The taxpayer can seek enforcement of the 
new pleading requirements by a motion to strike.237  In addition to this 
remedy, the Tax Court introduced admission and discovery procedures that 
supplement both the pleadings and stipulations in narrowing the issues by 
making the factual basis of the Commissioner’s litigating position 
available.238 
 
3. Affirmative Allegations 
 
Under certain circumstances, the Commissioner cannot be content with 
merely filing a general denial because affirmative pleading is mandated by 
statute or court rule.  The importance of affirmative pleading lies principally 
in its relationship to the burden of proof rules. 
The Board’s original rules directed the Commissioner to “set forth any 
new matters of fact and any propositions of law” in the answer.239  At the 
same time, the rules, without qualification, placed the burden of proof on 
the taxpayer.240  By 1925, however, the Board made clear that, as to 
defenses and affirmative relief, the Commissioner would have the burden 
of proof.241  In 1926, both the answer and burden of proof rules were 
amended to reflect this practice.  The Commissioner was required to plead 
“new matters upon which [he] relies for defense or affirmative relief”242 and 
the burden of proof for the new matter of fact affirmatively pleaded was 
shifted to the Commissioner.243  These rules were not, however, entirely 
satisfactory.  For example, strictly construed, the rules permitted the 
Commissioner to avoid the burden of proof as to fraud by simply raising 
                                                                                                                       
deny are deemed denied.  A similar proposal, which was rejected in 1948, provided 
in part: 
When the answer contains a denial of a fact alleged in the petition, the 
Commissioner shall state what the fact is or what he alleges the fact to be 
on information and belief, or that he is without any information of the fact 
which is denied. 
D.C. Bar Report, supra note 13, at 15. 
235 TAX CT. R. 36(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
236 TAX CT. R. 33(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 33(a) 
(Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
237 TAX CT. R. 52 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  
238 TAX CT. R. 70, 71, 72, 73, 90 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
239 B.T.A. RULE 9 (July, 1924 ed.). 
240 B.T.A. RULE 20 (July, 1924 ed.). 
241 General Lead Batteries Co., 2 B.T.A. 392, 395 (1925); see also 1925 House 
Hearings, supra note 72, at 907. 
242 B.T.A. RULE 14 (April 1, 1926 ed.). 
243 B.T.A. RULE 30 (April 1, 1926 ed.). 
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the issue in the deficiency notice and thereby technically preventing any 
allegations of fraud in the answer being classified as new matter.  The Board 
endorsed this approach until the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Budd v. 
Commissioner,244 and Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1928,245 declared the 
applicability of the common law rule, which required the party alleging 
fraud to prove it.246 
Five years later, in 1931, the answer and burden of proof rules were 
once again amended,247 and as revised remained unchanged until 1974.  The 
Commissioner was directed to plead affirmatively in his answer in three 
instances:  when the Commissioner alleged an affirmative defense, asked for 
affirmative relief, or by statute had the burden of proof.248  A separate 
amendment was made in the burden of proof rule to provide that the 
taxpayer had the burden of proof “except as otherwise provided by statute 
and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded in his answer, it shall 
be upon the respondent.”249  Clearly, as to matter with respect to which the 
Commissioner had the statutory burden of proof, the answer and burden of 
proof rules were consistent—the burden of pleading followed the burden 
of proof.250  However, it was not clear that the allegations of “new matter 
pleaded in the answer” which caused a shift in the burden under the burden 
of proof rule were identical with the “defenses” and “affirmative relief” 
required to be affirmatively pleaded by the answer rule.251  This difference 
in language created the potential for an incongruous interpretation of the 
two rules which could have resulted in the Commissioner being required to 
plead affirmatively without a corresponding shift in the burden of proof or 
vice versa.  The need for identity in the terminology of both rules was 
brought to the Board’s attention,252 but apparently the Board was not 
                                                     
244 43 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1930).  See Kerbaugh v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1014, 
1015–16 (1934), aff’d. 74 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1935). 
245 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 601, 602, 45 Stat. 872 (now codified at 
I.R.C. §§ 7454, 6902(a)). 
246 This change in practice was reflected in the 1931 revision of both the 
answer and the burden of proof rules.  B.T.A. RULES 14, 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
247 B.T.A. RULES 14, 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
248 B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
249 B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
250 Compare B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1, 
1931 ed.). 
251 See, e.g., Samuel Byer, Limitation of Issues in Tax Litigation, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON 
FED. TAX’N 1035 (1960); Memorandum to Member Arundell, Joint Comm. 
Chairman, c. 1937, at 1–2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: 
Memoranda and Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Arundell]; Ryan, supra note 
190, at 2–3; Surrey, supra note 123, at 2–3, 7–8; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 4–5. 
252 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9; Ryan, supra note 190; Surrey, 
supra note 123; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123. 
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prepared at that time to commit itself to a complete integration of the 
rules.253  Therefore, the distinctions, if any, between the two rules were left 
to case law. 
Affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer, such as res judicata and 
waiver,254 were clearly included in the term new matter and shifted the 
burden of proof to the Commissioner.255 Analysis was not so simple, 
however, with regard to “affirmative relief.”  Allegations seeking affirmative 
relief, which also caused a shift in the burden of proof, were generally 
classified by case law into two basic categories: increased or different 
deficiencies,256 and pleading new matter as distinguished from the broader 
burden of proof new matter.257  The Bureau was well aware of the 
procedural disadvantages of shifting the burden and attempted to influence 
the Board’s noncommittal position by commencing a campaign aimed at 
preventing a shift in the burden of proof in both cases, although it was 
generally recognized that both types of allegations should be pleaded.258 
In the case of increased deficiencies, the Board was compelled by statute 
to allow the Commissioner to claim an increased deficiency at or before the 
hearing.259  There was, however, no statutory provision mandating a shift in 
the burden of proof. The Bureau attempted to persuade the Board not to 
                                                     
253 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
254 See TAX CT. R. 39, 142 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
255 E.g., Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1937); see also 1925 
House Hearings, supra note 72, at 907; Surrey, supra note 123, at 7–8.  The Tax 
Court’s current rules expressly recognize that affirmative defenses must be pleaded 
and list those most common. Compare TAX CT. R. 39 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX 
CT. R. 142 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
256 See, e.g., Estate of Tony Cordeiro v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 195, 203 (1968); 
Beck Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 856 (1957); 
Rainbow Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1060 (1935); Hemphill 
v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1351, 1356 (1932); Cook v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 
92, 95 (1932); Stewart & Bennett, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 850, 855 (1930); 
National Tea Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1222, 1228–29 (1929).  See generally 2 
LAURENCE F. CASEY, FED. TAX PRAC. 14–19 (1955) [hereinafter cited as CASEY]. 
257 The new matter generally referred to in the following cases had to be 
affirmatively pleaded and the Commissioner had to assume the burden of proof, 
but the new matter was not classified as increased or different deficiencies or an 
affirmative defense.  E.g., Estate of Falese v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895, 899 
(1972); Estate of Gorby v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80, 91 (1969); Axelroad v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1962-118, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 626, 631 (1962); Cedar 
Valley Distillery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 870, 879 (1951); Campbell v. 
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 510, 511 (1948); O'Meara v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 622, 628 
(1947). 
258 Ryan, supra note 190, at 2–3; Surrey, supra note 123, at 7–8; Surrey, 1937, 
supra note 123, at 4–5. 
259 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(e), 44 Stat. 56 (now I.R.C. § 6214(a)). 
Pretrial Procedure                                      581 
 
 
shift the burden of proof in these cases, on the ground that the only 
difference between an original and increased deficiency was that the 
Commissioner issued the former, whereas the Appeals Division determined 
the latter.260  The Board was not convinced; it reasoned that the respondent 
could “not consistently rely on” the presumption that the original 
determination was correct “and at the same time urge that the 
determination [was] wrong by asking for an increase.”261 
In the case of pleading new matter, however, the issues were 
considerably more complex due to severe definitional problems.262 The 
Bureau anticipated the definitional problems inherent in the term “new 
matter” and attempted to convince the Board to make a clarifying revision 
that more specifically defined the term.263  The Bureau’s primary fear was 
that explanatory factual allegations pleaded in the answer would be 
classified as affirmative relief and would thereby be considered as new 
matter, which would shift the burden of proof.264  The Board appreciated 
the definitional problems, but concluded that a better term than new matter 
was not available.265  The Board felt that it would be inordinately difficult if 
not impossible to anticipate all allegations which might constitute new 
matter for purposes of affirmative relief.266 
In retrospect, the Commissioner’s apprehension—that explanatory 
factual allegations and new matter would be confused—appears to have 
been well founded in view of two distinct definitional problems with the 
term which subsequently arose. First, there were two kinds of new matter:  
pleading new matter and burden of proof new matter.  The former had a very 
narrow definition, including only those affirmative relief allegations which 
were not categorized as increased or different deficiencies;267 the latter had a 
                                                     
260 Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 4–5; see also Ryan, supra note 190, at 2–3. 
261 Cascade Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 946, 948 
(1932); see also Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 57 (1957).  The same analysis 
would apply to different deficiency adjustments that did not increase the actual 
amount of the deficiency.  See CASEY, supra note 256, at 14–19. 
262 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 
4–5. 
263 Surrey, supra note 123, at 7–8; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123 at 4–5. 
264 Ryan, supra note 190, at 2–3. 
265 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
266 See Arundell, supra note 251, at 1–2. 
267 See Estate of Horvath v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 551, 556–57 (1973); Estate 
of Falese v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895, 899 (1972); Estate of Gorby v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80, 91 (1969); McSpadden v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 478, 
493 (1968); Sorin v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 959, 969 (1958), aff’d, 271 F.2d 741 (2d 
Cir. 1959); Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 57 (1957); Tauber v. 
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179, 185 (1955); Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 870, 879 (1951). 
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very broad definition, encompassing all allegations in the answer which 
shifted the burden of proof other than statutory shifts in the burden of 
proof.268  The confusion was exacerbated by the Board/Tax Court’s failure 
in its published decisions to acknowledge the sense in which the term was 
being used.269  Nevertheless, pleading new matter was consistently treated 
as new matter for purposes of the burden of proof.270 
To the extent that the different definitions of new matter for purposes 
of pleading and burden of proof caused confusion, such confusion was 
eliminated in the 1974 rules revision by the complete integration of the 
answer and burden of proof rules.271 Pursuant to that revision, the 
Commissioner is directed to plead affirmatively only when the 
Commissioner has the burden of proof.272  The burden of proof is generally 
placed upon the taxpayer, with four exceptions.273  Two of the exceptions, 
affirmative defenses274 and statutory shifts in the burden of proof,275 were 
expressly included in prior versions of the answer rule.276  The other two 
exceptions, increased deficiencies277 and new matter,278 are the two 
categories of affirmative relief which, under prior answer rules, required 
affirmative pleading.279 It should be noted that the 1974 rule revision 
confined the definition of new matter to the former pleading definition as a 
                                                     
268 B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  Compare Estate of Falese v. 
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895, 899 (1972) (pleading new matter); Estate of Gorby v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80, 91 (1969) (pleading new matter); Hull v. Commissioner, 
87 F.2d 260, 261–62 (4th Cir. 1937) (affirmative defense) with Estate of Cordeiro v. 
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 195, 203 (1968) (increased deficiency); Markle v. 
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1593, 1599 (1952) (increased deficiency); Rainbow Gasoline 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1060 (1935) (increased deficiency). 
269 See supra notes 267–268. 
270 See supra notes 256, 268. 
271 Compare TAX CT. R. 36(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 
1974 ed.). 
272 TAX CT. R. 36(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 
36(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
273 TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
274 Compare TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 39 (Jan. 1, 
1974 ed.). 
275 TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  The more common instances of the 
statutory shift in the burden of proof are also listed in the rule.  TAX CT. R. 142(b), 
(c), (d), (e) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
276 Compare TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 
1931 ed.).  
277 TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
278 Id. 
279 Compare TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 
1931 ed.). 
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subdivision of affirmative relief, rather than the sweeping, all-inclusive 
definition of the term under previous burden of proof rules.280 
The second problem involved defining when allegations in the answer 
constituted pleading new matter.  The decision to classify these allegations 
as either explanatory factual allegations or pleading new matter, which, in 
turn, ultimately determined whether the issue would be entertained and 
who had the burden of proof, generally depended upon two factors:  the 
timeliness of the allegations and their consistency with the deficiency notice. 
If the allegations were made by answer or amended answer prior to the 
hearing, then the only real issue was whether the allegations were consistent 
with the general theory of the deficiency notice.281  If the allegations were 
consistent with the deficiency notice, the burden of proof remained on the 
taxpayer since the allegation simply explained or expounded upon the 
general theory of the deficiency notice.282  On the other hand, in the case of 
an inconsistency, the burden of proof was shifted to the Commissioner 
since the allegation constituted new matter.283  The standard that guided the 
decisions, as explained in Sorin v. Commissioner,284 was usually the specificity 
of the deficiency notice. Affirmative allegations were more likely to be 
classified as explanatory allegations, or in the court’s terminology, a new 
theory (as opposed to a new matter), if the deficiency notice was phrased in 
vague and general terms.285  On the other hand, new matter was a more 
typical conclusion if the deficiency notice pinpointed an exact reason for 
                                                     
280 See TAX CT. R. 36(b), 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); note 249 and accompanying 
text supra. 
281 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 22, 68–69 (1961), aff’d, 305 F.2d 949 
(2d Cir. 1962), aff’d, 374 U.S. 65 (1963); Estate of Scharf v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 
15, 27–28 (1962), aff’d, 316 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1963); Spangler v. Commissioner, 32 
T.C. 782, 793–94 (1959); Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 57 (1957); Tauber 
v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179, 185 (1955); Security-First Nat’l Bank of Los Angeles 
v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 633, 637 (1937). 
282 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 22, 68–69 (1961), aff’d, 305 F.2d 949 
(2d Cir. 1962), aff’d, 374 U.S. 65 (1963); Estate of Scharf v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 
15, 27–28 (1962), aff’d, 316 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1963); Spangler v. Commissioner, 32 
T.C. 782, 793–94 (1959). 
283 Sorin v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 959, 969 (1958), aff’d, 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 
1959); Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 57 (1957); Tauber v. Commissioner, 
24 T.C. 179, 185 (1955); Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 870, 
879 (1951); Security-First Nat’l Bank of Los Angeles v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 
633, 637 (1937). 
284 29 T.C. 959, 969 (1958), aff’d, 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1959).  For discussion 
of the interpretation of a new matter in subsequent decisions, see Part X.C.3.   
285 See supra note 282. 
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the deficiency determination, because of the increased likelihood of 
inconsistency.286 
If the Commissioner made the allegations in his opening statement, or 
any time thereafter, the Board/Tax Court generally approached the issue 
from one of two perspectives.  First, the Board/Tax Court might decide 
that the taxpayer had no prior notice of the new allegations and, therefore, 
was prejudicially surprised.287  Such a finding would preclude any 
consideration of the issue288 and generally would become more likely the 
longer the Commissioner waited to raise the issue.289  The other approach 
involved the usual new matter analysis with the correlative allocation of the 
burden of proof.290 
The Tax Court has consistently refused to delineate by rule the 
circumstances under which affirmative allegations will be classified as new 
matter,291 presumably for the same reasons it rejected the Bureau’s proposal 
to that effect in 1937.292 Nevertheless, the principle enunciated in Sorin 
appears to be a manageable standard.  Furthermore, the Tax Court has 
clarified the analytic approach to new matter.  In Estate of Horvath v. 
Commissioner,293 the Tax Court combined the prejudicial surprise and new 
matter/new theory approaches into a two-part analysis.  The court held that 
prior to a determination of the new matter issue, it must be decided if the 
taxpayer was prejudicially surprised.  Only upon determining that the 
taxpayer was not prejudicially surprised will the Tax Court address the 
allocation of the burden of proof by venturing into the new matter/new 
theory dichotomy.294 
                                                     
286 See supra note 283. 
287 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-281, 34 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1218, 1223–24 (1975); Estate of Horvath v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 
551, 555–56 (1973); Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 601, 
617 (1964); Theatre Concessions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 754, 760–61 
(1958); Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970, 976 (1940). 
288 See supra note 287. 
289 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-281, 34 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1218, 1223–24 (1975). 
290 Estate of Falese v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895, 899 (1972); Estate of Gorby 
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80, 91 (1969); McSpadden v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 478, 
493 (1968); Tauber v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179, 185 (1955); Cedar Valley 
Distillery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 870, 879 (1951); Security-First Nat’l Bank 
of Los Angeles v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 633, 637 (1937). 
291 See TAX CT. R. 36, 142 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
292 See supra notes 263–266 and accompanying text. 
293 59 T.C. 551 (1973).    
294 Id. at 555–56; see also Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 172 (“As with other 
amendments, we must consider whether granting respondent’s motion will surprise 
and/or unfairly disadvantage petitioners.”); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 




D. The Reply 
 
Prior to 1931, a reply was not considered essential to the expeditious 
disposition of tax controversies.295  Issue was joined upon filing of the 
answer, and any affirmative allegations contained therein were deemed 
denied.296  However, increased incidents of affirmative allegations in the 
answer, partially attributable to statutory amendments that placed the 
burden of proof on the Commissioner in fraud and transferee liability 
cases,297 led the Board to institute a formal reply procedure in 1931.298 
From 1931 to 1938, the reply provided an irrepressible source of 
controversy.299  The Board, striving to adapt the reply concept to the 
                                                                                                                       
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-281, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1218, 1223–24 (1975) 
(refusing to consider issue raised for the first time in post-trial briefing).  
295 See, e.g., B.T.A. RULES (1924–1931 eds.).  
296 B.T.A. RULE 17 (April 1, 1926 ed.).  
297 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 601, 602, 45 Stat. 871 (now codified at 
I.R.C. §§ 7454(a), 6902(a)).  
298 B.T.A. RULES 15, 17, 19 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 
§§ 601, 602, 45 Stat. 872 (now codified at I.R.C. §§ 7454(a), 6902(a)) (burden of 
proof on Commissioner in fraud and transferee cases). 
299 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 8–9; Letter from R. Miller, 
American Bar Ass’n Comm. on Fed. Tax. Chairman, to Member Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, April 22, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive 
Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Miller, April 22, 
1937]; Letter from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, to the General 
Counsel and American Bar Ass’n Comm. on Fed. Tax., Feb. 23, 1937, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Murdock, Feb., 1937]; Letter from Member Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, to R. Miller, American Bar Ass’n Comm. on Fed. Tax. 
Chairman, April 23, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1937]; 
Memorandum from Member Murdock, to Members of the Board, April 30, 1935, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1935]; Memorandum from 
Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, to Chairman Black, Nov. 8, 1937, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” 
“Memorandum in re Rules,” from Member Murdock, Rules Comm. Chairman, c. 
1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock]; Memorandum from Rules 
Comm. to the Board, Nov. 12, 1937, at 13, 14, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Rules 
Comm.]; Ryan, supra note 190, at 2–3; Surrey, supra note 123, at 4; Surrey, 1937, 
supra note 123, at 3, 4. 
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peculiarities of tax practice,300 vacillated among a spectrum of possibilities 
including a verified, compulsory reply, as well as the complete abolition of 
the procedure.301  Ultimately, in a major revision effort in 1938, the Board 
settled on a compromise procedure that restricted the situations demanding 
a reply and simultaneously provided a compelling incentive to reply under 
the prescribed circumstances.302 
At various times between 1938 and 1974, the Board/Tax Court 
attempted to clarify the 1938 procedure.303  These revisions, like their 
predecessors, concentrated on filing requirements and the form and content 
of the reply.  Whether these modifications were successful, however, is 




Filing encompasses three important and distinct issues:  whether a reply 
is required, when it must be filed, and what sanctions result from a failure 
to file timely.  Each of these questions was addressed by the 1931 and 
subsequent revisions. 
 
a. Requirement to Reply 
 
The 1931 revision directed the filing of a reply  
 
[i]f the answer of the Commissioner sets forth facts upon which he 
relies for affirmative relief, or contains a statement of the facts upon 
which he relies to sustain an issue in respect of which the burden of 
proof is placed upon him by statute. . . .305 
 
The rule thus required a reply in two of the instances when the 
Commissioner had the burden of proof:  when the Commissioner asked for 
affirmative relief in the answer, and when a statute placed the burden of 
proof on the Commissioner.  The rule’s application to the Commissioner’s 
request for affirmative relief was relatively clear:  If the Commissioner’s 
answer asserted new matter or a new deficiency, either in addition to or in 
place of the original deficiency, a reply was mandatory.306  In effect, the 
reply represented the taxpayer’s initial pleading with respect to the new 
                                                     
300 See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 123. 
301 See, e.g., id. 
302 B.T.A. RULES 15, 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
303 TAX CT. R. 15, 18 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.); TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
304 See infra notes 311–324 and accompanying text. 
305 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
306 If a reply was not filed, the affirmative allegations were deemed admitted.  
West Town State Bank v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 531 (1935). 
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matter or deficiency and fulfilled a function similar to the petition.  The 
major difference between the two was that the reply had no jurisdictional 
implications. 
The rule was not that clear, however, when the answer contained 
allegations of fraud,307 a matter on which the Commissioner, by statute, had 
the burden of proof.308  The wording of the rule implied that a reply was 
necessary whenever fraud was in issue.309  Nevertheless, the Board soon 
ruled that a reply would not be required if the Commissioner’s answer 
simply repeated allegations of fraud originally contained in the notice of 
deficiency which the taxpayer had already denied in his petition.310 
In 1955, further ambiguity was introduced by a revision that apparently 
required a reply whenever the answer contained material allegations of 
facts.311  Despite the apparent breadth of the new rule, subsequent decisions 
made clear that the court’s intent was only to require a reply if the answer 
                                                     
307 E.g. , Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299. 
308 B.T.A. RULES 14, 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 
§§ 601, 602, 45 Stat. 871 (now codified at I.R.C. §§ 7454(a), 6902(a)).  The other 
issue on which the Commissioner shouldered the burden of proof, transferee 
liability, apparently caused no controversy.  
309 See Statler v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 342, 345 (1932). For an excellent 
discussion of when fraud is involved, see Kerbaugh v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 
1014 (1934), aff’d, 74 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1935). 
310 Beringer v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 250, 251 (1933), wherein the Board 
stated “if the answer merely reiterates affirmatively matters already covered by his 
notice of deficiency and assailed by the petition, there is no requirement that the 
petitioner shall as to those matters file a reply, and his failure to do so is not 
prejudicial.” In Nicholson v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 977, 984 (1935), aff’d, 20 F.2d 
978 (8th Cir. 1937), the Board extended this exception by not requiring a reply if 
the denial of fraud in the petition was germane to the contents of the deficiency 
notice and not anticipatory to the answer.  However, if the petitioner did not deny 
fraud, but simply set up a defense in avoidance, then fraud was deemed admitted. 
Mauch v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 617, 625 (1937), aff’d, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 
1940).  
311 TAX CT. R. 15 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  This language was first suggested by 
Stanley Surrey in 1937 in the following proposed amendment: 
If the answer of the Commissioner sets forth allegations of fact, the 
petitioner shall, within 45 days after a copy of such answer is mailed to him 
or his counsel of record by registered mail, file a reply which shall contain: 
(1) A specific admission or denial of each material allegation of fact 
contained in the answer; 
(2) A clear and concise statement of any additional facts upon which he 
relies for defense. 
Surrey, supra note 123. 
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contained material allegations which the Commissioner had the burden of 
proving.312 
The rule, modified as  part of the major rules revision of 1974, provided 
as follows: 
 
Form and Content.  In response to each material allegation in the 
answer and the facts in support thereof on which the Commissioner 
has the burden of proof, the reply shall contain a specific admission 
or denial.313 
 
Strictly construed, the rule failed to inform taxpayers under what 
circumstances a reply was required, because it only related to the form and 
content of the reply.  But, when read in conjunction with the Tax Court 
Rules Committee note, it is evident that no change in practice was 
intended.314  Consequently, a reply was required “after service . . . of an 
answer in which material facts are alleged.”315 The ambiguity of the 
previous rule, however, was removed, and it became clear that a reply was 
required only when the answer contains “material allegations . . . on which 
the Commissioner has the burden of proof. . . .”316  The rule in its current 
form retains this approach.317    
                                                     
312 Gilday v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 260, 262 (1974); Gay v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1966-237, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (1966); Watson v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1964-155, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 927 (1964); Baglivo v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1962-127, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1962); Wolfe v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1961-131, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 655 (1961); Morris v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 
928 (1958); Accardi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1957-73, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 311 
(1957); Lugauskas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1957-56, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 
(1957).  This conclusion is also supported by the 1974 rules revision that requires a 
reply only when the answer contains material allegations in respect of which the 
Commissioner has the burden of proof.  TAX CT. R. 37(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  The 
official Note to the 1974 rules revision states that it made no change in the 
substance of the rule as modified in 1955.  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 
1, 1974 ed.). 
313 TAX CT. R. 37(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
314 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
315 TAX CT. R. 15 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
316 TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Gilday v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 260, 262 
(1974).  The 1931 answer rule required defenses as well as affirmative relief to be 
pleaded in the answer.  B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  The 1931 reply rule, on 
the other hand, only required the taxpayer to file a reply if the answer contained 
affirmative relief allegations.  B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  The natural 
inference was that a reply was unnecessary with respect to affirmative defenses.  
The 1955 revision of the reply rule, as subsequently interpreted, eliminated this 
confusion by requiring a reply in response to material factual allegations the 
Commissioner had the burden of proving.  TAX CT. R. 15 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  See 




b. Timely Filing 
 
The 1931 revision established a clear timetable for replying.  After the 
answer was sent to the petitioner by registered mail,318 the rule provided 
that “the petitioner shall, within 45 days . . . file a reply.”319  Inexplicably, in 
1955, the Tax Court removed this unambiguous direction and changed the 
rule to provide that “[t]he petitioner . . . shall have 45 days within which to 
file a reply. . . .”320  Although no change in practice was intended, and 
subsequent interpretations should have eliminated any lingering doubts,321 
this wording was significant because its failure to instruct the taxpayer in 
express terms to reply was another potential source of misunderstanding.  
Perhaps a preoccupation with symmetry and consistency offers the best 
explanation, inasmuch as the wording paralleled the phrasing of the answer 
rule.322  However, with respect to the answer, this phrasing was 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 312.  The current rule expressly requires a reply to affirmative defenses 
pleaded in the answer if the Commissioner files a motion requesting a reply.  TAX 
CT. R. 37(b), 39, 142 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
317  TAX CT. R. 37(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
318 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  In 1955, the registered mail requirement 
was dropped in favor of the methods of service contained in Rule 22.  TAX CT. R. 
15, 22 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
319 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  All subsequent revisions have provided 
45 days as the initial reply period. 
320 TAX CT. R. 15 (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
321 Compare Gilday v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 260, 262 (1974); Gay v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1966-237, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (1966); Myers v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1966-238, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1228 (1966); Sauer v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1964-74, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019 (1964); Baglivo v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1962-127, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1962); Wolfe v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-131, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 655 (1961); Morris v. 
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 928 (1958); Lugauskas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1957-
56, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1957); Greene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1957-28, 
16 T.C.M. (CCH) 133 (1957), with McDonald v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1955-
96, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 327 (1955); Corinblit v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1955-
148, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 545 (1955); Bowen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1954-92, 
13 T.C.M. (CCH) 640 (1954); Herring v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1953-77, 12 
T.C.M. (CCH) 248 (1953); Berdine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1953-98, 12 
T.C.M. (CCH) 324 (1953); Blankman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1952-338, 11 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1166 (1952); Black v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 474 (1952); Galvin v. 
Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 402 (1948); Downer v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 358 (1945); Weiss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1943-32, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 
447 (1943).     
322 Compare TAX CT. R. 15(a) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 14(a) (Aug. 15, 
1955 ed.).  A second change made by the 1955 revision provides further evidence 
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purposefully adopted to avoid a confrontation regarding the Board’s 
jurisdiction to compel the Commissioner to answer.323  Although the Tax 
Court was not so constrained in the case of the reply, it reaffirmed its 
commitment to this language by including it in the 1974 revision.324  The 
language persists today.325   
 
c. Failure to Reply 
 
The consequences attending the taxpayer’s failure to reply, usually the 
result of misunderstanding326 or ignorance,327 framed one of the more 
sensitive issues facing the Board.  Ultimately, it provided the impetus for 
change in this area. 
The 1931 rule provided that “[e]ach and every allegation of fact . . . set 
out in the answer and not denied in the reply, where a reply is required by 
these Rules, shall be deemed to be admitted.”328  This rule proved highly 
controversial.  Many practitioners opposed the imposition of penalties for 
failing to reply timely.329  They challenged both the Board’s power to relieve 
the Commissioner of his statutory burden of proof330 and the propriety of a 
policy that placed such importance on a minor error.331  In their view, the 
only discernible purpose of a reply was to facilitate framing the issues, and 
this could be accomplished regardless of how late it was filed.332 
Even among those who approved of the Board’s approach, there was 
considerable disagreement concerning the meaning of “deemed to be 
                                                                                                                       
of a movement toward symmetry between the answer and reply. As an alternative 
to replying, the petitioner was permitted “30 days within which to move with 
respect to the answer.”  TAX CT. R. 15(a) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  A similar option had 
been made available to the Commissioner with respect to the petition 31 years 
earlier.  B.T.A. RULE 9 (Sept. 27, 1924 ed.); TAX CT. R. 14(a) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  
See Memorandum from Victor Mersch, Tax Court Clerk, to Judge Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, Oct. 6, 1949, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive 
Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Mersch].  In 1974, 
the Tax Court continued this trend by modeling the reply rule after the answer rule.  
Compare TAX CT. R. 36 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
323 See supra notes 176–200 and accompanying text. 
324 TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
325  TAX CT. R. 37(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
326 See generally introductory Comment, B.T.A. RULES (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.); notes 
346–348 and accompanying text infra. 
327 Ash, supra note 206, at 258. 
328 B.T.A. RULE 19 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
329 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299; Murdock, supra note 299; Murdock, 
Feb., 1937, supra note 299. 
330 Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299. 
331 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299. 
332 Id.; Murdock, Feb. 1937, supra note 299, at 2. 
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admitted.”  Some read the phrase as requiring undenied factual allegations 
to be conclusively presumed admitted, thereby effectively relieving the 
Commissioner of the burden of proof.333 They argued that the Board’s 
statutory authority to promulgate its rules of procedure334 would be 
subverted unless meaningful sanctions were imposed upon petitioners who, 
without cause, failed to reply timely.335  Others interpreted “deemed to be 
admitted” as not totally foreclosing the petitioner on undenied allegations 
contained in the answer.  They agreed that integrating a coercive element 
into the rule would expedite compliance.  However, they questioned the 
efficacy of a conclusive presumption, claiming the benefits of the procedure 
were far exceeded by its disadvantages. In their view, affording the 
Commissioner a rebuttable presumption would be as effective in producing 
replies, would avoid inequitable and onerous results, and would be more 
defensible on appeal.336 
Only a few cases involved the issue, and the Board was not compelled 
to adopt definitively either position.337  This was primarily attributable to 
the rule that generally permitted the Board to accept untimely filings if the 
party could show “good and sufficient cause” for the delay.338  The same 
savings provision was employed by the Board to relieve parties from the 
                                                     
333 Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299. 
334 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 107 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7453). 
335 Murdock, 1937, supra note 299; Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299, at 2. 
336 Murdock, supra note 299; Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299, at 1; see also 
Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299; Memorandum from Judge Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman to Judge Raum, Tax Court Judge, March 3, 1953, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Murdock, 1953]. 
337 Prior to 1938, the Board had not decided whether a petitioner could present 
evidence on the issue of fraud after failing to reply.  In Statler v. Commissioner, 27 
B.T.A. 342, 344 (1932), the first case dealing with a failure to reply, the conclusive 
versus rebuttable presumption issue was not addressed.  Rather, it was simply held 
that the undenied allegations were deemed admitted.  See also Nicholson v. 
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 977 (1935); Kerbaugh v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1014, 
1016 (1934), aff’d, 74 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1935); Beringer v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 
250, 251 (1933), in which the meaning of “deemed to be admitted” was not 
reached because the Board decided a reply was unnecessary.  In Mauch v. 
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 617, 625 (1937), aff’d, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940), no reply 
was filed and the undenied allegations of fraud were deemed admitted.  However, 
the Board also held that the evidence introduced by the Commissioner supported a 
finding of fraud.  Cf. Murdock, Feb., 1937, supra note 299. 
338 B.T.A. RULE 20 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.); Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299, at 
4, 5; see also Murdock, 1937, supra note 299, at 1. 
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application of other controversial sanctions.339  Nevertheless the solution 
afforded by the relief provision was not wholly satisfactory. “Good and 
sufficient cause” was inherently ambiguous, and its application by an 
individual Board member could well be affected by his view of the necessity 
for a timely reply.  As a result, the consequences of a late reply were largely 
dependent upon which member presided at the hearing.340  These vagaries 
in the application of the rule elicited considerable criticism341 and, in 1937, 
in an effort to develop a universally acceptable procedure, the Board 
solicited recommendations from the Bureau and the tax bar.342 
The Commissioner expressed indifference to the subtleties of the 
alternatives under consideration.343  However, the Commissioner stressed 
that the uncertainty of the reply procedure was responsible for an 
inefficient allocation of time and money since Government attorneys had to 
be prepared to prove facts theoretically deemed admitted.344 The 
Commissioner indicated support for any uniformly enforced procedure, 
including the abolition of the reply, but an inconsistently enforced 
procedure was intolerable.345  On the other hand, Robert Miller, Chairman 
of the American Bar Association committee on federal taxation, was not as 
concerned with the uncertain application of the reply rule as with the 
apparent harsh implications of failure to reply timely.  He sympathized with 
the plight of the practitioners who did not regularly practice before the 
Board and who were therefore unfamiliar with its procedural rules;346 any 
procedure that did not account for this situation was, in Miller’s view, 
ill-conceived.347  Additionally, he argued that the usual reply was 
                                                     
339 E.g., supra notes 170–200 and accompanying text. 
340 Murdock, supra note 299; Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 14. 
341 Murdock, supra note 299; Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 14. 
342 Murdock, Feb., 1935, supra note 299.  The letter concluded: “[I]f the 
[present] rule is clear and not too harsh, it should stand.  If it is clear but too harsh, 
then it ought to be modified.  If the words ‘deemed to be admitted’ are not clear, 
the rule needs clarification.”  Id. at 3. 
343 See Murdock, supra note 299, in which it was indicated that the Bureau 
supported treating undenied allegations as prima facie evidence.  The tenor of its 
position was that any uniformly enforced procedure would be acceptable. 
344 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9; Murdock, supra note 299; Rules 
Comm., supra note 299, at 14. 
345 Murdock, supra note 299; Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 14. 
346 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299, at 2.  It was claimed that the Board 
did provide compensatory relief under the 1931 procedure in two related fashions.  
The Board was “not disposed to be too strict where taxpayers and their 
representatives plead ignorance of the rules.”  Secondly, “most all rules of the 
Board [could] be waived by a Board Member if a good cause [was] shown for the 
violation of the rule.”  Murdock, 1937, supra note 299, at 1. 
347 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299, at 2. 
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tantamount to a general denial, and only a misguided procedure would 
elevate such an insignificant pleading to pivotal importance.348 
The Board yielded in 1938, but in the process, reaffirmed its 
commitment to a reply procedure.349  Ostensibly, the purpose of the 
revision was to enable Government attorneys to ascertain prior to trial 
whether fraud had to be proven.350  However, the curious hybrid 
promulgated by the Board represented a compromise procedure obviously 
influenced by other considerations.351  It satisfied the uniformity criterion of 
the Commissioner by providing an explicit procedure that specifically dealt 
with a failure to reply.352  Simultaneously, it catered to Miller’s specifications 
by restricting the adverse consequences of a failure to reply.353 
The previous rule, which automatically deemed all undenied factual 
allegations admitted, was confined to cases in which a reply was filed which 
failed to deny such allegations.354  A new, more complex, procedure was 
provided to deal with a failure to reply timely. 
 
[W]here a reply is required by these rules, but no reply is filed, the 
adverse party, within 45 days after the expiration of the time fixed by 
these rules for filing . . . the reply .  . . may file a motion with the 
Board calling attention to the fact that the pleading has not been 
filed within the specified time and certain material allegations of fact 
have not been denied, and requesting the Board to enter its order 
that those particular undenied allegations shall be deemed to be 
admitted. The Board will serve a copy of this motion upon the other 
                                                     
348 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299. 
349 B.T.A. RULES 15, 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
350 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 9; Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 
14. Cf. Murdock, supra note 299. 
351 In Tucker, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1952-27, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 99, 102 
(1952), the following reasons were advanced for the rule: 
That rule was designed to make sure that the petitioner would be made 
doubly aware, first by the service of the answer, and, second, by the service 
of the order to show cause, of the necessity of a reply if he had any basis for 
denying the allegations of the answer.  Its purpose was also to require no 
further proof of fraud in cases in which the petitioner chose, by failing to 
deny the allegations, to require no evidentiary proof. 
See Murdock, 1953, supra note 336. 
352 B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.); Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 
9; Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 14. 
353 Compare B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.), with Miller, April 22, 1937, supra 
note 299. 
354 B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
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party and issue an order to show cause, returnable on or before a day 
certain.355 
 
On its face, the rule seemed to require taxpayers to offer a satisfactory 
explanation for failing to reply timely, as a condition precedent to obtaining 
relief.  However, this was not the intent of the provision.  The Board 
contemplated affording taxpayers two unrestricted opportunities to reply.356  
If the petitioner did not take advantage of the initial filing period, then the 
Commissioner’s motion would serve as an express reminder that unless a 
reply was forthcoming, specified undenied allegations would be 
presumptively deemed admitted.357  Additionally, although subsequent 
                                                     
355 Id. 
356 Cf. Tucker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1952-27, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 99, 
102 (1952); Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 14.  The intent of the rule, which was 
consistent with its interpretation, can be deciphered from the following:  
The Court realized that in cases where the Commissioner had the burden of 
proof, particularly in fraud cases, failure of a petitioner to know the rule 
requiring a reply might permit a decision on the pleadings that there was 
fraud and if it did not deny the petitioner his right to introduce proof to the 
contrary, at least it might work a great hardship on one every now and then.  
I think also there was some feeling that the Circuit Courts were not or 
would not be too happy in such a situation so the cumbersome procedure 
was adopted in order to bring the matter of the necessity of a reply 
definitely to the attention of the taxpayer whether or not he was smart 
enough to know that the rule required a reply. 
Murdock, 1953, supra note 336.  
When needed, a reply is to be filed within 45 days of service of answer (Rule 
15).  If not filed, respondent within 45 days thereafter may move to hold 
the undenied allegations of the answer deemed admitted. But if the reply is 
then received, it is filed. Mr. Swecker observes that the time for reply is thus 
90 days, with respondent and the Court sending a reminder that a reply is 
overdue. 
Mersch, supra note 322, at 4. 
It should be noted that the above description of the reply procedure is not 
entirely accurate.  If a reply was not filed within the initial 45-day period, the 
Commissioner had another 45 days within which to file a motion.  The taxpayer 
had until the return date of the motion to file the reply. 
357 See Berdine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1953-108, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 344 
(1953); Corcoran v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1953-4, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 89 
(1953); Tucker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1952-27, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 99, 102 
(1952); Kawaguchi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1946-91, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 293 
(1946).  In the following cases, allegations of fraud, transferee liability, or increased 
deficiency were deemed admitted.  E.g., Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1953-78, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 249 (1953) (fraud); Herring v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1953-77, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 248 (1953) (fraud); Downer v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1945-112, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 358 (1945) (fraud); McGlue v. 
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interpretations of the rule did not directly address the issue, it was evident 
that any reply filed prior to the return date of the Commissioner’s motion 
was considered timely.358  If the Commissioner neglected to file the motion 
timely, undenied allegations were deemed denied without the benefit of a 
reply.359 Notwithstanding the imprecision of the 1938 rule, from its 
inception the procedure was an unqualified success,360 and has only been 
changed in minor respects.361  
 
2. Content and Form 
 
The content of the reply has never been controversial.  The 1931 rule, 
which directed petitioners to file a reply containing “a specific admission or 
denial of each material allegation of fact contained in the answer” and any 
facts upon which he relied for defense,362 went unaltered until the 1974 
revision.363  The absence of disputes with regard to content is somewhat 
                                                                                                                       
Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 761, 766 (1941) (fraud); Black v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 
474 (1952) (increased deficiency); Belford v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 1210 
(increased deficiency); Blankman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1952-338, 11 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1166 (1952) (increased deficiency); Galvin v. Commissioner, 7 
T.C.M. (CCH) 402 (1948) (transferee liability). 
358 There is no case refusing to allow a taxpayer to file a reply prior to the 
return date of the show cause order.  
359 B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
360 Judge Murdock’s response to a suggestion that the rule be re-evaluated best 
illustrates the confidence in the rule.  “I do not believe we have had any case since 
the adoption of the rule where the taxpayer has had any basis for complaint.  The 
Commissioner does not find the rule too burdensome and I would be disposed to 
leave it as it is.”  Murdock, 1953, supra note 336. 
361 In 1955, the rule was clarified to expressly grant taxpayers the right to file 
the reply on or before the day fixed for the hearing of the Commissioner’s motion.  
TAX CT. R. 18(c)(2) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.).  The 1974 revision also made minor 
changes in the phrasing of the rule, but the substance of the rule remained intact.  
Compare TAX CT. R. 18(c) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 37(c) (Jan. 1, 1974 
ed.).  In 1951, it was recommended that the procedure be simplified as follows:  
Whenever the answer of the respondent includes allegations which bring it 
within Rule 15, the said answer shall be entitled “ANSWER REQUIRING 
REPLY” and shall at the end thereof, in the lower left-hand corner, the 
name and address of the person upon whom the petitioner shall serve his 
reply. 
Memoranda from V. Mersch, Tax Court Clerk, to Judge Kern, July 27, 1951, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
However, this proposal was never adopted. 
362 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.). 
363 Compare B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 15(b), (Jan. 25, 
1971 ed.). 
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surprising, since the phrasing of the rule paralleled the provision governing 
the answer.364  The latter rule has been a constant source of irritation to the 
tax bar, which objects to the Commissioner’s usual reliance on 
uninformative general denials in his answer.365  In view of the widespread 
taxpayer ignorance of the Board/Tax Court’s procedural rules, it is doubtful 
that taxpayers observed the reply rule any better than the Commissioner 
fulfilled the requirements of the answer rule.366  Rather, the incongruity is 
probably attributable to the infrequent use of the reply and the fact that few 
commentators have espoused the Service’s position on this matter. 
In 1974, the rule underwent an extensive revision aimed at making the 
reply more informative.367  The court attempted to restrict the use of the 
general denial by the following measures: (1) insisting that admissions and 
denials be specific; (2) requiring that taxpayers indicate whether they 
possess sufficient information to admit or deny allegations; (3) directing 
that petitioners qualify denials if only part of an allegation is denied; and (4) 
demanding that there be included a “clear and concise statement of every 
ground, together with the facts in support thereof, on which the petitioner 
relies affirmatively or in avoidance of any matter in the answer on which the 
Commissioner has the burden of proof.”368  The motivating force for this 
change is somewhat obscure. The normal impetus for revision, discontent 
with existing practice, was not present.  The controversy over the answer,369 
combined with a determination to cast the contents of the answer and reply 
in the same mold,370 were probably the decisive factors. 
With respect to the form of the reply, the central issue has been whether 
verification should be mandatory. Initially, the Board did not consider 
verification of the reply necessary.371  In 1935, movement towards 
verification began when the Board’s Rules Committee recommended 
mandatory verification of the reply and answer.372  The Board rejected the 
proposal, concluding the issue deserved further consideration.373  
                                                     
364 Compare B.T.A. RULE 14 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.), with B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb., 1, 
1931 ed.). 
365 See supra notes 201–238 and accompanying text. 
366 See CASEY, supra note 256, at 63, in which it is indicated that the Tax Court 
has not strictly enforced the rule relative to the content of the reply. 
367 TAX CT. R. 36, 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
368 Id.  The rule that emerged from the 1974 rules revision remains substantially 
the same today.  See TAX CT. R. 37 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
369 See supra notes 201–238 and accompanying text. 
370 Compare TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 36 (Jan. 1, 1974 
ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 37 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Mersch, supra note 322, 
at 4; see also supra note 322 and accompanying text.  
371 B.T.A. RULES (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.) did not mention verification of the reply. 
372 Murdock, 1953, supra note 299, at 2.  
373 Id. 
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Apparently there was little sentiment for requiring the Commissioner’s 
pleadings to be verified, and in light of this fact it was deemed inexpedient 
to require verification of the petitioner’s reply.374 
The question was resolved in 1938375 after strong lobbying by the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue for verification of the reply.376  The Bureau, 
which opposed requiring verification of answers, had no difficulty in 
justifying the apparent disparity: 
 
[T]he requirement of verification would eliminate the denial of 
matters obviously true, thus obviating the need for proof of these 
matters, and would place the taxpayer on record in regard to factual 
matters.  Although adoption of this suggestion would result in all of 
the petitioner’s pleadings being verified while those of the 
Government would remain unverified, it was thought that the 
difficulties attending verification by the Government would justify a 
difference in treatment if verification of the reply was thought 
desirable.377 
 
The Board, however, was well aware of the uproar certain to be heard if the 
proposal was adopted. 
 
[T]here would be considerable dissatisfaction among taxpayers and 
their counsel if this rule were adopted.  Those persons might be 
expected to point to the inadequacy of the Commissioner’s answers 
and to ask why additional burden should be placed upon the 
petitioner as to the pleadings, when by far the greater fault lies with 
the Commissioner, who not only does not verify his answers, but in 
too many instances files a general denial even denying facts he knows 
to be true.378 
 
A suggestion from Robert Miller, who advocated verification of the reply 
and answer only after a showing of good cause,379 ultimately provided the 
Board with a compromise procedure capable of maintaining a delicate 
balance between the competing considerations.380  “[D]ifficulties attending 
                                                     
374 Id.; Rules Comm., supra note 299 at 13; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 3. 
375 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
376 See Ryan, supra note 190, at 2; Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 3; Surrey, supra 
note 123, at 4; see also Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 13. 
377 Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 3. 
378 Rules Comm., supra note 299, at 13. 
379 Miller, April 22, 1937, supra note 299, at 5; Murdock, 1937, supra note 299. 
380 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
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verification by the Government” ruled out verification of the answer,381 but 
the Board accommodated most interests by requiring verification of the 
reply only if good cause was demonstrated.382  In 1974, the court subjected 
all pleadings to a similar rule—verification is not required unless specifically 




The pretrial stipulation procedure has been described as “the bedrock of 
Tax Court practice;”384 according to many, it is largely responsible for the 
court’s ability to keep current with the thousands of cases docketed each 
year.385  By eliminating the necessity of proof at trial with respect to 
uncontroverted issues of fact, pretrial stipulations result in savings of time 
and expense for both the court and the parties.386  Moreover, the necessity 
of complying with the stipulation procedure forces opposing counsel to 
consult and to develop the facts of their case in advance of trial.387  As a 
result, issues are perceived and litigating risks are evaluated at an early stage 
of the proceedings.  Many observers believe that the high rate of pretrial 
settlements that obtains in the Tax Court388 is largely due to this facet of its 
practice.389 
                                                     
381 Surrey, 1937, supra note 123, at 3. 
382 B.T.A. RULE 15 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
383 TAX CT. R. 33 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
384 Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974). 
385 JOHN P. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 139–
41 (1969); Gerald D. Babbitt & William Morris, An Introduction to the Tax Court of the 
United States, 21 TAX LAW. 615, 626–28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Babbitt & 
Morris]; Randolph F. Caldwell, Jr., Tax Court Has New Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
59 A.B.A. J. 1301, 1304 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Caldwell, 1973]; John W. Kern, 
The Process of Decision in the United States Tax Court, 8 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 
1013, 1013 (1950); Memorandum from Judge Raum to Chief Judge Murdock, Dec. 
14, 1959, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Raum, Dec. 14, 1959]. 
386 Charles D. Hamel, The United States Board of Tax Appeals , 2 NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 293, 307 (1924); Willis W. Ritter, Pitfalls in Practice Before the Board of Tax 
Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 297, 301 (1925). 
387 Robert R. Veach, Stipulating Facts in Tax Court, 34 TAXES 669, 674 (1956) 
[hereinafter cited as Veach].  
388 Throughout the history of the court, the rate of settlement has averaged 
between 70 percent and 90 percent of cases docketed. 
389 Caldwell, 1973, supra note 385, at 1304; Percy W. Phillips, Possible Methods of 
Eliminating Congestion of Tax Appeals, 5 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 243, 270 (1927); 
Memorandum from Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, entitled “Pre-trial 
Procedure,” Feb. 11, 1960, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum from Judge Turner, Rules Comm. 
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Three related controversies have arisen throughout the history of the 
stipulation procedure in the Tax Court.  The first involved whether 
stipulation procedures ought to be mandatory or permissive.  Although the 
stipulation procedure was successful from its initial adoption on a purely 
voluntary basis, pressures grew to make the procedure even more efficient, 
and the court moved toward mandatory stipulation of undisputed facts in 
every case.  With the adoption of mandatory stipulations, the controversy 
shifted to the question of what procedural forms would be most successful 
in requiring recalcitrant parties to stipulate.  The direction here has been 
toward increasing the court’s supervisory duties with respect to stipulations. 
Finally, a good deal of attention has centered on the relationship of the 
stipulation procedure to the issue of pretrial discovery.  The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, provided for liberal pretrial 
discovery,390 and subsequent changes in the federal discovery rules made 
them even more expansive.391  Although these rules, which govern district 
                                                                                                                       
Chairman, to the Judges of the Tax Court, Apr. 8, 1963, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum from Judge 
Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, to Judge Dawson, Sept. 28, 1962, at 3, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited 
as Turner, Sept. 28, 1962]. 
Judge Raum, a staunch supporter of the stipulation procedure, once observed 
that  
It may well be said therefore that we have a ‘built-in’ pretrial procedure that 
is productive of an astonishing amount of narrowing of issues, stipulating of 
facts, and settlement of entire cases.  And our Rule 31 [prior to 1974, rule 
31(b) prescribed the stipulation procedure] is either directly responsible for 
all of this or, at the very least is an important factor in the ultimate result.  
Raum, Dec. 14, 1959, supra note 385, at 2. 
390 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37, 308 U.S. 645, 694–713 (1939). 
391 Id. In 1970, the federal discovery rules underwent the first comprehensive 
review since 1938.  Included in the amendments were the following changes: 
Scope of Discovery.  New provisions are made and existing provisions 
changed affecting the scope of discovery: (1) The contents of insurance 
policies are made discoverable (Rule 26(b)(2)).  (2) A showing of good cause 
is no longer required for discovery of documents and things and entry upon 
land (Rule 34).  However, a showing of need is required for discovery of 
“trial preparation” materials other than a party’s discovery of his own 
statement and a witness’ discovery of his own statement; and protection is 
afforded against disclosure in such documents of mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation. (Rule 
26(b)(3)). (3) Provision is made for discovery with respect to experts 
retained for trial preparation, and particularly those experts who will be 
called to testify at trial (Rule 26(b)(4)).  (4) It is provided that interrogatories 
and requests for admission are not objectionable simply because they relate 
to matters of opinion or contention, subject of course to the supervisory 
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court proceedings, have never applied to the Board of Tax Appeals or the 
Tax Court,392 there have always been those who believed the Tax Court 
should adopt its own discovery procedures.393  For many years the Tax 
Court resisted the pressure to adopt pretrial discovery.  This resistance was 
justified primarily on the basis of the stipulation procedure and its 
importance in the settlement of cases.  Because stipulations were so 
successful, there was no need for broad discovery rules; moreover, the 
adoption of such rules might diminish the effectiveness of stipulations, a 
result to be avoided at all costs.  Finally, in 1974, the court introduced 
pretrial discovery into its rules of practice.394  However, this change was 
accompanied by the warning that pretrial discovery would not be permitted 
to encroach upon the stipulation procedure, and should be used only to 
supplement the stipulation process.395 
 
1. Stipulations from 1924 to 1945 
 
The Board’s first rules of practice and procedure, adopted in 1924, 
contained provisions recognizing stipulations as part of the pretrial 
                                                                                                                       
power of the court (Rules 33(b), 36(a)). (5) Medical examination is made 
available as to certain nonparties (Rule 35(a)). 
Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning 1970 Amendments of 
the Discovery Rules (1970). 
392 See Rule Making Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064; Starr v. Commissioner, 
226 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1955); Katz v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 957, 959 (2d 
Cir. 1954). 
393 Randolph F. Caldwell, Jr., Tax Court Procedure: Problems but Not Pitfalls, 27 
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1435, 1443 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Caldwell, 
1969]; Michael Kaminsky, The Case for Discovery Procedure in the Tax Court, 36 TAXES 
498 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kaminsky]; Converse Murdoch, Discovery Against the 
United States in Civil Tax Proceedings, 13 VILL. L. REV. 58, 59 (1967); Herman T. 
Reiling, Procedure in Federal Tax Litigation, 14 TAXES 598, 599 (1936) [hereinafter 
cited as Reiling].  
394 TAX CT. R. 70 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
395 TAX CT. R. 91(a)(2) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). Judge Raum remarked: 
An indispensable requirement of every well-tried case is a stipulation of 
facts.  The Court has regarded this as the dominant objective of every case. 
The various procedures in Title VII through XI were not meant, in any way, 
to serve as a substitute for as complete a stipulation as the parties are able to 
agree upon.  Rather, they were intended to assist in the development of 
facts prior to trial as early as possible in the litigation so as to strengthen the 
stipulation process and to minimize the last minute pressures that have 
characterized the formulation of a stipulation in the past.  
J. Earl Epstein, Proposed Rules of the Tax Court: A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the 
Section of Taxation, Annual Meeting—San Francisco, Aug. 12, 1972, 26 TAX LAW. 377, 
380 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].  
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procedure.396  As written, the early rules only provided for permissive 
stipulations and contained no procedure to effectuate the stipulation 
process.  The initiative usually came from the party desiring to stipulate, 
who was largely at the mercy of the cooperative spirit of the opposing 
party.  Nevertheless, even during this early period the Board recognized the 
importance of stipulations and attempted to induce agreements between the 
parties through informal pressures.  Thus, the Board did not hesitate to 
express its disapproval when an entirely unstipulated appeal was presented 
for trial, and in such cases postponement of the hearing was not unusual.397 
The early years witnessed important rulings respecting the requirements 
for valid stipulations and the purposes to which they could be applied.  To 
be effective, the stipulation had to be signed by both parties and filed with 
the Board;398 failure to comply with these formalities rendered the 
stipulation ineffective.399  The Board also required the stipulation to be clear 
and concise since the Board refused to interpret ambiguous statements to 
the prejudice of either party.400  On one occasion the Board rejected an 
argument that it should point out deficiencies in stipulations and provide 
counsel with an opportunity to correct them.401  The Board’s function was 
judicial, not inquisitorial; moreover, the management of its heavy workload 
required that it accept stipulations at face value. 
Occasionally, parties attempted to stipulate matters that went beyond 
the proper province of the stipulation procedure.  In this connection the 
Board ruled that jurisdictional defects, such as an untimely petition, could 
not be cured by stipulation.402  Moreover, conclusions of law could not be 
stipulated since the Board would not permit the parties to restrict its power 
to decide legal issues.403  Similarly, the Board would not be bound by a 
stipulation that was in contravention of statute.404  Such a stipulation not 
only was violative of the statute, but also contravened the principle limiting 
stipulations to factual issues. 
                                                     
396 B.T.A. RULE 30 (July 1, 1924 ed.). 
397 2 LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 7.38 n.40 (1955). 
398 B.T.A. RULE 30 (July 1, 1924 ed.). 
399 See Cole v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 665, 674 (1958). 
400 See Estate of Harse, 1 B.T.A. 1056, 1057 (1925). 
401 Ohio Clover Leaf Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 433, 434 (1927). 
402 See Blackstone v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 456, 458–59 (1928); Mohawk 
Glove Corp., 2 B.T.A. 1247, 1247 (1925); Alfred C. Ruby, 2 B.T.A. 377, 378 (1925).  
403 Ohio Clover Leaf Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1249, 1255 (1927); 
2 LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 7.38 n.41 (1955). 
404 Littauer v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 21, 28 (1931).  
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Although it appeared as though the stipulation procedure generally 
functioned satisfactorily,405 some proposals for improvement were made 
during the Board’s early years.406  One proposal advocated mandatory 
stipulations prior to the hearing with concomitant power in the Board to 
determine undisputed facts from an examination of the Commissioner’s 
files should the parties fail to stipulate.407  In addition to modifying the 
stipulation procedure, this proposal would have substantially changed the 
Board’s function as a purely judicial, non-investigatory body.  Because there 
was general approval of the Board’s court-like nature, this proposal 
attracted little support.   
The 1937 joint committee of the Board and Treasury, organized to study 
recommendations for facilitating the orderly disposition of cases,408 sought 
reduction in Board congestion by procedural methods of eliminating 
uncontested issues.  Initially, Treasury showed an inclination toward 
achieving this end by requiring stipulation in more cases.409  Ultimately, 
however, most of the committee’s work was directed to improvements in 
pleadings rather than stipulations.  The committee also considered 
recommending that the Board adopt pretrial discovery patterned after the 
then proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,410 but this proposal was 
dropped when the Chief Counsel’s Office withdrew its endorsement 
because of doubts concerning the Board’s authority to enforce discovery 
rules.411  Moreover, the committee was not convinced of any “immediate 
need” for such rules;412 it concluded that in view of the Board’s rules “on 
depositions, interrogatories, and production of documents, and the 
Commissioner’s power to compel disclosure of information, further 
consideration of these suggestions may well be left for the future.”413 
 
                                                     
405 See Forest D. Siefkin, Procedural Methods of the Board of Tax Appeals, 14 A.B.A. 
J. 365, 367 (1928). 
406 Board of Tax Appeals, 11 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 143, 143–44 (1933). 
407 Id. 
408 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
409 Treasury Dept. Press Service Release No. 10-25, at 2 (May 11, 1937). 
410 Preliminary Report of the Joint Committee of the Board of Tax Appeals 
and Chief Counsel’s Office § 13, c. Dec. 17, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
411 Id. 
412 Report of the Joint Committee of the Board of Tax Appeals and Chief 
Counsel’s Office, Dec. 17, 1937, at 12, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Petition: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.”  
413 Id. 
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2. The 1945 Revision 
 
The first major revision of the stipulation procedure occurred in 1945 in 
response to specific problems raised by the renegotiation cases.  Since 1942 
a series of acts had provided for the renegotiation of government contracts 
to eliminate excessive profits of government contractors and 
subcontractors.414  In 1943, a statutory procedure was established under 
which an administrative determination of excessive profits could be 
reviewed in a de novo proceeding in the Tax Court.415  The Tax Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction in these cases until 1971, when such jurisdiction was 
then vested in the Court of Claims.416  Most of the evidence in a 
renegotiation case consisted of books, reports, and other documents, which 
generally are undisputed.  Due to the quantity of such documentary 
evidence, the Department of Justice, which represented the Government in 
renegotiation cases, moved the Tax Court in Gifford Hill Pipe Co.417 to order 
an audit of the contractor that would be made available to the Government 
to aid in the preparation of its case.418  The motion was granted and the 
procedure proved successful in expediting the case.  As a result, the Justice 
Department thereafter proposed that the court require the full stipulation 
of facts in all renegotiation cases without resort to a motion and order.419  
The court also was impressed with the results in Gifford Hill.   Yet, rather 
than promulgate a specific rule applicable only to renegotiation cases, the 
court elected to redraft the stipulation rule, thereby making the procedure 
applicable generally in the hope of reducing the number of “isolated cases” 
                                                     
414 The first renegotiation act was enacted in 1942 as part of the Sixth 
Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942.  Act of Apr. 28, 1942, 
ch. 247, § 403, 56 Stat. 245.  Renegotiation procedures have remained in the law 
since that time as the result of a series of temporary statutes that have been 
periodically extended.  See REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, AN EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS TO EXTEND 
AND AMEND THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951, at 11–13 (1975). 
415 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701(b), 58 Stat. 86, amending Sixth 
Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, ch. 247, § 403(e), 56 Stat. 
246.  
416 Act of July 1, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-41, § 3, 85 Stat. 98, amending 
Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, 65 Stat. 21. 
417 11 T.C. 802 (1948), aff’d, 180 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1950). 
418 See Memorandum and Order, May 4, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence;” see also Memorandum from 
Presiding Judge Turner to the judges of the court, June 27, 1945, at 2, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited 
as Turner, June 27, 1945]. 
419 Turner, June 27, 1945, supra note 418, at 2. 
604           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
in which attorneys appeared at the hearing prepared to enter extensive 
exhibits of books and accounts.420 
As originally proposed, the revised rule stated that the court expected 
the parties to stipulate all evidence lending itself to stipulation, and “[a] 
party desiring to introduce such evidence must so advise his adversary. . . so 
that the parties may endeavor to stipulate the evidence to the fullest extent” 
possible.421  The Chief Counsel was concerned that this wording would 
require the Government to effect full disclosure of evidence that it intended 
to introduce at trial.422  The court responded to this problem by 
compromising its efforts to achieve mandatory stipulation.  It continued the 
prior rule’s seemingly permissive language that the parties “may agree upon 
any facts” prior to trial,423 and substituted “shall confer with his 
adversary”424 for the controversial “must so advise his adversary”425 as to 
matters to be stipulated.  However, at the same time, the court evidenced its 
determination to require stipulation by demanding that “both parties shall 
endeavor to stipulate evidence to the fullest extent to which either complete 
or qualified agreement can be reached.”426 The court’s willingness to dilute 
the proposed rule reflected its misgivings concerning its power to enforce a 
mandatory stipulation procedure.427  The legislation under which it operated 
provided it with no powers to coerce recalcitrant parties,428 and it was an 
agency in the executive branch lacking the inherent powers of courts to 
enforce process and punish contempt. 
The court further attempted to assume control of the procedure while 
reducing controversies by providing that an objection to materiality or 
relevancy would not be regarded as a proper excuse for refusal to 
stipulate.429  The objection could be reserved in the stipulation or raised at 
the hearing.430  This limitation on procedural objections to stipulations was 
                                                     
420 Id. at 3. 
421 Id. at 1. 
422 Memorandum from Presiding Judge Turner to Judge Murdock, Rules 
Comm. Chairman, Oct. 1, 1945, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, Oct. 1, 1945]. 
423 TAX CT. R. 31(b) (Nov. 1, 1945 ed.) (emphasis added). 
424 Id. 
425 Turner, June 27, 1945, supra note 418, at 1. 
426 TAX CT. R. 31(b) (Nov. 1, 1945 ed.). 
427 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 2. 
428 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 105. 
429 TAX CT. R. 31(b) (Nov. 1, 1945 ed.). 
430 Id.  Practitioners have been cautious of this rule, warning that rarely has the 
Tax Court refused to accept a fact once stipulated. Martin D. Cohen, Litigation 
Techniques That Increase Your Chances for Success in the Tax Court, 35 J. TAX’N 340, 341 
(1971); Veach, supra note 387, at 671.  The 1974 revision provided that “the court 
will consider any objection . . . made at the commencement of the trial or for good 
cause shown made during the trial.” TAX CT. R. 91(d) (Jan. 1, 1974, ed.). 
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clearly proper inasmuch as the court, not the parties, was the proper arbiter 
of such controversies. 
The new rule also dealt specifically with the problem of modification of 
a stipulation.  The analogy of a stipulation to a bilateral contract is clear,431 
and the court traditionally had been reluctant to permit the qualification or 
withdrawal of a stipulation properly entered in the record.432  However, 
criticism by the Chief Counsel of the harshness of a rule which required the 
parties to stipulate at their peril433 led the court to reconsider its position.  A 
review of relevant authorities434 ultimately convinced it to allow 
modification, change, or withdrawal of a stipulation in those cases in which 
enforcement would be unconscionable or contrary to the interest of 
justice.435 
Finally, in apparent recognition of a flaw in the original procedure that 
failed to provide a method for initiating the stipulation process, the court 
placed the burden on the party desiring to introduce the evidence sought to 
be stipulated.436  By doing so, the court could ascertain which party was 
responsible for failing to initiate the procedure. 
 
3. Putting Teeth into the Rule:  1955 Revision 
 
The court’s skepticism regarding its ability to compel compliance with a 
mandatory stipulation procedure forced it to disguise the mandate in 1945.  
The requirement that the parties “shall endeavor” to stipulate was couched 
in terms of the permissive “may agree” to a stipulation.  The experience 
with the new rule, however, soon allayed the fears.  In the words of Judge 
Turner: 
 
Due to our lack of power to enforce orders, we had our fingers 
crossed as to the reception of the new rule by the parties.  Even so, 
                                                     
431 See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 177 (1956). 
432 The Court’s reluctance to permit the parties to alter a stipulation properly 
admitted in evidence is indicated by the fact that as originally proposed, the rule 
provided that “[e]vidence tending to qualify, change, or contradict any stipulated 
fact will not be received.”  Turner, June 27, 1945, supra note 418, at 1. 
433 See Turner, Oct. 1, 1945, supra note 422, at 1. 
434 See id.; Memorandum from A. Cypert, clerk, to Presiding Judge Turner, 
entitled “New Rule on Stipulations,” Aug. 28, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
435 See TAX CT. R. 31(b) (Aug. 1, 1946, ed.), which provided that “[t]he Court 
may set aside a stipulation where justice requires, but will not receive evidence 
tending to qualify, change, or contradict any fact properly introduced into the 
record by stipulation.” 
436 Id. 
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we decided to put on a bold front and couched the rule in mandatory 
terms.  To our gratification and satisfaction it worked far beyond our 
fondest expectations.437 
 
The tax bar’s reception of the court’s authority to promulgate such a 
rule was sufficiently favorable to enable the court to make a more daring 
revision in 1955.  No longer uncertain respecting its power to require 
stipulation, the court announced that it “expect[ed] the parties to stipulate 
evidence to the fullest extent”438 possible. 
 
4. Revisions of the 1960s 
 
Several factors contributed to the effectiveness of the pretrial stipulation 
procedure, all of which indicated it would enjoy continued success.  The 
inherent advantages of stipulating, such as factual development of a case 
and greater likelihood of settlement, were incentives to stipulate.  The 
stipulation procedure was also a convenient method of meeting the burden 
of proof, and parties so employing it could rely on the court not to interpret 
ambiguous stipulations to their detriment.439  Finally, a party could not 
refuse to stipulate without being required to give an explanation to the 
court.  An explanation satisfactory to the court was seldom heard,440 and 
failure to stipulate had a tendency to arouse the court’s displeasure, thereby 
“[placing] counsel in a bad light before his case” had started.441 
Notwithstanding the inducements to stipulate and the expressions of 
approval of the procedure by its proponents, the 1950s and 1960s 
witnessed a mounting dissatisfaction with the status quo.  Considerable 
criticism came from those who favored the adoption of liberal pretrial 
discovery.442  These critics questioned the virtue of the court’s exclusive 
reliance on stipulations as a means of pretrial preparation.  In particular, 
they challenged the asserted importance of stipulations in the 70 percent to 
90 percent settlement rate.443  In their view, many of the cases clogging the 
court’s calendar were only filed to gain a negotiating advantage and were 
                                                     
437 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 2. 
438 TAX CT. R. 31(b) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
439 See Norfolk Nat’l Bank of Commerce & Trust v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 48, 
50 (4th Cir. 1933); Conservative Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 552, 555 
(1934).  
440 Veach, supra note 387, at 670–71. 
441 Id. 
442 William H. Bowen, Discovery in the Tax Court:  Why Not Follow the Federal 
Rules, 44 A.B.A. J. 129 (1958); Kaminsky, supra note 393. 
443 See Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 6. 
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never intended to go to trial.444  Thus, they contended the stipulation 
procedure played no part in the settlement of these cases. 
Criticism, however, was not limited to those who advocated the 
adoption of pretrial discovery.  An apparent oversight in the rule generated 
criticism from all quarters, and this oversight was ultimately corrected in a 
1962 revision.  The rule had failed to provide a procedure whereby a 
reluctant party could be forced to stipulate.  Consequently, in numerous 
cases, the parties failed to stipulate in a meaningful manner, and the case 
went to trial with either a meaningless stipulation, or none at all.445  At 
times, the failure to stipulate was the result of misunderstanding, so that 
one party would arrive at the call of the calendar thinking he and opposing 
counsel were in substantial agreement only to have the other party reject the 
proposal.446  In other cases, either one or both of the parties had delayed 
committing themselves to a stipulation hoping to gain a tactical 
advantage.447 
These difficulties may have been intensified because of the atmosphere 
prevalent at the Internal Revenue Service.  In the waning months of the 
Truman Administration, a scandal involving the Service and the Tax 
Division of the Justice Department was disclosed.448  The scandal, which 
                                                     
444 Id. 
445 See J. Earl Epstein, The New Stipulating Procedures in the Tax Court; How They 
are Working, 22 J. TAX’N 180, 181 (1965). 
446 Memorandum from Judge Turner, Rules Comm. Chairman, to the Judges 
of the Tax Court, Mar. 5, 1962, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, Mar. 5, 1962]. 
447 Id. 
448 In a 1951 letter to a federal judge, a retired intelligence agent of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue alleged that perhaps as many as 63 percent of the tax evasion 
prosecutions recommended by Bureau intelligence units throughout the country 
were being stifled by senior officials in both the Bureau and the Department of 
Justice.  Although not directly related to these allegations, a subcommittee of the 
Ways and Means Committee commenced work on June 1, 1951, to explore the 
activities and alleged improprieties of those charged with enforcement of the tax 
laws.  Within a month of the subcommittee’s first meeting, a rash of resignations by 
various Bureau officials had occurred.  The investigations continued and the 
subcommittee, chaired by Representative Cecil R. King, a California Democrat, 
persisted in attempting to discover “why so many” tax fraud cases recommended 
for prosecution had been dropped at “higher levels.” 
The subcommittee’s hearings attracted much publicity and generally were of a 
sensational nature.  By the time the subcommittee had completed its assignment in 
1952, its activities had proved to be a factor in the resignations, retirements upon 
request, or dismissals of approximately 200 persons within the Bureau.  Of that 
number, 53 were said to have been forced out for accepting bribes or gratuities, 71 
for such reasons as failure to discharge duties properly and rules infractions, 24 for 
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involved officials at the highest levels of tax administration, suggested that 
special treatment had been obtained by favored taxpayers.449  As a result of 
these disclosures the Service had, in the words of Judge Turner, taken an 
“awful kicking around” on the Hill and in the papers.450  Subsequently, in 
an effort to dispel criticism, the Service began resolving most, if not all, 
doubts against the taxpayer which resulted in a noticeable increase in 
deficiencies and appeals.451  Counsel for taxpayers complained that the 
Service was not auditing cases in good faith, but was “setting up claims for 
the purpose of chiseling taxpayers out of added amounts purely on a give 
and take basis.”452  Taxpayers responded by refusing to confer with 
government auditors and demanding immediate issuance of deficiency 
notices, hoping to gain a bargaining edge in settlement.453  The Service, for 
its part, commonly failed to cooperate in the stipulation procedure.454  In 
some cases, for example, the Government received a signed stipulation 
from the taxpayer and then neglected to file it with the court until calendar 
call, thereby reserving the power to repudiate at the eleventh hour.455  As a 
result of these and other factors, many cases were called at calendar without 
facts being stipulated.456 
Such problems strengthened the hand of those advocating either 
substantial change in the stipulation procedure or adoption of pretrial 
discovery.  Initially, judges of the Tax Court were inclined to regard the 
pressure for formal pretrial discovery as “mostly noise,”457 and continued to 
                                                                                                                       
embezzlement of funds or government property, 21 for failure to pay proper tax, 
and five for falsification or distortion of government records and reports.  Several 
high ranking government officials were among those implicated.  Most notable 
were Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., Commissioner of the Bureau from 1944 to 1947, who 
was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined $15,000 for income tax 
evasion; Daniel A. Bolich, former assistant commissioner, who was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment and fined $15,000 for conspiracy to obstruct justice; and 
T. Lamar Caudle, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice 
Department’s Tax Division, who was removed from office for engaging in “outside 
activities . . . incompatible” with his duties.  See generally NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1951, 
at 30; TIME, Sept. 22, 1952, at 27; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1955, at 48, col. 2; N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1954, at 46, col. 2; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1952, at 1, col. 2. 
449 See generally supra note 448. 
450 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 3. 
451 Id. at 3–4. 
452 Id. at 3. 
453 Id. at 4. 
454 Id. 
455 Bernard V. Lentz, Tax Court Procedure: Pretrial Techniques Affecting Stipulations 
and Settlement, 17 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 125, 131 (1959). 
456 Turner, Mar. 5, 1962, supra note 396, at 2. 
457 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 5. 
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extol the virtues of the existing stipulation rule.458  However, as defects in 
the stipulation procedure became more obvious and pressure increased 
from taxpayers and the American Bar Association,459 the court changed its 
view.  In 1962, it acknowledged that the pretrial stipulation procedure 
needed reform.  While some hoped for a major pretrial procedure revision, 
the court considered continued use of a strengthened stipulation procedure 
to be a better alternative.460  The court believed that pretrial discovery 
would unnecessarily increase its workload by requiring it to intervene in 
many of those controversies constituting the 70 percent to 90 percent of 
the docketed cases which were resolved either by stipulation or 
settlement.461  Furthermore, the court was convinced that stricter 
supervision would remedy the defects in the stipulation procedure in those 
cases in which it was not working because those who had previously 
attempted to resist the rule would be coerced into compliance.462  At the 
same time, it considered this approach essential to avoid needlessly 
complicating the larger number of cases in which stipulations had always 
worked.463 
The amendment allowed a party who wished to stipulate and found the 
opposing party uncooperative to obtain ex parte an order to show cause 
why the evidence sought to be stipulated should not be accepted for 
purposes of the case.  The order would be granted upon motion made 
within 30 to 10 days before the scheduled trial date and was returnable at 
trial calendar call.  As a part of the motion, the moving party was required 
to disclose the facts and evidence he desired to stipulate together with his 
sources so that his adversary would have sufficient information to make an 
informed and accurate stipulation.464 
                                                     
458 Raum, Dec. 14, 1959, supra note 385, at 2. 
459 “Indeed, certain members of the American Bar Association have been 
persistently urging the adoption of . . . [pretrial discovery] by the Tax Court, and 
their pressures may ultimately result in the A.B.A.’s taking a firm stand on this 
matter, recommending legislation to the Congress dealing with this subject.”  
Raum, Dec. 14, 1959, supra note 385, at 1. 
460 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 6–8; Turner, Mar. 5, 1962, supra 
note 446, at 4. 
461 Raum, Dec. 14, 1959, supra note 385, at 2; Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 
389, at 6. 
462 Turner, Mar. 5, 1962, supra note 446, at 4. 
463 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 6. 
464  The governing procedure provided as follows:  
(5) Results of noncompliance by a party.  If at the date of  issuance of trial notice 
in a case a party has failed to confer with his adversary, or has refused or 
failed to stipulate facts and evidence which are not in dispute or fairly 
should not be in dispute, as required under paragraph (2) hereof, and after 
trial notice, still fails or refuses to stipulate, the party proposing to stipulate 
610           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
Both the Chief Counsel and the tax bar had pressured the court for an 
earlier return date, but the court insisted upon a return date at calendar call 
for a variety of reasons.465  Of primary concern was the question of where 
such a motion would be heard.  The demonstrable advantages of an earlier 
return date did not, in the court’s opinion, justify a judge making a special 
trip to the place of the upcoming session to hear a motion.466  On the other 
hand, an early return date in Washington was rejected on the ground that 
severe administrative difficulties would thereby be created.  In the court’s 
view, such a procedure would swamp the regular motions calendar and 
require special calendars,467 a result the already overburdened court sought 
to avoid.  Additionally, the court considered unsatisfactory having the 
Internal Revenue Service attorneys located in Washington handle an early 
return date468 since these attorneys would not be the same attorneys with 
general responsibility for the cases.469  Finally, a Washington return date 
would constitute a hardship for many taxpayers.  Travel to Washington for 
these motions would be unnecessarily time consuming, inconvenient, and 
expensive.470  Noting that taxpayers’ counsel frequently complained about 
being required to come to Washington on procedural matters under the 
existing practice, the court concluded they would not react favorably to 
further travel.471  In addition to the lack of an acceptable location to hold 
the hearings, the court had two other objections to an early return date.  
First, it questioned the necessity of such a procedure since a conscientious 
attorney would not run the risk of failing to stipulate after the issuance of 
                                                                                                                       
may within 30 days, but not less than 10 days prior to the date set for call of 
the case from a trial calendar, file with the Court a motion for an order to 
show cause why the facts and evidence covered in his proposal to stipulate 
should not be accepted as established for the purposes of the case.  The 
facts and evidence covered by the motion shall be shown with particularity 
and by numbered paragraphs.  The motion shall contain adequate 
references to the sources of the matter set forth, and where the sources of 
material are in possession or under control of the moving party, the motion 
shall also show that the opposing party has had reasonable access thereto.  
The motion shall be accompanied by proof of service on the opposing party 
or his counsel.  Upon the filing of such motion, an order to show cause as 
moved shall be issued forthwith, unless the Court, in its discretion, directs 
otherwise, which order shall be returnable at the call of the case from the 
trial calendar.   
TAX CT. R. 31(b)(5) (Dec. 28, 1962 ed.). 
465 Turner, Sept. 28, 1962, supra note 389, at 9. 
466 Id. 
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an order to show cause, unless he had confidence in his ability to 
demonstrate why the order should not be made absolute.472  Second, and 
probably most important, was the court’s apprehension of getting involved 
in “formally refereeing the settlement of cases never intended for 
submission in the first place.”473  In the words of Judge Turner, the return 
date at calendar call was “the earliest date which [would] prevent our being 
roped in as referee in the ‘horse trading’ leading to settlement.”474 
These reasons were found unpersuasive by the tax bar which, within one 
month of the adoption of the revision, made a “demand that [the] [r]ule . . . 
be further amended to provide for effective admission of facts prior to 
calendar call . . . .”475  The “demand,” which was not entirely unexpected,476 
was in no uncertain terms.477 
The major criticism of the revision was that it hindered counsel in their 
preparation for trial.  The parties were anxious to know the results of the 
show cause order prior to the date of trial, so they could ascertain which 
facts would have to be proved;478 the 1962 revision left the parties uncertain 
because it merely provided for a determination at trial.  This uncertainty 
forced the parties to remain completely prepared to prove their case since 
they could not otherwise be assured of meeting their burden of proof.  
Usually the taxpayer was most inconvenienced, as the taxpayer generally 
had the burden of proof. 
The controversy became so intense that the court decided to revise the 
stipulation procedure in June, 1963, a mere six months after the 1962 
change.  Although the court refused to provide every movant with a 
mandatory hearing on the order to show cause prior to the scheduled trial 
date, the new rule assured the parties of advance notice of the controversial 
material contained in the proposed stipulation.479  This result was 
accomplished by requiring a response to the order prior to the trial date. 
The earliest day at which a party might move for an order to show cause 
was moved back to the 15th day before calendar call rather than the 30th, 
                                                     
472 Id. at 8. 
473 Id. 
474 Id. at 10. 
475 Memorandum from Judge Raum to the Judges of the Tax Court, Dec. 28, 
1962, at 1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Raum, Dec. 28, 1962]. 
476 “It is, of course, impossible to know with certainty just how a rule will work 
out in practice, and in certain respects, most everyone on the Rules Committee 
[had] his fingers crossed, so to speak, as to the results.”  Turner, Mar. 5, 1962, supra 
note 446, at 3. 
477 Raum, Dec. 28, 1962, supra note 475, at 2. 
478 Id. at 1–2. 
479 TAX CT. R. 31(b)(5) (Jan. 1, 1964, ed.). 
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with no further motions after the 35th day before trial, and a response 
thereto had to be filed within 25 days of receipt of the order; thus, if each 
party acted on the last possible day, all information would be exchanged at 
least 10 days before the call of the calendar.  Generally, the hearing on the 
order was to be held at calendar call, but in a proper case, it could be held 
“at such earlier time and at such place as the Chief Judge in his discretion 
may fix.”480  The court instituted further changes in the 1963 revision to 
ensure that the procedure accomplished the maximum amount of 
agreement on facts.  The party responding to a show cause order was 
required to list the matters which were not disputed.  As to the partially 
disputed material, the party had to indicate that which was disputed and 
that which was not.  Matters not disputed were deemed admitted.481 
Prior to recommending the 1963 revision, the Tax Court rules 
committee solicited opinions from the Chief Counsel’s office and the 
American Bar Association.  Both supported the amendment.482  However, 
the ABA endorsement proved to be short lived.  In 1964, a special 
committee on the stipulation rule released a report criticizing the tendency 
of the rule to operate to the advantage of the Government.483  Statistics 
indicated that in the two years of operation under the 1962 and 1963 
revisions, 37 motions for an order to show cause had been filed, most of 
them by the Government in cases involving civil fraud penalties or 
complicated factual issues, and many of them in cases in which the taxpayer 
was appearing pro se.484  The paucity of use by taxpayers’ counsel could 
partially be explained by their unfamiliarity with the rule and its potential, 
but more troublesome reasons were perceived by the bar group.  They 
suggested that taxpayers were reluctant to make a motion for fear of either 
alienating the Chief Counsel’s office or triggering a motion from the Chief 
Counsel in response.485  Moreover, the bar committee concluded that 
extensive use of the procedure by the Government indicated that the rule in 
operation “created an unintended imbalance in procedure and [gave] the 
Internal Revenue Service a tactical weapon to force acceptance of Regional 
                                                     
480 Id. 
481 Id. 
482 Letter from C. Hauser, Chief Counsel, to Judge Raum, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, Apr. 2, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & 
Correspondence;” Letter from Randolph Thrower, Chairman, A.B.A. Section of 
Taxation, to Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, Mar. 27, 1963, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
483 Report of the Special Subcomm. on TAX CT. R. 31(b)(5) of the Comm. on 
Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION, Nov. 4, 1964, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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485 Id. at 3. 
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Counsel’s proposed stipulations of fact.”486  This was particularly so in pro 
se cases in which the taxpayer’s inability to handle the procedural details 
might force him to accept the Government’s proposed stipulation unless 
the court intervened on his behalf.487 
Not all agreed that the ABA criticisms were well founded.  In the first 
place, it was suggested that the statistics were inconclusive because two 
years was too short a test period to determine the rule’s merits.488  
Furthermore, some considered the lack of use of the show cause order 
simply an indication of the parties’ good faith in stipulating.489  Additionally, 
whether the Government was unfairly employing the stipulation procedure 
at the expense of the pro se taxpayer was not susceptible of accurate 
measurement, as it involved a subjective analysis of complicated issues.  
The court took exception to the implication that it would condone abuse of 
the procedure. 
 
I’m sure it is not the intention of any member of the Court to permit 
the respondent to . . . take advantage of the pro se taxpayer . . . and I 
don’t believe this is the policy of the Chief Counsel’s office either.  
Whether it is the best thing to do or not I believe all of our judges 
tend to “protect” the pro se taxpayer; and I believe all of us would 
attempt to limit any order admitting facts to only such evidentiary 
facts about which there is no real dispute, eliminating conclusions, 
legal arguments, and ultimate facts, particularly in a pro se fraud 
case.490 
 
Although the criticisms of the stipulation procedure were not universally 
accepted as correct, the ABA report did serve to strengthen the position of 
those favoring adoption of the pretrial discovery methods of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.491  Nevertheless, the court persisted for another 
decade in its steadfast belief that the stipulation rule was better adapted to 
the special needs of tax litigation.492 
                                                     
486 Id. at 4. 
487 Id. at 12. 
488 Letter from Professor Polasky, University of Michigan, to Luther J. Avery, 
Chairman Special Subcomm., ABA Section of Taxation, July 17, 1964, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
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490 Letter from Judge Forrester to L.J. Avery, Chairman Special Subcomm. on 
TAX CT. R. 31(b)(5), July 20, 1964, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: 
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491 Caldwell, 1969, supra note 393, at 1443; Jules Ritholz, Diverse Views on 
Discovery in the Tax Court, 21 TAX LAW. 639 (1968). 
492 See supra note 491. 
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5. 1974:  Rule 31(b) Becomes Rule 91 
 
When, in 1974, the court finally changed its stand against pretrial 
discovery, it did so as part of the first complete revision of its rules of 
practice and procedure.  In connection with this endeavor, the court made 
several changes to the stipulation procedure, which, according to the Tax 
Court rules committee, were intended to result in stipulations being more 
“comprehensive, supported by affirmative action of the Court, and 
mandatory in all cases.”493 
The most important change requires parties to stipulate to more than 
just the “facts and evidence” required by the previous rule.  Stipulations 
must now include “all matters not privileged which are relevant to the 
pending case . . . .”494  Since the court’s intent is to require stipulation of all 
undisputed matters having a bearing on the case, a stipulation is no longer 
objectionable because it contains opinions, contentions, or legal 
conclusions which require the application of law to fact.495  The rule 
therefore reverses the court’s traditional position that conclusions of law 
may not be stipulated.  However, stipulations may not contain legal 
conclusions unrelated to the facts in issue,496 and the 1974 rule revision did 
not change the principle prohibiting stipulations in contravention of 
statute.497 
In addition to the broadened scope, certain other changes were made.  
Prior to 1974, the initiative for the commencement of the stipulation 
process was on the party desiring to introduce the facts sought to be 
stipulated.498  Because the taxpayer generally had the burden of proof, the 
taxpayer usually was required to begin the stipulation procedure.  The 1974 
rule, however, placed the burden of stipulating evenly on both parties, 
commanding them to stipulate “without regard to where the burden of 
proof may be with respect to the matters involved.”499 
Another change was made in the perennially troublesome area of time 
limitations.  Pursuant to the revised rule, parties could move for an order to 
show cause between 75 and 50 days before trial, and the response had to be 
served on the court and opposing counsel within 20 days of receipt; thus, 
the latest response date was 30 days before call of the case from the 
calendar.500  In 1979, the court liberalized the time restrictions on the filing 
                                                     
493 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
494 Id.; TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
495 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70(b), 91(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
496 Rule Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70(b) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
497 See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
498 See supra notes 424–427 and accompanying text. 
499 TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
500 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(2) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
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of a motion to show cause in this setting.  In particular, the court eliminated 
the reference to the 75-day period prior to trial as the earliest point at which 
a motion to show cause could be made.501  Accordingly, such a motion now 
may be made at any point after the issuance of a trial notice.502  
Additionally, the court introduced a slight extension of the period by which 
the motion had to be made, moving such date back from 50 to 45 days 
prior to the call of the case from the trial calendar.503   
With respect to the location and time of the hearing on the order to 
show cause, the 1974 revised rule proved more indefinite than its 
predecessor, which had provided that the hearing would generally be held at 
the call of the case from the trial calendar.504  The 1974 rule, intended to 
afford greater flexibility,505 provides that the hearing will be held at a time 
determined by the court.506 
The 1974 rule contains more extensive and specific criteria covering the 
form and content of the motion for,507 and response to,508 a show cause 
order.  Apparently, the intent here is to narrow as much as possible the 
areas of disagreement between the parties.  A new provision, “intended to 
                                                     
501  TAX CT. R. 91(f)(1), 71 T.C. 1199. 
502  See Rules Comm.  Note, TAX CT. R. 91(f)(1), 71 T.C. 1200.   
503  TAX CT. R. 91(f)(1), 71 T.C. 1199. 
504 TAX CT. R. 31(b)(5) (Jan. 1, 1971 ed.). 
505 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 91(f)(2) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
506 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(2) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
507 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(1) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  Instead of setting out just the facts 
and evidence covered by the motion and the sources and their location, the 1974 
rule revision required a moving party to 
(i) show with particularity and by separately numbered paragraphs each 
matter which is claimed for stipulation; (ii) set forth in express language the 
specific stipulation which the moving party proposes with respect to each 
such matter and annex thereto or make available to the Court and the other 
parties each document or other paper as to which the moving party desires 
a stipulation; (iii) set forth the sources, reasons, and basis for claiming, with 
respect to each such matter, that it should be stipulated; (iv) show that 
opposing counsel or the other parties have had reasonable access to those 
sources or basis for stipulation and have been informed of the reasons for 
stipulation; and (v) show proof of service of a copy of the motion on 
opposing counsel or the other parties. 
Id. 
508 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(2) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  An answering party is now required 
to set forth the partial admissions he is willing to make and to submit variant 
wording or qualifications for stipulations he disputes.  In this regard, the 1974 rule 
does not refer to “admissions and denials” but to “the part admitted and the part 
disputed,” and thus by its very wording, encourages the attitude that the answer to 
the show cause order does not end the stipulation process.  Id. 
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articulate present practice,”509 deals with the failure to respond to a show 
cause order.  If a party does not respond, in whole or in part, to a proposed 
stipulation, or the response is evasive, the rule deems that portion of the 
stipulation to be admitted.510  On the other hand, the rule makes clear that 
no stipulation will be ordered with respect to a matter which, in the opinion 
of the court, is genuinely disputed.511  In determining whether an issue is 
disputed, the court will not weigh opposing versions of the evidence unless 
one such version is patently incredible.512 
The most significant change effected in the 1974 rule revision was the 
court’s adoption of pretrial discovery by interrogatories and the production 
and inspection of papers and other things.513  An influential factor in the 
court’s decision to adopt discovery was the criticism evoked by the failure 
of the stipulation procedure, even after the 1963 revision, to provide the 
parties with a mechanism that guaranteed resolution of disputed 
stipulations prior to trial.514  The opportunity for discovery at least makes 
available evidence concerning those matters that might have to be proved at 
trial in the absence of a stipulation.  In this regard, it could be argued that 
pre-1974 Tax Court practice suffered doubly in comparison to the pretrial 
procedures applicable in district courts.  Not only has liberal pretrial 
discovery long been available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,515 
but those rules have also made stipulations available prior to trial under 
court supervised pretrial conferences at which the parties appear by court 
direction.516 
The adoption of pretrial discovery, however, did not signal the court’s 
abandonment of its historical reliance on the stipulation procedure.  Of 
particular importance is the court’s unique conception of the role of pretrial 
discovery.  Whereas the federal rules emphasize discovery, the Tax Court 
continues to regard stipulations as being of paramount importance with 
discovery to be used only to supplement the stipulation procedure; the 
court has stated that discovery “should be regarded as [an aid] to 
stipulation,”517 not an alternative.  This position was illustrated when the 
court granted a motion by the Commissioner for a protective order to 
postpone his response to interrogatories until the parties had attempted to 
                                                     
509 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 91(f)(3) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
510 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(3) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
511 TAX CT. R. 91(f)(4) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
512 Id. 
513 TAX CT. R. 70–73 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
514 See supra note 482 and accompanying text. 
515 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
516 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.    
517 See supra note 395. 
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stipulate.  In its view, reliance on the pretrial discovery procedure prior to 
efforts to stipulate was an abuse of the discovery procedure.518 
 
F. Pretrial Conferences 
 
A pretrial conference is a meeting between the parties that is supervised 
by the court.519  The procedure had its origins in necessity.  Due to a 
tremendous backlog of cases prior to 1930 in the local courts in Detroit, the 
local judges decided to conduct conferences with the parties to determine 
which cases could be resolved without a trial.520  From this beginning, the 
procedure was adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938521 and subsequently became an important part of the pretrial 
procedure in Federal district courts.522 
Shortly after the federal rules were adopted, the Board of Tax Appeals 
considered whether pretrial conferences would be compatible with its 
concept of pretrial procedure.523  The Board’s failure to adopt such a 
procedure indicates that it had concluded that pretrial conferences would 
not materially expedite the orderly disposition of tax controversies.524  
However, the apparent success of the new procedure525 soon led to 
                                                     
518 Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974). 
519 See generally Alexander Holtzoff, Pretrial Procedure in the District of Columbia, 3 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Holtzoff]; Clarence L. Kincaid, A 
Judges Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 
Kincaid]; Report of the Committee on Pretrial Procedure to the Judicial 
Conference for the District of Columbia, May 24, 1941, filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Pretrial Conference: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Judicial Conference]; Unsigned Memorandum to Chairman Arundell, Jan. 30, 1941, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Arundell]; Memorandum from Richard 
Barker entitled “Pretrial Procedure in the Board of Tax Appeals,” c. 1939, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda and Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Barker]. 
520 Holtzoff, supra note 519, at 1–2; Judicial Conference, supra note 519, at 1–2.  
521 FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 86, 308 U.S. 653, 684, 766 (1939). 
522 See generally Judicial Conference, supra note 519, at 1–3; Kincaid, supra note 
519, at 440; Note, Developments in the Law–Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 971 
(1961). 
523 Arundell, supra note 519; Barker, supra note 519. 
524 The Tax Court did not adopt a rule authorizing pretrial conferences until 
1963.  See TAX CT. R. 28 (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
525 See generally supra note 522. 
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proposals for adoption of a pretrial conference procedure modeled after 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.526 
In support of their proposals, the proponents of pretrial conferences, 
including the American Bar Association,527 argued that a court supervised 
pretrial conference would enhance materially the prospects of a pretrial 
settlement.528  In their opinion, as the parties were forced to deal with the 
issues during the course of these conferences, not only would the issues be 
narrowed, but the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases would 
become more readily apparent.529  As a result, the road to a compromise 
settlement would become more clear.  But even in those cases in which an 
accord was not reached, the advocates of pretrial conferences urged that 
such a procedure would be beneficial.530  In their view, a pretrial conference 
would enable the parties to get a better grasp on the issues while limiting 
and defining the scope of the inquiry at trial.531  This, in turn, would lead to 
                                                     
526 See Report of the Committee on Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION 
SECTION 65, 67–68 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ABA 1958]; Report of the 
Committee on Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION, 114, 116 (1957) 
[hereinafter cited as ABA 1957]; Report of the Committee on Tax Court 
Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 128 (1954); Report of the Committee on Tax 
Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 128 (1949) [hereinafter cited as ABA 
1949]; Report of the Committee on Tax Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION 
SECTION 110 (1948) [hereinafter cited as ABA 1948]; Report of the Committee on 
Tax Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 112 (1947) [hereinafter cited as 
ABA 1947]; Adam Y. Bennion, Equivalents of Pre-Trial and Discovery Procedure in Tax 
Court of United States, 11 U.S.C. TAX INST. 405 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Bennion]; 
Report of the Committee on Relations with the Tax Court of the United States, 
District of Columbia Bar Association, Mar. 31, 1948, at 8–9, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited 
as D.C. Bar Report]; Judicial Conference, supra note 519.  See generally J. Edgar 
Murdock, Tax Court is Fulfilling its Function; No Fundamental Changes Needed, 8 J. 
TAX’N 106, 107 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Murdock]; Memorandum from 
Clarence Opper to Chief Judge Murdock, May 2, 1958, filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Opper]; Letter from T. D. Taubeneck to Chief Judge Murdock, May 6, 1958, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
527 See ABA 1947, supra note 526. 
528 ABA 1957, supra note 526; Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Barker, supra 
note 519; see also Arundell, supra note 519, at 1–2. 
529 ABA 1957, supra note 526; ABA 1948, supra note 526; ABA 1947, supra note 
526; Arundell, supra note 519, at 1–2; Barker, supra note 519; D.C. Bar Report, supra 
note 526.   
530 See, e.g., ABA 1948, supra note 526; ABA 1947, supra note 526; Arundell, 
supra note 519; Barker, supra note 519; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 526. 
531 Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Arundell, supra note 519; D.C. Bar 
Report, supra note 526, at 8–9. 
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a more orderly presentation of the issues to the court.532  Moreover, the 
likelihood of one party surprising his adversary would be diminished as 
both parties would be forced to show their hands during the course of 
negotiations.533  This would be especially true if the court limited the scope 
of the controversy to matters raised at the conference.534  Finally, it was 
argued that pretrial conferences would remedy defects in then existing 
pretrial procedure.535    They noted that the pleadings often failed to define 
the issues and that the stipulation procedure was the only means available 
to correct this situation.536  They viewed pretrial conferences as a welcome 
supplement to the then applicable pretrial procedure.537 
Nevertheless, the Tax Court was not persuaded.  First, the court noted 
that, on the average, 85 percent of docketed cases were settled by the 
parties without any help from the court and that there was no evidence that 
pretrial conferences would significantly enhance this settlement rate.538  To 
the contrary, the court was concerned that such a procedure could actually 
decrease the settlement rate,539 which would cause an intolerable increase in 
its workload considering the large backlog of cases.  But even assuming the 
settlement rate would not be affected, the court was concerned that it 
would become entangled in cases that ordinarily would have been settled 
                                                     
532 See supra note 531. 
533 Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Arundell, supra note 519. 
534 ABA 1947, supra note 526. 
535 See generally William H. Bowen, Discovery in The Tax Court:  Why Not Follow the 
Federal Rules?, 44 A.B.A. J. 129 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Bowen]; Barker, supra 
note 519; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 526, at 8–9. 
536 See generally Bowen, supra note 535; ABA 1958, supra note 526, at 67–68; 
Barker, supra note 519; D.C. Bar Report, supra note 526, at 8–9; Murdock, supra 
note 526. 
537 ABA 1947, supra note 526; Barker, supra note 519; D.C. Bar Report, supra 
note 526. 
538 See Memorandum from Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, entitled 
“Pretrial Procedure,” Feb. 11, 1960, at 1–3, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Raum, 1960]; 
Memorandum from Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, to the Chief Judge, Dec. 
14, 1959, at 1–3, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Raum, 1959]; Memorandum from Judge 
Turner to the Judges of the Tax Court, Apr. 8, 1963, at 1, 5, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Turner]; Memorandum from Judge Turner to the Members of the Tax Court Rules 
Comm., Jan. 16, 1963, at 3, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda 
& Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, 1963]; Memorandum from Judge 
Turner to Judge Dawson, Sept. 28, 1962, at 6–9, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Turner, 1962]. 
539 See generally note 538 supra. 
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without its intervention.540  This attitude was premised on the belief that if 
the court gave its stamp of approval to pretrial conferences, many attorneys 
would indiscriminately use the procedure simply because it was available.541 
Second, the court doubted whether the procedure was feasible 
administratively.542  Although the Tax Court enjoyed national jurisdiction, 
its only permanent location was its headquarters was in Washington, D.C.  
Accordingly, it was not at all clear where a pretrial conference would be 
held.543  If the trial was scheduled for some place other than Washington, 
D.C., then the parties, especially the taxpayer, would be inconvenienced if 
they were required to come to Washington only for the purpose of 
attending a conference.544  On the other hand, if the judges were required to 
travel around the country in advance of the date set for trial, then the judges 
would suffer the inconvenience.545 
Finally, the court was not convinced there was a need for court 
supervised pretrial conferences.546  In the court’s view, the stipulation 
procedure, which required the parties to meet on a continual, albeit 
informal, basis until they had reached a stipulation of facts, already 
sufficiently provided for pretrial conferences.547 
Accordingly, the court refused to adopt a rule permitting pretrial 
conferences until 1963.548  Its official position, which was announced in 
1949 when the court rejected an ABA recommendation that it adopt 
pretrial conferences,549 however, did not foreclose completely the possibility 
of pretrial conferences in individual cases.550  Although the court expressly 
refused to adopt a formal rule providing for its participation in these 
conferences, it indicated that it would be amenable to holding a pretrial 
                                                     
540 Raum, 1960, supra note 538, at 1–2; Raum, 1959, supra note 538, at 1–2; 
Turner, supra note 538; Turner, 1962, supra note 538, at 3. 
541 Turner, supra note 538, at 3–4. 
542 Letter from Chief Judge Murdock to District Court Judge Holtzoff, Feb. 14, 
1957, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1957].  See generally Memorandum 
from Chief Judge Tietjens to the Rules Comm., Feb. 15, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited 
as Tietjens]; Turner, 1963, supra note 538, at 8–9. 
543 See generally Opper, supra note 526; Turner, 1963, supra note 538, at 8–9. 
544 See generally Turner, 1963, supra note 538. 
545 Turner, 1963, supra note 538. 
546 E.g., Murdock, supra note 526; Murdock, 1957, supra note 542; Turner, supra 
note 538, at 6–9; Turner, 1963, supra note 538. 
547 Raum, 1960, supra note 538, at 2; Raum, 1959, supra note 538, at 2. 
548 TAX CT. R. 28 (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
549 ABA 1949, supra note 526. 
550 ABA 1958, supra note 526; ABA 1949, supra note 526; Murdock, supra note 
526. 
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conference in complicated cases, upon motion by either party.551  The court 
reasoned that this halfway measure would allow it to avoid the risks it 
associated with a formal procedure and at the same time leave open the 
door to pretrial conferences in those cases in which the procedure might be 
beneficial.552  Furthermore, since the court was uncertain about the need for 
a more formal procedure, the number of requests for pretrial conferences 
under this informal procedure could be used as a yardstick to measure that 
need.553  Finally, although this compromise procedure provided far less than 
what had been requested, presumably the court hoped to appease the ABA 
and other proponents of pretrial conference to some extent by refraining 
from an outright rejection of the proposal.554 
However, things did not work out as planned.  The parties did not 
resort to the informal procedure,555 perhaps because they were not aware 
that it was available, and the bar was not dissuaded from insisting upon a 
formal rule authorizing pretrial conferences.556  This persistence, when 
combined with a total lack of opposition from the Government, provided 
the catalyst for reconsideration.557  Some judges were concerned that the 
ABA might become impatient and seek the desired procedural changes 
directly from Congress.558  Others were of the opinion that if the tax bar 
was convinced that pretrial conferences would expedite the disposition of 
tax controversies and the Government had no objection to such a 
procedure, then the court should seriously reconsider its position.559  
Nevertheless, there was a consensus among the judges, including those who 
desired to accommodate the tax bar, that the role of pretrial conference in 
the court’s pretrial procedure would have to be carefully constructed and 
                                                     
551 See note 550 supra. 
552 See ABA 1958, supra note 526; Murdock, supra note 526. 
553 See note 552 supra. 
554 See generally ABA 1949, supra note 526; Murdock, supra note 526. 
555 ABA 1958, supra note 526; Memorandum from Judge Raum, Rules Comm. 
Chairman, to the Judges of the Tax Court, Mar. 8, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Murdock, supra note 
526. 
556 See ABA 1958, supra note 526, at 67–68; Murdock, supra note 526, at 107; 
Raum, 1960, supra note 538; Raum, 1959, supra note 538. 
557 See Memorandum from Judge Drennen to the Judges of the Tax Court, 
Apr. 11, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Drennen]; Memorandum from Judge Raum, 
Rules Comm. Chairman, to the Rules Comm., Dec. 28, 1962, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Pretrial Conferences: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Raum, 1960, 
supra note 538, at 1–3; Raum, 1959, supra note 538, at 1–3. 
558 See Raum, 1959, supra note 538. 
559 See Drennen, supra note 557. 
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narrowly circumscribed if the potential hazards of such a procedure were to 
be avoided.560 
Eventually a majority of the court settled upon a compromise procedure 
which ultimately was adopted as Rule 28 in 1963.561  In very broad language, 
Rule 28 authorized the court, upon its own or a parties’ motion, to hold 
pretrial conferences in its discretion in appropriate cases.562  However, the 
court’s intent to relegate pretrial conferences to the narrow role of assisting 
parties to reach a stipulation or settlement only in those cases in which the 
informal conference required under the stipulation procedure proved 
unproductive was unmistakable.563  In addition to demanding that the 
moving party demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with the 
mandatory stipulation procedure as a condition precedent to obtaining a 
pretrial conference,564 the new rule warned the parties against treating 
pretrial conferences as a substitute for the conferences required under the 
stipulation procedure.565 
As introduced in 1964, Rule 28 apparently struck an appropriate balance 
between competing considerations.566  First, the rule silenced the court’s 
critics.  The ABA gave its “resounding endorsement”567 to the rule and the 
Government “heartily endorsed”568 it.  Additionally, the court managed to 
strengthen the stipulation procedure by demanding that the parties resort to 
the stipulation procedure prior to seeking a pretrial conference.569  In this 
connection, the prospect of a party explaining to the court why the informal 
stipulation conferences had not worked out, as a condition precedent to 
obtaining a pretrial conference, was an effective incentive to the adversary 
to make a good faith effort during the course of the stipulation conferences.  
Finally, and most importantly, the pretrial conference rule operated in such 
a manner that the court successfully avoided all of the pitfalls it had 
associated with pretrial conferences.  The renewed emphasis on the 
                                                     
560 Tietjens, supra note 542. 
561 TAX CT. R. 28 (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
562 TAX CT. R. 28(a) (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
563 Raum, 1960, supra note 538, at 3; Raum, 1959, supra note 538, at 3; Turner, 
supra note 538, at 3–4; see TAX CT. R. 28(d) (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
564 TAX CT. R. 28(d) (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
565 Id. 
566 TAX CT. R. 28 (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.).  As part of the 1974 revision to the Tax 
Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 28 was renumbered as Rule 110.  
However, this change did not alter the substance of the rule.  See Rules Comm. 
Note, TAX CT. R. 110, 60 T.C. 1125–26 (1974).   
567 Letter from Randolph Thrower, Chairman ABA Section of Taxation, to 
Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, Mar. 27, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
568 Letter from Crane Hauser, Chief Counsel, to Judge Murdock, Apr. 11, 
1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Stipulations: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
569 See TAX CT. R. 28(d) (Jan. 1, 1964 ed.). 
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informal stipulation conferences all but eliminated the need for a court 
supervised pretrial conference.570  Accordingly, formal pretrial conferences 
have only been used sparingly571 and, as a result, the court has not become 





Pretrial discovery is the process by which the parties through a series of 
procedural devices “discover” the bases of their opponents’ claims or 
defenses.572  Over the years, depositions upon oral examination,573 
depositions upon written interrogatories,574 interrogatories to the parties,575 
production of documents and things,576 and admissions577 have emerged as 
the primary discovery tools.578  In 1974, the Tax Court finally incorporated 
some of these discovery devices into its pretrial procedure.579  Although 
prior to 1974 pretrial discovery was not permitted, this result did not appear 
to be required by Board/Tax Court rules.580  Beginning with the Board’s 
original rules in 1924, three rules were susceptible to a construction that 
would have allowed pretrial discovery, and subsequent revisions of these 
rules over the next 49 years added nothing to expressly preclude such a 
construction.581 
Original Rule 40, which authorized the Board to issue a subpoena 
requiring the production of documentary evidence, did not state whether it 
could be used for discovery purposes.582  Perhaps the failure to provide for 
a pretrial return date of subpoenaed material precluded such a result;583 
                                                     
570 See generally LESTER M. PONDER, UNITED STATES TAX COURT PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 112 (1976); Lester M. Ponder, Tax Court, Court of Claims, and 
District Court—A Practicing Lawyer’s View, 21 U.S.C. TAX INST. 117, 127–28 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Ponder]. 
571 See Turner, supra note 538, at 3. 
572 See generally Note, Developments in the Law–Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940 
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments].  
573 Id. at 553–57; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
574 Developments, supra note 572, at 958–59; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 31. 
575 Developments, supra note 572, at 959–65; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
576 Developments, supra note 572, at 965–68; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
577 Developments, supra note 572, at 968–71; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 36. 
578 See generally Developments, supra note 572, at 942–71. 
579 See TAX CT. R. 70–73, 90, 100–04 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
580 Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–66. 
581 Compare B.T.A. RULES 40–42 (July, 1924 ed.), with TAX CT. R. 44–46 (Feb. 9, 
1943 ed.), and TAX CT. R. 44–46 (Jan. 25, 1971 ed.). 
582 B.T.A. RULE 40 (July, 1924 ed.). 
583 See id.; Developments, supra note 572, at 1064. 
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whatever the reason, the subpoena was not used for discovery purposes.584  
Similarly, original Rules 41 and 42, which provided for depositions upon 
oral examination and written interrogatories respectively, did not provide 
whether they could be used for discovery.585  Nevertheless, depositions 
were generally relegated to the role of perpetuating testimony of witnesses 
who for good cause were unable to testify at the trial.586 
The absence of pretrial discovery in Board/Tax Court procedure 
became an increasingly controversial issue.587  The debate evolved through 
three different phases and spanned a period of 50 years. 
                                                     
584 Developments, supra note 572, at 1064. 
585 See B.T.A. RULES 41–42 (July, 1924 ed.); Developments, supra note 572, at 
1064. 
586 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Babbitt and 
Morris, supra note 385, at 627–28; Bowen, supra note 535, at 131; Harold Dubroff, 
Federal Taxation, 1973–74 ANN. SURVEY OF AMER. L. 265, 286 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Dubroff]; Ponder, supra note 570, at 131–32; see also LOYAL E. KEIR, THE 
PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF CASES IN THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
66 (1955).  In the past, the Tax Court had permitted the use of depositions to 
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Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the Tax Court, see Starr v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 
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matter of due process, see id. at 722, and that the discovery procedures are rules of 
evidence which must be followed by the Tax Court, see generally Kaminsky, supra 
note 393. 
587 See generally note 586 supra; Bennion, supra note 526; William H. Bowen, Tax 
Litigation–The Choice of Forums, 9 TAX EXEC. 273, 277 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 
Bowen, 1957]; Caldwell, 1969, supra note 393, at 1443; Marvin J. Garbis & Robert 
L. Frome, Selecting the Court for the Optimum Disposition of a Tax Controversy, 27 J. 
TAX’N 216, 217 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Garbis & Frome]; Laurence Goldfein & 
Richard A. Levine, New Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure:  How They Work:  
Their Impact, 40 J. TAX’N 2, 3–6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Goldfein & Levine]; 
Laurence Goldfein & Richard A. Levine, Tax Court Proposes Far Reaching Changes in 
its Rules of Practice and Procedure, 37 J. TAX’N 66, 68–71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Goldfein & Levine, 1972]; Arthur Groman & Hilbert P. Zarky, Rules of Evidence in 
Tax Court of United States, 10 U.S.C. TAX INST. 603, 612–13 (1958) [hereinafter cited 
as Groman & Zarky]; Converse Murdoch, Discovery Against the United States in Civil 
Tax Proceedings, 13 VILL. L. REV. 58, 66–69 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Murdoch]; 
Proposed Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court—Report of Views of 
Members of the Section of Taxation Special Subcommittee on Revision of Tax Court Rules, 26 
TAX LAW. 393, 394–96 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ABA Subcommittee]; Panel 
Discussion, supra 395; Reiling, supra note 393; Jules Ritholz, Diverse Views on Discovery 
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The first phase of the debate commenced in 1924 and lasted until 1938.  
During this period, the absence of pretrial discovery was neither unique nor 
controversial.  Many forums did not emphasize discovery in their pretrial 
procedure588 and, as a result, there was presumably no expectation that the 
Board would or should allow discovery.  However, by 1937, it was 
becoming apparent that the United States Supreme Court might adopt 
liberal pretrial discovery procedures as part of the proposed Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.589  This prospect provided the catalyst for the Board to 
reevaluate its rules to determine if its pretrial procedure would be benefitted 
by pretrial discovery.590  After carefully weighing various proposals, the 
Board elected to forego pretrial discovery, at least for the immediate 
future.591  Although there was some discussion about the Board’s authority 
to enforce discovery procedures,592 the principal reason for abandoning the 
proposals was that “[n]o one experienced in the actual trial and preparation 
of cases before the Board [had] suggested that the adoption of these 
procedures would be desirable.”593  Accordingly, the Board decided to wait 
and see whether the Supreme Court adopted pretrial discovery before 
reconsidering its position.594 
                                                                                                                       
in the Tax Court, 21 TAX LAW. 639 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ritholz]; George L. 
Whitfield & Charles E. McCallum, Burden of Proof and Choice of Forum in Tax 
Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Whitfield & 
McCallum]; Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–66. 
588 See generally Developments, supra note 572, at 946–51. 
589 Report of the Joint Committee of the Board of Tax Appeals and Office of 
the Chief Counsel, Dec. 21, 1937, at 11–12, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial 
Discovery: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee 
Report 1937]; Memorandum from S. Surrey to Member Arundell, Nov. 4, 1937, at 
4, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & 
Correspondence;” Memorandum from the Board’s Rules Comm. to the Board, c. 
1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Rules Comm. Memo.]. 
590 See supra note 589. 
591 Joint Committee Report 1937, supra note 589, at 11–12; Rules Comm. 
Memo., supra note 589.  See generally memoranda from HTR to the Rules Comm., 
May 13, 14, 15, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum, entitled “Suggested Rules 
Relating to Dispositions and Discovery Procedure,” to the Rules Comm., c. 1937, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & Correspondence,” 
wherein various proposals are set forth. 
592 See Joint Committee Report 1937, supra note 589, at 11–12; Rules Comm. 
Memo., supra note 589. 
593 Rules Comm. Memo., supra note 589, at 2. 
594 Joint Committee Report 1937, supra note 589, at 11–12; Rules Comm. 
Memo., supra note 589, at 2. 
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Shortly thereafter, in 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure595 which marked the beginning of the second stage 
of the pretrial discovery debate which lasted until 1963.  In view of the 
pretrial discovery procedures incorporated into the new federal rules, the 
Board apparently did reconsider whether such devices should be 
incorporated into its pretrial procedure.596  Nevertheless, it declined to do 
so.  However, the success that these procedures enjoyed in Federal district 
courts and many state courts, which subsequently adopted similar 
procedures, radically changed the complexion of the debate as pretrial 
discovery was no longer considered an aberration.597 
Viewed superficially, the majority of the commentary during this period 
seemed to favor the adoption by the Tax Court of at least some pretrial 
discovery procedures.598  However, a closer analysis revealed that much of 
the sentiment favoring pretrial discovery, especially that advanced from the 
late 1940s to the early 1960s, was not premised as much on the merits of 
these procedures as it was based on a general dissatisfaction with the court’s 
existing pretrial procedure.599  Countless proposals were forthcoming which 
advocated a myriad of changes covering the entire spectrum of pretrial 
procedures.  For example, some commentators looked to more informative 
pleadings and deficiency notices for the solution to pretrial problems.600  
Others sought a mandatory stipulation procedure with a pretrial return date 
for the order to show cause why a proposed stipulation should not be 
deemed admitted.601  Still others pressed for the adoption of a pretrial 
conference procedure.602  The plethora of recommendations to improve the 
court’s pretrial procedure indicates that the debate over pretrial discovery 
during this period had become intertwined with the larger controversy over 
the entire pretrial procedure.  It is not at all clear that those favoring pretrial 
discovery in the context of an otherwise meager pretrial procedure would 
also have advocated the adoption of pretrial discovery if the Tax Court had 
a full complement of other pretrial procedures. 
By 1963, however, the Tax Court had made three important changes in 
its pretrial procedure that quelled the clamor for pretrial reform.  First, in 
1956, the Tax Court made it clear in Licavoli v. Commissioner603 that the 
                                                     
595 FED. R. CIV. P. 86, 308 U.S. 645, 766 (1939). 
596 See generally Arundell, supra note 519; Barker, supra note 519. 
597 See generally Developments, supra note 572. 
598 See generally Bennion, supra note 526; Bowen, supra note 535; Bowen, 1957, 
supra note 587; Groman & Zarky, supra note 587; Kaminsky, supra note 393. 
599 See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 535; Kaminsky, supra note 393; supra notes 526 
and 582; supra notes 437–477 and accompanying text. 
600 See supra notes 201–238 and accompanying text. 
601 See supra notes 414–477 and accompanying text. 
602 See supra notes 525–565 and accompanying text. 
603 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 862 (1956), aff’d, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958). 
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motion for a further and better statement of a pleading or defense604 would 
be more readily available to cure flagrant abuses of the pleading rules.  
Second, the court gradually acceded to pressure to make the stipulation 
procedure more meaningful by making the procedure mandatory and 
providing for a pretrial return date for the motion to show cause why a 
proposed stipulation should not be deemed admitted.605  Third, the Tax 
Court agreed to hold pretrial conferences in those cases in which it 
determined they would be beneficial.606  As a result, much of the 
controversy over pretrial reform subsided and the proponents of pretrial 
discovery could no longer draw on indirect support from related problems.  
Rather, they would have to convince the court of the need for pretrial 
discovery based solely on the merits of these procedures. 
The campaign from 1963 to 1974 to convince the court of the 
desirability of adopting pretrial discovery formed the final stage of the 
pretrial discovery debate.607  During this period, the earlier consensus 
favoring liberal pretrial discovery was dissipated, and a formidable minority 
opinion opposing pretrial discovery had to be reckoned with and 
overcome.608 
Those who favored the adoption of pretrial discovery enumerated 
several advantages of such procedures.  First, they contended that discovery 
procedures would allow the parties to obtain evidence and leads for 
evidence while the facts and circumstances were still fresh in the minds of 
those involved.609  In this way, it was argued, the parties would be able to 
preserve evidence and use it later during settlement negotiations or the 
actual trial, should the need arise.610  Second, they urged that the process of 
discovering all of the relevant facts and circumstances helps to limit the 
scope of the controversy.611  By the same token, obtaining this information 
                                                     
604 See TAX CT. R. 17(c) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
605 See supra notes 414–477 and accompanying text. 
606 See supra notes 525–565 and accompanying text. 
607 See generally ABA Subcommittee, supra note 587; Caldwell, 1969, supra note 
393; Murdoch, supra note 587; Panel Discussion, supra note 395; Ritholz, supra note 
587. 
608 Compare Bennion, supra note 526, at 405–08; Bowen, supra note 535; 
Groman & Zarky, supra note 587; Kaminsky, supra note 393; Reiling, supra note 393; 
Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–66; with Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587; 
Goldfein & Levine, 1972, supra note 587; Ponder, supra note 570. 
609 See Bowen, supra note 535, at 129; Developments, supra note 572, at 944–46, 
1064–66. 
610 See generally supra note 609. 
611 See Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Bowen, supra note 535, at 129–30, 
132; Dubroff, supra note 586, at 286; Developments, supra note 572, at 944–46, 1064–
66. 
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would facilitate defining the issues within the scope as limited.612  Third, 
giving the parties access to all of the relevant factual information would 
make surprise less of a factor in determining the outcome of the 
controversy.613  In this manner, decisions would more likely be consistent 
with the equities of the controversies.614  Finally, the advocates of pretrial 
discovery argued that the inadequacy of the pleadings and the deficiency 
notice in defining the issues necessitated discovery.615  Although the 
stipulation procedure and pretrial conferences provided some relief, they 
urged that a full complement of pretrial procedures was essential if the 
parties were to overcome the inadequacies of the pleadings.616 
Depending upon whether a proponent of discovery was representing 
the position of the Government or the taxpayer, the need for and advantage 
of discovery procedures were perceived differently.617  On the one hand, 
some argued that the Government and not the taxpayer needed pretrial 
discovery.618  Unlike the normal civil suit in which the parties generally had 
prior dealings, the Government generally was not a party to the transactions 
giving rise to the alleged tax liability.619  Moreover, the Government’s access 
to information through its administrative investigatory powers was not 
deemed an adequate substitute for the more formal court authorized 
pretrial discovery procedures.620  The administrative investigations were not 
conducted by trained trial attorneys who, theoretically, were better prepared 
to handle such discovery proceedings.621 
On the other hand, those representing taxpayers contended that the 
taxpayer and not the Government had the greater need for discovery 
procedures and would also derive the greater benefit therefrom.622  They 
acknowledged that in many cases the taxpayer was in possession of most of 
the relevant information.623  However, they asserted that the existing 
procedure was in effect a one-way street since the Government effectively 
                                                     
612 See supra note 611. 
613 Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Bowen, supra note 535, at 129–31; 
Dubroff, supra note 586, at 286; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 643; Developments, supra 
note 572, at 944–46, 1064–66. 
614 Dubroff, supra note 586, at 286. 
615 See Bowen, supra note 535, at 129–31; Kaminsky, supra note 393; Reiling, 
supra note 393; Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–65. 
616 See generally supra note 615; Bennion, supra note 526. 
617 Ritholz, supra note 587, at 642. 
618 Bowen, supra note 535, at 132; Reiling, supra note 393. 
619 See supra note 618. 
620 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 7602. 
621 Bowen, supra note 535, at 132. 
622 Kaminsky, supra note 393; Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–65. 
623 Bowen, supra note 535, at 132; Dubroff, supra note 586, at 287; Developments, 
supra note 572, at 1064–65. 
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had access to discovery proceedings through its administrative investigatory 
powers.624  In their opinion, the addition of pretrial discovery to Tax Court 
procedure would provide a more balanced procedure.625  Both parties 
would have similar access to pretrial discovery, but because the 
Government already had access to such proceedings through its 
administrative power, they claimed that the litigating position of the 
Government would not be enhanced materially.626  Furthermore, they 
argued there was a real need for pretrial discovery in cases in which the 
Government relied on information obtained from sources other than the 
taxpayer.627  In cases dealing with fraud, transferee liability or divorce, 
pretrial discovery was considered essential if the taxpayer was to have access 
to information to the same extent as the Government.628 
All advocates of discovery rejected the criticism that such procedures 
would materially increase the court’s workload.629  They noted that the 
discovery rules could easily be drafted to minimize the court’s participation 
in these procedures.630  More importantly, however, they urged that issue 
formulation, the natural byproduct of discovery, not only would facilitate 
the orderly presentation of a case, but also would increase the likelihood of 
settlement as the parties would be forced to deal with the strengths and 
weaknesses of their respective cases.631 
Opponents of discovery were not bereft of arguments to support their 
view.  Most of their arguments did not address the advantages of discovery 
in terms of issue formulation; rather, they disputed that these advantages 
were sufficient to offset what they regarded as the insurmountable 
disadvantages of discovery proceedings to the parties and to the court. 
First, they argued that the existing procedure provided a relatively 
uncomplicated and inexpensive format for the orderly disposition of tax 
controversies.632  This format, they asserted, would be seriously disrupted 
by the addition of pretrial discovery.633  If the Tax Court provided pretrial 
                                                     
624 Bowen, 1957, supra note 587, at 277; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 643. 
625 See supra note 624.  See generally Bowen, supra note 535, at 129–32; Kaminsky, 
supra note 393; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 643. 
626 See generally Bowen, supra note 535, at 129–32; Bowen, 1957, supra note 587, 
at 277; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 643. 
627 Developments, supra note 572, at 1064–65. 
628 Id. 
629 Bennion, supra note 526, at 407–08; Bowen, supra note 535, at 131; Dubroff, 
supra note 586, at 287. 
630 See Bowen, supra note 535, at 131. 
631 See id. at 132; Dubroff, supra note 586, at 286–87. 
632 See Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3; Panel Discussion, supra note 395, 
at 387–89; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 641. 
633 See supra note 631. 
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discovery on any regular basis, both parties would, as a matter of course, be 
obliged to pursue discovery,634 which would unnecessarily prolong the 
proceeding and invariably increase the cost of litigation.635  Such a result 
would be especially burdensome in cases in which a negligible tax was 
involved or in the case of a pro se taxpayer.636  Furthermore, critics were 
concerned about the great potential for abuse of discovery procedures, 
especially on the part of the Government which, in most cases, would not 
bear the same economic and time constraints confronted by taxpayers.637 
Second, many commentators argued that pretrial discovery would 
adversely affect the nature of tax litigation.638  They feared that pretrial 
discovery would foster laxity during the administrative process of auditing 
because of the knowledge that any errors or oversights during the 
administrative stage could be discovered and corrected during the litigating 
phase of the proceeding.639  Furthermore, they were convinced that the 
existing compromise attitude engendered by the informal conferences 
required by the stipulation procedure would be supplanted by an inflexible 
combative attitude associated with formal discovery procedures.640  
Third, and most important, was the apprehension that pretrial discovery 
would damage irrevocably the effectiveness of the stipulation procedure in 
producing settlements.641  The stipulation procedure was considered 
primarily responsible for the 85 percent pretrial settlement rate of docketed 
cases.642  If pretrial discovery encroached upon that settlement rate, it would 
place an intolerable burden on the Tax Court, which already faced a large 
backlog of cases.  Regardless of whether the settlement rate was affected, 
the opponents of pretrial discovery were sure that these procedures would 
increase the court’s workload.643  In their view, the conclusion was 
inescapable that pretrial discovery would at the minimum increase the 
court’s motion practice thereby involving the court in controversies that 
otherwise would have been settled without such intervention.644 
                                                     
634 See Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 4; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 641. 
635 See Dubroff, supra note 586, at 287; Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3; 
Panel Discussion, supra note 395, at 388; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 641. 
636 Ritholz, supra note 587, at 641–42. 
637 Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3–4; Goldfein & Levine, 1972, supra 
note 587, at 68; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 640. 
638 See Dubroff, supra note 586, at 287; Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3–
4; Panel Discussion, supra note 395, at 388–89; Ritholz, supra note 587, at 640–42. 
639 Goldfein & Levine, 1972, supra note 587, at 68. 
640 See note 637 supra. 
641 Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3–4. 
642 Dubroff, supra note 586, at 287; Panel Discussion, supra note 395, at 389. 
643 See Goldfein & Levine, 1972, supra note 587, at 68. 
644 See Dubroff, supra note 586, at 287; Panel Discussion, supra note 395, at 390. 
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Finally, they rejected the proposition that the parties’ need for pretrial 
discovery was a sufficient justification for incurring the disruptive effects of 
discovery procedures.  They observed that in most cases the Government 
had access to all of the necessary information through its administrative 
investigatory powers and that the taxpayers usually had all of the 
information in their possession from the outset.645  Moreover, they asserted 
that to the extent the pleadings did not define the issues, the mythical gap in 
the Tax Court’s pretrial procedure due to lack of pretrial discovery was 
more than filled by the administrative processes generally initiated prior to 
issuance of a deficiency notice, and the stipulation and pretrial conference 
procedures initiated, pursuant to Tax Court rules, subsequent to the filing 
of a Tax Court petition.646 
 
1. Adoption of Discovery Procedures 
 
Presumably because of the controversial nature of pretrial discovery, the 
Tax Court was reluctant to adopt such procedures.  However, largely as a 
result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which settled its status as an article I 
court, the Tax Court embarked on a comprehensive reevaluation of its 
procedural rules.647  This effort lasted nearly four years and culminated in 
adoption of a pretrial discovery procedure in 1974.648   
The initial discovery rules adopted by the court were more limited than 
the Federal Rules.  First, discovery was strictly limited in terms of who 
                                                     
645 See Garbis & Frome, supra note 587, at 217; Ponder, supra note 570, at 132; 
Whitfield & McCallum, supra note 587, at 1180. 
646 Babbitt and Morris, supra note 385, at 627–28; Bennion, supra note 526, at 
405–12; Goldfein & Levine, supra note 587, at 3–4; Goldfein & Levine, 1972, supra 
note 587, at 68; Groman & Zarky, supra note 587, at 612–14. 
647 Panel Discussion, supra note 395, at 378.  There is also some evidence that the 
Tax Court reevaluated the rules of procedure in 1967 as a result of certain 
proposed legislation aimed at making the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
applicable to the Tax Court as nearly as possible.  See S. 2041, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967); H.R. 10100, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Joint Comm. Report from Judge 
Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, to the Chief Judge, Sept. 8, 1967, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Joint Comm. 
Report from Edward Radue to Judge Raum, Rules Comm. Chairman, Sept. 6, 1967, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Pretrial Discovery: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
648 TAX CT. R. 70–73, 90 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  For a contemporaneous discussion 
of these discovery rules, see generally LESTER M. PONDER, UNITED STATES TAX 
COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 104–12 (1976); Michael D. Annis, The New 
Tax Court Rules, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1341 (1974); Dubroff, supra note 
586, at 285–95; Robert J. Murray, Tax Court Discovery:  The Need for Restraint, 53 
TAXES 327 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Murray]. 
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could be subject to the procedure.649  Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Tax Court did not allow discovery from nonparty third 
persons, except in the case of transferee liability.650   
Second, in an effort to preserve the stipulation process as the mainstay 
of its pretrial procedure, the court’s discovery rules required the parties to 
fully use their opportunities for informal consultation before resorting to 
formal discovery procedures.651  In Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner,652 the 
court refused to require the Service to answer petitioners’ interrogatories 
since they had not first sought to obtain the information through informal 
consultation, even though the Service’s counsel stated he was available for 
discussions.653  Rule 70(a)(1), wrote Chief Judge Dawson, “means exactly 
what it says”: discovery procedures should only be used after attempts have 
been made to obtain needed information through informal procedures and 
voluntary efforts.654  The court has persistently enforced the informal 
consultation requirement since its adoption of pretrial discovery,655 
although, for a brief period, the admissions procedure656 was held to be 
available without prior resort to any other procedure.657 
Third, the court’s approach provided only three discovery devices: 
admissions,658 interrogatories, and production of documents and things.659  
                                                     
649  Id. at 384; TAX CT. R. 71–72, 90 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
650  Compare TAX CT. R. 70–73 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.), with FED. R. CIV. P. 30–31, 34. 
651  TAX CT. R. 70(a), 60 T.C. 1097 (1973); see W. M. Drennen, New Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court: How Are They Working?, 27 U. FLA. 
L. Rev. 897, 905 (1975). 
652  61 T.C. 691 (1974). 
653  Id. at 692. 
654  Id. 
655  See, e.g., Odend’hal v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 400, 404 (1980); International 
Air Conditioning Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 89, 92–94 (1976). 
656  TAX CT. R. 90, 60 T.C. 1114–17 (1973).  Any party may, without leave of 
court, serve on any other party a request for admission of the truth of relevant, 
nonprivileged matters or for the authenticity of a document.  Failure to deny the 
request for admission or object thereto within 30 days of service results in an 
automatic admission.  Id. 
657  In Pearsall v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 94 (1974), the court held that the 
petitioner was not required to seek information informally before serving requests 
for admissions.  A subsequent revision of the Tax Court rules made clear that the 
requirement of prior informal consultation applies to admissions requests, as well 
as to other discovery procedures.  See TAX CT. R. 90(a), 71 T.C. 1198–99 (1978); see 
also Odend’hal, 75 T.C. at 404 (holding that Pearsall was no longer to be followed). 
658  TAX CT. R. 90, 60 T.C. 1114–17 (1973).  “Technically, admissions are not 
considered a discovery device. . . . (Admissions were] put . . . in the Title with 
stipulations because a matter admitted may become a part of the record [in a case], 
whereas a matter discovered will not.  However, . . . admissions are [often] used for 
purposes of discovery.”  Letter from Judge Simpson to Professor Harold Dubroff 
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Depositions, thought by some to be the most important of discovery 
devices,660 were not allowed for the purpose of discovery.661 
 
2. Expanding Discovery Techniques 
 
Depositions were not included in the discovery procedures initially 
adopted by the Tax Court for fear that they would prove more burdensome 
than beneficial.662  Specifically, the court was concerned that the costs of 
Tax Court litigation could rise dramatically if liberal use of depositions was 
allowed.663 Additionally, the court, apprehensive that discovery might 
undermine and replace stipulation procedures and thus interfere with the 
efficient operation of the court,664 concluded that allowing depositions in its 
initial adoption of pretrial discovery would be “too drastic a departure from 
present Tax Court practice.”665 
Those in favor of expanding discovery procedures in the Tax Court, 
however, considered the absence of depositions and other provisions for 
third-party discovery to be one of the most serious defects in Tax Court 
pretrial procedure.666  It was argued that the use of depositions would aid in 
                                                                                                                       
1, Nov. 4, 1986, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” 
(commenting on Professor Dubroff’s proposed chapter on the amendments of the 
Tax Court rules); see Drennen, supra note 651, at 899; see also TAX CT. R. 70(a)(1), 60 
T.C. 1097 (1973) (failing to list admissions as a method of discovery). 
659  TAX CT. R. 70–73, 60 T.C. 1097–1103 (1973).   
660  William H. Newton III, The United States Tax Court: Should Discovery be 
Expanded?, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 611, 616 (1979). 
661  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 80, 60 T.C. 1104 (1973).  A deposition 
could be used for the limited purpose of preserving the testimony of a witness 
unable to appear.  The Rules of Practice initially promulgated by the Board of Tax 
Appeals in 1925 allowed depositions for these purposes.  B.T.A. RULES 41, 42, 1 
B.T.A. 1293–94 (1925); see also TAX CT. R. 80–85, 60 T.C. 1103–14 (1973) (rules 
governing depositions).  In Estate of Haber v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 236 (1988), the 
court refused to authorize a deposition to preserve the testimony of a 38-year old 
accountant because he regularly engaged in risky sporting activities such as 
skydiving and motorcycle racing.  See Masek v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1096 (1988); 
Reed v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 698 (1988) (both cases evincing reluctance to order 
depositions for purposes of preserving testimony). 
662  TAX CT. R. 70(a) note, 60 T.C. 1097 (1973); Drennen, supra note 651, at 
899.  Depositions were long allowed for the purpose of preserving testimony of a 
witness unable to appear.  See supra note 661. 
663  See Letter from Judge Simpson to Professor Harold Dubroff, supra note 
658, at 1. 
664  Drennen, supra note 651, at 899. 
665  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70(a), 60 T.C. 1097 (1973). 
666  See, e.g., Newton, supra note 660, at 632–36. 
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the fact-finding process and would lead to an increase in settlements rather 
than an erosion of the stipulation process.667  Furthermore, after a few years 
in operation, it was contended that pretrial discovery in the Tax Court did 
not appear to have the ill effects on court practice that its opponents had 
envisioned.668 
 
a. The Adoption of Rule 74:  Consensual Depositions of Parties 
and Non-Parties 
 
In 1979, proponents of more liberal Tax Court discovery met with some 
success when the court adopted Rule 74.669  Rule 74 allows the taking of a 
deposition for the purpose of discovery from either a party or a non-party 
witness if “all the parties to a case” consent.670  The reluctance of the court 
to expand its discovery provisions to include pretrial depositions was based 
primarily on the concern for the burden and cost imposed on litigants by 
deposition discovery.  The court concluded that it had no reason to object 
if the parties themselves agreed that the deposition should be taken.671 
Under Rule 74, the consent of the parties to a deposition must be filed 
in duplicate with the court.672  Depositions are subject to the same time 
limits as the other discovery procedures and may not be commenced until 
30 days after joinder of issue and must be completed 45 days prior to the 
date set for the call of the case from a trial calendar.673  If a party wishes to 
depose a non-party witness, notice must be served upon that witness, and if 
the deposition is in the form of written questions,674 a copy of the questions 
                                                     
667  Id. at 623. 
668  Id. at 633–34. 
669  71 T.C. 1194–95 (1979). 
670  TAX CT. R. 74(a), 71 T.C. 1194 (1979) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(b) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.)).   
671  See Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman of Committee on Court 
Procedure, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson 1–2, July 1, 1985, filed at 
U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (expressing views of individual 
members on proposed amendments to the rules of the Tax Court). 
672  TAX CT. R. 74(a), 71 T.C. 1194 (1979) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(b) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.).  The stipulation must include the names and addresses of the 
deponents, the time and place of the deposition, the officer before whom the 
deposition will be taken, and any provision desired with respect to expenses and 
fees.  Id.; TAX CT. R. 81(d), 60 T.C. 1106 (1973). 
673  TAX CT. R. 70(a)(2), 71 T.C. 1191 (1979). Prior to the 1979 amendments, 
the deadline for completion of discovery was 75 days prior to the date set for the 
call of the case from a trial calendar.  Former TAX CT. R. 70(a)(2), 60 T.C. 1097 
(1973). 
674  Depositions upon written questions are “not favored, and . . . should not be 
taken in . . . absence of a special reason.”  TAX CT. R. 74(e), 71 T.C. 1194–95 
(1979) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(e)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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must be attached.675  A non-party witness may object to the deposition 
within 15 days after notice, and the burden is on the party seeking the 
deposition to move for an order with respect to the objection.676  A 
transcript must be made of every deposition, but the transcript may not be 
filed until ordered or permitted by the court.677 
 
b. The Adoption of Rule 75:  Non-Consensual Depositions of Non-
Parties 
 
Rule 74 fell short of removing what some viewed as a major defect in 
Tax Court pretrial procedure—the inability of a party to obtain essential 
information from third persons absent the consent of the opposing party.678  
Although a party could obtain documents and things of third persons from 
another party so long as they were “in the possession, custody or control of 
the party on whom the request [was] served,”679 the Tax Court rules 
contained no provision, absent the consent of the parties, for discovery 
directly from third persons. 
The Service believed that the information obtainable under the Tax 
Court’s discovery rules was insufficient for the development of cases and 
proposed that the court adopt a less restrictive rule that would allow 
discovery depositions from third persons.680  A rule of this kind could be 
used to obtain information otherwise non-discoverable prior to trial and 
could avoid undeveloped cases and “repeated requests for continuances.”681  
Depositions from non-parties could be particularly valuable to the Service 
in cases involving partnerships in which the petitioner was a limited partner, 
                                                     
675  Id. 
676  TAX CT. R. 74(c), 71 T.C. 1194 (1979) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(b)(3) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.). 
677  TAX CT. R. 74(d), 71 T.C. 1194 (1979) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(e)(1) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.).   
678  Newton, supra note 660, at 622. 
679  TAX CT. R. 72(a)(1), 60 T.C. 1101 (1973). 
680  Letter from Stuart E. Seigel, Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue 
Service, to Judge Raum 1–5, July 1, 1977, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Discovery” (recommending major revisions in the Tax Court’s 
discovery rules); see also Office of Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, 
Statement of Background Facts Showing Possible Uses of Proposed Rule 75 
(1982), filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (background 
information on Rule 75 and its uses). 
681  Office of the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 
680. 
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and a general partner, uninvolved in the litigation, was in possession of 
documents that were crucial to the case.682 
The Service proposal generally was supported by the tax bar,683 despite 
some concern that third-party depositions could be used routinely by the 
Service to substitute for audit-level investigations and could present a 
further and unnecessary burden on the court.684  Tax Court judges generally 
agreed that some expansion of discovery procedures was needed.685  
Although records necessary to Tax Court litigation might be subpoenaed 
from third parties, subpoenas not returnable until trial often gave the parties 
inadequate time to examine the records and evaluate their positions.686  
Despite some judges’ concern that the broad use of discovery depositions 
as allowed in other forums would result in protracted litigation, greater cost, 
and an increase in the workload of the Tax Court, the prevalent sentiment 
was that there existed sufficient need to warrant allowing third-party 
depositions in limited situations.687 
Continuing its general expansion of discovery, the court in 1983 adopted 
Rule 75, which directly addressed the concerns of those who felt the court’s 
third-party procedures were too restrictive.  [Pursuant to the Tax Court’s 
consolidation of the provisions governing depositions in 2010,688 Rule 75 is 
currently designated as Rule 74(c).]  From 1983 to 2010, Rule 75 provided 
for depositions in certain cases from non-party witnesses without either the 
consent of the deponent or of the other party or parties in the 
proceeding.689  A deposition under such conditions represents an 
extraordinary method of discovery, and the procedure may be used only 
                                                     
682  Id.  To a large extent, the “entity-level” audit and litigation provisions of the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Reform Act of 1982 eliminated this particular discovery 
problem.  See Part VII.C (discussing the development of partnership-level 
proceedings). 
683  Letter from Andrew W. Singer, Court Procedure Committee of the A.B.A. 
Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson 2, Oct. 5, 1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court in 
“Rules Committee: Discovery” (informing the Tax Court of the favorable results of 
a poll of members of the Tax Court Procedure Committee concerning proposed 
discovery Rule 75). 
684  Id. at 1. 
685  Tax Court Rules Committee Minutes 1, Jan. 5, 1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court 
in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (noting that “some expansion” of the court’s 
discovery depositions rule was desirable). 
686  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Tannenwald 2, Oct. 29, 
1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (discussing reasons 
why a broader discovery deposition rule was needed for the Tax Court).  
687  See id. at 3. 
688  See Section G.4 of this Part.   
689  See TAX CT. R. 75, 79 T.C. 1140–41 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 
74(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.)).  As described in text accompanying infra notes 773–776, 
Rule 75 was substantially revised in 2010.   
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when a non-party witness can give testimony or possesses documents or 
things that constitute discoverable material that are not otherwise 
obtainable through informal consultations or alternate means of 
discovery.690 
To eliminate unnecessary judicial intervention, a non-consensual 
deposition may be taken without leave of the court.691  The party desiring to 
take a deposition must give notice to every other party and to the non-party 
witness to be deposed.692  Either a party or the non-party witness may 
object to the deposition within 15 days after notice by serving objections on 
the party seeking the deposition, and the burden is on the party desiring to 
take the deposition to move for an order in regard to the objections.693 
The time span for taking a non-consensual deposition is more restrictive 
than that of the other discovery procedures.694  Depositions under this 
provision may not be taken until “[a]fter a notice of trial has been issued or 
after a case has been assigned to a Judge or Special Trial Judge.”695  Both 
the Service and the bar expressed the concern that this restriction could 
curtail a party’s ability to use the rule effectively.696  Additionally, the Service 
contended that applying the same time frames to non-consensual 
                                                     
690  TAX CT. R. 75(b), 79 T.C. 1140 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(1) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
691  TAX CT. R. 75(a), 79 T.C. 1140 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(1) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.)); see Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, Jan. 
11, 1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery.” 
692  TAX CT. R. 75(c), 79 T.C. 1140 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 
74(c)(2)(A) (July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
693  TAX CT. R. 75(d), 79 T.C. 1140 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 
74(c)(2)(B) (July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
694  “Discovery [under other discovery rules] shall not be commenced, without 
leave of Court, before the expiration of 30 days after joinder of issue . . . and shall 
be completed . . . no later than 45 days prior to the date set for call of the case from 
a trial calendar.”  TAX CT. R. 70(a)(2), 71 T.C. 1191 (1979). 
695  TAX CT. R. 75(a), 79 T.C. 1140 (1982) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(1) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
696  Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue 
Service, to Judge Simpson 1–2, Mar. 4, 1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Discovery” (opining that the time frame for the use of Rule 75 was 
unrealistic and offering revisions to remedy the defects); Letter from John B. Jones, 
Jr., Vice Chairman of Government Relations, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Judge 
Simpson 1, Mar. 10, 1982, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” 
(pointing out that the members of the taxation section of the A.B.A. expressing 
views on the proposed deposition rule thought that the Service would gain most 
from the new rule). 
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depositions as applied to other discovery procedures would expedite 
discovery, as well as the settlement process.697 
Nevertheless, the Tax Court concluded that a restricted time frame 
would enable the court to limit use of non-consensual depositions to the 
rare situations for which they were intended.698  Since the identity of the 
judge who will conduct a trial session in the Tax Court is known at the time 
the notice of the trial session is issued, the trial judge’s identity will be 
known in every case in which a witness is deposed under his procedure.  
The Tax Court, in this manner, intended to limit the use of non-consensual 
depositions to situations in which the trial judge could decide whether to 
compel a deposition to which a party had objected.699 
In adopting Rule 75, the Tax Court emphasized that invocation of the 
rule would be appropriate only in those “extraordinary” situations in which 
all other formal and informal discovery procedures have been exhausted.700  
Adhering to this view, the court has held that a summary judgment motion 
could not be opposed on the ground that discovery was incomplete because 
a non-consensual deposition had not been taken.701  The court granted the 
summary judgment motion because petitioners did not have a “pertinent 
discovery request . . . outstanding.”702  Although petitioners maintained that 
they should have been allowed to take Rule 75 depositions from certain 
witnesses, the court held that the petitioners should have subpoenaed the 
individuals they wanted to depose so that they could have appeared at the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment; having failed to avail 
themselves of this “preferable alternative,” and having failed to appear 
                                                     
697  Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue 
Service, to Judge Simpson, supra note 696, at 2. 
698  See Tax Court Rules Committee Minutes, supra note 685, at 1–2. 
699  See Letter from Judge Simpson to Professor Harold Dubroff, supra note 
658.  
700  The note accompanying Rule 75 provided as follows: 
Under the Rule, a discovery deposition may be taken only of a witness who 
is not a party to the case; the deposition of a party may be taken only upon 
consent of all parties under Rule 74.  The new Rule 75 provides an 
extraordinary method of discovery which may be used only where the 
information sought cannot be obtained by informal consultation or by other 
discovery methods.  For example, if the other requirements of the Rule are 
satisfied, a deposition might be taken under the Rule in a case involving the 
tax liability of a limited partner who does not have access to the books and 
records of the partnership, or where a bank or other person possesses 
records which are relevant to the tax liability of a party and are otherwise 
unavailable. 
Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 75, 79 T.C. 1141–42 (1982).  
701  Brunwasser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-196, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1011, 1013, aff’d without published opinion, 833 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1987). 
702  Id. at 1013. 
Pretrial Procedure                                      639 
 
 
themselves at the hearing, petitioners were not entitled to a Rule 75 
deposition.703 
Rule 75 was not established for the routine deposing of key witnesses, 
and any party seeking to compel a deposition pursuant to the provision 
must convince the court of its necessity.  A key element in this regard is 
whether the information sought could not be obtained through informal 
consultation.704  Other factors may be whether the opposing party has 
refused to consent to a Rule 74 deposition and whether the subjects of the 
deposition possess critical information.705 
In DeLucia v. Commissioner,706 the Service had determined deficiencies and 
additions to tax for fraud707 against a husband and wife who failed to 
indicate on their joint return income the husband derived from operating 
massage parlors and related activities.  The Tax Court previously granted 
the Service’s motion for summary judgment in regard to the husband’s 
liability, but left open the substantive issue of whether the wife was entitled 
to the “innocent spouse” protection of what was then § 6013(e) of the 
Code.708 
The Service contended that the husband was “no longer a party to this 
case, inasmuch as all issues concerning him ha[d] been concluded,”709 and 
moved for the compulsory deposition of the husband as a non-party 
witness under Rule 75.  The Service argued that in view of the fact that 
informal consultations with the petitioner-wife had proved “unfruitful” and 
that because the husband was “the only source of information available 
which could shed light on the matter concerning the innocent spouse 
status” of the wife, compulsory deposition of the husband was justified 
under Rule 75.710  The petitioners responded that the husband was still a 
party to the case and thus would not qualify as a Rule 75 deponent.711 
                                                     
703  Id.  Cf. Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1329, 1401–03 (1986) (subpoena 
duces tecum returnable one week before trial after two years had passed since 
issuance of notice of deficiency was quashed due to its overly burdensome nature). 
704  Ripley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-555, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1391, 
1395. 
705  Id. 
706  DeLucia, 87 T.C. 804 (1986). 
707  Section 6653(b) provides for the imposition of additions to tax for tax 
underpayments attributable to fraud. 
708  DeLucia, 87 T.C. at 808.  Under former § 6013(e), an “innocent spouse” 
signing a joint return was relieved from liability for tax underpayments attributable 
to the “grossly erroneous items” of the other spouse, if the innocent spouse “did 
not know and had no reason to know” of the understatement.  I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) 
(1986).  This provision, as slightly revised, is now contained in § 6015(b). 
709  87 T.C. at 810. 
710  Id. at 809. 
711  Id. at 811.  
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The Tax Court agreed with the petitioners.712  The summary judgment 
order was interlocutory and unappealable713 and no decision had yet been 
entered against the husband.  The court stated that its jurisdiction over the 
husband continued until the entry of a final decision.714 
Moreover, the court expressed reservations over whether Rule 75 
discovery would be appropriate even if a final decision as to the husband 
had been entered by the Tax Court because “a party maintains his or her 
status as a party for other Internal Revenue Code provisions.”715  For 
example, the entry of a decision “triggers” the availability of Rule 162, 
under which a party may move to revise or vacate the court’s opinion.716  
The entry of decision also initiates the 90-day period for appeal under § 
7483.717  The court held that if it were to ignore the restrictions of Rule 75, 
which only permits the depositions of non-party witnesses, it “would 
merely be assisting respondent [Commissioner] in circumventing both the 
literal language and the carefully limited objectives of our discovery 
rules.”718 
It is clear that the Tax Court will not allow non-consensual depositions 
to be used to avoid the restrictions of other rules of discovery.719  One 
seeking to use this extraordinary method of discovery must first “pass the 
threshold requirement that the information it seeks to discover is 
                                                     
712  Id.  The only alternative, the court noted, would be for all parties to consent 
to the deposition of the husband.  Id. at 813. 
713  Id. at 811.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added § 7482(a)(2)(A) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which provides that “Courts of Appeals . . . [may], in their 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from [certain interlocutory orders of the 
Tax Court].”  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1558(a), 100 Stat. 
2085, 2757–58, overruling Shapiro v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1980).  See 
Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 193, 87 T.C. 1560 (1986). 
714  DeLucia, 87 T.C. at 812. 
715  Id. at 813. 
716  Id. 
717  Id.; I.R.C. § 7483. 
718  DeLucia, 87 T.C. at 813–14. 
719  See Estate of Van Loben Sels v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 64, 68–69 (1984).  
In Estate of Van Loben Sels, the petitioner sought compulsory deposition of the 
Service’s expert witnesses under Rule 75.  The court noted that while Rule 70(b) 
did not specify the scope of discovery from opposing expert witnesses, Rule 71(d), 
an interrogatory provision, clearly did so.  Id. at 68–69.  Because Rule 71(d) allowed 
discovery of information regarding expert witnesses only from the opposing party, 
not from the experts themselves, the Tax Court refused to read the “extraordinary” 
Rule 75 to provide greater discovery than its more lenient counterparts.  Id.; see also 
Howe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-213, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 
(compulsory deposition of Service’s expert witness disallowed under Rule 75 where 
material was not discoverable under the more general Rules 70 and 71). 
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discoverable within the meaning of Rule 70(b).”720  Thus, until the 
provisions of Rule 75 were substantially modified in 2010,721 a deposition 
taken in the absence of the consent of all the parties was not available with 
respect to matters adequately provided for in other rules.722 
 
3. Discovery of Expert Witnesses 
 
The original discovery procedures adopted by the Tax Court were 
limited with regard to expert witnesses.  Rule 71(d)723 provided that any 
party could require any other party, through the use of interrogatories, to 
identify any expert witness expected to be called to testify, giving such 
expert’s name, address, occupation, and qualifications, and to provide a 
statement describing the subject and substance of the expert’s anticipated 
testimony.724  Because of the significance of expert testimony in many Tax 
Court cases, an argument could be made that discovery of experts should 
be expanded.725 
In 1979, Rule 71(d) was amended to allow a party to furnish a copy of 
an expert’s report in lieu of a statement presenting the subject and 
substance of the expert’s report.726  The amendment also added a 
requirement that each party submit to every other party and the court, at 
least 15 days prior to trial, a copy of all expert witness reports expected to 
be used in conjunction with expert testimony.727 
Although the 1979 amendment marked an expansion of discovery 
procedures concerning expert witnesses, Rule 71 continued to limit 
discovery to information obtainable from the opposing party in the form of 
responses to interrogatories and experts’ reports.728  A compulsory 
deposition of an opposing expert witness was not allowed because of the 
limits already imposed by Rule 71.729 
Several Tax Court judges felt that the requirements of Rule 71(d)(2), as 
amended in 1979, were unclear and therefore recommended that the rule be 
revised and clarified.730  Specifically, these judges were unsure whether a 
                                                     
720  Estate of Van Loben Sels, 82 T.C. at 68. 
721  See Section G.4 of this Part.   
722  Id. at 69. 
723  TAX CT. R. 71(d), 60 T.C. 1100–01 (1973). 
724  Id. 
725  Newton, supra note 660, at 636. 
726  TAX CT. R. 71(d)(1), 71 T.C. 1192 (1979). 
727  TAX CT. R. 71(d)(2), 71 T.C. 1192–93 (1979). 
728  Estate of Van Loben Sels v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 64 (1984). 
729  Id. at 69. 
730  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett 1, Sept. 11, 
1985, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery (discussing various 
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party should be required to submit an expert report to another party whose 
expert had not prepared a written report, or whether to preclude the oral 
testimony of an expert witness who had not done so.731  A general 
consensus existed that a more “clear cut” rule was needed and that the 
provisions regarding expert reports should not be “‘buried’ in the rule 
dealing with interrogatories.”732  Dissatisfaction with Rule 71 was 
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure contained extensive provisions with regard to discovery of 
expert opinion.733 
                                                                                                                       
proposed rule changes and their benefits to the Tax Court procedure).  As 
amended in 1979, Rule 71(d)(2) provided as follows: 
If not furnished earlier, each party who expects to call an expert witness 
shall furnish each other party and shall submit to the Court, not later than 
15 days prior to the call of the trial calendar on which the case shall appear, 
a copy of all reports intended to be used in conjunction with the testimony 
of the witness at the trial of the case.  
TAX CT. R. 71(d)(2), 71 T.C. 1192–93 (1979).  In 1986, the court deleted the 
provisions of Rule 71(d)(2) pertaining to the preparation and exchange of expert 
reports and moved them to Rule 143(f) (later to be redesignated Rule 143(g)).  Rule 
71(d)(2) therefore now simply provides a cross-reference to the appropriate 
provision.  See TAX CT. R. 71(d)(2), 143(g)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
731  See Memorandum from Judge Cohen to Judge Simpson 1, Nov. 8, 1984, 
filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (expressing Judge 
Cohen’s views on expert reports in Rule 71(d)(2)). 
732  Id.; Tax Court Rules Committee Minutes, Jan. 24, 1985, filed at U.S. Tax 
Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery.” 
733  Prior to amendments in 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
addressed the discovery of expert witness opinion through Rule 26(b)(4).  Under 
the then-existing regime, a party could, through interrogatories, require another 
party to identify any expert expected to testify, and provide the subject and 
substance of the expert’s opinion, as well as the grounds upon which it is based.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (prior to amendment in 1993).  The court could, 
upon motion, order discovery regarding experts by other means available under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) (prior to 
amendment in 1993).  If an expert had been retained in anticipation of litigation but 
was not expected to be called at trial, an opposing party generally could discover 
information regarding that expert’s opinion only “upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances” which make it impracticable to obtain the information by other 
means.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (prior to amendment in 1993).  The Federal 
rules required a party seeking discovery of expert material to pay a reasonable fee to 
the expert for the time spent in responding to a discovery request other than an 
interrogatory, “unless manifest injustice would result.” Furthermore, a party 
seeking the discovery of information regarding an expert not expected to be called 
as a witness had to pay the other party a fair portion of the reasonable expenses 
and fees incurred by the “party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.”  
The purpose of these provisions was to prevent one party from obtaining the 
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Although Tax Court judges generally agreed that the provisions 
regarding experts needed clarification, their views differed concerning the 
appropriate changes.734  Some judges insisted that detailed reports from 
experts were necessary to educate the triers of fact; others contended that 
the requirement of a written report would penalize an expert who did not 
write well.735  Most agreed that the judge should have the discretion to 
waive the requirement of a written report in appropriate cases.  
Additionally, although at least one judge expressed concern that the 
requirement of written reports from expert witnesses might be used by the 
Service to harass taxpayers by refusing to settle unless such reports were 
produced, it was also suggested that such a rule might instead encourage 
settlement.736 
The Tax Court Rules Committee responded to suggestions regarding 
expert witness discovery by proposing, in 1985, an amendment to Rule 
143.737  Suggestions of the judges together with comments from the tax bar 
and the Service were taken into consideration in formulating the 
amendment.738  Because the judges had “different views as to when a 
written report should be required,” the amendment, although providing 
guidance for situations in which a report should be received, basically 
“enables each Judge to proceed as he sees fit.”739 
 
                                                                                                                       
benefit, without cost, of expert work for which the other party paid.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (prior to amendment in 1993).  
In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shifted away from relying on 
interrogatories as the primary vehicle for discovery of expert witness opinion, 
finding that this approach “was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely 
dispensed with the need to depose the expert and often was even of little help in 
preparing for the deposition of the witness.”  Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 
26 (1993 Amendment).  Rule 26 was therefore modified to require the preparation 
and disclosure of a detailed report of the expert witness that is intended to set forth 
the substance of the expert’s direct testimony.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
734  Tax Court Rules Committee Minutes, 2–4, Aug. 28, 1985, filed at U.S. Tax 
Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (expressing differing views of judges 
regarding expert reports and testimony). 
735  Id. at 2–3. 
736  Id. at 3. 
737  See TAX CT. R. 143(f), 85 T.C. 1134–35 (1985). 
738  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 730, 
at 1; see also Tax Court Rules Committee Minutes, supra note 734, at 2–4 (expressing 
various views of judges on the changes in Tax Court procedures). 
739  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 730, 
at 2. 
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a. Expert Reports 
 
Rule 143(f) went into effect on July 1, 1986.740 [As part of a restructuring 
of Rule 143 in 2010, Rule 143(f) was redesignated as Rule 143(g).741]  The 
rule generally requires that expert witnesses prepare written reports for 
submission to the court and other parties, unless the court permits 
otherwise.742  Expert testimony, without a written report, will ordinarily be 
excluded if such testimony deals with “third-party contacts, comparable 
sales, statistical data, or other detailed, technical information.”743  On the 
other hand, the court may dispense with the requirement of a written report 
if the expert testimony is limited to industry practice or rebuttal of other 
expert testimony.744 
As contemplated under Rule 143(g), an expert report must give the 
qualifications of the expert as well as the expert’s opinion and the facts or 
data on which it is based.745  The report is required to set forth detailed 
reasons for the expert’s conclusions and will be marked as an exhibit and 
received into evidence as the expert’s direct testimony.746  Additional direct 
testimony may be allowed for clarification of the report, to cover matters 
arising after the report’s preparation, or at the court’s discretion.747  A 
strategy based on submitting incomplete reports and then attempting to 
“provid[e] substance of the expert’s testimony through oral testimony” is 
unlikely to succeed.748  The court may completely exclude the testimony of 
an expert failing to comply with the requirements of the rule unless the 
failure is for good cause and does not cause “undue prejudice” to the other 
                                                     
740  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 143(f), 85 T.C. 1136 (1986).   
741  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 143, 134 T.C. 360–62 (2010). 
742  Written reports from experts serve several important functions.  “First, it 
requires both the expert and the attorney to prepare well in advance of trial” thus 
eliminating surprise and clarifying the actual need for discovery.  George C. Pratt, 
A Judicial Perspective On Opinion Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 39 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 313, 322 (1982).  Second, the submission of written reports from experts 
results in a savings of cost, time, and effort.  For example, written reports allow 
opposing counsel, prior to trial, to focus on the weaknesses in an expert’s 
testimony thus conserving judicial resources.  Id. at 322–23. 
743  TAX CT. R. 143(g)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (introduced as TAX CT. R. 143(f)(2), 
85 T.C. 1135 (1979)).   
744  Id. 
745  TAX CT. R. 143(g)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (introduced as TAX CT. R. 143(f)(1), 
85 T.C. 1134–35 (1979)). 
746  Id. 
747  Id. 
748  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 730, 
at 3. 
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party.749  All reports prepared pursuant to the rule must be furnished to the 
court and to the other parties not later than 30 days prior to the call of trial 
calendar on which the case appears.750 
When Rule 143(g) was introduced, members of the tax bar criticized the 
rule on various grounds.751  Some were concerned that the comprehensive 
reports required under the rule would require counsel and parties to 
become more actively involved in the drafting of expert reports, thus 
making the submission of expert testimony in the Tax Court more 
“expensive and time consuming in comparison with other tax litigation 
forums.”752  Furthermore, it was suggested that at least some oral testimony 
might be necessary to evaluate an expert, particularly in the case of experts 
who do not routinely write detailed reports in the course of their 
business.753  It was also observed that discovery of experts was more liberal 
in district court and Claims Court, neither of which required a written 
report as a prerequisite to testimony at the time Rule 143(g) was 
introduced.754  Nonetheless, most practitioners who commented on Rule 
143(g) supported it.755 
 In 2012, the court modified Rule 143(g) to require that expert reports 
contain the same information required under the corollary provision of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).  Accordingly, in addition to stating 
the expert witness’s opinions and the basis and reasons for them, the report 
also must state the qualifications of the witness (including a list of all 
publications authored by the expert within the prior 10 years), a list of cases 
                                                     
749  TAX CT. R. 143(g)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (introduced as TAX CT. R. 143(f)(1), 
79 T.C. 1134–35 (1979)).  The opposing party would be unduly prejudiced if his 
ability to cross-examine the expert was “significantly impaired” or if the opposing 
party was denied the “reasonable opportunity” to obtain rebuttal testimony.  Id.  In 
1989, the court increased the number of days before the call of the trial calendar 
that a party is required to submit an expert witness report to the court and other 
parties from 15 to 30, finding that the prior 15-day period did not afford sufficient 
time for thorough consideration of the report.  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 
143(f)(1), 93 T.C. 954 (1989).  The court anticipated that the additional time for 
consideration of an expert report by the opposing party would occasion additional 
settlements.  Id.   
750  TAX CT. R. 143(g)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (introduced as TAX CT. R. 143(f)(1), 
79 T.C. 1134–35 (1979)).  
751  See Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman of Committee on Court 
Procedure, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson, July 1, 1985, filed at U.S. 
Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (expressing views of individual 
members on proposed amendments to the rules of the Tax Court). 
752  Id. at 10–11. 
753  Id. at 13. 
754  Id. at 8. 
755  Id. at 11. 
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in which the witness has testified at deposition or at trial in the prior four 
years, and a statement of the compensation to the witness.756  The 2012 
revisions also followed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) by 
introducing Rule 70(c)(3), which protects from discovery drafts of expert 
witness reports as well as communications between counsel and the expert 
witness.757  
 
b. Depositions of Expert Witnesses 
 
As previously noted, the Tax Court discovery procedures as originally 
adopted and as amended in 1979 and 1986 afforded limited opportunity 
insofar as concerned expert witnesses.  With nonconsensual discovery and 
compelled exchange of information circumscribed by the restrictions of 
Rules 71(d) and 143, depositions of expert witnesses were potentially 
available to litigants only upon consent through the vehicle of Rule 74.758  
In light of that situation, some members of the bar urged the Tax Court to 
expand its discovery provisions to permit nonconsensual depositions of 
expert witnesses.759  Proponents argued that deposing an expert witness 
could reveal weaknesses in some experts’ testimony and thus lead to more 
settlements, while opponents emphasized their concern that increased costs 
and burdens on the parties and the court would outweigh the small number 
of increased settlements.760   
By 1989, the court’s experience suggested that the time had come to 
permit depositions of expert witnesses, on both a consensual and a 
nonconsensual basis.761  To that end, the court adopted Rule 76 effective 
July 1, 1990, stating in the accompanying note:  “It is expected that such 
depositions will not only enhance trial preparation and hence the 
                                                     
756   TAX CT. R. 143(g)(1) and accompanying Rules Comm. Note, 139 T.C. 552–
55 (2012).   
757  TAX CT. R. 70(c)(4) and accompanying Rules Comm. Note, 139 T.C. 534–39 
(2012).   
758   See Estate of Van Loben v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 64 (1984) (establishing 
the inapplicability of Rule 75 as a basis for compulsory depositions of expert 
witnesses); Howe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-213, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 
(distinguishing Rules 74 and 75 in connection with depositions of expert witnesses).    
759   See Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman of Committee on Court 
Procedure, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson,  July 1, 1985, filed at 
U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (expressing views of individual 
members on proposed amendments to rules of the Tax Court); Letter from Judge 
Simpson to Professor Harold Dubroff, supra note 658 (commenting on Professor 
Dubroff’s proposed chapter on amendments of the Tax Court rules). 
760   See Letter from Judge Simpson to Professor Harold Dubroff, supra at 658; 
Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman of Committee on Court Procedure, A.B.A. 
Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson, supra at 759. 
761   See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 76, 93 T.C. 910–911 (1989).  
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presentation of the evidence at trial, but will also increase the number of 
settlements in cases requiring the assistance of experts.”762  Rule 76(a)(1) 
made explicit that depositions of an expert witness upon consent of all 
parties to a case were available and would be governed by Rule 74.763  Rule 
76(a)(2) then proceeded to authorize the deposition of an expert witness 
without consent of all parties, but only pursuant to an order of the court as 
“an extraordinary method of discovery.”764  The balance of the rule set 
forth the conditions to frame its use.   The scope of depositions under the 
rule is limited to the expert’s training and to matters pertaining to the 
opinion being offered in his or her capacity as an expert.765  Timing mirrors 
the more restrictive provisions governing non-consensual depositions in 
that depositions of expert witnesses may be taken only after a notice of trial 
has been issued or after a case has been assigned to a judge or special trial 
judge and within the time for completion of discovery under Rule 
70(a)(2).766  In general, the party desiring to depose an expert witness files a 
detailed written motion with the court and serves a copy on the expert 
witness and each other party.767  Any objection or other response to the 
motion must be filed with the court within 15 days of service of the 
motion.768  A disposition by order will follow, with or without hearing, 
specifying the parameters for conduct of the deposition and directing the 
witness to appear at the time, place, and date designated therein.769    
Alternatively, the court may take action sua sponte to order the taking of 
the deposition of an expert witness, without the predicate of a motion by a 
party.770  The rule also addresses allocation of associated expenses, generally 
placing the burden on the party taking the deposition absent stipulation to 
the contrary.771  The expense provision applies to expert depositions under 
                                                     
762   Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 76, 93 T.C. 911.    
763  The provisions governing the consensual deposition of an expert witness 
are now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
764  The provisions governing the non-consensual deposition of an expert 
witness are now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(1), (4) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
765   TAX CT. R. 76(b) and accompanying Rules Comm. Note, 93 T.C. 911 
(1989) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(A) (July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
766   TAX CT. R. 76(c) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
767   TAX CT. R. 76(d)(1), (2) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(B)(i) (July 6, 
2012 ed.)). 
768   TAX CT. R. 76(d)(3) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(B)(ii) (July 6, 
2012 ed.)).   
769   TAX CT. R. 76(d)(3) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(B)(ii) (July 6, 
2012 ed.)). 
770   TAX CT. R. 76(f) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(C) (July 6, 2012 ed.)).   
771  TAX CT. R. 76(g) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 74(c)(4)(D) (July 6, 2012 
ed.)).   
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both Rule 74 and 76, as does a further provision governing use of expert 
depositions for purposes other than discovery.772   
  
4. Restructuring and Expansion of Deposition Procedures 
 
 The court significantly modified the procedures governing depositions 
for discovery purposes by merging existing Rules 74, 75, and 76 into a 
single new and expanded Rule 74.  The revised Rule 74 became effective 
January 1, 2010.  As highlighted in the accompanying note of the Rules 
Committee, the restructuring was undertaken “to improve clarity, eliminate 
redundancies, and streamline the Court’s Rules.  New Rule 74 contains 
provisions governing all depositions that may be taken for discovery 
purposes in Tax Court proceedings.”773  As revised, Rule 74 is structured in 
five principal paragraphs.  Paragraph (a) outlines the general framework of 
the rule, providing a roadmap for its use.  Paragraph (b) then covers 
depositions upon consent of the parties, essentially incorporating the 
operative text of the prior version of Rule 74.  Paragraph (c) governs 
depositions without consent of the parties and is subdivided to address 
nonconsensual depositions of nonparty witnesses, of party witnesses, and 
of expert witnesses.  The provisions directed to nonparty witnesses and to 
expert witnesses parallel those of former Rules 75 and 76, respectively.    
Paragraph (d) reprises the other potential uses of expert witness 
depositions, another feature of the former Rule 76.  The final two 
paragraphs (e) and (f) set forth general and administrative provisions 
broadly applicable to all discovery depositions. 
 From a substantive perspective, the revised Rule 74 amended the 
existing authorization for discovery depositions to provide that a party 
could move to take the deposition of another party to the proceeding 
without that party’s consent.774  Additionally, the court, in exercise of its 
discretion, now may order the deposition of a party sua sponte.775  Like 
other forms of nonconsensual depositions, the authorization to depose a 
party to the proceeding absent consent was characterized as an 
“extraordinary method of discovery,” available only where information 
discoverable under Rule 70(b) cannot be obtained through informal 
communications or other means of discovery.776  
 
                                                     
772  TAX CT. R. 76(e), (g); see also Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 76, 93 T.C. 
910–913.  
773  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 74, 134 T.C. 337 (2010).   
774  See Tax Ct. R. 74(c)(3) (July 6, 2012 ed.); Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 74, 
134 T.C. 337 (2010).   
775  Id.   
776  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 74, 134 T.C. 337 (2010); see also TAX CT. R. 
74(c)(1)(B) (July 6, 2012 ed.).    
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5. Limitations on the Use of Interrogatories 
 
In 2009, in an effort to more closely align the Tax Court’s pretrial 
discovery procedures with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court 
revised Rule 71(a) to conform with Federal Rule 33(a).777  Beginning in 
2010, a party to a Tax Court proceeding generally is limited to serving on 
another party 25 written interrogatories, including discrete subparts.778  
Interrogatories served on expert witnesses in accordance with Rule 71(d) 
are exempt from this general limitation.779 
Prior to the adoption of this change, there existed no presumptive limit 
on the number of written interrogatories a party could serve on another.780  
The court perceived that a limit on written interrogatories should (1) 
encourage parties to exchange information without resorting to 
interrogatories, (2) improve the efficiency of the interrogatory process, and 
(3) permit the court to have greater discretion over the use of 
interrogatories.781   
The limit is not intended to inhibit necessary discovery; therefore, the 
limit may be exceeded either by agreement of the parties or judicial 
intervention.782  The court may grant a party’s motion for leave to serve 
additional interrogatories provided that such grant does not run afoul of 
Rule 70(b)(2).  The court will consider whether (1) the request is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or the information sought is 
obtainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive, (2) the party seeking additional interrogatories has had 
ample opportunity by discovery to obtain the information sought, and (3) 
the interrogatories are unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake.783 
 
6. Sanctions for Discovery Abuse 
 
The Tax Court has generally insisted on compliance with its Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and has rendered decisions and orders against 
                                                     
777  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 71, 134 T.C. 324 (2010). 
778 Id. at 325.  The rule does not define a “discrete subpart.”  The Advisory 
Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a) provide guidance on 
how interrogatories are to be counted. 
779  TAX CT. R. 71(a), (d) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
780  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 71, 134 T.C. 324 (2010). 
781  Id. 
782  Id. 
783  Id. at 325. 
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noncomplying parties in numerous cases.784  The Tax Court rules provide 
various sanctions for failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders.785  
These rules are modeled on similar provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,786 and when the Tax Court interprets its discovery rules, it 
generally looks to federal court decisions interpreting the Federal Rules for 
guidance.787 
 
a. Sanctions for Noncompliance with Court Order 
 
After it has been determined that a party has failed to comply with a 
discovery order of the court, sanctions under Rule 104(c) are appropriate.788  
Dismissal of the action is one of the most severe sanctions available under 
                                                     
784  See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 105, 111 (1984); Odend’hal v. 
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 400, 404 (1980); International Air Conditioning Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 89, 92–93 (1976); Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 
T.C. 691, 692 (1974). 
785  The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provide sanctions against 
parties who fail to obey a Tax Court discovery order.  In such cases, the court may 
(1) treat the matter to which the order relates as being established; (2) refuse to 
allow the disobedient party to support designated claims or defenses or prevent 
particular matters from being introduced into evidence; (3) strike a pleading, render 
a judgment by default, or dismiss the case of the disobedient party; and/or (4) hold 
the disobedient party in contempt and award fees and expenses.  TAX CT. R. 104(c) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.).  Rule 104(b) allows a party to make a motion to the court to 
compel a party to answer, respond, or comply with a discovery request.  TAX CT. R. 
104(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  The Tax Court may also invoke Rule 123 to dismiss a 
case against a petitioner who fails to prosecute, fails to comply with Tax Court rules 
or an order of the court, “or for other cause which the Court deems sufficient.”  
TAX CT. R. 123(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see, e.g., Levy v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 794 
(1986) (dismissing case under Rule 123(b) for failure to prosecute when petitioners 
never stipulated any facts or prepared for trial, despite the court’s warnings); 
Freedson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 931 (1977), aff’d, 565 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(dismissing case under Rule 123(b) in light of petitioners’ bad faith and dilatory 
tactics). 
786  Tax Court Rule 104(a) is adapted from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(d).  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 104(a), 60 T.C. 1124 (1973).  Tax Court 
Rule 104(c) is derived from Federal Rule 37(b)(2).  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. 
R. 104(c), 60 T.C. 1124 (1973). 
787  See Dusha v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 592 (1984); Rosenfeld v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 105, 116–17, 120 (1984); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 493, 495–99 (1981); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 469, 
473–74 (1979); Freedson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 931, 935–38 (1977), aff’d, 565 
F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978). 
788  TAX CT. R. 104(c), 79 T.C. 1144–45 (1982), amended by 85 T.C. 1132–33 
(1985). 
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either the Tax Court rules or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.789  In 
construing Federal Rule 37(b)(2), the counterpart of Tax Court Rule 
104(c)(3), the Supreme Court has held that dismissal is improper if the 
party’s “failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, 
bad faith, or any fault of [the party].”790  Prior to 1984, only one case, Fox v. 
Commissioner,791 applied this standard for dismissal of cases under Tax Court 
Rule 104(c)(3).792 
In Fox, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Tax Court’s 
dismissal of the taxpayer’s petitions for failure to comply with the court’s 
discovery order.793  In so doing, the court interpreted Rule 104(c)(3) to 
preclude dismissal as a discovery sanction unless the failure to comply was 
(1) willful and in bad faith, and (2) there was a total failure to respond.794 
Some Tax Court judges saw these conditions for dismissal as “almost 
impossible . . . to satisfy” in most cases, even those that obviously should 
be dismissed.795  The “total” failure to respond requirement was viewed by 
those judges as particularly “unwarranted.”796  They believed that, in some 
cases, a party might answer several discovery requests but fail to respond to 
the most significant requests that go to the “very heart of the case.”797  For 
example, a taxpayer who supplied “any requested information, such as his 
taxpayer identification number,”798 might avoid dismissal under so strict a 
                                                     
789  Dusha, 82 T.C. at 599, 605–06.  The authority of the court to deem matters 
admitted if not denied under Rule 90(c) can also be a severe sanction.  See TAX CT. 
R. 90(c), 85 T.C. 1129–30 (1985).  See, e.g., Krock v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1986-580, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1146 (petitioner’s failure to answer admission requests 
resulted in admission of facts sufficient to satisfy Service’s burden of proof on issue 
of fraud). 
790  Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958). 
791  718 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1983). 
792  Id. 
793  Id. at 256.  In Fox, the Service sought an order compelling the petitioners to 
answer its interrogatories and an order compelling the production of documents.  
Id. at 253.  The court granted the motion after a hearing at which neither 
petitioners nor their counsel appeared.  After the petitioners continued to refuse to 
comply with the court’s order and with the Service’s discovery requests, the Service 
moved for dismissal of the petitions, and after a hearing at which, again, neither the 
petitioners nor their counsel appeared, the motion for dismissal was granted.  Id. 
794  Id. at 255. 
795  Memorandum from Judge Raum to Judge Simpson 1, Nov. 22, 1983, filed 
at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Discovery” (discussing the desirability of 
amending the Tax Court Rules to overcome the effect of the Fox decision). 
796  Id. 
797  Id. 
798  Memorandum from Chief Judge Dawson, to Judges, Senior Judges, and 
Special Trial Judges 1, Jan. 19, 1984, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: 
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standard.799  In these situations, most Tax Court judges probably would 
agree that it should not be necessary to find a complete failure to respond 
in order to dismiss.800 
In a memorandum to Tax Court judges circulated shortly after Fox, 
Chief Judge Dawson suggested that the judges might wish to limit that 
decision as precedent and rely on other cases interpreting the Federal Rules 
analogous to Tax Court rules, which upheld the dismissal of a case, even if 
there was not a total failure of compliance with a discovery order.801  
Although some judges recommended amending the Tax Court rules to 
make it clear that a “deliberate” failure to respond or a “total” failure to 
respond was not required before imposing sanctions under Rule l04(c)(3),802 
no such amendments were adopted; instead, the court employed the timely 
opportunity provided by Dusha v. Commissioner803 to limit the Fox decision as 
precedent. 
In Dusha, an opinion reviewed in conference, the court dismissed the 
case of a petitioner who refused to comply with a discovery request and a 
Tax Court discovery order on the grounds that the information sought by 
the respondent was not in his “individual possession, custody, or control.”804  
The court explained that “[g]iven the nature of the information sought by 
respondent—petitioner’s tax returns, bank accounts,” as well as the 
petitioner’s employment and compensation—the petitioner’s refusal to 
comply was willful and in bad faith.805  Of no small significance was the 
court’s previous consideration and rejection of the petitioner’s claims, 
arguments he insisted on repeating despite the court’s warning that the 
arguments were frivolous.806 
In dismissing Dusha,807 the court discussed the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Fox, earlier decisions in the Seventh Circuit, and decisions of other circuit 
courts and concluded that Fox failed to distinguish between Tax Court 
                                                                                                                       
Discovery” (emphasis in original) (discussing the effect of Fox v. Commissioner, 
718 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
799  Id. 
800  See Memorandum from Judge Raum to Judge Simpson, supra note 795, at 2. 
801  Memorandum from Chief Judge Dawson, to Judges, Senior Judges, and 
Special Trial Judges, supra note 798, at 2–3. 
802  See Memorandum from Judge Raum to Judge Simpson, supra note 795, at 1–
2. 
803  82 T.C. 592 (1984). 
804  Id. at 596 (emphasis in original). 
805  Id. at 607.  
806  Id. at 608.  The Tax Court may impose damages of up to $25,000 under 
§ 6673 against taxpayers who assert frivolous arguments in defiance of Tax Court 
orders.  See Part X.D.   
807  82 T.C. 592 (1984). 
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Rules 104(a) and 104(c).808  Under Rule 104(a) and its counterpart, Federal 
Rule 37(d), a complete failure to respond to a discovery request is necessary 
before the imposition of any sanctions.809  On the other hand, Federal 
district courts had not permitted “minimal compliance”810 to bar dismissal 
under Federal Rule 37(b)(2); similarly, the Tax Court refused to allow partial 
compliance to preclude dismissal of an action under Rule 104(c)(3).811 
The distinction drawn in Dusha was justified by the different situations 
to which the rules were addressed.  Tax Court Rule 104(c)(3) and Federal 
Rule 37(b)(2) provide for the imposition of sanctions only if a party has 
failed to comply with a discovery order issued by the court; in contrast, Tax 
Court Rule 104(a) and Federal Rule 37(d) provide for the imposition of 
sanctions in any case in which a party fails to attend a deposition, answer 
interrogatories, or respond to requests for inspection, whether or not a 
court order has been issued.812 
Although conceding its distinction might be nothing more than 
“quibbling over a simple matter of semantics,”813 the court in Dusha also 
disagreed with the requirement established by the court in Fox that 
noncompliance “be both willful and in bad faith.”814  The standard 
articulated by the Supreme Court and applied by the Tax Court in Dusha 
requires only “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault.”815  The court recognized 
that “dismissal is a sanction of last resort, not to be used 
indiscriminately,”816 but explained that “here, as in other areas of the law, 
the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule 
must be available to the [trial] court in appropriate cases, not merely to 
penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, 
but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of 
                                                     
808  Id. at 601; see Memorandum from Chief Judge Dawson, to Judges, Senior 
Judges, and Special Trial Judges, supra note 798; Memorandum from Joanne 
Hickcox to Judge Simpson 23, Dec. 6, 1983, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Discovery” (analyzing the Fox decision and its relation to discovery 
requests and court orders). 
809  Dusha, 82 T.C. at 604.  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 104, 60 T.C. 
1124 (1973) (stating that paragraph (a) of Rule 104 is adapted from Rule 37(d) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
810  Dusha, 82 T.C. at 604. 
811  Id. 
812  Id. at 602–04.  Compare TAX CT. R. 104(a), 79 T.C. 1144 (1982), with FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(d); compare TAX CT. R. 104(c)(3), 79 T.C. 1145 (1982), with FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37(b)(2)(C) (essential elements substantially identical). 
813  82 T.C. at 605. 
814  Id. (emphasis in original). 
815  Id. 
816  Id. 
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such a deterrent.”817  The court has consistently adhered to the standard 
enunciated in Dusha.818 
 
b. Expanded Procedures for Deterring Discovery Abuse 
 
The Tax Court has proceeded cautiously in introducing and expanding 
the use of pretrial discovery and has repeatedly emphasized that formal 
pretrial discovery should not interfere with informal communication 
between the parties which can lead to stipulations and settlements.  In 1985, 
the court strengthened its stance with rule amendments that permit it to 
limit unreasonable discovery, as well as to impose sanctions upon counsel 
who attempt to use discovery procedures for improper purposes.   
Rule 70(b)(2), as amended in 1985, permits the court to limit discovery if 
(1) it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” or if the information is 
readily obtainable from another source, (2) the party has already had “ample 
opportunity . . . to obtain the information sought,” or (3) “the discovery is 
unduly burdensome or expensive.”819  This amendment followed a similar 
revision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,820 which was intended to 
“guard against discovery that is redundant or disproportionate to the 
amount of money or the importance of the issues at stake.”821  In limiting 
                                                     
817  Id. at 605–06 (quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey 
Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)).  The court stated that “dismissal is inappropriate 
where the litigant’s failure to comply with the Court’s order is based upon the 
proper exercise of a recognized privilege, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.”  Id. at 606.  The assertion of the Fifth Amendment, 
however, must be based upon a possible danger of incrimination and not just used 
as a “blanket refusal.”  Id.  Thus, the petitioner’s repetition of self-incrimination 
arguments that were held to be frivolous at the hearing on the request for a 
discovery order justified dismissal.  Id. at 606, 608. 
818  See, e.g., Delaney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-73, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 
777, 779; Kuhn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-638, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 265, 
267; Romano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-568, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472, 
1474; Figura v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-567, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1469, 
1471; Wedeking v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-530, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 
1286.  In addition to being subject to Rule 104 sanctions, parties failing to comply 
with an order of the Tax Court may also be subject to damages of up to $25,000 
under § 6673.  See Part X.D (discussing development of the § 6673 penalty). 
819  TAX CT. R. 70(b)(2), 85 T.C. 1127 (1985).  Following a restructuring of Rule 
70 in 2012, these provisions are now contained in TAX CT. R. 70(c)(1) (July 6, 2012 
ed.).  See TAX CT. R. 70 and accompanying Rules Comm. Note, 139 T.C. 534 
(2012).   
820  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
821  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70, 85 T.C. 1128 (1985). 
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discovery under Rule 70(b)(2), the court may act on its own initiative or 
pursuant to a motion under Rule 103.822 
The Rule 70(b)(2) amendment had the support of the tax bar,823 but the 
Service expressed concern as to how the court would interpret the rule’s 
limitations on discovery.824  The Service urged that the restrictions on 
discovery be confined to the litigation stage, so that the court would not 
deny otherwise reasonable discovery requests on the grounds that the 
information sought might have been obtained “more conveniently or less 
expensively” during the administrative process.825  Perhaps in reaction to 
the perception that the Service was using discovery as a substitute for 
inadequate audits, the court declined to adopt the Service’s suggestion.826 
To further encourage parties to reduce discovery-related controversies, 
Rules 70(e) and 90(d) were also amended in 1985 to require that every 
discovery and admission request, response, or objection be signed by 
counsel, or by the party, if unrepresented.827  The court hoped that these 
changes would deter both excessive discovery and resistance to reasonable 
discovery requests.828 
The signature of counsel or the party certifies that the discovery request, 
response, or objection is made in good faith and not for any improper 
                                                     
822  TAX CT. R. 70(b)(2), 85 T.C. 1127 (1985) (now reflected in TAX CT. R. 
70(c)(1) (July 6, 2012 ed.)). 
823  See Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman of Committee on Court 
Procedure, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, to Judge Simpson, supra note 759, at 5–6. 
824  See Letter from Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Chief Counsel for Internal Revenue 
Service, to Judge Simpson 2, June 24, 1985, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Discovery.” 
825  Id. 
826  See Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1329 (1986).  In Durkin, the Tax 
Court quashed portions of a subpoena duces tecum in which the Service sought 
books and records of several non-parties who were only indirectly involved in the 
transactions at issue.  Id. at 1401–03.  The court refused to support the Service’s 
subpoena on the grounds that “the requests were overly burdensome compared to 
their probative value.”  Id. at 1401.  The court noted the apparent inadequate trial 
preparation by the Service and stated that “[t]he processes of this Court are simply 
not designed to be used to conduct a thorough investigation of a complex tax 
case.”  Id. at 1403. 
827  TAX CT. R. 70(e), 90(d), 85 T.C. 1127–28, 1130–31 (1985).  Following a 
restructuring of Rule 70 in 2012, Rule 70(e) is now designated as Rule 70(f).  See 
Rules Comm.  Note, TAX CT. R. 70, 139 T.C. 539 (2012).   
828  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 70, 85 T.C. 1128–29 (1985); Rules Comm. 
Note, TAX CT. R. 90, 85 T.C. 1132 (1985). 
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purpose, such as delay of the litigation.829  If a certification is made in 
violation of this requirement, the court, upon motion or sua sponte, has the 
power to order a party or its counsel to pay resulting expenses as well as 
reasonable counsel fees to the other party.830  Similar provisions allowing 
the court to levy costs and attorneys’ fees on a party who submits a 
frivolous pleading or violates a court order were incorporated into Rules 
33(b) and 104(c)(4).831  
One judge recognized that sanctions historically imposed by the Tax 
Court such as “exclusion of evidence, deeming facts admitted, and dismissal 
of actions, often penalize the party when the real culprit is the counsel.”832  
Thus, the court has altered its focus, placing the responsibility on counsel to 
act in good faith and indicating that sanctions will be imposed on counsel 
for violating this responsibility.833 
 
H. Case Management Procedures 
 
1. Joint Motion for Assignment of a Judge 
 
The Tax Court permits parties in complex cases to jointly move the 
court to assign the case to a judge, before it is set for trial, if the parties 
believe the case cannot be conveniently tried on a regularly scheduled trial 
calendar.834  The court expects that a joint motion for assignment of a case 
will be filed as soon as feasible after the case is at issue (i.e., the pleadings 
are closed) and should briefly set out the most significant issue(s), the 
amount in controversy, the requested place of trial, and any other relevant 
information the parties wish to bring to the court’s attention.  
 
2. Motions Practice 
 
The Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that “an 
application to the Court for an order shall be by motion in writing, which 
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor and shall set forth the 
                                                     
829  TAX CT. R. 70(e), 90(d), 85 T.C. 1127–28, 1130–31 (1985). Following a 
restructuring of Rule 70 in 2012, this aspect of Rule 70 is now designated as Rule 
70(f)(1). 
830  TAX CT. R. 70(e)(2), 90(d)(2), 85 T.C. 1128, 1131 (1985).  Following a 
restructuring of Rule 70 in 2012, this aspect of Rule 70 is now designated as Rule 
70(f)(2).   
831  TAX CT. R. 33(b), 104(c)(4), 85 T.C. 1125–26, 1132–33 (1985). 
832  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 730, 
at 4.  
833 Id. at 4–5. 
834 See Press Release, United States Tax Court, Oct. 19, 1990 (issued by Chief 
Judge Arthur L. Nims, III). 
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relief or order sought.”835  The court may in its discretion dispose of a 
motion with or without directing that a written response be filed and with 
or without a hearing.836   
If a hearing is set, the matter may be heard in Washington, D.C., or at 
some other location (such as the requested place of trial) which serves the 
convenience of the parties and the court.837  Historically, motions generally 
were heard in Washington, D.C.  In more recent years, motions are set for 
hearing at trial sessions in the city requested as the place of trial.  In 2010, 
the court confirmed this change in practice by amending Rule 50(b)(2) to 
modify the phrase that hearings on motions “normally will be held in 
Washington, D.C.” to read that hearings “may be held in Washington, 
D.C.”838 
The Rule change was accompanied by a change in court practices 
regarding Washington, D.C. motions sessions.  Prior to 2010, motions on 
cases in the general docket (i.e., cases not yet calendared for trial) generally 
were calendared for hearing at a motions session in Washington, D.C.  
Beginning in 2010, general docket motions are screened internally by 
judges, set for hearing in the place of trial requested by the petitioner if 
factual testimony appears to be needed, or decided based upon the written 
submissions of the parties if factual testimony is not needed.  Contrary to 
the historic practice, general docket motions are rarely calendared for 
hearing in Washington D.C.   
If the motion is set for hearing, a party to the motion may, before or at 
the time of the hearing, submit a written statement (commonly referred to 
as “a Rule 50(c) statement”) explaining the party’s position together with 
supporting documents, and such statement may be submitted in lieu of or 
in addition to attendance at the hearing.839  
 
3. Calendaring Cases for Trial 
 
The court normally sets a case for trial after the Commissioner files an 
answer to the petition.840  The court holds trial sessions in 74 cities, setting 
numerous trial sessions each year in larger cities such as Los Angeles and 
New York.  The court schedules at least one trial session per year in smaller 
cities.   
                                                     
835 TAX CT. R. 50(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
836 TAX CT. R. 50(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
837 TAX CT. R. 50(b)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
838 Id. (emphasis added); see also Rules Comm. Note, 136 T.C. 612. 
839 TAX CT. R. 50(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
840  A case normally is eligible to be set for trial after the answer is filed and any 
motions have either been disposed of or are ripe for hearing at the trial session. 
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The court schedules one-week or two-week trial sessions depending on 
the number of cases ready for trial in a particular city and other scheduling 
restraints.  Until 1984, cases were calendared for trial after the parties filed 
status reports stating that they were ready for trial.  Under this practice, 
some cases were not set for trial for several years.  In 1985, in response to a 
dramatic increase in the number of case filings, the court began to expedite 
the process by automatically calendaring all cases for trial after the answer 
to the petition was filed. 
Before 2008, the court calendared up to 75 regular cases and 100 small 
tax cases per week of trial session.  Beginning with the Spring 2009 term, 
the maximum number of regular cases per week of session was increased to 
100 and the number of small tax cases per week of session was increased to 
125. 
The court issues a Notice Setting Case For Trial (trial notice) to the 
parties five months before the trial session is scheduled to begin.841  The 
five-month period is intended to give the parties ample opportunity to 
engage in settlement discussions and to prepare for trial.  The trial notice 
includes the date and time for the calendar call and the courthouse address 
and courtroom number for the trial session.  Calendar calls normally begin 
on Monday morning at 10:00 A.M.  In addition to informing the parties 
that they are expected to be present and prepared for trial at the time of the 
calendar call, the trial notice is accompanied by a Standing Pretrial Order 
for regular tax cases842 and a Standing Pretrial Notice for small tax cases.843   
 
4. Standing Pretrial Order and Pretrial Memorandum 
 
The Standing Pretrial Order has emerged as a central tool of case load 
management, one that defines the contours of pretrial practice before the 
Tax Court.  The order is the culmination of the practice of many Tax Court 
judges who had established a practice of causing to be included in the 
“notice setting case for trial” (notice of trial) a memorandum from the court 
clerk describing the matters that the judge assigned to the calendar wished 
the parties to consider prior to trial.844  As time progressed, some judges, 
becoming convinced that a judge-signed order would be more effective 
                                                     
841 Before 2007, the notice setting small tax cases for trial was sent three 
months before the trial session was scheduled to begin. 
842  The contents of the Standing Pretrial Order are discussed in detail below in 
Section H.4. of this Part. 
843  The contents of the Standing Pretrial Notice are discussed in detail below in 
Section H.5. of this Part.  In small tax cases in which the taxpayer is not 
represented by counsel, the court also sends a “stuffer” notice that provides 
information about low-income taxpayer clinics operating in the city where the trial 
will be held.  The stuffer notice program is described in Part XIII.B.2. 
844  Id. 
Pretrial Procedure                                      659 
 
 
than a memorandum from the clerk, began to substitute such orders for the 
clerk’s memorandum.845  Eventually, the Standing Pretrial Order evolved. 
The Standing Pretrial Order is a device which seeks to encourage 
settlement negotiations and enhance the efficient management of cases 
which are ultimately tried.846  This is accomplished by requiring the parties 
to meet prior to trial to prepare a stipulation and to file a report before trial 
that sets forth the parties, the issues, the witnesses, and a summary of the 
facts and legal issues in the case.847  Originally, not all Tax Court judges 
were convinced of the utility of the Standing Pretrial Order.848  In the past, 
orders issued by the different judges followed no standard pattern.849  
Apparently, the Tax Court has been reluctant to interfere in the case 
management styles of individual judges by incorporating a standard order 
into the Rules of Practice and Procedure or otherwise requiring adoption of 
a uniform order.850 
Nonetheless, some judges encouraged the court to adopt a uniform 
Standing Pretrial Order.851  Although the effect of the Standing Pretrial 
Order was difficult to measure, the judges who used the order were 
convinced that its benefits in providing for orderly case management 
outweighed the additional burdens on the judges.852  Moreover, some 
believed that the increased burden placed on the parties by the Standing 
Pretrial Order, particularly on the attorneys in the Office of the Chief 
Counsel, would be eased if a standard order was used.853 
In response to these concerns, Judge Mary Ann Cohen chaired an ad 
hoc committee investigating the practicality of the Tax Court’s adoption of 
a standard Standing Pretrial Order.854  Subsequently, on March 11, 1988, the 
Tax Court adopted a uniform order to be used during regularly scheduled 
trial sessions pending before regular and senior Tax Court judges.855  In 
                                                     
845  Id. 
846  See Sterrett, The U.S. Tax Court: Innovation and New Procedures Help in Managing 
Over 70,000 Cases, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 120, 123 (1986). 
847  Id. at 122–23. 
848  Id. at 123. 
849  Id. 
850  See Meade Whitaker, Some Thoughts on Current Tax Practice, 7 VA. TAX REV. 
421, 426 (1988). 
851  See Memorandum from Robert Armen, Deputy Counsel to Chief Judge, to 
Chief Judge Sterrett, Mar. 24, 1988, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: 
Tax Court Inventory.” 
852 See Whitaker, supra note 850, at 426. 
853 Id. at 423 n.7. 
854 See Memorandum from Robert Armen, Deputy Counsel to Chief Judge, to 
Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 850. 
855 See id. The Standing Pretrial Order is not incorporated in the Tax Court 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, and individual judges who use it may adopt 
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1990, the Tax Court amended what is now Rule 131 to include a new 
paragraph (b) to recognize the regular practice of including a pretrial order 
with the notice of trial.856  In describing the rule amendment, the court 
noted that the pretrial order was designed “to facilitate the orderly and 
efficient disposition of all cases on a trial calendar,” while warning that the 
failure to comply with the directives in the order could subject a party or 
party’s counsel to sanctions.857  
The Standing Pretrial Order is attached to the Notice of Trial and 
informs parties of their responsibilities and of possible sanctions in the 
event of noncompliance.858  The Order requires the parties to “begin 
discussing settlement and/or preparation of a stipulation of facts as soon as 
practicable.”859  The “soon as practicable” time specification is a departure 
from prior orders adopted on an individual basis, which typically placed a 
more certain limitation on the time within which parties should begin 
discussions.860  The more flexible time period incorporated into the 
standard order may have been a concession to those judges who were 
concerned that a rigid time period would lead to unnecessary judicial 
involvement, because of motions for sanctions and the like. 
The Standing Pretrial Order provides that “[v]aluation cases and 
reasonable compensation cases are generally susceptible of settlement, and 
the Court expects the parties to negotiate in good faith with this goal in 
mind.”861  The court encourages settlement of these cases because “a 
settlement by the parties usually results in a better decision at a much earlier 
date.”862 The court also expects a settlement of all minor issues so that 
judicial attention can be focused on issues worthy of the court’s scrutiny.863 
                                                                                                                       
variations as they see fit.  For example, some judges may request additional 
information from the parties, such as that required by the Joint Case Status Report.  
See Whitaker, supra note 850, at 424.  The Status Report identifies whether a case 
will probably or definitely go to trial, and estimates the length of the trial.  See id. at 
424 n.11. 
The current Standing Pretrial Order adopted by the Tax Court appears in 
Appendix E; see also Whitaker, supra note850, at 445 (providing an early sample 
standing pretrial order). 
856 TAX CT. R. 131(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (originally introduced as TAX CT. R. 
132(b), 93 T.C. 946 (1990)); see also Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 132, 93 T.C. 
947 (1990).  
857 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 132, 93 T.C. 947 (1990).  
858 See Whitaker, supra note 850, at 422–23. 
859 See Appendix E (Standing Pretrial Order). 
860 See id.; see also Whitaker, supra note 850, at 445–46 app. A (for a sample 
Standing Pretrial Order requiring discussion to begin within 20 days). 
861 See Appendix E (Standing Pretrial Order). 
862 See Whitaker, supra note 850, at 435. 
863 See Whitaker, supra note 850, at 445–46 app. A. 
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The parties are forewarned in the Standing Pretrial Order that 
non-compliance can lead to sanctions, including dismissal of the case of the 
non-complying party.  Continuances will only be granted for good reason, 
even those requested upon joint motion. 
The standardized Order requires that the parties stipulate all facts to the 
maximum extent possible.  All documents and written evidence must be 
marked and stipulated in accordance with Rule 91(b), unless such evidence 
is to be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.  Any non-stipulated 
documents which a party expects to use at trial (for purposes other than 
impeachment) must be identified in writing and exchanged by the parties no 
later than 14 days prior to the first day of the scheduled trial session.  
Failure to comply with the stipulation or the exchange requirement may 
result in the court’s refusal to receive the documents into evidence. 
A significant element of the Standing Pretrial Order is its requirement 
that a Pretrial Memorandum be prepared by each party in all cases in which 
a “basis of settlement” has not been reached.864  The Pretrial Memorandum 
must be submitted to the court and the opposing party no less than 14 days 
before the first day of trial session.865  The memorandum requires the 
parties to identify any witnesses expected to testify and to include a brief 
summary of their anticipated testimony.  Witnesses not so identified will 
not be allowed to testify at trial without leave of court.  As previously 
discussed, expert witnesses must prepare a written report that must be 
submitted to the judge and served on the other parties at least 30 days prior 
to the first day of trial session.866  Failure to comply with this requirement 
may result in the exclusion of the expert’s testimony.867 
The Pretrial Memorandum must also include a summary of the facts of 
the case and a brief synopsis of applicable legal authorities, as well as any 
evidentiary problems expected to be encountered. By forcing the parties to 
focus on the issues, marshal the evidence, and articulate their arguments, 
the Pretrial Memorandum seeks to increase the possibility of settlement and 
to decrease the possibility that some significant aspect of the case may be 
                                                     
864 See Standing Pretrial Order, ¶ 3.  The form Pretrial Memorandum adopted 
by the U.S. Tax Court is attached to the Standard Pretrial Order. 
865  On June 4, 2010, the court began requiring that the Pretrial Memorandum, 
which previously had been submitted to the trial judge, instead be submitted to the 
Clerk’s Office for filing in all cases.  Previously filing was discretionary with the 
judge.  This change ensures retention of the Pretrial Memorandum conforms Tax 
Court procedures with those of other federal courts.. 
866 See Standing Pretrial Order, ¶ 6.  The Standing Pretrial Order, in this regard, 
reflects the requirements of Rule 143(g), to which it refers.  
867 See TAX CT. R. 143(g)(2) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
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overlooked.868  Even if the Standing Pretrial Order does not lead to the 
settlement of a particular case, it may nonetheless result in the more 
efficient use of trial time.869 
If the parties reach a basis for settlement prior to trial, the Standing 
Pretrial Order requires that they submit a stipulated decision to the court 
before the first day of the trial session.870  Additional time for filing the 
settled decision may be granted only if it is clear that a settlement has been 
agreed to by the parties and only if the parties are prepared to stipulate for 
the record the basis of the settlement and the reasons for the filing delay.  
Presumably, this restriction is intended to prevent stipulations from falling 
apart after the court grants additional time and to ensure that the request 
for additional time to file a stipulated decision is not used as a guise by a 
party in search of a continuance. 
The Standing Pretrial Order should not be confused with the “pretrial 
conference” provided by Rule 110.  A pretrial conference among the parties 
and the court may be requested by either party or by the court on its own 
motion.871  Pretrial conferences are undertaken “with a view to narrowing 
issues, stipulating facts, simplifying the presentation of evidence, or 
otherwise assisting in the preparation for trial or possible disposition of the 
case in whole or in part without trial.”872   Pretrial conferences are not 
available if a party requesting the conference has not complied with the 
mandatory stipulation conferences of Rule 91873 or if the request is 
frivolous or for the purpose of delay.874 
 
5. Standing Pretrial Notice 
 
In cases tried under the small tax case procedures of § 7463 or § 7436(c), 
the Tax Court provides a Standing Pretrial Notice in lieu of the Standing 
Pretrial Order.  The Standing Pretrial Notice represents a more user-
friendly version of the Order, in that it explains the meaning of key 
concepts such as “settlement” and “stipulations” while also providing the 
taxpayer with a check-list to prepare for trial.875  In certain respects, the 
Standing Pretrial Notice also is less demanding.  Rather than directing the 
parties to stipulate facts and documents that are not in dispute and to file a 
Pretrial Memorandum, the Standing Pretrial Notice states that the parties 
                                                     
868 See Sterrett, supra note 846, at 123; 2 L. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 
§ 7.48(b) (1981). 
869 See Sterrett, supra note 846, at 123. 
870 See Appendix E (Standing Pretrial Order). 
871 TAX CT. R. 110(b), (c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
872 TAX CT. R. 110(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
873 See  TAX CT. R. 110(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
874 Id. 
875 See Appendix F (Standing Pretrial Notice).   
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“should” do so.876  The softening of word choice reflected in the Standing 
Pretrial Notice is undoubtedly designed to make the process less 
intimidating for unrepresented taxpayers who frequently use the small tax 
case procedures.   
 
6. Final Status Report 
 
To further streamline pretrial case management, the court implemented 
the use of Final Status Reports in 2007.  The Standing Pretrial Order directs 
the parties to submit a Final Status Report only if the status of the case as 
reported to the court in the Pretrial Memorandum has changed.  For parties 
that receive a Standing Pretrial Notice, the court recommends that they 
submit a Final Status Report, if applicable. 
The Final Status Report was developed as a simple means of informing 
the court of a last-minute settlement, or a change in the anticipated 
likelihood or length of trial.877  The Report can be submitted either 
electronically on the court’s website, by fax, or by mail.  The court must 
receive it no later than 3 p.m. eastern time on the last business day before 
the case’s calendared trial session begins.  The submitting party must also 
send a copy of the Report to the opposing party and provide another copy 
to the opposing party at the calendar call, if the opposing party is present. 
 
I. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
In 1990, the Tax Court adopted Rule 124 to expressly authorize parties 
to resolve factual disputes by voluntary binding arbitration.878  The court 
intended the rule to reflect pre-existing practice, noting that it had 
“consistently permitted” parties to resolve factual issues through binding 
arbitration when presented with the request.879  The court articulated two 
purposes for adopting the Rule 124.  First, the rule was intended to 
encourage the use of this alternative dispute resolution technique by 
informing parties of its availability.880  Second, the rule provided for a basic 
arbitration procedure while setting forth minimum requirements for an 
order authorizing use of the procedure.881  However, the court clarified that 
the articulation of basic procedure for binding arbitration was not intended 
to be exclusive:  “[T]he Rule is not intended to be unduly restrictive or to 
discourage innovative and imaginative approaches to arbitration, nor is it 
                                                     
876 See id.   
877  See Press Release, United States Tax Court, Nov. 27, 2007. 
878  TAX CT. R. 124, 93 T.C. 943–44 (1989). 
879  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 124, 93 T.C. 944 (1989). 
880  Id. 
881  Id. 
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intended to preclude voluntary non-binding arbitration.”882  Additionally, 
the court noted that the voluntary binding arbitration procedure was 
particularly well suited to resolve valuation disputes, although the court was 
careful to note that arbitration under Rule 124 applied without limitation to 
any factual dispute.883   
Pursuant to the newly adopted Rule 124, the parties initiated the 
arbitration procedure through the filing of a joint motion.884  The motion 
had to be accompanied by a joint stipulation that (1) identified the issues to 
be resolved, (2) included a statement that the parties would be bound by the 
arbitrator’s findings, (3) identified the arbitrator or the process to be used to 
select one, (4) identified how the costs of the arbitration would be allocated, 
and (5) included a prohibition on ex parte communication with the 
arbitrator.885  If the case had not already been assigned to a judge, the chief 
judge would assign the motion to a judge or special trial judge for 
disposition.886  If the court granted the motion, the court would appoint the 
arbitrator along with any instructions the appointing judge deemed 
necessary or appropriate.887  The arbitration process under Rule 124 was 
concluded by the filing of a report by the parties which stated the findings 
of the arbitrator and included any report or summary that the arbitrator 
may have prepared.888   
Concerned that Rule 124 conveyed an air of exclusivity in favor of 
binding arbitration, the court retroactively amended the rule in 1998 to 
include a provision expressly stating that nothing in Rule 124 “shall be 
construed to exclude use . . . of other forms of voluntary disposition of 
cases, including mediation.”889   The court went a significant step further to 
remove arbitration as the focus of Rule 124 in 2011, when it changed the 
title of the rule to “Alternative Dispute Resolution.”890  In explaining the 
title change, the court noted that few arbitrations had been conducted in 
the 20 years since the adoption of Rule 124, compared to substantially more 
mediations.891  More substantively, the court expanded the rule to include a 
section detailing the process for employing voluntary nonbinding 
                                                     
882  Id. 
883  Id. at 944–45. 
884  TAX CT. R. 124(a), 93 T.C. 943 (1989).   
885  TAX CT. R. 124(b)(1)–(2), 93 T.C. at 943–44.   
886  TAX CT. R. 124(a), 93 T.C. at 943.  
887  TAX CT. R. 124(b)(3), 93 T.C. at 944.  
888  TAX CT. R. 124(b)(4), 93 T.C. at 944.  
889  TAX CT. R. 124(b)(5), 109 T.C. 612–13 (1998).  
890  TAX CT. R. 124, 136 T.C. 630–31 (2011).   
891  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 124, 136 T.C. at 631.   
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mediation.892   The court continued to leave the door open for use of other 
dispute resolution methods.893   
Under Rule 124(b) as revised, either party may move the court for 
permission to use voluntary binding mediation to resolve any issue in 
controversy—not just factual disputes.894 It may be either a joint or 
unopposed motion that can be made any time after the case is at issue and 
before the case is final.895  If the court grants the motion for mediation, an 
order granting the motion will set forth directions to the parties as the court 
considers appropriate. 
The mediation is conducted in confidence.  Any document or 
information exchanged pursuant to the mediation is not disclosed to 
anyone outside of the mediation.  Therefore, any document, exhibit, or 
argument by the parties or counsel does not become part of the record in 
the case.  However, as prescribed in the mediation order, a judge may 
determine that it is necessary to disclose certain information when a 
manifest injustice would otherwise occur, disclosure would help establish 
violation of a law, or the possible harm to the public health or safety 
outweighs maintaining the integrity of the mediation proceedings. 
The parties may request that a judge or special trial judge act as a 
mediator, and the requested judge may so serve upon order of the chief 
judge.896  At the conclusion of the mediation, to the extent the parties reach 
any agreement, the parties normally will formalize their agreement by filing 
a stipulated decision or a stipulation of settled issues.  As the mediation is 
nonbinding, the mediator may not make rulings or impose a settlement 
upon the parties. Rather, the primary role of the mediator is to facilitate a 
settlement agreed to by the parties.   When the parties reach a settlement 
through mediation, a contract has been formed.897  A valid settlement 
therefore cannot be repudiated,898 although the court can modify or set 
aside a settlement for good cause.899  If the parties are unable to reach a 
settlement as a result of the mediation, the matter will be returned to the 
docket for trial in due course.  The mediator will not communicate with the 
                                                     
892   TAX CT. R. 124(b), 136 T.C. at 630–31.  The provisions governing voluntary 
binding arbitration were consolidated under Rule 124(a).   
893   TAX CT. R. 124(c), 136 T.C. at 31. 
894   See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 124, 136 T.C. at 631 (clarifying that 
issues susceptible of resolution through mediation “are not limited to factual 
ones”). 
895   Id. 
896  TAX CT. R. 124(b)(2), 136 T.C. at 631. 
897  See Dorchester Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 330 (1997); 
Estate of Halder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-84, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1051. 
898   Dorchester Industries, 108 T.C. at 330. 
899   Id. at 334–35. 
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trial judge with respect to any of the matters that occurred during the 
mediation. 
Mediation has been used successfully by parties before the Tax Court.  
For instance, in United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner,900 the 
parties severed a § 38 investment tax credit issue and mediated resolution.  
On remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the 
parties further mediated complete resolution of the remaining issues over 
multiple years.    
                                                     
900  T.C. Memo. 1999-268, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, rev’d and rem’d, 254 F.3d 1014 
(11th Cir. 2001). 







The principal organic legislation for the Board of Tax Appeals was 
contained in the Revenue Act of 1924 and the Revenue Act of 1926.  These 
acts generally provided the Board with broad discretion to formulate its 
rules of practice and procedure.  This discretion, in respect of pretrial 
procedures, was virtually unlimited.  However, the extent of permissible 
discretion in respect of trial and post-trial procedures was qualified by 
congressional dictates.  In fact, the trial and post-trial procedures were, and 
continue to be, largely shaped by statutory directives.  This difference in 
approach probably was influenced by four considerations that reflected the 
special problems associated with trial and post-trial procedures. 
First, because of the unique opportunity for pre-assessment review, the 
Board was viewed as potentially the principal trial body for tax 
controversies.  To make such a forum attractive to litigants, it would be 
necessary to provide taxpayers with an adequate opportunity to be heard at 
convenient locations throughout the country.  Second, the complexity of 
the legal and factual issues in tax controversies required that Board 
proceedings be conducted in accordance with relatively liberal rules of 
evidence.  In this connection, it also was recognized that the triers of fact 
and law in Board proceedings should be individuals with specialized 
knowledge in tax law.  Third, the nature of the tax system as a self-assessing 
mechanism, in which the relevant facts in most controversies would be in 
the possession of taxpayers, necessitated appropriate guidelines for 
determining who would bear the burden of proof.  In most situations, such 
burden would be on the taxpayer, but the desirability for exceptions to this 
rule was recognized in certain situations.  Finally, Congress believed that a 
principal value of the Board would be as a source of publicized precedents.  
This role, it was hoped, would (1) reduce the haphazard and conflicting 
quality of previous administrative and judicial interpretations, and (2) 
provide a basis by which the Government and the taxpayer would be able 
to agree to a settlement without the need of a judicial adjudication.  The 
need for such a body of precedents could only be fulfilled if Board 
procedures assured well-reasoned and uniform decisions. 
In response to these considerations, Congress established the Board of 
Tax Appeals as a national trial body with headquarters in Washington, D.C.  
The Chairman of the Board was directed to provide local hearings to 
minimize taxpayer inconvenience and expense.  The 1924 Act left to the 
Board’s discretion the promulgation of rules governing both evidence and 
burden of proof.  The 1926 Act limited such discretion with respect to 
evidence, and later legislation did the same for certain burden of proof 
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questions.  In subsequent years, Board/Tax Court experience with such 
procedures has led to both statutory changes and revisions of Board/Tax 
Court rules.  This Part will examine in detail the development and 
application of the procedures that govern proceedings before the Tax 
Court.  Additionally, this Part will explore the Tax Court’s authority to 
sanction parties and their counsel for, in general terms, failing to prosecute 
their proceeding before the court in good faith.   
 
A. Place of Trial 
 
In establishing the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924, Congress believed 
that pre-assessment review would only be effective if localized hearings 
were available to aggrieved taxpayers.1  Local hearings would provide the 
taxpayer with the substantial convenience of having the Board come to the 
taxpayer rather than the expensive and time consuming process of going to 
Washington.2  The availability of localized hearings would put the Board on 
a level of accessibility comparable with the Federal district courts in which 
most refund suits were instituted.  Disagreement arose, however, over 
whether the Board’s divisions were to be permanently located outside of 
Washington or were to ride circuit and return to Washington for the 
decision process.3  The proponents of permanent, regional divisions outside 
Washington believed that such a structure would ensure a more rapid 
determination of tax appeals.4  On the other hand, it was argued that the 
Board’s function of establishing a uniform system of tax precedents would 
be impeded by permanent field divisions.5  Such divisions would not benefit 
from other Board members’ experience and would make full Board review 
of division decisions impracticable.6 
The arguments in favor of a central Washington forum with divisions 
that would ride circuit prevailed, and the Revenue Act of 1924 authorized 
the Board’s chairman to prescribe localized hearings “with a view to 
                                                     
1 See S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 9 (1924). 
2 Press Release from the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Oct. 8, 1924, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
3 E.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2621 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Young); see also Lyle T. 
Alverson, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed?, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 337 (1926) 
[hereinafter cited as Alverson]. 
4 65 CONG. REC. 2621 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Young). 
5 Charles D. Hamel, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 293, 308 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Hamel]; see also Alverson, supra note 3, at 
339. 
6 Id.; see also Hamel, supra note 5, at 308; J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do 
With the Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391 (1925). 
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securing reasonable opportunity to taxpayers to appear before the Board . . . 
with as little inconvenience and expense to taxpayers as is practicable.”7 
The Board initiated its circuit hearings in April, 1925, by sending a three-
member division to the northwest and the Pacific coast.8  Early success of 
the procedure was evidenced by an increased demand for such hearings 
and, as a result, the Board announced plans to extend circuit hearings to the 
eastern part of the country.9  Nonetheless, the ability of the Board to send 
more than one division into the field was severely limited.  This difficulty 
arose because the Board, composed of only 16 members, was required to 
have three members hear each appeal, those three members constituting a 
“division.”10  In light of the limited manpower, a suggestion was made to 
have testimony in the form of depositions taken outside of Washington by 
the law assistants of the Board.11  However, the basis for this proposal was 
removed by the 1926 Revenue Act, which authorized segmenting the Board 
into 16 separate one-member divisions; thus, more divisions were available 
to meet the increased demand for localized hearings.12 
Although the additional field divisions somewhat reduced the waiting 
period for a circuit hearing, a number of operational difficulties continued 
to plague the Board.  An early difficulty confronted by the Board was its 
lack of an effective procedure to make prompt designation of cases to the 
circuit calendars.  In this connection, the Board had adopted a rule that 
placed all cases upon the Washington calendar unless the parties requested a 
circuit hearing.13  Many times, however, requests for calendar changes 
would not be received until after the Board had mailed a notice of a hearing 
in Washington.14  The Board informally adopted a practice that placed the 
                                                     
7 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 338 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7446). 
8 Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, Apr. 13, 
1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence;” Office Order, Apr. 25, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Field Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
9 See Letter from Chairman Korner to Secretary Mellon, May 24, 1926, at 8, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Korner Letter]. 
10 For a discussion of the division structure, see Part XI.B.   
11 Korner Letter, supra note 9, at 8. 
12 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 106, amending Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(c)–(f), 43 Stat. 337 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7444(c)).  The 
membership of the Board and Tax Court remained at 16 until 1980, when 
Congress increased the number of Tax Court judges to 19.  See Pub. L. No. 96-439, 
§ 1(a), 94 Stat. 1878 (1980).   
13 B.T.A. RULE 24 (Apr. 1, 1926 ed.). 
14 See Preliminary Committee Report of the Joint Committee of Board and 
Treasury Personnel, c. 1937, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: 
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cases of all taxpayers residing on the Pacific coast on the circuit calendar, 
but this departure from the rule was insufficient to stem the delay in hearing 
cases elsewhere.15  Nevertheless, serious consideration was not given to the 
problem until 1937,16 when 75 percent or more of the cases initially set for 
hearing in Washington were ultimately placed upon the circuit calendar for 
hearing in the field.17 
Various suggestions were offered to remedy the delay and unnecessary 
paperwork generated by the calendar practice.  Some of the proposals were 
directed at pending cases; others suggested changing procedures for appeals 
filed in the future.  As to pending cases, alternative suggestions were made 
to have the Board (1) make specific inquiry of each taxpayer, (2) place all 
cases on the field calendar and remove them to the Washington calendar 
only upon motion, or (3) notify taxpayers that the hearing would be in 
Washington unless the taxpayer notified the Board within set time limits.18  
The Board chose a compromise position and provided that all pending 
cases would be placed upon the calendar that the pleadings indicated would 
be most convenient for the parties, subject to change only if the parties 
notified the Board promptly.19  As to subsequent appeals, the Board 
amended its rule in 1938 to require that the petition be accompanied by a 
statement expressing the petitioner’s desire as to where the hearing should 
be held—either in Washington or at a location where the Board customarily 
held hearings.20  The Bureau was also permitted, when filing its answer, to 
request a specific location for trial.  The Board would then make a decision 
as to hearing location and notify the parties.21  The Board typically observed 
the wishes of the taxpayer with regard to hearing location.22  The Board 
                                                                                                                       
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Committee 
Report]. 
15 Id. 
16 The primary reason for the late date at which the Board dealt with this 
problem reflected the fact that in the early years of the Board only a small 
percentage of total cases heard by the Board were heard in the field.  J. Gilmer 
Korner, The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 642 (1925).  Initially, the 
Board had indicated that cases heard in the field would not be heard as rapidly as 
cases in Washington. See Tentative Plan for Hearing of Appeals Outside of Washington 
Drafted, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 331 (1924). 
17 Preliminary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 2. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Report of the Joint Committee of Board of Tax Appeals and Chief Counsel’s 
Office, Dec. 17, 1937, at 5, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report]. 
20 B.T.A. RULES 25–26 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
21 Id. 
22 Statutory provisions mandated that preference be given the taxpayer in the 
selection of trial location.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(e), 44 Stat. 108 
(1926). 
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would permit a subsequent change if good cause was shown, on motion of 
either party, provided that the motion was made prior to mailing notice of 
hearing date to the parties.23   
Thereafter, the procedure was further amended to limit the situations in 
which the Commissioner could file an initial request for hearing location 
with his answer.24  With the exception of situations in which the petitioner 
failed to indicate a preference, the Commissioner was barred in the first 
instance from requesting a different location.25  The provision for a 
subsequent motion to change the designated place of hearing was left 
unchanged.26  However, in 1990, the Tax Court eliminated the hard 
deadline on filing a motion to change the place of trial.  Instead of treating 
all motions made after the notice of time of trial had been issued as not 
timely filed, the court warned that motions made after the designation of 
the time of trial may be deemed dilatory and therefore denied unless the 
basis for the motion arose during the later time period or good cause 
existed for not making the motion sooner.27   
Another problem in connection with field sessions was the difficulty in 
obtaining guaranteed courtroom space in which to hold hearings.28  Prior to 
                                                     
23 B.T.A. RULE 26 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.). 
24 TAX CT. R. 26 (Feb. 9, 1943 ed.). 
25 Id.  The Tax Court deemed this change advisable because it believed that the 
Government was not concerned over where the hearing was held. 
26 Compare B.T.A. RULE 26 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 26 (Feb. 9, 1943 
ed.).   
27 TAX CT. R. 140(c) (July 1, 1990 ed.), 93 T.C. 948–89 (1990).  The present rule 
provides as follows: 
RULE 140.  PLACE OF TRIAL 
 
(a) Requests for Place of Trial:  The petitioner, at the time of filing 
the petition, shall file a request for place of trial showing the place at which 
petitioner would prefer the trial to be held.  If the petitioner has not filed 
such a request, then the Commissioner, at the time the answer is filed, shall 
file a request showing the place of trial preferred by the Commissioner.  
The Court will make reasonable efforts to conduct the trial at the location 
most convenient to that requested where suitable facilities are available.  
The parties shall be notified of the place at which the trial will be held.   
(b) Form:  Such request shall be set forth on a paper separate from the 
petition or answer.  See Form 5, Appendix I.   
(c) Motion to Change Place of Trial:  If either party desires a change 
in the place of trial, then such party shall file a motion to that effect, stating 
fully the reasons therefor.  Such motions, made after the notice of the time 
of trial has been issued, may be deemed dilatory and may be denied unless 
the ground therefor arose during that period or there was good reason for 
not making the motion sooner.   
TAX CT. R. 140 (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
28 Joint Committee Report, supra note 19, at 19. 
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1937, the Board, with the exception of a brief period in New York City, had 
never been able to secure regularly assigned courtroom space in any city 
outside Washington.29  This difficulty undoubtedly arose from both a lack 
of federal office space and reluctance on the part of some courts to view 
the Board as a judicial entity.30  Thus, the Board was required to make 
temporary arrangements in each city in which it held circuit hearings.  Such 
arrangements often proved time consuming and resulted in the Board 
experiencing considerable difficulty in arranging its circuit calendars.31  
These difficulties reduced the number of circuit hearings that might 
otherwise be desirable32 and frequently precluded the Board from giving 
taxpayers, their counsel, and the Bureau adequate advance notice of 
hearings.33 
In 1937, a joint committee of Board and Treasury personnel suggested 
that the Board direct efforts at securing additional courtroom space and 
that Treasury assist in these efforts.34  Furthermore, the committee 
proposed that fixed schedules of periodic visits to certain cities be 
established.35  In combination, these reforms would both reduce the delays 
in bringing cases to trial and provide counsel for both parties with sufficient 
advance notice of the hearing to permit them to prepare adequately their 
cases.36  The Tax Court has been increasingly successful in procuring 
courtroom space.  In numerous cities, particularly those that are visited 
frequently during the year, specific federal courtroom space has been 
designated for the court.37  The availability of this space has probably been 
due to active procurement practices by the court, increased federal office 
                                                     
29 Id. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 20; see also Memorandum on Securing Accommodations, Nov. 10, 1937, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
32 Joint Committee Report, supra note 19, at 20. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 21.  The Joint Committee, composed of members of the Board, 
Treasury, and Internal Revenue, was appointed to consider how contested 
deficiencies might be more effectively handled.  Id. at 1. 
35 Preliminary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
36 Id.; see also Joint Committee Report, supra note 19. 
37 See, e.g., Tax Court Conference Minutes, May 15, 1970, and Feb. 12, 1971; see 
also LESTER M. PONDER, UNITED STATES TAX COURT PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURES 132 (1976).  But see Report of Comm. on Court Procedure, ABA 
TAXATION SECTION (1971), reprinted in 25 TAX LAW. 598–99 (1972); Report of 
Comm. on Court Procedure, ABA TAXATION SECTION 128–29 (1949).  The 
Committee on Court Procedure viewed the space problem as very acute in its 1971 
report.  In fact, the committee proposed that legislation be enacted that would 
require the General Services Administration to acquire office space in every major 
city for all travelling federal courts. 
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space, and legislative recognition of the court’s judicial status in 1969.38  
The Tax Court presently conducts trial sessions in 74 cities spread over 46 
states and the District of Columbia.39  The court has dedicated courtroom 
space in 37 of these locations, and it borrows courtroom facilities in the 
remaining cities.  Hence, even though the bulk of the Tax Court’s work is 
performed at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., the court has a broad 
physical presence nationally to facilitate taxpayer access to its prepayment 




Although the statutory provisions governing the rules of evidence in the 
Tax Court have been amended on several occasions,40 there has been no 
change in the court’s basic approach to admissibility problems.  The court 
consistently has adhered to a practice of liberal admission of evidence, 
usually admitting evidence “not clearly inadmissible, and then decid[ing] its 
relevancy and weight, if any, after reviewing the entire record.”41  This 
practice reflects the belief that the court should provide the parties with an 
opportunity to develop the factual bases of their positions to the fullest 
extent possible.42 
                                                     
38 Tax Court Conference Minutes, May 15, 1970, and Feb. 12, 1971. 
39 TAX CT. R. Appendix I, Form 5 (“Request for Place of Trial”).  The current 
available locations for Tax Court field hearings are reproduced in Appendix D.   
40 Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337 with Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 106, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 5, § 1111, 53 
Stat. 160, and I.R.C. § 7453. 
41 Lester M. Ponder, Trial Court Litigation–Tax Court, Court of Claims and District 
Court:  A Practicing Lawyer’s View, 21 U.S.C. TAX INST. 117, 134 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as Ponder]; see also Martin D. Cohen, Litigation Techniques That Increase Your 
Chances for Success in the Tax Court, 35 J. TAX’N 340, 343 (1971); Arthur Groman & 
Hilbert P. Zarky, Rules of Evidence in Tax Court of United States, 10 U.S.C. TAX INST. 
603 (1958); Max J. Hamburger, Choice of Forum for Litigation:  The United States Tax 
Court, 32 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1315, 1325–28 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Hamburger]; Harry M. Harrington, Jr., What are the Rules of Evidence 
Applicable in the Tax Court of the United States?, 46 TAXES 471 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as Harrington]; J. Gilmer Korner, Procedure in the Appeal of Tax Cases Under the 
Revenue Act of 1926, 4 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 413, 414–15 (1926) [hereinafter cited 
as Korner, 1926]; Albert Raum, Tax Court Litigation, 9 U.S.C. TAX INST. 631, 647 
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Raum]; Henry D. Stevens, Legal Evidence Before the Board 
of Tax Appeals, 6 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 459, 460 (1928) [hereinafter cited as 
Stevens]. 
42 Hamburger, supra note 41, at 1327–28; Thomas V. Lefevre, The Trial of a Tax 
Court Case, 27 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1449, 1499–1500 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Lefevre]; Ponder, supra note 41, at 133–34. 
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The earliest enactment dealing with the Board, the 1924 Revenue Act, 
empowered the Board to prescribe its own rules of practice and evidence.43  
Pursuant to this authority, the Board promulgated rules of practice in July, 
1924, but specifically provided for only one small aspect of evidence 
admissibility, relating to ex parte affidavits.44  Otherwise, the Board deemed 
it inadvisable to adopt specific and technical rules of evidence.  The 
development of such rules would require time and effort better spent in 
dealing with the caseload that had developed quickly; moreover, the 
application of rigid evidentiary rules would interfere with the general, 
informal atmosphere the Board desired in its hearings.45 
Despite the fact that no formal code of evidence was promulgated, the 
Board was not free to ignore judicial evidentiary standards in the interest of 
informality.46  The 1924 Act required the Board’s findings of fact in a case 
to be prima facie evidence in any subsequent proceeding in federal court.47  
It was therefore necessary to provide a record supported by adequate proof 
that would be cognizable by judicial bodies.48 
In an attempt to effect a compromise between the desired informality 
and the statutory responsibility to present a prima facie record, the Board, 
in ruling on evidence admissibility, generally followed the evidentiary rules 
applicable in equity proceedings.49  Under such rules, the Board could 
receive a wider spectrum of evidence than that admissible in proceedings at 
law.50  The standard thus adopted was reasonable because Board 
proceedings, with their absence of jury trials, resembled equity more than 
law.51 
                                                     
43 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7453). 
44 See B.T.A. RULE 31 (July, 1924 ed.) (banning use of ex parte affidavits as 
evidence unless opposing counsel consented to their introduction). 
45 Letter from Chairman Hamel to H. Mitchell, Oct. 8, 1924, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
46 See J. Gilmer Korner, Practice Before The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 3 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 220, 221 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Korner, 1925]. 
47 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g)–(h), 43 Stat. 337, 338. 
48 65 CONG. REC. 2684 (1924) (remarks of Mr. Chindblom); Hamel, supra note 
5, at 295. 
49 See Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 856–57 (1925); Memorandum from T.C. Lavery to R.H. 
Jackson, General Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, c. Aug. 1935, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as 
Jackson Memorandum].  But see Willis W. Ritter, Pitfalls in Practice Before the Board of 
Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 297, 298 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Ritter]. 
50 J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do with the Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 391, 392 (1925); Korner, 1925, supra note 46, at 221. 
51 Korner, 1925, supra note 46, at 221. 
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Nonetheless, the incentive to enforce rigidly even the equitable 
standards of evidence was hindered by the lack of direct appeal or review of 
the Board’s decisions.52  Subsequent action was de novo, and there was no 
occasion for the parties to preserve rights on appeal by way of exceptions 
to evidence and requests for findings.53  The hearing before the Board was 
“little more than a preliminary skirmish, a run for luck.”54  Hence, strict use 
of equity rules was never enforced by the Board, and evidence was usually 
admitted for “what it was worth.”55 
The enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926 radically altered the existing 
procedure for judicial review of the Board’s decisions.56  No longer was the 
Board a forum for preliminary skirmishes,57 and a party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Board could not bring a collateral action and have a trial de 
novo on issues of fact and law.  The Act limited his right to a direct review 
of the Board’s decision in a court of appeals.58  With this provision for an 
appellate procedure, it became necessary that definite and consistent 
standards governing the admissibility of evidence before the Board be 
employed.59  Several proposals were offered as to what standards should be 
used.  One suggestion was that the Board develop its own rules of evidence 
in keeping with the provisions of the 1924 Revenue Act.60  However, this 
approach was considered unfeasible as it would have required the Board to 
write a treatise on evidence.61  Additionally, the prior two years had 
demonstrated that the Board, left to its own devices, had failed to adopt a 
consistent pattern of evidence admissibility.62  Another proposal was for the 
Board to adopt rules of evidence prevailing in the United States district 
courts.63  This proposal was objectionable since the district courts applied 
the rules of evidence of the particular state in which they were located,64 
                                                     
52 See Korner, 1926, supra note 41, at 414. 
53 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274(a)–(b), 900(g), 43 Stat. 297, 337. 
54 Blair v. Curran, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (1st Cir. 1928). 
55 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 49, at 3; see also Hearings on Revenue Revision, 
1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 856–57 (1925); 
J. Emmett Sebree, United States Board of Tax Appeals, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 428, 432 (1933); 
Stevens, supra note 41, at 460.  But see Walter W. Hammond, The United States Board 
of Tax Appeals, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1925); Ritter, supra note 49, at 298. 
56 Compare Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 44 Stat. 109, 110 with 
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g)–(h), 43 Stat. 337, 338. 
57 Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origin and Functions, in 
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 36 (1955). 
58 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 44 Stat. 109, 110. 
59 67 CONG. REC. 1144 (1925) (remarks of Mr. Mills). 
60 Id. at 1143 (remarks of Mr. Garrett). 
61 Id. at 1144 (remarks of Mr. Mills). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1137. 
64 Id. at 1144. 
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and would therefore lead to inconsistent rules of evidence for the Board.  A 
party’s success in a case might depend upon the fortuitous location of 
where the Board was sitting when the case was heard.65  Additionally, such 
a rule would be difficult for the Board to apply because it would require the 
application of 48 systems of evidentiary rules.  The Board had experienced 
the difficulties with such a rule under the 1924 Act, pursuant to which 
parties occasionally argued that questions of admissibility be determined by 
the laws of evidence prevailing in the district where the hearing occurred.66 
The difficulties with the foregoing proposals led Congress to require 
that the Board apply the rules of evidence of the courts of equity of the 
District of Columbia.67  The Board would now have a single source of 
evidentiary precedents that was consistent with the general theory of 
admissibility the Board had employed during its first two years.68 
Notwithstanding the expressed direction to follow the District of 
Columbia equity rules, the attitude of certain Board members toward strict 
application of evidentiary standards was not markedly changed, and 
evidence continued to be accepted on a “for what it was worth” basis.69  
Several factors contributed to this reluctance to apply strictly the required 
rules of evidence.  The Board, in the view of certain members, was an 
executive agency and not a judicial body.70  Additionally, some Board 
members believed it better to let everything in to prevent reversal and to 
ensure an adequate record for the higher court, even if evidence of dubious 
quality was admitted.71  Unlike cases at law, improperly received evidence at 
                                                     
65 Id. at 1137; Korner, 1926, supra note 41, at 414. 
66 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 49, at 4. 
67 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 107, amending Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 338; 67 CONG. REC. 3530 (1925).  At the time of 
the 1926 revision, “the Equity Court in the District of Columbia . . . [was] the 
Supreme Court of the District sitting in equity cases.”  Stevens, supra note 41, at 
460.  Pursuant to section 61 of the then D.C. Code, “the Supreme Court of the 
District [possessed] the same powers and [exercised] the same jurisdiction as the 
Circuit and district courts of the United States.”  Id.  Section 1640 of the Code 
provided that the sources of evidence applicable in equity cases were the common 
law, principles of equity, and British statutes in force in Maryland on February 27, 
1801, except insofar as they were inconsistent with, or replaced by some provision 
of the Code.  Id.  Other sources of evidence were the provisions of the Code, rules 
and decisions of the United States Supreme Court in reference to the District of 
Columbia’s rules of evidence, rules and decisions of the court of appeals in the 
district, and rules and decisions of the supreme court of the district.  Id. 
68 See generally Korner, 1926, supra note 41, at 414–15; Stevens, supra note 41, at 
461. 
69 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 49, at 3. 
70 Id. at 29. 
71 Id. 
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the trial level in equity cases was not a basis for reversal.72  On the other 
hand, the exclusion of proper evidence was reversible.73  Finally, the Board 
felt pressured to accept some forms of improper evidence because this was 
frequently the only type of proof submitted by petitioners unfamiliar with 
the Board, who mistakenly believed that the Board was an agency of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue and that its proceedings were therefore 
administrative in nature.74 
In 1939, the statute governing the rules of evidence was amended for 
the second time.  The new provision required that the Board follow the 
rules of evidence “applicable in courts of the District of Columbia in the 
type of proceedings which prior to September 16, 1938, were within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of equity of said District.”75  This change was 
necessitated by the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938, which provided for the merger of all law and equity cases into one 
form of civil action.76  The new statutory provision was designed to prevent 
this merger from affecting the substantive rules of evidence before the 
Board; it had no other purpose and did not effect any change in pre-existing 
Board practice.77 
Fifteen years later, as part of the 1954 Code revision, the reference to 
equity rules was dropped and the Tax Court (the Board had been renamed 
the Tax Court of the United States by the Revenue Act of 194278) was 
required to follow the same evidentiary rules applicable in non-jury trials in 
the United States District Court of the District of Columbia.79  The Tax 
                                                     
72 Id. at 30. 
73 Slayton v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 497, 498 (1st Cir. 1935), aff’g 29 B.T.A. 931 
(1934); R. Hoe & Co. v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 630, 633–34 (2d Cir. 1929), aff’g 7 
B.T.A. 1277 (1927); S.G. Sample Co. v. Commissioner, 23 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 
1928), rev’g 5 B.T.A. 1034 (1927). 
74 John E. McClure, Practice Before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, 6 NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 92 (1928). 
75 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 5, § 1111, 53 Stat. 160 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7453).  The Board amended its rules to reflect the statutory change in its April 1, 
1941 edition.  See B.T.A. RULE 31(a) (Apr. 1, 1941 ed.). 
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
77 But see Letter from J. Hanes, Under Secretary of the Treasury, to Chairman 
Arundell, Mar. 15, 1939, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & 
Correspondence,” and Letter from Chairman Arundell to J. Hanes, Mar. 29, 1939, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & Correspondence,” wherein 
a recommendation by the Under Secretary to amend § 1111 of the 1939 Internal 
Revenue Code to provide that the proceedings of the Board be conducted in 
accordance “with the rules of evidence applicable in the courts of the District of 
Columbia” was endorsed by the Chairman. 
78 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957. 
79 I.R.C. § 7453.  Subsequent to the statutory revision, the Tax Court revised 
Rule 31(a) of its Rules of Practice to provide that “the proceedings of the Court 
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Court, which had proposed the change to Congress, noted that there had 
been no separate courts of equity in the District of Columbia after 
September 16, 1938, and that the 1939 provision was the source of 
persistent concern among members of the tax bar.80  The amendment, by 
removing the reference to an obsolete type of proceeding, would clarify the 
law and eliminate much of the confusion that then existed.81 
Since the United States District Court of the District of Columbia was 
required to follow the guidelines specified in Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the admissibility of evidence,82 the Tax Court was 
also bound by this provision.83  Prior to a significant revision that took 
effect in 1975,84 Rule 43(a)85 represented a significant departure from 
preexisting practice and resulted from dissatisfaction with the technical 
rules of common law evidence.  The adoption of the rule signaled more 
expansive tests for the admissibility of evidence.86  The rule provided that 
evidence was admissible if it met any of three standards:  (1) the provisions 
                                                                                                                       
and its divisions will be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence 
applicable in trials without a jury in a United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia.”  TAX CT. R. 31(a) (Aug. 15, 1955 ed.). 
80 Memorandum from Rules Committee to the Tax Court, Jan. 6, 1954, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
81 Id. 
82 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided that such rules 
“govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil 
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (prior 
to amendment in 2007 in connection with general restyling of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
83 TAX CT. R. 143 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.); Harry Graham Balter, Rules of Evidence 
Applicable in Proceedings Before the Tax Court of the United States:  Burden of Proof and 
Presumptions, MARQ. 7TH ANN. INST. ON TAX’N 1, 2 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 
Balter]; Harrington, supra note 41, at 471–72; Ponder, supra note 41, at 134; Raum, 
supra note 41, at 647; Memorandum from E. Radue to Chairman of the Rules 
Committee, Sept. 6, 1967, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & 
Correspondence;” Memorandum from R. Caldwell to Judge Raum, Chairman of 
the Rules Committee, Sept. 1, 1967, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
84  See FED. R. CIV. P. 43, Advisory Comm. Notes – 1972 Amendments.  The 
1982 amendments to Rule 43 became effective on August 1, 1975.  See Pub. L. No. 
93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. at 1926, 1949.  
85 For a general discussion of the provisions of Rule 43(a) as then in effect, see 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 456–58 (3d ed. 1976).  Rule 
43 was revised significantly in 1972 when its general provisions were superseded by 
the detailed provisions of the then-new Federal Rules of Evidence.   
86 See, e.g., Edwin Conrad, Let’s Weigh Rule 43(a), 38 VA. L. REV. 985, 987 (1952); 
Leonard C. Thompson, Rule 43(a)—A Decadent Decade, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 238 
(1948); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence in Federal Courts Under Rule 43(a), 46 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1946). 
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of a federal statute providing for admissibility;87 (2) the rules theretofore 
applied in federal courts in suits in equity; or (3) the rules of evidence in the 
courts of the state in which the federal court was sitting.88  Since the 
District of Columbia is not a state, its evidentiary rules are not affected by 
state law.89  Accordingly, the Tax Court had to base the admissibility of 
evidence on the remaining two provisions of former Rule 43(a).  Of these, 
the standard of prior equity practice was by far the more important 
provision, since few federal statutes on evidence were then in existence.90 
Courts declared the purpose of former Rule 43(a) to be in favor of 
admissibility rather than exclusion,91 and the provision regarding prior 
equity practices was interpreted broadly.92  As a result, broad latitude was 
accorded to the trial judge in his rulings on admissibility.93  In this 
connection, federal courts did not view themselves as limited in the 
application of the provision to only those instances in which the same or 
substantially the same evidence was held to be admissible in pre-1938 
decisions by federal equity courts.94  Such prior courts considered other 
sources of law for their evidentiary rulings, and courts operating under Rule 
43(a) did likewise, further increasing the scope of admissibility.95  These 
                                                     
87 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. 1977) (business records statute). 
88 While state rules of admissibility are controlling in the federal courts under 
Rule 43(a), state exclusionary rules are not, and evidence admissible under either of 
the first two tests will be received even though the state courts have held otherwise.  
See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 410 n.20 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Boerner v. United States, 117 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1941). 
89 Harrington v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 939, 954 (1967), aff’d, 404 F.2d 237 (5th 
Cir. 1968). 
90 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 457 (3d ed. 1976). 
91 See, e.g., Levitt v. H.J. Jeffries, Inc., 517 F.2d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 1975); Bair v. 
American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1973); Bailey v. 
Kawasaki-Kisen K.K., 455 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1972); Butler v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 431 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 
1946); Dellefield v. Blocdel Realty Co., 128 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1942). 
92 E.g., United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 1966), 
wherein the court noted that:  
[if the provision were] to be limited to specific equity precedents the 
category would be of little significance for such precedents are few and 
inadequate.  Moreover, they would establish no independent principles, for 
in evidence as elsewhere the maxim applies that equity follows the law. . . .  
To prevent the creation of precedents merely because one did not already 
exist would frustrate the liberal purpose of the Rule, and in light of equity’s 
historic role in alleviating the rigidity of the common law, would render 
ironic the reference to proceedings in courts of equity. 
93 See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th 
Cir. 1961). 
94 See Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). 
95 In Monarch, the court stated that: 
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expansive views of the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of 
former Rule 43(a) lent support to the Tax Court’s long established liberal 
evidentiary policy and supplied adequate justification for its continuance.96 
Although the emphasis in former Rule 43(a) generally was conceded to 
be on admissibility, the vagueness of the “equity” standard necessarily led to 
varying interpretations.97  Additionally, uncertainties developed with respect 
to the extent to which federal courts could formulate essentially new rules 
based on the equity standard.98  As a result, an advisory committee was 
created by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1965 to codify a 
system of federal rules of evidence.99  Ten years later, Congress adopted the 
recommendations of the advisory committee for the federal court system.100  
Since these rules are applicable to the District Court for the District of 
Columbia,101 they are applicable to the Tax Court as well, and the Tax 
Court, in its 1974 rules revision, provided for the applicability of the new 
rules in its proceedings.102 
Although the Tax Court has never before been subject to a 
comprehensive code regulating the admissibility of evidence in its 
                                                                                                                       
in today’s litigation with its endless complexities many of which are an 
outgrowth of our scientific age we would hardly think that a court instituted 
with all of the power the organic constitution could invest in it would have 
to stand helpless in the face of a new situation.  Since it has vast duties and 
powers . . . surely such [a] court has the capacity to deal judicially with the 
manner of ascertaining the truth in a novel situation. 
281 F.2d at 411.  
96 See Hicks Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 982, 1014–15 (1971); see also 
Hamburger, supra note 41, at 1327; Ponder, supra note 41, at 133–34. 
97 Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1286–87 (5th Cir. 1974). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966). 
99 For a discussion of the historical background leading to the creation of the 
Advisory Committee, see KENNETH R. REDDEN &  STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1–5 (1975); A Preliminary Report on the Advisability 
and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 
30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).  Early recognition of the effect that a uniform rules of 
evidence scheme would have on the Tax Court is indicated in a letter from Chief 
Judge Tietjens to W. Shafroth, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Mar. 18, 1963, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & 
Correspondence,” in which the Chief Judge advised Mr. Shafroth of the Tax 
Court’s interest in the Advisory Committee. 
100 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (effective Aug. 1, 1975).  
101 The Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable to proceedings in all courts of 
the United States.  Fed. R. Evid. 101(a).   
102 TAX CT. R. 143(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.) provided that its rules “include the rules 
of evidence in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any rules of evidence 
generally applicable in the Federal courts (including the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia).”  This provision remains in the current version 
of the rule.   
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proceedings, the federal evidentiary rules should have little practical effect 
on the court’s traditional policy of liberal admission.  Moreover, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, with their increased bias in favor of admissibility, will 
narrow further any evidentiary distinctions that formerly existed between 
the Tax Court and other federal tribunals.103 
The most recent change in the Tax Court’s evidentiary rules occurred in 
2009, when the court revised Rule 143 of its Rules of Practice and 
Procedure to prescribe testimony procedures that would more closely 
follow current Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 143 
generally requires a witness to testify in open court.  However, beginning in 
2010, that requirement may be satisfied by contemporaneous transmission 
of testimony from a different location.104  This alternate means of providing 
testimony is not available as of right; rather, the court may permit its use 
only where good cause in compelling circumstances is shown, and then only 
with “appropriate safeguards.”105   
The rule does not specify the form of transmission.  However, the 
advisory committee notes to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure acknowledge that video transmission should be used where the 
cost is reasonable in relation to the matters in dispute, the means of the 
parties, and the circumstances that justify transmission.106  The notes of the 
Rules Committee also recognize that audio transmission may be sufficient, 
particularly where the testimony is of less significance to the matters in 
dispute.107   
In adopting the revision to its Rule 143, the Tax Court recognized that 
witnesses periodically are unable to attend a trial for a variety of unexpected 
reasons (such as accident or illness) but remain able to testify from another 
location.108  Rescheduling the trial or hearing to accommodate such a 
witness could cause substantial delays and significant costs.109  In such 
circumstances, the court recognizes that justice may be better served by 
                                                     
103 See Balter, supra note 83; Lefevre, supra note 42, at 1499.  For a treatise-like 
review of the Tax Court’s experience in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 
Joni Larson, Tax Evidence III:  A Primer on the Federal Rules of Evidence as Applied by the 
Tax Court, 62 TAX LAW. 555 (2009).   
104 TAX CT. R. 143(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
105 Id.  Based on the explanatory note to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (on which the revisions to Tax Court Rule 143 were based), 
“appropriate safeguards” entail measures that ensure accurate identification of the 
witness and that protect the witness against influence by persons present at the 
location where the testimony is being provided.  FED. R. CIV. P. 43, Adv. Comm. 
on Rules Notes–1996 Amendment.   




682            The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
allowing the witness to testify by contemporaneous transmission.  Such 
accommodation could be particularly useful where a risk exists that other, 
and perhaps more critical, witnesses may be unavailable at a later date.  The 
Tax Court therefore employs courtroom technology to facilitate the receipt 
of remote testimony from a witness when necessary.110 
 
C. Burden of Proof 
 
The allocation of the burden of proof in proceedings before the Board 
of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court traditionally has been derived from 
common law principles, superseded by statutory directive in narrow 
instances only.  However, Congress took a greater interest in burden of 
proof allocations through the enactment of § 7491 as part of the Internal 
Revenue Service Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,111 through which 
Congress imposed more extensive deviations from the prevailing norms to 
the benefit of the taxpayer.  This Section first discusses the development of 
the general principles governing the allocation of the burden of proof in 
proceedings before the Board and the Tax Court and then details the 
manner in which § 7491 alters the pre-existing landscape.   
 
1. Development of General Rule 
 
Since the inception of the Board in 1924, the burden of proof in its 
proceedings has, as a general matter, been placed on the taxpayer.112  
Although little doubt about the propriety of placing this burden on the 
taxpayer has been expressed,113 the rule itself has been difficult to define 
and apply.114  Varying judicial interpretations have arisen as to the nature 
                                                     
110 Id. at 362. 
111 Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3001(a), 112 Stat. 685, 727. 
112 Compare B.T.A. RULE 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 142 (July 16, 
2012 ed.).   
113 Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975); Hearings on Revenue 
Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 907 
(1925) [hereinafter cited as 1925 House Hearings]; Randolph E. Paul, A Plea For 
Better Tax Pleading, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 507, 517 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Paul]. 
114 See Balter, supra note 83, at 19; Lawrence F. Casey, A Case of Failure of Proof 
in the Tax Court, 6 TAX L. REV. 227 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Casey]; George 
Craven, Pre-Trial and Post-Trial Tax Court Practice, 4 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. 
TAX’N. 260, 263 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Craven]; Albert L. Hopkins, The United 
States Board of Tax Appeals, 12 A.B.A. J. 466, 468 (1926) [hereinafter cited as 
Hopkins]; Mark Marcossan, The Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 29 TAXES 221 (1951); 
William Schwerdtfeger, The Burden of Proof in the Tax Court, 42 KY. L.J. 147, 149 
(1954). 
Trial Procedure                                        683 
 
and extent of the taxpayer’s burden of proof115 and the relationship of the 
presumption of correctness to the burden of proof.116  Likewise, in cases in 
which the burden of proof has been placed on the Commissioner, most 
notably in the cases of allegations of fraud117 and requests for affirmative 
relief,118 disagreement has arisen over the extent of the Commissioner’s 
burden in proving the former119 and in defining those situations that 
constitute the latter.120 
The burden of proof on the taxpayer in Tax Court proceedings appears 
to consist of two distinct evidentiary burdens:  first, the burden of going 
forward with sufficient evidence on an issue of fact to entitle the taxpayer 
to have the issue decided by the court on the basis of the evidence 
presented, and second, the burden of final persuasion that the evidence 
introduced at trial meets the requisite level of proof necessary to sustain the 
taxpayer’s litigating position.121  An additional factor in the taxpayer’s 
burden of proof is the presumption of correctness accorded the findings 
contained in the deficiency notice.122  Two divergent views on the 
                                                     
115 Compare, Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959) with 
Commissioner v. Smith, 285 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1960).   
116 Compare Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), aff’g 63 F.2d 976 (8th Cir.), 
aff’g 25 B.T.A. 117 (1932) with Fairmount Cemetery Ass’n v. Helvering, 79 F.2d 163, 
164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1935), rev’g and rem’g 30 B.T.A. 740 (1934), and Hemphill Schools, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1943), vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 
1282 (1942).   
117 By statute, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof in any proceeding 
“involving the issue whether the petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to 
evade tax.”  I.R.C. § 7454(a); TAX CT. R. 142(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
118 TAX CT. R. 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
119 Compare Arlette Coat Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 751 (1950) with Miller v. 
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 915 (1969) and York v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 742 (1955). 
120 See Balter, supra note 83, at 19; Samuel Byer, Limitation of Issues in Tax 
Litigation, 18 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1035 (1960); Richard Forman, The 
Burden of Proof, 39 TAXES 737 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Forman]; George L. 
Whitfield & Charles E. McCallum, Burden of Proof and Choice of Forum in Tax 
Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Whitfield & 
McCallum]. 
121 See Balter, supra note 83, at 20–22; Herman H. Copelon, Practical Problems on 
Burden of Proof in Civil Trials, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 865, 868–70 
(1951) [hereinafter cited as Copelon]; Bouldin S. Motherhead, The Burden of Proof in 
Federal Tax Cases, 14 CERT. PUB. ACCT. 286, 287 (1934); Theodore Ness, The Role of 
Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liability, 12 TAX L. REV. 321, 329 
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Ness]. 
122 Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1927).  “No reasonable taxpayer 
will quarrel with this special endowment of correctness bestowed upon the 
Commissioner’s letters.  It is historically well-founded and it is necessary as an aid 
to the collection of revenues . . . .”  Paul, supra note 113, at 517.  Note that the 
presumption of correctness does not attach if the Commissioner’s determination is 
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presumption’s effect upon the burden of proof have developed.  The 
prevailing view is that the presumption is coextensive with the taxpayer’s 
initial burden of going forward with the evidence.123  Hence, the taxpayer 
must appear and introduce competent and substantial evidence that could 
support a finding in his favor,124 or the court will dismiss the petition and 
determine the deficiency as specified by the Commissioner.125  Accordingly, 
once the taxpayer has produced such evidence that could support a finding 
to the contrary, the presumption vanishes and the case must be decided 
upon the evidence presented.126  The presumption is merely a procedural 
device, not a substitute for evidence and cannot survive the introduction by 
the taxpayer of countervailing evidence.127  In this view, the presumption 
simply requires a threshold showing that a reasonable man could reach a 
conclusion favorable to the taxpayer.128 
On the other hand, some early Board decisions indicated disagreement 
with this approach and instead viewed the presumption of correctness as 
                                                                                                                       
proven to be arbitrary or careless.  See Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner 250 F.3d 
696, 702 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (1959)).  In 
such cases, not only does the presumption vanish, the burden rests on the 
Commissioner to establish the correct amount of tax owed.  Id.   
123 Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975); Potts, Davis 
& Co. v. Commissioner, 431 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1970), aff’g T.C. Memo. 
1968-257; Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969); Gersten v. 
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 199 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’g in part and rem’g in part 28 
T.C. 756 (1957); A & A Tool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300, 304 
(l0th Cir. 1950), rev’g and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 473 (1949); Crude Oil Corp. of 
America v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 809, 810 (10th Cir. 1947), rev’g and rem’g 6 T.C. 
648 (1946); Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 
1943), vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 1282 (1942); Starr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1976-289, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1291, 1293; Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 
1393 (1970), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973); Reiben v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1959-91, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 416, 418. 
124 E.g., Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969). 
125 Section 7459 provides in pertinent part:  “If a petition for a redetermination 
of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court 
dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is 
the amount determined by the Secretary.”  I.R.C. § 7459(d); see also TAX CT. R. 123 
and 149(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
126 See Capital Blue Cross v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 117, 128–29 (3d Cir. 
2005); Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68–69 (7th Cir. 1969); Federal Nat’l 
Bank of Shawnee, Oklahoma v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 494, 497–98 (l0th Cir. 
1950), rev’g and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1949); Harrison v. Commissioner, 24 
T.C. 46 (1955); see also Copelon, supra note 121, at 870; Ness, supra note 121, at 331. 
127 Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Balter, 
supra note 83, at 23; Copelon, supra note 121, at 868–69. 
128 See, e.g., Longino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-80, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1491; Starr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-289, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1291, 1294. 
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providing the source of the taxpayer’s entire burden of proof.129  These 
cases suggested that until the taxpayer successfully carried his ultimate 
burden of proof, the presumption remained a viable probative force.130  
Although the difference between the two views may be more apparent than 
real, especially in cases in which the judge is the sole trier of fact, the second 
approach generally has been rejected by the appellate courts.131  The feeling 
of these courts is that equating the presumption with the burden of proof 
may result in improperly treating the presumption as evidence.132  As a 
result, the Commissioner may be able to hide behind the deficiency notice 
in a doubtful case.133  Additionally, such treatment of the presumption does 
not provide an incentive for the trial court to evaluate properly the evidence 
presented and supplies an easy escape hatch for judicial indecision.134  More 
modern decisions issued by the Tax Court suggest that the approach of 
equating the presumption of correctness with the entire burden of proof 
has fallen by the wayside.135 
The consequences of the taxpayer’s successful overturning of the 
presumption have also been the subject of some judicial disagreement.  
Some appellate decisions have indicated that the burden of proof then 
shifts to the Commissioner to prove the deficiency.136  This view has been 
                                                     
129 Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1943), 
vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 1282 (1942); Fairmount Cemetery Ass’n v. Helvering, 79 
F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1935), rev’g and rem’g 30 B.T.A. 740 (1934). 
130 Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 963–64 (9th Cir. 
1943). 
131 Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969); Gersten v. 
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 199 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’g in part and rem’g in part 28 
T.C. 756 (1957); A & A Tool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300, 303–04 
(10th Cir. 1950), rev’g and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 473 (1949); Hemphill Schools, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1943), vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 
1282 (1942); Fairmount Cemetery Ass’n v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 163, 164 (D.C. 
Cir. 1935), rev’g and rem’g 30 B.T.A. 740 (1934). 
132 Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1943), 
vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 1282 (1942); J.M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 
F.2d 123, 124 (9th Cir. 1941). 
133 See Fairmount Cemetery Ass’n v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 163, 164 (D.C. 
Cir. 1935), rev’g and rem’g 30 B.T.A. 740 (1934). 
134 See Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 
1943), vacating and rem’g 46 B.T.A. 1282 (1942). 
135 E.g., Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1393 (1970), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973); Longino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2013-80, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1491; Starr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-289, 
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292. 
136 See Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959), rem’g 16 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 763 (1957); Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 715 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’g 
and rem’g T.C. Memo. 1957-129.  In these cases, the courts indicated that 
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criticized as running counter to the express language of the Tax Court rules, 
which place the burden of proof on the taxpayer, and has been rejected by 
the Tax Court and most appellate courts.137  The prevailing view does not 
shift the burden of going forward until the evidence adduced by the 
taxpayer is so overwhelming that it would be sufficient not only to put the 
issue in dispute, but to have the court decide the issue in the taxpayer’s 
favor on the ground that reasonable minds could not differ.138  Since the 
negation of presumption indicates solely that the taxpayer’s position may be 
correct,139 the Commissioner is not required to introduce any evidence in 
his own behalf to prevail.  The court may conclude that the taxpayer, 
although successful in reaching the threshold quantum of proof to require a 
decision on the evidence presented, has failed to carry his ultimate burden 
of persuasion.140 
Although most cases agree that the taxpayer who has the burden of 
proof must always satisfy the burden of going forward with evidence to 
rebut the presumption, courts have been divided with regard to the 
question of what the taxpayer must demonstrate to satisfy the final burden 
of persuasion.  Early decisions indicated that the burden was on the 
taxpayer not only to establish that the Commissioner’s determination was 
erroneous, but also to produce sufficient evidence from which a correct 
determination of tax liability could be made.141  For example, in Burnet v. 
                                                                                                                       
destruction of the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner.  
However, more recent cases clarify that a shift in the burden of persuasion to the 
Commissioner (requiring the Commissioner to establish the amount of the 
deficiency) occurs only when the taxpayer establishes that the determination 
contained in the notice of deficiency was arbitrary and erroneous.  See Estate of 
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 250 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2001); McCall v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-75, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1370.  
137 See Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1973); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 
T.C. 1364, 1393 (1970), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973). 
138 See Suarez v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 841, 845 (1974); Durovic v. 
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1393 (1970), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 487 F.2d 36 
(7th Cir. 1973); Reiben v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1959-91, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 
416, 418. 
139 Niederkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1958), aff’g in 
part and rem’g in part T.C. Memo. 1956-255; A & A Tool & Supply Co., 182 F.2d 
300, 304 (10th Cir. 1950), rev’g and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 473 (1949); see also 2 
LAWRENCE CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 7.3, at 9 (1958). 
140 Starr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-289, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1291, 
1294. 
141 See Mente v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1935), aff’g 29 B.T.A. 
804 (1934); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 424, 427 (4th 
Cir. 1933), aff’g and rev’g 24 B.T.A. 599 (1931); Ohio State Mortgage Co. v. 
Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1162 (1931), appeal dismissed, 59 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1932); 
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Houston,142 the taxpayer was able to demonstrate that the deficiency was 
excessive but was unable to produce sufficient proof of the correct amount 
actually due.  The Supreme Court, in a 1931 decision affirming the original 
deficiency stated:  “The impossibility of proving a material fact upon which 
the right to relief depends, simply leaves the claimant upon whom the 
burden rests with an unenforceble [sic] claim, a misfortune to be borne by 
him . . . as a result of a failure of proof.”143 
Four years later, however, in the landmark case of Helvering v. Taylor,144 
the Supreme Court implicitly rejected its earlier position.145  The Court 
stated that it could not “reasonably be held that he [a taxpayer] is bound to 
pay a tax that confessedly he does not owe, unless his evidence was 
sufficient also to establish the correct amount that lawfully might be 
charged against him.”146  Although such a stringent burden, the Court 
reasoned,147 was applicable in refund suits in which the ultimate question 
presented for decision was the amount of overpayment,148 nothing in the 
language of the Board’s burden of proof rule, the statutory language 
defining the Commissioner’s assessment procedures, or the companion 
legislative histories suggested such a burden for the taxpayer before the 
Board. The proper rule, the Court concluded, required the Board to 
redetermine the deficiency based upon the evidence presented, and not to 
require the taxpayer to prove the correct amount, or lose everything.149  
                                                                                                                       
Craven v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 78 (1930); Brown v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 
859 (1930), rev’d and rem’d in part and aff’d in part, 54 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1931); Washer 
v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 632 (1928), aff’d, 35 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1929). 
142 283 U.S. 223, 227 (1931), rev’g 39 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1930), rev’g 13 B.T.A. 279 
(1928). 
143 Id. at 228. 
144 293 U.S. 507 (1935), aff’g 70 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1934), rev’g and rem’g 27 B.T.A. 
1426 (1933). 
145 293 U.S. at 510–15.  Although the Court in Taylor did not in its decision 
specifically overrule Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931), it did distinguish the 
cases on which Burnet was based as being refund actions and stated that the burden 
in those cases was not to merely demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous 
but also to establish the exact amount to which the taxpayer was entitled. 
146 293 U.S. at 515. 
147 Id. at 514. 
148 See Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932). 
149 293 U.S. at 516. For application of the Taylor rule, see Capital Blue Cross v. 
Commissioner, 431 F.3d 117, 128–29 (3d Cir. 2005); Rockwell v. Commissioner, 
512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975); Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th 
Cir. 1969); Riss v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1967), aff’g T.C. 
Memo. 1964-190; Grubb v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1963), rev’g and 
rem’g T.C. Memo. 1961-153; Commissioner v. Smith, 285 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1960), 
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1958-210; A & A Tool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 
300 (l0th Cir. 1950), rev’g and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 473 (1949); Federal Nat’l Bank 
688            The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
Thus, in situations in which the taxpayer is unable to produce proof of the 
exact cost of property for an allowable loss deduction,150 or the precise 
amount of an expenditure for some purpose encompassed within the 
deduction provisions of the Code,151 but some reliable evidence is available 
from which a reasonable allowance can be approximated, the Tax Court 
generally will order a corresponding reduction of the deficiency.152 
Despite the difficulties of identifying the nature of the burden on the 
taxpayer, the decision to place the burden of proof on the taxpayer has met 
with little controversy during the Board/Tax Court’s existence.153  When 
the Board, in promulgating its first rules of practice and procedure,154 chose 
to place the burden of proof on the taxpayer, it was following a long 
recognized principle that administrative actions of Government are 
presumed correct.155 
Nonetheless, limited criticism of this decision was expressed in hearings 
dealing with the 1926 Revenue Act.  One witness asserted that the rule 
placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer was “contrary to the rule that 
obtains in any court outside of France . . . [in that] the taxpayer is required 
to come into court and prove he is innocent.”156  Another stated that 
                                                                                                                       
of Shawnee, Oklahoma v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 494, 497 (l0th Cir. 1950), rev’g 
and rem’g 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1949); National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 
F.2d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1943), aff’g 43 B.T.A. 1209 (l941). 
150 Gutwirth v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 666 (1963); Brown v. Commissioner, 24 
T.C. 256 (1955); Abraham v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 222 (1947). 
151 Cohan v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 743 (1928), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976); 
Green v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 538 (l976); Durovic v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 480 
(1975), for applications of the “Cohan” rule.   
152 The leading case in this area is Cohan v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 743 (1928), 
aff’d in part and rev'd in part, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).  In Cohan, the Board upheld 
the Commissioner’s disallowance of certain travel and entertainment expenses.  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit stated that absolute certainty in the amount of an 
expense was usually impossible, and was unnecessary as the Board should make as 
close an approximation as it can, so long as the evidence indicated that the taxpayer 
had spent sums allowable as deductions.  Although strict requirements for 
substantiation of travel and entertainment deductions are presently required under 
§ 274(d), the “Cohan” rule has been broadly asserted by the Tax Court in other 
situations.  See generally Casey, supra note 114, for a further analysis of the “Cohan” 
rule. 
153 See supra note 113. 
154 B.T.A. RULE 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.). 
155 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 600 (1931). 
156 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, at 877.  Mr. Gore, representing the 
American Institute of Accountants was adamant in his belief that the burden of 
proof should be on the Commissioner: 
It seems to us that if the Commissioner has a warrant for the proposition of 
an additional assessment, the proof ought to be at hand, before him, and 
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taxpayers, under threat of criminal and civil sanctions for filing false 
statements of taxable income should have their returns accorded a prima 
facie correct status,157 and thus, the Commissioner, if he asserted a 
deficiency, should be required to disprove the validity of the return.158 
Nonetheless, strong arguments existed against changing the established 
rule.  The taxpayer was the party most familiar with the facts upon which he 
based his return and was considered to be in a better position to produce 
evidence supporting these facts if called upon to do so.159  In this 
connection, there were those who gloomily predicted that if the burden of 
proof was placed on the Commissioner, 24 out of 25 cases otherwise won 
by the Commissioner would be lost.160  In fact, one commentator was of 
the opinion that if the burden of proof was placed on the Commissioner, 
“[y]ou might as well repeal the income tax law and pass the hat, because you 
will practically be saying to the taxpayer, How much do you want to 
contribute toward the support of the government? and in that case they 
would have to decide for themselves.”161 
Moreover, the burden of proof rule in the Board closely corresponded 
to that applicable in refund actions in Federal district court and the Court 
of Claims, in which taxpayers had the burden of proving that they had 
overpaid their tax.162  Additionally, since Congress was not constitutionally 
required to provide pre-assessment judicial-type review in tax disputes, 
limiting such review with restrictive procedural rules could not be regarded 
as unfair.163 Finally, the taxpayer was the petitioner in Board litigation, and 
                                                                                                                       
having the proof, it is of no embarrassment for him to come before the 
Board of Tax Appeals and present the proof.  We know of no reason why 
the right of the taxpayer should be sacrificed to the convenience of the 
Commissioner where it is a matter of the Commissioner contending that 
the taxpayer is wrong. 
Id. at 877; see also Hopkins, supra note 114, at 470. 
157 Hopkins, supra note 114, at 470. 
158 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, at 877 (testimony of Mr. Gore).  The 
Senate, during its deliberations on the 1926 Act added a provision which made the 
return of the taxpayer prima facie evidence of its correctness.  In conference, the 
amendment was rejected, the conference committee stating that such a provision 
would alter the burden of proof in Board cases and hence, would be inappropriate.  
H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 39 (1925). 
159 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, at 908, 930 (statements of Mr. Ivins 
and Mr. Hamel); see also John E. McClure, Practice Before the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, 
6 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 92 (1928). 
160 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, at 908 (statement of Mr. Ivins). 
161 Id. at 907. 
162 Id. at 908. 
163 See Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (1975). 
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American jurisprudence has generally placed the burden of proof on the 
party invoking the jurisdiction of the tribunal.164 
The advocates of the status quo were successful in maintaining the 
burden of proof rule originally promulgated in 1924.165  In a 1989 opinion, 
the United States Claims Court succinctly summarized the standard 
allocation of the burden of proof in tax proceedings in the following terms:   
 
[The] presumption [of correctness] in favor of the Commissioner is a 
procedural device that requires the plaintiff to go forward with prima 
facie evidence to support a finding contrary to the Commissioner’s 
determination.  Once this procedural burden is satisfied, “the 
taxpayer must still carry [the] ultimate burden of proof or 
persuasion” on the merits.  Thus, the plaintiff not only has the 
burden of establishing that the Commissioner’s determination was 
incorrect, but also of establishing the merit of its claims by a 




Prior to the enactment of § 7491,167 the principal statutory exception to 
the general rule that places the burden of proof on the taxpayer concerned 
the issue of civil tax fraud.168  However, the burden on the Commissioner 
to prove fraud has not always been provided by statute.169  Under the 1924 
Revenue Act, Congress provided the Board with the power to prescribe its 
own rules of practice, procedure, and evidence,170 and in its first rules, the 
Board required that the taxpayer “shall open and close and the burden of 
proof shall be upon him.”171  Although in refund cases, the burden of proof 
with respect to fraud was upon the party alleging it; hence the Government 
had the responsibility of proving fraud.  Yet early Board decisions indicated 
that Board members were following the straightforward language of the 
rule and were placing the burden of disproving fraud on the taxpayer.172  
                                                     
164 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, at 907–08 (statement of Mr. Ivins). 
165 Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337 with Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 107. 
166 Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 593–94 (1989) 
(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).    
167 Section 7491 is addressed in Section C.4 below.  
168 I.R.C. § 7454(a). 
169 Compare I.R.C. § 7454(a) with Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 
Stat. 337. 
170 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
171 B.T.A. RULE 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.). 
172 See Ginsburg v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 417, 421 (1928), appeal dismissed, 
48 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1930); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 656, 658 
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Few complaints were heard against this practice during the first two years 
of the Board’s existence.173  This lack of criticism may have stemmed from 
the fact that prior to 1926, an action before the Board was little more than a 
“preliminary skirmish,”174 and a party aggrieved by a decision of the Board 
could bring a collateral action and have a trial de novo on issues of fact and 
law.175  As a result of the 1926 legislation, however, the Board’s decisions 
were no longer open to collateral attack; direct appellate review of the 
Board’s decisions was substituted.176  Nevertheless, the Board did not 
change its rule regarding burden of proof in fraud cases, and criticism was 
soon forthcoming.177  The practice was condemned as inconsistent with 
fundamental concepts of Anglo-Saxon and American penal procedure,178 
under which the burden of proof in respect of fraud was invariably placed 
upon the party asserting it.179  Additionally, there was reference to 
suspicions prevalent at the time that the Bureau occasionally alleged fraud 
in cases in which no evidence of fraud existed, simply to avoid the running 
of the period of limitations.180 
                                                                                                                       
(1927). Cf. F.W. Lukins, 3 B.T.A. 204, 209 (1925) (the Board stated that proof of 
fraud was upon the Commissioner in cases in which he had not asserted the 
penalty as part of the deficiency). 
173 An examination of the 1925 House Hearings, supra note 113, indicates that 
no specific suggestions were proposed concerning proof of fraud.  Additionally, 
case law indicates that although the Board applied the presumption of correctness 
to an assertion of a fraud penalty in the notice of deficiency, and required the 
taxpayer to carry the burden of proof, the quantum of proof necessary to overturn 
any presumption of fraudulent intent was minimal.  See Humphreys v. 
Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 656, 658 (1927) (uncontradicted testimony of the taxpayer 
was sufficient to overcome the presumption of fraud). 
174 Blair v. Commissioner, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (1928).  
175 Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origin and Function, in 
THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 36 (1955). 
176 Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337 with Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001, l003(a), 44 Stat. 109, 110; see also CHARLES D. HAMEL, 
PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE U.S. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 168 (1938) 
[hereinafter cited as C. Hamel]. 
177 Letter from ABA Special Committee on Federal Taxation to William Green, 
Chairman, Joint Tax Committee, June 15, 1927, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Burden of Proof: Memoranda & Correspondence;” see also Appeal Procedures 
Changed, 5 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 292 (1927); Hopkins, supra note 114, at 470. 
178 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1928, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 70th Cong., 
1st Sess. 25 (1928) [hereinafter cited as 1928 Senate Hearings]; Hearings on Revenue 
Revision, 1928, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 
(1928). 
179 Id. at 26. 
180 Id. at 25. 
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The analogy of the civil fraud provision to a criminal penalty was not 
lost on Congress,181 and the statutory delegation of power given the Board 
to prescribe its rules of practice and procedure was modified by an express 
provision in the Revenue Act of 1928 that placed the burden of proving 
fraud on the Commissioner.182  Even in the absence of the 1928 
amendment, it is likely that the Board’s original burden of proof rule as to 
fraud could not have persisted for long.  In Budd v. Commissioner,183 decided 
prior to the 1928 change, the Board decided the fraud issue adversely to the 
taxpayer by holding that he had not satisfied his burden of proof.  On 
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the Board,184 holding that it was bound to 
follow the general principle of evidence that the party who alleges fraud 
must prove it.185  The court reasoned that under the 1924 Revenue Act, 
which provided that the Board could promulgate its own rules of evidence 
and procedure, the Board had the power to alter such a basic principle.186  
However, the 1926 Revenue Act took away the power of the Board to 
formulate its own rules of evidence, and instead required the Board to look 
to the rules of evidence applicable in the equity courts in the District of 
Columbia.187  Because the burden of proof rule was a rule of evidence,188 
and since equity courts in the District followed the traditional rule, the 
Board had no power to place the burden of disproving fraud on the 
taxpayer.189  In the view of the Third Circuit, the 1928 amendment was 
merely declaratory of existing law.190 
With the change in the burden of proof rule, situations arose in which 
the necessity of the Commissioner proving fraud was questioned.191  First, 
                                                     
181 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 38 (1928). 
182 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 851, § 601, 45 Stat. 872, amending Revenue Act of 
1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 107.  For a discussion of the new statutory 
amendment and a proposed change in the Board’s rules of practice to reflect the 
amendment, see Memorandum from Chairman Littleton to members of the Board, 
June 12, 1928, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Burden of Proof: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” In 1931, the Board revised its rule to reflect the change.  Compare 
B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.) with B.T.A. RULE 30 (May 1, 1928 ed.). 
183 12 B.T.A. 490 (1928). 
184 43 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1930). 
185 Id. at 512. 
186 See id.  
187 Id. 
188 See Central Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915). 
189 43 F.2d at 512. 
190 Id. at 513. 
191 See Memorandum from J. Murdock, Chairman, Rules Committee, to Rules 
Committee, Feb. 23, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum entitled “Suggestions Relating to 
Board Procedures and Functioning,” c. 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum from R. 
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if the taxpayer, ignoring Board pleading rules, failed to reply to an allegation 
of fraud asserted in the Commissioner’s answer, would that failure to reply 
be deemed an admission of fraud and thereby relieve the Commissioner of 
his burden?192  Second, if the taxpayer failed to appear at trial, should the 
decision of the Board dismissing the proceeding result in a determination as 
to the fraud penalty without the Commissioner offering proof on the 
issue?193  The initial treatment of these questions was varied194 and provided 
strong impetus for reconsideration of prevalent Board practices.  As a 
result, the reply rule was modified substantially to prevent harsh results 
from a failure to respond.195  Additionally, the Board rules committee 
suggested that the general practice of including the fraud penalty in the 
decision of the Board upon the taxpayer’s default be expressly authorized 
by statutory amendment.196  Although no such amendment has ever been 
enacted, subsequent decisions by the Board/Tax Court have uniformly 
included the fraud penalty without the Commissioner producing proof 
upon default by the taxpayer.197 
                                                                                                                       
Miller to J. Murdock, Chairman, Rules Committee, May 11, 1937, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Letter from 
R. Miller to J. Murdock, Chairman, Rules Committee, Apr. 26, 1937, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
192 Under the Board’s rules of practice, a reply to a statement of facts contained 
in the answer supporting issues in respect of which the burden of proof was placed 
on the Commissioner was required.  B.T.A. RULE 15 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  Every 
material allegation set out in the answer and not denied in the reply, where a reply 
was required, would be deemed admitted.  B.T.A. RULE 9 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.).  For 
an application of these rules, see Statler v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 342, 345 (1932). 
193 Memorandum from R. Miller to J. Murdock, Chairman, Rules Committee, 
Apr. 28, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.”  
194 See Kerbaugh v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1014, 1017 (1934), aff’d, 74 F.2d 
749 (lst Cir. 1935); Statler v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 342, 345 (1932). 
195 Compare B.T.A. RULE 18 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.) with B.T.A. RULE 19 (Feb. 1, 1931 
ed.). 
196 Report of Board Members of Joint Committee, c. 1937, at 19, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Letter 
from S. Surrey to L. Morris, Aug. 2, 1937, at 4, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
197 Doncaster v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 334, 337 (1981); Gilday v. 
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 260, 262 (1974); Morris v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 928, 929 
(1958).  Cf. Black v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 474 (1953) (holding that the 
Commissioner’s burden of proof was sustained by an order of the court that the 
undenied affirmative allegations contained in his amended pleading be deemed 
admitted by the taxpayer).  Pursuant to the Tax Court rules, “when any party has 
failed to plead or otherwise proceed as provided by these Rules . . . such party may 
be held in default . . . on motion of another party. . . .  Thereafter, the Court may 
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Apart from situations in which the taxpayer defaults and the 
Commissioner is spared the necessity of producing evidence, the burden of 
proof in respect of fraud requires that fraud be proved by more than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.198  The evidence must be of a clear and 
convincing nature199 and must be more than suspicions or mere probability 
of dereliction.200  In certain circumstances, however, the burden of proof 
may be met by a consistent pattern of income understatement over a 
number of years.201  Additionally, conviction on criminal tax fraud 
charges,202 either by a plea of guilty or after trial and verdict, conclusively 
establishes fraud for civil penalty purposes, and the taxpayer is collaterally 
estopped from introducing evidence on the issue for the same tax years.203  
Finally, conviction for willful failure to file a timely return,204 without more, 
does not of itself establish the elements of fraud necessary to impose the 
civil penalty.205 
 
3. New Matter 
   
Perhaps the most controversial exception to the rule that the taxpayer 
bears the burden of proof involves “new matter” pleaded in the 
Commissioner’s answer.  Tax Court rules specify that the burden shall be 
on the Commissioner “in respect of any new matter, increases in deficiency, 
and affirmative defenses, pleaded in his answer.”206  Under the prior burden 
of proof rule, all of these categories were collectively described as “new 
                                                                                                                       
enter a decision against the defaulting party upon such terms and conditions as the 
Court may deem proper . . . .” TAX CT. R. 123(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
198 E.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 915, 918 (1969); Gano v. 
Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 518, 532–34 (1930). 
199 TAX CT. R. 142(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
200 Shultze v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 444, 447 (1929). 
201  Compare Hounsell v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 611 (1950) with Arlette 
Coat Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 751 (1950); see also Paul P. Lipton, Recent Civil 
Fraud Cases—Problems of Burden of Proof, 31 TAXES 110 (1953). 
202  I.R.C. § 7201. 
203 Gammill v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 607 (1974); Amos v. Commissioner, 43 
T.C. 50 (1964), aff’d, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965); see also Harry Graham Balter, Tax 
Court Switch: New Case Holds Criminal Conviction Proves “Fraud” in Civil Action, 22 J. 
TAX’N 104 (1965).  A conviction based on a nolo plea, however, does not 
conclusively establish fraud in a subsequent Tax Court proceeding.  See Mickler v. 
Fahs, 243 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1965); Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 
1963); see also John M. Bray, Nolo Pleas in Tax Cases, 26 TAX LAW. 435, 437 (1973). 
204  I.R.C. § 7203. 
205  Anderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1973-155, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 762; 
Arconti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-215, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 945. 
206  TAX CT. R. 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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matter.”207  Since the early years of the Board, this term has proven difficult 
to define and has been the subject of varying judicial interpretations.208  Its 
trifurcation in the current rules has eased the problem to some degree, but 
by its nature, “new matter” is an elusive concept and will probably continue 
to be so. 
Under the original rules of the Board, the burden of proof was on the 
taxpayer without exception.209  Thus, strictly construing the language of the 
rule, the Commissioner could assert an increased deficiency from that 
originally claimed, and the burden of disproving the increased amount 
would remain on the taxpayer.  Nonetheless, statements by Board 
members, both in decisions and in hearings before the Ways and Means 
Committee, indicated that the Board was shifting the burden of proof to 
the Commissioner if he requested such affirmative relief in his answer.210  
In 1926, the Board formally amended its rule to require that if “any new 
matter of fact” was pleaded in the Commissioner’s answer,211 the burden of 
proof in respect of the “new matter” would be on the Commissioner.  A 
further change in the rule occurred in 1931, when the Board removed the 
words “of fact” as modifying “new matter.”212   Although the rule was to 
remain unchanged until the 1974 revision,213 dissatisfaction with the 
wording of the rule surfaced as early as 1937 in deliberations of the Board’s 
rules committee.  At that time, various proposals were advanced to define 
“new matter” more precisely.  One suggestion considered substitution of 
the term “additional deficiency” for “new matter.”214  Another suggestion 
                                                     
207  Compare TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 32 (Jan. 25, 
1971 ed.). 
208  See generally Balter, supra note 83; Forman, supra note 120; Whitfield & 
McCallum, supra note 120. 
209  B.T.A. RULE 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.).   
210  General Lead Batteries Co., 2 B.T.A. 392, 395 (1925); 1925 House Hearings, 
supra note 113, at 907.  
211  Compare B.T.A. RULE 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.) with B.T.A. RULE 30 (Apr. 1, 
1926 ed.). 
212  Compare B.T.A. RULE 30 (Apr. 1, 1926 ed.) with B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1. 
1931 ed.). 
213  Compare B.T.A. RULE 30 (Feb. 1, 1931 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 32 (Jan. 25, 1971 
ed.) and TAX CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
214  Memorandum from S. Surrey, Joint Committee member, to L. Morris, 
Chairman, Joint Committee, Aug. 2, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Memorandum from R. 
Ryan, Joint Committee member, to L. Morris, Chairman, Joint Committee, May 14, 
1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
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would have substituted “affirmative defenses” for “new matter.”215 These 
proposals, however, were rejected, primarily in the belief that they were too 
limiting and that other circumstances might also constitute “new matter.”216 
Thus, the rules committee opted for the flexibility offered by continued 
judicial construction of the term. 
As subsequently interpreted, “new matter” came to be comprised of 
four distinct categories: increased deficiencies, new adjustments, affirmative 
defenses, and new theories.  The first and third of these categories were 
culled from “new matter” in the 1974 revision of the Tax Court rules and 
are now stated specifically in the burden of proof rule as situations in which 
the burden is on the Commissioner.217 The second and fourth categories 
remain as elements of “new matter.” 
The first of the traditional pre-1974 categories of “new matter” involves 
the assertion in the Commissioner’s answer or amended answer of an 
increased deficiency.218  Thus, if the Commissioner originally determines a 
deficiency by disallowing one-half of a taxpayer’s moving expense and 
subsequently asserts in the answer or amended answer that the entire 
moving expense should be disallowed, the burden of proving the additional 
deficiency rests with the Commissioner. 
The second type of “new matter” arises if the Commissioner claims a 
new or different adjustment from that originally made in the deficiency 
notice.219 For example, if the Commissioner disallows a moving expense 
deduction in the deficiency notice and subsequently asserts in the answer or 
amended answer that the moving expense is properly allowable, but a 
medical deduction is not, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof with 
respect to the disallowance of the medical deduction. 
The Board/Tax Court has had little difficulty in its application of the 
first two categories.  Since the deficiency notice is accorded a presumption 
of correctness, it would be theoretically inconsistent to allow the 
Commissioner to subsequently increase or change the original adjustments 
and still retain the benefit of the presumption as to the new or different 
                                                     
215  Memorandum to J. Murdock, Chairman, Rules Committee, Nov. 19, 1937, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
216  Joint Committee Report, supra note 19, at 9. 
217  TAX CT. R. 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
218  E.g., Estate of Cordeiro v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 195, 203 (1968); Estate 
of Schneider v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 940, 956 (1958); Winston v. Commissioner, 
15 T.C.M. (CCH) 477 (1956); Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 10 
T.C. 7 (1948); Hull v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 265, 266 (1929).  Accord, Brook v. 
Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 346 (1969). 
219  E.g., Tauber v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179 (1955); Cedar Valley Distillery, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 870 (1951); General Lead Batteries, 2 B.T.A. 392 
(1925). 
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adjustments.220 Additionally, the burden of proof traditionally has been 
placed on the party who requests affirmative relief in his pleadings.221 
The third category comprises affirmative defenses asserted in the answer 
or amended answer.  Such affirmative defenses include res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, estoppel, waiver, duress, fraud, and the statute of 
limitations.222  Although the original burden of proof rule was silent as to 
affirmative defenses, it was clear that such defenses asserted in the answer 
were considered “new matter” and the burden of proof was accordingly 
shifted.223 
The final category of “new matter” consists of those situations in which 
the Commissioner asserts in the answer or at trial a new or different reason 
for the same adjustment made in the deficiency notice.224 Unlike the 
increased deficiency, different adjustment, or affirmative defense, the 
development of this category has been a more recent occurrence and 
denotes an expansive interpretation of “new matter” from the previous, 
more limited approach.225  Early Board/Tax Court decisions indicated that 
the sole matter for decision was the correctness of the adjustment made to 
the taxpayer’s income in the deficiency notice.226  The issue was not 
conceived as being the sufficiency of the reasoning assigned in the 
deficiency notice for such adjustment.227 In this connection, it was held that 
                                                     
220  Cascade Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 946, 948 
(1932); see also Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 57 (1957). 
221  CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 337, at 785 (2d ed. 1972). 
222  TAX CT. R. 39 and 142(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
223  Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 260, 261–62 (4th Cir. 1937); 1925 House 
Hearings, supra note 113, at 907; Memorandum entitled “Suggested Changes in 
Rules of Practice of the Board of Tax Appeals,” c. 1937, at 7, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Responsive Pleadings: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Jackson 
Memorandum, supra note 49, at 22. 
224  F.T.D. Florists, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 333 (1976); Jayne v. 
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 744, 748 (1974); Horvath v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 551 
(1973); Estate of Falese v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895 (1972); McSpadden v. 
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 478, 492–93 (1968); Estate of Scharf v. Commissioner, 38 
T.C. 15 (1962), aff’d, 316 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1963); see also Estate of Emerson v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612 (1977). 
225  Compare C. Hamel, supra note 176, at 141 n.51 with Rules Comm. Note, TAX 
CT. R. 142(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
226  Estate of Finder v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 411, 423 (1961); Fleischmann v. 
Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 672 (1939); Chipley v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1103, 
1106 (1932); Gossett v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1279, 1284 (1931), aff’d, 59 F.2d 
365 (4th Cir. 1932); Brown v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 859 (1930), rev’d in part, 54 
F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1931). 
227  Bair v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1952); 
Carnrick v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 12 (1930). 
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the Commissioner need not assign any reason whatsoever for a specific 
adjustment.228  So long as the Commissioner did not allege a new reason for 
the deficiency that would result in an increased deficiency or a new 
adjustment, he was free to assign any reason without concern that the 
burden of proof would shift.229  For example, if the Commissioner had 
determined a deficiency by disallowance of a bad debt deduction and gave 
as his reason that the debt had been paid, he could, at trial, or in his answer, 
allege the additional reason that no debt had ever existed and the burden of 
proof as to both theories would remain on the taxpayer.  Since the two 
reasons were directed at the same adjustment, the Board/Tax Court 
believed that this additional and different reason was not “new matter,” 
even though different factual issues might be put in dispute.230 
Nonetheless, subsequent commentary and judicial decisions suggest that 
such an approach does not withstand careful analysis.231  “Burden of proof 
has meaning only in relation to disputed issues of fact.”232  Accordingly, 
modern Tax Court decisions have broken from the early line of cases and 
now indicate that in cases in which the Commissioner raises a new theory 
to sustain a deficiency, and such new theory necessitates the presentation of 
different evidence, the Commissioner shall bear the burden of proving any 
factual matter on which the new theory is based.233  Thus, if the 
Commissioner asserts in the deficiency notice that a bad debt deduction is 
disallowed on the ground that the debt was paid, and subsequently raises 
the issue that no debt ever existed, the Commissioner would have the 
burden of proving the new allegation.   
On the other hand, if the new position taken by the Commissioner 
merely clarifies or develops the original determination in a manner that is 
not inconsistent with the original position, the new theory does not rise to 
the level of a new matter that otherwise would operate to shift the burden 
                                                     
228 Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 973, 998 (1941), aff’d, 129 F.2d 
363 (7th Cir. 1942). 
229  Estate of Scharf v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 15 (1962), aff’d, 316 F.2d 625 
(7th Cir. 1963); Bair v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff’d, 199 F.2d 589 (2d 
Cir. 1952); Fleischmann v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 672, 682 (1939). 
230  Fleischmann v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 672, 682 (1939). 
231  Whitfield & McCallum, supra note 120, at 1186; see also Sanderling, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 743 (1976); Estate of Falese v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 895 
(1972). 
232  Whitfield & McCallum, supra note 120, at 1186. 
233  See Wayne Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 500 (1989); Achiro v. 
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 
612 (1977); F.T.D. Florists, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 333 (1976); Sanderling, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 743 (1976); Horvath v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 551 
(1973); Estate of Gorby v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 80 (1969). 
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of proof. 234  The bounds of when a new theory raised by the 
Commissioner will not be considered a new matter for burden-of-proof 
purposes were tested in Sorin v. Commissioner.235  In Sorin, the Commissioner 
had determined a deficiency without providing any specific Code provision 
as a reason for his determination.  At the hearing, the Commissioner raised 
a specific Code section as a more specific ground for his position.236  In 
refusing to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, the court 
concluded that “when the determination is made in indefinite and general 
terms, and [the reason advanced] is not inconsistent with some position 
necessarily implicit in the determination itself . . .,” no “new matter” is 
raised.237  Such an approach has been criticized as encouraging overly broad 
and uninformative deficiency notices.238   
 
4. Reassignment of Burden of Proof Pursuant to Section 7491 
 
a. General Rule 
 
As part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998,239 Congress modified the prevailing burden-of-proof norms in tax 
cases through the enactment of § 7491.  On its face, the most significant 
change introduced by the statute is the prospect of the taxpayer shifting the 
burden of proof to the Commissioner under § 7491(a)(1).  Congress was 
concerned that individuals and small businesses stood at a disadvantage 
when forced to litigate against the Service, and that the general presumption 
of correctness in favor of the Commissioner contributed to that 
disadvantage.240  Accordingly, Congress set out to craft an exception that 
would place the burden of proving factual matters on the Commissioner in 
cases where the individual or small business taxpayer cooperated with the 
Service and satisfied the relevant substantiation and recordkeeping 
requirements.  The shifting of the burden of proof was believed to 
effectuate a better balance in the parties’ relative litigating postures without 
encouraging tax avoidance.241  Consistent with the motivation to level the 
                                                     
234  Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612 (1977); Estate of Jayne v. 
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 744 (1974). 
235  29 T.C. 959 (1958), aff’d per curiam, 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1961). 
236  Id. at 968. 
237  Id. at 969. 
238  For an analysis of the deficiency notice, see Part VI.A.2.b. 
239  Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3001(a), 112 Stat. 685, 727.  Section 7491 is 
applicable to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations 
commenced after the July 22, 1998 effective date of the legislation.  Id. § 3001(c), 
112 Stat. at 727.     
240  See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 44 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-599 at 238 (1998).   
241  S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 44 (1998).   
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litigating playing field, a shift in the burden of proof is available only to 
those non-individual taxpayers (specifically, corporations, partnerships, and 
trusts) whose net worth does not exceed $7 million.242   
Section 7491(a)(1) imposes several conditions on the taxpayer’s ability to 
shift the burden of proof, all of which the taxpayer bears the burden of 
establishing.243  Most significantly, the taxpayer must introduce “credible 
evidence” with respect to a factual matter relevant to ascertaining the 
taxpayer’s tax liability.244  As explained in the report of the Senate Finance 
Committee, credible evidence for this purpose “is the quality of evidence 
which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to 
base a decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted 
(without regard to the judicial presumption of correctness).”245  Hence, the 
statute requires the taxpayer to satisfy the burden of production in order to 
shift the ultimate burden of proof (that is, the burden of persuasion) to the 
Commissioner.246   
Not all evidence offered by the taxpayer contributes to the 
establishment of the credible evidence prerequisite.  As the modifier 
“credible” indicates, only evidence that a court determines is worthy of 
belief will assist the taxpayer in satisfying the evidentiary prerequisite.247  In 
that regard, the Senate Finance Committee specifically noted that 
“implausible factual assertions, frivolous claims, or tax protestor-type 
arguments” will not contribute to the establishment of credible evidence of 
the taxpayer’s factual position.248   
                                                     
242 See I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(C) (incorporating net worth limitation of 
§ 7430(c)(4)(C)(A)(ii), which in turn incorporates the definition of a party under the 
first sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)).   
243  See Hibgee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438 (2001).  Additionally, the 
taxpayer must raise the prospect of § 7491(a)(1) at trial to permit the Commissioner 
to present evidence that the statutory conditions had not been satisfied.  The 
taxpayer may not raise § 7491(a)(1) for the first time in post-trial briefing.  See 
Estate of Deputy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-176, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497.   
244  I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1).   
245  S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45 (1998). 
246  See Philip N. Jones, The Burden of Proof Under the ’98 Act—Not Much Substance 
Under All That Smoke, 90 J. TAX’N 133, 134 (Mar. 1999) (detailing distinction 
between burden or production and burden of persuasion in tax setting).  
Interestingly, Congress expressly employed the concept of “burden of production” 
in § 7491(c), which places the burden of production on the Commissioner with 
respect to penalties and additions to tax.   
247  See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45–46 (1998).  As explained by the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Blodgett v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 
2005), the prospect of a court rejecting testimony as incredible is “not only 
fundamental since incredible testimony, axiomatically, cannot constitute credible 
evidence, but this concept is contained within the definition of credible evidence.”   
248  See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45 (1998).   
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In addition to establishing credible evidence of the taxpayer’s factual 
position, the taxpayer must satisfy a host of prerequisites enumerated in 
§ 7491(a)(2) before the burden of persuasion will be shifted to the 
Commissioner.  First, the taxpayer must comply with all substantiation 
requirements provided in the Code and the regulations issued thereunder.249  
The second prerequisite shares a similar documentation theme by requiring 
the taxpayer to maintain all of the records required by the Code and 
regulations.250  As the first two prerequisites under § 7491(a)(2) appear to be 
legal requirements of the tax treatment sought by the taxpayer, they 
effectively amount to reminders rather than meaningful conditions to the 
potential burden shift under § 7491(a).  A shift in the burden of proof 
concerning a factual matter relating to the tax treatment of an item is 
irrelevant if the claimed tax treatment is not permitted as a matter of law.   
The third prerequisite is more intriguing.  The taxpayer must 
“cooperate” with all reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, 
information, documents, meetings, and interviews.251  As explained in the 
legislative materials accompanying this provision, the notion of full 
cooperation for this purpose entails providing the Secretary with 
“reasonable assistance” in obtaining access and inspection of witnesses, 
information, and documents that are not within the taxpayer’s control, even 
if the witnesses or other items are located in a foreign country.252  Although 
not expressly stated in the statute, the legislative materials provide that a 
“necessary element” of the taxpayer’s full cooperation with the Secretary is 
the taxpayer’s exhaustion of his or her administrative remedies—including 
the exhaustion of any appeal rights provided by the Service.253  However, 
the legislative materials clarify that a taxpayer will not be viewed as failing to 
cooperate for this purpose simply by refusing to extend the statute of 
limitations on assessment.254  The “full cooperation” prerequisite therefore 
injects a measure of strategy into the litigation process:  Does the cost to 
the taxpayer of (1) providing reasonable assistance to the Service in its fact 
gathering process and (2) fully exhausting available administrative remedies 
(including pursuing the case before the IRS Office of Appeals) justify the 
benefit to be achieved from the shift in the burden of proof?255  Given the 
                                                     
249  I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 239–40 (1998) 
(“[I]f a taxpayer required to substantiate an item fails to do so in the manner 
required (or destroys the substantiation), this burden of proof provision is 
inapplicable.”). 
250  I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(B).   
251  Id.   
252  H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, at 56 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45 (1998).    
253  H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, at 56–57 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45 (1998).    
254  S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 45 (1998). 
255  See Jones, supra note 246, at 135 (detailing the downside to the taxpayer of 
seeking to comply with the § 7491(a) conditions).    
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limited benefit of the burden shift described below, the § 7491(a) calculus 
may not justify a change in taxpayer behavior.  
Despite the apparent significance of shifting the burden of proof to the 
Commissioner under § 7491(a)(1), the provision appears to have had little 
practical effect.256  The report of the Senate Finance Committee describes 
the potential payoff of § 7491(a)(1) as follows:  “If after evidence from both 
sides, the court believes that the evidence is equally balanced, the court shall 
find that the Secretary has not sustained his burden of proof.”257  Hence, 
the shift in the burden of proof under § 7491(a)(1) will be meaningful only 
in the rare instance of an evidentiary tie.  The provision therefore appears 
more symbolic than substantive.258 
The Tax Court quickly fell into a practice of not addressing the merits of 
the taxpayer’s contention that § 7491(a)(1) shifted the burden of proof to 
the Commissioner, noting that it was deciding the matter on the 
preponderance of the evidence.  As a result, the court dispensed with the 
taxpayer’s invocation of § 7491(a) as irrelevant.  However, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals took issue with this practice in Griffin v. 
Commissioner.259   
At trial, the Tax Court in Griffin determined that the taxpayers had 
produced no credible evidence that certain real estate tax payments made 
on behalf of their closely held corporations constituted ordinary and 
necessary expenses of the taxpayers’ individual trades or businesses 
(separate and apart from the trades or businesses in which the corporations 
engaged).  Accordingly, the court rejected the taxpayers’ invocation of the 
burden shifting rule of § 7491(a).260  Nonetheless, the court explained by 
way of footnote that even if the burden of proof had been placed on the 
Commissioner, “we would decide this issue in his favor based on the 
                                                     
256  See Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change in the 
Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 PITT L. REV. 61, 81 (2008) (concluding 
that “[o]verall, the change in the burden of proof in the Act did not have a 
statistically significant effect on those cases decided within the Tax Court when the 
taxpayer was an individual”).  But see John R. Gardner & Benjamin R. Norman, 
Effects of the Shift in the Disposition of Tax Cases, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1357, 
1374–75 (2003) (observing that it is “largely inconclusive” whether the taxpayer or 
the Government has fared better in terms of percentage victories following the 
legislation, but concluding that the shift in the burden of proof under § 7491 
“likely” had a positive effect on taxpayers resulting from the reduction in the 
number of cases brought by the Government).   
257  S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 46 (1998).  
258  See Jones, supra note 246, at 135 (“Thus, it appears that the new shift in the 
burden of proof in credible evidence cases is an example of Congress claiming to 
have made a significant change for the benefit of taxpayers, without having made a 
significant change at all.”).   
259  315 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2003).   
260  T.C. Memo. 2002-6, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1058, 1061–62.   
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preponderance of the evidence.”261  The Circuit Court of Appeals, on the 
other hand, held that the taxpayer’s testimony supplied the requisite 
“credible evidence” required under § 7491(a)(1), and directed the Tax Court 
to explain how the Commissioner had met his burden of proving that the 
payments did not relate to an individual trade or business of the 
taxpayers.262  The appellate court chided the Tax Court in the process, 
declaring, “It is not sufficient to summarily conclude that the outcome is 
the same regardless of who bears the burden of proof; if that were the case, 
§ 7491(a) would have no meaning.”263  On remand, bound by the appellate 
court’s determination that the taxpayers had introduced credible evidence 
of deductibility, the Tax Court held for the taxpayers on the basis that the 
Commissioner had not offered sufficient evidence to the contrary.264   
Following its apparent injection of a measure of fortitude into the 
shifting of the burden of proof under § 7491(a)(1) in Griffin, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the practical consequence of a shift in 
the burden of proof—this time, however, in the context of a new matter—
in Polack v. Commissioner.265  As in Griffin, the Tax Court had concluded that 
it need not determine whether the burden of proof had been shifted to the 
Commissioner because the court decided the case on a preponderance of 
the evidence.266  However, in Polack, the Eighth Circuit agreed.  Without 
mentioning its prior decision in Griffin, the appellate court observed that 
“‘[t]he shifting of an evidentiary burden of preponderance is of practical 
consequence only in the rare event of an evidentiary tie . . . .’”267 
Recognizing an “apparent conflict in precedents on the significance of 
the shifting burden of proof,” the Eighth Circuit resolved the conflict in 
Blodgett v. Commissioner.268  In short, the panel in Blodgett favored the 
approach of Polack.  The court explained as follows: 
 
There is a simple reason for our choice.  In a situation in which 
both parties have satisfied their burden of production by offering 
some evidence, then the party supported by the weight of the 
evidence will prevail regardless of which party bore the burden of 
persuasion, proof or preponderance. Therefore, a shift in the 
                                                     
261  Id. at 1061 n.4.   
262  315 F.3d at 1022.   
263  Id.   
264  Griffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-64, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1084, 
1086.   
265  366 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2004).   
266  Polack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-145, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1811, 
1814 n.7.   
267  Polack, 366 F.3d at 613 (quoting Cigaran v. Heston, 159 F.3d 355, 357 (8th 
Cir. 1998)).    
268  394 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005).   
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burden of preponderance has real significance only in the rare 
event of an evidentiary tie.  Here, the record is clear, if the tax 
court did err in failing to shift the burden of proof, any error was 
harmless because the weight of the evidence supported a decision 
for the Commissioner.269  
 
The Tax Court has endorsed the approach of the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Blodgett.  In Knudsen v. Commissioner,270 the court declared that 
where the preponderance of the evidence served as the standard of proof 
and the preponderance of evidence favored one party, the court could 
decide the case “on the weight of the evidence and not on an allocation of 
the burden of proof.”271  This approach is consistent with the explanation 
in the legislative record accompanying the enactment of § 7491(a) that the 
provision would operate to the benefit of the taxpayer if the evidence 
presented by the parties were equally balanced.   
 
b. Statistical Reconstruction Cases 
 
Section 7491(b) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with 
respect to any item of income of an individual taxpayer that the 
Commissioner reconstructs solely through the use of statistical evidence 
pertaining to unrelated taxpayers.  As an example, if an individual taxpayer’s 
income is reconstructed solely by reference to the average income of 
taxpayers in the area where the taxpayer resides, the Government will bear 
the burden of establishing the taxpayer’s income by a preponderance of the 
evidence.272  Given the tenuous relationship between the taxpayer’s income 
and the statistical averages of data pertaining to unrelated taxpayers, the 
statutory placement of the burden of proof likely will render it more 
difficult for the Government to rely on such statistical data alone.273  The 
probative value of the statistical data would need to outweigh any opposing 
evidence offered by the taxpayer.  The existence of § 7491(b) therefore will 
discourage the Government from relying on such statistical evidence alone, 
and instead encourage the Government to bolster such statistical evidence 
with facts relating to the particular taxpayer before the court (such as a 
                                                     
269  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
270  131 T.C. 185 (2008). 
271  Id. at 189.   
272  See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 46 (1998) (supplying this example).    
273  On the other hand, if the Government rests on the statistical data in 
reconstructing the taxpayer’s income and the taxpayer offers no evidence in 
rebuttal, then placement of the burden of proof on the Government pursuant to 
§ 7491(b) will have no practical effect.  So long as the statistical data carries any 
probative weight, the preponderance of the evidence necessarily will tilt in the 
Government’s favor absent evidence to the contrary.   
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cash-flow analysis).  Doing so will preclude the application of § 7491(b) 
while also strengthening the Government’s case under the preponderance-




Section 7491(c) places the “burden of production” on the 
Commissioner with respect to any penalty or addition to tax imposed on an 
individual taxpayer.  The statute does not define “burden of production” or 
otherwise attempt to distinguish it from the “burden of proof” addressed in 
the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of the statute.  Nonetheless, the 
legislative materials accompanying the enactment of § 7491(a) couch the 
Government’s burden in terms of the burden of going forward:  “[T]he 
Secretary must come forward initially with evidence regarding the 
appropriateness of applying a particular penalty to the taxpayer.”274  In its 
first opportunity to interpret § 7491(c), the Tax Court in Higbee v. 
Commissioner275 announced that, to meet its burden of production, the 
Commissioner “must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that 
it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty.”276         
With respect to penalties or additions to tax that are implicated by 
objective standards, such as the accuracy related penalty or the additions to 
tax for late filing or payment, the Government should find its burden of 
production under § 7491(c) fairly easy to satisfy.  For example, the Tax 
Court in Higbee determined that the Commissioner had satisfied its burden 
of production with respect to the § 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for late filing 
by perfunctorily noting the parties’ stipulation that the return was filed one 
year late.277  However, penalties asserted under § 6662(a) based on 
negligence or disregard of the rules or regulations could present a more 
difficult evidentiary challenge, as the Commissioner must make a 
preliminary showing that the taxpayer’s behavior fell within those 
descriptive categories.278      
Litigation concerning penalties and additions to tax often reduces to the 
availability of defenses to those additional levies.  In that regard, § 7491(c) 
does not provide taxpayers any evidentiary comfort.  The legislative history 
accompanying the enactment of § 7491(c) clarifies that the provision does 
not affect the burden of establishing defenses to penalties and additions to 
                                                     
274  S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 46 (1998).   
275  116 T.C. 438 (2001).   
276  Id. at 446.   
277  Id. at 447.  
278 See, e.g., Brooks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-141, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1832 (noting that the Commissioner introduced evidence showing that petitioner 
failed to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of her reporting 
positions with respect to various deductions).   
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tax.  Rather, the burden of proof with respect to defenses remains with the 
taxpayer:  “[I]f the taxpayer believes that, because of reasonable cause, 
substantial authority, or a similar provision, it is inappropriate to impose the 
penalty, it is the taxpayer’s responsibility (and not the Secretary’s obligation) 
to raise those issues.”279  This approach is sensible, as it prevents the 
Commissioner from being placed in the difficult, if not impossible, position 
of establishing a negative proposition—that is, the absence of a reasonable 
justification for the taxpayer’s position.  
Section 7491(c) places the “burden of production” on the taxpayer, as 
opposed to the “burden of proof.”  The Tax Court in Higbee v. Commissioner 
found the distinction in terminology deliberate.  Accordingly, the court 
reasoned that, once the Government carries its burden of production, the 
ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to penalties and additions to tax 
remains with the taxpayer.280   
 
D. Damages for Frivolous or Groundless Proceedings 
 
1. Pre-TEFRA Damages 
 
A persistent problem for the Tax Court has been the management of 
the large number of petitions filed by taxpayers challenging Service 
determinations.  Although most Tax Court proceedings are based on bona 
fide disputes, many taxpayers have brought appeals as a means of delaying 
the assessment and collection of taxes.  In response to an increasing 
number of groundless appeals,281 the Revenue Act of 1926 authorized the 
court to impose damages for frivolous petitions.282  The 1926 provision 
(now codified, with amendments described below, as § 6673 of the Internal 
Revenue Code) provided that: 
 
                                                     
279  Higbee, 116 T.C. at 446 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 241 (1998)).   
280  Id. at 446–47 (“Congress’ use of the phrase ‘burden of production’ and not 
the more general phrase ‘burden of proof’ as used in section 7491(a) indicates to us 
that Congress did not desire that the burden of proof be placed on the 
Commissioner with regard to penalties.”).  But see Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. 
Cl. 568, 582 (2008) (reasoning that the Government bears both the burden of 
production and burden of persuasion with respect to penalties as a result of the 
combination of § 7491(a) and (c)).  
281 Revenue Revision, 1925, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), in 7 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, 1909–1950 THE LAWS, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES & ADMIN. DOCUMENTS 892–93, 906, 912 (B. Reams, Jr. 
ed. 1979). 
282 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 9, 105, 109 (adding new 
section 911 to amend Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253). 
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Whenever it appears to the Board that proceedings before it have 
been instituted by the taxpayer merely for delay, damages in an 
amount not in excess of $500 shall be awarded to the United States 
by the Board in its decision.  Damages so awarded shall be assessed 
at the same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and 
demand from the collector, and shall be collected as a part of the 
tax.283 
 
Despite this authority, which continued unchanged until 1982,284 the 
Tax Court traditionally had been hesitant to impose damages against 
taxpayers with groundless claims,285 presumably because of the concern that 
it would inhibit those with legitimate disputes with the Service from 
petitioning the court.  Yet, faced with an increasing number of cases 
advancing specious arguments that crowded the court’s already congested 
docket,286 it seemed inevitable that the court’s tolerance of groundless 
claims would wear thin.287 
In 1977, the court expressed its increasing impatience with the volume 
of tax protest cases in Hatfield v. Commissioner,288 a case involving a petitioner 
who had written “Object Self Incrimination” in answer to wages and 
income questions on her income tax return: 
 
In recent times, this Court has been faced with numerous cases, 
such as this one, which have been commenced without any legal 
justification but solely for the purpose of protesting the Federal tax 
laws.  This Court has before it a large number of cases which deserve 
careful consideration as speedily as possible, and cases of this sort 
needlessly disrupt our consideration of those genuine controversies.  
Moreover, by filing cases of this type, the protesters add to the 
caseload of the Court, which has reached a record size, and such 
cases increase the expenses of conducting this Court and the 
                                                     
283 Id. 
284 See infra notes 312–339 and accompanying text for a description of the 
TEFRA amendments to § 6673. 
285 See, e.g., Bateman v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 351, 370–71 (1936); W.E. 
Beckmann Bakers’ & Confectioners’ Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 860, 
863–64 (1928).  The Board of Tax Appeals did not exercise its authority to impose 
damages until 1933.  See Coombs v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 1216, 1216–17 
(1933).  
286 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 985 (1984); Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., 
Reflections on the Tax Court, 36 TAX LAW. 853, 854, 856 (1983). 
287 Murray H. Falk, Damages Against Taxpayers in the Tax Court Under TEFRA, 
61 TAXES 92, 93 (1983). 
288 68 T.C. 895 (1977). 
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operations of the IRS, which expenses must eventually be borne by 
all of us. 
Many citizens may dislike paying their fair share of taxes; 
everyone feels that he or she needs the money more than the 
Government.  On the other hand, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
so eloquently stated:  “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”  
The greatness of our nation is in no small part due to the willingness 
of our citizens to honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection 
system which depends upon self-assessment.  Any citizen may resort 
to the courts whenever he or she in good faith and with a colorable 
claim desires to challenge the Commissioner’s determination; but 
that does not mean that a citizen may resort to the courts merely to 
vent his or her anger and attempt symbolically to throw a wrench at 
the system.  Access to the courts depends upon a real and actual 
wrong–not an imagined wrong–which is susceptible of judicial 
resolution.  General grievances against the policies of the 
Government, or against the tax system as a whole, are not the types 
of controversies to be resolved in the courts; Congress is the 
appropriate body to which such matters should be referred.289 
 
Although the court did not impose damages against the petitioner in 
Hatfield, it did warn that it would give “serious consideration” to imposing 
damages under § 6673 in future cases involving frivolous claims.290 
Two years later, in Wilkinson v. Commissioner,291 it became clear that the 
court’s reservoir of patience with frivolous claims had run dry.  The 
taxpayer refused to substantiate various deductions claimed on his income 
tax return at the audit level and at the subsequent Tax Court trial.292  The 
taxpayer also failed to comply with a district court order requiring 
compliance with an administrative summons; the district court ordered the 
petitioner to produce records to substantiate his deductions, or to assert 
some “‘legitimate constitutional privilege or right.’”293  The taxpayer argued 
that producing his books and records would be self-incriminatory and 
would violate his Fifth Amendment rights.294 The court stated that this 
                                                     
289 Id. at 899 (citation omitted). 
290 Id. at 900. The Tax Court subsequently repeated its warning in two 
memorandum opinions.  See Clippinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-107, 
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 484, 486; Crowder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-273, 37 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1173, 1173-3. 
291 71 T.C. 633 (1979). 
292 Id. at 634, 636. 
293 Id. at 634 (apparently quoting district court order to enforce administrative 
summons) (emphasis added by Tax Court). 
294 71 T.C. at 637–39.  Specifically, petitioner argued that: (1) requiring him to 
produce his books would result in a deprivation of his right to a jury trial and an 
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argument was “completely without legal merit,” citing earlier decisions in 
which it had rejected the argument.295  Significantly, the taxpayer was aware 
that his arguments were frivolous because the Service had sent him copies 
of Tax Court decisions involving similar constitutional attacks and he had 
been repeatedly informed at various stages of the audit and Tax Court 
proceedings that his claim was without merit.296  The taxpayer nonetheless 
refused to abandon his claim, and the court imposed damages of $500, the 
maximum penalty then authorized by § 6673, holding that he had 
commenced the action merely to delay paying his taxes.297 
Subsequently, the Tax Court made it clear that a personal warning was 
not a predicate to the imposition of § 6673 damages when it imposed 
damages sua sponte in Sydnes v. Commissioner.298  Apparently, the court 
believed that its warning in earlier cases served to inform the petitioner and 
others of the possibility of the imposition of damages.  Furthermore, the 
taxpayer in Sydnes had previously litigated the same issue,299 twice in the Tax 
Court and once on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.300  The Tax Court thus was satisfied that the taxpayer “had 
no reasonable expectation of receiving a favorable decision” at the time he 
filed the petition.301 
                                                                                                                       
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof; (2) the determination of a 
deficiency, made without access to his books, was arbitrary; (3) there had been an 
infringement of his right to petition for redress of grievances; (4) the tax was an 
unlawful taking of property; and (5) the Service was engaged in extortion.  Id. at 
638–39. 
295 Id. at 638. 
296 Id. at 642–43. 
297 Id. at 643. 
298 74 T.C. 864, 872 (1980), aff'd per curiam, 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1981). 
299 The only issue involved in Sydnes was whether mortgage payments made by 
the taxpayer on “property awarded to his former wife under a divorce decree were 
support payments or part of a property settlement.”  Id. at 865. 
300 See Sydnes v. Commissioner, No. 1889-77 (T.C. Nov. 7, 1979); Sydnes v. 
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 170 (1977), aff’d in part and rev’d and rem’d in part, 577 F.2d 60 
(8th Cir. 1978). 
301 Sydnes, 74 T.C. at 872. In awarding maximum damages against the taxpayer, 
the court explained that it would not hesitate to award damages sua sponte in 
appropriate cases: 
While in the past we have been reluctant to impose damages in cases 
involving persons other than those who were merely protesting the Federal 
tax laws, we think the imposition of damages in the circumstances here is 
fully warranted. Moreover, since the statute does not restrict us to those 
cases in which a party has requested us to impose damages, we think we 
should do so, on our own motion, where the facts and circumstances so 
dictate. 
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Despite its increased readiness to impose § 6673 damages, the Tax 
Court was reluctant to extend the damages penalty to cases in which a real 
possibility existed that the petitioner had a bona fide purpose in maintaining 
the Tax Court proceeding. An illustration of this reluctance occurred in 
1979, when the court considered whether a proceeding instituted by Ms. 
Hatfield, “the same taxpayer whose earlier case had ushered in this new 
era,”302 was instituted merely for delay.303  The Service’s primary argument 
for imposition of damages was that taxpayer’s involvement in earlier 
proceedings in which the Tax Court called attention to § 6673 was 
convincing evidence that the present proceedings were instituted merely for 
delay.304  The court found that the petition contained “no real indication of 
the grounds on which petitioner contests the deficiencies determined.”305  
The taxpayer’s motion to strike the Service’s answer did, however, assert 
that “[w]hat Petitioner has or has not done in this ‘court’ in the past is of 
absolutely no consequences [sic] as concerns this Case; . . . this Case should 
stand or fall on its own merits.”306  In these statements, the court found an 
“indicat[ion] that petitioner may have intended to contest respondent’s 
determination . . . on grounds other than those raised in her 1974 case.”307  
Because the Service’s only argument for imposing § 6673 damages was 
petitioner’s prior involvement in a case that involved the issue of § 6673 
damages, and because the record contained no details regarding the 
taxpayer’s present claim (the taxpayer did not personally appear at court to 
tell the court the nature of her objection to the notice of deficiency), the 
                                                                                                                       
Id.; see Greenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 806 (1980) (taxpayer contested the 
disallowance of deductions taken by him to protest the use of his taxes “to support 
war” after having previously filed two Tax Court petitions based on same grounds 
and each time being informed of their lack of merit). 
302 Falk, supra note 287, at 94. 
303 Hatfield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-181, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 756; see 
also Ritchie v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 126 (1979).  The taxpayer in Ritchie offered 
frivolous arguments; nonetheless, damages were denied because the taxpayer, 
having not appeared at trial, was not informed that his constitutional objections 
were without basis.  Id. at 131.  Contrasting Wilkinson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633 
(1979), the court discussed the significance of the extent to which both the Service 
and the court had gone to inform the taxpayer that these claims were without 
merit.  Although the Service’s memorandum of authorities attached to the Service’s 
motion for damages against Ritchie cited Hatfield, the court did not deem this 
sufficient to provide the petitioner with subjective knowledge of the baselessness of 
his claim.  Ritchie, 72 T.C. at 130–31. 
304 Hatfield, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 757. 
305 Id. at 758. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
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court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the 
imposition of § 6673 damages.308 
Prior to the amendment of § 6673 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),309 the statutory requirement that 
proceedings be instituted “merely for delay” was interpreted by the Tax 
Court to preclude the imposition of damages unless the petitioner 
understood that no genuine grounds existed for resisting the Service’s 
determination.310  Proof of such understanding could be found in prior 
unsuccessful litigation of the same issue or in the taxpayer's actual 
awareness of Tax Court decisions holding the taxpayer’s position 
groundless as a matter of law.  In cases in which the taxpayer was unaware 
of precedent rejecting the position asserted, damages were not imposed, 
regardless of the total inadequacy of the taxpayer’s assertions.311 
 
2. Damages Expanded by TEFRA 
 
In TEFRA, Congress both expanded the circumstances in which the 
Tax Court could impose damages against taxpayers and raised the 
maximum penalty to $5,000.312  The purpose of these amendments was to 
                                                     
308 Id.  Any doubts under current law regarding whether the Tax Court will 
impose damages against taxpayers who fail to appear at trial seem to have been 
resolved.  See, e.g., Telemaque v. Commissioner, No. 38490-84 Tax Ct. 
Memorandum Sur Order (Jan. 3, 1986) (imposing $2,000 damages).  For a more 
recent case imposing the current maximum § 6673 penalty of $25,000 on taxpayer 
who had a history of filing frivolous proceedings (which subjected the taxpayer to 
lighter § 6673 penalties) and who then failed to appear at trial, see Precourt v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-24, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112.   
309 TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982) (currently 
codified at I.R.C. § 6673). 
310 The court’s restrictive reading of § 6673 stemmed from the statutory 
requirement that the action must have been instituted “merely for delay,” 
precluding the court from imposing damages when the taxpayers may have had 
purposes other than delay for petitioning the court.  The 1982 amendment of 
§ 6673, however, provides that the Tax Court may now impose damages against 
taxpayers who file petitions “primarily for delay.” See infra notes 312–316 and 
accompanying text. 
311 Falk, supra note 287, at 94. 
312 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982).  In Wilkinson v. 
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 633 (1979), the Tax Court noted that “[w]hen the costs 
incurred by this Court and respondent are considered, the maximum damages 
authorized by law ($500) do not begin to indemnify the United States for the 
expenses which petitioner’s frivolous position has occasioned.”  Id. at 643. 
Taxpayers using the “Court as their soapbox” merely had to pay a $500 “toll.”  
Graves v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-154, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1204, 1207 
(taxpayer protesting the use of his taxes for military expenditures), aff'd without 
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assist the court in curbing its “ever-increasing caseload.”313  As amended by 
TEFRA, § 6673 provided as follows: 
 
Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that proceedings before it 
have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for 
delay or that the taxpayer’s position in such proceedings is frivolous 
or groundless, damages in an amount not in excess of $5,000 shall be 
awarded to the United States by the Tax Court in its decision.  
Damages so awarded shall be assessed at the same time as the 
deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the 
Secretary and shall be collected as a part of the tax.314  
 
The former standard for applying damages under § 6673 was thus 
replaced with a two-prong test.  First, the Tax Court may impose damages 
if the proceedings are commenced “primarily” to delay paying the 
determined deficiency.315  The court had interpreted this “subjective” 
condition to the imposition of damages as requiring a determination that 
the taxpayer had no bona fide purpose in instituting the Tax Court 
proceeding.  The change from “merely” to “primarily” authorizes the court 
to impose damages against taxpayers commencing dilatory proceedings, 
even though delay may not have been the only purpose for commencing 
the proceeding.316 Additionally, the 1982 amendment of § 6673 strongly 
suggests that damages may be imposed if the taxpayer “maintains” a 
dilatory position, irrespective of his original intent in commencing the 
proceeding.317 
Second, the Tax Court may impose damages against a taxpayer whose 
“position in such proceedings is frivolous or groundless” under the 
“objective” condition of the statute.318  This part of § 6673 should authorize 
the Tax Court to impose damages against a taxpayer whose position is 
groundless, i.e., a position that conflicts with established precedent, without 
                                                                                                                       
published opinion, 698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982). Increasing the maximum damages 
authorized under § 6673 was necessary to adequately compensate the Government 
for the dilatory tactics of certain taxpayers and to act as a greater deterrent to 
frivolous proceedings.  See Falk, supra note 287, at 95. 
313 H.R. REP. NO. 97-404, at 10, 11 (1981).  
314 I.R.C. § 6673, following amendment by Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 
324, 574 (1982). 
315 Id. 
316 Id.; see also Grimes v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 235, 238–39 (1984), aff’d, 806 
F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
317 See Grimes v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 235, 238–39 (1984), aff'd, 806 F.2d 
1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
318 I.R.C. § 6673, following amendment by Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 
324, 574 (1982). 
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requiring proof that the taxpayer is actually aware that his position is 
meritless.319  
In Abrams v. Commissioner,320 the taxpayer contended that he incurred no 
tax liability for the years 1980 and 1981.321 His petition stated that 
“Petitioner’s only income was in the form of wages which are personal 
property and, as such, are not subject to the imposition . . . of a direct 
tax.”322  Finding that “[i]t is clear beyond doubt that the petition raises no 
justiciable facts respecting any of respondent’s determinations,”323 the Tax 
Court, sua sponte, imposed damages of $5,000 against the taxpayer.324  The 
                                                     
319 McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1987). 
320 82 T.C. 403 (1984) (taxpayer asserted that wages are not subject to income 
tax).  For other cases holding as frivolous the claim that wages are not income and 
imposing § 6673 damages, see Connor v. Commissioner, 770 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 
1985); Stephens v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-196, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 607 
(damages of $1,000 imposed), motion to vacate granted, 88 T.C. 1529 (imposed 
additional damages of $1000 for filing a frivolous motion to vacate); McCabe v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-533, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 962; Borders v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-466, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 617.  The first Tax Court 
case awarding higher damages as authorized by TEFRA marked no definitive 
revision of the standard the Tax Court would follow in imposing damages.  The 
Tax Court warned, however, that the damages penalty would not, in light of the 
TEFRA amendment, be limited to cases in which the taxpayer was aware prior to 
filing the petition that the position taken was groundless.  Grimes v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 235, 238–39 (1984).  In Grimes, the taxpayer argued that his 
wages were not includable in gross income.  Damages of $2,500 were imposed.  In 
a subsequent proceeding, no longer contending that wages were not income, but 
asserting an equally baseless exemption for living expenses, Mr. Grimes was 
assessed damages of $5,000 by the Tax Court.  When he appealed the Tax Court’s 
decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and assessed an additional $1,500 for pursuing 
a frivolous appeal.  Grimes v. Commissioner, 806 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
321 82 T.C. at 405. 
322 Id.   
323 Id. (emphasis in original).  
324 Id. at 413.  Section 6673 does not require that the Tax Court determine the 
actual costs incurred by the Government.  The “primary purpose of the statute is 
not to compensate the United States as opposing party but instead to penalize 
taxpayers who raise frivolous claims in the tax court.”  Sauers v. Commissioner, 
771 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Larsen v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 939, 941 
(9th Cir. 1985) (referring to § 6673 damages as a “penalty”); Crain v. 
Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming Tax Court’s penalty 
assessment).  The Third Circuit held in Sauers that the Tax Court neither had to 
determine the actual damages sustained by the Government nor relate those 
damages to the § 6673 penalty.  771 F.2d at 67–69.  Cf. Carter v. Commissioner, 
784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986) (Tax Court not authorized to impose double 
penalty ($10,000) on husband and wife, even though two separate notices of 
deficiency were issued, because the Tax Court entered only one decision in the 
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court did so even though it did not appear that the taxpayer had previously 
litigated the same issue or that he was aware of court precedents holding his 
position to be frivolous.325 
 
In our view, petitioner is yet another in a seemingly unending parade 
of tax protesters bent on glutting the docket of this Court and others 
with frivolous and groundless claims (all of which have been 
summarily rejected by this Court and others on innumerable 
occasions), and he has instituted and maintained this proceeding 
primarily for delay.326 
 
The Abrams decision is significant because it marked the first occasion on 
which the Tax Court imposed damages upon a taxpayer without evidence 
that the taxpayer had personal knowledge of the lack of merit of his action. 
Later cases have made it clear that the Tax Court will impose damages 
against taxpayers who should have been aware that the arguments they 
presented were previously rejected by the court.327  Increasingly, the court 
                                                                                                                       
case); Ruberto v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (Tax Court abused its 
discretion when it did not give taxpayers reasonable time to submit original checks 
in support of deductions), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1984-557. 
It has been held that the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the imposition 
of damages was improper.  See Carter, 784 F.2d at 1009; Larsen, 765 F.2d at 941.  
The burden of proof analysis in these cases is subject to doubt.  Unlike deficiencies 
in tax, additions to tax, and other assessable penalties, § 6673 damages cannot be 
determined by the Service as part of the 90-day letter.  Cf. I.R.C. § 6662.  This is so 
because the application of § 6673 depends on the taxpayer’s actions after receiving 
the 90-day letter, viz. whether a frivolous or dilatory Tax Court proceeding is 
brought or maintained.  Thus, the normal presumption of correctness attaching to 
administrative determinations (which is the basis for generally placing the burden 
of proof on the taxpayer) does not apply to § 6673.  These damages are imposed by 
the Tax Court either pursuant to motion by the Service or sua sponte.  The Tax 
Court has not addressed the issue of the burden of proof in its application of 
damages.  Since the court is, in a real sense, a party to the transaction giving rise to 
the damages, burden of proof rules may be unnecessary. Insofar as appellate courts 
are concerned, whether the Tax Court’s imposition of damages should be sustained 
is a matter of the standard of appellate review rather than the burden of proof, i.e. 
the “clearly erroneous” rule.  See I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
325 The petitioner also argued for a jury trial and against the validity of the 
Service’s procedures.  Abrams, 82 T.C. at 405. 
326 Id. 
327  See, e.g., Oneal v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1235, 1243 (1985) (awarding 
damages because despite “numerous Court opinions squarely on point, petitioners 
have forced an already overburdened Court and tax system to unnecessarily 
consume precious resources”); Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-487, 52 
T.C.M. (CCH) 691 (imposing damages because numerous Tax Court decisions had 
previously held the same trust schemes invalid). 
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has been willing to impose damages against taxpayers raising frivolous 
arguments in a summary fashion without lengthy opinions.328  Furthermore, 
the court has not limited the application of § 6673 to situations involving 
the spurious arguments denying the legitimacy of the tax system, but has 
also imposed damages against taxpayers litigating the merits of abusive tax 
shelters.329 
                                                     
328 See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-242, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 
814; Klimek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-246, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 50; Ross v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-27, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 920. Cf.  McLaughlin v. 
Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1987) (reducing Tax Court awarded damages 
from $5,000 to $3,500 because Tax Court did not make findings demonstrating that 
the egregiousness of taxpayer’s conduct warranted maximum damages); May v. 
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1309 (8th Cir. 1985) (urging the Tax Court to make 
specific findings of fact that support the imposition of damages so that an appellate 
court can efficiently review the Tax Court’s determination).  In McCoy v. 
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1027(1981), aff’d, 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983), the court, 
indicating that it would summarily dispose of frivolous and frequently rejected 
arguments, stated: 
It may be appropriate to note further that this Court has been flooded with 
a large number of so-called tax protester cases in which thoroughly 
meritless issues have been raised in, at best, misguided reliance upon lofty 
principles.  Such cases tend to disrupt the orderly conduct of serious 
litigation in this Court, and the issues raised therein are of the type that have 
been consistently decided against such protesters and their contentions 
often characterized as frivolous.  The time has arrived when the Court 
should deal summarily and decisively with such cases without engaging in 
scholarly discussion of the issues or attempting to soothe the feelings of the 
petitioners by referring to the supposed “sincerity” of their wildly espoused 
positions. 
Id. at 1029–30. 
329 See, e.g., Oneal v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1235 (1985) (taxpayers insisted on 
litigating merits of coal shelter despite the adverse precedent of previous cases 
involving similar facts); Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-233, 53 
T.C.M. (CCH) 780 (imposing damages of $5,000 on taxpayer litigating merits of 
master sound recording tax shelter). 
Samuel Sterrett, former Chief Judge of the Tax Court, stated: 
If the lawyer is presenting issues arising out of a tax shelter that is 
transparently abusive, I don’t know why we should absolve the taxpayer 
from paying the 6673 penalty simply because a shelter is involved rather 
than a claim that the income tax law is unconstitutional. . . . It certainly is 
not the goal or purpose of the court to impose an additional penalty on 
someone for losing a case . . . . [However, a] lawyer who presents arguments 
with respect to a shelter that has been held to be abusive in prior cases, and 
those opinions have been sustained by circuit courts, will do well to 
consider whether or not he has any reasonable expectation of prevailing, or 
simply is trying to buy time. 
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If the taxpayer has any legitimate grounds for maintaining the suit, 
however, it appears that damages will not be imposed.330  In a 
memorandum opinion, Judge Featherston stated: 
 
Section 6673 is no doubt intended . . . to assist the Court in 
regulating its docket by deterring frivolous filings.  It is not intended, 
however, to be used as a bludgeon to force settlements or a threat 
against the good faith advocacy of potentially meritorious legal and 
factual positions.  There is a difference between a frivolous 
proceeding and one ultimately found to be without merit.331 
 
Moreover, resolution of novel issues against the taxpayer will not occasion 
imposition of § 6673 damages, even if the resolution is predictable based 
upon relevant precedent.  Thus, in a case involving taxpayers engaged in a 
tax straddling scheme utilizing mortgage certificates issued by the 
Government National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, damages were not imposed—even though the court 
                                                                                                                       
Marvin J. Garbis, Interview: Samuel Sterrett on How the Tax Court Sees Its Docket, 1 TAX 
TIMES 3, 26 (July 19, 1987). 
330 See, e.g., Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-142, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 
373, 376 (denying damages when Service failed to prove fraud in two of three years 
at issue); Petersen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-108, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 235, 
241 (denying damages under § 6673 when taxpayer’s case was somewhat 
distinguishable from other tax protester cases); McMains v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1987-85, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 118, 120 (damages denied when taxpayer 
prevailed on issue of unreported income); Kellner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1986-524, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 875, 880 (damages denied even though it was the 
taxpayer’s fifth appearance before the court, because “some evidence and authority 
. . . arguably supported her position”); Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-
278, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1378, 1386 (court held it was “tempting to award damages” 
on sham family trust, but declined to do so “[b]ecause of the now conceded 
deductions and the extent of disputed facts”); Sampson v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1986-231, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1148, 1154 (reluctantly denying damages on 
sham family trust because case also involved an issue of jurisdiction); Estate of 
duBois v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-160, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 895, 902 
(damages denied because case presented some legitimate issues).  But cf. 
McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1987) (court reduced damages 
awarded by Tax Court because of absence of findings of egregiousness of 
taxpayer’s conduct, but imposed sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal based on 
taxpayer’s grounds for not paying income tax). 
331 Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-488, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 694, 
699; see also Marx v. Commissioner, No. 36612-85, Tax Ct. Memorandum Sur 
Order (Mar. 23, 1986), reprinted in 33 TAX NOTES (microfiche Doc. No. 86-7221) 
(Dec. 1, 1986) (holding that Service’s offer to concede fraud penalty in exchange 
for maximum damages award was improper because the amount of § 6673 damage 
awards is a matter of judicial discretion). 
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noted that the petitioners were knowledgeable businessmen who should 
have been aware, and were aware, that the schemes were “‘too good’ to be 
real”—because the law regarding tax straddles was uncertain until after the 
trial date.332  The court took the opportunity, however, to serve notice that 
it would not be reluctant to impose damages in future cases against 
petitioners who knew or reasonably should have known that the tax shelters 
they disputed were “factual shams.”333 
Although the 1982 amendment to § 6673 may have eliminated the 
requirement of subjective knowledge that the taxpayer’s position is 
“frivolous or groundless,”334 it appears likely that in most cases in which 
                                                     
332 Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968, 1001 (1985), aff'd sub nom. Sochin v. 
Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1988). 
333 Id. at 1002. 
334 TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(b), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982).  The 
Seventh Circuit has held that in determining whether the taxpayer has taken a 
frivolous position under § 6673 “[t]he inquiry is objective.  If a person should have 
known that his position is groundless, a court may and should impose sanctions.”  
Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986).  According to the 
Seventh Circuit, the purpose of § 6673 
is to induce litigants to conform their behavior to the governing rules 
regardless of their subjective beliefs. Groundless litigation diverts the time 
and energies of judges from more serious claims; it imposes needless costs 
on other litigants. Once the legal system has resolved a claim, judges and 
lawyers must move on to other things.  They cannot endlessly rehear stale 
arguments.  Both appellants say that the penalties stifle their right to 
petition for redress of grievances.  But there is no constitutional right to 
bring frivolous suits. 
Id. at 72.  (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).  According to the Seventh 
Circuit, however, whether the petition was filed primarily for delay is a subjective 
inquiry.  Id.  Under this prong of § 6673, it must be established that the taxpayer 
intentionally commenced the case to delay paying his taxes before damages may be 
imposed for delaying the proceedings.  In most cases, such a showing will be 
unnecessary since the court has the authority to impose damages against taxpayers 
whose positions are frivolous on their face.  Cf.  May v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
1301 (8th Cir. 1985).  In May, the court held that sanctions are proper under § 6673 
if it is “incontrovertible” that the taxpayer did not pursue his claim “in good faith 
because he knew or should have known that the claim or argument was frivolous or 
because he sought to delay payment of taxes.”  Id. at 1306 (emphasis added). 
Nonetheless, the court also stated that when a taxpayer files a claim with no 
knowledge of its frivolity, “[u]nless th[e] petitioner subsequently becomes aware 
that his petition is frivolous, . . . he should not be subject to section 6673 
damages.” Id. at 1308.  Accordingly, it is not clear whether the Eighth Circuit 
adheres to the view that § 6673 may appropriately be applied simply if the 
taxpayer’s petition is frivolous. 
 Confusion regarding the scope of § 6673 as it relates to the state of mind of the 
taxpayer has been compounded by the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in 
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damages are imposed, the taxpayer is aware that his position is frivolous.  A 
number of cases holding taxpayers subject to damages involve petitioners 
who have had the same or similar arguments rejected in prior suits.335  In 
others, the taxpayer’s actual knowledge that his position is without merit is 
apparent, either because the taxpayer admitted awareness of cases in which 
similar arguments were rejected336 or because the taxpayer was informed by 
the Service or the court that damages may be expected.337 
                                                                                                                       
McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986 (1987).  In McLaughlin, the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the Tax Court’s imposition of $5,000 in § 6673 damages.  Concluding that 
the Tax Court had not made factual findings demonstrating the egregiousness of 
the taxpayer’s conduct, the Seventh Circuit reduced the § 6673 damages to $3,500.   
In doing so, the court stated that “meaningful appellate review . . . requires an 
articulation by the Tax Court of those particular factors, both objective and, in 
appropriate cases, subjective, upon which it has relied in fixing the sum assessed.”  
Id. at 988.  The taxpayer’s victory in McLaughlin was totally eroded by the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to impose frivolous appeal sanctions of $1,500, thus restoring to 
$5,000 the taxpayer’s total bill for engaging in frivolous litigation.   
335 See, e.g., Pollard v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1987) (one prior 
suit); Lukovsky v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (one prior suit); 
Coulter v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 580 (1984) (one prior suit); Grimes v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 235 (1984) (one prior suit); Sydnes v. Commissioner, 74 
T.C. 864 (1980) (two prior suits), aff’d per curiam, 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Bentson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-172, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 495 (one prior 
suit); Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-490, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (four 
prior suits); see also May v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1307 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(listing cases that have awarded § 6673 damages when taxpayers brought suit using 
arguments that had been previously rejected and deemed frivolous by the court). 
336 See, e.g., Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 770 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 
(6th Cir. 1986) (taxpayer admitted studying cases and statutes); see also May, 752 
F.2d at 1307 n.8 (listing cases in which § 6673 damages have been assessed against 
a taxpayer having actual knowledge that the claim was frivolous and asserting it to 
delay payment). 
337 Allen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-242, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 814, 816 
(taxpayer advised during trial of authority of court to impose damages); Weeks v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-198, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 609, 610 (Service 
provided taxpayer with names of cases rejecting taxpayer’s arguments as “legal 
garbage”); Boaz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-180, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 512, 
514 (Service warned taxpayer repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment claims asserted 
were frequently rejected); Lawrence v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-242, 53 
T.C.M. (CCH) 361, 363 (taxpayer advised by Service prior to trial that damages 
would be requested); Lam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-138, 53 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 359, 361 (court advised taxpayer not to pursue his case on frequently 
rejected claims).  Cf.  Graboske v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-262, 53 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 896, 901 (damages denied based on the record and considering that Service 
did not move for damages until the conclusion of the trial). 
Additionally, the taxpayer may be deemed to have constructive knowledge that 
an argument is frivolous if counsel for the taxpayer had the same argument rejected 
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Despite the fact that § 6673 does not require the Tax Court to warn the 
taxpayer personally of its authority to impose damages,338 the court often 
has issued a warning before imposing damages in certain types of cases.339 
                                                                                                                       
in previous suits.  See May v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1307 n.9 (8th Cir. 
1985); Manley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-558, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, 
1361 (decided under pre-TEFRA version of § 6673). 
338 See Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986); May, 752 
F.2d at 1305. 
339 In Grace v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-304, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1484, a 
case involving a master sound recording tax shelter, the court warned taxpayers 
“involved in similar tax avoidance or evasion schemes” of its authority to impose 
damages.  Id. at 1491. Subsequently, in Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-
233, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 780, another master sound recording tax shelter case, the 
court, sua sponte, awarded damages of $5,000 to the Government.  Id. at 785. 
In Sampson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-231, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1148, the 
Tax Court “reluctantly” declined to award damages against a petitioner contesting 
deficiencies stemming from a sham family trust because of a separate jurisdictional 
issue in the case.  Id. at 1154.  However, the court noted that it did not believe 
petitioners had a meritorious case and, at least implicitly, indicated that damages 
might be imposed against taxpayers maintaining similar positions.  Id.  Again, in 
Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-278, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1378, the court 
stated that “[i]t is tempting to award damages in view of the groundless contentions 
of petitioners and our conclusion that the Trust was a sham.  Because of the now 
conceded deductions and the extent of disputed facts, we do not award damages in 
this case.”  Id. at 1386.  In Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-487, 52 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 691, however, damages of $2,500 were imposed against a taxpayer arguing 
the merits of a sham family trust.  Id. at 694.  The court noted that “[p]etitioners 
herein should have been aware of the numerous decisions of this Court that have 
declared invalid family trust schemes similar to the Trust employed by petitioners.”  
Id.; accord Schauer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-237, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 793, 
797 (awarding damages and noting that the court has refused to award damages “in 
several family trust cases only because of factors separate and apart from the family 
trust transactions”). 
In 1983, the Tax Court issued a warning to taxpayers seeking to use the 
“church” as a means of avoiding the payment of taxes:  
[O]ur tolerance for taxpayers who establish churches solely for 
tax-avoidance purposes is reaching a breaking point.  Not only do these 
taxpayers use the pretext of a church to avoid paying their fair share of 
taxes, even when their brazen schemes are uncovered many of them resort 
to the courts in a shameless attempt to vindicate themselves.  When such 
frivolous cases are brought to this Court, there is a question as to whether 
damages should be imposed under section 6673. Although we have decided 
not to impose such damages in the instant case, if taxpayers continue to 
make frivolous claims with respect to churches established solely for 
tax-avoidance purposes, serious consideration will be given to imposing 
such damages in those cases. 
720            The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
3. Subsequent Statutory Developments 
  
a. Additional Predicate for Imposition of Damages 
 
In 1984, Congress indicated its approval of the increased imposition of 
the damage penalty by the Tax Court and urged the court to take further 
action to dispense with lengthy opinions in routine tax protester cases and 
                                                                                                                       
Miedaner v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 272, 282 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also 
McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468, 484 n.16 (1981) (noting that “[i]n cases of 
this type [church avoidance schemes], an award of damages under sec. 6673 may be 
in order under appropriate circumstances”), aff’d without published opinion, 720 F.2d 
664 (3d Cir. 1983); Adamson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-489, 52 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 699, 701–02 (awarding $5,000 in damages to the Government in “church” 
case and warning that damages would be assessed against attorneys who brought 
frivolous suits); Sigelbaum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-472, 52 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 630, 632 (rejecting petitioner’s first amendment argument and awarding the 
Government $2,000 in damages); Riggs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-317, 
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1566, 1568 (awarding $1,000 in damages to the Government for 
basing suit on “church” case arguments previously rejected).  But see Fowler v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-142, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 373, 376 (denying 
damages when Service failed to prove fraud in contributions claimed to be made to 
church in two of three years at issue); Petersen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1987-108, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 235, 241 (damages denied because the case was 
“somewhat unique and capable of distinction from the plethora of cases 
concerning tax protestor sponsored ‘churches’ where [the Tax Court] awarded 
damages without hesitation”); McMains v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-85, 53 
T.C.M. (CCH) 118, 120 (damages denied when taxpayer prevailed on issue of 
unreported income); Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-268, 51 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1321, 1325 (denying damages in “church” case and explaining that taxpayer 
seemed “somewhat different from most of the taxpayers seeking the benefit of [the 
Universal Life Church] connection, even though on balance, the scales in our 
judgment tipped against him”). The Tax Court also issued a warning to taxpayers 
engaged in abusive tax shelters when it stated that “[t]his case was well tried and 
skillfully briefed by able counsel, but neither the evidence nor the briefs present 
anything new.  At some point, the arguments in these highly leveraged tax 
avoidance (or evasion) schemes must be regarded as ‘frivolous or groundless.’”  
Elliot v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 227 (1985), aff’d without published opinion, 782 F.2d 
1027 (3d Cir. 1986).  The court imposed $5,000 in damages against taxpayers who 
insisted on litigating the merits of an abusive coal shelter lease despite previously 
published decisions involving the same material facts.  Oneal v. Commissioner, 84 
T.C. 1235, 1242–44 (1985).  The Tax Court’s first warning to taxpayers of its 
readiness to impose § 6673 damages was in Hatfield v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 895 
(1977).  See supra notes 288–290 and accompanying text. 
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to consolidate tax shelter cases, “as well as to assert, without hesitancy in 
appropriate instances, the penalties that the Congress has provided.”340 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986,341 Congress again amended § 6673 to 
extend the circumstances in which the damage penalty may be applied.  The 
damages sanction may now be applied in cases in which a taxpayer 
“unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies.”342  This 
amendment reemphasizes congressional concern over the flood of cases 
then congesting the Tax Court’s docket and serves as an important 
inducement to taxpayers to attempt to resolve their disputes before filing 
petitions with the Tax Court. 
Initially, the House proposed to authorize the Tax Court to impose a 
penalty of $120, an amount in addition to and twice the fee for filing a Tax 
Court petition, against taxpayers who unreasonably failed to resolve their 
disputes administratively.343  Presumably because Congress believed that a 
stronger deterrent to dilatory or frivolous proceedings was needed to assist 
the Tax Court in the management of its congested docket, it concluded that 
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was more appropriately 
included as an additional basis to impose damages under § 6673. 
Although the House bill was not enacted in the form originally 
proposed, the legislative history to the House proposal is helpful in 
understanding the reasons for the amendment of § 6673: 
 
                                                     
340 H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 1673 (1984); see also Brown v. Commissioner, 85 
T.C. 968, 1002 (1985), aff’d sub nom. Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 
1988); Oneal v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1235, 1243 (1985).  In 1987, Chief Judge 
Sterrett noted that 
[a]s mandated by Congress, we have been liberal in our imposition of the 
6673 penalties in the so-called tax protestor area.  We are seeing a marked 
effect, which we think has been very salutory [sic], and we expect to see a 
continuing diminishment in the number of tax protestor cases filed. 
Garbis, supra note 329, at 26. 
341 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. 
342 Id.  § 1552(a), 100 Stat. at 2753 (codified at I.R.C. § 6673).  As amended, 
§ 6673 provided at the time:  
Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that proceedings before it have been 
instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay, that the 
taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless, or that the 
taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies, damages in 
an amount not in excess of $5,000 shall be awarded to the United States by 
the Tax Court in its decision.  Damages so awarded shall be assessed at the 
same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from 
the Secretary and shall be collected as a part of the tax. 
I.R.C. § 6673 (1986) (emphasis added). 
343 H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 841–42 (1985) (explaining section 1316 of H.R. 
3838, 99th Cong. (1985)). 
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The Tax Court inventory has risen dramatically over the past ten 
years.  One factor contributing to this increase has been the practice 
of taxpayers petitioning their cases directly to the Tax Court without 
attempting to settle the dispute with the Appeals Division of the IRS.  
The Appeals Division has more authority to settle cases than the 
Examination Division of IRS does.  Appeals regularly settles large 
numbers of cases based on the hazards of litigation. Many of the 
cases taken directly to the Tax Court are eventually settled by the 
Appeals Officers after the case has been opened in the Tax Court 
with little involvement by the Court. 
The committee consequently believes that it is appropriate to 
provide a penalty for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  This 
new penalty will allow the Tax Court to penalize taxpayers who 
needlessly involve the Court in a dispute that should have been 
resolved in the Appeals Division of the IRS.344 
 
b. Statutory Designation as a Penalty 
 
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,345 Congress 
clarified the nature of the § 6673 charge while also significantly increasing 
the monetary amount that could be levied under the provision.  Seeking to 
clarify that the Government need not prove specific damages before the 
Tax Court could impose the § 6673 penalty,346 Congress eliminated any 
references to “damages” under the statute.  In addition to changing the 
heading from “Damages Assessable For Instituting Proceedings . . .” to 
“Sanctions and Costs Awarded by Courts,” Congress changed the reference 
                                                     
344 Id. at 841.  The House Report indicates that a taxpayer should not be 
subject to damages, under the proposed standard, in the following cases: (1) if the 
taxpayer is challenging a regulation, ruling, or other matter outside the negotiating 
authority of the Appeals Division; (2) if the taxpayer attended a first level appeals 
meeting or cannot attend because of the undue burden to the taxpayer; (3) if the 
Service waives the appeals meeting; or (4) if no action was taken by appeals after 
having the case for six months or longer.  Id. at 841–42.  The 1986 legislation also 
included a reporting provision enabling Congress to monitor the Tax Court 
inventory.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires that 
[t]he Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate and the Tax Court shall each 
prepare a report for 1987 and for each 2-calendar year period thereafter on 
the inventory of cases in the Tax Court and the measures to close cases 
more efficiently.  Such reports shall be submitted to the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate. 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1552(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2753–54. 
345 Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989).   
346 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1399–1400 (1989).   
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to “damages” under § 6673(a) to a “penalty.”347  Clarification that the 
charge imposed under § 6673 constituted a penalty for tax purposes had the 
further benefit of permitting the Government to employ its administrative 
collection powers to recover the amount imposed under the provision.348   
In addition to clarifying what may be considered a technical point, 
Congress acted to enhance the deterrent effect of the § 6673 penalty.  
Concerned that the prevailing $5,000 penalty was not effective in deterring 
taxpayers in “tax shelter cases” from taking frivolous positions, Congress 
raised the ceiling on the § 6673 penalty to $25,000.349  In so doing, Congress 
expressed its intention that the enhanced penalty be applied primarily—but 
not exclusively—in the tax shelter context.350  No such limitation was 
included in the statute, however, and the Tax Court has imposed the 
$25,000 maximum penalty generally upon taxpayers outside of the tax 
shelter context who consistently advance frivolous arguments or generally 
abuse the legal process in the face of prior warnings or prior impositions of 
lesser § 6673 penalties.351   
 
c. Sanctions Against Counsel 
 
Effective July 1, 1986, Tax Court Rule 33(b) was amended to provide 
for the imposition of sanctions against counsel or parties who sign frivolous 
pleadings presented to the court.352  The amendment was derived from a 
                                                     
347 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7731(a), 103 Stat. 2400.   
348 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-447, at 1400.   
349 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7731(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2400 (1989) (amending 
I.R.C. § 6673(a)).   
350 H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1399.   
351 See, e.g., Nis Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523 (2000); Powell v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-174, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 56; Precourt v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-24, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112; Tinnerman v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-150, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 20, aff’d, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 
2013-1368 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
352 TAX CT. R. 33(b), 85 T.C. 1125–26 (1985).  The rule provides: 
(b) Effect of Signature:  The signature of counsel or a party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  The 
signature of counsel also constitutes a representation by him that he is 
authorized to represent the party or parties on whose behalf the pleading is 
filed.  If a pleading is not signed, it shall be stricken, unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader.  If a 
pleading is signed in violation of this Rule, the Court, upon motion or upon 
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1983 revision of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,353 and the 
purposes for amending that rule are helpful in explaining the reasons for 
the amendment of Rule 33(b).354 
Although prior to its revision, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure355 had provided for the imposition of sanctions against abusive 
                                                                                                                       
its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, including reasonable counsel’s fees. 
Id. Rule 33(b) remains unchanged following the 1985 amendment.  
353 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (as amended in 1983, but prior to amendments in 1987, 
1993, and 2007). The rule then provided as follows: 
Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s 
individual name, whose address shall be stated.  A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign the party’s pleading, motion, or other 
paper and state the party’s address.  Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied 
by affidavit.  The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness 
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.  The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer’s 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader 
or movant.  If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of 
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
354 See TAX CT. R. 33(b), 85 T.C. 1125–26; Versteeg v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 
339, 342 (1988); Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, at 4, 
Sept. 11, 1985, filed at U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Litigation Costs” 
(pointing out that Tax Court Rule 33 is one of the rules “taken virtually verbatim 
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).  
355 Prior to its amendment in 1983, Rule 11 provided as follows: 
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by 
at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall 
be stated.  A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his 
pleading and state his address.  Except when otherwise specifically provided 
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counsel, “experience shows that in practice [the former rule] was not 
effective in deterring abuses.”356  For example, considerable confusion 
existed under Rule 11, regarding “the standard of conduct expected of 
attorneys” and the sanctions available if counsel was found to have delayed 
the court’s processes through abusive actions such as the filing of frivolous 
pleadings.357  The amendment of Rule 11 was “intended to reduce the 
reluctance of courts to impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities 
of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of 
sanctions.”358  It was believed that “[g]reater attention by the district courts 
to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when 
appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to 
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or 
defenses.”359  Rule 11, as amended in 1983, was calculated to remove any 
doubt regarding the availability of sanctions or the propriety of imposing 
them against abusive counsel.360  Tax Court Rule 33(b) was changed for 
similar reasons.  The amendment was “designed to emphasize the 
responsibilities of counsel and deter dilatory and abusive tactics by 
imposing effective sanctions therefor.”361  Under Rule 33(b), counsel has a 
                                                                                                                       
by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit.  The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness 
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.  The signature of an 
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground 
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.  If a pleading is not 
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be 
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the 
pleading had not been served.  For a willful violation of this rule an attorney 
may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.  Similarly action may be 
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1982). 
356 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Notes of Adv. Comm. on Rules – 1983 Amendment.  
357 Id. at 106–07; see ROBERT E. RODES, KENNETH F. RIPPLE & CAROL 
MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 64–65 (Federal Judicial Center 1981). 
358 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Notes of Adv. Comm. on Rules – 1983 Amendment 
(citation omitted). 
359 Id.  Although Rule 11 “is not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or 
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,” it is intended to stress the 
“affirmative duty” of counsel to reasonably inquire into the facts and law prior to 
any filing.  Id.  What amounts to a reasonable inquiry will depend on the 
circumstances surrounding a particular case.  Id. 
360 See id. 
361 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 33, 85 T.C. 1126 (1985).  The note states 
that “[a]lthough the Rule as amended also applies to unrepresented parties, the 
Court has discretion to take into account the special circumstances that may arise in 
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“duty to make reasonable inquiry as to both the facts and the law prior to 
the filing of any pleading.”362 
The additional burden of frivolous claims and a crowded Tax Court 
docket were the impetus behind the amendment of Rule 33(b).363 “The 
historic sanctions, such as exclusion of evidence, deeming facts admitted, 
and dismissal of actions, often penalize the party when the real culprit is the 
counsel.”364  Now that fair notice has been given, the court has indicated 
that it “will not hesitate to impose . . . sanction[s] upon offending counsel in 
appropriate cases in the future.”365 
Rule 33(b) apparently is not restricted to taxpayers and their counsel.  In 
appropriate cases, one may anticipate imposition of sanctions against the 
Government and its counsel.  It is more likely, however, that the Tax Court 
would use its statutory authority to award reasonable litigation costs to the 
prevailing taxpayer366 if the position adhered to by the Service was found to 
be without grounds.367 
                                                                                                                       
pro se situations.”  Id.  Pro se taxpayers who are warned that their position is 
frivolous, yet continue to stick to their guns, may expect imposition of § 6673 
damages.  See, e.g., Wilcox v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-225, 53 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 741, aff’d, 848 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1988).  In Wilcox, the court imposed 
$2,000 in damages against a pro se taxpayer who “regurgitates many of the now 
familiar tax protester arguments that have repeatedly been held to be utterly 
without merit and frivolous.”  Id. at 742; Weeks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
1987-198, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 609, 610 (damages of $5,000 determined against a pro 
se taxpayer who presented frivolous arguments, despite the fact that the Service 
had provided the taxpayer with cases rejecting the arguments as “legal garbage”) 
(citation omitted). 
362 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 33, 85 T.C. 1126 (1985). 
363 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
354, at 4. 
364 Id. 
365 Adamson v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 699, 702 (1986) (prior to 
effective date of amended Rule 33(b)).  The Tax Court exercised its authority under 
Rule 33(b) in Versteeg v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 339 (1988) (litigation costs of 
$498.90 awarded against petitioner’s counsel for pursuing litigation over which 
court lacked jurisdiction); see also Larsen v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 
1985); Kalgaard v. Commissioner, 764 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1985); Pittler v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-320, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1587, 1588 n.1 (noting 
that “additional sanctions” would be imposed under new Rule 33(b) “against 
counsel who signs a pleading that he knows is not well founded in fact and 
warranted in law and/or that is interposed to cause delay”). 
366 I.R.C. § 7430.   
367 See, e.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 494 (1933) (determining the 
taxpayer’s motion for sanctions under Rule 33(b) to be moot in light of award of 
litigation costs under § 7430), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 43 F.3d 172 
(5th Cir. 1995).   
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The application of Rule 33(b) to counsel in connection with the 
prosecution of frivolous claims has been obviated in large part by the 
expansion of § 6673 to permit the Tax Court to impose costs on attorneys 
and others admitted to practice before the Tax Court pursuant to § 
6673(a)(2).368  As part of the 1989 amendment to § 6673, Congress 
authorized the Tax Court to require any attorney or other non-attorney 
representative to pay excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees that are 
incurred because the representative “multiplied the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously.”369    
The Tax Court first imposed the sanction under § 6673(a)(2) in Harper v. 
Commissioner.370  There, the court found that the attorney’s tactic of 
producing documents for copying one at a time violated the court’s order 
compelling document production and prevented discovery from moving 
forward.371  The court further found that the attorney’s conduct prevented 
the case from being ready for trial on the last day of the scheduled trial 
session.  Finding that the production of documents was crucial to the 
substantive issues of whether the taxpayer had adequately substantiated 
business expenses and itemized deductions, the court concluded that the 
attorney’s conduct with respect to discovery “unreasonably and vexatiously 
multiplied the proceedings.”372  Additionally, the attorney filed a motion for 
summary judgment while conceding that the principal issue in the case was 
a question of fact, and the attorney refused to comply with the pretrial 
order to stipulate facts and to submit a trial memorandum.373   
The amount of “excess” attorney’s fees to be imposed under 
§ 6673(a)(2) is limited to that attributable to the sanctioned misconduct of 
the attorney or other representative.   Once the amount of time has been 
determined, the court applies an hourly rate based on the experience level 
of the opposing attorney and the cost of living in the area where the 
attorney practices.374  In making these determinations, the Tax Court looks 
                                                     
368 In Gillespie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-202, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 91, the 
Tax Court invoked Rule 33(b) as an alternative basis to § 6673(a)(2) for requiring 
the taxpayer’s counsel to pay the Government’s excess attorney’s fees attributable 
to the unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of the proceedings.  Id. at 101 n.6.   
369 I.R.C. § 6673(a)(2) (as added by Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7731(a), 103 Stat. 
2106, 2400 (1989)).  Congress indicated that § 6673(a)(2) was modeled on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, which confers similar authority upon Federal district courts.  H.R. REP. NO. 
101-247, at 1399-1400 (1989).   
370 99 T.C. 533 (1992).   
371 Id. at 547. 
372 Id. at 547–48. 
373 Id. at 548.   
374 See id. at 549 (“Attorney’s fees awarded under section 6673(a)(2) are to be 
computed by multiplying the excess hour reasonably expended on the litigation by 
a reasonable hourly rate.  The product is known as the ‘lodestar’ amount.”).   
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to authorities interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a substantially identical 
provision applicable in Federal district court.375   
Section 6673(a)(2) applies to both representatives of the taxpayer and 
attorneys representing the Government.  Nonetheless, an imposition of 
costs under § 6673(a)(2) most often accompanies the imposition of a 
§ 6673(a)(1) penalty against the taxpayer when the taxpayer’s attorney is 
complicit in the sanctioned conduct.376 
The prospect of sanctions for pursuing frivolous actions does not end at 
the trial level.  Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, 
it may . . .  award just damages and single or double costs to the 
appellee.”377  Damages and costs under Rule 38 can be imposed on counsel 
















                                                     
375 See id. at 551 (looking to authorities under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for guidance). 
376 See, e.g., Nis Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523 (2000); Powell v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-174, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 56, aff’d sub nom., Barringer 
v. United States Tax Court, 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-5368 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
377 FED. R. APP. P. 38; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (“Where a judgment is affirmed 
by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge 
to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or double costs.”).   
378 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides as follows: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct. 





OPINIONS, DECISIONS, AND APPEALS 
 
A. The Decision Process 
 
Upon the completion of trial and submission of briefs, the Tax Court’s 
decision process begins.  This process has been shaped by the court’s desire 
to provide an impartial and expedient judicial review of tax controversies 
that will serve as a source of uniform precedents for the Service and the 
public.1  Accordingly, it is imperative that accurate and well-reasoned 
written findings of fact and opinions be prepared as quickly as is 
practicable.2  The findings of fact and opinion in a case (referred to in the 
statute as a “report”)3 as well as the decision thereon4 are prepared by one 
of the judicial officers of the court.  To disseminate effectively these 
opinions, the statute provides for general publication of the court’s reports; 
however, such publication is not necessary in cases that concern well-settled 
legal principles.5 
                                                     
1 See generally Lyle T. Alverson, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed?, 4 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 337 (1926); Gerald D. Babbitt & William Morris, An Introduction to the 
Tax Court of the United States, 21 TAX LAW. 615 (1968); Charles D. Hamel, The United 
States Board of Tax Appeals, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 293, 308 (1925) [hereinafter 
cited as Hamel]; John W. Kern, The Process of Decision in the United States Tax Court, 8 
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1013 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Kern]; J. 
Gilmer Korner, Procedure in the Appeal of Tax Cases Under the Revenue Act of 1926, 4 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 413 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Korner]; J. Edgar Murdock, 
Tax Court is Fulfilling its Function; No Fundamental Changes Needed, 8 J. TAX’N 106 
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Murdock]; Percy W. Phillips, Possible Methods of 
Eliminating Congestion of Tax Appeals, 5 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 243 (1927) 
[hereinafter cited as Phillips]; Edward N. Polisher, Tax Court Commissioners, 28 
TAXES 413 (1950); Forest D. Siefkin, Has the Board of Tax Appeals Failed?, 5 NAT’L 
INC. TAX Mag. 45 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Siefkin]; Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., 
After TrialCHow A Case is Decided, 27 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1505 
(1968); Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: A View from the Bench, 59 A.B.A. 
J. 295 (1973). 
2 I.R.C. § 7459(a)–(b) provides: 
A report upon any proceeding instituted before the Tax Court and a 
decision thereon shall be made as quickly as practicable. . . .  It shall be the 
duty of the Tax Court and of each division to include in its report upon any 
proceeding its findings of fact or opinion or memorandum opinion. 
3 I.R.C. § 7459(b). 
4 I.R.C. § 7459(a), (c).   
5 I.R.C. § 7462 provides: “The Tax Court shall provide for the publication . . . 
in such form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use.”   
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Since 1924, the division, whether composed of three members or a 
single member, has been the basic decision-making unit of the court.6   
Because the danger of inconsistent interpretations made necessary some 
form of internal review,7 a conference procedure was authorized by the 
Revenue Act of 1924 and established by the Board in the same year to 
make possible the review of division reports prior to their promulgation.8  
Although the objectives of conference review have remained unchanged,9 
difficulties with respect to the selection of cases for review,10 taxpayer 
misunderstanding as to the nature of conference review,11 and the 
mechanics of conference operation, particularly in voting practices,12 have 
confronted the court. 
Upon completion of action by the conference, or, if no conference 
review is directed by the chief judge,13 the findings of fact and opinion in 
the controversy are filed and served on the parties.14  If the entire deficiency 
has been upheld or the entire deficiency has been rejected, the decision is 
entered in the records of the court.15  The date of decision is the date when 
it is entered in the records of the court indicating the amount of the 
deficiency.16  In the event that the deficiency is neither totally approved nor 
rejected, it is generally necessary to employ the procedures of Rule 155 of 
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure to reach a final 
determination of the precise monetary amount of the tax liability.17  In these 
                                                     
6 See Section B of this Part.  
7 See Letter from Chairman Korner to Secretary Mellon, May 24, 1926, at 5, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Korner Letter]. 
8 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
9 Compare Korner Letter, supra note 7, with Kern, supra note 1 and Murdock, 
supra note 1. 
10 Early practice of the Board was to review every division decision.  Korner 
Letter, supra note 7, at 5.  See Section F of this Part for a discussion of the 
development of the present practice under which the chief judge determines which 
cases will be reviewed by the court. 
11 E.g., United States Bd. of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. James S. 
McCandless, 26 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1928); see also 69 CONG. REC. 10135 (1928). 
12 See Section F.2 and F.3 of this Part.   
13 I.R.C. § 7460(b) provides: “The report of the division shall become the report 
of the Tax Court within 30 days after such report by the division unless within such 
period the chief judge has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax 
Court.” 
14 I.R.C. § 7459. 
15 Id. 
16 I.R.C. § 7459(c) provides: “A decision of the Tax Court . . . shall be held to be 
rendered upon the date that an order specifying the amount of the deficiency is 
entered in the records of the Tax Court. . . .” 
17 TAX CT. R. 155 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
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cases, the responsibility rests with the parties to provide the court with the 
necessary computations.18  Upon the filing of a computation, either by 
agreement of the parties, or by decision of the court when the parties are 
unable to agree, the court will enter the decision.19 
 
B. Development of the Single-Member Division Structure 
 
Under the provisions of the 1924 Revenue Act, the Board was to have 
not less than seven and not more than twenty-eight members.20  The 
Chairman was empowered to divide the Board into divisions,21 and 
although no particular number of members per division was dictated 
specifically,22 the statutory provisions authorizing division of the Board23 
and its legislative history24 indicated that Congress intended at least three 
members per division.25 The statute required the divisions to hear and 
determine appeals assigned by the Chairman.26  Decisions of a division 
became decisions of the Board upon the expiration of 30 days unless the 
Chairman directed review by the entire Board.27  The division concept 
undoubtedly had its roots in the predecessor to the Board of Tax Appeals, 
the Committee on Appeals and Review, which also had been divided into 
groups of three.28 
Despite the statutory provision of a division structure, in the early 
months of the Board’s operation, the members sat en banc.29  This was due 
to a lack of cases ready for trial.  By September, 1924, however, the work 
before the Board had progressed to a point at which it was deemed 
                                                     
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7443). 




24 Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1924, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 68th Cong., 
1st Sess., at 24 (testimony of Mr. Gregg) [hereinafter cited as 1924 Senate 
Hearings].  
25 Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 3. 
26 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(e)–(f), 43 Stat. 337 (now codified at 
I.R.C. § 7460(a)). 
27 Id. § 900(f) (now codified at I.R.C. § 7460(b)).  For a discussion of the court 
review procedures, see Section F of this Part.  
28 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24. 
29 See John H. Parrot, 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924); Everett Knitting Works, 1 B.T.A. 5 
(1924).  The Revenue Act of 1924 clearly provided that decisions could be made by 
the full Board.  Ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
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advisable to divide the membership into divisions.30  At this time, the Board 
was divided into three divisions, one of three members, two others of four 
members each.31  Subsequently, as additional members were appointed to 
the Board, another division consisting of three members was added.32  
During the initial year and a half of the Board’s operation, these divisions 
sat four days a week for the hearing of appeals.33  After the hearing, a 
division conference would be held at which a decision would be reached; 
thereupon one of the members of the division would be assigned the task 
of writing the division’s findings of fact, opinion, and decision.34  Board 
conferences, at which the division decisions were reviewed by the entire 
Board, occupied two additional days of the week.35  Accordingly, the only 
time that individual members had for deciding appeals and writing findings 
of fact and opinions was in the evening hours, on Sundays or at such times 
as they could be spared from the hearing of cases.36  To maximize this time, 
a practice developed of having only two or three divisions, a total of six to 
eleven members, sit each week.37  Because each division could hear only 
approximately four cases a day,38 it soon became apparent that the three- or 
four-member divisional structure was not conducive to a rapid 
determination of tax appeals.39  During the first two years of the Board’s 
                                                     
30 Press Release from the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Sept. 4, 1924, filed at the 
U.S. Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
31 Division No. 1 was comprised of Mr. Ivins, Chief, Mr. Korner, and Mr. 
Marquette.  Division No. 2 was comprised of Mr. James, Chief, Mr. Sternhagen, 
Mr. Trammell, and Mr. Trussell. Division No. 3 was comprised of Mr. Graupner, 
Chief, Mr. Lansdon, Mr. Littleton, and Mr. Smith.  Memorandum from Chairman 
Hamel, Sept. 3, 1924, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Organizing the Board: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
32 Announcement from Chairman Hamel, Mar. 28, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
33 Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, June 11, 
1926, at 8, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Divisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Reorganization Memorandum]; Korner 
Letter, supra note 7, at 3–4. 




38 Id.; see also Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 860 [hereinafter cited as 1925 House Hearings].  
39 In an effort to alleviate the difficulties attendant upon three-man divisions, 
the Board informally permitted a single member of a division to hear a case, who 
would report to the full division.  The full division would render a decision that 
would be subject to Board review.  Arguments of counsel at the close of the 
evidence, were, in each appeal, to be heard by the entire division, so far as 
practicable.  Circular on Internal Administration, Sept. 12, 1924, filed at the U.S. 
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existence, an unexpected and heavy influx of appeals brought the number 
of pending appeals to 10,000 by early 1926, which aggravated the problem 
and provided a strong impetus to find a remedy for the backlog of cases.40  
The cause for the heavy influx of appeals was twofold.  First, it was 
believed that many taxpayers appealed from deficiencies that were clearly 
proper.41  Second, the Bureau had sent out many deficiency notices without 
a sufficient effort on the part of the conferees of its Income Tax Unit to 
settle disputes.42 
Various remedies were developed to alleviate the increasing congestion.  
For example, in the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress authorized the Board 
to impose a filing fee of up to $10 as a means of discouraging the large 
number of trivial appeals.43  Additionally, the Bureau indicated that it would 
initiate a policy that would encourage conferees to settle with taxpayers 
more readily, and would expand the process of stipulation so as to shorten 
the length of hearings.44  These measures were not, however, believed to be 
adequate to cure the problem, and the Board proposed to Congress in 1925 
that it be empowered to create divisions of one member each.45  The 
hearing of a case required far less time than the decision process, but 
because divisions of three or four members were required to sit and hear 
                                                                                                                       
Tax Court in “Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  See also 1925 House 
Hearings, supra note 38, at 890. 
40 See Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 33, at 1; see also B.T.A. 
Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
41 Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 33, at 2; Korner Letter, supra note 7, 
at 1–2. 
42 Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 2. 
43 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 106.  The adoption of the $10 
filing fee resulted in a 25% reduction in the number of appeals brought before the 
Board.  See Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 33, at 4.  But see Alverson, 
supra note 1, at 339.  Another possibility suggested to reduce the number of appeals 
before the Board was to set a jurisdictional limitation on the amount of a deficiency 
that could be appealed to the Board. Letter from A.E. Graupner to J. Gilmer 
Korner, Aug. 28, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Revenue Act of 1926: 
Memoranda & Correspondence”; J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do With the 
Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391, 392 (1925).  This alternative 
was not considered politically expedient and was not seriously advocated.  Cf. 1925 
House Hearings, supra note 38, at 887–89 (testimony of Mr. Morris).  Another 
proposal involved the imposition of a penalty against the taxpayer when it appeared 
that a proceeding was brought merely for delay.  Id. at 892.  Such a proposal was 
enacted as part of the 1926 legislation and is still effective.  See I.R.C. § 6673. 
44 Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 33, at 6. 
45 1925 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 887 (remarks of Mr. Morris), 912 
(remarks of Mr. Ivins).  Strong support for one-member divisions was apparent in 
the tax bar.  See George Maurice Morris, American Bar Association Tax Revision 
Recommendations, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 403, 404 (1925). 
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each case, a necessary result was the hearing of more cases than the 
members could decide without frequent intervals of recess from the hearing 
process.46 Under a one-member division structure, each division could hear 
the same number of cases as a three- or four-member division in the same 
amount of time.  More importantly, one-member divisions would provide 
substantially more time for members to remain off the bench and engage in 
the decision process.47  Thus, whereas under the then existing practice two 
divisions were on the bench and two were off, the new system would create 
16 divisions and permit five divisions to be on the bench hearing cases with 
ten divisions off the bench engaged in the decision process.48  The 
remaining division consisted of the Chairman, whose review and 
administrative duties precluded him from hearing a significant number of 
cases.49  The Board was confident that this system would enable it to hear 
and decide a greater number of cases in a shorter period of time and would 
serve to reduce the mounting congestion.50 
The move to permit the Board to have single-member divisions met 
with some resistance in Congress.  First, fears were raised that the risk of 
pro-Government bias would be greater than with multi-member divisions.51  
Second, the express language of the statute provided for Board review of 
division decisions only in the discretion of the Chairman,52 and it was 
possible that the Board could reverse its established policy of reviewing 
each division decision.53  Were such a reversal to come about under a 
system that would have 16 divisions, the danger of inconsistent opinions 
would multiply.54  Accordingly, the Ways and Means Committee in its report 
proposed that one-member division decisions automatically be reviewed by 
the entire Board, while division decisions that were made by two or more 
members be subject to the same statutory provisions established under the 
1924 Revenue Act.55  The Senate, however, rejected these proposals and 
                                                     
46 Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 33 at 8–9; Korner Letter, supra note 
7, at 4. 
47 Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 4. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 5. 
51 As a result, the House bill provided that one-member division decisions be 
automatically reviewed by the Board.  This proposal was deleted in conference.  
H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1926). 
52 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
53 The Board did in fact reverse its prior policy in the spring of 1927 and 
henceforth required the Chairman to review each decision to determine if Board 
review was necessary.  See infra note 216 accompanying text. 
54 See Alverson, supra note 1, at 339; J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do With the 
Board of Tax Appeals?, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391 (1925). 
55 H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925). 
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instead provided that one-member divisions be established and that the 
statutory direction to the Chairman be left unchanged.56  In conference, the 
House receded from its proposal.57 
Shortly thereafter, the Board was divided into 16 single-member 
divisions.58  Although Congress increased the number of Tax Court judges 
(and hence the number of divisions) from 16 to 19 in 1980 due to the 
court’s increased workload,59 the procedures employed with respect to the 
single-member divisions have remained essentially unchanged since 1926.60  
The opinion is prepared by the judge who hears the case.61  The report 
(opinion or memorandum opinion) is transmitted to the chief judge who, 
with the assistance of legal staff, reviews the opinion, notes any comments 
or suggested revisions, and decides whether to direct that the opinion be 
reviewed by the Court Conference.62  Summary opinions authored by 
special trial judges undergo similar review by a Presidentially-appointed 
judge assigned to the Small Tax Case Division.   
To enhance the goal of consistency of result in the Court’s opinions, all 
opinions are circulated to the judges before they are released to the public.  
Opinions normally are released to the parties and are available to the public 
on the court’s website at 3 p.m.  The Reporter of Decisions telephonically 
                                                     
56 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 35 (1925). 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 53 (1925).  The 1926 Act provided that the 
Chairman was authorized to divide the Board into divisions of one or more 
members.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 106, amending Revenue Act 
of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
58 Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, June 25, 
1926, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence”; 
Board Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926.  As part of Board reorganization in that 
year, the “part” system was established. The “parts” were composed of three 
divisions and provided an initial collegial review of a division decision with specific 
recommendations made as to the necessity of full Board review.  This procedure 
was eliminated in 1932.  For a discussion of the part system and conference review, 
see infra notes 211–216 and accompanying text.  
59 See Pub. L. No. 96-439, § 1(a), 94 Stat. 1878 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-933, at 2 
(1980) (citing the increased workload of the Tax Court as the basis for the 
expansion).    
60 Compare I.R.C. §§ 7459–7460 with Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 
Stat. 105–07, amending Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a)–(h), 43 Stat. 337–38. 
61 I.R.C. §§ 7459(b), 7460(a). See Hamlin’s Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 
(10th Cir. 1954); Hawaiian Freight Forwarders Ltd. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 745 
(9th Cir. 1952). 
62 I.R.C. § 7460(b).  This policy of chief judge discretion was established in 
1927.  See infra note 216 and accompanying text.  If review is warranted, the report 
of the division is reviewed in accordance with the procedures established for the 
Court Conference.  See Section F of this Part. 
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notifies the parties when an opinion is released.  Thereafter, a decision is 
entered in the case in accordance with the opinion.63   
 
C. Findings of Fact and Opinion 
 
Under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1924, the Board was 
required to make written findings of fact in every case.64  These findings 
served as prima facie evidence in any further proceedings between the 
taxpayer and the Bureau.65  Although the necessity of providing a written 
statement of fact findings was clear from the outset, there was a division of 
views during deliberations on the 1924 Act with respect to the need for a 
written opinion.  The proponents of an opinion requirement argued that it 
would be impossible to convince a litigant that a case was being decided 
fairly if a Board member could refuse to give his reasons for a decision.66  
Second, the Board in its opinion might make a serious mistake that the 
interested party could discover and point out to the Board without the 
necessity of further action.67  Finally, the proponents of an opinion 
requirement believed that Congress was creating a judicial entity, and 
traditionally courts gave reasons for their decision.68  On the other hand, an 
opinion requirement was not viewed as conducive to an expeditious 
handling of the expected heavy influx of tax appeals.69  In addition, the lack 
of direct appeal from the Board’s decision in a case obviated the necessity 
of a written opinion.70  If either party was dissatisfied with the Board’s 
determination, a de novo action could be instituted.  In such a proceeding 
the court would not be obligated to consider the Board’s reasoning.71  As a 
compromise between those urging an opinion requirement and those 
                                                     
63 See Section G of this Part.   
64 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
65 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 337, provided that in “any 
proceeding in court under sections 274, 279, 308, or 312, and in any suit or 
proceeding by a taxpayer to recover any amounts paid in pursuance of a decision of 
the Board, the findings of the Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts 
therein stated.” 
66 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 389–90, 392 (testimony of F. Lowsen, 
American Institute of Accountants).  
67 Id. 
68 65 CONG. REC. 8132-34 (1924). 
69 See id. at 2684 (remarks of Mr. Chindblom). 
70 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(b), 43 Stat. 297; H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, 
at 8 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 42 (1924). 
71 Bolon B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origin and Function,  THE 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31, 36 (1955); Memorandum from T. C. 
Lavery to R. H. Jackson, General Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, c. Aug. 1935, 
at 19, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Evidence: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Jackson Memorandum].  
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doubting the necessity of such a requirement, the 1924 Act required a 
written opinion only in those cases in which the amount of tax in 
controversy exceeded $10,000.72 
Difficulties soon arose in the application of the statutory provisions with 
respect to the necessity of findings of fact in every case and the situations in 
which an opinion was required.  It had become apparent that numerous 
cases were brought by taxpayers appealing from obviously correct 
determinations.73   Likewise, a substantial number of cases were brought 
merely for delay, were not prosecuted, or were filed improperly.  Such futile 
appeals resulted in a mounting backlog on the Board’s calendar,74 and the 
necessity of preparing findings of fact in these cases served only to reduce 
the amount of available time the members had for preparing the findings of 
fact in cases that involved bona fide disputes.75  Accordingly, it was believed 
appropriate that, in the above types of cases, the Board be permitted to 
dispense with findings of fact.76  The House, in the Revenue Bill of 1926, 
agreed to relieve the Board of the duty in instances in which a case was “not 
decided upon the merits but was dismissed on motion on the ground that 
the proof” was clearly insufficient to sustain the allegation of the petition or 
that there was a failure to prosecute or to conform to the rules of the 
Board.77  However, the House was cognizant of the danger of accusations 
of pro-Government partiality that might be leveled at the Board by 
disgruntled taxpayers dismissed on motion.78  Accordingly, the House bill 
directed automatic Board review of cases dismissed by a division on the 
ground that the proof was insufficient.79  The Senate Finance Committee, 
however, viewed such a requirement as being unnecessary, particularly in 
view of the provision that permitted the Chairman of the Board to direct 
review of a division opinion.80  In conference, the House receded on its 
proposal to require automatic review.81 
In addition to difficulties with the requirement of written findings of 
fact, the Board discovered that the opinion requirement established in the 
Revenue Act of 1924 was not responsive to actual needs.  The basic 
problem, pointed out by the Board during congressional deliberations on 
                                                     
72 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337.  Indexed for inflation, 
the initial $10,000 threshold for the amount in controversy equates to roughly 
$133,000 in 2012 dollars.   
73 Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 2. 
74 See H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18–19 (1925). 
75 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 910–12. 




80 S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 35–36 (1925). 
81 H.R. REP. NO. 69-356, at 53 (1926). 
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the 1926 Act, was that cases in which the taxes in controversy exceeded 
$10,000 sometimes involved no substantial question of law, whereas other 
cases, in which the disputed amounts were substantially less, frequently 
involved difficult questions of law that affected many cases.82  Consistent 
with this view, the practice of the Board, despite the provisions of the 1924 
Act, had been to write opinions in all cases, regardless of the amount in 
dispute.83  The Board believed that well-reasoned opinions were important 
in building public confidence and providing precedents in the interpretation 
of the tax law.84  Moreover, other provisions of the 1926 legislation that 
limited review of Board determinations to direct appeal of its decisions 
increased the importance of opinions.  A reviewing court would be less 
likely to reverse a decision of the Board in which an opinion setting forth 
the reasons for a decision was provided.85  As a result of these 
considerations, the congressional tax committees recommended that the 
Board have discretion to determine the cases in which an opinion would be 
provided.86  Notwithstanding the fears of certain members of Congress that 
the Board would abuse the discretion accorded it,87 and the suggestion that 
the Commissioner be permitted to request the Board to write an opinion 
when he deemed it advisable,88 the recommendations of the committees 
were adopted without amendment.89 
The final major statutory change in the requirements for findings of fact 
and opinion was incorporated in the Revenue Act of 1928, which 
eliminated the necessity of findings of fact in certain cases decided on the 
merits.  Instead, the Act provided the Board, in promulgating its report, 
with discretion to include, in the alternative, findings of fact, an opinion, a 
memorandum opinion, or both a findings of fact and an opinion or 
memorandum opinion.90  In view of the availability of a record of the 
evidence presented to the Board, the requirement of detailed findings of 
fact in every case was believed to be unnecessary.91  However, in those 
                                                     
82 See 67 CONG. REC. 1136–37 (1925). 
83 Id. 
84 See generally 1925 House Hearings, supra note 38. 
85 See generally Jackson Memorandum, supra note 71, at 30.   
86 E.g., H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 907(b) (1925). 
87 67 CONG. REC. 1136 (1925). 
88 Id. at 1137. 
89 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 107, amending Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337. 
90 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 872, amending Revenue Act of 
1926, ch. 27, § 907(b), 44 Stat. 107 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7459(b)). 
91 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 30 (1928); Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1928, Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. at 540, 553–59 (1928) 
(statement of Special Committee on Federal Taxation of American Bar 
Association) [hereinafter cited as 1928 House Hearings]; Hearings on Revenue Revision, 
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cases in which a complicated factual setting was presented, the new 
provision provided necessary flexibility.92  Concern on the part of some 
members of Congress that omission of a findings of fact would permit the 
circuit courts to substitute their judgment on the facts for that of the Board 
was countered by the fact that the circuit courts were able to reverse or 
modify decisions of the Board (so far as facts were concerned) only if no 
substantial evidence existed to support the decision of the Board.93 
The statutory provisions in respect of the obligation of the Board/Tax 
Court to prepare findings of fact and opinions remained unchanged from 
1928 to 1982.94  These statutory provisions, however, have never been 
incorporated into the Tax Court rules.  Although it was suggested that such 
provisions be incorporated into the rules as part of the 1974 rules revision, 
the court’s rules committee rejected the proposal.95  Rather, the committee 
referred to the appropriate statutory provisions by footnote in the court’s 
rules.96 
 
D. Bench Opinions 
  
1. The Amendment of Section 7459(b) 
 
The requirement of written findings of fact and opinions (collectively 
referred to as “reports”)97 served several important functions.  First, written 
reports disclosed the court’s view of the law in the circumstances before it.  
Second, written reports kept the general public informed of the court’s 
interpretation of the tax law.  Third, written reports assisted the courts of 
appeals in reviewing Tax Court decisions, which became appealable under 
the 1926 Act.98  Finally, because written reports were subject to the court’s 
                                                                                                                       
1928, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1928) (remarks of 
W. A. Staub). 
92 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 30 (1928). 
93 Id. 
94 Compare Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 872 with I.R.C. 
§ 7459(b). 
95 See Draft of Proposed Rules in Connection With 1974 Rules Revision, §§ 155 
and 156 of Title XV entitled “Opinion and Decision,” Dec. 3, 1971, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Tax Court Rules 
Committee Minutes, Dec. 20, 1971. 
96 TAX CT. R., Title XV, “Decision” (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
97 See I.R.C. § 7459(b). 
98 Ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1003(a), 44 Stat. 9, 109–10.  See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (providing 
for appellate review in the United States Courts of Appeals).   
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procedures for review by the chief judge and court conference,99 they 
helped to assure the consistency of Tax Court precedents.  
Faced with an increasing number of frivolous cases,100 however, it 
became apparent that the written report requirement was often needlessly 
burdensome.  Because the court had previously disposed of many 
groundless claims in similar proceedings, a written report in these cases was 
of little value. 
In 1982, in an effort “to promote the efficient operation of the [Tax] 
Court,”101 Congress amended § 7459(b) of the Code to provide that 
“[s]ubject to such conditions as the Tax Court may by rule provide, the 
requirements of this subsection and of section 7460 are met if findings of 
fact or opinion are stated orally and recorded in the transcript of the 
proceedings.”102  
This amendment prompted concern among some Tax Court members 
who were apprehensive of the potential adverse effect that the authority to 
issue oral findings of fact and opinion (hereinafter “bench opinions”) could 
have on the consistency of Tax Court opinions.103  Accordingly, a prime 
objective of the Tax Court in implementing its bench opinion authority was 
the adoption of a rule to assure the continuing consistency of its 
precedents.104  In defining and implementing that policy, however, the Tax 
                                                     
99 A division report “shall become the report of the Tax Court within 30 days 
after such report by the division, unless within such period the chief judge has 
directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.” I.R.C. § 7460(b).  
The court conference procedures are discussed in Section F of this Part. 
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 985 (1984); Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., 
Reflections on the Tax Court, 36 TAX LAW. 853, 857 (1983).  
101 127 CONG. REC. 32078 (1981) (Senate Finance Committee Technical 
Explanation of the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982). 
102 Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-362, § 106, 96 Stat. 
1726, 1730.  While initially findings of fact and opinion were referred to as “bench 
decisions,” the phrase “bench opinions” is now used.   
103 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, Nov. 12, 1982, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench Decisions” (expressing his 
concern regarding the maintenance of consistency when bench opinions are 
rendered); Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, Jan. 24, 1983, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench Decisions” (favoring the adoption of 
guidelines for use by the judges and special trial judges, but opposing such 
guidelines in the published rules of the court because published rules would invite 
motions for written opinions and create an unnecessary vehicle for appellate review 
of the Tax Court’s interpretations of its rules); Memorandum from Judge Sterrett 
to Chief Judge Tannenwald, Jan. 17, 1983, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Bench Decisions” (expressing fear that uniformity of decision might be 
weakened by “a proliferation of unguided bench opinions” if the court were to 
adopt Judge Goffe’s suggestion). 
104 See supra note 103.  
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Court could not lose sight of the purpose of the amendment to § 7459(b)—
that is, to enable the court to cope with its tremendous workload by 
disposing expeditiously of cases appropriate for bench opinions.105  Finally, 
the Tax Court did not intend to allow these objectives to interfere with the 
rights of parties by subjecting them to arbitrary actions; it was the intent of 
the Tax Court that the bench opinion authority be exercised with fairness, 
consistency, and compatibility with the spirit of court precedents.106 
A great concern of the Tax Court in considering guidelines for the 
issuance of bench opinions was the maintenance of consistency in court 
opinions.107  Because a bench opinion issued under § 7459(b) would avoid 
review by the chief judge and the court conference,108 other safeguards were 
clearly needed to prevent inconsistencies between the law as applied in 
bench opinions on the one hand and written precedents on the other.  
Intricately interwoven with these considerations was whether guidelines for 
the issuance of bench opinions should be promulgated in the Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, or whether internal guidelines would be more 
appropriate.109  The advantages of a rule would be to inform parties of the 
court’s bench opinion authority, and if general standards were included in 
the rule, to help assure consistency in the circumstances in which bench 
opinions were issued.110  There was fear, however, that the promulgation of 
a specific rule would restrict the Tax Court’s flexibility in exercising its 
bench decision authority.111 
                                                     
105 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the Judges, Jan. 27, 1983, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench Decisions.” 
106 See id. 
107 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, Jan. 1983, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench 
Decisions” (setting forth guidelines for the exercise of discretion granted by Rule 
152); Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, supra note 103. 
108 The amendment to § 7459(b) provides that “the requirements of this 
subsection and of section 7460 are met if findings of fact or opinion are stated 
orally and recorded in the transcript of the proceedings.”  I.R.C. § 7459(b).  The 
court conference procedures are discussed in Section F of this Part. 
109 Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the Judges, supra note 105; 
Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, supra note 103; Memorandum from 
Judge Sterrett to Chief Judge Tannenwald, supra note 103; Memorandum from 
Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, Nov. 10, 1982, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Rules Committee: Bench Decisions” (suggesting that a specific rule that delineates 
certain types of cases in which bench opinions are appropriate may preclude a 
judge “from rendering a bench decision in an otherwise appropriate case . . . and 
may invite complaints from parties who believe that a judge has rendered a bench 
decision in a case not covered by the rule”). 
110 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the Judges, supra note 105, at 3–4. 
111 See Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, supra note 103.  Judge 
Goffe was particularly concerned that the inclusion of guidelines in the proposed 
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Another point of concern to Tax Court members was whether the 
guidelines controlling the exercise of the bench opinion authority should be 
general, so as to grant the individual judges a broader range of discretion in 
determining the cases appropriate for bench opinions, or whether the 
guidelines should be specific and limited to a few circumscribed cases.112  
Most judges seemed to believe that general standards would best enable a 
judge to exercise the discretionary authority properly.113  They also 
recognized, however, that general, imprecise standards could be interpreted 
differently by different judges, and the consistency that had historically been 
a significant feature of Tax Court precedents could be lost.114 
The Tax Court considered whether to enumerate within a rule the types 
of cases that could appropriately be disposed of by bench opinions.115  
Although the adoption of a rule specifying the types of cases in which 
bench opinions could be issued would probably assist in maintaining 
consistency in court opinions, such a rule also could present problems.  
First, in drafting the rule, it would be difficult for the court to conceive of 
every type of case that would be appropriate for a bench opinion.116  
Consequently, a judge might be prevented from issuing a bench opinion in 
                                                                                                                       
rules of the court—particularly the language, “if he is satisfied as to the factual 
conclusions to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is 
clear”—could be interpreted by a court of appeals to restrict the court “in 
circumstances we cannot now anticipate.”  Id.  Judge Goffe also pointed out that a 
specific rule would create a standard of review different from the existing clearly 
erroneous standard.  He saw the phrase “law being clear” as limiting language that 
could create “another unnecessary vehicle for interpretations of our rules.”  Id. 
112 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, supra note 107.  Chief Judge Tannenwald listed seven types of cases that 
“may be particularly appropriate for bench decisions,” see infra note 158, but he 
recognized the necessity of allowing judges flexibility in applying such guidelines:  
“Obviously, not every case of the types enumerated above will be appropriate for 
bench decision.  I also am sure that you will have cases of a type not enumerated 
above in which a bench decision will be appropriate.”  Memorandum from Chief 
Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial Judges, supra note 107, at 4; see also 
Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, supra note 103 (expressing 
his concern that requiring a transcript of each bench decision to be provided to the 
chief judge would place an undue burden on the chief judge and his staff, as would 
a provision allowing a losing party to make a motion for reconsideration of a bench 
decision, which motion would be considered by the chief judge). 
113 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, supra note 107; Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, 
supra note 103. 
114 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Rules Committee, supra note 24. 
115 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the Judges, supra note 105; 
Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 109.  
116 Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 109, at 7.  
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an otherwise appropriate case simply by the fact that it was not of the type 
enumerated.117  Second, a specific rule could give rise to complaints from 
parties who believed that a bench opinion had been given in a case not 
specified within the rule.118  In either event, the goal of increasing the 
efficiency of the Tax Court would be subverted. 
 
2. The Proposal of Rule 152 
 
Rule 152, as proposed by the Rules Committee in 1982, provided as 
follows: 
 
[e]xcept in actions for declaratory judgment or for disclosure . . ., the 
Judge, or the Special Trial Judge in any case in which he is authorized 
to make the decision of the Court pursuant to Code section 
7456(d)(2) or (3), may, in his discretion, orally state his findings of 
fact or opinion if he is fully satisfied as to the factual conclusions to 
be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is 
clear.119 
 
Examples of the types of cases in which bench opinions might be rendered 
were included in the note accompanying the proposed rule, with a 
specification that the examples were not intended to be all inclusive.120 
 
                                                     
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See Letter from Judge Simpson to Kenneth W. Gideon, Chief Counsel to 
Internal Revenue Service, Dec. 15, 1982, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Bench Decisions” (this letter includes a draft of the proposed rule 
which was sent to the Service and the tax bar for comment).  For the complete text 
of Proposed Rule 152, see infra note 149. 
120 The note accompanying the proposed rule provided in part: 
Examples (which are not intended to be all-inclusive) of the types of 
cases in which oral findings of fact or opinion might be rendered include: 
(1) Cases involving substantiation of deductions (e.g., for medical care, 
charitable contributions, or casualty losses), including cases where the rule 
in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930), is applicable; 
(2) fraud cases in which the deficiencies have been admitted and the only 
issue is whether there was the requisite intent to evade tax; (3) depreciation 
cases in which the issue is the useful life or cost of property; and (4) 
valuation cases. 
Under the Rule, the Court’s findings will be recorded in the transcript of 
the proceeding.  Those pages of the transcript which record the Court’s 
findings of fact or opinion (or a written summary thereof) will be provided 
to all parties free of charge. 
See Letter from Judge Simpson to Kenneth W. Gideon, supra note 119. 
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a. Opposition to the Proposed Rule 
 
Although Judge Goffe favored the adoption of guidelines for the use of 
the judges and special trial judges in issuing bench opinions, he opposed 
setting forth these guidelines in a rule.121  Specifically, he opposed the clause 
in proposed Rule 152 that would limit the use of bench opinions to cases in 
which the facts and law were clear.122   
Judge Goffe argued that the Tax Court rules did not specify the 
circumstances in which an opinion would be published or issued as a 
memorandum, nor was there a rule to inform parties when or whether 
court review would be directed.123  Judge Goffe believed that if the general 
guidelines for issuing bench decisions were included in a rule, a party could 
pursue an appeal on the grounds that the judge had failed to follow that 
rule.124  In this event, a court of appeals could restrict the Tax Court’s 
flexibility in exercising the bench opinion authority through an 
unanticipated interpretation of the rule.125 
Moreover, Judge Goffe expressed concern that the language limiting the 
use of bench opinions to cases in which the facts and law were clear might 
encourage motions seeking written opinions.126  Presumably, parties 
believing they would win would move for the judge to issue a bench 
opinion.  Conversely, losing parties, apprehensive that a bench opinion 
might result in an additional obstacle to overcome on appeal, could file a 
motion that the judge issue a written opinion, on the grounds that the facts 
or law in a particular case were not clear.  Judge Goffe asserted that these 
problems would frustrate the congressional goal of increasing Tax Court 
efficiency.  Judge Goffe argued that Congress had not included such 
limiting language in its amendment to § 7459(b), and the Tax Court should 
not so limit itself by a specific rule.127 
 
b.  The Rule’s Proponents 
 
The Rules Committee was convinced that the advantages of setting 
forth the guidelines for issuing bench opinions within a rule outweighed the 
                                                     
121 Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, supra note 103, at 1. 
122 Id.; see supra note 111 (quoting the language Judge Goffe opposed). 
123 Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, supra note 103, at 1–2. 
124 Id. at 2. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.; see also Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra 
note 109, at 8–9 (recommending against the court’s granting parties the right to 
object to a judge’s decision to render a bench decision because such a right would 
be inconsistent with the statutory language and with the congressional purpose of 
promoting more efficient operation of the court). 
127 Memorandum from Judge Goffe to the Judges, supra note 103. 
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disadvantages.128  The Chairman of the Rules Committee, Judge Simpson, 
argued that although the amendment to § 7459(b) had been enacted to 
enable the Tax Court to cope with its heavy workload, it was important that 
bench opinions be issued only in appropriate cases.129  This was particularly 
important because of the lack of opportunity for review by the chief judge 
or court conference in cases in which a bench opinion was issued.130  In 
addition, because there might be a propensity to consider bench opinions 
less carefully than written opinions, the record in such cases would tend to 
make the task of a reviewing court of appeals more difficult.131  Because of 
his concern that the authority to issue bench opinions could significantly 
alter the operation of the Tax Court, Judge Simpson believed that the use of 
bench opinions should be approached with extreme care.132 
Judge Simpson pointed out that through its issuance of written opinions 
and because of the procedures for review by the chief judge and at court 
conference, Tax Court decisions were consistent in their application of the 
tax law.133  Judge Simpson believed that the authority to issue bench 
opinions should be exercised while keeping the traditions and practices of 
the Tax Court in perspective.134  A written opinion should be prepared 
whenever the facts or law of the case are such that there is reason to advise 
the Service and the bar of the Tax Court’s view of the law in those 
circumstances.135  Similarly, in cases in which questions arise as to whether a 
proposed conclusion is consistent with other decisions of the court, a 
written opinion should be prepared to avoid circumvention of the review 
procedures.136   
The Rules Committee was not convinced that the issuance of internal 
guidelines regarding the use of bench opinions would, in itself, ensure 
consistency in the application of the law by Tax Court judges.137  Including 
the guidelines within a rule, the Rules Committee believed, would be more 
effective and would have the additional benefit of informing Congress and 
the tax bar of the circumstances in which a bench opinion might be 
made.138 Moreover, the Rules Committee was concerned that if the 
guidelines were not specified, Congress and the bar might be curious as to 
Tax Court policy regarding bench opinions and ask for a specific statement 
                                                     
128 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the Judges, supra note 105. 
129 Id. at 1–2. 
130 Id. at 2. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 3. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 3–4 
137 Id. at 4. 
138 Id. 
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regarding the court’s bench opinion policy.139  If the Tax Court were to 
issue a statement more specific than a rule, it could restrict the court’s range 
of discretion in exercising the bench opinion authority. 
The Rules Committee concluded that there was only a minimal risk that 
a court of appeals would limit the court’s ability to exercise the bench 
opinion authority with an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the 
rule.140  The proposed rule left the determination whether to issue a bench 
opinion to the judge.141  It was believed that an appellate court would be 
unlikely to conclude that such a determination was appropriate for 
review.142  Furthermore, even if review were to be granted and a court of 
appeals were to rule that the trial judge had abused his discretion in 
rendering a bench opinion, the court would merely remand and order the 
preparation of a written opinion.143 
 
c. Comments from the Service and Tax Bar  
 
Although proposed Rule 152 had support from members of the tax bar 
and the Service,144 a question was raised whether the last clause of the rule 
would preclude a judge from giving his factual conclusions orally when the 
facts of the case were clear but the law was unclear.145  Often a judge’s 
factual conclusions can be very helpful to counsel in preparing their 
arguments of law, and there was some concern that proposed Rule 152 
might be read to preclude a judge from stating his factual conclusions, if the 
judge’s legal conclusions were not stated simultaneously.146  
Although Rule 152 had the general support of the Service, the Service 
recommended amending the rule to allow either party to make a motion for 
a bench opinion.147  Presumably because it was intended that the discretion 
                                                     
139 Id. 




144 See Letter from Tax Practitioner to Judge Simpson, Jan. 11, 1983, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench Decisions”; (Letter from Kenneth W. 
Gideon, Chief Counsel of Internal Revenue Service, to Judge Simpson, Jan. 12, 
1983, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Bench Decisions.”  
145 See Letter from Tax Practitioner to Judge Simpson, supra note 144.  The last 
clause of the proposed rule provided that the judge could render a bench opinion 
“if he is fully satisfied as to the factual conclusions to be reached in the case and 
that the law to be applied thereto is clear.”   
146 See Letter from tax practitioner to Judge Simpson, supra note 144. 
147 See Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Chief Counsel of Internal Revenue 
Service, to Judge Simpson, supra note 144. 
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to issue a bench decision would rest entirely with the trial judge, no 
amendment was made to the rule to address this concern.148 
 
3. The Adoption and Employment of Rule 152 
 
Rule 152, in virtually the same form proposed by the Rules Committee, 
was adopted by the court and went into effect in 1983.149  The note 
accompanying Rule 152, however, was revised from its proposed form to 
exclude enumeration of types of cases in which bench opinions might be 
expected.150  The court felt that it would be more appropriate to set forth a 
                                                     
148 TAX CT. R. 152, 79 T.C. 1147 (1982).  
149 Id.  At the time of its adoption, Rule 152 provided as follows: 
(a) General: Except in actions for declaratory judgment or for 
disclosure (see Titles XXI and XXII), the Judge, or the Special Trial Judge 
in any case in which he is authorized to make the decision of the Court 
pursuant to Code Section 7456(d)(2) or (3), may, in his discretion, orally 
state his findings of fact or opinion if he is satisfied as to the factual 
conclusions to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto 
is clear. 
(b) Transcript: Oral findings of fact or opinion shall be recorded in the 
transcript of the trial.  The pages of the transcript that contain such findings 
of fact or opinion (or a written summary thereof) shall be served by the 
Clerk upon all parties.  
(c) Citation: Opinions stated orally in accordance with paragraph (a) of 
this Rule shall not be cited or relied upon as precedent.  However, such 
opinions (including findings of fact) may be referred to for purposes of the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the 
case. 
Id.  The only material difference between the rule as proposed and as adopted is 
that proposed Rule 152(a) required the judge or special trial judge to be “fully” 
satisfied as to facts and law. Cf. supra note 119.  Rule 152 remains in material 
respects the same as when it was introduced.  See TAX CT. R. 152 (July 6, 2012 ed.).     
150 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 152, 79 T.C. 1148 (1982).  The note 
provides: 
Rule 152 permits the presiding Judge or Special Trial Judge to orally 
state findings of fact or opinion in appropriate cases, pursuant to the 
authority of section 106(b) of the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. 97-362 (Oct. 25, 1982).  The Rule does not apply in actions for 
declaratory judgment or for disclosure.  
Under the Rule, the Court’s findings will be recorded in the transcript of 
the proceeding.  Those pages of the transcript which record the Court’s 
findings of fact or opinion (or a written summary thereof) will be provided 
to all parties free of charge. 
The authority conferred by this Rule may be exercised on and after 
March 1, 1983, in pending and future cases. 
Id. 
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general standard for issuing bench opinions, rather than designate particular 
types of cases, and that the broad discretion granted the trial judge by Rule 
152 was necessary for the effective employment of the Tax Court’s bench 
opinion authority.151  It was also recognized, however, that considerable 
problems could be created by this broad grant of discretion.  Shortly after 
the enactment of Rule 152, Chief Judge Tannenwald issued a set of 
suggested guidelines to be followed in exercising the bench opinion 
authority.152 
Initially, Chief Judge Tannenwald pointed out that the court was 
required by statute to record “findings of fact or opinion” in the 
transcript;153 a mere final pronouncement in favor of the Service or the 
taxpayer would not be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 7459(b).154  
Accordingly, Chief Judge Tannenwald urged that a bench opinion should 
not be rendered in any case unless both the relevant facts and the applicable 
law could be readily summarized from the bench.155  Additional 
considerations exist in appealable cases, i.e., cases not governed by the small 
case procedures.156  Appellate courts expect complete and detailed findings 
of fact and a full discussion of the legal issues involved in Tax Court cases.  
To reduce the possibility of reversal, Chief Judge Tannenwald suggested 
that bench opinions be rendered in appealable cases only if the expectations 
of appellate courts could be met, and a statement of the facts and legal 
issues were recorded clearly in the transcripts.157 
Chief Judge Tannenwald listed seven types of cases in which bench 
opinions may be particularly appropriate.158  He recognized that not every 
                                                     
151 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, supra note 107. 
152 Id.  Theodore Tannenwald, Jr. began his tenure as Judge of the United 
States Tax Court on August 2, 1965.  On July 1, 1981, he became Chief Judge and 
served in that position until July 1, 1983. 
153 Id.  The legislative history of the amendment to § 7459(b) indicates that 
transcripts of the proceedings are to be provided to parties free of charge.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-929, at 34 (1982).   
154 In 1992, the Court Conference reconfirmed the Court’s policy that a bench 
opinion must be stated on the record at the trial session at which the testimony was 
concluded in that case.  
155 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, supra note 107. 
156 Cf. I.R.C. § 7463(b). 
157 Memorandum from Chief Judge Tannenwald to Judges and Special Trial 
Judges, supra note 107.  
158 Id.  Chief Judge Tannenwald listed the following types of cases as 
appropriate for bench decisions: 
(1) “Protester” cases involving legal arguments that have been raised 
and rejected repeatedly in the past. 
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type of case enumerated would be appropriate for a bench opinion, and 
that there would be unlisted cases suitable for disposition through bench 
opinions.159  Nonetheless, he thought it would be helpful to suggest certain 
cases in which bench opinions might be appropriate, because pretrial 
preparation in those cases might aid in the effective use of Rule 152.  Chief 
Judge Tannenwald suggested the judges and special trial judges bring 
sample opinions to trial in cases that appear appropriate for disposition 
through bench opinions.160 
Chief Judge Tannenwald expressed the importance of ensuring that the 
“consistency and uniformity which have been the hallmark of our opinions 
are preserved.”161  He reiterated that in cases in which a bench opinion is 
rendered, the parties are deprived of the opportunity to file briefs, and the 
opinion is not subject to review by the chief judge or court conference.162  
Chief Judge Tannenwald also noted that in small tax cases, the losing party 
cannot appeal a decision the party believes to be contrary to established 
precedent of the Tax Court.163  Thus, he requested that the transcript of 
cases in which bench opinions were rendered be forwarded to him, or in 
small tax cases, to the judge in charge of the small tax division.164 
 
                                                                                                                       
(2) Fraud cases in which the deficiencies have been admitted and the 
only issue is whether there was the requisite intent to evade tax, particularly 
where determination of that issue depends upon an evaluation of the 
petitioner’s credibility as a witness. 
(3) Substantiation cases in which the taxpayer does not have books and 
records to support deductions taken (e.g., for medical care, charitable 
contributions, or casualty losses) and determination of the deductible 
amount depends on application of the rule in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 
540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930). 
(4) Cases in which the Court must determine whether a particular 
expenditure constitutes an ordinary and necessary business expense 
deductible under Code section 162(a) or a nondeductible personal, family, 
or living expense. 
(5) Cases in which the Court must determine whether amounts paid to a 
medical intern or resident are an excludible scholarship or fellowship grant 
under Code section 117(a). 
(6) Depreciation cases in which the only issue to be resolved is the 
useful life of property. 
(7) Valuation cases. 
Id. at 3. 
159 Id. at 4. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 4–5.  
163 Id. at 5. 
164 Id.  
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E. Memorandum Opinions 
 
Although memorandum opinions were not expressly authorized until 
the Revenue Act of 1928,165 as early as 1924 the suggestion was made that 
many decisions published in full in the bound volume reports were of little 
value as authority and therefore should be promulgated solely in 
mimeographed form for the parties.166   Notwithstanding the suggestion, the 
first use of memorandum opinions was in late 1927.167  The procedure 
consisted of preparing findings of fact and a memorandum opinion, which 
would be included in the file, thereby satisfying the requirement of the 
Revenue Act of 1924 that the findings of fact and opinion be of public 
record.168  The statutory provision requiring publication “in such form and 
manner as may best be adopted for public information and use”169 was 
construed liberally to permit the Board to “publish” memorandum opinions 
by mere insertion in the Board’s bound volume of the date decision was 
entered, such insertion being considered enough for the limited value such 
cases had.170  Consistent with its position that memorandum opinions were 
not worthy of publication, the Board soon adopted the policy of not citing 
prior memorandum opinions in its opinions.171 
Use of the memorandum opinion quickly increased, and by the late 
1930’s a substantial number of proceedings before the Board were disposed 
of in this manner.172  Such practice reflected a growing number of cases that 
were essentially fact driven, involving routine and well-settled questions of 
law.173  The Board had employed this device in an effort to save printing 
                                                     
165  Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 872, amending Revenue Act of 
1926, ch. 27, § 907(b), 44 Stat. 107; see also 1928 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 
189, 523, 540. 
166  Memorandum from Charles Gebhardt to Member Sternhagen, c. Jan., 1925, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
167  Board Conference Minutes, Nov. 11, 1927. 
168  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 107, amending Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 338 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7461). 
169  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 107, amending Revenue Act of 
1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 338 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7462). 
170  See Memorandum from Judge Murdock to Judges of the Court, Apr. 6, 
1950, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1950]. 
171  The Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 26, 1946, indicate that prior 
Board/Tax Court policy had been not to cite memorandum opinions. 
172  See Report of the Joint Committee of Board of Tax Appeals and Chief 
Counsel’s Office, Dec. 17, 1937, at 24, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field 
Divisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee 
Report].  
173  Preliminary Committee Report of the Joint Committee of Board and 
Treasury Personnel, c. 1937, at 12, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: 
Opinions, Decisions, and Appeals                         751 
 
costs, but members of the tax bar began to urge a more extensive use of 
informal memorandum opinions as a panacea for the congestion of cases 
on the Board’s calendar.174  The Board, however, rejected such use of 
memorandum opinions.175  In its experience, the Board had found that little 
if any time was saved by their use.  Each case, regardless of the form of the 
opinion, still required the same study of the record and preparation time.176  
Additionally, because cases involving memorandum opinions frequently 
were appealed, the chances for reversal would increase if the quality of 
workmanship declined as a result of more summary use of the 
memorandum form.177 
The policy of neither citing nor publishing memorandum opinions was 
reevaluated in the 1950’s by the court membership.178  Proponents of 
publication believed that numerous cases had been promulgated as 
memorandum opinions without sufficient regard to their possible value as 
precedent.179  Such designation had prevented citation in subsequent cases, 
creating particular difficulty in situations in which the memorandum 
opinion was the only case on point.180  In addition, the private publishing 
services were printing memorandum opinions, the tax bar was buying them, 
and parties and other courts often relied on memorandum opinions as 
authority.181  Finally, the amount of money saved by not publishing the 
estimated two additional volumes a year did not outweigh the 
inconvenience to the judges and the disservice to the tax bar.182  
Despite these criticisms, the court did not change its policy.183  First, 
publication was not as inexpensive as the proponents of publication 
                                                                                                                       
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Committee 
Report]. 
174  Id. at 11. 
175  Joint Committee Report, supra note 172, at 24; Preliminary Committee 
Report, supra note 173, at 12.   
176  Joint Committee Report, supra note 172, at 24. 
177  The Joint Committee Report also pointed out that well drafted findings of 
fact and a reasonably exhaustive opinion that indicated that the Board had 
considered all the arguments would tend to satisfy the losing party with the 
soundness of the Board’s decision and, therefore, to reduce the number of appeals. 
Preliminary Committee Report, supra note 173, at 13. 
178  See Murdock, 1950, supra note 170; see Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 
5, 1954 and Mar. 19, 1954. 
179  Murdock, 1950, supra note 170; Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 5, 
1954. 
180  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 5, 1954. 
181  Murdock, 1950, supra note 170, at 1. 
182  Id. 
183  See Tax Court Conference Minutes, Mar. 19, 1954. 
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believed.184  Second, if publication of all opinions was not established, 
citation of a memorandum opinion could not be allowed as this would 
indicate that the court had committed an error in not publishing the 
opinion in the first instance.185  However, in those situations in which a 
citation in an opinion was to a higher court decision that affirmed or 
reversed a memorandum opinion, it was deemed appropriate to indicate 
whether it affirmed or reversed the Tax Court’s memorandum opinion.186  
In any event, the court’s membership agreed to exercise greater care in 
determining whether an opinion would be released in memorandum 
form.187  Further discussions among the court’s membership in the early 
1970’s resulted in an affirmation of the traditional policy.188 
The Tax Court in more recent times has developed a position with 
respect to memorandum opinions that can best be described as more 
embracive.  Although memorandum opinions still do not have binding 
precedential value,189 the court nonetheless has recognized that 
memorandum opinions constitute persuasive authority that aid in the 
disposition of present cases.  For instance, in the case of Convergent 
Technologies, Inc. v. Commissioner,190 the Tax Court—through a memorandum 
opinion—explained the relevance of a prior memorandum opinion 
concerning a similar factual scenario as follows: 
 
Sun Microsystems, Inc., being a memorandum opinion of this Court, is 
not controlling precedent.  Darby v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 51, 67 
(1991). . . . However, given the substantial similarity of the factual 
                                                     
184  The proponents of publication had asserted that the additional cost would 
be approximately $10,000, the cost of preparing two additional volumes. Sales of 
the volumes, the proponents believed, would cover the Government printing 
expenditures.  However, critics of the plan did not believe that $10,000 would 
cover expenses.  Memorandum from Judge Van Fossan, Chairman, Committee on 
Memorandum Opinions, to Chief Judge Kern, Feb. 25, 1954, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
185  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 5, 1954. 
186  Administrative Memorandum No. 153 from Chief Judge Murdock to the 
Judges of the Court, May 29, 1959, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
187 Memorandum from Judge Van Fossan, Chairman, Committee on 
Memorandum Opinions, to Chief Judge Kern, Feb. 25, 1954, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Tax Court Conference 
Minutes, Mar. 19, 1954. 
188 Tax Court Conference Minutes, May 5, 1970. 
189 See Darby v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 51, 67 (1991) (citing Newman v. 
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 494, 502 n.4 (1977)); see also Andrews v. Commissioner, 931 
F.2d 132, 137 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We note that prior memorandum decisions of 
the Tax Court are not treated by that court as binding precedent.”).   
190 T.C. Memo. 1995-320, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 87.   
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foundation of this case and Sun Microsystems, Inc., there is no reason 
why we should not follow the same analytical approach.191 
 
Hence, it is now a common albeit non-universal practice of Tax Court 
judges to support their opinions with citations to prior memorandum 
opinions.  As memorandum opinions are often cited by the court, the court 
now permits parties to cite memorandum opinions as part of the briefing 
process.  Indeed, the court issued a press release in 2012 articulating a 
uniform means of spot citing to memorandum opinions given the lack of 
publication in an official reporter.192  
The increased citation of memorandum opinions has not eroded the 
distinction between memorandum opinions and division opinions, as the 
former give rise to persuasive authority only.  Because division opinions 
make up the body of Tax Court precedent that will be afforded stare decisis 
deference in future cases, the judges of the court have a greater interest in 
the holding and analysis of a proposed division opinion than that of a 
memorandum opinion. Accordingly, the decision of whether an opinion 
should be published as a division opinion or issued as a memorandum 
opinion continues to carry significance.   
That said, emphasizing the technical distinction between the 
precedential value of memorandum opinion and a division opinion risks 
understating the degree of deference those opinions are afforded by the 
court.  The Tax Court has a strong institutional interest in maintaining 
integrity in its decision-making process, and the institutional integrity of the 
court would be undermined if each judge felt free to issue a decision 
adopting a holding or analysis that could not be reconciled with that of a 
prior memorandum opinion.  Thus, the court’s interest in decisional 
consistency results in considerable respect being afforded to prior 
memorandum decisions as a practical matter.  What then is the lasting value 
of the distinction between memorandum opinions and division opinions? 
Perhaps the best answer is the signaling value of such designations to the 
tax bar and the public at large.  The court releases hundreds of opinions 
each year, many of which are driven by factual determinations that offer 
little value to the disposition of future cases.  Official publication of an 
opinion as a division opinion to be included in the Reports of the United 
States Tax Court signals to the public and to the Government that the court 
views the opinion as noteworthy in some respect, for reasons described 
below.  The channeling function performed by the Tax Court in designating 
                                                     
191 Id. at 95.   
192 Press Release, United States Tax Court (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/062612.pdf.  The court announced that it would 
commence embedding page markers in the slip opinions published on its website, 
anticipating that such pagination would be reproduced by private print and 
electronic publishers.  Id. 
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opinions as memorandum opinions or division opinions thereby facilitates 
more efficient use of the court’s opinion product. 
Under current practice, the division that prepares the opinion indicates 
on the transmittal to the chief judge whether it recommends that the 
opinion be published by the court or issued as a memorandum opinion. 
The decision, however, rests within the discretion of the chief judge.193  
Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen explained the factors that guide the exercise 
of the chief judge’s discretion in this regard as follows: 
 
[C]ases involving application of familiar legal principles to routine 
factual situations, nonrecurring or enormously complicated factual 
situations, obsolete statutes or regulations, straightforward factual 
determinations, or arguments patently lacking in merit will be 
classified as memorandum opinions. . . . However, an opinion may 
be designated for publication if it adopts or rejects a particular 
methodology or an unusual argument of one of the parties that may 
recur in other cases.  On the other hand, an opinion may be so 
factually intense that it is not feasible to distill from it useful 
precedents even if it is one of many similar cases and, therefore, is 
released as a memorandum opinion.194 
 
Similarly, in its press release announcing the uniform means of spot 
citing to memorandum opinions, the court explained that these opinions 
“generally address cases which do not involve novel legal issues and in 
which the law is settled or the result is factually driven.”195  Memorandum 
opinions therefore carry that designation because the court views these 
opinions as not contributing in a meaningful way to the body of Tax Court 
precedent.   
 
F. Court Conference 
 
An especially significant feature of Tax Court procedure is the court 
conference. During these conferences, the entire court membership of 
active judges reviews division reports referred to it by the chief judge.  The 
chief judge has considerable discretion in selecting reports for court review, 
but generally the reports selected are those that either conflict with 
precedent or that contain issues not previously addressed by the court.  
Since the court as a whole is involved in reviewing such reports and 
                                                     
193 See Report Control Card, United States Tax Court, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
194 Mary Ann Cohen, How to Read Tax Court Opinions, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 
1, 6 (2001).  
195 Press Release, United States Tax Court (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/062612.pdf.   
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determining whether a precedent should be followed or overruled, or 
determining the proper resolution of issues of first impression, the 
consistency of Tax Court decisions is preserved.  In large part, the court 
conference procedures justify the assertion that the Tax Court is a single, 
national court, as opposed to 19 separate courts.196  Notwithstanding early 
misunderstandings on the part of observers as to the nature of conference 
review,197 the conference procedure generally has been praised for its role in 
providing uniformity in Tax Court opinions.198 
The selection of a case for court review rests within the discretion of the 
chief judge.  In a 2001 law review article, then Chief Judge Mary Ann 
Cohen provided the following insight regarding the principles that guide the 
exercise of this discretion: 
 
We use certain rules of thumb.  Court review is directed if the 
report proposes to invalidate a regulation, overrule a published Tax 
Court case, or reconsider, in a circuit that has not addressed it, an 
issue on which we have been reversed by a court of appeals. . . .  
Court review is also directed in cases of widespread application 
where the result may be controversial, where the Chief Judge is made 
aware of differences in opinion among the judges before the opinion 
in released, or, occasionally, where a procedural issue suggests the 
desirability of obtaining a consensus of the judges.  Court review is 
not available on motion of the parties, before or after the opinion 
has been released.199 
 
1. Historical Origins 
 
In the early days of the Board, every division opinion was referred to the 
entire membership for review.200  Although such extensive review was not 
                                                     
196  See, e.g. Kern, supra note 1, at 1019; Murdock, supra note 1, at 108–09. 
197  Early misunderstandings of the review process involved taxpayers who 
considered Board review the equivalent of a de novo hearing on the merits.  See 
infra notes 217–224 and accompanying text.  Such misunderstandings were 
eliminated by amendments in the Revenue Act of 1928, which clearly indicated the 
internal nature of the review procedure.  See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 
45 Stat. 872, amending Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a)–(b), 44 Stat. 107. 
198  E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925), wherein it was stated that “the great 
value of the Board lies in its practice in meeting regularly for common discussion 
and consideration of opinions prepared and proposed to be issued.” 
199  Cohen, supra note 194, at 5–6 (emphasis in original).   
200  Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
756           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
mandated by statute,201 it was believed that establishment of a uniform body 
of precedents made such review necessary.202  In 1926, Chairman Korner 
proposed to the Board a plan of reorganization that would take advantage 
of the newly authorized one-member divisions and also would provide for a 
certain degree of internal review.203  In the view of the Chairman, the time 
burden imposed on members by Board review of every division decision 
was out of proportion to the value of such review in assuring uniformity.204  
Accordingly, Chairman Korner proposed a realignment of the Board into 
16 divisions of one member each with a grouping of the divisions into five 
“parts” composed of three divisions each; the Chairman would not be 
assigned to a part.205  The parts would serve the function of providing 
intermediate review of division decisions prior to their referral to the 
Chairman.206  Under the procedure envisioned by Chairman Korner, a 
one-member division would initially hear the case, study the record and 
make a decision.207  Thereafter, a second member of the part would review 
the record so the fact finding and legal conclusions of the first division be 
given a further check.208  Following such review, the three members of the 
part would consider the report, and if in accord, it would generally be 
adopted without full Board review.209  In this manner, consideration by the 
entire Board would be necessary in only those few cases in which there was 
a difference of opinion in the part, in which the decision of the part 
conflicted with an existing precedent of the Board, or in which the 
Chairman, for other reasons, concluded that review was desirable.210 
                                                     
201  The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1924 clearly gave the discretion to 
the Board Chairman to order Board review of any division decision.  Revenue Act 
of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(f), 43 Stat. 337. 
202  Korner Letter, supra note 7, at 6. 
203 Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, June 11, 
1926, at 8, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Divisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Reorganization Memorandum]; Board 
Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
204  Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 203, at 13. 
205  Id. at 11–12.  Under the part system, the five parts would be composed of 
three members each.  Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the 
Board, June 25, 1926, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
206  Reorganization Memorandum, supra note 203, at 13. 
207  Id. at 12. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. 
210 Id. Chairman Korner proposed that the system of circulating mimeographed 
opinions among the Board membership continue.  This would enable the other 
members of the Board to offer criticism on the proposed opinion.  Id. at 16. 
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Although Chairman Korner’s proposal for single-member divisions and 
a part system was approved by the Board membership,211 disagreement 
arose with respect to allowing the Chairman to make the decision as to 
whether a division report should be reviewed by the entire Board.212  
Rather, the membership felt constrained to continue the policy of Board 
review of every division decision, in the interest of uniformity.213  In an 
attempt to effect a compromise between the Chairman’s belief that many 
cases did not require Board review and the membership’s fear that 
inconsistent decisions would undermine the Board’s theretofore successful 
work, the Board required the parts to make specific recommendations to 
the Board conferences as to whether a division report merited in-depth 
Board review.214  With such recommendations, substantial time could be 
saved at the Board conferences.215 
By 1927, the increased production of cases fostered by the realignment 
of the Board into 16 divisions and the realization by the Board membership 
that many division decisions could adequately be decided without the 
necessity of Board review led to adoption of the current policy that leaves 
to the discretion of the chief judge the selection of cases to be reviewed by 
the entire membership.216 
Despite the intent of Congress that Board review serve as a collegial, 
albeit internal device,217 early misconceptions by the tax bar and the 
judiciary threatened to change its character.  Taxpayers, aware that their 
cases were undergoing Board review, demanded the right to appear before 
the Board.218  Although no statutory provision expressly denied the 
taxpayer the right to appear,219 the Board adopted a policy that internal 
review was not the equivalent of an en banc hearing in the Federal courts of 
appeals.220  Members of the Board believed that an internal review process 
was quicker than an en banc hearing that permitted re-argument, and that 
                                                     
211 Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, June 25, 
1926, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” 
Board Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
212  Board Conference Minutes, June 23, 1926. 
213  Id. 
214  Memorandum from Chairman Korner to members of the Board, June 25, 
1926, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
215  Id. at 2. 
216  See Board Conference Minutes, May 31 and June 3, 1927. 
217  See 69 CONG. REC. 704 (1927). 
218  See id. 
219  Compare Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1000, 44 Stat. 107, amending Revenue 
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(e)–(f), 43 Stat. 377 with Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 
§ 601, 45 Stat. 872, amending Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 107. 
220  See J. Gilmer Korner, Practice Before The United States Board of Tax Appeals, 3 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 220, 224 (1925); Board Conference Minutes, Feb. 10, 1933. 
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the taxpayer had the responsibility to present his case adequately in the 
course of the initial hearing and decision process.221  The Board position 
provoked some taxpayers to seek writs of mandamus to compel the Board 
to adopt division decisions that had been revised at conferences at which 
the taxpayer had no right to appear.222   Sensing that adverse judicial rulings 
would create undue confusion and take years to remedy,223 Congress 
enacted specific statutory guidelines in the Revenue Act of 1928 that denied 
parties the right to appear at the conference if an opportunity for hearing 
was provided in the first instance at the division level.224  On the other 
hand, the Chairman was authorized by statute to permit the parties access 
to the conference if deemed necessary.225  
The House Ways and Means Committee adopted another proposal 
designed to remedy the same problem.  In its report on the 1928 Act, the 
Committee recommended that the right of a division to “decide” a case in 
the first instance be eliminated and that a preliminary report (containing the 
findings of fact and opinion in a case) by the division to the Chairman be 
substituted.226  The preliminary report of the division would become the 
Board’s decision either by a lapse of 30 days or by adoption at the Board 
conference.227  Although the differences, real and apparent, between the 
words “decision” and “report” appear to be of little significance, members 
of the tax bar felt that such a procedure would be contrary to traditional 
judicial practices and would breed mistrust of Board action.228  As a result, 
the Senate Finance Committee, in an amendment to the 1928 Revenue Bill, 
provided that it would be the duty of the division to “hear and make a 
determination upon” a proceeding assigned to the division and to “make a 
report of any such determination which constitutes its final disposition of 
the proceeding.”229  This change, the Committee asserted, would ensure a 
continuation of the policy that a division determine a case in the first 
instance.230 
                                                     
221  See generally 69 CONG. REC. 704 (1927). 
222  See id. 
223  Id. 
224  Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 872 (amending Revenue Act 
of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 107). 
225 Id. 
226 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 31 (1927). 
227 Id. 
228 E.g., Letter from E. Prettyman to Chairman Littleton, Dec. 27, 1927, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  In this letter, 
Prettyman complained that the separation of the decision process from the hearing 
process was an alien concept in judicial entities and would not create an 
atmosphere of trust on the part of the taxpayer in the actions of the Board. 
229 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 37–38 (1928); H.R. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 21 (1928). 
230 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 37–38 (1928); H.R. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 21 (1928). 
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Since the statutory changes of 1928, the court conference procedure has 
undergone little change.231 The policy of part review, though formally 
dropped in 1932,232 has continued throughout the court’s history in an 
informal manner.  Current practice indicates that frequent consultation 
between the judges is the rule, rather than the exception.233 If the chief 
judge determines that review is necessary, the division “report”234 
(containing findings of fact and opinion in a case) is placed on the 
conference calendar.  At least a week in advance of the scheduled 
conference, the report is distributed to the court membership for study.235  
At the conference, the report is discussed and voted upon.236  If the report 
is approved, it is released as an opinion of the court.  If rejected, the report 
is reassigned to the original division or to another division for rewriting in 
accordance with the legal analysis of the majority.237  Reassignment to a 
different division usually occurs only if the division that originally wrote the 
report declines to accept the majority view.238   If the report of the division 
fails, by statute it will not be included in the record of the case.239  Under 
the court’s procedures, the original division has the right to write a 
dissenting opinion setting forth that division’s views.240  If, however, the 
judge who prepared the division report agrees to rewrite the report in 
                                                     
231 Compare Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 907(a)–(b), 45 Stat. 872 with I.R.C. 
§§ 7459, 7460. 
232 Board Conference Minutes, Apr. 1, 8, 1932. 
233 See generally articles cited in supra note 1. 
234 I.R.C. § 7460. 
235 Kern, supra note 1, at 1019; Murdock, supra note 1, at 109. 
236  It is also possible that the judges of the court may decide to remove a case 
from court review.  Although no rule has been adopted in this regard, prior practice 
has required a majority vote of the conference to override the prerogative of the 
chief judge that a case be reviewed.  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Oct. 4 and 
Nov. 1, 1968. 
237  Where a report reviewed by the court fails to be adopted and, as a 
consequence, another judge is assigned the task of writing the report to reflect the 
views of the majority, the fact that court review was directed, that the report 
prepared by the judge who presided at trial failed to be adopted, and that another 
judge has been assigned to write the report in accordance with the views of the 
majority all constitute confidential matters within the court that are not disclosed to 
the parties or the public.  Administrative Order No. 96, entitled “Reassignment of a 
Court Reviewed Case,” Mar. 23, 1960, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Order No. 96]. 
238  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Nov. 6, 1959. 
239  I.R.C. § 7460(b).  The provision excluding the report of the division from 
being part of the record in any case in which the chief judge directs court review 
originally appeared in 1928. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 871 
(amending Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 906(b), 44 Stat. 106). 
240  See Order No. 96, supra note 237. 
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accordance with the majority view, the parties cannot determine the original 
position of the division.241  
If the division report is adopted by the court, the opinion will be filed, 
together with any dissenting or concurring opinions, as a court-reviewed 
case.  If the division report has been rejected, the rewritten report usually is 
filed only if approved by the court.242  Subsequent to approval, and together 
with any dissenting or concurring opinions, the report then is filed as a 
court-reviewed opinion. 
 
2. Voting Procedures  
 
a. Threshold to Prevail 
 
In the development of conference procedures, the Board/Tax Court has 
formulated rules for the number of members required to be present to take 
action on a reviewed case and the number of members required to overrule 
precedent. 
From the earliest days of the Board, the adoption or rejection of a 
division report generally has been based on a majority of those present and 
voting.243  Such is not the case, however, in situations in which adoption of 
a report will result in overruling an existing precedent.244  Such action 
requires a majority of the active judges (excluding any judge who has 
recused himself or herself from participation in the conference) at the time 
of the vote, and is applicable to any precedent, whether or not the 
precedent had been reviewed previously by the court.245  The different 
requirements reflect a determination on the part of the court to inhibit any 
tendency towards frequent change in established interpretations.246   
 
b. Participation by Recalled Judges 
 
As a general rule, recalled judges are not permitted to vote at court 
conferences.247  However, a recalled judge may vote at the conference on all 
matters relating to a case heard and decided by that judge which has been 
                                                     
241  See Tax Court Conference Minutes, Nov. 6, 1959. 
242 See Kern, supra note 1, at 1019.  On rare occasion, the court conference will 
authorize the chief judge to promulgate the rewritten report as a memorandum or 
regular decision without re-referral to the court.  Tax Court Conference Minutes, 
Sept. 14, 1951. 
243 See Board Conference Minutes, Oct. 2, 1931, wherein a reaffirmation of the 
longstanding practice occurred. 
244 Board Conference Minutes, Nov. 11, 1932. 
245 Board Conference Minutes, Nov. 8, 1935. 
246 See Kern, supra note 1; Murdock, supra note 1. 
247  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 26, 1954. 
Opinions, Decisions, and Appeals                         761 
 
referred to the conference by the chief judge.248  In the court’s view, 
prohibiting retired judge participation in this instance would be contrary to 
the intent of the statute that gives a recalled judge the powers of a full-time 
judge.249  However, the question of whether a recalled judge may vote to 
overrule a prior decision has not been as clearly answered.  Although the 
recalled judge has the same power as a full-time judge, such power is in the 
context of the limited matter for which the judge has been recalled, and in 
one view the power to overrule a precedent is broader in scope than merely 
deciding an individual case.  In addition, the policy of the court has always 
been to require a majority of the full-time membership to overrule a prior 
decision.250  If a recalled judge is permitted to vote in situations in which a 
precedent might be overruled, this policy could be thwarted in the event of 
a deadlock among the full-time membership.251  On the other hand, it may 
be argued that overruling a precedent is no different than establishing a 
precedent.252  A committee established to study the problem recommended 
that recalled judges not be permitted to vote to overrule precedents.253 
However, no action was taken on the committee’s recommendation.254 
 
                                                     
248  Id. 
249 Report of the Committee on Recalled Judges to the Tax Court, Feb. 26, 
1954, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” 
[hereinafter cited as Recalled Judges Report].  Section 7447(c) governs the authority 
of a recalled judge and provides as follows: 
(c) RECALLING OF RETIRED JUDGES.—At or after his retirement, any 
individual who has elected to receive retired pay under subsection (d) may 
be called upon by the chief judge of the Tax Court to perform such judicial 
duties with the Tax Court as may be requested of him for any period or 
periods specified by the chief judge; except that in the case of any such 
individual: 
(1) the aggregate of such periods in any one calendar year shall not 
(without his consent) exceed 90 calendar days; and 
(2) he shall be relieved of performing such duties during any period 
in which illness or disability precludes the performance of such duties. 
Any act, or failure to act, by an individual performing judicial duties 
pursuant to this subsection shall have the same force and effect as if it were 
the act (or failure to act) of a judge of the Tax Court; but any such 
individual shall not be counted as a judge of the Tax Court for purposes of 
section 7443(a).  Any individual who is performing judicial duties pursuant 
to this subsection shall be paid the same compensation (in lieu of retired 
pay) and allowances for travel and other expenses as a judge. 
250  Id. 
251  Such a proposal was advanced in 1958.  Tax Court Conference Minutes, 
Dec. 19, 1958.  No action was taken by the court. 
252  Recalled Judges Report, supra note 249. 
253  See id. 
254  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Feb. 26, 1954. 
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c. Publication of Conference Votes 
 
The publication of conference voting has been the subject of much 
discussion among the court’s membership.255  Although the court has 
always indicated in its published reports whether an opinion has been 
subject to conference review,256 full publication of the vote of the members 
has not been required.257  If a judge writes a concurrence or a dissent, that 
judge’s position, along with that of the author of the majority opinion, 
obviously is known.258  Moreover, a judge may note in the published report 
that judge’s concurrence or dissent with an opinion or result, without the 
necessity of writing a separate opinion.259  Nonetheless, the position of 
                                                     
255  The issue of publication has arisen on several occasions, most notably in 
1954 and 1969.  See supra notes 261–273 and accompanying text. 
256  But see supra note 236. 
257  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Dec. 30, 1954. 
258 The practice of the Board, from its earliest years, has been to discourage 
unpublished dissenting opinions.  In 1924, the Board adopted a rule which 
provided that if a dissent was not published, it could not be filed in the court 
records.  Board Conference Minutes, Dec. 13, 1924. 
259  The Board has adopted a policy that dissenting and concurring opinions are 
to be circulated prior to the promulgation of the report in an effort to familiarize 
the membership with the views of their associates.  Board Conference Minutes, 
Apr. 26, 1935.  Each judge who casts a “no” vote on a conference report is given 
the opportunity to indicate whether he wishes his name to appear in approval of a 
dissenting opinion.  See Tax Court Conference Minutes, Mar. 17, 1950.  To 
eliminate delays that developed in members signifying their decision to be noted as 
dissenting, the court in 1950 adopted a procedure of providing a judge with one 
week in which to indicate his position on a dissenting opinion.  Administrative 
Memorandum No. 1, entitled “Establishment of Time Limit in Obtaining 
Clearance on Dissenting Opinions,” Mar. 30, 1950, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.”  Finally, consideration has also been 
given to the situation in which the author of a majority report is rewriting the 
opinion solely in deference to the majority view and not because of his agreement 
therewith.  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Nov. 6, 1959.  Although the court had 
established a policy that in cases in which a member wrote the opinion of the court, 
no published dissent would be permitted to be filed by him, Tax Court Conference 
Minutes, July 31, 1942, a question arose as to whether a judge who rewrote an 
opinion in accordance with majority wishes could indicate within the body of the 
opinion that he did not agree and in fact retained a view different from that of the 
majority, Tax Court Conference Minutes, Nov. 6, 1959.  In conference, the court 
rejected such a proposition, on the premise that it represented an opportunity to 
express a minority view in a majority opinion and would appear to weaken the 
presentation of the majority position.  Id.  Rather, it was believed that the majority 
opinion should be written by someone in agreement with the majority position and 
that judges who personally disagreed should present their views in dissenting 
opinions. Id.  But see Haserot v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 864, 872 (1966) (Judge 
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those not attending the conference, those who vote “pass,” and those who 
concur or dissent without wishing to signify their vote in the published 
report is not made known to the public.260 
The first major criticism of these practices occurred in 1954, when Judge 
Maris, in Stern v. Commissioner,261 suggested that the Tax Court “follow 
accepted forms of judicial procedure by indicating in some appropriate way 
on its record in each case . . . the names of the judges who participate in the 
decision ultimately rendered.”262  Shortly thereafter, in a memorandum to 
the court, Chief Judge Kern advocated that the names of those judges not 
participating (absent and not voting by proxy) be supplied to those who 
request such information and be made a part of the record in each appeal.  
Such an approach, Judge Kern believed, would leave undisturbed the court 
policy of voting by proxy and permitting pass votes and was preferable to 
affirmatively listing the names of all the judges agreeing with the majority 
opinion.263  Because Judge Kern’s approach would lead to the names of 
those not participating becoming public as a result of their notation in the 
record, it was suggested that publication of those not participating in the 
reports also was advisable.264  An alternative to the Kern proposal was 
advanced by Judge Murdock, who suggested that certification be made as to 
the number of judges who adopted the position of the court.  Such an 
approach, he believed, would more nearly answer the criticism of Judge 
Maris.265  None of these proposals was adopted.  Rather, the court 
concluded that further study of the problem was necessary.  A special 
committee established for this purpose subsequently reported that no 
compelling reasons existed to change prior practices; nonetheless, the 
committee recommended a limited form of identification.266  Under the 
recommendation, the only judges to be identified would be those who did 
not participate in the discussion, and, in addition, did not vote.267  For 
purposes of the rule, a judge who voted a “pass” would not be identified.  
The recommendation was not approved and the prior practice of the court 
                                                                                                                       
Tannenwald, author of the majority opinion, wrote a separate opinion “speaking 
separately”), aff’d, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).  
260  See Kern, supra note 1. 
261  215 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1954). 
262  Id. at 708. 
263  Memorandum from Chief Judge Kern to Judges of the Court, Dec. 17, 
1954, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
264  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Dec. 30, 1954. 
265  Id. 
266  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Dec. 30, 1954 and Feb. 4, 1955. 
267  Memorandum from the Committee on Publication to the Chief Judge, Feb. 
9, 1955, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
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continued.268  Varying reasons were given for the court’s rejection of the 
recommendation.  First, objections to exposing the internal operations were 
raised, and notwithstanding the interest of the bar and others in the views 
of the various judges on questions before the court, it was believed that 
practice by the court should not be affected by such interest or 
speculation.269 Second, the problem of judges conducting trial sessions in 
the field who did not wish to be identified as non-participating would arise.  
Although an absent judge would have been permitted to vote by proxy 
under the recommendation, such encouragement of proxy voting was 
viewed as potentially dangerous and not within the spirit of the 
conference’s purpose.270  Third, identification of non-participants might 
encourage the parties to request reconsideration by the full court if the 
number of non-participants was great and the decision close.271  
Reconsideration of the publication issue occurred in 1969.272  
Arguments similar to those raised 15 years earlier were offered in 
opposition to any change in pre-existing court policy and continuation of 
the prior policy was approved.273 
 
3. 1985 Amendments to Conference Procedures 
 
In 1985, Chief Judge Samuel Sterrett requested the Tax Court Rules 
Committee to consider how a court conference quorum should be 
determined when some judges are disqualified.274  During consideration of 
this matter, the Rules Committee undertook to propose internal guidelines 
that would resolve this and other questions concerning court conference 
procedures.275  The result was a formulation of the conference procedures 
of the Tax Court.276 
                                                     
268  Id. at 1. 
269  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Mar. 11, 1955. 
270  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Dec. 30, 1954 and Mar. 11, 1955.  
271  Tax Court Conference Minutes, Mar. 11, 1955. 
272  Memorandum from Judge Simpson to the judges, Feb. 24, 1969, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Tax Court 
Conference Minutes, Feb. 28, and May 2, 1969. 
273  Tax Court Conference Minutes, May 2, 1969. 
274 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, Sept. 11, 
1985, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court Conference 
Procedures (1985).”  
275 Id.  The proposed procedures generally formalized existing practices and 
provide for some situations in which there was no established practice.  Id. at 1.  
Judge Simpson’s memorandum stated that “[i]n no case does a proposed procedure 
change an established practice.” Id. 
276 The procedures, approved by the court conference on October 25, 1985, 
were adopted by the court for its internal use and have not been published.  A copy 
of the procedures are filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court 
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a. Effect of Disqualification on Quorum 
 
Although the Internal Revenue Code does not directly address the 
question,277 § 7444(d) provides useful guidance for the formulation of a rule 
governing the effect of disqualification on the court conference quorum: 
 
A majority of the judges of the Tax Court or of any division thereof 
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the 
Tax Court or of the division, respectively.  A vacancy in the Tax 
Court or in any division thereof shall not impair the powers nor 
affect the duties of the Tax Court or division nor of the remaining 
judges of the Tax Court or division, respectively.278 
 
The Rules Committee was particularly concerned that disqualification of 
members of the court conference could create a situation in which a 
minority of the court could adopt a position in conflict with the majority 
view.279  For example, if two of the 19 judges were disqualified from taking 
                                                                                                                       
Conference Procedures (1985).” [hereinafter cited as Tax Court Procedures for 
Court Conferences]. 
277 I.R.C. § 7444(d). 
278 Section 455(a) of title 28 of the United States Code requires 
self-disqualification by a “judge . . . of the United States” in any case “in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Section 451 
provides that reference to a judge of the United States includes “judges of the 
courts of appeals, district courts, Court of International Trade and any court 
created by Act of Congress, the judges of which are entitled to hold office during 
good behavior.”  28 U.S.C. § 451.  Tax Court judges serve 15-year terms.  I.R.C. 
§ 7443(e).  Thus, the disqualification statute is inapplicable to the Tax Court.  The 
Tax Court, however, has voluntarily adopted the rule that Tax Court judges who 
would be disqualified from a particular case under section 455 of title 28, must 
disqualify themselves from a case and refrain from engaging in any discussion of 
the case with their colleagues.  See Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, 
supra note 13, RULE 276 (quoted infra note 316). 
279 The question of how to determine a quorum when some judges are 
disqualified arose in anticipation of Dunn Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 745 (1986) 
(involving the tax consequences of the divestiture of AT&T).  See Letter from 
Judge Simpson to Harold Dubroff, Aug. 27, 1987, at 1–2, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Rules Committee: Court Conference Procedures (1985).”  The parties in 
Dunn Trust filed a joint motion requesting treatment of the case under the 
“expedited procedures that the court had recently announced it was introducing for 
handling especially significant cases.”  See Eric S. Kracov, AT&T Case Offers Hope 
for Swift Resolution of Important Tax Disputes, 31 TAX NOTES 657 (May 19, 1986).  The 
Dunn Trust case was assigned to Judge Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., and his report 
was referred to the conference for review because of its significance.  At the 
conference, only ten judges participated, in addition to Judge Tannenwald (then a 
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part in a decision, nine of the remaining 17 judges might vote to overrule 
Tax Court precedent that the majority of active judges believed should be 
followed.  Similarly, were an issue of first impression involved in such a 
case, the nine judges might reach a conclusion with which the majority of 
Tax Court judges disagreed.280 
The Rules Committee also was concerned that if a majority of the court 
membership was required to review division reports, the court would be 
unable to do so if ten or more of the 19 judges were disqualified.281  The 
Rules Committee reviewed the different approaches taken by the appellate 
courts for the federal circuits in considering the effect of judicial 
disqualification on their power to act en banc.282  After observing a fairly 
                                                                                                                       
recalled senior judge).  Letter from Judge Simpson to Harold Dubroff, supra note 
279, at 1–2.  Nine judges disqualified themselves and did not participate.  Because 
all of the participating judges agreed with Judge Tannenwald’s opinion, the court 
was not confronted with a situation in which an opinion was approved by a 
minority of the court.  Id. at 1–2.  Dunn Trust is, however, illustrative of the 
problem that might arise when a substantial number of judges are forced to 
disqualify themselves from a particular case.  Id. 
280 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
274, at 4; Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox, Deputy Counsel to the Chief Judge, 
to Judge Simpson, May 22, 1985, at 7, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules 
Committee: Court Conference Procedures (1985).” 
281 See Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox, Deputy Counsel to the Chief 
Judge, to Judge Simpson, supra note 280, at 8. 
282 See id. at 4–8; Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, 
supra note 274, at 2–3. 
Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “[a] 
majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who are not 
disqualified may order that an appeal . . . be . . . reheard by the court of appeals in 
banc.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). The purpose of the en banc procedure is to help 
assure the uniformity of decisions within a circuit and to enable a majority of the 
judges of a circuit to control the resolution of important issues.  See United States v. 
American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689–90, reh’g denied, 364 U.S. 854 
(1960); Peter Michael Madden, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 407–08 (1974) (discussing the en banc procedures of the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals in light of the American-Foreign Steamship 
Corp. decision).  The court conference procedure is not the equivalent of an en 
banc hearing in the courts of appeals.  Neither party is entitled to a hearing before 
the Tax Court reviewing a division report, except upon order of the chief judge.  
Oral arguments have never been presented during the court conference.  Moreover, 
although the court conference and en banc procedures share a similar major 
purpose, assuring uniformity of precedent, the court conference procedure, unlike 
the en banc procedure, is not designed to afford parties an opportunity to reargue a 
case.  2A LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, § 8.37, at 284 (1981). 
In Green Spring Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’g 
18 T.C. 217 (1952) and 18 T.C. 929 (1952), the court stated: 
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pronounced split among the circuit courts of appeals,283 the Tax Court 
unanimously agreed to adopt the rule that disqualified judges are to be 
disregarded in determining whether a quorum exists for conference 
review.284  The Rules Committee believed that the result of judicial 
disqualification was similar to a vacancy on the court285 and pointed out that 
the statute clearly provides “that a vacancy is not to impair the ability of the 
Court to function.”286  If the court were presented with a situation in which 
there were ten vacancies, the statute would allow the remaining nine judges 
                                                                                                                       
It is of course arguable that when Congress modified the conclusive 
effect to be given to a decision of the Tax Court in these cases by the Act of 
1941 and provided for a review of decisions by a special division in 1942, it 
had in mind the procedure followed by the courts of appeals in reviewing 
ordinary decisions of the Tax Court; but it is more reasonable to construe 
the statute in the framework of the legislation relating to the taxation of 
incomes.  In these statutes, as they appear today in the Code, we find [the 
predecessor of I.R.C. § 7444], which empowers the Tax Court to designate 
a presiding judge who may from time to time divide the court into divisions 
of one or more judges; [the predecessor of I.R.C. § 7460] which directs that 
a division shall hear and determine any proceeding before the Tax Court 
which is assigned to it and shall make a report thereof, and that the report 
shall become the report of the Tax Court within thirty days unless the 
presiding judge directs that it shall be reviewed by the Tax Court; and [the 
predecessor of I.R.C. § 7458] which provides that notice and opportunity to 
be heard upon any proceeding instituted before the Tax Court shall be 
given to the parties, and that if an opportunity to be heard is given before a 
division of the Tax Court, neither party shall be entitled to notice and 
opportunity to be heard before the Tax Court upon review, except upon a 
specific order of the presiding judge.  In our opinion it was this kind of 
review without additional opportunity to the parties to be heard which 
Congress had in mind in enacting section 732(d).  The purpose of the 
review was not to secure a reargument of the case but to assure a consistent 
and uniform application of the principles of the excess profits tax statute by 
a group familiar with the problems involved. 
Id. at 475–76.  Accord A.B. Frank Co. v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 
1954). 
283 For discussion of the prevailing circuit split, see Harold Dubroff & Charles 
M. Greene, Recent Developments in the Business and Procedures of the United States Tax 
Court; Part Five: Court Conferences, 52 ALB. L. REV. 147, 151–53 (1987).   
284 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
274, at 3–4. 
285 Id. at 4. 
286 Id. (stating that when a judge disqualifies himself, it is similar to a vacancy 
on the court).  Section 7444(d) provides that “[a] vacancy in the Tax Court or in 
any division thereof shall not impair the powers nor affect the duties of the Tax 
Court or division nor of the remaining judges of the Tax Court or division, 
respectively.”  I.R.C. § 7444(d). 
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to continue carrying on the business of the court.287  Similarly, the Rules 
Committee believed that the remaining nine judges should have the 
authority to carry on the business of the court were it ever faced with a 
situation in which ten judges were forced to disqualify themselves.288  
Although five judges could make the decision of the entire court in this 
situation, such a possibility was believed better than placing the court in a 
position in which it simply could not function.289 
 
b. Representation by Proxy 
 
Although the Rules Committee unanimously agreed that judges 
disqualified from a particular case should be disregarded in determining a 
conference quorum, there was disagreement regarding the effect of 
representation by proxy at the court conference.290  Prior Tax Court 
practice had permitted unrestricted proxies, and members of the Rules 
Committee who favored counting proxies in determining a quorum argued 
that court members are often unavoidably absent at conference time due to 
their demanding travel schedules.291  Proxy representation would allow 
participation by absent judges and would prevent undue interference with 
the operations of the court.  The proponents of proxy representation noted 
that such a practice would be in accordance with general principles of 
corporate governance.292 
Those opposed to counting proxies in determining a conference 
quorum, however, believed that a majority of the court’s members who 
were not disqualified from a particular case should be present to carry on 
the business of the court; otherwise, important decisions could be made 
with only a few judges present,293 and an important purpose of the court 
conference would be thwarted.  The practices of corporations were argued 
                                                     
287 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 




291 Id. at 4–5. 
292 Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox, Deputy Counsel to the Chief Judge, 
to Judge Simpson, supra note 280, at 2.  The memorandum quoted, as an example, 
Delaware law governing shareholder voting standards:  “A majority of the shares 
entitled to vote, present in person or represented by proxy, shall constitute a 
quorum at a meeting of stockholders.”  Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 216(1) (1983)). 
293 Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 274, 
at 5. 
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to be of little relevance to Tax Court procedure.294  Private corporations 
often have thousands of shareholders who may live anywhere in the world, 
and because their primary concerns are financial, they may feel no major 
need to be physically present at a shareholders’ meeting.295  The Tax Court, 
however, is a governmental body of only 19 members who have a duty to 
meet and discuss before acting.  Of far more relevance to Tax Court 
procedures than corporate practices, it was argued, were the operations of 
other governmental bodies whose members are required to travel 
extensively.296  An example of such a body is the United States Congress, 
where a majority of committee members must be present for a quorum and 
where proxies are not allowed for any purpose during deliberations on the 
floor.297 
The question of conference voting had occasioned some controversy.  
The Rules Committee considered proposals that would require absent 
judges to be precluded from voting, or would provide that conference 
debates be transcribed, so that absent judges could be informed of the 
various positions at conference before casting their votes. 
Those who questioned unrestricted use of proxies also recognized, 
however, that often some judges were unavoidably absent at conference 
time, and sometimes many judges were unavoidably absent.  Nonetheless, 
prior research often gave these judges a well-informed opinion of the issues 
being discussed at conference.  Thus, in fairness to the judges and the 
purposes of court review, their votes should not be precluded. 
To address the conflicting concerns of the Rules Committee, Judge 
Chabot proposed a rule that would require a majority of the judges not 
disqualified from a particular case to be present in person to determine a 
conference quorum; but once a quorum was established, the votes of 
absent members could be cast by proxy.298  Judge Chabot’s proposal was 




                                                     
294 Memorandum from Judge Chabot to Judge Simpson, May 23, 1985, filed at 





299 Rule 2 of the Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences provides: 
“Quorum.  A majority of the judges entitled to vote on a case, present in person, 
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business with respect to that case.” 
Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 2; see also Tax 
Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 3 (quoted infra note 
300). 
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c. Voting Requirement and Votes Cast After Conference  
 
 In adopting the Procedures for Court Conference, the Tax Court 
continued its established practices with respect to the vote required to 
adopt a division report.  Generally, a report approved by a majority of the 
judges voting by proxy or in person will be considered adopted.300  If the 
report overrules a prior decision of the court, however, the vote of a 
majority of the judges entitled to vote on the case is required to adopt it.301  
Judges entitled to vote include all those not disqualified from a particular 
case, as well as any senior judge who may have authored the report.302  Rule 
1 of the Procedures for Court Conferences makes it clear that even if the 
report of a senior judge is not adopted in conference and the case is 
reassigned, the senior judge who authored the report will remain “entitled 
to vote on all matters relating to the case.”303 
The significance of the controversy over the use of proxies is somewhat 
diminished by Rule 4 of the Procedures for Court Conferences, which 
allows judges who are not present at conference to later cast a vote and 
which permits those who are present to change their vote within a limited 
period.304  There was concern, however, that Rule 3 of the conference 
                                                     
300 Rule 3 of the Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences provides: 
3. Vote required.  A quorum being present, the affirmative vote of the 
majority of the judges present in person or represented by proxy at the 
Court Conference and entitled to vote on the case shall be sufficient to 
adopt the report in that case, except that the affirmative vote of a majority 
of the judges entitled to vote on the case shall be required to overrule a 
prior Tax Court opinion.  If the votes cast at the Court Conference are 
sufficient to decide the outcome of a case, the Chief Judge shall have the 
authority to declare at the Conference whether the report in the case is 
adopted or not adopted, even though votes cast after the Court Conference 
could alter the outcome. 
Tax Court Procedure for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 3.  
301 Id.  
302 Rule 1 of the Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences provides: 
1. Voting rights.  Any active judge who is not disqualified in a particular 
case shall be entitled to vote on all matters relating to that case.  Any senior 
judge shall be entitled to vote on all matters relating to any case in which he 
is the author of the report.  Where the report of a senior judge is not 
adopted by the Court Conference and the case is reassigned, the senior 
judge who was the author of the initial report shall continue to be entitled 
to vote on all matters relating to the case. 
Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 1.  
303 Id. 
304 Rule 4 of the Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences provides: 
4. Submission of Separate Opinions and Voting After Conference.  All separate 
opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions concerning a 
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procedures (authorizing the chief judge to declare at the time of the 
conference whether a report is adopted or not) might reverse the pre-
existing Tax Court practice requiring the chief judge to resubmit to 
conference any case the outcome of which is altered by votes cast after the 
conference.305  Rule 4 of the conference procedures, however, clarifies that 
the case must again be scheduled for conference consideration in all 
situations in which the outcome of the case is changed, including changes 
resulting from votes by absent judges.306 
Allowing absent judges to vote was believed necessary because some 
cases may involve issues so thoroughly familiar to a judge that the 
conference discussion may be of little importance to that judge in deciding 
how to vote.307  Whether a judge will vote with or without the benefit of 
conference discussion is, therefore, left to the discretion of each individual 
judge. 
The court was concerned that conference cases be processed as 
expeditiously as possible.308  Accordingly, rules were adopted setting forth 
                                                                                                                       
conference case, shall be submitted to the Chief Judge’s office within 14 
days after the conference at which such case was acted upon.  Any judge 
entitled to vote on the case may vote, or may change his vote, within 14 
days after such conference, or within 7 days after the distribution of a 
separate opinion, whichever period expires later.  However, if the votes by 
absent Judges or the changes in votes would result in a change in the 
outcome of a case, the case will again be scheduled for conference 
consideration.  The Chief Judge may, for good cause, extend the period for 
the submission of separate opinions and the period for voting, and he may, 
for cause, shorten such periods on giving the Judges adequate notice of his 
intention to do so. 
Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 4.  
305 See Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 3 
(quoted supra note 300); see also Memorandum from Judge Whitaker to Chief Judge 
Sterrett , Oct. 1, 1985, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court 
Conference Procedures (1985)” (expressing his understanding that under Rule 4 
“any judge, whether attending a conference or absent, [could] join in any separate 
opinion within 7 days after distribution and . . . could change his or her vote 
without consent of the conference”); Memorandum from Judge Chabot to Judge 
Simpson, June 25, 1985, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court 
Conference Procedures (1985)” (stating that he was troubled by the proposed 
changes to Rule 4 that would allow the chief judge to poll conference absentees to 
reach a result inconsistent with a majority of those who voted at conference).  
306 See Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 4 
(quoted supra note 304). 
307 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
274. 
308 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Judges and Senior Judges, Sept. 
26, 1985, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court Conference 
Procedures (1985).” 
772           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
reasonably definite limits with respect to voting on and adoption of 
conference cases.  If the number of votes at conference are enough to 
decide a case, the chief judge is authorized to declare that the report has 
been adopted, even though votes cast after the conference could alter the 
outcome.309  Absent judges, or judges who voted in conference and wish to 
change their vote, generally must cast their vote within 14 days after the 
conference, or within seven days after the distribution of a separate 
opinion, whichever period expires later.310  The chief judge is given 
discretion, for cause, to extend the period for voting or shorten the period 
within which a late vote may be cast, provided the judges are given adequate 
notice of the shortened time period.311 
 
d. Participation by Disqualified Judges 
 
As stated previously, judges of the United States subject to title 28 are 
required to disqualify themselves from any case in which their “impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”312  The extent to which a disqualified 
judge is allowed to participate in the discussion of a case with his colleagues, 
however, was not totally clear.313 
An opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial 
Conduct314 deals with a situation in which a panel of three judges have 
discussed but not decided a case, and one judge subsequently finds it 
necessary to disqualify himself.  The question presented is whether the 
other two judges should also disqualify themselves.  In concluding that the 
other two judges are not disqualified, the opinion notes that judges often 
must disregard important facts of which they are aware, as in the case of 
evidence inadmissible at trial.315  The mere fact that a judge is recused after 
oral argument or conference on the case is not, according to the opinion, a 
                                                     
309 See Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 3 
(quoted supra note 300). 
310 See Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, RULE 4 
(quoted supra note 304). 
311 Id. 
312 See supra note 278; 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, Canon 3, Rule 2.11(A) (2011).   
313 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
274. 
314 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, vol. 2, pt. B, Adv. Opinion 71 (July 20, 
2012); see also Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox, Deputy Counsel to the Chief 
Judge, to Judge Simpson, supra note 280.  The language of 28 U.S.C. § 455 is largely 
repeated in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, Canon 3, Rule 2.11(A) (2011). 
315 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, vol. 2, pt. B, Adv. Opinion 71 (July 20, 
2012). 
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sufficient basis to question the impartiality of the remaining judges.  A clear 
inference from the opinion is that the remaining judges should disregard 
potentially prejudicial statements made by the judge who is recused.  As a 
further refinement of this issue, the Tax Court conference procedures 
provide that disqualified judges shall refrain from participating in any 
discussion of the case from which they are disqualified.316 
 
e. Motions for Court Review 
 
In 1985, the Tax Court considered the feasibility of adopting a rule that 
would authorize the chief judge to consider and grant motions for court 
review.317  Historically, the efforts of taxpayers to appear before the Board 
of Tax Appeals when their cases were undergoing review and to compel the 
adoption of division reports revised in conference had been denied, first by 
the Board, and later by statute.318  Tax Court conference procedures and 
applicable statutes have undergone little change since 1928.319  Still, it 
appears that the court has regularly received motions, usually after the 
expiration of the 30-day period referred to in § 7460(b), for the chief judge 
to direct court review of a division report.320  Accordingly, Chief Judge 
Sterrett suggested that the Chairman of the Rules Committee, Judge 
Simpson, examine the possibility of authorizing the chief judge to order 
                                                     
316 Rule 5 of the Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences provides: “5.  
Participation by disqualified judge.  A judge who is disqualified in a particular case shall 
not participate in the discussion of that case.  See 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 and Canon 
3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relating to the reasons for a judge to 
disqualify himself.”  Tax Court Procedures for Court Conferences, supra note 276, 
RULE 5. 
317 Two internal memoranda of the Tax Court address the adoption of a rule 
allowing the chief judge to grant motions for court review:  Memorandum from 
Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, Nov. 4, 1985, and Memorandum from 
Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, Oct. 31, 1985, both filed at the U.S. Tax Court 
in “Rules Committee: Court Conference Procedures (1985).” 
318 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 872 (amending Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 9, 107). 
319 See I.R.C. §§ 7458–7460.  Two post-trial motions are available to bring a 
case before the Tax Court for a second hearing: the motion for reconsideration and 
the motion to vacate.  See TAX CT. R. 161 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (motion for 
reconsideration of opinion); TAX CT. R. 162 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (motion to vacate or 
revise decision). 
320 See Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317 
(stating that the purpose of the memorandum was to address the court’s concern 
with motions for review after the  30-day period under § 7460(b) had expired). 
774           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
court review in appropriate cases, even though the statutory period has 
expired.321 
The first question to be resolved in considering the adoption of a rule 
authorizing the chief judge to grant motions for review of opinions after 
expiration of the 30-day period was whether such a rule would be contrary 
to § 7460(b), which formed the basis of the court’s historic position that the 
chief judge does not have the authority to order review of a report more 
than 30 days after its submission: 
 
(b) Effect of Action by a Division.—The report of the division 
shall become the report of the Tax Court within 30 days after such 
report by the division, unless within such period the chief judge has 
directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.  Any 
preliminary action by a division which does not form the basis for 
the entry of the final decision shall not be subject to review by the 
Tax Court except in accordance with such rules as the Tax Court 
may prescribe.  The report of a division shall not be a part of the 
record in any case in which the chief judge directs that such report 
shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.322 
 
An internal Tax Court memorandum on this issue concludes that the 
statutory language does not appear to preclude the court from adopting a 
rule that would grant the chief judge the power to direct review after the 
30-day period expires.323  Closely analogous to this situation, the 
memorandum notes, is the undisputed authority of a judge to vacate an 
opinion which the judge has authored.324  Presumably, Tax Court judges 
acting collectively could adopt a rule authorizing the chief judge to vacate 
an opinion and direct that the report in the case be reviewed by the court.325 
                                                     
321 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
317, at 1; Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317, at 
1. 
322 I.R.C. § 7460(b). 
323 See Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317, 
at 2–3. 
324 Id. 
325 On occasion, the Tax Court has withdrawn a published opinion and 
published a superseding revised opinion.  In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 
(1976), the court stated: “[P]etitioners filed a ‘Motion for Reconsideration by the 
Full Court’ which was denied.  The motion was referred to the trial judge as a 
motion for reconsideration of the opinion.  The trial judge granted this motion and 
the Court’s opinion was withdrawn . . . .”  Id. at 160; see also Cruttenden v. 
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 191 (1978), superseding T.C. Memo. 1978-4, aff’d, 644 F.2d 
1368 (9th Cir. 1981); Estate of Henning v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 374 (1977), 
opinion withdrawn Dec. 27, 1977. 
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An argument against the authority of the Tax Court to adopt a rule 
allowing review of an opinion after the expiration of the 30-day period can 
be found in the second sentence of § 7460(b), which provides that 
preliminary action of a division shall not be subject to court review “except 
in accordance with such rules as the Tax Court may prescribe.”326  Based on 
the fact that Congress has, in some circumstances, provided explicitly for 
court-made exceptions to statutory general rules, it may be inferred that in 
the absence of such an express grant of rule-making authority, the court is 
left without the power to prescribe rules.  Thus, since Congress was silent 
as to post-adoption action by the Tax Court, it may be argued that the Tax 
Court does not have the authority to prescribe rules that would extend the 
power beyond the statutory period. 
Nevertheless, those on the court who considered the question 
apparently concluded that, although the 30-day rule might implicitly 
preclude the chief judge from ordering review of an opinion after the 30 
days has expired, nothing in the statute precludes the court from conferring 
this authority, by rule, upon the chief judge.327  The legislative history of the 
predecessor to § 7460(b) is not at odds with this conclusion.  The 30-day 
rule was originally enacted, it appears, to thwart taxpayer efforts to 
personally appear at court conferences or to alter the results of conference 
consideration.328  Thus, although a rule authorizing the chief judge to vacate 
an opinion to grant review after the 30-day period has expired is not entirely 
consistent with the statute’s legislative history, it would not seem to conflict 
with its principal purpose of precluding taxpayer interference with the Tax 
Court’s procedures for review.  Despite the fact that court members 
reviewing the situation apparently concluded that the chief judge could, by 
the promulgation of a court rule, be given the authority to direct review of 
an opinion after the 30-day period, problems implicit in such a rule 
precluded its adoption. 
The third sentence of § 7460(b) states that “[t]he report of a division 
shall not be a part of the record in any case in which the chief judge directs 
that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.”329  In Estate of Varian 
v. Commissioner,330 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
rejected petitioner’s claims that the court-reviewed case should include the 
findings of fact and opinion of the division that originally issued the report, 
and held that the purpose of the third sentence of § 7460(b) “is to preclude 
                                                     
326 I.R.C. § 7460(b).  
327 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Chief Judge Sterrett, supra note 
317; Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317, at 3. 
328 See I.R.C. § 7458 (parties not entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard 
upon Tax Court review except as so ordered by chief judge).  
329 I.R.C. § 7460(b). 
330 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968), aff’g per curiam 47 T.C. 34 (1966); see also 
Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317.  
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a two-tier ‘appellate’ relationship between the full court and its divisions.”331  
At least to some extent, a rule authorizing the chief judge to consider and 
grant motions for court review would establish an appellate-type 
relationship because, in effect, parties making such a motion would be 
appealing the opinion of a division to the full court.332 
Additionally, adoption of such a rule could undermine the authority of 
the chief judge to direct court review.  Currently, this power rests solely 
with the chief judge and is not subject to appellate review.333  A rule 
authorizing motions for court review might set forth the circumstances in 
which such motions should be granted.  Appellate courts could then review 
the decision of the chief judge under such a rule and determine whether it 
had been applied correctly.  This could lead to an unexpected and undesired 
interpretation of the rule, thus restricting the Tax Court’s flexibility under 
its own rules of procedure. 
Finally, allowing parties to file motions for court review would 
undoubtedly increase the number of motions received by the Tax Court, 
since a non-prevailing party would have little to lose by filing a motion for 
review.334  Although the court currently may deny such motions without 
explanation, if the circumstances in which the motions might be granted 
were established by a rule, summary disposition of these motions might 
become impossible.  Thus, the court would be faced with an unwarranted 
increase in its workload. 
As an alternative to a rule authorizing motions for court review, it was 
suggested that the court might wish to adopt an internal procedure for 
disposing of the motions it continues to receive.335  For example, the judge 
conducting the trial in a particular case could agree to vacate a report in a 
case in which the court has received what appears to be a meritorious 
motion for review and resubmit it to the chief judge as a new report of the 
division.336  Although such a procedure would enable the court to avoid the 
problems it might face in adopting a rule, the chief judge would be forced 
to rely on the power of persuasion to convince the author of the opinion of 
the merits of the motion for court review.  Chief Judge Sterrett, after 
hearing the various arguments, was convinced that the matter was “not 
                                                     
331 396 F.2d at 755 n.2. 
332 See Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317. 
333 Sisto Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 268, 269–70 (2d Cir. 1945).  
334 See Memorandum from Joanne Hickcox to Judge Simpson, supra note 317. 
335 Id. 
336 See Memorandum from Judge Simpson to Judges and Senior Judges, supra 
note 308. 
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worth pursuing,”337 and, apparently, the policy of denying such motions for 
court review without explanation continues. 
 
G. Rule 155 
 
The promulgation of a “report,”338 containing the findings of fact 
and/or opinion in a case, whether by division or conference, does not 
necessarily complete all Tax Court action.  The report only decides the legal 
and factual questions that have been placed in issue by the parties.339  The 
statutory responsibility of the court, however, is to redetermine deficiency 
assertions by the Commissioner.340  Since its inception as the Board of Tax 
Appeals, the court has interpreted this responsibility to require a decision 
expressed in monetary terms.341 
In some cases, quantifying the decision involves no additional action.  
This occurs in those cases in which the court finds that the deficiency 
notice is entirely correct, or, alternatively, that it is completely erroneous.  
In those situations, the court in its report simply directs entry of a decision 
for the full deficiency claimed or for no deficiency.342  
In many cases, however, multiple issues are raised by the parties, and the 
court may find for the Commissioner on some and the taxpayer on 
others.343  Even in cases in which a single issue is involved, the court may 
                                                     
337 Memorandum from Chief Judge Sterrett to Judge Simpson, Nov 18, 1985, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rules Committee: Court Conference Procedures 
(1985).” 
338  Section 7459 provides that 
[A] report upon any proceedings instituted before the Tax Court and a 
decision thereon shall be made as quickly as practicable. . . .  It shall be the 
duty of the Tax Court and of each division to include in its report upon any 
proceedings its findings of fact or opinion or memorandum opinion. 
I.R.C. § 7459(a). 
339  MARVIN JOSEPH GARBIS & ROBERT L. FROME, PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL 
TAX CONTROVERSIES § 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GARBIS & FROME]. 
340  I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
341  See generally 2 LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 8.40 (1955) 
[hereinafter cited as L. CASEY]; HAMEL, supra note 1, at 160; Laurence F. Casey, 
Tax Court Procedure: Some Current Problems, 5 TAX L. REV. 57, 58–63 (1949) 
[hereinafter cited as Casey]; Greenberger, Scope of Rule 50 Computations, 12 N.Y.U. 
ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 963 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Greenberger]; Kern, 
supra note 1, at 1020; Robert N. Miller, Tax Court Pleadings and Rule 50 Settlements: 
Points to be Considered in the Petitioner’s Behalf, 5 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 
158, 178 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. 
342  E.g., Florida Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269, 282 (1976); 
Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 247, 255 (1976). 
343  E.g., Estate of Fawcett v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 889, 901 (1976). 
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conclude that neither party is entirely correct.344  Finally, although the court 
may find the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency entirely 
erroneous, difficulties in quantifying the decision may arise if the court 
concludes that the taxpayer overpaid his taxes for the applicable year.345  
These findings require the court to recompute tax liability on corrections to 
gross income, taxable income, or credits necessitated by the findings of fact 
and opinion to formulate a monetary decision.346  In some instances, this 
procedure may be time consuming, as one adjustment may require changes 
in seemingly unrelated items.  For example, the disallowance of a taxpayer’s 
business deduction may result in an increased adjusted gross income, which 
in turn may require an adjustment in those deductions based on, or limited 
by, adjusted gross income, as is the case with medical and charitable 
deductions.347 
In its earliest reports, the Board frequently incorporated a monetary 
decision on tax liability in its findings on substantive issues.348  The early 
days of the Board were among its busiest, and the burden of making these 
ministerial, though involved, computations must have been immediately 
felt.349  Apparently for this reason some of the early reports of the Board 
did not include a monetary decision but rather required the decision to be 
settled by “consent or on seven days’ notice.”350  Soon the Board concluded 
that a formal rule of practice would be desirable to handle cases in which 
the decision of the Board was neither completely in favor of the taxpayer 
nor the Commissioner.  In December 1924, four months after the Board 
issued its first report, it promulgated Rule 50 of its rules of practice.351  
Entitled “Settlement of Final Determination,” the rule placed the principal 
burden of quantifying the decision on the parties.352  Among the most 
recognizable of rules to readers of the Board/Tax Court reports, the most 
noticeable change in the rule did not appear until 1974, when, as part of a 
major rules revision, it was renumbered Rule 155.353 
                                                     
344  E.g., Wolman v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 883, 889 (1976). 
345  I.R.C. § 6512(b); Huntington Nat’l Bank, 13 T.C. 760, 774 (1949). 
346  L. CASEY, supra note 341; GARBIS & FROME, supra note 339; Greenberger, 
supra note 341. 
347  I.R.C. §§ 213, 170. 
348  E.g., The Hotel De France Co., 1 B.T.A. 28, 32 (1924). 
349  See generally J.S.Y. Ivins, What Should Congress Do with the Board of Tax 
Appeals?, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 391, 394 (1925). 
350  E.g., Robert P. Hyaims Coal Co., 1 B.T.A. 217, 220 (1924). 
351  Press release from U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Dec. 17, 1924, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Rule 155: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
352  B.T.A. RULE 50 (Jan. 1, 1925 ed.). 
353  TAX CT. R. 155 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.).  Although the rule was renumbered, there 
were no major changes in the substance or form of the rule.  Compare TAX CT. R. 
155 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 50 (Jan. 25, 1971 ed.). 
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The original rule provided for recomputation by either stipulation, if the 
parties were in agreement, or by submission of alternative proposals to the 
Board, if the parties did not agree.354  If disagreement occurred, either party 
could file a proposed computation, and the opposing party would be 
required to show cause before the Board, either by personal appearance or 
by filing an alternative proposal, as to why the initial proposal was incorrect.  
Upon the opposing party’s appearance or his submission of an alternative 
proposal, the Board would assign the contested computation proposals to 
an available division for either a hearing or a disposition on the papers filed. 
The Board’s early experience with the rule yielded two substantive 
modifications to the provision.355  The first, an amendment promulgated in 
November 1925, required all contested computation arguments to be heard 
by the division that had issued the report in the particular case involved.356  
The purpose of this revision was to ensure that the determination of tax 
liability would be in conformity with the intent of the division from which 
the report originated.357 
Early experience with the rule presaged what was to be the principal 
problem in its application and resulted in the second modification.  In cases 
in which the computation was contested, one party was usually heard to 
complain that his adversary was attempting in the computation proceeding 
either to relitigate substantive issues that the Board had already decided or 
to raise new issues of law or fact.358  The early versions of the rule did not 
expressly indicate the position of the Board on this question, but the Board 
soon adopted the view that the computation proceeding could not be 
employed for any purpose other than the quantification of tax liability based 
solely on issues properly raised and decided in its prior report.359  This 
policy was recognized explicitly in 1928 by an amendment which provided 
that 
 
[a]ny hearing under this rule will be confined strictly to the 
consideration of the correct computation . . . resulting from the 
determination already made. . . . [T]his rule is not to be regarded as 
affording an opportunity for rehearing or reconsideration.360 
                                                     
354  B.T.A. RULE 50 (Jan. 1, 1925 ed.). 
355  Compare B.T.A. RULE 50 (Jan. 1, 1925 ed.) with B.T.A. RULE 50 (Nov. 1, 
1925 ed.) and B.T.A. RULE 50 (May 1, 1928 ed.). 
356  B.T.A. RULE 50 (Nov. 1, 1925 ed.). 
357  See Memorandum from Chairman Hamel to members of the Board, Feb. 
25, 1925, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rule 155: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
358  See Forest D. Siefkin, Procedural Methods of the Board of Tax Appeals, 6 NAT’L 
INC. TAX MAG. 334, 337, 349 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Siefkin]. 
359 Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 674, 675–76 (1927). 
360  B.T.A. RULE 50 (May 1, 1928 ed.). 
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Since 1928, the rule has been renamed,361 renumbered,362 and broken 
down into component paragraphs.363  Nonetheless, the procedural 
guidelines under the rule and the usual practices followed thereunder have 
remained essentially unchanged.364  Customary practice under the rule is for 
the Commissioner to prepare a computation in accordance with the court’s 
report and submit it to the taxpayer or his counsel.365  If the petitioner 
agrees with the computation, it is signed by the taxpayer and filed with the 
Tax Court whereupon decision is entered.366  If the parties are in 
disagreement over the amount of the computation and stipulation is not 
possible, the rule provides that the parties may submit alternative proposals 
that they believe to be in accordance with the court’s report.367  Because the 
court experienced “inordinate delay” in the parties’ filing their 
computations, the court amended Rule 155 in 2011 to require the parties to 
submit their proposed computations within 90 days of service of the 
opinion in the case, unless otherwise directed by the court.368  
In cases where the parties fail to agree on the computation, the 
procedure for resolving the disagreement is initiated when one of the 
                                                     
361  B.T.A. RULE 50 (Jan. 1, 1938 ed.).  The rule was renamed “Computation by 
Parties for Entry of Decision.”  It was believed that such a name would further 
clarify the purpose of the rule.  Memorandum from Rules Committee to Members 
of the Board, Nov. 12, 1937, at 35, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rule 155: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
362  TAX CT. R. 155 (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
363  TAX CT. R. 50 (Aug. 15. 1955 ed.); Memorandum from Judge Harron to V. 
Mersh, Clerk of the Court, May 6, 1955, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Rule 155: 
Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
364  Compare HAMEL, supra note 1 with GARBIS & FROME, supra note 339.  The 
amendments to Rule 155 since its introduction have been minor in scope.  The 
discussion below notes the subsequent amendments that are of most import.   
365  GARBIS & FROME, supra note 339; Greenberger, supra note 341, at 964–65. 
366  The agreement by the taxpayer to the computation figure submitted by the 
Commissioner, in accordance with the Tax Court’s report, does not bar further 
appeal by the taxpayer.  The merits of the case are not fixed by such agreement.  
The taxpayer is merely agreeing that if, upon appeal, the opinion of the Tax Court 
is sustained, then the computation figure submitted by the Commissioner is proper.  
GARBIS & FROME, supra note 339; Miller, supra note 341, at 179. 
367  TAX CT. R. 155(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
368 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 155(a), (b), 136 T.C. 635–36 (2011).  
Additionally, if the computation concerns an overpayment, every computation for 
entry of decision is required to include the amount and date of each payment of tax 
by the taxpayer.  TAX CT. R. 155(a), (b), 93 T.C. 963–64 (1989).  This information 
is required to supply the court with the requisite factual record to resolve any later 
dispute concerning the Commissioner’s failure to refund the determined 
overpayment with interest.  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 155(a), (b), 93 T.C. at 
964.      
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parties submits a computation to the court.  In its original form, Rule 155 
required the clerk of court to serve a copy of the computation on the 
opposing party and to place the matter on the motion calendar for 
argument.  Over time, the court relaxed these requirements.  The clerk no 
longer is obligated to serve the computation on the opposing party; rather, 
the clerk need only serve notice of the computation’s filing.369  More 
significantly, unagreed cases are no longer automatically calendared for 
argument.370  Fairly early in the operation of the rule, the court noted that 
the opposing party failed to make an appearance at the automatically 
calendared motion “in the overwhelming majority of cases.”371  Seeking to 
avoid this inefficiency, the court amended the rule to retain discretion to 
schedule a hearing only in those instances in which the differing 
computations appeared to involve a genuine dispute.372     
If the opposing party fails to file an objection or an alternative 
computation within the period specified in the notice from the clerk, the 
court has the discretion to accept the submitted computation as correct.  If 
computations have been submitted by both parties, the matter will be 
resolved by the division that issued the report.373  Any permitted argument 
on the matter does not constitute a retrial of the underlying issue, and, as 
stated in the express prohibition contained in the rule, the court will not 
reconsider the determination of facts and law contained in the report.374 
Notwithstanding the express prohibition against relitigation of issues, 
contested computations under the rule have usually involved the question 
of whether an issue included in the computation properly was raised and 
resolved at trial.375  The court has adopted a very restrictive view as to what 
constitutes a proper computation issue and has held that issues raised in a 
petition but not proven,376 issues raised in a brief for the first time,377 and 
                                                     
369 The Tax Court amended Rule 155(b) in 2010 to eliminate the requirement 
that the Clerk serve an unagreed computation on the opposite party.  TAX CT. R. 
155(b), 134 T.C. 367–68 (2010).  The Rules Committee did not provide an 
explanation for this change.  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 155(b), 134 T.C. at 
368.   
370 See TAX CT. R. 155(b), 71 T.C. 1209 (1979).   
371 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 155(b), 71 T.C. at 1209–10.   
372 Id.   
373 TAX CT. R. 155(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
374 TAX CT. R. 155(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
375 E.g., Nemmo v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 583, 592 (1955), rev’d and rem’d sub 
nom. Polizzi v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1957); Zimmermann v. 
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 618, 620 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.2d 1023 (3d 
Cir. 1939); Great N. Ry. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 1347, 1356 (1928), aff’d, 40 
F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930). 
376 See Hens & Kelly, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 305, 328 (1952). 
377 Sussman v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1314 (1936), aff’d, 102 F.2d 919 (2d 
Cir. 1939). 
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issues not in the petition or answer but raised at trial378 have not been 
properly raised and disposed of and therefore cannot be considered in the 
computation process.379  Additionally, a finding of fact by the court that is 
neither in issue nor material to the conclusions of law cannot be raised in 
the computation.380  In more recent times, the court has explained that the 
prohibition against raising a “new issue” in the Rule 155 computation 
setting generally precludes consideration of issues that would require the 
introduction of evidence not already contained in the record.381  On the 
other hand, the new issue prohibition does not apply to an adjustment, 
which, although not specifically dealt with in the report, necessarily results 
from the application of such report.382  Thus, an adjustment of the 
taxpayer’s charitable contribution, the allowance of which is limited by 
adjusted gross income, is not a new issue, although the necessity of such an 
adjustment was not raised at trial.383 
Although a decision in a case may be entered only after the computation 
has been arrived at, the findings of fact and the opinion that precede the 
computation process conclude all judicial consideration of the legal and 
factual issues in the case.384  The underlying policy for the court’s restrictive 
view has been to prevent the computation procedure from becoming an 
extension of trial.385  The court’s rigid limitation on the function of the 
recomputation procedure derives from the view that the trial and decision 
process that precedes that procedure is the only appropriate forum in which 
to decide contested issues, and that the credibility of the court would 
                                                     
378 See, e.g., John Gerber Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 26, 31 (1941). 
379 Bankers Pocahantas Coal v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1932), 
aff’g 55 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1930), aff’g 18 B.T.A. 901 (1929); Welsh Homes, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 279 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1960), aff’g 32 T.C. 239 (1959); Polizzi v. 
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 1957), rev’g and rem’g Nemmo v. 
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 583 (1955); see also Estate of Stein v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 
275, 277–80 (1963); Baird v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 415, 416 (1941); Fifth Ave. 
Bank of New York v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 701, 705 (1935), aff’d, 84 F.2d 787 
(3d Cir. 1936). 
380 Meyers v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 648, 649 (1949). 
381 See Harris v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 121, 124 (1992); Cloes v. 
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 933, 935 (1982); Rubenstein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2010-274, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 542.   
382 Zimmermann Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 618, 620 (1937), rev’d on other 
grounds, 100 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1939). 
383 Id. at 620. 
384 George Craven, Pre-Trial and Post-Trial Tax Court Practice, 4 N.Y.U. ANN. 
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 260, 268 (1946). 
385 See Bankers Pocahantas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 308 (1932), 
aff’g 55 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1930), aff’g 18 B.T.A. 901 (1929); Estate of Stein v. 
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 275, 277–80 (1963). 
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seriously be diminished if its published reports could not be relied upon 
with certainty.386 
An interesting assault on the relitigation prohibition came in 
Commissioner v. Erie Forge,387 in which the Commissioner argued that he 
should be privileged to assert additional deficiencies or penalties at any time 
prior to formal entry of decision by the court.388  The Commissioner’s 
argument was predicated on a jurisdictional provision according power to 
the court to allow such increases when claim for the increase was advanced 
by the Commissioner “at or before the hearing or rehearing.”389  In the 
Commissioner’s view, the statutory provision barred the Tax Court from 
refusing to consider an asserted increase at any time, up to and including 
the recomputation procedure, and provisions in the court’s rules to the 
contrary had to yield to the express language of the statute.390  Had the 
Commissioner’s position been accepted, a serious threat would have been 
posed to the procedural protections afforded the taxpayer.  Cases that had 
been fully tried would have been subject to retrial at the wish of the 
Commissioner any time before entry of decision.391  The Commissioner’s 
position, although based on ostensible statutory authority, was rejected on 
appeal.392  In the view of the Third Circuit, the right of the Commissioner 
to claim an increased deficiency was subject to the Tax Court’s Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, themselves based on statutory authority,393 which 
reserved to the court discretion to reject a party’s attempt to change his 
litigating position during the course of the proceedings.394 
Despite the difficulties the Tax Court has encountered concerning the 
prohibition against relitigation within the framework of the computation 
procedure, most applications of the procedure are concluded without 
controversy.  Accordingly, the court has had no reason to alter the basic 
requirements of the rule since its promulgation in 1924.  Designed to afford 
                                                     
386 Siefkin, supra note 358, at 338.  If a party is concerned that a matter may not 
be properly raised in the Rule 155 context, a conservative approach is to move for 
leave to amend the pleadings in the underlying case and to seek reconsideration of 
the court’s opinion.  See, e.g., Pinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-393, 80 
T.C.M. (CCH) 393 (following opinion disallowing claimed foreign tax credits, 
taxpayers amended pleadings to claim deductions for foreign tax payments in lieu 
of credits; court granted leave to amend).   
387 167 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1948), aff’g 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 1127 (1945). 
388 Id. at 76. 
389 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 272(e), 53 Stat. 83 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6214(a)). 
390 See TAX CT. R. 17, 19 (Jan. 1, 1944 ed.). 
391 Casey, supra note 341, at 58–63. 
392 167 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1948). 
393 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 1111, 53 Stat. 160 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7453). 
394 167 F.2d at 76. 
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the court relief from the time-consuming process of converting its legal 
conclusions into a precise monetary equivalent, the rule has served its 




Since 1926, decisions of the Board/Tax Court have been reviewable 
initially by the Federal courts of appeals.396  Either party may invoke such 
review as a matter of right.397  Appeal from the courts of appeals to the 
Supreme Court is available either on certiorari or certification.398  Treatment 
of the formulation of this review structure in the Revenue Act of 1926 
appears in Part III of the text.399  The present discussion will focus on some 
of the more significant formal aspects of the appeal procedure, such as time 
to appeal and venue, and some of the special policy problems associated 
with the unusual appellate structure for tax cases, such as scope of review 
on appeal and whether a national trial court should follow the precedents of 
the several courts of appeals. 
 
1. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
 
The Revenue Act of 1926 authorized the court of appeals for each 
circuit to adopt rules governing the procedure for appellate review of Board 
decisions.400  Soon after the enactment of the 1926 legislation, however, the 
Board urged the adoption of uniform rules applicable to all appeals from its 
decisions.401  Although there existed considerable support for this goal,402 
the appellate rules that were adopted by each of the courts of appeals, while 
similar in many respects, were not identical.403 
                                                     
395 See generally CHARLES D. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
U.S. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 168 (1938); Greenberger, supra note 341, at 963; 
Miller, supra note 341, at 158. 
396 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001(a), 1003(a), 44 Stat. 109 (now codified 
at I.R.C. § 7482(a)). 
397 Id. § 1001(a), 44 Stat. 109 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7482(a)). 
398 Id. § 1003(a), 44 Stat. 109 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7482(a)).  
399 See Part III, notes 57–87 and accompanying text. 
400 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001(b), 44 Stat. 109. 
401 See U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Proposed Rules Governing Appeals to the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals (1926), filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Appeals: Rules of Procedure.” 
402 Memorandum entitled “Rules Governing Appeals from the Board of Tax 
Appeals to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,” Oct. 8, 1926, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Appeals: Rules of Procedure.” 
403 See Memorandum to members of the Board describing the appellate rules of 
practice theretofore adopted, Dec. 7, 1927, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Appeals: 
Rules of Procedure.” 
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Some years later, after the successful adoption of various uniform rules 
governing procedure in the Federal district courts, Congress concluded that 
the cause of judicial administration also would be furthered if the 
procedural rules governing appeals from the Tax Court were uniform 
throughout the circuits.404 Accordingly in 1954, section 2074 was added to 
title 28 authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe such uniform rules of 
appellate procedure.405  Before any rules were promulgated pursuant to this 
authority, the movement for uniform appellate rules was broadened to 
encompass appellate procedure in general, and legislation was adopted 
authorizing the drafting and adoption of rules of appellate procedure 
applicable to all civil actions in the courts of appeals.406  These rules, known 
as the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, were drafted over a seven-year 
period by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of the United States 
Judicial Conference.  The rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court on 
December 4, 1967, with a prospective effective date of July 1, 1968.407 
Under these rules, appeals from decisions of the Tax Court are treated 
similarly with appeals from civil actions in the district courts.408 
 
2. Time for Filing Appeal 
 
Prior to July 1, 1968, when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
became effective, statutory rules had governed the time within which a 
petition for review of a Tax Court decision had to be filed.  Under the 1926 
Act, this period was set at six months from the time the Board’s decision 
was rendered.409  In 1932, the period was reduced to three months to 
conform to the practice governing appeals from decisions of Federal 
district courts.410  In 1954, the provision again was amended to provide a 
                                                     
404 See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1262, at 2 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1074, at 1 (1954). 
405 Act of July 27, 1954, ch. 583, 68 Stat. 567.  The Supreme Court opposed 
enactment of § 2074 since it felt the courts of appeals were “better adapted to 
determine, upon the basis of actual experience, the particular procedural problems 
in this field, and to fashion rules designed to meet those problems.”  Letter from 
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson to Chauncey W. Reed, Apr. 28, 1953, reprinted in H.R. 
REP. NO. 83-1262, at 4 (1954). 
406 Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-733, §§ 1–2, 80 Stat. 1323, amending 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (1948) and repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1954). 
407 The history of the development of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure is described in 9 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 201.05 
(2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE]. 
408 FED. R. APP. P. 14. 
409 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001(a), 44 Stat. 109. 
410 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 1101, 47 Stat. 286; H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, 
at 52 (1932); S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 56 (1932). 
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party with an appeal period of four months when another party to the 
proceeding filed a timely appeal within the three-month period.411 
As amended in 1966 to authorize the promulgation of the appellate 
rules, section 2072 of title 28 provided as follows: 
 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general 
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the 
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of 
the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime 
cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for 
the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United 
States and for the judicial review or enforcement of orders of 
administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers. 
. . .  
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to 
Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular 
session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the 
expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the 
contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal 
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.412 
 
Thus, applicable statutory authority empowered the Supreme Court, 
with certain limitations, to promulgate appellate rules that would supersede 
conflicting statutes.  Although Congress substantially modified section 2072 
of title 28 in 1988,413 the ability of the Supreme Court to override an 
otherwise governing statute through the rules enabling process remains 
intact.414  Pursuant to this authority, the rules of appellate procedure 
provide that a petition for review of a Tax Court decision must be filed with 
the clerk of the Tax Court within 90 days of the entry of the Tax Court 
decision, or within 120 days of such entry when a timely notice of appeal 
has been filed by another party.415 That the power to promulgate these rules 
was seen as permitting the modification of statutory restrictions on appeal 
time is indicated by the fact that at the time of their adoption, these rules 
changed existing practice which theretofore had been prescribed by statute. 
Under the statute, appeals were commenced by a petition for review rather 
                                                     
411 I.R.C. § 7483, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 
§ 959(a), 83 Stat. 734. 
412 Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323 (emphasis 
added).   
413  See Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 401(a), 407, (1988), 102 Stat. 4648, 4652. 
414  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c).   
415  FED. R. APP. P. 13(a). 
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than a notice of appeal and the time limits for filing were three months and 
four months from entry of decision, rather than 90 days and 120 days.416  
The statute subsequently was amended to conform to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure,417 but presumably this was unnecessary to validate the 
change and should not preclude future changes in the court-made rules that 
will supersede currently existing statutes.418 
 
3. Effect of Motion to Vacate 
 
The period for filing a notice of appeal is deferred if a party files a 
motion to vacate or revise the Tax Court’s decision.419  In that case, the 90-
day period runs from the entry of the order denying the motion or from the 
entry of the revised decision.420  Such a motion must be filed within 30 days 
after the decision has been entered, unless the court permits otherwise.421  
However, the Tax Court may allow a motion to vacate to be filed after the 
30-day period only if the party files for leave to file the motion before the 
decision becomes final as a result of the expiration of the 90-day period for 
filing a notice of appeal.422  With respect to an untimely motion to vacate, 
the 90-day period for appealing the Tax Court’s decision is extended only if 
the court grant’s the motion for leave to file the motion.423   
                                                     
416  I.R.C. § 7483, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 
§ 959(a), 83 Stat. 734. 
417  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 959(a), 83 Stat. 734 
(amending I.R.C. § 7483); see also TAX CT. R. 190(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (reflecting 
conditions for filing appeal contained in Federal Rule of Appellate procedure 13(a) 
and § 7483).   
418  See Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. APP. P. 13. 
419  See FED. R. APP. P. 13(a)(2) (“If, under Tax Court rules, a party makes a 
timely motion to vacate or revise the Tax Court’s decision, the time to file a notice 
of appeal runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion or from the 
entry of a new decision, whichever is later.”); see also TAX CT. R. 162 (July 6, 2012 
ed.) (governing motions to vacate or revise).   
420  FED. R. APP. P. 13(a)(2).  A subsequent motion with respect to an original 
motion to vacate, however, does not commence a 90-day period for filing the 
notice of appeal.  See Okon v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1025, 1026 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(noting general principle that “tolling motions may not be tacked together to 
perpetuate the prescribed time for appeal”).  
421  Id.  
422  See Manchester Group v. Commissioner, 113 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1997).   
423  See Nordvik v. Commissioner, 67 F.3d 1489, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995); Simon v. 
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1949).  But see Denholm and McKay Co. 
v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 1942) (concluding that the Tax Court 
retains jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to vacation only if the court acts 
on the motion before the end of the 90-day period for filing an appeal).   
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A motion for reconsideration of the court’s opinion or findings of 
fact424 typically is filed prior to the entry of the court’s decision, and the 
motion likely will be acted upon prior to the decision being entered as well.  
The effect of a motion to reconsideration filed after the entry of the Tax 
Court’s decision is not entirely clear.  Such motions do not enjoy the 
express tolling effect afforded to motions to vacate provided in the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in Nordvick v. 
Commissioner425 overturned prior precedent to hold that such a motion fell 
within the broad category of motions that challenge the substance of the 
Tax Court’s decision and that are entitled to the tolling effect provided 
under the federal appellate procedure rules.426  However, the safer and more 
certain approach is to properly style the motion as one to vacate or revise 
the court’s decision.   
 
4. Finality of Tax Court Decisions 
 
Because the time limits for seeking review of a Tax Court decision are 
established by statute and therefore could be considered jurisdictional, it is 
arguable that no circumstance would permit review of a Tax Court decision 
after the statutory period had elapsed and the decision had, under the 
statute, become final.427  Although this interpretation originally reflected the 
conventional wisdom,428 some decisions prior to 1957 had indicated that 
under certain circumstances such as mutual mistake or excusable neglect in 
filing an appeal, a final decision of the Tax Court might be reopened.429  
The reopened case, in turn, would permit a second appeal period to 
commence when a subsequent decision of the Tax Court was rendered.  
However, the Supreme Court in 1957 affirmed per curiam the Ninth Circuit 
                                                     
424 See TAX CT. R. 161 (July 6, 2012 ed.) (governing motions for 
reconsideration). 
425  67 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1995) (overruling Trohimovich v. Commissioner, 
776 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1985)).   
426  Id. at 1493–94 (relying in part on the advisory committee notes to Rule 
13(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).  
427  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § l005(a), 44 Stat. 110 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7481(a)(1)), provided that Board decisions became final upon the expiration of 
the statutory time for appeal if no timely appeal was filed. 
428  See White’s Will v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1944); Monjar v. 
Commissioner, 140 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1944); Denholm & McKay Co. v. 
Commissioner, 132 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1942); Swall v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 324 
(9th Cir. 1941); Sweet v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1941); Commissioner 
v. Realty Operators, Inc., 118 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1941). 
429  Reo Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1955); La 
Floridienne J. Buttgenbach & Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1933); see 
also Lentin v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1956). 
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decision in Lasky v. Commissioner,430 which held that the Tax Court (then an 
independent agency in the executive branch of Government) had no 
inherent power to vacate a decision that had become final under the statute 
on the ground of excusable neglect.  Such a power, the Ninth Circuit stated, 
could be exercised only by a federal court and not by a body that was 
“merely an administrative agency.”431  The Supreme Court did not issue an 
opinion in Lasky; thus it was not clear whether the case was affirmed on the 
ground of the Tax Court’s technical status as an agency in the executive 
branch (a ground which figured in the decision of the Ninth Circuit), or the 
ground that the statute provided a definite period in which the petition for 
review had to be filed, and, in the absence thereof, the decision of the Tax 
Court became final (the position of the Government in urging affirmance 
of the Ninth Circuit432).  In any event, it appears settled that a decision of 
the Tax Court becomes final after the statutory period for appeal has 
elapsed with no review sought.433  Only two narrow exceptions exist to this 
rule.  The Tax Court may vacate an otherwise final decision if the decision 
was procured by a fraud on the court434 or if the court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the decision in the first instance.435   
 
5. Reviewable Decisions 
 
The “decision” of the Tax Court that may be reviewed on appeal 
pursuant to § 7482(a) is interpreted more broadly than the definition of the 
term contained in § 7459.436  Rather, a decision for purposes of § 7482 
includes, among other things, an order resolving a motion for the Tax 
                                                     
430  352 U.S. 1027 (1957), aff’g 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956). 
431  235 F.2d at 98. 
432  Brief for Respondent at 15, Lasky v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957). 
433  See e.g., Harbold v. Commissioner, 51 F.3d 618, 621–22 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lasky); Tascano v. Commissioner, 441 
F.2d 930, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).   
434  See Drobny v. Commissioner, 113 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (detailing fraud 
on the court as the single narrow instance in which an otherwise final decision of 
the Tax Court could be set aside); Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 
2003) (affirming Tax Court’s decision to modify otherwise final decision based on 
intentional fraud perpetrated on court); see also Flood v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 
904 (9th Cir. 1972); Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1971); 
Kenner v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1968).   
435 See Billingsley v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989); Abeles v. 
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 103 (1988); Brannon’s of Shawnee, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
69 T.C. 999 (1978).   
436 See Louisville Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 333, 337 (6th 
Cir. 1961) (explaining that “the words ‘decisions of the Tax Court’ as contained in 
Section 7482(a) should not be construed to have meaning only as such meaning 
may be found within the narrow confines of Section 7459(c)”).   
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Court to restrain assessment pursuant to § 6213(a),437 an order resolving a 
motion to review a proposed sale of seized property pursuant to 
§ 6863(b)(3)(C),438 an order denying a motion to intervene,439 and any other 
order disposing of the proceeding before the court.440      
Prior to 1986, interlocutory orders of the Tax Court were not subject to 
appeal.441  Congress reversed this prohibition through the enactment of 
§ 7482(a)(2) in connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.442 This 
provision, appearing in neither the House nor Senate versions of the 
legislation but instead first appearing in the conference agreement, 
authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Tax Court provided 
the presiding Tax Court judge includes in an interlocutory order (1) a 
statement that the order involves a controlling question of law, (2) a 
substantial ground for difference of opinion exists with respect to the 
question of law, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order might 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.443 An 
application for an appeal of the order must be made within ten days of the 
court issuing this statement, and the court of appeals may take the appeal in 
its discretion.444  The appeal is made to the court of appeals that would hear 
the appeal from a final decision in the matter,445 and if the appellate court 
accepts the appeal, it will have jurisdiction over any subsequent appeal of a 
decision by the Tax Court in the matter.446   
 The Tax Court proceeding generally does not pause as a result of an 
appeal of an interlocutory order.  Neither the application of an appeal nor 
its acceptance by the appellate court operates to stay the Tax Court 
                                                     
437 See I.R.C. § 7482(a)(3); Tax Ct. R. 190(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
438 Tax Ct. R. 190(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
439 See Sampson v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 262, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(following Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1981), and 
Dixon v. Commissioner, 666 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
440 Louisville Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 
1961) (Tax Court order requiring the taking of a deposition reviewable as a decision 
of the court on grounds that the order “granted all relief sought and disposed of 
the entire proceeding pending before it”); Ryan v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 324, 
326 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that “a court of appeals may consider an appeal as long 
as it arises out of a final decision of the Tax Court”).   
441 See Shapiro v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1980) (cited in H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-841, at 80 (1986)); see also Ryan v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 324, 327 
(3d Cir. 1982). 
442 Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986), § 1558(a), 98 Stat. 494.  
443 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(2)(A); TAX CT. R. 193(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-841, at 80 (1986).   
444 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(2)(A).  
445 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(2)(B); TAX CT. R. 193(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).    
446 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(2)(C).   
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proceeding unless ordered by the Tax Court or the Court of Appeals 
accepting the appeal.447    
A particular issue concerning the ripeness of Tax Court decisions for 
appellate review arises in the context of proceedings relating to multiple tax 
years.  Specifically, if an order of the Tax Court dismisses some, but not all, 
of the disputed tax years at issue in a petition for redetermination, can the 
appellate court entertain an appeal concerning the tax years that have been 
disposed of by the Tax Court?  The issue has created an interesting split 
among the circuit courts of appeals.  As explained by the Third Circuit in 
N.Y. Football Giants v. Commissioner,448 three approaches exist.  The 
permissive approach, endorsed only by the D.C. Circuit, is to allow the 
appeal of orders that finally dispose of particular claims.449  The middle 
ground, adopted by the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, is to permit the 
appeal to go forward only if the Tax Court makes a Rule 54(b) 
determination that its judgment pertaining to those claims is final and 
immediately appealable.450  This approach may appear curious at first 
glance, as there exists no Rule 54 in the Tax Court Rules of Practice and 
Procedure.  Rather, Rule 54 appears in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and it permits a court to direct entry of a judgment as to fewer than all 
claims raised if the court determines that there exists “no just reason for 
delay.”451  Despite the absence of this provision in the Tax Court rules, the 
court may prescribe its own procedure in the absence of a governing rule, 
giving particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the 
extent they are suitable.452 In this manner, the Tax Court can issue a Rule 
54(b) determination in the same manner as a Federal district court.  The 
third approach, endorsed by the Second and Sixth Circuits, is to not permit 
appellate review of an order that does not dispose of the entire case, 
notwithstanding any Rule 54(b) certification.453 For its part, the Third 
Circuit in N.Y. Football Giants endorsed the middle ground permitting an 
appeal provided the Tax Court issues a Rule 54(b) statement, finding this 
approach to be more in keeping with the statutory directive under 
                                                     
447 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(2)(A); TAX CT. R. 193(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
448 349 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2003).   
449 InverWorld v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
450 Nixon v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 920 (5th Cir. 1999); Brookes v. 
Commissioner, 163 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998); Shepherd v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 
633 (7th Cir. 1998).   
451 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).   
452  TAX CT. R. 1(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  
453 Schrader v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1990); Estate of Yaeger v. 
Commissioner, 801 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1986).  
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§ 7482(a)(1) to review decisions of the Tax Court in the same manner and 
the to the same extent as those of Federal district courts.454   
     
6. Venue 
 
From 1926 until the present, appeals from Board of Tax Appeals and 
Tax Court decisions have gone to the Federal circuit courts of appeals.  
This structure, which can be graphically conceptualized as an inverted 
pyramid, as opposed to the standard court structure in which lower court 
decisions are funneled into less numerous appellate courts, has been 
described as “an anomalous and topsy-turvy appellate system.”455  One of 
the complexities created by this unusual format456 has involved venue, the 
question of the location of the proper court to hear a litigation. 
Although venue is not strictly a jurisdictional matter,457 a faulty venue 
choice by an appealing party may have drastic results. Thus, if a party 
choosing to appeal a Tax Court decision files a notice of appeal to the 
wrong court of appeals and the appeal is dismissed for that reason, it may 
be too late to appeal to the proper court inasmuch as the time for filing a 
notice of appeal may have expired.458  Nonetheless, courts have generally 
proven forgiving in permitting transfer of venue when the taxpayer files the 
appeal with an improper court.459  Since 1926, proper venue for appeals 
from the Board/Tax Court has been determined under statutory rules 
contained in the tax laws.460  The rules have undergone changes in 1934461 
                                                     
454 N.Y. Football Giants v. Commissioner, 349 F.3d 102, 106–07 (3d Cir. 
2003).   
455 James Craig Peacock, An Anomalous and Topsy-Turvy Appellate System, 19 
A.B.A. J. 11 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Peacock]. 
456 Although unusual, the structure is not unique.  Judicial review of 
administrative determinations generally involve appeals fanning out across the 
country from the findings of a single agency.  See 9 J. MOORE, supra note 407, at 
¶ 215.03. 
457 1 J. MOORE, supra note 407, at ¶¶ 0.140[1.-1], [1.-2].  Nonetheless, the courts 
sometimes refer to incorrect venue as a jurisdictional deficiency.  Compare 
Nash-Breyer Motor Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 483 (1931) with Industrial Addition 
Ass’n v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 310 (1945). 
458  For example, under the 1926 Act, unless a petition for review was “duly” 
filed within six months after the Board decision was rendered, the Board decision 
became final, and therefore unreviewable.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ l001(a), 
1005(a), 44 Stat. 109 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7481(a)(1)). 
459 See, e.g., Dornbusch v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1988).   
460  For the venue rules enacted in 1926, see Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 
§ 1002, 44 Stat. 110. 
461   Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 519, 48 Stat. 760, amending Revenue Act of 
1926, ch. 27, § 1002. 44 Stat. 110. 
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and 1966,462 but whether an ideal has been achieved is subject to some 
question. 
The 1926 Act provided, in effect, four separate venue rules depending 
principally on the nature of the taxpayer.  First, in the case of an individual, 
proper venue was in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
individual was an inhabitant, or if the individual was not an inhabitant of 
any circuit, in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.463  
Second, in the case of a person other than an individual or a corporation, 
i.e., a trust or estate, proper venue was in the circuit court for the circuit in 
which was located the collector of the tax to whom such person made the 
return, or, if no return were made, in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.464  Third, in the case of a corporation, venue was determined 
according to a three-tier rule: if the corporation had no principal place of 
business or principal office or agency in the United States, venue was in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; if the corporation had such 
a place of business, office or agency, venue was determined under the same 
two-tier rule applicable to trusts and estates.465  Finally, the statute provided 
that “in the case of an agreement between the Commissioner and the 
taxpayer, [proper venue would be in] . . . the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the circuit, or the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, as 
stipulated in such agreement.”466 
Although these rules may, at first impression, have appeared both 
comprehensive and comprehensible, problems soon emerged in their 
interpretation.  For example, in the case of the venue by agreement 
provision, the question arose whether the parties could stipulate a venue in 
any court of appeals.  While some thought this was the clear import of the 
statutory language,467 the Supreme Court held that an agreement was 
improper if it stipulated a venue other than the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, or alternatively, a circuit that would otherwise be 
proper under the general venue rules.468 
In addition, a more troublesome question arose as to what venue would 
be proper in a case involving the liability of a transferee of assets for a tax 
                                                     
462   Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 1109 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7482(b)). 
463   Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1002(a), 44 Stat. 110. 
464   Id. § 1002(b). 
465   Id. § 1002(b)–(c). 
466   Id. § 1002(d). 
467   E.g., Peacock, supra note 455, at 14. 
468   Nash-Breyer Motor Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 483 (1931).  Evidently, 
Congress also disagreed with the Supreme Court’s interpretation, for in the 
Revenue Act of 1934, the law was changed to make clear that any court of appeals 
could be the stipulated venue.  Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 519(a), 48 Stat. 760 
(now codified at I.R.C. § 7482(b)(2)). 
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deficiency of his transferor.  The rules worked reasonably well if the 
transferee was an individual—venue would depend on his inhabitance.  But 
if the transferee was not an individual, venue could depend on where the 
“person made the return.”469  There not being any such thing as a transferee 
return, it might be argued that venue would depend on where the transferor 
made his return.  But if the transferor was not a party to the litigation, why 
should the venue rules, which are essentially rules for the convenience of 
the litigants,470 force a party to litigate in a circuit with which he has no 
nexus?471 
The most serious venue questions under the 1926 Act involved 
individuals.  Where was an individual an inhabitant?  Was it his residence, 
his domicile, or did some other rule govern?  When was inhabitance to be 
tested if the individual was an inhabitant of different circuits when he filed 
the disputed return, the petition to the Board, and the petition for review of 
the Board’s decision? Problems also existed with respect to parties who 
were representatives of an individual.  Thus, in the case of a deficiency 
asserted against a taxpayer who had died before the applicable date for 
determining inhabitance, would venue be determined by reference to the 
decedent’s last inhabitance, the inhabitance (if any) of his estate, or the 
inhabitance of the executor(s) of the estate? 
In the years following the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926, courts 
and commentators began to explore these and other venue questions.472  It 
                                                     
469   Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1002(b)–(c), 44 Stat. 110. If the corporate 
transferee had no principal place of business or principal office or agency within 
the United States, there was no problem—venue was in the Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia.  Id. § 1002(c). 
470  1 J. MOORE, supra note 407, at ¶ 0.140[1.-1]. 
471  According to Peacock, supra note 455, at 13, such a case actually occurred.  
The appellant filed a petition for review in the circuit where the transferor made its 
return and also filed a petition in the circuit where the transferee made its return.  
In Peacock’s view, neither venue was proper and the petition should have been 
filed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, since the “person” to 
whom the venue statute referred was the transferee and no return relative to the tax 
in dispute had been filed by such person. 
472  Nash-Breyer Motor Co. v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 483 (1931) (stipulation of venue 
limited to either Court of Appeals of District of Columbia or circuit court 
otherwise proper under general venue rules); Turner’s Estate v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 
759 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (taxpayer, an inhabitant of the Third Circuit, died the day 
before the Board hearing and his estate was substituted as party; Court of Appeals 
of District of Columbia held to be improper venue—appeal (in absence of 
stipulation) could only be taken to the Third Circuit since that was decedent’s 
inhabitance); Ayer v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1933); Burnet v. White 
Eagle Oil & Refining Co., 58 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1932) (in transferee liability case in 
which both transferor and transferee were corporations, appellate venue depends 
on location where transferor, not transferee, filed return); Rusk v. Commissioner, 
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appeared that the determination of proper venue, which ideally should be 
mechanical and result in the choice of a convenient forum,473 should not 
present as many difficulties as were encountered. 
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in connection with 
the Revenue Act of 1934, a representative of the American Bar Association 
Committee on Federal Taxation criticized the situation: 
 
In at least nine cases, appeals have been improperly taken because of 
the existing confusion in the statutes.  In at least 100 cases or more, 
now, it has been necessary to appeal to 2 circuit courts at the same 
time, in order to be protected against a misconstruction or against 
the construction of the court to which you first appeal. . . .474 
 
With this prompting from the ABA, and with the support of the Treasury, 
the venue rules were amended by Congress in the 1934 Act to provide a 
simplified rule for appeals from decisions of the Board.475  The revised 
rule,476 which was to stand until revised in 1966, provided that venue should 
be in the “Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit in which is located the 
collector’s office to which was made the return of the tax in respect of 
which the liability arises, or if no return was made, then [in] the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia.”  The Act also amended the venue by 
stipulation provision to make clear that the parties on appeal could validly 
agree to venue in any court of appeals they chose.477 
Thus, the rule that formerly had been applied to trusts and estates was 
applied to all appeals.  The new provision eliminated much of the old 
uncertainty, and the most significant controversies that arose under the new 
provision were whether a “return” was “made,”478 and whether the 
Government would be deemed to have waived its objections to the venue 
                                                                                                                       
53 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1931); Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1931) 
(executors of taxpayer decedent were real parties in interest and their inhabitance 
determines venue, even though they were substituted as parties after petition was 
filed with Board); see also Peacock, supra note 455. 
473  1 J. MOORE, supra note 407, at ¶ 0.140[1.-1]. 
474  Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
67 (1934). 
475  78 CONG. REC. 6325 (1934). 
476  Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 519(a), 48 Stat. 760. 
477  Id. § 519(b). 
478  Commissioner v. Roosevelt & Son Inv. Fund, 89 F.2d 706, 708 (2d Cir. 
1937); see also Commissioner v. Clarion Oil Co., 148 F.2d 671, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1945); 
Commissioner v. Germantown Trust Co., 106 F.2d 139, 140 (3d Cir. 1939), rev’d, 
309 U.S. 304 (1940). 
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selection of the taxpayer.479  It may be observed that the 1934 rules, 
although fairly certain, did not always result in a forum that was convenient.  
Thus, if the taxpayer moved after filing his return, or if the party to the 
litigation was contesting transferee liability in respect of a transferor who 
had filed his return in a distant collector’s office, proper venue might be 
geographically distant from the location of the party or his attorney at the 
time the appeal was taken.480  Nonetheless, these rules did not arouse any 
noticeable dissatisfaction.  First, the rules were easily applied.  Moreover, in 
those cases in which application of the rule resulted in genuine hardship to 
the taxpayer, the Government generally would agree to a satisfactory 
change in venue.481 
As a result of the increasing use of computers in tax collection, 
Congress, in 1966, authorized the Internal Revenue Service to divide the 
country into broad geographical regions for return filing purposes, and to 
require residents of each of these regions to file their return in one central 
location.482  The legislation contemplated that there would be seven filing 
regions.483  Since some judicial circuits included more than one regional 
filing center and other circuits included no regional centers, a change in the 
venue rules enacted in 1934 was necessary if disproportionate 
concentrations of appeals in some of the circuits were to be avoided.484  
Accordingly, as part of the same 1966 legislation, Congress adopted new 
venue rules that in some respects are similar to those contained in the 
                                                     
479  In Lamb v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1967), the court held that the 
Commissioner had waived his objections to an improper venue selection by the 
taxpayer.  The waiver was found in the Commissioner’s action in transferring the 
audit to, and issuing the deficiency notice from, the District Director’s office 
located in the circuit to which the taxpayer ultimately appealed; see also Industrial 
Addition Ass’n v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 310 (1945); Wegener v. Commissioner, 
119 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1941). 
480  Under the 1934 rules, it was apparent that an appeal in a transferee liability 
case should be venued, absent an agreement or a waiver, in the circuit in which the 
transferor filed his return, since that was the return involving the “tax in respect of 
which the liability arises.”  Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 519, 48 Stat. 760. 
481  See Peacock, supra note 455, at 16, wherein he states: “It is only right to say, 
however, that the General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been 
very reasonable and obliging in entering into . . . a stipulation when requested by a 
taxpayer.”  Nothing indicates that this policy has changed in any significant respect 
since the time it was noted by Peacock in 1933.  However, a taxpayer would 
probably be excessively optimistic to request a stipulation for a venue that has 
already ruled in accordance with the position he is maintaining. 
482  Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 1, 80 Stat. 1107 (amending 
I.R.C. §§ 6091(b), 6151(a)). 
483  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1915, at 1 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-1625, at 1 (1966). 
484  H.R. REP. No. 89-1915, at 1 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-1625, at 1 (1966). 
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Revenue Act of 1926.485  The 1966 rules determine venue in the case of any 
person, other than a corporation, on the basis of his residence, with venue 
being provided in the circuit court of appeals for the circuit in which such 
person resided at the time his petition was filed with the Tax Court.  If the 
person does not have a residence within any circuit, venue is provided in 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  In the case of a 
corporation, venue is to be in the circuit court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the corporation has its principal place of business or principal office 
or agency, or if it has no principal place of business or principal office or 
agency within a judicial circuit, appellate venue is in the circuit court for the 
circuit in which is located the office to which the corporation made the 
disputed return.  If the corporation has no principal place of business, 
office or agency within a judicial circuit and has not filed a return with 
respect to the disputed tax, venue is in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.  The revised rules made no change in the venue by agreement 
provision as modified by the 1934 Act.486 
It should be apparent that some of the same problems which existed 
under the 1926 venue rules were reintroduced with the 1966 amendments.  
Thus, the mechanical rule based on return filing was almost completely 
abandoned, and inquiry must now be made to such decidedly 
non-mechanical concepts as “residence,” (in the case of persons other than 
corporations) and “principal place of business or principal agency or office” 
(in the case of corporations).  Moreover, some of the same issues that arose 
with respect to fiduciary representatives of the taxpayer also arise under the 
new provisions.  For example, if the taxpayer dies before the filing of the 
petition to the Tax Court, will appellate venue vary depending on whether 
his estate or his executor is the named party in the Tax Court petition?487 
                                                     
485  Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 1109 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)). 
486  See supra note 477 and accompanying text. 
487  Cf. Turner’s Estate v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (for purposes 
of 1926 Act venue rules, the executors and not the estate would be regarded as the 
real party in interest).  The Tax Court periodically faces this question in 
determining the circuit court precedent that governs the proceeding before it under 
the Golsen rule (discussed in Section H.9 below), but the court has not yet 
definitively resolved the matter.  The most extensive treatment is found in separate 
opinions in the court-reviewed opinion in Estate of Clack v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 
131 (1996).  Drawing on the § 7482 and the legislative history accompanying the 
1966 amendments thereto, as well as cases addressing the venue for refunds suits 
brought by estates, Judge Parr concluded that the determination of appellate venue 
should be based on the residence of the executor (or the principal place of business 
of a corporate executor).  Id. at 167 (Parker, J., dissenting).  Judge Parker’s separate 
opinion was joined by Judge Cohen.  This approach was endorsed by the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of Israel v. Commissioner, 159 F.3d 593, 595 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998), which characterized the conclusion that the executor, rather than the 
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In addition to these uncertainties, the new rules introduced more 
opportunity for discretionary forum selection than existed under the filing 
location standard.  Thus, if the principal place of business of a corporation 
is located in a different judicial circuit than its principal office or agency, 
presumably the corporation could file its appeal petition with either circuit. 
Additionally, if the same decision involves more than one petitioner, the 
possibility for forum selection also will exist.  Thus, if the petitioners in a 
case involving an estate are fiduciaries residing in different circuits, an 
appeal to the circuit in which any fiduciary resides probably would be 
proper.488  Since different substantive rules may obtain in different 
circuits,489 appellate venue selection occasionally can be determinative of 
the outcome of the controversy.490 
Congress has periodically updated the venue provisions of § 7482(b) in 
an attempt to keep up with the expanded range of matters over which the 
Tax Court possesses jurisdiction.  Appellate venue for review of a 
declaratory judgment relating to the qualification of retirement plans under 
§ 7476 is determined by reference to the principal place of business of the 
employer;491 appellate venue for review of a declaratory judgment 
concerning the tax-exempt status of an organization under § 7428 is 
determined by reference to the location of the organization’s principal 
office or agency;492 appellate venue for review of decisions arising under the 
TEFRA partnership proceedings is determined by reference to the principal 
place of business of the partnership;493 and a declaratory judgment relating 
to an over-sheltered return pursuant to § 6234 is determined by the legal 
                                                                                                                       
estate, should be viewed as the petitioner for purposes of § 7842(b) as “hardly open 
to dispute.”  
Judge Gerber, in a concurring opinion in Estate of Clack, addressed the issue 
raised by Judge Parker, and came to the opposite conclusion.  He found it more 
logical to regard the estate as the petitioner in the proceeding, and he noted that 
this approach minimized the prospect of forum shopping because a decedent’s 
domicile becomes fixed at death.  106 T.C. at 146–47 (Gerber, J., concurring).  [On 
the other hand, fiduciaries could move to or perhaps be selected in a jurisdiction 
with favorable circuit court precedent.]  Judge Gerber’s concurring opinion was 
joined by five other judges of the court.   
In light of the uncertainty regarding the venue for appeals in cases involving an 
estate, the court has adopted a policy to avoid identifying the petitioner as the 
estate.   
488 See discussion in supra note 487.   
489  See infra notes 573–574 and accompanying text. 
490  See Peacock, supra note 455, at 15–16. 
491 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(C).  
492 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(D).  
493 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(E)  
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residence of a non-corporate petitioner or the principal place of business of 
a corporate taxpayer.494   
However, § 7482(b) does not address every type of case the Tax Court 
has jurisdiction to hear.  In cases not expressly addressed by the 
enumerated provisions of § 7482(b), which include decisions emanating 
from a variety of areas of the Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals serves as the default appellate venue.495  As one 
example, an appeal of a Tax Court decision concerning a petitioner’s right 
to a whistleblower award pursuant to § 7623 would rest with the D.C. 
Circuit under the default provision.  The Tax Court, however, has not been 
overly exacting in its reference to appellate venue in cases arising under its 
expanded jurisdiction.  For instance, in Murphy v. Commissioner,496 the 
taxpayer petitioned for review of an adverse collection due process hearing 
pursuant to § 6330(d).  In addressing the controlling precedent in the case, 
the Tax Court observed by footnote that an appeal of the case would lie 
with the First Circuit Court of Appeals—apparently based on the residence 
of the taxpayer.497  However, § 7482(b)(1)(A) references the individual 
appellant’s residence only in cases involving a “redetermination of a 
deficiency.”  As the validity of the underlying tax liability often is not at 
issue in a collection due process proceeding and was not at issue in Murphy, 
the Tax Court’s determination of appellate venue appeared incorrect.498  
Nonetheless, the case was appealed to the First Circuit, which accepted the 
appeal and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision with no discussion of its 
appellate jurisdiction.499   
The apparent imprecision in the determination of appellate venue for 
cases arising under aspects of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction of more recent 
vintage may be characterized as harmless error if no party objects to the 
broad use of an individual’s residence as the determining factor for 
appellate venue in a wide variety of cases.  On the other hand, one can 
expect the issue to be analyzed in greater detail as commentary increasingly 
highlights the matter.  An appropriate response would be for Congress to 
expand § 7482(b)(1)(A) to encompass cases other than redeterminations of 
deficiencies.   
 
                                                     
494 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(F).    
495 I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1) (flush language); see also James Bamberg, A Different Point 
of Venue:  The Plainer Meaning of Section 7482(b)(1), 61 TAX LAW. 445 (2008) (detailing 
how many cases arising under the Tax Court’s expanded jurisdiction are not 
specifically addressed in § 7482(b) and that, as a result, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals provides the venue for appeal).     
496  125 T.C. 301 (2005). 
497  Id. at 313 n.6.   
498  See Bamberg, supra note 495, at 467 (making this point).   
499  469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).   
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7. The Appellate Process in Operation—Problems and Controversies 
 
Under the appellate structure established in 1926 (and still applicable 
today), appeals can be taken from a forum of national jurisdiction, the Tax 
Court, to one of 12 different intermediate courts of appeals, and finally to 
the Supreme Court.  Given the complexity of the tax laws and the 
multiplicity of approaches that can be taken in the judicial resolution of 
many tax problems, this appellate system occasionally has created 
conflicting rules at the intermediate appellate level. 
Most would agree that geographic uniformity is a desirable goal in tax 
administration and that the particular tax rule applied should not vary with 
appellate venue.  However, under the existing system, the prevailing rule in 
a tax controversy may be determined by the taxpayer’s residence or place of 
business. 
Besides creating a lack of geographic uniformity, the appellate system as 
it has evolved in tax cases may also tend to encourage litigation in tax 
matters.  Thus, even though the Service, the Tax Court, and one or more 
courts of appeals may have ruled unfavorably on an issue, taxpayers often 
continue to litigate the question in the hope of securing a favorable ruling in 
their particular circuit or from the Supreme Court.500  This same 
phenomenon may also work in reverse with the Government being 
reluctant to give up on an issue until the weight of authority is 
overwhelming.501 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court traditionally has been under 
significant pressure to pass on many more tax cases than it would like to 
and to pass on cases solely for the purpose of achieving a uniform rule, 
even though the issues involved may be trivial and not otherwise deserving 
of consideration at the ultimate appellate level.502  In fact, the primary 
reason for the grant of certiorari in tax cases is to resolve conflicts among 
the courts of appeals.503 
It may be argued that a genius of our judicial system is that it affords the 
opportunity for a full ventilation of a particular issue by several courts 
before its ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court.  It also may be argued 
                                                     
500  See, e.g., examples cited in Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax 
Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1156–57 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Griswold]. 
501 The experience under the former entity-classification regulations (the 
so-called Kintner regulations) in determining the tax status of professional 
corporations provides one such historic example.  See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
¶ 2.06 (3d ed. 1971). 
502  See Griswold, supra note 500, at 1163–64; see also Laing v. United States, 423 
U.S. 161 (1976) (example of the Supreme Court hearing a tax controversy in which 
a conflict existed between the circuits). 
503  Griswold, supra note 500, at 1163. 
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that any law, tax or otherwise, is subject to the same vagaries of divergent 
interpretation by different courts, yet the Republic has managed to survive.  
Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that the issue of multiple jurisdiction of 
tax appeals has aroused a good deal of comment—much of it critical of the 
existing system.504 
With respect to the role of the Tax Court, the issue has surfaced in two 
different contexts.  First, with reference to the role of appellate courts in tax 
litigation, there was a brief period of time in which the Supreme Court 
                                                     
504 “If we were seeking to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax 
jurisprudence, we could hardly do better than to provide for 87 courts with original 
jurisdiction, 11 appellate bodies of coordinate rank, and only a discretionary review 
of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court.”  ROSWELL FOSTER MAGILL, THE 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1934). 
“Few tax questions are ever put at rest until they have been interred in the 
United States Supreme Court Reports. . . .  In the meantime, the issue is usually 
obscured by a mass of conflicting decisions.”  Robert B. Eichholz, Should the Federal 
Income Tax be Simplified?, 48 YALE L.J. 1200, 1216 (1939). 
“We are getting too much law, and too many kinds of law, and from too many 
sources, for tax administration to be simple, or the law clear.  Should we reserve to 
the Supreme Court only constitutional questions in tax matters?  Should matters of 
statutory construction be settled by a tax court, instead of by the twelve Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, with their frequent conflict of viewpoint?”  Robert H. Jackson, 
Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes, 13 TAXES 641, 686 (1935); see also 
Montgomery B. Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies Under the 
Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1939); Paul D. 
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of 
Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Griswold, supra note 500; 
John M. Maguire, Federal RevenueCInternal or Infernal?, 21 TAXES 77 (1943); Federick 
L. Pearce, Trends in Federal Tax Procedure, 69 J. ACCOUNTANCY 369 (1940); Program 
and Committee Reports, ABA TAXATION SECTION 64 (1940); Sidney I. Roberts, 
Wilbur H. Friedman, Martin D. Ginsburg & Carter T. Louthan, A Report on 
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325 (1972); J.S. Seidman, Proposed 
Procedural Changes in Federal Tax Practice, 67 J. ACCOUNTANCY 221 (1939); Stanley S. 
Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 
(1940); Stanley S. Surrey, The Traynor Plan–What It Is?, 17 TAXES 393 (1939); 
William A. Sutherland, New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Controversies: A Critical 
Comment, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 359 (1940); Roger John Traynor, Administrative 
and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes–A Criticism and A 
Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938); Roger John Traynor & Stanley S. Surrey, 
New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 336 (1940); G. Aaron Younquist, Proposed Radical Changes 
in the Federal Tax Machinery, 25 A.B.A. J. 291 (1939); Comment, The National Court of 
Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality and Desirability, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 863 
(1973); Note, Controversy Between the Tax Court and Court of Appeals: Is the Tax Court 
Bound by the Precedent of Reviewing Courts?, 7 DUKE L.J. 45 (1957); Note, The Old Tax 
Court Blues: The Need for Uniformity in Tax Litigation, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 970 (1971). 
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believed it had found at least a partial answer to the vexing problems of lack 
of uniformity and burgeoning tax litigation.  This answer proceeded from a 
special interpretation of the scope of appellate review to be accorded 
decisions of the Tax Court.  This period of judicial history is related in the 
following section. 
Second, from the vantage point of the Tax Court, the appellate review 
structure also has produced an unusual problem with respect to the court's 
perception of its own role as a national trial court, the decisions of which 
are subject to review by multiple appellate courts.  This problem is traced in 
the section following discussion of the scope and standard of appellate 
review. 
 
8. Scope and Standard of Review 
 
Historically, the factual findings of a federal equity court, and more 
recently the findings of a law court sitting without a jury, have been 
reviewable under the “clearly erroneous” standard,505 which permits reversal 
on the facts, even if evidence exists to support the trial court’s findings, “if 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”506  On the other hand, in 
cases tried before a jury, courts generally have only asserted power to 
modify factual determinations of the jury if not supported by “substantial 
evidence,” which has been construed as “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”507 
These standards have been recognized as being quite different, with the 
former permitting greater flexibility to the reviewing court than the latter.  
Thus, in District of Columbia v. Pace,508 which involved a statute providing that 
findings of the Board of Tax Appeals of the District of Columbia “shall 
have the same effect as a finding of fact by an equity court or a verdict of a 
jury,”509 the Supreme Court stated that “findings of fact by an equity court 
and the verdict of a jury have from time immemorial been subject to 
different rules of finality in that findings of a judge are accepted unless 
                                                     
505  5A J. MOORE, supra note 407, at ¶ 52.03[1]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
506  United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
507  Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also 
N.L.R.B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (3d ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS]; LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 596 (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. JAFFE]; 5A J. MOORE, 
supra note 407, at ¶¶ 50.02[1], 50.07[2]; Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of 
Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 73 
(1944). 
508  320 U.S. 698 (1944). 
509  Act of May 16, 1938, ch. 223, § 4(a), 52 Stat. 371. 
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‘clearly wrong’ and that the review of a jury verdict is much more 
restricted.”510 
Although the extent to which factual determinations of agencies of the 
executive branch can be reviewed is largely a matter of legislative 
discretion511 (for example, in the case of the Tax Court’s former 
renegotiation jurisdiction, the statute specifically precluded appellate review 
of Tax Court findings512), the general practice and the common law view 
have been that such action should be reviewable under the same standard 
applicable to jury verdicts.513 The feeling seems to be that the expertise of 
the agency and the interest of uniform administration dictate a more limited 
judicial review of administrative action than in the case of the factual 
finding of a judge sitting without a jury.514 
The only provision in the 1926 Act dealing with the scope of appellate 
review of Board determinations, § 1003(b), provided: “Upon . . . review . . . 
[of Board decisions, the appellate] courts shall have power to affirm or, if 
the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to 
reverse the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the case for a 
rehearing, as justice may require.”515 
A strict textual analysis of this language does not indicate clearly the 
scope of review to be accorded factual determinations of the Board.  By not 
providing for any review of factual matters, the provision could be 
interpreted as precluding such review entirely; on the other hand, the 
absence of a specific standard could be viewed as leaving the matter to the 
courts as guided by the common law experience.516  Nevertheless, the 1926 
committee reports indicate that a restrictive appellate review was 
contemplated.  The report states that “[i]n view of the grant of exclusive 
power to the Board finally to determine the facts upon which tax liability is 
based, subdivision (b) of section 1003 limits the review on appeal to what 
                                                     
510  320 U.S. at 701; see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, 
Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 88–89 (1944).  Contra, 
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1955). 
511  K. DAVIS, supra note 507, at § 29.01. 
512  Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, § 108, 65 Stat. 21. 
513  N.L.R.B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 
(1939); K. DAVIS, supra note 507, at § 29.02. 
514 N.L.R.B. v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 1952). 
515  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 110 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7482(c)(1)). 
516  That this language is not inconsistent with review of factual determinations 
is indicated by the fact that this provision still appears in the statute, see I.R.C. 
§ 7482(c)(1), even though it is now clear that appellate courts can review factual 
determinations of the Tax Court, see I.R.C. § 7482(a).  General statutory standards 
of the scope of review of administrative determinations were not provided until the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.  Administrative Procedure 
Act, ch. 324, § l0(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
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are commonly known as questions of law.”517  The reports, however, 
moderate this apparent bar on review of factual determinations by including 
within the definition of “questions of law” the issue of “the existence of at 
least some evidence to support the findings of fact.”518 
In the years following 1926, the appellate courts were faced with the 
problem of giving effect to the restricted appellate review of Board factual 
determinations.  Inasmuch as no precise line defines the boundary between 
questions of law and those of fact, the results of the cases were not always 
consistent.519  Moreover, in the view of the Supreme Court in the 1943 
landmark decision in Dobson v. Commissioner,520 many courts were simply 
ignoring the limitations on appellate review of Board decisions.  “[E]ven a 
casual survey of decisions in tax cases, now over 5,000 in number, will 
demonstrate that courts, including this Court, have not paid the scrupulous 
deference to the tax laws’ admonitions of finality which they have to similar 
provisions in statutes relating to other tribunals.”521 
Although this practice, the Court believed, was erroneous, it was 
understandable in view of the history of appellate tax practice.522  Prior to 
1926, most tax cases came up to the appellate courts from district court 
proceedings either at common law against the collector of the tax, or under 
the Tucker Act against the United States.523  Traditional notions of scope of 
review applied to these appeals, and the reviewing court could review 
factual as well as legal determinations of the court below.524  Moreover, 
litigation originating in the Board during the 1924–26 period that ultimately 
found its way to the appellate courts by way of a trial de novo in district 
court or the Court of Claims was also subject to this scope of review.525  
For these reasons, according to the Supreme Court, the appellate courts had 
grown accustomed to treating tax cases in the same manner as other 
appeals.526 
Dobson represented an effort by the Supreme Court to require appellate 
courts to observe more closely the statutory limitation on the scope of 
                                                     
517  S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (926); see also H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 19 (1925). 
518  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926). 
519  See Wm. Cutler Thompson, Comments Upon the Nature and Scope of Appellate 
Review of Cases Originating in the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 25 (1934).  
520  320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
521  Id. at 494. 
522  Id. at 495–98. 
523  Id. at 495–96 
524  Id. 
525  Id. at 496–97. 
526  Id. at 497–98.  This reasoning seems specious since the federal appellate 
courts when reviewing factual findings of juries were presumably doing so on the 
substantial evidence rule—the same scope of review generally applicable to 
administrative determinations. 
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review.  The case involved taxpayers who, some years after selling stock at a 
loss, successfully sued the persons from whom they originally had 
purchased the stock on the grounds of fraud and securities act violations.  
The main question was whether the taxpayers’ recoveries should be 
excluded from income, because the recoveries plus the proceeds from the 
sale of the stock were less than the purchase price of the stock, and because 
the taxpayers had obtained no tax reduction from their losses on the stock 
sale as their deductions exceeded their income for the years of sale. 
The Dobson case was submitted to the Board for decision on stipulated 
facts;527 the arguments of the parties before the Board, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the Supreme Court centered on 
whether the total economic effect of all the transactions relating to the 
stock purchase and sale should be given determinative weight for tax 
purposes.  The Board ruled on this question in the affirmative, in favor of 
the taxpayers, by applying the “tax benefit” doctrine.528  The circuit court 
reversed the Board, holding that each tax year must stand on its own and 
reasoning that a subversion of the statute of limitations would result unless 
the taxpayers were required to treat their recoveries as income in the year of 
receipt.529 
In reversing the Eighth Circuit and approving the Tax Court decision 
(by the time Dobson reached the Supreme Court, the Board had been 
renamed the Tax Court), the Supreme Court evidenced its exasperation 
with the volume and nature of the tax cases it was called on to decide, the 
growing complexity of tax laws, the substantial volume of tax litigation 
generally, and the delays and lack of uniformity in such litigation.530  In its 
view, the Tax Court was constituted as a panel of experts and was equipped 
by virtue of the qualifications of its judges and staff to deal competently and 
independently with questions of tax law.531  The Court perceived the 1926 
Act and its legislative history as clearly limiting the scope of review of Tax 
Court decisions to questions of law.  So long as there was “warrant in the 
record” for the findings of the Tax Court, the finality of its decisions should 
not be disturbed.532  According to the Supreme Court, a strict observance 
of these principles would substantially ease the regrettable state into which 
the administration of the tax laws had fallen.533 
                                                     
527  Estate of Collins v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 765, 765–66 (1942). 
528  Id. at 769–70. 
529  Harwick v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 732, 735–37 (8th Cir. 1943). 
530  320 U.S. at 494–95, 499–500 ¶ n.25. 
531  Id. at 498–99. 
532  Id. at 501. 
533  Id. at 494–95, 499–502.  The Court was later to state that “Congress has 
plainly designed . . . [the Tax Court] to serve, as it were, as the exchequer court of 
the country.”  McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 64 (1944). 
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The difficult problem that had to be faced by the Court in Dobson was 
how to separate questions of law from fact.534  The distinction had been 
given some meaning in other contexts, but always had been somewhat 
obscure.535  Some help was offered by the committee reports on the 1926 
Act which stated that the reviewing court could consider 
 
the constitutionality of the substantive law applied, the 
constitutionality of the procedure used, failure to observe the 
procedure required by law, the proper interpretation and application 
of the statute or any regulation having the force of law, the existence 
of at least some evidence to support the findings of fact, and the 
validity of any ruling upon the admissibility of evidence. . . .536 
 
However, the helpfulness of this language in distinguishing fact from law 
was more apparent than real, and the Supreme Court conceded that the 
distinction was a difficult one, especially in cases involving mixed questions 
of fact and law.537 
A close reading of Dobson does not reveal any specific tests that the 
Supreme Court believed should be applied in making the distinction.  
Rather, the Court concluded that the application of the tax benefit doctrine 
was essentially an accounting question of whether related transactions 
should be integrated.  Since the Tax Court had found as a matter of fact 
that the taxpayers had no economic or tax gain on the integrated 
transaction, and since no statute or regulation explicitly required a different 
result, the Supreme Court held that it was error for the court of appeals to 
reverse the Tax Court’s decision.538 
Although the fact that the Supreme Court implied that accounting 
matters were factual questions was of some significance, the truly startling 
aspect of the case was the promulgation by the Court of what amounted to 
a rule of construction in applying the fact-law distinction.  Recognizing the 
difficulties inherent in categorizing the tax benefit rule as a question of fact, 
and the general difficulties in distinguishing legal questions from factual 
matters, the Court stated, “when the [reviewing] court cannot separate the 
                                                     
534  320 U.S. at 500–0l. 
535  Id. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961) 
with L. JAFFE, supra note 507, at 549–50; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Control 
of Administrative Action; A Review, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 669–72 (1966). 
536  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 20 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 36 (1926). 
537  320 U.S. at 499–500. 
538  Id. at 501–03, 506–07. The Court had, in the past, noted the special 
expertise of the Board of Tax Appeals in accounting matters.  Lucas v. American 
Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1930). 
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elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the 
decision of the Tax Court must stand.”539 
The Dobson rule was not well received by commentators540 or the bar.541 
In the first place, the applicable statute provided that a reviewing court had 
power to modify or reverse a Tax Court decision if it were “not in 
accordance with law.”542  Dobson, however, forbade appellate review of legal 
matters in the absence of a “clear-cut mistake of law.”543  Although this rule 
may have been suited to according finality to Tax Court decisions and 
avoiding the necessity of prolonged inquiry into whether a question was 
one of law or fact, there were those who believed that the rule represented a 
short cut wholly unauthorized by governing law.544 
Another remarkable aspect of Dobson was its strong inference that 
accounting matters were questions of fact.  Many provisions of the tax laws 
deal with accounting matters; did Dobson require that all these matters be 
treated as questions of fact?545 There was some indication that the Court 
was influenced in categorizing the question as one of fact by reason of the 
nonexistence of specific statutory or regulatory authority on the point in 
issue.  However, to distinguish law from fact using this criteria was certainly 
a novel approach.546 
                                                     
539  320 U.S. at 502. 
540  George T. Altman, The Dobson Rule, 21 TUL. L. REV. 527 (1947); Louis 
Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. REV. 477, 
539–43 (1945); Griswold, supra note 500, at 1170–73; Robert E. Nelson, The 
“Dobson” Rule Reaffirmed by the “Kelley” Case, 24 TAXES 104 (1946); Randolph E. Paul, 
Dobson v. Commissioner, 23 TAXES 83 (1945); Randolph E. Paul, Dobson v. 
Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944) 
[hereinafter cited as Paul]; Note, The Dobson Rule in the Circuit Courts, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 448 (1947); Judicial Review of Tax Court Decisions, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 339 (1946). 
541  Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 167–73 (1948). 
542  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § l003(b), 44 Stat. 110. 
543  320 U.S. at 502. 
544  In a statement supporting legislative overruling of Dobson, the American Bar 
Association complained that: 
In our opinion the Dobson decision represents an utterly unwarranted 
invasion by the United States Supreme Court of the legislative field, and in 
addition, as legislation it is thoroughly unsound. . . .  [I]t is our hope that the 
committee will see fit to call attention to the great damage and confusion 
which always results from the invasion by the courts of the fields of policy 
which have been entrusted by the Constitution solely to the legislative 
branch of the Government. 
Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1948). 
545  Paul, supra note 540; see also L. JAFFE, supra note 507, at 579–82. 
546  320 U.S. at 502–03. 
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Moreover, although the impact that Dobson had on the volume of tax 
litigation is subject to some question,547 it seems clear that the decision in 
                                                     
547  Set forth below is a table detailing the number of tax cases decided by the 
federal courts (including the Board/Tax Court) for the period 1935–1953. 
 









1935 29 382 54 240 1,405 
1936 45 382 58 128 1,496 
1937 25 232 79 222 965 
1938 U N A V A I L A B L E 1,113 
1939 33 137 125 203 1,312 
1940 43 351 53 405 1,322 
1941 58 531 46 447 1,328 
1942 37 522 31 469 1,418 
1943 21 443 32 335 1,317 
1944 25 416 95 242 1,013 
1945 32 340 30 242 928 
1946 21 273 29 281 801 
1947 13 242 15 207 827 
1948 6 243 24 183 807 
1949 12 264 30 315 838 
1950 12 261 12 226 868 
1951 6 289 27 324 1,040 
1952 9 292 20 501 956 
1953 14 339 58 439 996 
 
* Number of dockets disposed of by decisions in which there was written opinion. 
 
These figures indicate a general decrease in tax litigation starting in the early 1940’s 
and extending into the early 1950’s.  A Dobson defender might well argue that this 
decrease was a result of that case’s limitation on the scope of appellate review.  
However, problems exist with such an argument.  In the first place, one would 
expect Dobson to have its major impact in the appellate courts.  Yet the most 
dramatic decrease in cases occurred in the district courts where decisions declined 
from 469 in 1942 to 183 in 1948, a decrease of 61 percent.  It is true that courts of 
appeals decisions also declined dramatically, from 531 in 1941 to 242 in 1947, a 
drop of 54 percent, but so did Tax Court cases, which declined from 1,418 in 1942 
to 807 in 1948, a drop of 43 percent.  Decline in Supreme Court cases, although 
relatively the greatest of all from 58 in 1941 to six in 1948, a drop of 90 percent, are 
not very meaningful since the Court can control the number of tax cases it hears. 
If Dobson accounted for a decrease in tax litigation, one would expect the 
smallest decline (or even an increase) in district court cases, since taxpayers would 
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that case did not have a salutary effect on the complexity of tax law.  If 
anything, appellate cases became further complicated by the requirement of 
considering whether the Tax Court decision was reviewable.548 
The Supreme Court was called upon several times to determine the 
applicability of Dobson, and the resulting decisions did not seem wholly 
consistent.  In a leading debt-equity decision, John Kelley Co. v. 
Commissioner,549 the Court refused to review the arguably contradictory 
conclusions of the Tax Court on whether certain purported interest 
payments should be treated as such for purposes of the tax laws, or whether 
they should be treated as distributions with respect to stock.  Since the case 
dealt with the meaning of the “well understood words . . . ‘interest’ and 
“dividends,’” the Court concluded, over three dissents, that the 
determination of the Tax Court must be dispositive.  Yet in Trust of Bingham 
v. Commissioner,550 the Court refused to apply Dobson in a case involving the 
question of whether certain legal fees were deductible because paid in 
connection with “property held for the production of income.”551  The Tax 
Court had ruled that the fees qualified for deduction under this test;552 the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the 
Tax Court had erred in application of the law.553  Observing that decision 
turned on “the meaning of the words . . . ‘property held for the production 
of income,’”554 the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Circuit was 
                                                                                                                       
tend to increase their appearances in those courts in order to preserve their rights 
of appellate review.  Paul, supra note 540, at 798. 
Rather, it seems probable that the general decline in tax litigation during this 
period was due to a combination of two factors.  First, it is at least arguable that 
World War II contributed to the decline by attracting manpower that might 
otherwise have been engaged in tax disputes.  Additionally, taxpayers may have 
been less inclined to contest a tax that was helping to support a popular war.  A 
second possible cause for the decrease can be traced to 1938 when the Bureau 
“inaugurated a definite program looking to the decentralization of the appellate 
procedure for the administrative settlement of income, profits, estate, and gift tax 
controversies.”  1939 COMM’R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 39 (1939).  Writing in 1942, 
the Chief Counsel for the Bureau asserted that the decentralization program was 
the reason for the decline in tax disputes.  John Philip Wenchell, 13 PA. BAR 
ASSOC. Q. 110, 110–16 (1942); see also Milton E. Carter, Decentralization of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue, 17 TAXES 403 (1939). 
548  See Paul, supra note 540, at 798–801; 93 CONG. REC. A3281 (1947) (remarks 
of Mr. Hobbs). 
549  326 U.S. 521 (1946).   
550  325 U.S. 365 (1945). 
551  Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(2), 53 Stat. 12 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 212(1)). 
552 2 T.C. 853 (1943). 
553 Commissioner v. Kenan, 145 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944). 
554 325 U.S. 365, 371 (1945). 
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correct in not applying Dobson as a bar to appellate review.555  Thus, the 
meaning of “interest” and “dividend” were questions of fact, but the 
meaning of “property held for the production of income” was a question of 
law.556 
As distinctions necessary for the application of Dobson became finer, and 
the doctrine of limited review became sometimes as difficult of application 
as the solution of the underlying case, some members of the Court sought 
refinements of Dobson in the hope that the original purpose of the decision 
could be preserved.  In Bingham’s Trust, Justice Frankfurter in a concurrence 
joined by Justices Roberts and Jackson (the latter being the author of 
Dobson), argued that the Dobson principle would be subverted if appellate 
courts were required to “make an independent examination of the meaning 
of every word in tax legislation.”557 In his view, the thorny distinction 
between mixed questions of fact and law and pure questions of law should 
be discarded; if the decision of the Tax Court were reasonable, it must 
stand, even if the appellate court disagreed either on the law or the facts.558 
In view of the not wholly consistent interpretation given to Dobson by the 
Supreme Court, it is not surprising that many concluded that the doctrine, if 
anything, spawned rather than subdued litigation.559 
Finally, Dobson was criticized as creating multiple standards of appellate 
review in tax cases.  Since tax cases originating in the district courts and the 
Court of Claims remained fully subject to appellate review for legal error, it 
was possible that the same appellate court might be required to apply 
different substantive rules of law depending on the court in which the case 
was commenced. One can easily detect a note of frustration in the 
following excerpt from an opinion of Judge Learned Hand: 
 
                                                     
555 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that on the merits the Tax Court 
decision was correct.  325 U.S. 365 (1945), rev’g 145 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944). 
556 In Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), decided in the same 
term as Dobson and nine months prior thereto, the Court held that the meaning of 
the word “gift” was a legal question and that the Board of Tax Appeals had erred in 
finding that donative intent was a requisite element of the definition.  In Dobson v. 
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), there was some intimation that the Court 
considered the application of the phrase “sale or exchange” to be a nonreviewable 
question of fact. 
In Commissioner v. Scottish American Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119 (1944), the Court held 
that the existence of an “office or place of business” within the United States was a 
question of fact the determination of which by the Tax Court was unreviewable if 
supported by substantial evidence. 
557 325 U.S. 365, 380 (1945). 
558 Id. at 381–82. 
559 For a discussion of the interpretative problems that arose following Dobson, 
see Note, The Dobson Rule in the Circuit Courts, 60 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1947) 
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[I]f the case were an appeal from a district court, we should have no 
alternative but to reverse.  But the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
admonished us (in so many decisions that it would be idle to repeat 
them), that our power to review a ruling of the Tax Court is very 
much more limited than in the case of a district court.  As we 
understand it, before we may substitute our own interpretation of a 
provision of the Revenue Act, not only must a naked question of law 
detach itself from the nexus of law and fact in the record as a whole; 
but we must conclude that the Tax Court has been indubitably 
wrong in its decision of the question which emerges:  reasonable 
differences in legal opinion we are to resolve in its favor. . . . 
That finality depends, as we understand, upon the added competency 
which inevitably follows from concentration in a special field.  Why, 
if that be so, we—or indeed even the Supreme Court itself—should 
be competent to fix the measure of the Tax Court’s competence, and 
why we should ever declare that it is wrong, is indeed an interesting 
inquiry, which happily it is not necessary for us to pursue.560 
 
As a result of these deficiencies, the Dobson doctrine had few adherents.  
In 1948, it died an apparent quiet death as a result of efforts of the 
American Bar Association.561  The overruling of Dobson was, at that point, 
so uncontroversial that it was accomplished in a bill, the movement of 
which through Congress depended on its acceptability to all.562  Since then, 
                                                     
560 Brooklyn Nat’l Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 452–53 (2d Cir. 
1946).  For other cases in which the Second Circuit indicated it would apply 
different substantive rules depending on whether the trial was in the Tax Court or a 
district court, see Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946); 
Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1946). 
Adherents of the Dobson doctrine recognized this difficulty, but their suggestion 
was to repose all tax jurisdiction in the Tax Court.  See Trust of Bingham v. 
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 378 n.l (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
561 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991 (now codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7482(a)).  Curiously, although this provision specifically made the scope of review 
in appeals from Tax Court decisions the same as in the case of appeals from district 
court decisions, no modification was made in the original statutory language of the 
1926 Act into which the Supreme Court read the Dobson rule.  This language still 
appears in § 7482(c)(1), and provides as follows: 
Upon such review, such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision 
of the Tax Court is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the 
decision of the Tax Court, with or without remanding the case for a 
rehearing, as justice may require. 
562 The primary purpose of the legislation was to codify and enact into positive 
law title 28 of the United States Code.  The bill, H.R. 3214, as passed by the House 
provided for the removal of the Tax Court from title 26 to title 28 and would have 
clarified the status of the court as a legislative court.  This proved to be 
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controversial in that it raised the question whether non-lawyers would or should be 
permitted to continue to practice before the court, and whether legislative 
jurisdiction over the court should be in the tax committees or the judiciary 
committees.  See Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); 93 CONG. REC. A3279-8l (1947) (remarks of 
Mr. Hobbs); id. 8384–93 (1947); Part IV, notes 140–258 and accompanying text.  
To eliminate this controversy, and thus insure the passage of the bill that was 
otherwise universally supported, all provisions relating to the Tax Court were 
eliminated save the overruling of Dobson. S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 2 (1948); 94 
CONG. REC. 7927–31, 8498–501 (1948). 
The passing of Dobson was not completely unlamented. Witness the following 
ditty performed at the twenty-fifth anniversary dinner in honor of the Tax Court, 
on June 3, 1949. Lyrics by Edgar J. Goodrich, Esq., who had been a member of the 
Board of Tax Appeals from 1931 to 1935. 
 
AIR: MY BONNIE LIES OVER THE OCEAN 
 
1. There once was a time on the Tax Court 
When the loser would sadly give up, 
But Congress has ruined our standing 
Now every decision goes up! 
Chorus: Bring back, bring back, 
Oh, bring back dear Dobson, T.C., T.C., 
(Repeat). 
2. Old Dobson tied up all appeal courts, 
They had to accept what we found 
But now each one does as it pleases 
Turns our facts and figures around. 
Chorus: Bring back, etc. 
3. Sing, HO, for the Wisdom of Jackson, 
Who gave us that beautiful rule, 
Sing, FIE, on a troublesome Congress 
That throws us all back in the pool. 
 
Additionally, it is clear that at least some Justices of the Supreme Court were not 
happily reconciled to the 1948 legislation: 
In spite of the gelding of Dobson . . . by the recent revision of the Judicial 
Code . . . I still think the Tax Court is a more competent and steady 
influence toward a systematic body of tax law than our sporadic 
omnipotence in a field beset with invisible boomerangs.  I should reverse in 
reliance upon the Tax Court’s judgment more, perhaps, than my own. 
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
That Dobson may be gone but not forgotten is further illustrated by Lustman v. 
Commissioner, 322 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1963), a 1963 case in which the Dobson rule 
evidently was applied.   
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the scope of review in appeals from Tax Court decisions has been the same 
as in the case of appeals from district court decisions tried without a jury.563  
Although the death of Dobson as a result of the enactment of § 7482(a) 
was well understood with respect to the scope of appellate review of Tax 
Court decisions, this is not to say that Dobson was universally understood to 
have no lasting value.  Rather, the ghost of Dobson continued to hover in 
cases suggesting that the Tax Court’s conclusions of law were entitled to a 
heightened measure of deference above the standard de novo review.  In 
Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,564 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
observed the existence of these cases and explained that the source of 
confusion appeared to rest in an internal inconsistency in § 7482.565  Section 
7482(a), requiring Tax Court decisions to be reviewed in the same manner 
as decisions from Federal district courts, suggests de novo review.566  On 
the other hand, § 7482(c)(1), the predecessor of which the Supreme Court 
interpreted in Dobson, allows a reviewing court to modify or reverse a Tax 
Court decision “not in accordance with law.”  This provision, suggests a 
heighted standard of review applied to decisions of administrative 
agencies.567  Because Congress failed to alter this standard as part of the 
1948 legislation, an argument can be made that a heightened standard of 
review for the Tax Court’s jurisdiction remained appropriate.  Although this 
interpretation enjoyed support among some commentators,568 it has not 
taken hold to date.  For instance, after noting the varying interpretations of 
§ 7482 with respect to the standard of review to be afforded to Tax Court 
                                                     
563 I.R.C. § 7482(a); see also Banks v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 
1963); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963). 
564 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).   
565 Id. at 1412. 
566 See id.  
567 See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).   
568 See David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions:  Dobson 
Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 646–53 (1996) (detailing the legislative history of the 
1948 statutory revision and arguing that the legislation did not overturn the 
deferential standard of review to be afforded to Tax Court decisions pursuant to 
Dobson).  Professor Shores contended that deferential review of Tax Court 
decisions not only was warranted under § 7482, but also desirable as a matter of 
policy.  See id. at 671–73; see also Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court 
Decisions of Law:  Promoting Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAW. 361 
(2005) (concluding that deferential review of Tax Court decisions provides the best 
option for the future of tax adjudication).  But see Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing 
Deference to the Tax Court, 64 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014) (contending that Dobson has 
been legislatively abrogated as a doctrinal matter, and that this interpretation 
comports with sound policy); Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second 
Best:  Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 235 (1998) (exploring adverse consequences of heightened deference to the 
Tax Court’s legal conclusions).   
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decisions, the Ninth Circuit in Vukasovich concluded that affording a special 
level of deference to Tax Court decisions was inappropriate.569 
 
9. Precedential Value of Decisions of Other Courts 
 
Very shortly after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926, the Board 
became aware that its status as a national trial tribunal presented it with an 
unusual problem regarding the role of precedent in its decisions.  On 
October 13, 1926, A. W. Gregg, General Counsel for the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue met with Chairman Korner of the Board to discuss several recent 
decisions of the Board involving a specific point in the excess profits tax.570 
Although the Board had accepted the Government’s position in each of 
these cases,571 several decisions of other courts had adopted a contrary 
view.572  The situation of the Treasury in these circumstances was difficult.  
It could adhere to the position that it had taken in the past, but the choice 
of the litigating forum was largely discretionary with the taxpayer and it 
seemed that further defeats were inevitable because sensible taxpayers 
simply would avoid taking their cases upon this point to the Board.  On the 
other hand, it did not seem to be an entirely satisfactory solution to the 
problem for Treasury to change its position in reliance on the court 
decisions.  In its view, the decisions of the Board were technically correct 
and ought to be followed by Treasury in the administration of the tax laws 
absent a contrary determination by the Supreme Court.  At his meeting with 
Chairman Korner, Mr. Gregg requested an indication from the Board as to 
whether it would continue to adhere to its original position; if so, Treasury 
also would adhere to that position in the hope of ultimately obtaining a 
conflict among the circuit court decisions thereby gaining entry to the 
Supreme Court.  That the problem was sorely troubling to the Treasury is 
indicated by the mere fact of the ex parte communication from the General 
Counsel to the Chairman of the Board.  The matter was raised three days 
later at a Board conference, but the Board, quite properly, did not take any 
action with respect to Mr. Gregg’s request.573 
                                                     
569 Vukasovich, 790 F.2d at 1413.  However, the court did note that Tax Court 
judgments “in its field of expertise are always accorded a presumption that they 
correctly apply the law.”  Id.      
570  The circumstances and scope of the meeting are described in a 
memorandum from Chairman Korner, Oct. 14, 1926, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Appeals: Precedent of Appellate Courts.” 
571  Phoenix Seed & Feed Co., 2 B.T.A. 909 (1925); Mesa Milling Co., 2 B.T.A. 
770 (1925); St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B.T.A. 649 (1925); F. J. Thompson, Inc., 1 
B.T.A. 535 (1925). 
572  Curtis Mfg. Co. v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 115 (1926); John B. Semple & 
Co. v. Lewellyn, 1 F.2d 745 (W.D. Pa. 1924), aff’d, 10 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1926). 
573  Board Conference Minutes, Oct. 16, 1926. 
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Most tribunals have little difficulty in identifying governing precedent.  
In the case of a trial court, for example, controlling precedent generally 
includes the pronouncements of courts having appellate jurisdiction over its 
decisions.  On the other hand, courts do not regard themselves bound by 
the rulings of other courts of equal rank, or even by the rulings of courts of 
higher rank if such courts do not have jurisdiction to review the decisions 
of the lower court. 
The position of the Tax Court with respect to the courts of appeals has 
always been anomalous.  Since the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to 
review Tax Court decisions, it can be argued that the Tax Court is not free 
to ignore the precedents of these appellate courts.  Yet each of the circuit 
courts is of coordinate rank and is therefore free not to follow the 
precedents of the others.  Thus, the Tax Court has 12 overseers who may, 
and sometimes do, differ among themselves.  The question necessarily 
presented in these circumstances is when, if at all, the Tax Court should be 
bound by the precedent of a court of appeals ruling. 
Until 1970, the Tax Court consistently had taken the position that it was 
not bound to follow the precedent of any of the courts of appeals.  
Although this was the policy of the court since its inception, it was neither 
explicitly stated nor rationalized until the 1957 decision in Lawrence v. 
Commissioner,574 a court-reviewed opinion in which no dissents were noted.  
In Lawrence, the taxpayers had filed their return for the year in issue with a 
collector of internal revenue located in the Ninth Circuit.  Under the rules 
then applicable, appellate venue would be in that circuit unless the parties 
stipulated otherwise.575  Such a stipulation was unlikely since a previously 
decided Ninth Circuit decision seemed to favor the position adopted by the 
taxpayers.576   Nevertheless, the Tax Court refused to follow that precedent 
and instead held for the Government.  The court recognized that it had the 
obligation to consider seriously all adverse precedents in the appellate 
courts and to follow such precedents if it concluded that they were correct, 
even if such a conclusion would require the overruling of previously 
decided Tax Court decisions.577  However, principally for three reasons, the 
court believed itself justified, and indeed obligated, to refuse to follow 
decisions of the courts of appeals that in the view of the Tax Court were 
decided wrongly. 
First, it was clear that Congress perceived one of the functions of the 
Tax Court to be the creation of a uniform body of precedents to govern the 
                                                     
574  Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), rev’d per curiam, 258 F.2d 
562 (9th Cir. 1958). 
575  See supra notes 485–487 and accompanying text. 
576  Slaff v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1955). 
577  27 T.C. 713, 716 (1957). 
816           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
interpretation of the tax laws.578  For this reason, Congress placed 
considerable emphasis on the importance of the court conferences at which 
the judges could exchange views and prevent the promulgation of 
conflicting decisions.579  In the opinion of the court, uniformity of 
application of the tax laws was of prime concern in its creation, and it 
believed that this objective would be compromised if it were constrained to 
adhere to authority with which it disagreed simply because of the vagaries 
of appellate venue.580 
Second, the court in Lawrence found support for its conclusion in the 
problems that could arise with respect to identifying the applicable circuit. 
Under venue rules, the parties could stipulate venue in any court of appeals 
they desired.581  Additionally, even though at the time Lawrence was decided 
appellate venue generally was determined under the objective standard of 
where the disputed return was filed,582 in some cases appellate venue might 
lie in multiple circuits with respect to identical issues.  Such multiple venue 
problems could exist in the case of partners in the same partnership who 
filed their returns in different circuits.583  The cases might be heard together 
in the Tax Court but could be appealed to different appellate courts.  
Moreover, a similar venue problem could exist with respect to the same 
taxpayer if the Tax Court proceeding involved a single issue spanning more 
than one tax year and the returns for those years were filed in different 
circuits.584 
Finally, the Tax Court also believed its result in Lawrence was demanded 
by the difficulty sometimes encountered in determining precisely what rule 
of law applied in a particular circuit.585  Sometimes precedents were not as 
clearly stated as might be hoped and other times seemingly conflicting lines 
of authority existed within the same circuit. 
For these reasons, the Tax Court concluded that the cause of tax 
administration would best be served by its continuing to apply its own view 
                                                     
578  Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 953 (1925) (testimony of A. W. Gregg, Solicitor of Internal 
Revenue). 
579  H.R. REP. NO. 69-1, at 18 (1925); S. REP. NO. 69-52, at 35 (1926). 
580  27 T.C. at 718.  Unquestionably, some legislators did regard the promotion 
of uniformity as a vital function of the Board. 65 CONG. REC. 2621 (1924) (remarks 
of Mr. Young).   Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how this uniformity was 
to be achieved under either the 1924 or the 1926 legislation, in view of the fact that 
the Board was not the final arbiter of tax disputes. 
581  I.R.C. § 7482(b)(2). 
582  See supra notes 482–499 and accompanying text. 
583  27 T.C. at 719. 
584  Id. 
585  Id. 
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of the law regardless of adverse precedents in the courts of appeals, even in 
circuits that would most likely hear an appeal from the Tax Court decision. 
The Lawrence and Dobson rules were similar in at least one respect—the 
particular court promulgating each rule was virtually alone in perceiving its 
merits.  The Lawrence rule attracted almost unanimous unfavorable 
criticism,586 and a serious, although unsuccessful, effort was made to have it 
legislatively overruled.587  Additionally, three circuit courts that addressed 
the issue manifested varying degrees of displeasure with the Tax Court’s 
practice of not following applicable precedent of higher courts.588  Perhaps 
for these reasons Lawrence was applied sparingly,589 at least explicitly, and 
few were surprised when, in 1970, the Tax Court announced in Golsen v. 
Commissioner that “[n]otwithstanding a number of considerations which 
originally led [to Lawrence] . . . it is our best judgment that better judicial 
administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is 
squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of 
Appeals and to that court alone.”590 
                                                     
586  Louis A. Del Cotto, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a 
Study, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 5, 8–10 (1962); Jack Lee Orkin, The Finality of the Court of 
Appeals Decisions in the Tax Court: A Dichotomy of Opinion, 43 A.B.A. J. 945 (1957); F. 
Trowbridge Vom Baur & George M. Coburn, Tax Court Wrong in Denying Taxpayer 
the Rule Laid Down in His Circuit, 8 J. TAX’N 228 (1958); Note, Status of a Controversy: 
The Tax Court, the Courts of Appeals and Judicial Review, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 164 (1971); 
57 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1957); 7 DUKE L.J. 45 (1957); 70 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 
1315 (1957).  The Lawrence opinion did, however, have at least one defender:  the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who believed the decision to be sound as 
encouraging uniformity.  Hearings on S. 2041 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 158 
(1968) (testimony of Sheldon Cohen). 
587  H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), introduced by Chairman Mills of 
the Ways and Means Committee, at the request of the American Bar Association, 
would have added I.R.C. § 7459(g): 
A decision of a United States Court of Appeals shall be given effect by the 
Tax Court in the same manner and to the same extent in all cases 
reviewable by such United States Court of Appeals under section 7482(b)(1) 
as it would be given effect by a district court in such circuit. 
588  Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957) (“a decision by 
one judge of the Tax Court, which, in effect, overrules a decision of the court of 
appeals in the circuit in which both cases arose, is not consonant with the 
responsibilities of the respective tribunals involved”); Stacey Mfg. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956) (“the Tax Court . . . is not 
lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow . . . the settled law of the 
circuit”); Holt v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1955) (“We seem to 
play at hide-and-go-seek with the Tax Court in these cases.”). 
589  See John J. Charles, Status of a Controversy: The Tax Court, the Courts of Appeals, 
and Judicial Review, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 164, 168 (l971). 
590  54 T.C. 742, 757 (l970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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The Lawrence rule was not only defensible but clearly correct when the 
appeal from the Tax Court reasonably could be considered to be taken to a 
circuit that had not had occasion to consider the particular issue involved.  
In such circumstances, more harm than good would be done by requiring 
the Tax Court to adopt a view with which it did not agree simply because 
authority for such view existed in one or more other circuits.  Since courts 
of appeals are free to disagree with each other, reversal by the appellate 
court would be just as likely whether the Tax Court adopted its own view or 
the view of another circuit.  Accordingly, Golsen has no application to cases 
involving questions on which there is no precedent in the appropriate court 
of appeals.591  In this regard, the Tax Court has held that a circuit court 
bench decision, not having precedential value within the circuit, will not be 
regarded as precedent for purposes of Golsen.592 
In addition to those cases in which the question has not been addressed 
properly by the appropriate court of appeals, Golsen is inapplicable in at least 
two other situations.  First, a seemingly controlling circuit decision may not 
be followed if the court believes that decision to be distinguishable on its 
facts593 or in the issues presented.594  In addition, the court may refuse to 
adhere to a precedent if it views the precedent as stale because of some 
intervening event, such as new enactments, new regulations or a well-
considered line of cases in other circuits.595  In both instances, the 
precedential value of the earlier decision is dubious and the teaching of 
Golsen that decisions “squarely in point” must be given effect is not 
offended.596 
                                                     
591  Webb v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1008 (l977); Lewis v. Commissioner, 65 
T.C. 625 (l975); Patman, Young & Kirk, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-
185, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 798, aff’d, 536 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1976). 
592  Ruegsegger v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 463 (1977). 
593 E.g., Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977); Allen v. Commissioner, 66 
T.C. 340 (1976); Bridges v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 968 (1974). 
594  Thompson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 737 (1976); Richmond, 
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 174 (1974), aff’d, 528 
F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1975); Page v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 64 (1974), aff’d, 
524 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975). 
595  Kent v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 133 (1973); see also Kowalski v. 
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 44 (1975) (finding Golsen not controlling with regard to a 
Third Circuit decision as that case had been decided under the 1939 Code). 
596  See Thompson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 737, 742 n.6 (1976); Spalding v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-250, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1074, 1076; Page v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-15, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 64, 65, aff’d, 524 F.2d 1149 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
Opinions, Decisions, and Appeals                         819 
 
Within these limitations, Golsen has been applied consistently.597  If the 
venue for an appeal is in a court that has clearly expressed an opinion on 
the issue involved, good reason exists for requiring the Tax Court to follow 
the applicable precedent whether it is in agreement.  The appellate court 
presumably would follow its own precedent on an appeal from a Tax Court 
decision and a contrary ruling by the Tax Court would simply put the losing 
party in the Tax Court to the hardship of appealing to gain a reversal.  
Moreover, as a matter of sound judicial administration it would seem that a 
lower court should not have discretion to refuse to follow the precedent of 
a court to which its cases must be appealed, and in this regard, it seems 
reasonable that the Tax Court should be viewed as a lower court in relation 
to the appellate court to which a particular decision is appealable. 
The reasons given in Lawrence for not applying these policies were not 
compelling.  The fact that the applicable precedent within a particular 
circuit may be hard to discern either because of cryptic or conflicting 
decisions should not obviate a lower court’s duty to apply such precedent.  
Certainly such a problem would not relieve a district court from following 
precedent within its circuit, nor, even under Lawrence, would it relieve the 
Tax Court from following Supreme Court precedent.  The problem is a 
routine one for any court. 
The second justification for Lawrence, that appellate venue may be in 
doubt in some cases, also was not weighty.  In the great bulk of cases there 
is no problem in determining the court to which an appeal will lie.  This was 
particularly true at the time Lawrence was decided when venue was 
determined by the location of the return filing.598  Although the parties 
theoretically had (and still have) the option of jointly stipulating any venue 
they desire,599 the possibility of the exercise of such an option would be 
remote if the court that would hear the appeal in the absence of a 
stipulation had ruled in favor of one of the parties.600  Moreover, even at 
the present time, when appellate venue is predicated principally on either 
the residence of the taxpayer or its principal place of business,601 the 
determination of proper venue will not present a problem in most cases; in 
those few cases in which it does, the Tax Court need not feel constrained to 
follow the precedent of any particular court of appeals.  As to those cases in 
which multiple appellate venues exist because there are multiple taxpayers 
                                                     
597  E.g., McCormac v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 955 (1977); Collins Electrical Co. 
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 91l (1977); Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162 
(1975). 
598  See supra notes 485–487 and accompanying text. 
599  I.R.C. § 7482(b)(2). 
600  This fact was taken into account in Golsen. 54 T.C. at 757 n.15. 
601  I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1). 
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involved,602 there may be more than one reasonable policy that could be 
pursued by the Tax Court.603  However, the fact that these cases may 
present difficulties or that appellate venue may not be determinable in a few 
cases, is not justification for refusing to follow applicable precedent in a 
circuit when it is virtually certain that the appeal, if any, will be venued 
there. 
Finally, Lawrence was not defensible on the ground that the Tax Court is 
a national court, the formation of which was intended to promote 
uniformity of tax decisions.  It is true that the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is 
national, and it is also true that an important purpose of the Tax Court is 
the promulgation of precedents to aid in the administration of the tax 
laws.604  But it does not follow that these considerations justify ignoring 
applicable precedent in the courts of appeals.  The courts of appeals are 
legally free to refuse to follow Tax Court precedents, and it thus can be 
concluded that Congress, although it may have regarded uniformity as 
desirable, did not view the Tax Court as the instrument for accomplishing 
this goal.  If it did, it would have provided for no review of Tax Court 
decisions (except possibly by the Supreme Court) or, less drastically, it 
would have provided review in only a single appellate court instead of 12 
                                                     
602  At the time Lawrence was decided, multiple appellate venues as to the same 
taxpayer could exist because different tax years were involved and the taxpayer filed 
returns for those years within different circuits.  However, under present law, 
appellate venue is based on the residence or principal place of business of the 
taxpayer at the time the petition to the Tax Court was filed. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1).  
Thus, it will be unusual for a single Tax Court case, involving a single taxpayer, to 
be appealable to more than one court of appeals.  Such a situation could arise if a 
single taxpayer files multiple petitions which are later consolidated in a single case, 
and the taxpayer was a resident in different circuits when the petitions were filed.  
Compare Fausner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1971-277, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1187, 
aff’d, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 413 U.S. 838 (1973) with Fausner v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971). 
603  If, for example, a single Tax Court case involves several shareholders of the 
same corporation who reside in different circuits, it might seem unfair for the Tax 
Court to treat the taxpayers differently depending on their residence.  Nevertheless, 
although it would be reasonable to reach a uniform result in such a case, it is 
believed that the sounder result would be to apply Golsen.  The uneven application 
of the law in such a case would be dramatic, but not essentially any more illogical 
than that reached in separate cases involving different taxpayers but the same issue. 
Compare Fausner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1971-277, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1187, 
aff’d, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 413 U.S. 838 (1973) with Fausner v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971) (applying different rules to the identical taxpayer 
on the basis of Golsen). 
604  See supra note 578. 
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courts of appeals.605  Moreover, even if it is accepted that uniformity is an 
important and congressionally desired goal, it cannot be said that the 
Lawrence rule did anything to further this end.  Lawrence did not and could 
not bind the courts of appeals to follow a uniform precedent espoused by 
the Tax Court.  Nothing was accomplished by the Tax Court’s adhering to 
its views except requiring the losing party in the Tax Court to take an 
appeal to achieve a more or less forgone result.  The Tax Court could 
exercise the same persuasive authority by deciding its cases in accordance 
with controlling precedent while at the same time expressing any 
reservations that it might have about the correctness of such precedent.  In 
fact, that is now the practice under Golsen.606 
It has been suggested that the decision in Golsen was a consequence of 
the Tax Court’s 1969 change in status from an independent agency of the 
executive branch to a court of record established under article I of the 
Constitution.607  In this view, prior to the 1969 changes the Tax Court saw 
its administrative role as preeminent and therefore strove to promote 
uniformity through the Lawrence rule; however, in Golsen, the court 
recognized its new judicial status and thereby subordinated its opinions to 
those of a reviewing court in the interest of efficient dispute adjudication.  
The fact that Golsen was announced less than a year after the 1969 legislative 
changes lends some support to this theory, and it is not unlikely that some 
Tax Court judges were led to their decision in Golsen by their heightened 
sensitivity to the Tax Court’s judicial role.  Nevertheless, since the effect of 
the 1969 Act on the function and powers of the court were minimal, it 
probably would be erroneous to place a great deal of emphasis on this 
explanation of Golsen.  Rather, the decision seems primarily explainable in 
terms of a recognition that, regardless of the benefits of uniform 
application of the tax laws, an adjudicative body must realistically take 
account of its power to achieve such a goal.  Even the Service, an 
administrative agency responsible for uniform administration of the tax 
laws, has recognized this fact in a ruling in which it states that it will follow 
precedent within a particular circuit even though it disagrees with the 
decision, while following a different rule in other areas of the country.608 
                                                     
605  An illustration of such a technique may be found in the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, under which judicial review of determinations of the Price 
Administrator could only be had in a single Emergency Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court.  Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(c)–(d), 56 Stat. 32. 
606  See Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 146, 148 (1972); Smith v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 260, 269–70 (1970), vacated and rem’d, 457 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
607  John J. Charles, Status of a Controversy: The Tax Court, the Courts of Appeals, and 
Judicial Review, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 164, 170 (1971). 
608  Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534 (dealing with the gift taxation 
consequences of political contributions).  The similarity of the ruling to Golsen was 
















                                                                                                                       
noted in RICHARD B. STEPHENS, GUY B. MAXFIELD & STEPHEN A. LIND, 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 9-5 n.21 (3d ed. 1974). 
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A persistent problem in the development of the Board/Tax Court has 
been the management of its heavy workload.  Its division structure and 
many of its procedures, such as pleadings and stipulations, have been 
shaped largely by the statutory directive that decisions “be made as quickly 
as practicable.”1  Soon after the creation of the Board, a controversy 
developed with regard to the use of personnel, other than members of the 
Board, to assist in the hearing and decision process.  In connection with the 
Revenue Act of 1928, the American Bar Association, concerned over the 
Board’s developing backlog of cases, recommended to Congress that 
special masters similar to those then employed in the Court of Claims be 
used to relieve the divisions of the necessity of taking evidence in cases in 
which lengthy evidentiary hearings would be likely.2  As part of their duties, 
the masters would prepare detailed findings of fact, thereby reducing the 
burden on the divisions.3 
Although the recommendation of the ABA was not incorporated into 
the provisions of the 1928 Revenue Act, renewed support for the use of 
such commissioners was advanced in the report of a joint committee of 
Board and Treasury personnel in 1937.4  The committee proposed that use 
of commissioners should be limited to cases that were likely to involve 
lengthy hearings and voluminous records.5  Although it was suggested that 
the broad language of the 1926 Act permitted the use of commissioners 
                                                     
1  I.R.C. § 7459(a). 
2  Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1928, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
70th Cong., 1st Sess. at 539–41 (1928) (statement of ABA) [hereinafter cited as 
1928 House Hearings]; see also Phillips, supra note 242; American Bar Association Tax 
Revision Recommendations, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 403 (1925). 
3  1928 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 540. 
4  Report of the Joint Committee of Board of Tax Appeals and Chief Counsel’s 
Office, Dec. 17, 1937, at 28, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Field Divisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report].  In 
the Joint Committee Report, the commissioner was referred to as an “examiner.” 
The purpose of such an examiner was to assist the Board in the taking of 
testimony, receiving other evidence and preparing proposed findings of fact. 
5  Id. 
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without the necessity of a statutory amendment,6 the committee felt 
otherwise and stated that legislation would be necessary to permit the 
Chairman of the Board to appoint, use, and remove such commissioners.7  
Subsequently, in the Revenue Act of 1943, the Tax Court’s Presiding Judge 
was given the authority to designate attorneys from the legal staff of the 
court to act as commissioners in particular cases.8  In response to the newly 
authorized power, the court promulgated a procedure under which the 
commissioner would conduct the hearing in accordance with the court’s 
rules of practice, the parties would have 30 days in which to file proposed 
findings of fact, and the commissioner would prepare and submit to the 
court or division a report of such findings with service made on both 
parties.9  The parties could then file exceptions to the commissioner’s 
findings within 20 days.10  Thus, the parties would have an opportunity to 
express views on the proposed findings of fact in advance of the issuance 
of the opinion, an opportunity that was not available in cases in which the 
hearing took place before a judge of the court.11 
The commissioner procedure was used sparingly in its infancy.12  In fact, 
the first designation of a commissioner occurred in 1948.13  In the resulting 
                                                     
6  See Memorandum from T.W.S. to Mr. Logan Morris, Member, Board of Tax 
Appeals, Apr. 5, 1937, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence.” 
7  See Joint Committee Report, supra note 4, at 28. 
8  Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 503(b), 58 Stat. 72, amending Int. Rev. Code of 
1939, ch. 5, § 1114, 53 Stat. 160.  Legislative history of the provision is found in 
H.R. REP. No. 78-871, at 71 (1943), and S. REP. No. 78-627, at 94 (1943).  The 
reports indicate that commissioners were to be attorneys from the legal staff of the 
court, designated to act in particular cases, by written order of the presiding judge.  
The Tax Court was given the power to promulgate rules for the use of 
commissioners. 
9  TAX CT. R. 48 (July 1, 1944 ed.).  A commissioner, in cases under the 1944 
Tax Court Rule 48 and present Rule 182, has no power to enter decision in a case.  
Germain v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 226 (1952). 
10 TAX CT. R. 48(c) (July 1, 1944 ed.). 
11 Compare TAX CT. R. 48(c) (July 1, 1944 ed.) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 5, 
§§ 1117(a)(b), 53 Stat. 162 (now codified at I.R.C. § 7459).  Eight years later, the 
Tax Court amended Rule 48, in an effort to streamline the exception procedure.  
Whereas earlier the parties had to file exceptions to the commissioner’s proposed 
findings of fact within 20 days of service, the court merged the filing of exceptions 
into the requirement of filing briefs.  TAX CT. R. 48(d) (Sept. 5, 1952 ed.).  The time 
for filing initial briefs, including exceptions to the proposed findings of fact, was 
later extended to 60 days.  TAX CT. R. 182(a) (Jan. 1, 1974 ed.). 
12 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Murdock to Judges of the Tax Court, 
Nov. 15, 1956, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & 
Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1956]; see also Edward N. Polisher, 
Tax Court Commissioners, 28 TAXES 413 (1950). 
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opinion, the court emphasized that only the findings of fact were the 
commissioner’s,14 and that the commissioner did not decide any of the legal 
issues involved.15 
The infrequent use of the commissioner procedure and the clear 
demarcation of the commissioner’s role were indicative of broader 
questions that faced the court:  Would the use of commissioners be 
beneficial to the status of the court in the long run, and would it be 
effective in reducing the amount of time spent by a judge in a particular 
case?  Diverging views with respect to these questions existed on the court.  
Most judges apparently opposed any substantial use of commissioners, and 
in practice, their view prevailed.16  However, others believed that the 
commissioner system should be expanded.  In their view, the opponents of 
the commissioner procedure had improperly placed too much emphasis on 
the quantitative results of each commissioner.  Rather, the important 
consideration was how much additional work a judge would be able to 
produce, freed from the burden of those cases assigned to commissioners 
for hearing and preparation of findings of fact.17 
Those opposed to the commissioner procedure argued that extensive 
use of the commissioners would not result in any substantial savings of time 
because the judges were still required to study the record to reach a decision 
and prepare an opinion.18  In this regard, critics also contended that a 
commissioner would not be able to convey accurately the “sense” of the 
witnesses to the judge charged with the writing of the opinion.19   
Additionally, the use of commissioners was viewed as not befitting a judicial 
tribunal, although this viewpoint ignored the fact that the court was not 
technically a full judicial body at the time and that the Court of Claims used 
commissioners extensively during this period.20  The opponents suggested 
that such a process might create an unfavorable public impression since 
those hearing the case would not be judges and might thereby prejudice the 
court’s efforts to be accepted as a judicial tribunal in fact if not in form.21  
Finally, they noted that the actual case production by the commissioners 
over a seven-year period from 1948 to 1955 had been slow, and that 
                                                                                                                       
13 The first case in which the court used a commissioner was decided in 1948.  
See Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 665 (1949). 
14 Id. at 672. 
15 Id. 
16 Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 24, 1959. 
17 Id. (remarks of Judge Fisher). 
18 See Murdock, 1956, supra note 12, at 5. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 4–5.     
21 Id. at 5. 
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reassignment of certain cases from the commissioners to the judges 
probably was necessary to dispose of them.22 
Contrary to the prevalent view on the court opposing extensive use of 
commissioners, the American Bar Association, in its 1957 proposal to 
remove the Tax Court from the executive to the judicial branch of 
Government, recommended a broad expansion in both the use and powers 
of the commissioners.23  Under the proposal, the Tax Court would be 
authorized to appoint not more than ten commissioners, who would be 
paid at the same rate as commissioners of the Court of Claims.24  In 
addition to reporting findings of fact, the commissioners also would make 
recommendations for conclusions of law and decisions.  The parties would 
have an opportunity to file exceptions to the findings and 
recommendations, and hearings would be provided by the court within a 
reasonable time.  If no exceptions were filed, the findings of fact and the 
conclusions of law and decisions would become the decisions of the court.  
Finally, the court would not be permitted to consider issues not raised by 
exception to the commissioners’ reports.25  These recommendations were 
incorporated unchanged as part of the proposed legislation, submitted to 
Congress in 1958 and 1959, to give the court article III status.26 
Although the court welcomed the move toward judicial status, it 
opposed the proposed statutory provisions concerning the procedures to be 
employed in proceedings before a commissioner.27  The court indicated that 
the proposed procedures, if employed, would result in both a fundamental 
alteration of the court’s nature and a disruption of its operations.28  For 
example, the requirement of a hearing provided “by the court,” if 
interpreted to mean review by the full court, would result in greater delays 
in rendering decision in a case.29  Moreover, the court would not be 
permitted to consider any issue of fact not raised by exception to the 
                                                     
22 Id. at 5–6. 
23 See Tax Court Act, Feb. 1957, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter cited as Tax Court Act].  For a 
discussion of the American Bar Association proposals in respect of article III status 
for the court, see Part IV.B.2.  
24 Tax Court Act, supra note 23, at 9. 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 Compare Tax Court Act, supra note 23, §§ 913, 2651 with S. 3796, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. §§ 913, 2651 (1958) and S. 1274, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 913, 2651 (1959). 
27 E.g., Letter from Chief Judge Murdock to Senator Eastland, July 17, 1959, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Letter 
from Judge Murdock to H. Kilpatrick, Jan. 22, 1957, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence.” 
28 Memorandum from Judge Train to Chief Judge Murdock, July 17, 1959, filed 
at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence” [hereinafter 
cited as Train]. 
29 Id. at 1. 
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commissioner’s report.  Such a format, the court concluded, would change 
the Tax Court from a trial court to a court of review.30  Rather, the court 
concluded, if it was considered necessary to include a provision with respect 
to proceedings before commissioners, the language of the then-present law 
should be retained.31  The ABA proposal for new court status and a change 
in the commissioner procedure was not enacted, and the procedures 
employed in proceedings before commissioners remained subject to court 
determination.32 
Although the commissioner system was proposed originally as a means 
of handling lengthy evidentiary cases, it emerged as an important aspect of 
Tax Court procedure in connection with small tax cases.33  The small tax 
case procedure was the result of congressional concern over the failure to 
provide a readily available means of impartial review of modest deficiency 
disputes.34  In response to this concern, the court, in 1968, adopted a 
procedure for small tax cases that provided for a simplified petition, early 
assignment to trial calendar, informal trial procedures and waiver of briefs.35  
However, Congress believed that the then-existing statutory provisions, 
with their requirement of technical rules of evidence, precluded such a 
procedure from achieving its greatest potential.36   Accordingly, the 1969 
                                                     
30 Id. Note that this argument later would be advanced (unsuccessfully) by the 
taxpayers in Freytag v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), as a basis for 
challenging the propriety of the assignment of their case to the special trial judge.  
See text accompanying infra notes 121–124.   
31 Letter from Chief Judge Murdock to Senator Eastland, July 17, 1959, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” Train, supra 
note 28. 
32 Compare TAX CT. R. 48 (Sept. 1, 1965 ed.) with TAX CT. R. 48 (Nov. 15, 1952 
ed.). 
33 I.R.C. § 7463. 
34 S. REP. No. 91-552, at 302 (1969). 
35 During the fall of 1968, the Tax Court “in recognition of the apparent 
demand for a procedure for handling small tax claims simply and expeditiously” 
drafted a separate set of rules to accomplish these objectives.  These new 
procedures became effective Jan. 1, 1969.  Memorandum from Chief Judge 
Drennen to Tax Court Judges, Nov. 26, 1968, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” see also Tax Court Conference 
Minutes, Nov. 1, 15, 29, 1968. 
36 At this time the Internal Revenue Code required that all proceedings begun in 
the Tax Court, irrespective of dollar amount, be conducted with equal formality.  
Laurence Goldfein and Michael I. Saltzman, The New Tax Court Small Claims 
Division: How It Will Operate, 34 J. TAX’N 2 (1971).  Section 7453 provides that every 
hearing must be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to 
trials without a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Section 7458 
requires every proceeding to be stenographically transcribed.  At the conclusion of 
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Tax Reform Act authorized a simplified and relatively informal procedure 
for deficiency disputes involving not more than $1,000.37   This amount has 
been periodically raised over time to $1,500, $5,000, $10,000, and, most 
recently, to $50,000.38   
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Tax Court to 
make extensive use of commissioners in small tax cases,39 and certain 
statutory modifications with respect to commissioners were designed to 
facilitate this objective.  Of importance in this regard was authorization for 
the court to appoint full-time commissioners who would be compensated at 
the same rate as commissioners of the Court of Claims.40  Prior to this 
statutory revision, the court had been authorized only to appoint an 
attorney from the legal staff of the court to act as a commissioner on a 
case-specific basis.    
Pursuant to the 1969 amendment, the court established a small tax case 
division under the supervision of a judge of the court.41  The majority of the 
                                                                                                                       
each of these proceedings the court is compelled to report all of its findings of fact, 
opinions and memorandum opinions.  I.R.C. § 7459(b). 
37 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 733 (enacting 
I.R.C. § 7463).  If neither the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute, nor the 
amount of any claimed overpayment exceeded $1,000 for any taxable year in the 
case of income and gift tax or $1,000 for estate tax, the taxpayer was given the 
option to request that the proceeding be conducted under a small case procedure.  
In addition, the Act provided that notwithstanding statutory limitations which 
require certain formal rules of evidence, publication, hearings, etc., the small case 
procedure would be conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence, practice 
and procedure as the Tax Court might prescribe. 
38 The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 increased the limit to 
$1,500. Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 203(b)(2), 86 Stat. 919, 945 (1972).  The Revenue Act 
of 1978 increased the jurisdictional amount to $5,000.  Pub. L. No. 95-600, 
§ 502(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2763, 2879 (1978).  The Tax Reform Act of 1984 increased the 
jurisdictional amount to $10,000.  Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 461 (a), 98 Stat. 494, 823.  
Lastly, Congress increased the ceiling amount on small tax cases to $50,000 as part 
of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.  Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, § 3103, 112 Stat. 685, 731 (1998). 
39 S. REP. No. 91-552, at 304 (1969). 
40 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 958, 83 Stat. 734.  In 1986, 
Congress set the compensation of special trial judges to equal 90 percent of the 
salary paid to a presidentially appointed judge of the court.  Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514. § 1556(a), 100 Stat. 2754 (adding I.R.C. § 7443A(d)(1)).     
41See Memorandum from the Ad Hoc Committee on Small Tax Cases to the 
Chief Judge, Apr. 2, 1970, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence,” wherein it was recommended that the Chief 
Judge assign one of the judges of the court as the judge in charge of such division. 
Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr. was designated as the first judge in charge of the 
Small Tax Case Division.  See Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970; 
General Order No. 2, U.S. Tax Court, Sept. 1, 1970.   
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small tax case sessions are assigned to special trial judges (the official 
designation since 198442) for hearing and the preparation of summary 
findings of fact and opinion.43  The report of the special trial judge is then 
submitted to the chief judge, or if the chief judge so directs, to a judge or 
division of the court for review.44  This review is conducted by the judge 
heading the small tax case division.  To expedite the resolution of small tax 
cases, which generally involve well-settled legal questions, such opinions 
generally are not subsequently reviewed by the chief judge if authored by a 
special trial judge.45           
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 authorized commissioners and 
later special trial judges to issue summary opinions in small tax cases, the 
commissioner/special trial judge lacked authority to enter the decision in 
such cases.46  Congress corrected this shortcoming in 1980, granting special 
trial judges the authority to make the decision of the court in small tax 
cases.47   
The small tax case procedure has proved to be remarkably popular with 
taxpayers who invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, the majority of whom 
chose to prosecute their cases on a self-represented basis.  Given the large 
number of small tax cases filed in the Tax Court, the small tax case 
procedure is detailed in Part XIII in connection with a discussion of the 
Tax Court’s institutional support for self-represented litigants.   
                                                     
42 In 1975, the court issued a General Order which provided that a 
“commissioner” should be referred to as a “special trial judge” except when in 
conflict with statute.  General Order No. 4, 65 T.C. IV (1975).  The Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 changed the statutory designation of a “commissioner” to “special trial 
judge.”  Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 464, 98 Stat. 494, 824–25. 
43 In more recent years, as the number of special trial judges has declined and 
the number of cases being tried under the small tax case procedures has increased 
(due in large part to the increase in the limitation on the amount in controversy), 
judges of the court have presided over a substantial share of small tax cases.   
44 The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that a special trial 
judge presiding over trial of a small tax case shall “prepare a summary of the facts 
and reasons for the proposed disposition of the case” as soon as practicable after 
trial.  TAX CT. R. 182(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  The summary opinion is to be submitted 
to the chief judge, or if the chief judge so directs, to a judge or division of the 
court.  Id.     
45 Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970. 
46 See Memorandum from the Ad Hoc Committee on Small Tax Cases to the 
Chief Judge, Apr. 2, 1970, at 3 n.6, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970.  
The language of § 7463, as then in effect, permitted a brief summary of reasons to 
satisfy the requirements of a decision as defined in § 7459(b).  However, Congress 
made no change to § 7459(a), which required that such a decision be made by a 
judge.   
47 Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 105(a)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 194, 218 (1980). 
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B. Early Expansion in Use of Special Trial Judges 
 
Rules promulgated by the Tax Court following the 1969 Act generally 
retained the pre-existing limitations on the authority of special trial judges.  
Thus, except in small tax cases, special trial judges were authorized only to 
prepare findings of fact and were not authorized to prepare an opinion in 
the case.48  Reports containing the special trial judge’s findings of fact were 
submitted for review to the chief judge or a judge designated by the chief 
judge.  The report of a special trial judge thus differed significantly from a 
judge’s report, which usually contains both findings of fact and opinion.   
Prior to the 1974 revision of the Tax Court Rule of Practice and 
Procedure, special trial judge reports were served on the parties.49  After 
service of the reports, the parties had a limited time in which to file 
exceptions to the proposed findings of fact, in advance of the issuance of 
an opinion.50  Upon receiving any exceptions filed by the parties, the judge 
was authorized to direct the parties to file additional briefs or order that an 
oral argument be held so as to better enable the judge to determine whether 
the special trial judge’s report should be adopted, rejected, or modified.51 
The Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure were revised in 1974 
to expand the special trial judges’ function to include preparation of 
proposed opinions.52  However, the procedures for filing exceptions to the 
reports of special trial judges53 were elaborate and could unnecessarily 
consume judicial resources.  Accordingly, in 1976, the Tax Court further 
expanded the use of special trial judges.54  From the inception of the small 
tax case procedure, special trial judges had been authorized to prepare a 
preliminary findings of fact and opinion in a report submitted for review 
directly to the judge in charge of the small tax case division.55  As a result, 
the managerial capabilities of special trial judges in small tax cases were not 
hampered by the procedures for parties filing exceptions to their reports 
which applied in other cases.  Recognizing that the procedures for objecting 
to the special trial judge reports could adversely affect the efficient 
disposition of regular cases involving small amounts of tax, the court 
authorized the submission of cases involving deficiencies of $2,500 or less 
to special trial judges; the reports prepared in these cases were submitted 
                                                     
48 TAX CT. R. 48 (Jan. 25, 1971 ed.). 
49 See TAX CT. R. 48 (Sept. 1, 1965 ed.).   
50 Id. 
51 Id.. 
52 See Former TAX CT. R. 182(b), 60 T.C. 1149 (1973). 
53 See Former TAX CT. R. 182(c), 60 T.C. 1149 (1973). 
54 General Order No. 5, 67 T.C. XXI (1976). 
55 See Part XIII.A., text accompanying notes 8–14.   
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directly to the chief judge, or to a judge designated by him.56  By providing 
for submission of special trial judge reports in such cases directly to the 
chief judge or a judge designated by him, the court eliminated the 
unnecessary restraints on judicial time and attention that could arise if one 
or both parties objected to the report of a special trial judge in a case 
involving a small amount of tax.  Moreover, by eliminating the time 
consuming procedures in cases not exceeding the $2,500 limitation, the 
authority of special trial judges was made consistent in cases involving small 
amounts of tax, regardless of whether the case was conducted under the 
small tax case procedure.  In cases involving amounts exceeding the $2,500 
limitation, however, the procedures for service on the parties and for filing 
party exceptions continued to apply. 
The 1976 changes in the Tax Court’s use of special trial judges served as 
the foundation for current § 7443A(b)(3), which permits the chief judge to 
assign to a special trial judge any case in which the deficiency placed in 
dispute does not exceed $50,000.  Accordingly, all cases concerning a 
statutorily determined small amount of tax—regardless of whether the 
taxpayer elects the small tax case procedures of § 7463—may be heard by a 
special trial judge.  In cases in which the taxpayer does not proceed under 
§ 7463, the special trial judge submits the report in the case to the chief 
judge (as opposed to the head of the small tax case division) for review.57   
 
C. Authority to Make Decisions in Certain Cases 
 
In the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982,58 Congress provided that 
special trial judges could make the decision of the court in any declaratory 
judgment case,59 small tax case, or any other case in which the amount in 
dispute did not exceed the jurisdictional limit applicable to small tax cases.  
The Tax Court rules make it clear that a special trial judge may make the 
decision in the case even if it does not go to trial.60  Moreover, as a result of 
the 1982 legislation, special trial judges have the authority to render “bench 
decisions” in those cases, other than declaratory judgment proceedings, in 
which they have decision-making authority and in which the facts and law 
                                                     
56 General Order No. 5, 67 T.C. XXII (1976).  It is not clear why the court 
chose the $2,500 amount. 
57 TAX CT. R. 182(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
58 Pub. L. No. 97-362, § l06(c)(1), 96 Stat. 1726, 1730 (adding I.R.C. § 7456(d) 
(1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7443A(c)). 
59 In the Revenue Act of 1978, Congress provided that, subject to the discretion 
of the Tax Court, special trial judges could make the decisions of the court in 
declaratory judgment proceedings.  Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 336(b)(1), 92 Stat. 2763, 
2841–42 (1978); former Tax Ct. R. 218, 68 T.C. 1051 (1977). 
60 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 182, 85 T.C. 1138 (1985). 
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are clear.61  The difference between authority to make a “decision” and the 
authority to make a “report” is significant, because the decision authority 
more directly involves the application of judicial power.62  
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984,63 Congress clarified that the authority of 
special trial judges to preside over a case extends to any proceeding to 
which they are assigned by the chief judge.  However, except to the extent 
specifically authorized by statute, special trial judges were not authorized by 
Congress to make a decision of the court.  Hence, in those cases in which 
the special trial judge could not enter the decision, the special trial judge was 
required to submit a report containing findings of fact and opinion to the 
chief judge, who would then assign the case to a division of the court for 
disposition.64   
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress moved the 
jurisdictional limits of special trial judges from § 7456(d) to its current 
location in § 7743A(b).65  At that time, the chief judge of the court was 
permitted to assign to a special trial judge any declaratory judgment 
proceeding, any proceeding governed by the small tax case procedures of 
§ 7463, any proceeding in which the amount in dispute did not exceed the 
jurisdictional limits of the small tax proceedings, and “any other proceeding 
which the chief judge may designate.”66  When the catch-all category was 
added in as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,67 Congress also enacted 
the predecessor of §7443A(c), authorizing the special trial judge to enter 
decision in any case assigned to him other than cases assigned under the 
catch-all category.  For those cases, a decision on behalf of the court had to 
                                                     
61 See TAX CT. R. 152, 79 T.C. 1147–48 (1982); TAX CT. R. 182(a)–(b), 81 T.C. 
1068 (1983), 82 T.C. 1073 (1984), 85 T.C. 1138 (1985); Tax Ct. R. 182(b), (c) (July 
6, 2012 ed.); see also Part XI.D., addressing the Tax Court’s authority to issue bench 
decisions.   
62 See I.R.C. § 7459. 
63 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 463(a), 98 Stat. 494, 824 (1984) (amending I.R.C. 
§ 7456(d)(1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1986))). 
64 TAX CT. R. 183(b), 81 T.C. 1068 (1983).  The division to which the case was 
assigned could modify or reject the report.  TAX CT. R. 183(c), 81 T.C. at 1068. 
However, at the time, service of the special trial judge’s report was not required to 
be made on the parties, and the parties did not have a right to further brief the case.  
TAX CT. R. 183(a), (c), 81 T.C. at 1068.  The division could, in addition to directing 
the filing of additional briefs, receive further evidence, direct oral argument, or 
recommit the report to the special trial judge with instructions.  TAX CT. R. 183(c), 
81 T.C. at 1068.  The provisions for reviewing reports of special trial judges have 
since been significantly modified.  The development of the Tax Court’s  procedures 
for reviewing reports of special trial judges is discussed below in Section D of this 
Part.  
65 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1556(a), 100 Stat. 2754 (1986).   
66 I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(1)–(4) (as enacted in 1986).   
67 Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 463(a), 464(b), 98 Stat. 494, 824.  
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be entered by a presidentially appointed judge of the court.   
Whether the text of the § 7443A(b)(4) catch-all category meant what it 
actually said—that is, that the chief judge of the Tax Court could assign any 
proceeding to special trial judge for hearing and preparation of a 
preliminary report, provided the decision in the case is entered by a 
presidentially appointed Tax Court judge—was challenged by the taxpayers 
in First Western Securities Inc. v. Commissioner.68  This case emanated the same 
straddle investment strategy that served as the subject of the Freytag 
litigation previously analyzed in Part V.  Stressing the complexity of the 
underlying case at hand, the taxpayers in First Western contended § 
7443A(b)(4) did not permit the assignment of a case involving complex 
financial transactions with deficiencies measured in the billions at stake to a 
special trial judge.  Conceding that the text of § 7443A(b)(4), interpreted 
literally, did not impose any limitations on the cases that could be assigned 
to a special trial judge pursuant to that provision, the taxpayers claimed that 
§ 7443A(b)(4), interpreted in context, was limited to the sort of cases 
enumerated in the preceding provisions of § 7443A(b)(1)-(3) of the statute 
(which generally concerned cases involving declaratory judgments or 
relatively minor deficiencies).69  The taxpayers relied principally on the 
Supreme Court’s then recent decision in Gomez v. United States70 to support 
their narrow interpretation of the statute.  The Court in Gomez addressed 
the scope of a provision in the Federal Magistrates Act permitting 
magistrates to be assigned “such additional duties as are not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States,”71 a provision that 
preceded a list of specific delegable duties.  Specifically, the Court examined 
whether the general grant of authority permitted a magistrate to conduct 
juror voir dire in a criminal case.  The Supreme Court found the general 
grant of authority insufficient for this purpose.  Instead, the Court 
explained that the specific list of delegable duties “outline[d] the attributes 
of the office,” and that additional duties encompassed by a general grant of 
                                                     
68 94 T.C. 549 (1990).   
69 During the relevant period, § 7443A(b) provided as follows: 
(b) Proceedings which may be assigned to special trial judges.—The chief 
judge may assign— 
   (1)  any declaratory judgment proceeding,  
   (2)  any proceeding under section 7463,  
   (3)  any proceeding where neither the amount of the deficiency placed in 
dispute . . . nor the amount of any claimed overpayment exceeds $10,000, 
and  
   (4)  any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate,  
to be heard by the special trial Judge of the court. 
70 490 U.S. 858 (1989).   
71 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).   
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authority “reasonably should bear some relation to the specified duties.”72  
Given the Court’s contextual interpretation of the Magistrate’s Act in 
Gomez, the taxpayers’ statutory argument in First Western was not as specious 
as it appeared at first glance.   
The Tax Court in First Western rejected the taxpayers’ interpretation of 
§ 7443A(b)(4) as not only inconsistent with the literal text of the provision 
but also with congressional intent.  The court grounded its explanation in 
the broader legislative change concerning the authority of special trial 
judges in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.  The legislative history 
accompanying the statutory change described the genesis for the 
amendment and its effect as follows: 
 
Reasons for Change 
 
The committee wishes to clarify that additional proceedings may 
be assigned to [Special Trial Judges] so long as a Tax Court judge 
must enter the decision. 
 
Explanation of Provision 
 
A technical change is made to allow the Chief Judge of the Tax 
Court to assign any proceeding to a special trial judge for hearing and 
to write proposed opinions, subject to the review and final decision 
by a Tax Court judge, regardless of the amount in issue.  However, 
special trial judges will not be authorized to enter decisions in the 
latter category of cases.73   
 
Accordingly, in contrast to the statute at issue in Gomez, the Tax Court 
recognized that Congress did not intend § 7443A(b)(4) to provide an 
overarching general grant of authority that rounded out the specific 
delegations of authority under § 7443A(b)(1)-(3).  Instead, Congress 
intended § 7443A(b)(4) to supply an independent source of authority 
concerning cases that could be assigned to special trial judges subject to a 
separate procedural regime—namely, the requirement that the decision in 
the assigned case be entered by a presidentially appointed judge of the 
court.  Accordingly, no context was to be gleaned by reference to 
§ 7443A(b)(1)–(3), leaving assignment of the case permissible pursuant to 
                                                     
72 Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864.   
73 H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1568 (1984) (quoted in First Western, 94 T.C. at 
555).  The legislation therefore amended § 7443A(c), precluding the special trial 
judges from entering a decision in cases assigned to them pursuant to 
§ 7443A(b)(4).   
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the terms of § 7443A(b)(4).74  The Tax Court’s rejection of the taxpayer’s 
narrow interpretation of § 7443A(b)(4) was repeated in similar terms by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case,75 as well as by the Supreme 
Court in resolving the related case of Freytag v. Commissioner.76 
The range of cases that may be assigned by the chief judge to a special 
trial judge for hearing and decision has expanded over the years, beyond the 
expansion in the scope of cases that may be tried by a special trial judge 
under the small tax case procedures of § 7463.  In 1998, Congress 
authorized special trial judges to hear and issue a decision in any review of a 
collection due process determination pursuant to § 6330(d).77  Most 
recently, in 2006, Congress authorized special trial judges to hear and decide 
an appeal of an adverse whistleblower award determination pursuant to 
§ 7326(b)(4).78  Following these expansions of the authority, the catch-all 
category of cases over which a special trial judge may preside but not make 
the decision of the court has been redesignated as § 7443A(b)(7).   
 
D. Review of Special Trial Judge Reports 
 
Prior to 1983, Tax Court Rule 182 provided the procedural guidelines 
governing the Tax Court’s review of reports submitted by special trial 
judges.79  The prior post-trial procedure for cases tried before a special trial 
judge (then referred to as a commissioner), housed in Tax Court Rule 182, 
provided for a copy of the commissioner’s report, containing proposed 
findings of fact and opinion, to be served the parties.80  The procedures 
                                                     
74 See First Western, 94 T.C. at 555–56.  As later explained by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the taxpayers in First Western attempted to use the legislative 
history accompanying § 7443A(b)(4) to their advantage, noting that Congress 
characterized the addition of the provision as a “technical change.”    The argument 
was that a mere technical change would not have permitted a special trial judge to 
hear any type of case the chief judge of the court determined to assign, with the 
discretion of the chief judge serving as the sole limitation.  See Samuels, Kramer & 
Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 982 (2d Cir. 1991).  The Supreme Court in 
Freytag ultimately dispensed with this argument on its terms, noting that Congress 
regarded the amendment as technical only because it confirmed the Tax Court’s 
longstanding use of commissioners as evidentiary referees.  See Freytag v. 
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 875 (1991).   
75 See Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 979–82 (2d Cir. 
1991).    
76 501 U.S. 868, 873–77 (1991). 
77 Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3401(c)(1), 112 Stat. 731, 749 (adding current I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(4)).   
78 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(2), 
120 Stat. 2959 (adding current I.R.C. § 7443(b)(6)).   
79 TAX CT. R. 182, 60 T.C. 1149 (1973).   
80 TAX CT. R. 182(b), 60 T.C. 1149 (1973).  
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afforded the parties an opportunity to file exceptions to the commissioner’s 
report, and the reviewing judge could schedule oral argument on those 
exceptions in the judge’s discretion.  The reviewing judge thereafter 
possessed a number of options concerning action on the commissioner’s 
report.  The judge could (a) adopt the report in full, (b) modify the report 
or reject the report in whole or in part, (c) receive additional evidence from 
the parties, or (d) recommit the report to the commissioner with 
instructions.81  The procedures required the reviewing judge to afford a 
degree of deference to the commissioner’s factual findings, as reflected in 
the closing sentence in Rule 182: 
 
Due regard shall be given to the circumstance that the 
commissioner had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses; and the findings of fact recommended by the 
commissioner shall be presumed to be correct.82 
 
The explanatory note to Rule 182 provided that the rule was intended to 
align the Tax Court’s procedures in this setting with those of the Court of 
Claims, and the note specifically referenced Court of Claims Rule 147(b) 
(which served as a practical verbatim template for Rule 182) with respect to 
the “special weight” to be accorded the findings of the commissioner who 
heard the case.83   
The degree of deference with which the Tax Court judge responsible for 
entering the decision in the case was to review the findings of the 
commissioner under Rule 182(d) proved to be a central issue in Rosenbaum v. 
Commissioner.84  There, the reviewing judge noted that he had given “due 
regard” to the circumstance that the special trial judge had the opportunity 
to see and evaluation the credibility of the witnesses.  Nevertheless, the 
judge reversed certain findings of the special trial judge, explaining that the 
presumption of correctness “does not impair nor dilute our duty of bearing 
the ultimate responsibility for determining matters before us.”85   
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Stone v. Commissioner86 
reversed and remanded the case based on the level of deference the 
reviewing Tax Court judge accorded the findings of the hearing officer.  
Describing the level of deference employed by the reviewing Tax Court 
judge as “somewhere between de novo review and a mild presumption in 
favor of correctness,” the court explained that Rule 182(d) required a 
                                                     
81 TAX CT. R. 182(d), 60 T.C. 1150 (1973).  
82 Id.   
83 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 182(d), 60 T.C. 1150 (1973).      
84 T.C. Memo. 1983-113, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 825.   
85 Id. at 827.   
86 865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
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“relatively high level of deference” embodied in clearly erroneous review.87 
 The D.C. Circuit based its decision on Rule 182(d)’s emulation of Court 
of Claims Rule 147(b).  At the time of Rule 182’s adoption, the Court of 
Claims reviewed the credibility determinations of its hearing officers under 
a clearly erroneous standard.88  While the court explained that the Tax 
Court was free to establish a different set of rules to govern the relation 
between it and its special trial judges, the court determined that the Tax 
Court, in adopting Rule 182(d), had chosen language with a well-established 
meaning that it could not later disavow.89   
The Tax Court significantly modified the post-trial procedures 
governing cases referred to special trial judges for trial but not for final 
decision in 1983.  The amended procedures, moved to Tax Court Rule 
183,90 no longer required a copy of the special trial judge’s report to be 
                                                     
87 Id. at 344.   
88 Id. at 345 (citing Elmers v. United States, 172 Ct. Cl. 226 (1965)).   
89 Id. at 347.  The D.C. Circuit concluded its analysis with the following:   
If a simple preponderance of the evidence—half plus a little bit—suffices to 
overturn the factual findings of a Special Trial Judge, then it is difficult to 
see what value or force attaches to the presumptive correctness of that 
judge’s factual determinations, much less the “due regard” owed “to the 
circumstance that the [Special Trial Judge] had the opportunity to evaluate 
the credibility of the witnesses.” 
Id.  
90 81 T.C. 1069 (1983).  Rule 183, as amended in 1983, is reproduced below:   
Rule 183.  Cases Involving More 
Than $5,000 
  Except in cases subject to the provisions of Ru1e 182 or as otherwise 
provided, the following procedure shall be observed in cases tried before a 
Special Trial Judge: 
  (a) Trial and Briefs:  A Special Trial Judge shall conduct the trial of any 
such case assigned to him for such purpose.  After such trial, the parties 
shall submit their briefs in accordance with the provisions of Rule 151.  
Unless otherwise directed, no further briefs shall be filed.  
  (b)  Special Trial Judge’s Report:  After all the briefs have been filed by 
all the parties or the time for doing so has expired, the Special Trial Judge 
shall submit his report, including his findings of fact and opinion, to the 
Chief Judge, and the Chief Judge will assign the case to a Division of the 
Court.  
  (c)  Action on the Report:  The Division to which the case is assigned 
may adopt the Special Trial Judge’s report or may modify it or may reject it 
in whole or in part, or may direct the filing of additional briefs or may 
receive further evidence or may direct oral argument, or may recommit the 
report with instructions.  Due regard shall be given to the circumstance that 
the Special Trial Judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the 
witnesses, and the findings of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge 
shall be presumed to be correct.   
838           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
served on the parties.  Additionally, the amended procedures eliminated the 
round of briefing following submission of the special trial judge’s report 
that permitted the parties to record their objections thereto.  Instead, Rule 
183(b) simply required the special trial judge to submit a report containing 
the judge’s proposed findings of fact and opinion to the chief judge of the 
Tax Court, who would in turn assign the case to a judge of the court for 
disposition.  However, the options available to the reviewing judge under 
the streamlined procedures remained largely the same.  The reviewing judge 
could adopt the report, reject or modify the report in whole or in part, 
direct the filing of additional briefs, receive additional evidence, schedule 
oral argument, or recommit the report to the special trial judge with 
instructions.  Importantly, the reviewing Tax Court judge remained 
obligated under Rule 183(c) to afford “due regard” to the circumstance that 
the special trial judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the 
witnesses, and the factual findings of the special trial judge continued to 
enjoy a presumption of correctness.  
The explanatory note that accompanied the Tax Court’s changes to 
these procedures did not provide a rationale for the court’s movement to 
the streamlined approach.  Years later, in its briefing before the Supreme 
Court in Ballard v. Commissioner,91 the Commissioner suggested that the Tax 
Court eliminated the disclosure of the special trial judge’s report and the 
round of briefing that followed out of a desire to expedite the resolution of 
cases.  The Commissioner cited statements made by Chief Judge 
Tannenwald in 1983 warning of an increased number of tax shelter and tax 
protestor cases attributable to newly enacted provisions of the Code, 92 a 
prediction that later was borne out in the Tax Court’s docket. 93  
Additionally, the modification of the Tax Court’s rules in this context were 
consistent with modifications the court made in 1976 to its procedures 
governing cases that fell outside of the small tax case category but involved 
deficiencies less than $2,500.  The court eliminated the requirement that the 
parties receive the special trial judge’s report with an opportunity to object 
in this setting, explaining that the change was made “to dispose of pending 
cases more promptly and efficiently.”94  
                                                     
91 544 U.S. 40 (2005).  The Ballard litigation is analyzed below in Section E of 
this Part.   
92 Brief for Respondent at 35, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005) 
(citing Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1984:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. pt. 4, at 8 (1983)).   
93 Id. (citing Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1987:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 4, at 355, 380 (1986)).    
94 Tax Ct. General Order No. 5, at 1 (Oct. 1, 1976) (cited in Brief for 
Respondent, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005), at 36).  For a discussion 
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The Tax Court’s burgeoning docket during the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s suggests that similar considerations of expediency motivated the 
court to adopt the streamlined Rule 183 procedures in 1983.  The court’s 
docket increased from approximately 12,000 pending cases in fiscal year 
1970, to 35,000 in 1980, and to more than 58,000 in 1983.  Approximately 
34,000 new cases were filed in fiscal year 1983 alone.  Making matters more 
pressing, the court was forced to cancel all trial calendars in the spring of 
1982 due to appropriations issues.  The court therefore was faced with an 
increasing backlog of cases.  Many of the cases filed during this period 
involved complex tax shelters that had been assigned to special trial judges 
and were subject to the former Rule 182 adoption procedures.  In response 
to the influx of cases, the chief judge significantly increased the number of 
special trial judges, from 7 to 17.  The decision to no longer serve the 
special trial judge’s report on the parties and to eliminate the extra round of 
briefing on such report reflected in Rule 183 is best understood as an 
additional measure taken by the court to promote the expeditious 
disposition of the cases before it.95   
The Tax Court’s practice of reviewing the reports of special trial judges 
came under examination in the cases of Freytag v. Commissioner96 and Ballard 
v. Commissioner,97 both of which are discussed extensively below.98  The 
Supreme Court in Ballard concluded that the Tax Court had adopted a 
practice of “quasi-collaborative” judicial deliberation between the special 
trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court judge under Rule 183, one through 
which the Tax Court treated the initial report submitted by the special trial 
judge as an “in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular 
judge and the special trial judge.”99  The Supreme Court in Ballard 
determined this “novel” and “anomalous” practice to represent an 
unreasonable interpretation of Rule 183.100  The Supreme Court determined 
that the rule instead required the initial (but later withdrawn) report 
submitted by the special trial judge to the chief judge to be included in the 
                                                                                                                       
of the expansion in the authority of special trial judges occasioned by the 1976 
alteration of the Tax Court’s procedures, see text accompanying supra notes 54–56.   
95 In a speech before the American Bar Association Section of Taxation Court 
Procedure Committee following the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ballard v. Commissioner (discussed below in Section E), Chief Judge Gerber of the 
Tax Court described the motivation for the rule change in these terms, describing 
the Tax Court’s desire to avoid the previously cumbersome Rule 182 procedures in 
the face of a burgeoning caseload.  See Chief Judge Joel Gerber, Speech to ABA 
Tax Section Court Procedure Committee, at 1–2 (Sept. 16, 2005).     
96 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
97 544 U.S. 40 (2005).     
98 See Section E of this Part.   
99 Id. at 57.   
100 Id. at 57, 59–62.   
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appellate record.101     
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard, the Tax Court 
amended Rules 182 and 183 in 2005.102  The 2005 amendments reinstated 
the procedure of serving the parties with the report of the special trial judge 
pursuant to Rule 183(b), and the parties once again were provided the 
opportunity to submit written objections to the findings and conclusions 
contained in the special trial judge’s report pursuant to Rule 183(c).  
However, the stated level of deference to the special trial judge’s findings 
remained unchanged.  Newly designated Rule 183(d) continues to provide 
that “due regard” is to be given to the circumstance that the special trial 
judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and 
that the special trial judge’s findings of fact are to be presumed correct.103   
 Additionally, the 2005 revision of the Tax Court rules also added a 
paragraph to Rule 182 which addresses cases in which the special trial judge 
is statutorily authorized to make the decision of the court.  Pursuant to Rule 
182(e), if the chief judge decides to assign any such case (other than a small 
tax case) to a presidentially appointed judge of the court to prepare the 
opinion and make the decision, the court would follow the procedures set 
forth in Rule 183.104  Hence, the proposed findings of fact and opinion 
prepared by the special trial judge in such instances would be filed as the 
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special trial 
judge as contemplated by Rule 183(b).105  The 2005 modifications of Tax 
Court Rules 182 and 183 were intended to align the Tax Court’s practice in 
this area with the procedures employed by Federal district courts to review 
the findings and recommendations of a Magistrate Judge.106   
 
E. Examining the Tax Court’s Procedures for Reviewing Special Trial 
Judge Reports:  The Saga of Ballard v. Commissioner 
 
The Tax Court’s procedures for reviewing reports submitted by special 
trial judges in cases requiring final decision to be entered by a presidentially 
appointed judge of the Tax Court have been the subject of considerable 
controversy.  The controversy emanated from the Tax Court’s 1983 
decision to modify its procedural rules to no longer provide litigants with a 
copy of the special trial judge’s report as it was assigned to the reviewing 
                                                     
101  Id. at 52.   
102  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 183, 125 T.C. 343–47 (2005). 
103  Newly designated Rule 183(d) added one element not included in its pre-
1983 predecessor:  the requirement that the reviewing judge’s action on the special 
trial judge’s report be separately noted by appropriate order or in the judge’s report.   
104  TAX CT. R. 182(e), 125 T.C. 342 (2005). 
105  Id.   
106  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 183, 125 T.C. 345–46 (2005).       
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Tax Court judge.107  Despite the absence of the special trial judge’s report in 
the case record, the modified procedures continued to obligate the 
reviewing judge to afford deference to the factual determinations made by 
the special trial judge in the undisclosed report.  The manner in which the 
Tax Court reviewed special trial judge reports under this framework 
culminated in the Supreme Court decision in Ballard v. Commissioner.108 
 The Ballard litigation concerned the Commissioner’s assertion of income 
tax deficiencies and a civil tax fraud penalty against two real estate 
executives and a prominent tax attorney.  The case centered on allegations 
that these three individuals participated in a kickback scheme that generated 
income the parties failed to report.  Several years after a lengthy trial, the 
Tax Court issued an opinion that adopted the opinion of the special trial 
judge who had presided over trial of the case.  The adopted opinion 
represented a considerable victory for the Commissioner, as it upheld the 
Commissioner’s deficiency determinations and sustained the imposition of 
the civil fraud penalty.  However, counsel for one of the taxpayers had 
reason to believe that the special trial judge had, at some prior stage, drafted 
an opinion in favor of the taxpayers—not only on the issue of civil tax 
fraud, but on the majority of the underlying deficiency determinations as 
well.  The taxpayers in the case therefore sought disclosure of what they 
referred to as the special trial judge’s original report.  The Tax Court 
declined, stating that the taxpayers had been provided the special trial 
judge’s only report in the case—the one that was adopted by the reviewing 
judge.  Orders issued by the Tax Court in response to the taxpayers’ 
motions appeared to acknowledge the existence of prior drafts of the 
special trial judge’s report, but the court refused to disclose any such draft 
on grounds that disclosure would represent an intrusion into its internal 
deliberative process.   The dispute between the taxpayers and the Tax Court 
therefore appeared to turn on a definitional matter—that is, what document 
constituted the report of the special trial judge. 
 All three taxpayers in the Ballard litigation appealed the decision against 
them to the Court of Appeals for the circuit in which they resided.  In 
addition to contesting the decision on the merits, the taxpayers sought an 
order compelling the Tax Court to release the purported original report of 
the special trial judge.  After the Circuit Courts of Appeals declined to do 
so, two of the taxpayers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari on the disclosure issue alone.  Specifically, the taxpayers 
contended that the alleged practice of the reviewing Tax Court judge 
working with the special trial judge to modify the special trial judge’s initial 
                                                     
107  The Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure governing review of a 
report submitted by a special trial judge, including the 1983 revisions to such rules, 
are discussed above in Section D of this Part.     
108  544 U.S. 40 (2005).   
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report in the case—to yield a final report that the reviewing Tax Court 
judge then would adopt in full—violated the taxpayers’ due process rights 
as well as the statute governing appellate review of Tax Court decisions.  
 Notwithstanding the universal rejection of these claims at the Circuit 
Court level, the Supreme Court granted the taxpayers’ certiorari petition.  In 
its opinion in Ballard, the Supreme Court examined the assumed but 
unconfirmed practice of Tax Court judges working with special trial judges 
on the content of the final report to be issued by the special trial judge.  
The Court held that the Tax Court could not exclude from the record on 
appeal the special trial judge’s report as it was first conveyed to the chief 
judge of the court for assignment.  While the result of the case may have 
been predicted given the circumstances leading up to the grant of certiorari, 
the rationale for the Court’s decision was somewhat surprising.  The Court 
did not rule in favor of the taxpayers on the constitutional or statutory 
grounds raised by the parties in their certiorari petitions; rather, the Court 
determined that the Tax Court failed to follow its published procedures 
governing the case.  
 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard, the Tax Court 
released the original report issued by the special trial judge, a report that the 
special trial judge had withdrawn prior to any official action being taken 
upon it by the reviewing Tax Court judge.  As previously claimed by the 
taxpayers, this report had determined that the taxpayers were not liable for 
the majority of the asserted income tax deficiencies, much less the civil 
fraud penalty.  The release of this report ultimately led to decisions in favor 
of the taxpayers on the merits. 
 The Ballard litigation represents one of the more challenging chapters in 
the Tax Court’s history.  In addition to the Supreme Court’s determination 
that the Tax Court had failed to adhere to its procedural rules governing the 
case, fallout from the release of the special trial judge’s original but later 
withdrawn report in the case led some to question the Tax Court’s integrity.  
Even though the Tax Court has since amended the procedural rule that 
spawned the Ballard litigation,109 the story of the Ballard litigation warrants 
expanded discussion given the effect of the case on public perception of the 
court.110  In doing so, this Section endeavors to convey the story from a 
chronologically accurate standpoint, recounting factual aspects of the 
proceedings as they became publicly available.   
                                                     
109  See text accompanying supra notes 102–106.   
110 The proceedings in the Ballard litigation and the conduct of the Tax Court 
therein received extensive coverage in tax-related periodicals.  Coverage of the Tax 
Court’s procedures in the case even spilled into the popular press.  See, e.g., Louise 
Story, A Glimpse Inside U.S. Tax Court and How It Made a Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 
23, 2005, at C4; Maurice Possley, Tax Court Case Stirs Multiple Questions: Request for 
Judge’s Trial Findings Rebuffed, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2005, at C1.   
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 In many respects, the central dispute in the Ballard litigation was 
foreshadowed in the Supreme Court case of Freytag v. Commissioner.111  
Although Freytag is most noted for its determination that the appointment 
of special trial judges does not contravene the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution,112 the taxpayer’s statutory argument in Freytag turned on the 
extent of the Tax Court’s review of the special trial judge’s report.  The 
Supreme Court managed to sidestep the procedural issues in Freytag, but the 
case highlighted shortcomings in the Tax Court’s procedures in this 
setting—shortcomings the Tax Court failed to address at the time.  The 
often overlooked procedural aspect of Freytag provides a critical backdrop 
to the Ballard litigation.    
 
1. Analysis of Rule 183 Procedures in Freytag v. Commissioner 
 
The Tax Court’s modified procedures under Rule 183 for reviewing the 
reports of special trial judges first were examined in litigation that 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag v. Commissioner.113  
Because the particulars of the Tax Court’s review of the special trial judge’s 
report proved central to this aspect of the case, they are recounted below. 
 
a.  Developments at the Tax Court 
 
The Freytag litigation concerned ten test cases relating to a tax shelter 
based on straddle derivative transactions that were consolidated for 
discovery, briefing, trial, and decision.  Trial of the cases began before Judge 
Richard C. Wilbur in November of 1984, but the trial was periodically 
postponed on account of Judge Wilbur’s illness.  In November of 1985, 
Chief Judge Samuel Sterrett of the Tax Court assigned Special Trial Judge 
Carlton D. Powell to preside over the trial as an evidentiary referee.  The 
proceedings were videotaped for the benefit of Judge Wilbur, permitting 
him to observe the proceedings from his home.  At this point in the case, 
Judge Wilbur anticipated that he would prepare his factual findings and 
opinion in the case when he recovered.  However, Judge Wilbur’s 
continued illness eventually forced him to retire from his full-time position 
as judge in April of 1986, whereupon he assumed senior status.  In July of 
1986, Chief Judge Sterrett notified the parties that he intended to assign the 
case to Special Trial Judge Powell pursuant to what was then § 7443A(b)(4) 
for the preparation of findings of fact and opinion,114 unless the parties 
                                                     
111  501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
112  This aspect of the Freytag case is addressed in Part V.     
113  501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
114  At that time, § 7443A(b)(4) permitted the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to 
assign “any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate” to a special trial 
judge, in addition to the types of cases enumerated in prior portions of § 7443A(b).  
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objected.  All but one of the taxpayers (whose case was severed) consented 
to the assignment, on the condition that either Judge Wilbur or Chief Judge 
Sterrett bear responsibility for entering the decision in the case.115   
Trial of the consolidated cases before the Tax Court in Freytag was fairly 
complex.  The trial consumed 14 weeks of evidence, 9,000 pages of 
transcripts, and over 3,000 exhibits.116  Special Trial Judge Powell, who 
already had presided over nine weeks of the trial in his capacity as 
evidentiary referee before being formally assigned the case, prepared a 
report sustaining the Commissioner’s position on all fronts, including the 
imposition of a negligence penalty.117  On October 21, 1987, Chief Judge 
Sterrett issued an order assigning the case to himself for disposition.  On 
the same day, Chief Judge Sterrett adopted the report of Special Trial Judge 
Powell in full.   
 
b. Appeal to the Fifth Circuit 
 
On appeal of their case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
taxpayers challenged the Tax Court’s compliance with the relevant statutory 
procedure.  Specifically, the taxpayers contended that Chief Judge Sterrett’s 
wholesale adoption of Special Trial Judge Powell’s report on the same day 
that Chief Judge Sterrett assigned the case to himself effectively permitted 
Special Trial Judge Powell to enter the final decision in the case—contrary 
to the limitation posed by § 7443A(c).118  The Fifth Circuit treated the 
taxpayer’s contention as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court, and therefore determined the issue appropriate to hear for the 
first time on appeal.   
The Fifth Circuit accepted the taxpayers’ contention that Special Trial 
Judge Powell submitted his report in the case on the date Chief Judge 
Sterrett assigned the case to himself, even though the precise date of such 
submission was not reflected in the record.  However, the court curtly 
rejected the taxpayers’ challenge on the merits:  “Our analysis begins and 
ends with the simple fact that the opinion in this case was issued by the Tax 
Court in the name of the chief judge.”119  The court found no evidence that 
Chief Judge Sterrett failed in his obligation to maintain full responsibility 
                                                                                                                       
However, pursuant to § 7443A(c), the special trial judge lacked authority to enter 
the final decision in a § 7443A(b)(4) case.  Hence, the special trial judge’s report 
had to be submitted to a regular judge of the Tax Court for proposed adoption.    
115  See Freytag v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1990); Brief for 
Petitioner, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), at 8.   
116  Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 871 n.1 (1991) (citing statements of 
taxpayers’ counsel at oral argument).   
117  See id. at 887–89.   
118  See Freytag, 904 F.2d at 1015.   
119  Id.   
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for the decision in the case,120 and the court was not willing to infer 
impropriety based on the (presumed) short time span between the filing of 
the special trial judge’s report and the issuance of the Tax Court opinion 
adopting it.    
In addition to stressing the alleged brief amount of time Chief Judge 
Sterrett devoted to reviewing the report of Special Trial Judge Powell prior 
to adopting it, the taxpayers argued that the Tax Court’s procedures as 
written could not be reconciled with § 7443A(c).  Rule 183(c) obligated the 
reviewing Tax Court judge to regard the factual findings of the special trial 
judge as presumptively correct.  With respect to the level of deference that 
presumption entailed, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Stone v. Commissioner121 had interpreted the rule as permitting the reviewing 
Tax Court judge to overturn the factual findings of the special trial judge 
only if they proved “clearly erroneous.”122  The taxpayers in Freytag 
characterized the Tax Court procedures contained in Rule 183(c), as 
interpreted in Stone, as establishing a regime of appellate-like review by the 
Tax Court judge. The taxpayers then contended that effective appellate 
review of special trial judge reports by the Tax Court violated the statutory 
directive under § 7443A(c) that a regular Tax Court judge bear primary 
responsibility for the entry of the decision in the case.123   
The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected the taxpayers’ structural argument under 
Rule 183(c) as well.  The court noted that the Tax Court judge to whom a 
§ 7443A(b)(4) case was assigned possessed “full responsibility” for the 
decision in the case, rejecting the assertion that the Tax Court judge 
conducted his review of the special trial judge’s report from an appellate 
posture.  The Fifth Circuit justified its position in part by pointing to the 
changes to the Tax Court’s procedures as reflected in Rule 183.  The 
elimination of the parties’ entitlement to a copy of the special trial judge’s 
report as it was conveyed to the reviewing Tax Court judge along with the 
ability of the parties to file exceptions to such report undermined any 
characterization of the reviewing Tax Court judge operating in an appellate 
capacity in this context.124   
 
                                                     
120  See id. (“We will assume that the judge [acted] in good faith.  The record 
before us is devoid of any evidence that even remotely suggests otherwise.”).  
121  865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
122  Id. at 345–47.   
123  Brief for Petitioners at 22–23, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).   
124  Freytag v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 1011, 1015 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990).  
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c. The Supreme Court’s Resolution 
 
The taxpayers in Freytag pressed their objection to the application of the 
Tax Court’s procedures in the case before the Supreme Court following the 
grant of their certiorari petition.  The taxpayers contended that “[t]he 
special trial judge’s filing of his report and its verbatim adoption by Chief 
Judge Sterrett appear from the record to have been virtually 
simultaneous.”125  The taxpayers buttressed their interpretation of the 
record with the Fifth Circuit’s observation that Special Trial Judge Powell 
filed his report on the same day as its adoption,126 an observation the Fifth 
Circuit had dismissed as irrelevant.127  Claiming that “[n]o presumption of 
administrative regularity [could] convert this into meaningful review,” the 
taxpayers characterized the Tax Court’s application of § 7443A(b)(4) in the 
case as effectively permitting the special trial judge to enter the final 
decision in the case.128   
The taxpayers in Freytag understandably were pleased to cite the Fifth 
Circuit’s finding that Special Trial Judge Powell had issued his report in the 
case on the same day it was adopted by Chief Judge Sterrett.  Yet that 
characterization overstated the case.  As noted by the Commissioner, the 
record on this issue consisted of two documents:  an order by Chief Judge 
Sterrett formally reassigning the case to himself for disposition and the 
entry by Judge Sterrett of his decision adopting the report of Special Trial 
Judge Powell on the same day.  Neither of these address the date on which 
Special Trial Judge Powell first submitted his report to the Chief Judge for 
assignment.129  Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the taxpayers 
acknowledged that Special Trial Judge Powell “sometime in the preceding 4 
months had filed a report with the Chief Judge of the tax court.”130  This 
concession, coupled with the complexity of the case, suggested that Chief 
Judge Sterrett received Special Trial Judge Powell’s report a considerable 
period prior to the day he adopted it as his own.   
The taxpayers’ challenge to the application of § 7443A(b)(4) consumed a 
considerable portion of the parties’ oral argument before the Court, a 
                                                     
125  Brief for Petitioners at 8, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
126  Id. at 23–24.   
127  See Freytag, 904 F.2d at 1015.   
128  Brief for Petitioners at 24, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).   
129  See Brief for Respondent at 18 n.9, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).  The Commissioner noted that it was the apparent practice of the Tax 
Court to formally reassign the case to a regular Tax Court judge only when the 
reviewing judge was prepared to enter decision in the case.  See id. (citing various 
decisions adopting reports of special trial judges and the attendant orders assigning 
cases to Tax Court judges).   
130  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).   
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surprising fact given that the Tax Court’s application of §  7443A(b)(4) was 
of dubious relevance to the questions presented in the taxpayers’ petition 
for certiorari.  At argument, counsel for the taxpayers did not mince words 
concerning the alleged failure of Chief Judge Sterrett to adequately review 
the report of the special trial judge:  “[T]here is no basis to suppose there 
was meaningful review or therefore meaningful supervision that would 
enable us to accept this as the decision of the Tax Court rather than that of 
the special trial judge himself.”131  Moments later, counsel for taxpayers 
reiterated the point in even stronger terms:  “We do think that there is 
nothing—absolutely nothing in this record to suggest that the regular tax 
court judge actually reviewed the case.”132  When pressed about the number 
of days that would have been sufficient for review of the special trial judge’s 
report, counsel for taxpayers returned to the lack of transparency in the 
proceedings by noting the Tax Court’s failure to serve the parties with the 
special trial judge’s report:   
 
The Government simply tries to suggest that perhaps it was 5 days or 
2 days or 14 days – who knows?  The parties can’t know, because 
they have no opportunity to see the special trial judge’s report or 
know when it is filed or object to it, unlike the procedure in the 
Magistrate’s court.133 
 
As these excerpts indicate, the conduct of the Tax Court and, 
specifically, Chief Judge Sterrett, was being called into question.  Making 
matters interesting, Chief Judge Sterrett was present in the courtroom as a 
spectator.  The colloquy below provides some indication of the 
awkwardness of the situation.  Additionally, the exchange reflects both the 
taxpayers’ frustration at not being provided with the special trial judge’s 
report as it was submitted to the chief judge for assignment and the Court’s 
reluctance to assume that Chief Judge Sterrett lacked familiarity with the 
case until he formally assigned it to himself: 
 
QUESTION: The first -- Judge Sterrett was chief judge. 
 
MS. SULLIVAN: That’s right. 
 
QUESTION: He knew what was going on. 
 
MS. SULLIVAN: Well -- 
                                                     
131  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991).   
132  Id. at 12–13.   
133  Id. at 12.   
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QUESTION: He must have known what was going on. 
 
MS. SULLIVAN: Actually, Your Honor -- 
 




MS. SULLIVAN: Like the line in Annie Hall where Woody Allen 




MS. SULLIVAN: I won’t ask him, Your Honor. What I would like 
to point out not that -- we cast no aspersion on Chief Judge Sterrett 
personally in the least. What we are doing here in the absence of any 
evidence that there was meaningful review is arguing about what we 
should presume from the regular procedures of the tax court that 
Chief Judge Sterrett can be expected faithfully to adhere to. And the 
published rules of the tax court say you reassign the special trial 
judge’s case to a judge of the tax court and then that judge reviews it. 
 
QUESTION: Ms. Sullivan. 
 
MS. SULLIVAN: Yes, Justice? 
 
QUESTION: Would you be satisfied with the usual expression that I 
think you and I have seen of an appellate court judge who says, I 
have reviewed all of the objections of appellate [sic] and find no 
merit in any of them? Is that what you want? 
 
MS. SULLIVAN: I believe we might accept that, Justice Marshall. 
But the fact is under the tax court’s rules, the chief judge of the tax 
court could not review all of the objections of the parties to the 
special trial judge's findings because they never got to see them. 
 
Up until 1984, the tax court had provided by its rules for 
exceptions by the parties to the special trial judge’s report and an 
opportunity to try to get the tax court judge to reject some of those 
findings. That opportunity was eliminated in 1984.134 
                                                     
134 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-15, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991). 
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Following the lengthy discussion of the Tax Court’s procedures in the case, 
the Court questioned whether these matters were properly subsumed in the 
questions presented in the taxpayers’ certiorari petition.  Only then did 
counsel conclude her argument of the case on statutory grounds, spending 
the few remaining minutes of oral argument addressing the Appointments 
Clause issue.    
Notwithstanding the Court’s apparent uneasiness concerning the 
relevance of the Tax Court’s application of § 7443A(b)(4) to the appeal 
before it, the Court pressed the Commissioner’s counsel at oral argument 
concerning the presumption of correctness afforded to the special trial 
judge’s findings of fact under Tax Court Rule 183(c).  After noting that the 
taxpayers failed to raise the issue before the Tax Court—the body best 
equipped to resolve issues concerning the application of  its procedural 
rules—counsel for the Commissioner contended that Rule 183(c) did not 
contravene the statutory requirement that a regular Tax Court judge enter 
decision in § 7443A(b)(4) cases.  Conceding on brief that the presumption 
of correctness contained in Rule 183(c) was “not ideal,”135 counsel 
contended that the presumption merely provided a starting point for the 
consideration of the case by the regular Tax Court judge.  Accordingly, the 
benefit of the presumption of correctness was confined to its resulting 
inertia.  In the Commissioner’s view, this process fell far short of an 
effective abdication of the Tax Court judge’s responsibility to enter the 
decision in the case.136   
Later in the argument, counsel for the Commissioner addressed the 
relevance of the Tax Court’s failure to serve the parties with the special trial 
judge’s report.  In short, the Commissioner found no fault with the 
procedure, given that the special trial judge possessed no statutory authority 
with respect to cases assigned under § 7443A(b)(4): 
 
And again to get back to the relationship between the regular tax 
court judge and the special trial judge, it is internal. Petitioners 
object, we never had a chance to review the report. We never had a 
chance to object to it. And they say that's very different than the 
procedure that applies with respect to magistrates. That’s our point 
exactly. A magistrate decides a matter that he is -- he is hearing -- a 
civil trial. And therefore, the parties need to be able to review that 
decision to determine if they want to object and seek further review. 
                                                     
135  Brief for Respondent at 19, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).  
Counsel for the Commissioner at oral argument conceded that if the presumption 
of correctness necessitated the application of a “clearly erroneous” standard of 
review, then the Tax Court rule “might well” violate the statute.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 40, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
136  Id. at 34–35.   
850           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
Special trial judge under subsection (b)(4) decides nothing, and 
therefore, it’s perfectly appropriate that there is no opportunity for 
review and objection, just as there is not an opportunity for a party 
to review and object to a law clerk’s draft that is -- that is submitted 
to a judge. A law clerk acts as an aide and assistant to the judge, just 
as a special trial judge does to a regular judge under this provision.137 
 
Despite the portion of the parties’ briefs and oral arguments devoted to 
the issue of whether the Tax Court procedures effectively enabled the 
special trial judge to enter the Tax Court’s decision in contravention of the 
statutory structure set out in § 7443A(b)(4) and (c), the Supreme Court 
barely touched on these issues when it issued its decision in the Freytag case.  
The Court did not address at all the compatibility of the presumption of 
correctness to be afforded to the special trial judge’s findings of fact under 
Rule 183(c) with the statutory scheme.  Concerning the taxpayers’ 
contentions regarding the alleged failure of Chief Judge Sterrett to 
meaningfully review Special Trial Judge Powell’s report, the Court 
dispensed with the matter by footnote.  In doing so, the Court followed the 
Fifth Circuit’s lead in refusing to infer impropriety on the basis of a thin 
record alone: 
 
In any event, this chronology does not appear to us to be at all 
significant.  The Chief Judge had the duty to review the work of the 
Special Trial Judge, and there is nothing in the record disclosing how 
much time he devoted to the task.  As Chief Judge, he was aware of 
the presence of the several cases in the court and the magnitude of 
the litigation.  The burden of proof as to any negative inference to be 
drawn from the time facts rests on petitioners.  We are not inclined 
to assume “rubber stamp” activity on the part of the Chief Judge.138   
 
Even though the Supreme Court in Freytag rejected the taxpayers’ 
argument that the Rule 183 procedures could not be reconciled with 
§ 7443A(c), the case served to highlight shortcomings in the streamlined 
procedures.  The points raised concerning the length of Chief Judge 
Sterrett’s review of Special Trial Judge Powell’s report suggested the need to 
clarify the reviewing Tax Court judge’s right to access to the workings of 
the special trial judge prior to the submission of the special trial judge’s 
formal report.  The procedures could have been modified further to 
acknowledge expressly the reviewing Tax Court judge’s ability to consult 
with the special trial judge in the preparation of the special trial judge’s 
report.  Additionally, the Freytag litigation highlighted the potential 
                                                     
137  Id. at 36–37.   
138  Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 872 n.2 (1991).   
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problems stemming from the presumption of correctness afforded to the 
factual findings of the special trial judge.  To reinforce the reviewing judge’s 
responsibility for the case, Rule 183(c) could have been revised to eliminate 
this presumption in favor of de novo review,139 while maintaining the 
requirement that “due regard” be provided to the presiding judge’s ability to 
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.  However, Rule 183(c) 
was not revised in the aftermath of Freytag, leaving many of these issues to 
be raised once again in the course of the litigation in Ballard.   
 
2. The Initial Tax Court Opinion in Ballard 
 
The litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard 
v. Commissioner had its origins in an alleged kickback scheme involving three 
individuals:  Claude M. Ballard, Robert W. Lisle, and Burton W. Kanter.  
Ballard and Lisle served as senior real estate executives with Prudential Life 
Insurance Company of America (Prudential), which during the relevant 
time period held one of the largest commercial real estate portfolios in the 
country.  Their senior status within the company enabled Ballard and Lisle 
to exert considerable influence over Prudential real estate transactions and 
lending operations.  Kanter was a prominent Chicago tax attorney who 
counseled a number of high-profile clients, including the Pritzker family, 
owners of the Hyatt Corporation.  In addition to his legal practice, Kanter 
taught at his alma mater, the University of Chicago Law School, and he 
originated the renowned “Shop Talk” column in the Journal of Taxation.  
Kanter was known for his aggressive tax planning techniques, including 
those he employed to help finance the production of movies during the 
1960’s and 1970’s, including “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.”  
Kanter’s aggressive tax planning apparently carried over to his personal 
finances, leading the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to note that “from 
1979 to 1989 Kanter, who hobnobbed with Pritzkers and Hollywood 
producers and who participated in countless extremely large and lucrative 
business ventures, reported a negative adjusted gross income each year on 
his federal tax return and paid no federal income taxes.”140  Kanter’s 
activities drew the attention of the IRS, to put it mildly.  He and various of 
                                                     
139  De novo review of a hearing officer’s findings in the civil context does not 
implicate due process concerns.  As explained by Judge Cudahy in his separate 
opinion in the Seventh Circuit’s initial consideration of the Estate of Kanter case, 
“the Fifth Amendment does not require that the Tax Court review STJ findings 
using any particular degree of deference. . . . [T]here is no constitutional 
requirement that the Tax Court use an appellate-style review of its STJ reports.”  
Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 882 (7th Cir. 2003) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
140  Id. at 838.   
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his closely held entities were audited by the Service “virtually, if not literally, 
every year since Richard Nixon was President.”141 
In the early 1970’s, Kanter met Lisle and Ballard at the grand opening of 
the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Houston, Texas.  The three became friends, 
and, according to the IRS, their friendship led to an arrangement whereby 
Kanter assisted Ballard and Lisle in collecting fees in exchange for 
exercising their influence over Prudential’s real estate investment decisions.  
These fees were paid into an entity controlled by Kanter, Investment 
Research Associates, Ltd., or one of its subsidiaries.  The fee income, 
totaling approximately $5 million by the end of 1983, later was distributed 
in a 45-45-10 ratio to corporations controlled by Ballard, Lisle, and Kanter, 
respectively.   
After discovering and investigating this arrangement, the Service issued 
deficiencies notices to Ballard, Lisle, and Kanter, for 1975 through 1982, 
1984, and 1987 through 1989 alleging that the three individuals received 
millions of dollars of income from the arrangement that they failed to 
report.  The individuals and their related entities petitioned the Tax Court 
for review.  On January 7, 1994, Chief Judge Lapsley W. Hamblen assigned 
the consolidated cases to Special Trial Judge D. Irwin Couvillion for trial 
pursuant to § 7443A(b)(4).142   
The notices of deficiency issued by the Commissioner in the case failed 
to assert the civil fraud penalty.  The Commissioner thereafter sought to 
amend its answers in the cases to raise the fraud penalty, and the parties and 
the Court agreed that the amended answers would not be filed until the trial 
commenced in June 1994.143  Hence, the case did not raise the prospect of 
fraud when it was assigned to Special Trial Judge Couvillion for trial.   
The trial took place largely over the summer of 1994, consuming five 
weeks of actual trial time.  Over 50 witnesses testified at the trial, and the 
resulting transcript of the proceeding spanned approximately 6,000 pages.  
In addition, the parties introduced thousands of exhibits into evidence, and 
these exhibits consumed hundreds of thousands of pages.    
The parties concluded their post-trial briefing in the case in March 1996.  
The next communication from the Tax Court came on December 15, 1999, 
the day on which Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen issued an order by which 
                                                     
141  Id.   
142  At the time, § 7443A(b)(4) permitted a special trial judge to hear any 
assigned case.  However, the special trial judge could not enter the decision in a 
case assigned under this provision; rather, the decision had to be entered by a 
presidentially appointed judge of the court.  See IRC § 7443A(c).  Given the 
expansion of the types of cases a special trial judge may hear, former § 7443A(b)(4) 
now is contained in § 7443A(b)(7).   
143  See Investment Research Assocs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-
407, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 1076.   
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she “reassigned” the case to Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr. 144 for 
disposition.  The order provided that Judge Dawson had been assigned the 
case on September 2, 1998, suggesting that Special Trial Judge Couvillion 
had submitted his report to Chief Judge Cohen on or before that date.  On 
the same day the order reassigning the case to Judge Dawson was entered, 
Judge Dawson issued a memorandum opinion that “agree[d] with and 
adopt[ed] the opinion of the Special Trial Judge.”145  The decision then 
reproduced the opinion of Special Trial Judge Couvillion in full.   
The incorporated opinion, over 600 pages in length, represented a 
considerable victory for the Service.  The opinion upheld substantially all of 
the Commissioner’s deficiency determinations.  Most notably, the opinion 
sustained the Commissioner’s imposition of the penalty for civil tax fraud.   
 
3. Post-Trial Developments 
 
Counsel for the taxpayers in Investment Research Associates came away from 
the case anticipating a decision in their favor based on comments made by 
Judge Couvillion at trial.146  According to one of Kanter’s attorneys, Randall 
G. Dick, he had occasion to speak with one or more judges of the Tax 
Court about the case.  These judges reportedly informed him that Special 
Trial Judge Couvillion had initially submitted a report holding in favor of 
the taxpayers.  Pursuant to these conversations, Dick became convinced 
that Judge Couvillion’s findings had been reversed in a manner not reflected 
in the record.147   
Thereafter, in April 2000, the taxpayers filed a motion with the Tax 
Court seeking access to “all reports, draft opinions, or similar documents 
prepared and delivered to the Court pursuant to Rule 183(b).”148  Judge 
Dawson denied the motion by order dated April 26, 2000, explaining as 
follows:   
 
                                                     
144  At the time, Judge Dawson had assumed senior status, having served two 
full terms as a Tax Court judge from 1962 to 1985.   
145  Investment Research Assocs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407, 
78 T.C.M. 951, 963.   
146  See Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).  
According to counsel for Kanter, Special Trial Judge Couvillion stated “I’m waiting 
to hear the fraud case,” when the Government rested at trial.  Sam Young, Kanter 
Plaintiffs Call for Investigation of Tax Court Judges, 126 TAX NOTES 1181, 1182 (Mar. 8, 
2010).    
147  These conversations were later recounted by Dick in an affidavit filed in 
August 2000.  The details of the affidavit are discussed in text accompanying infra 
notes 152–154.   
148  See Tax Court Order dated August 30, 2000 (describing the contents of the 
taxpayers’ initial request).   
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[P]etitioners’ motion requesting access to any internal Court 
documents, including any preliminary drafts of reports or opinions, 
documents, memorandums or notes by judges, special trial judges or 
employees of the Court, will be denied.  In any event such materials 
are confidential and not subject to production because they relate to 
the internal deliberative processes of the Court.149    
 
As part of the order, Judge Dawson stated that he gave due regard to the 
fact that Special Trial Judge Couvillion evaluated the credibility of the 
witnesses, and that he regarded the findings of fact recommended by the 
Judge Couvillion to be presumptively correct.150   
A month later, the taxpayers moved to place Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion’s initial post-trial report under seal and to include it in the 
record, thereby making it available for appellate review.   The Tax Court 
denied this order as well.151      
Having been twice rebuffed in their efforts to gain access to what they 
believed to be Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s original report in the case or, 
at a minimum, cause such report to be included in the record under seal, 
Mr. Dick swore out an affidavit detailing the particulars of his informal 
communications with judges of the Tax Court concerning the case.  Mr. 
Dick declared that he had been informed by two judges of the court that 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion, in his original report that he submitted to the 
Chief Judge, had concluded that the taxpayers did not realize unreported 
income from the transactions at issue and that the civil fraud penalty was 
not applicable.152  According to the affidavit, these judges told Mr. Dick 
that “substantial sections of the opinion were not written by Judge 
Couvillion,” and that the portions of the opinion relating to the finding of 
fraud “were wholly contrary to the findings made by Judge Couvillion in his 
report.”153  Mr. Dick testified that he had confirmed these events with a 
third judge of the Tax Court.154  
Armed with Mr. Dick’s declaration, the taxpayers on August 22, 2000, 
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s previous denial of the 
                                                     
149  Tax Court Order dated April 26, 2000.   
150  Id.   
151  Tax Court Order dated May 30, 2000.   
152  Affidavit of Randall G. Dick, Aug. 21, 2000, at ¶ 4.   
153  Id. ¶ 5.  The amicus brief filed by the Estate of Burton Kanter—represented 
in part by Randall Dick—in support of the certiorari petition filed by Ballard 
explains that Mr. Dick believed that his legal obligations to his client required 
testifying to the statements made to him by unnamed judges of the court.  Brief of 
Joshua S. Kanter, as Executor of the Estate of Burton W. Kanter, as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, Ballard v. Commissioner, Docket No. 03-184, at 7 n.2 (Oct. 
6, 2003).    
154  Id. ¶ 7. 
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taxpayers’ motion for access to what they believed to be Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion’s initial report in the case.  In the alternative, this last motion 
requested a new trial—before someone other than Judge Dawson.  On 
August 30, 2000, the Tax Court denied the taxpayers’ motion once again.  
However, at this point, the court provided a more thorough explanation of 
its position: 
 
 In the present motion . . . Randall G. Dick, . . . for the first time 
in the motion and in his declaration attached thereto, has made 
general assertions, without specificity, that two or three judges of the 
Court informed him that an original report of Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion “concluded that payments made [by those seeking 
Prudential’s business] were not taxable to the individual Petitioners 
and that the fraud penalty was not applicable.”  Although Mr. Dick 
states in his declaration that some judges commented about the 
procedures involved in handling these cases, whatever may have 
been said to Mr. Dick is irrelevant and immaterial.   
 
 The only official Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion by 
the Court in these cases is T.C. Memo. 1999-407, filed on December 
15, 1999, by Special Trial Judge Couvillion, reviewed and adopted by 
Judge Dawson, and reviewed and approved by former Chief Judge 
Cohen.   
 
 Judge Dawson states and Special Trial Judge Couvillion agrees, 
that, after a meticulous and time-consuming review of the complex 
record in these cases, Judge Dawson adopted the findings of fact and 
opinion of Special Trial Judge Couvillion, that Judge Dawson 
presumed the findings of fact recommended by Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion were correct, and that Judge Dawson gave due regard to 
the circumstance that Special Trial Judge Couvillion evaluated the 
credibility of the witnesses.   
 
The order was signed by Chief Judge Thomas B. Wells, Judge Dawson, and 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion.   
After this final rejection by the Tax Court, the taxpayers petitioned the 
appropriate Circuit Courts of Appeals seeking for a writ of mandamus 
ordering the Tax Court to release the initial post-trial report issued by 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion in the case.  All such petitions were denied.155  
The taxpayers thereafter appealed the decision against them on the merits.  
                                                     
155  See In re Estate of Lisle, No. 00-60637 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000); In re 
Ballard, No. 00-14762-H (11th Cir. Oct. 23, 2000); In re Investment Research 
Assocs., No. 00-3369 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2000).   
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However, as part of the taxpayers’ appeal on the merits, each taxpayer 
continued to seek access to the special trial judge’s initial post-trial report in 
the case.  Lisle’s appeal was prosecuted by his estate, which was subject to 
administration in Texas.  Kanter died during the period of appeal of his 
decision, and his estate was subject to administration in Illinois.  Ballard had 
since moved to Florida.  Accordingly, appeals from the case rested in three 
different Circuit Courts of Appeals:  the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, 
and the Eleventh Circuit, respectively. 
 
4. Treatment at the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
     
a. The Eleventh Circuit in Ballard 
 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first appellate decision 
in the litigation, resolving the appeal prosecuted by Ballard.156  In addition 
to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Tax Court’s 
findings, Ballard argued that the Tax Court’s procedures denying access to 
the initial post-trial report issued by the special trial judge in the case 
violated his due process rights.  Ballard’s due process argument proceeded 
from a number of angles.  First, he analogized the use of special trial judges 
by the Tax Court to the use of magistrate judges and special masters by a 
Federal district court, noting that the Tax Court provided the lone example 
of a federal court that required the official presiding over trial to submit a 
report of proposed findings of fact and opinion to the court for adoption, 
modification, or rejection before making the report available to the parties.  
In Ballard’s view, the Tax Court’s departure from this universally accepted 
practice through Rule 183 led to a presumptive denial of due process.  
Apart from this broader objection, Ballard contended that the Tax Court’s 
failure to include the initial report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion in the 
record made it impossible to determine if Judge Dawson afforded his 
factual findings the requisite presumption of correctness.  Lastly, Ballard 
contended that the absence of the initial report precluded meaningful 
appellate review of the Tax Court’s actions.157  
The Eleventh Circuit noted that Ballard’s arguments all were premised 
on the assertion that “the underlying report adopted by the Tax Court [was] 
not, in fact, Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s report.”158  In the court’s view, 
Ballard’s assertion was belied by the record before it, which “clearly 
reveal[ed]” that the report adopted by Judge Dawson was that of Special 
Trial Judge Couvillion.159  The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the August 
                                                     
156  See Ballard v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2003).  
157  See id. at 1042 (summarizing Ballard’s due process arguments).   
158  Id. 
159  Id.   
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30, 2000 order signed by Special Trial Judge Couvillion along with Chief 
Judge Wells and Judge Dawson.160   
However, the Eleventh Circuit did not rest its rejection of Ballard’s due 
process contentions on the record alone.  After assuming the truth of the 
allegations contained in Mr. Dick’s affidavit, the court nonetheless found 
Ballard’s due process claim wanting: 
 
While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be unique to that 
court, there is nothing unusual about judges conferring with one 
another about cases assigned to them.  These conferences are an 
essential part of the judicial process when, by statute, more than one 
judge is charged with the responsibility of deciding the case.  And, as 
a result of such conferences, judges sometimes change their original 
position or thoughts.  Whether Special Trial Judge Couvillion 
prepared drafts of his report or subsequently changed his opinion 
entirely is without import insofar as our analysis of the alleged due 
process violation pertaining to the application of Rule 183 is 
concerned.161  
  
After disposing with Ballard’s due process claim, the Eleventh Circuit 
proceeded to affirm the Tax Court decision on the merits.   
 
b. The Seventh Circuit Majority in Estate of Kanter 
 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was next to weigh in, hearing the 
appeal prosecuted by Kanter’s estate.162  During argument before the 
Seventh Circuit, the taxpayers’ counsel was pointedly asked which Tax 
Court judges had spoken informally with Mr. Dick.163  Counsel identified 
those judges as Judge Julian I. Jacobs, and Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. 
Panuthos.164   
The Seventh Circuit, in a divided opinion, followed the lead of the 
Eleventh Circuit in rejecting the taxpayers’ due process claims.  As an initial 
matter, the court determined that all of the taxpayers’ claims were rendered 
                                                     
160  Perhaps obviously, the Eleventh Circuit was most persuaded by the 
participation of Special Trial Judge Couvillion in the order:  “[W]e . . . save for 
another day the more troubling question of what would have occurred had Special 
Trial Judge Couvillion not indicated that the report adopted by the Tax Court 
accurately reflected his findings and opinion.”  Id. at 1043.  
161 Id.   
162  See Estate of Kanter, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2003).  
163  See id. at 875–76 n.1 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
164  Id. at 875.  Counsel was not asked for the name of the third Tax Court 
judge alleged to have confirmed the contents of Mr. Dick’s conversations with the 
two named individuals.   
858           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 
moot because the underlying report adopted by the Tax Court was, in fact, 
the report authored by Special Trial Judge Couvillion, as recited in the 
opinion itself.165  The court observed that any preliminary 
recommendations of Special Trial Judge Couvillion—“if they ever 
existed”—would lack relevance as having been abandoned.166   
The court was not troubled by the allegation that the facially 
straightforward statement by Judge Dawson in the opinion—that he agreed 
with and adopted the report of the special trial judge—may have masked a 
“quasi-collaborative judicial deliberation” between the two.  Even if this 
process rendered the factual determinations of the special trial judge 
“malleable,”167 the court determined that such a practice would not offend 
its notions of fundamental fairness, much less rise to the level of a due 
process violation.  The Seventh Circuit grounded its rejection of the 
taxpayers’ due process claims in the statutory regime governing the 
assignment of cases to special trial judges under § 7443A(b)(4).  Because the 
Tax Court maintains sole authority to enter the decisions in these cases, the 
reviewing Tax Court judge serves as the original finder of fact.  As such, the 
deference the Tax Court judge had to afford the preliminary factual findings 
of the special trial judge was necessarily limited.  While the Tax Court 
procedures obligated the reviewing judge to afford due regard to the special 
trial judge’s ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses while 
presuming the preliminary factual findings to be correct, the Seventh Circuit 
explained that the presumption operated as a mere starting point.  The Tax 
Court could overcome the presumption by finding evidence that suggested 
the preliminary findings were incorrect.  The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected 
the taxpayers’ contention that the factual findings of the special trial judge 
could be overturned only if clearly erroneous, finding that such an approach 
would “all but abdicate the Tax Court’s original decisionmaking 
authority.”168   From this perspective, the special trial judge’s report lacked 
little if any independent significance.  The Seventh Circuit therefore 
regarded suppression of the report pursuant to Tax Court procedures to be 
inconsequential.169    
The taxpayers in Estate of Kanter contended that inclusion of the special 
trial judge’s initial report in the case was necessary to facilitate effective 
appellate review by an article III court.  Not only did the Seventh Circuit 
reject this argument, it turned the argument on its head.  Citing its 
jurisdiction to review “decisions” of the Tax Court pursuant to § 7482(a)(1) 
                                                     
165  Id. at 840–41. 
166  Id. at 844.   
167  Id. at 841.   
168  Id. at 841.  In this regard, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Estate of Kanter 
mirrors the position taken by the Commissioner at oral argument in the Freytag 
case.  See Section E.1.c. of this Part.   
169  Id. at 841–42. 
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as opposed to “reports,” the court concluded that the special trial judge’s 
report was not reviewable on appeal.  The Seventh Circuit observed that the 
scope of its appellate jurisdiction lent credence to the Commissioner’s view 
that the reports of special trial judges were properly regarded as preliminary 
factual findings that arise in the course of the Tax Court’s internal 
deliberative process.170  Indeed, the court analogized the review of a special 
trial judge’s report by a Tax Court judge to the occasional review of the 
report of a Tax Court judge by the full Tax Court.  Citing § 7460(b), the 
Seventh Circuit observed that portions of the report issued by the Tax 
Court judge presiding over the case that were not adopted in the final 
opinion emanating from court conference were not preserved in the record 
for later review.  Accordingly, not all “reports” of the Tax Court 
necessitated publication or even inclusion in the record.   
 
c. The Estate of Kanter Dissent 
 
As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit in Estate of Kanter did not issue 
a unanimous decision.  Through a separate 24-page opinion in the case, 
Judge Cudahy explained his belief that the Tax Court’s failure to include the 
initial post-trial report issued by the special trial judge in the record on 
appeal constituted a violation of the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment due 
process rights.   Given the considerable influence of Judge Cudahy’s dissent 
in the Supreme Court’s later resolution of the case, Judge Cudahy’s 
rationale is discussed at length below.   
Judge Cudahy devoted considerable attention to the Tax Court’s 
practice of reviewing the reports of special trial judges before turning to his 
legal analysis.  While Judge Cudahy did not necessarily accept Kanter’s 
alleged version of events as fact, he agreed with the taxpayers that the Tax 
Court’s routine declaration in this setting that it “agrees with and adopts the 
opinion of the Special Trial Judge” did not mean that the Tax Court’s 
opinion represented a verbatim adoption of the special trial judge’s original 
report in the case.171  Rather, Judge Cudahy found that the record 
supported the view that the Tax Court engaged in a “quasi-collaborative 
process of review” of the special trial judge’s initial report from which a 
new and frequently revised report emerged to be adopted in full by the Tax 
Court judge.172  Judge Cudahy based this determination primarily on the 
extraordinary consistency with which Tax Court judges adopted the reports 
of special trial judges without objection or modification.  Having reviewed 
880 decisions involving a special trial judge report since the then-current 
Rule 183 procedures had been adopted, Judge Cudahy observed that the 
                                                     
170  Id. at 842.   
171  Id. at 875 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
172  Id. at 876.   
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Tax Court never once failed to adopt the proposed opinion of the special 
trial judge.  He regarded this degree of unanimity “impossible” among all of 
the judicial officers of the Tax Court. 173  Judge Cudahy’s legal analysis 
therefore presumed some degree of a collaborative process between a 
special trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court judge from the time the 
special trial judge issued his initial post-trial report in the case to the time 
the Tax Court issued the ultimate opinion in the case.   
Judge Cudahy did not regard the alleged collaborative process between 
the special trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court judge as per se 
objectionable; rather, he recognized that the opportunity of the special trial 
judge to receive additional input into the decision making process may 
enhance the quality of the final product.174  From this standpoint, Judge 
Cudahy proceeded to note the various grounds on which he agreed with the 
majority opinion, albeit reluctantly at times.  First, he agreed that Rule 
183(c) did not require the report of the special trial judge to be reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard, rejecting the taxpayers’ invocation of 
the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Stone v. Commissioner.175  Second, even though 
he acknowledged that the Tax Court’s application of Rule 183 necessitated 
the existence of two reports (that is, the initial report conveyed to the chief 
judge and the final opinion reviewed and adopted by the Tax Court), Judge 
Cudahy did not find that the Tax Court had violated its procedure under 
Rule 183.176  He noted that the Tax Court enjoys a considerable level of 
deference in interpreting its procedural rules;177 hence, he accepted the Tax 
Court’s position that Rule 183 no longer required the production of special 
trial judge reports even while lamenting the movement away from 
transparency reflected in the amended procedure.  Last, Judge Cudahy 
acknowledged that although the statutory regime governing the publication 
of Tax Court reports created a strong presumption in favor of public 
dissemination of Tax Court documents, nothing in those statutes 
specifically required the Tax Court to make the initial report of the special 
trial judge public.178  
Turning to the taxpayers’ due process claims, Judge Cudahy again found 
a number of points of agreement with the majority opinion.  Reviewing 
                                                     
173  Id.   
174  Id. at 883, 887.   
175  See id. at 887–88.  Judge Cudahy found the holding of the D.C. Circuit in 
Stone v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (that the presumption of 
correctness provided under former Rule 182 necessitated a clearly erroneous level 
of deference to the special trial judge’s findings), to have been superseded by the 
Tax Court’s adoption of new procedures that eliminated production of the special 
trial judge’s report.  See id. at 878.   
176  Id. at 878.   
177  Id.   
178  See id. at 881.   
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relevant Supreme Court precedent, Judge Cudahy concluded that, outside 
of the criminal setting, due process does not require the ultimate finder of 
fact to be constrained by a formal degree of deference to the hearing 
officer.  As appellate-style review of special trial reports was not 
constitutionally required, the Tax Court’s presumed quasi-collaborative 
model in this setting was not constitutionally precluded.179  Consistent with 
this approach, Judge Cudahy concluded that any reversal of the special trial 
judge’s initial factual findings by the Tax Court judge as a result of the 
collaborative process did not offend a taxpayer’s due process rights—even 
if the reviewing Tax Court judge did not first rehear the testimony of the 
relevant witness.180    
This discussion led to the one due process point on which Judge 
Cudahy differed from the majority:  the taxpayer’s due process right to 
appellate review of the Tax Court’s decision.  Judge Cudahy viewed the 
appellate court’s access to the initial findings of the special trial judge as 
indispensable to its task of evaluating the findings in the final Tax Court 
opinion under the requisite clearly erroneous standard of § 7482(a).  In 
explaining his conclusion, Judge Cudahy parsed the operation of clear-error 
review.  Specifically, he explained that clear error standard of review did not 
yield a uniform level of deference to be afforded to all factual findings.  
Rather, the greater a factual finding turned on the ability of the hearing 
officer to evaluate the credibility of the witness, the greater a degree of 
deference was owed.181  From this standpoint, an appellate court would not 
be able to know the degree of deference to be afforded to the findings of 
fact in the Tax Court’s opinion unless it were aware of the extent to which 
those findings differed from those of the special trial judge.182  Judge 
Cudahy found the need for the special trial judge’s initial findings 
particularly pressing in the “quasi-criminal” context of civil tax fraud:  “I 
can think of no single item of more significance in evaluating a Tax Court’s 
decision on fraud than the unfiltered findings of the STJ who stood watch 
over the trial.”183   
                                                     
179  See id. at 882.   
180  Id. at 883–84.   
181  See id. at 884 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 
(1985)).   
182  See id. at 885 (“If we are to give ‘even greater deference’ to the findings of a 
judge who has heard the witness whose credibility is at stake, we must inevitably 
give less deference to the judge who subsequently reverses those findings.”).   
183  Id. at 886.  The dissent ultimately reached the conclusion that the failure of 
the Tax Court to include the initial report of the special trial judge in the record on 
appeal constituted a due process violation based on a three-part balancing test 
suggested by Supreme Court precedent.  Judge Cudahy found that the quasi-
criminal nature of a civil fraud determination gave rise to a more significant private 
interest on the part of the taxpayer than a simple civil determination.  The risk of 
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To his credit, Judge Cudahy addressed the most glaring and difficult 
retort to his position:  The special trial judge signs the final report that is 
adopted by the Tax Court, thereby certifying the correctness of any factual 
findings that may have been modified in the process of the collaborative 
review.  Judge Cudahy observed that the alleged quasi-collaborative process 
could yield such a result, whereby the “original impressions of the STJ are 
tempered through the collaborative process with the Tax Court, and . . . the 
Tax Court’s opinions would be molded and informed by the first-hand 
impressions of the STJ.”184  However, Judge Cudahy was not willing to 
accept this “utopian” characterization of the Tax Court’s procedures.  
Citing the subordinate status of special trial judges and the resulting absence 
of judicial independence,185 Judge Cudahy refused to ascribe binding effect 
to the special trial judge’s subsequent assent to the findings contained in the 
final Tax Court opinion.    
 
d. The Fifth Circuit in Estate of Lisle 
 
Appeal of the Tax Court’s decision in Investment Research Associates on 
behalf of Lisle was prosecuted by his estate before the Fifth Circuit.186   The 
court disposed of the taxpayers’ due process challenge to the Tax Court’s 
application of its Rule 183 procedures in short order.  Finding the prior 
analysis of the issue by the Eleventh Circuit in Ballard and by the Seventh 
Circuit in Estate of Kanter as “direct and persuasive,” the Fifth Circuit in 
Estate of Lisle adopted it as its own.187  The Fifth Circuit devoted the bulk of 
its opinion to addressing the merits of the Tax Court’s determination, 
which yielded a considerable victory for the taxpayers.  While it upheld the 
Tax Court’s determination that the Commissioner had established Lisle’s 
income tax deficiencies by a preponderance of the evidence, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that the evidentiary record failed to support a finding 
that Lisle had engaged in tax fraud by clear and convincing evidence.188  
Hence, the Fifth Circuit overturned the imposition of the civil fraud penalty 
against Lisle, and this determination also affected the tax years that 
                                                                                                                       
error in the setting was heightened as well.  Without the special trial judge’s report, 
the appellate court would be reviewing, on the basis of a cold record, the Tax Court 
judge’s determination of fraud, which also was made on the basis of a cold record.  
Finally, Judge Cudahy viewed the additional cost and administrative burden of 
avoiding the risk of error—that is, publication of the special trial judge’s initial 
report—as de minimis.  See id. at 887.   
184  Id. at 887.   
185  Id.  
186  See Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2003).   
187  Id. at 384.   
188  Id. at 382–83.   
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remained open to the Commissioner under the statute of limitations on 
assessment.     
 
5.  Supreme Court Review 
  
Following their defeats at the Circuit Court level, Ballard and the Estate 
of Kanter petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.189  Ballard’s petition 
presented the following questions for review:  (1) whether the alleged off-
the-record collaborative process between Special Trial Judge Couvillion and 
Tax Court Judge Dawson was consistent with the due process clause or the 
right to effective article III review; and (2) whether § 7482(a), which 
requires Tax Court decisions to be reviewed in the same manner as 
decisions of a U.S. District Court, is consistent with the alleged secretive 
collaboration between the special trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court 
judge in this setting.  The petition filed on behalf of Kanter’s estate raised 
two questions for review:  (1) whether the due process clause or governing 
federal statutes require the court of appeals to review the decision of the 
Tax Court on the basis of a complete record that included the special trial 
judge’s findings of fact, and (2) whether Rule 183 required the Tax Court to 
uphold factual findings of special trial judges unless clearly erroneous.  The 
Supreme Court granted the parties certiorari petitions on April 26, 2004.  
Although the parties did not raise the Tax Court’s compliance with the 
Rule 183 procedures (apart from the appropriate degree of deference to be 
afforded to the special trial judge’s factual findings) as part of their certiorari 
petitions or in their briefs, Justices Ginsburg and Souter injected this as a 
possible issue in the taxpayers’ favor early in the taxpayers’ argument of the 
case:   
 
JUSTICE GINSBURG:  Mr. Shapiro, why don’t you simply read the 
text of 183(b) --  
 
MR. SHAPIRO:  Yes.  
 
JUSTIFICE GINSBURG:  . . . It says, special trial judge’s report.  It 
is the only report to which the Tax Court rules refer.  
 
MR. SHAPIRO:  That’s correct, Your Honor.  And it’s -- 
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  And -- and if in fact --   
 
                                                     
189  The Estate of Lisle likely declined to continue its appeal to the Supreme 
Court because the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the civil fraud determination 
eliminated a large portion of the estate’s liability.   
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MR. SHAPIRO: -- it is presumed correct.  
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  -- you rely on the rule, do we even have to 
resolve the issue on the meaning of report in the statute?  Can’t we 
simply, from your position, rely on the rule and say you’ve got to 
follow your own rules? 
 
MR. SHAPIRO:  Absolutely.  This is a report that must be 
submitted.  It is presumed correct under this rule.  It’s an 
independent evaluation of credibility from the only judge who heard 
the witnesses, and of course, it’s part of the record.  And it doesn’t --   
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  So you’ve really got three arguments.  You’ve 
got the rule.  You’ve got the statute, and you have due process.  
 
MR. SHAPIRO:  And it doesn’t make the slightest difference that 
the superior judge caused the subordinate judge to say, I have 
changed my mind at a later stage in the proceeding, because it is the 
original report that is presumed correct under the rules.190   
 
An exchange between the Court and counsel for the Commissioner on the 
same topic highlighted the critical procedural question in the case:  Does a 
post-trial report submitted by a special trial judge in a § 7443A(b)(4) 
proceeding but later withdrawn by the authoring judge in favor of a 
substitute report continue to have significance under the Tax Court’s 
procedures, or is the withdrawn report treated as a nullity?   
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  . . . The rule presumes that some original 
document, which you are treating as provisional, enjoys a 
presumption of correctness, and I don’t see the consistency between 
provisionality and deliberate character on the one hand and 
presumption on the other.  
 
MR. HUNGAR:  If I may, Your Honor, the rule does not state that 
the, quote, original report shall receive a presumption of correctness.  
It doesn’t even say that -- that any report shall receive a presumption 
of correctness.  It says the findings of fact recommended by the 
special trial judge.   
 
                                                     
190  Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–9, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 
(2005).  
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JUSTICE SOUTER:  And aren’t those findings of fact the findings 
of fact that are delivered to the chief judge in the report that is made 
to the chief judge before it is even assigned to a Tax Court judge? 
 
MR. HUNGAR:  Not if -- not if the tax -- if the special trial judge 
has abandoned those recommendations, withdrawn those 
recommendations, and replaced them.   
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  But he hasn’t abandoned them at the point he 
delivers them to the chief judge, and if that’s what this is referring to, 
then the presumption of the -- of -- of correctness necessarily has to 
apply to whatever the document is that’s delivered to the chief judge.  
 
MR. HUNGAR:  Well, it applies to the report, but I submit that if 
the special trial judge withdraws in order to correct an error in the 
report, what he submits as the corrected report is then the, quote, 
report.191   
 
After members of the Court continued to press counsel for the 
Commissioner on the application of Rule 183 in the case, counsel 
appropriately noted that the ability of the special trial to change his initial 
report under Rule 183 was not among the questions presented in the 
case.192  Rather, Rule 183 had been raised by Kanter’s estate only in 
connection with the level of deference owed to the factual findings of the 
special trial judge as a result of the rule’s treatment of such findings as 
presumptively correct.   
Although predicting the result and rationale of a Supreme Court 
decision based on the content of oral argument is an approach fraught with 
                                                     
191  Id. at 38–39.   Earlier in the argument, counsel for the Commissioner and 
Justice Souter engaged in a similar exchange: 
 
MR. HUNGAR:  . . . the important thing to understand, Your Honor, is 
that nothing in the rule precludes, during the course of the deliberative 
process that then follows, the special trial judge from concluding that he has 
made a mistake, that he no longer agrees with the -- the stated findings of 
fact in that -- in that original report, from withdrawing and submitting a 
corrected report.   
 
JUSTICE SOUTER:  But that is not the way the rule reads.  The rule reads, 
as I understand it, under (c) that the court itself may accept, reject, or 
modify.  It doesn’t say anything about the special trial judge reconsidering 
and rewriting his report. 
Id. at 29–30.   
192  Id. at 46.   
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peril, the tenor and content of the oral argument in Ballard strongly 
resonated in the Court’s resolution of the case.193  Justice Ginsburg, writing 
for a seven-justice majority, reversed the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit 
and Seventh Circuit.  The grounds for reversal did not rest in the due 
process clause or any statute governing the appeal of Tax Court decisions 
or the publication of Tax Court documents.  Rather, the Supreme Court 
grounded its decision in the Tax Court’s failure to follow its published 
procedure governing the proceeding under Rule 183.194   
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by tracing the 
development of the Tax Court’s procedures for reviewing the reports of 
special trial judges is cases assigned to them for trial pursuant to 
§ 7443A(b)(4).  In the course of this discussion, the Court accepted the 
taxpayers’ premise that, following the 1983 amendments to Rule 183, the 
Tax Court adopted the following novel practice regarding the post-trial 
report issued by the special trial judge to the chief judge: 
 
No longer does the Tax Court judge assigned the case alone review 
the report and issue a decision adopting it, modifying it, or rejecting 
it in whole or in part.  Instead, the Tax Court judge treats the special 
trial judge’s report essentially as an in-house draft to be worked over 
collaboratively by the regular judge and the special trial judge.195    
 
In reaching this understanding, the Court cited the declaration by Mr. Dick 
concerning his informal conversations with members of the Tax Court, 
quoting from his affidavit.  Additionally, the Court observed the remarkable 
degree of unanimity between special trial judges and their reviewing Tax 
Court judge peers noted by Judge Cudahy in his dissent to the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Estate of Kanter.   
Unlike the appellate courts below, the Supreme Court was not 
indifferent to the presumed collaborative process between the special trial 
judge and the reviewing Tax Court.   Rather, in the Court’s view, the 
anomalous practice represented an “unreasonable” and “arbitrary” 
interpretation of Rule 183.196  The Court thereafter explained its 
interpretation of the procedural rule:  Rule 183(b) referred to the report 
initially communicated by the presiding special trial judge to the chief judge 
of the Tax Court—not some later report representing the collaborative 
work of the special trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court judge.  
Furthermore, this initial report (which the Court referred to as the “Rule 
183(b) report” for clarity) served as the subject of Rule 183(c), a provision 
                                                     
193  See Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).  
194  Id. at 58–59.   
195  Id. at 57.   
196  Id. at 59, 61.      
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the Court observed was captioned “Action on the Report.”  Noting that 
Rule 183(c) required the Tax Court to accord the factual findings of the 
presiding special trial judge deference when conducting the review process, 
the Court highlighted the anomaly that would result if Rule 183(c) were 
interpreted as referring to a subsequent report submitted by the special trial 
judge with the aid of the reviewing judge:   
 
One would be hard put to explain . . . how a final decisionmaker, 
here the Tax Court judge, would give “due regard” to, and 
“presum[e] to be correct,” an opinion the judge himself collaborated 
in producing.197 
 
Unmoved by any purported efficiencies generated by the Tax Court’s 
assumed practice, the Court found that the practice was not warranted by 
the Tax Court’s published procedures.  The Court’s rationale can therefore 
be summed up through the following blunt observation:  “The Tax Court, 
like all other decisionmaking tribunals, is obligated to follow its own 
Rules.”198    
The Court’s disposition of the case in Ballard undoubtedly was colored 
by its displeasure with the lack of transparency in the Tax Court’s alleged 
practice of reviewing special trial judge reports.  The Court noted the 
routine practice in federal judicial and administrative decision making 
tribunals to disclose the initial report of the hearing officer to the parties 
and to include the hearing officer’s report in the appellate record.199  The 
Court viewed the assumed “concealment” of the special trial judge’s initial 
report by the Tax Court as representing a “departure of . . . bold character” 
from the prevailing norm.200  Given this perspective, the Court was not 
inclined to afford the Tax Court considerable leniency in the interpretation 
and application of its procedural rules.   
The Court in Ballard noted that the Tax Court’s assumed practice of 
failing to disclose the original report issued by the special trial judge and of 
“obscuring” the procedure by which the Tax Court judge reviewed such 
report impeded “fully informed” appellate review.”201  While this point 
appeared to channel the rationale of Judge Cudahy in his dissent in the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Estate of Kanter, the Supreme Court was not 
similarly willing to resolve the case on constitutional grounds.  Indeed, the 
Court likely was reluctant to invoke notions of due process to achieve the 
                                                     
197  Id. at 59.   
198  Id.   
199  See id. at 46.   
200 Id.; see also id. at 61 (“We are all the more resistant to the Tax Court’s 
concealment of the only special trial judge report its Rules authorize given the 
generally prevailing practice regarding a tribunal’s use of hearing officers.”).   
201  Id. at 59–60.  
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result it desired in the case, concerned over the ramifications of a decision 
on those grounds.  Justice Breyer remarked at oral argument as follows:  “If 
we have to go to the Constitution, I don’t see exactly the implications.  So 
I’m nervous.” 202 Accordingly, the Court did not resolve the case on the 
basis of due process violations alleged by the taxpayers or, for that matter, 
the myriad claimed statutory violations.  Instead, the Court merely warned 
that if the Tax Court were to modify its procedural rules to expressly 
condone its assumed practice in this context, any such change would be 
subject to review on constitutional and statutory grounds at that time.  
The result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard may not have been 
surprising, given the lack of transparency embodied in the Tax Court’s 
assumed practice of reviewing special trial judge reports.  Yet the Court’s 
rationale proved exceedingly weak.  As the body that promulgated the 
procedural rule the Court thrust to the forefront of the resolution of the 
case, one would expect the Tax Court to be afforded wide deference in 
determining the proper application of the Rule.203   
In that regard, reconciling the assumed practice of the Tax Court with 
the terms of Rule 183 did not present an overwhelming task.  Rule 183(b) 
referred to the report submitted by the special trial judge to the chief judge 
for assignment, and Rule 183(c) was captioned “Action on the Report.”  As 
the majority explained, these two provisions presumably referred to the 
same document.  However, if the special trial judge were to withdraw that 
report and substitute an amended report in its place,204 the withdrawn 
report would be rendered a nullity.  Only one report would remain—the 
later submitted substitute—to be governed by the Rule 183 procedures.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, explained this interpretation of 
Rule 183 more succinctly: 
 
Paragraph (c)’s use of the possessive “Special Trial Judge’s report” is 
most naturally read to refer to the report authored and ascribed to by 
the special trial judge.  If the special trial judge changes his report, 
                                                     
202  Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 
(2005).  
203  This point essentially summarizes the dissent authored by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in the case, which was joined by Justice Thomas:  “The Tax Court’s 
compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we should defer to the 
interpretation of that court.” Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 68 (2005) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).   
204  How the special trial judge would arrive at the decision to withdraw the 
report initially submitted to the chief judge in this manner—whether through 
further independent research or contemplation, or through input received from the 
reviewing judge—would be irrelevant, as no prohibition existed on collaboration 
between the special trial judge and the reviewing Tax Court judge (or, for that 
matter, any other judge of the Tax Court). 
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then the new version becomes “the Special Trial Judge’s report.”  It 
is the special trial judge’s signature that makes the report attributable 
to him.205   
 
Under this approach, the withdrawn and superseded initial report of the 
special trial judge would have no lasting significance.  Rather, it would 
amount to a prior draft of the final report submitted in the name of the 
special trial judge.  And no party claimed entitlement to discovery of prior 
drafts of Tax Court opinions or reports as such.  Hence, the reasonableness 
of the Tax Court’s interpretation of Rule 183 turned on the reasonableness 
of treating a report, initially submitted by the special trial judge but later 
withdrawn by the same judge, as an internal draft.206  Views on this question 
may differ, but treating the withdrawn report as a nullity certainly is not 
unreasonable or arbitrary as characterized by the Supreme Court majority in 
Ballard.207   
The Supreme Court’s invocation of Rule 183 as the basis for its decision 
in favor of the taxpayers in Ballard represented something of a path of least 
resistance for the Court to achieve its desired result.  The Court clearly was 
not enamored with the assumed practice of the Tax Court, as evidenced by 
its repeated characterization of the Tax Court’s “concealment” of the 
special trial judge’s initial report.  By basing its decision on the Tax Court’s 
                                                     
205  Id. at 71.   
206  Another way of framing the same issue is whether, after having submitted 
the initial draft of his post-trial report to the chief judge, the presiding special trial 
judge had any standing to participate in the case going forward. 
207  See id. (“At the very least, it is not unreasonable or arbitrary for the Tax 
Court to construe the Rule as not requiring the disclosure of preliminary drafts or 
reports.”).  Regarding the Court’s rhetorical question concerning how a reviewing 
Tax Court judge could afford deference to factual findings that judge helped 
prepare, see id. at 59, the question does not highlight a logical obstacle.  In fact, the 
answer is simple:  the reviewing judge would be affording deference to the 
substituted factual findings of the special trial judge with which the reviewing judge 
likely agrees.  The rhetorical question becomes problematic only if the substituted 
findings of fact do not actually represent those of the special trial judge, but instead 
only those of the reviewing Tax Court judge, notwithstanding the special trial 
judge’s issuance of the substituted report.  This approach assumes the existence of 
reviewing Tax Court judges who routinely impose their views on consistently 
compliant special trial judges.  It ignores the prospect of (a) a reviewing Tax Court 
judge who does not desire to participate in the “quasi-collaborative” deliberative 
process in the first place, (b) a special trial judge who resists suggestions of the 
reviewing Tax Court judge that contravene his own, and (c) a special trial judge 
who simply wishes to be rid of the case after submitting his post-trial report to the 
Chief Judge.  Hence, the Tax Court’s interpretation of Rule 183(c) did not 
necessarily produce illogical results as the majority suggested. 
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“arbitrary construction” of Rule 183,208 at the Tax Court’s expense, the 
Supreme Court was able to avoid broaching the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process protections—a critical but evolving constitutional doctrine—to 
dispose of the case before it.209  However, it is worth noting that the dissent 
authored by Judge Cudahy in Estate of Kanter, which appeared to influence 
the majority’s decision in Ballard, determined that the Tax Court’s assumed 
practice of quasi-collaborative decision making was not precluded by Rule 
183.  Rather, Judge Cudahy’s point of contention rested in the Tax Court’s 
refusal to include the initial findings of the special trial judge in the appellate 
record—an issue that has nothing to do with Rule 183. 210  Judge Cudahy 
viewed the initial report as indispensable to meaningful review of the Tax 
Court’s ultimate factual findings, and he was willing to invoke the litigants’ 
constitutional rights to due process of law as a means of assuring its 
inclusion.  The Supreme Court in Ballard, however, did not see the need to 
follow Judge Cudahy down this sobering legal path to achieve essentially 
the same result.   
Typically, the Supreme Court’s resolution of the case triggers a 
denouement of sorts in the legal proceedings.  Not in this instance.  Rather, 
the decision in Ballard pointed to a crescendo:  production of the elusive 
initial report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion in Investment Research Associates, 
if indeed the claimed prior report even existed.  However, obtaining access 
to this report involved additional procedural maneuvering, as the Supreme 
Court in Ballard did not order its production.  The Court reversed the 
judgments of the Eleventh Circuit in Ballard and the Seventh Circuit in 
Estate of Kanter to the extent those judgments upheld the Tax Court’s 
exclusion of the special trial judge’s initial post-trial report from the record 
on appeal, and remanded the cases for “further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.”211 
 
                                                     
208  Id. at 61.   
209  Basing its decision on the variety of narrow statutory grounds raised by the 
parties and their amici would have similarly permitted the Court to limit 
ramifications of its holding.  Presumably, either the Court found the statutory 
avenues for ruling in the taxpayers’ favor less meritorious than the Rule 183 
rationale, or the Court determined the Rule 183 approach to present the preferred 
narrow basis for its decision.      
210  See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Tax Court’s 
interpretation of its own rules of procedure receives a great deal of deference.  
Therefore, the 1983 amendment to the Tax Court rules had the effect of no longer 
requiring that the parties (or the general public or a reviewing court, for that 
matter) have access to the STJ’s report.”).   
211  Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65.   
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6. Release of the Initial Report of the Special Trial Judge 
 
The Seventh Circuit was the first court to grabble with the Court’s 
decision in Ballard on remand.212  In a per curiam opinion issued on May 9, 
2005, the majority in Estate of Kanter II declined the estate’s request for the 
initial report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion to be produced on the parties 
and included in the record on appeal.213  Instead, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s decision.  Judge Cudahy, however, expressed his 
displeasure at protracting the proceedings in this manner:  “This report 
must be included in the record, and I see no reason why it cannot be 
produced without further delay.  It was improperly withheld, and its 
nondisclosure ought to cease—now.”214   
The next court to act on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard was the 
Eleventh Circuit.  On May 17, 2005, it granted Ballard’s motion to include 
the initial report submitted by Special Trial Judge Couvillion in the appellate 
record, directing the Tax Court to transmit the appellate record as 
supplemented within 14 days.215  The Tax Court complied, producing the 
report for the first time on May 26, 2005.   
The release of Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial post-trial report in 
Investment Research Associates confirmed the suspicions of the taxpayers’ 
attorneys.  In the initial report, spanning some 300 pages, Special Trial 
Judge Couvillion unqualifiedly rejected the Commissioner’s central theory 
of the case:   
 
Respondent has not demonstrated that there was an underpayment 
tax by any of the petitioners arising out of what respondent derisively 
described throughout the trial as “kickback schemes” wherein 
moneys were exacted as a condition for doing business, and that 
such moneys constituted income that was nor [sic] reported by 
petitioners. 
. . .  
[T]here were no “kickback schemes”, and none of the alleged 
“kickback schemes” payments by “the Five” represented unreported 
                                                     
212  See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005).   
213  See id. at 934.   
214  Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).   
215  See Order of Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ballard v. Commissioner, 
Docket 01-17249-GG (May 17, 2005), reprinted in Crystal Tandon, Eleventh Circuit in 
Ballard Orders Special Trial Judge Report Included in Record, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 24, 
2005, available at 2005 TNT 99-2.   
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taxable income of Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle.  There was, therefore, 
no underpayment of tax.216 
 
Having rejected the Commissioner’s deficiency determinations, the 
Commissioner’s assertion of a civil fraud penalty quickly fell by the wayside: 
 
[I]n the Court’s view, certain transactions that respondent cited . . . in 
asserting petitioners are liable for these additions to tax for fraud, at 
best, amount to only respondent’s suspicions of fraud.  The Court, 
however, does not consider these transactions as even rising to the 
level of suspicion of fraud.  Consequently, the Court holds that 
petitioners are not liable for additions to tax for fraud under section 
6653(b).217   
 
The initial report submitted by Special Judge Couvillion in Investment 
Research Associates is difficult to reconcile with his subsequent report, to put 
it mildly.  The incompatibility of the two is even more striking when one 
considers that a penalty for civil tax fraud—the imposition of which the 
subsequent report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion affirmed—requires the 
Government to establish fraudulent conduct by clear and convincing 
evidence.218  The disclosure of Judge Couvillion’s initial report in the case 
therefore left the Tax Court to face considerable challenges on the public 
relations front.   
Through a July 19, 2005 order issued in the Estate of Lisle proceeding 
that remained before the Tax Court, Chief Judge Gerber referred to the 
observation by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Ballard that 
“we do not know what happened in the Tax Court, a point that is 
important to underscore here.”219  Chief Judge Gerber therefore sought to 
clarify the record in the case by serving the parties with separate statements 
                                                     
216  Initial Report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion, Investment Research 
Assocs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, at 84–85.  This report is reproduced as an 
attachment to a June 16, 2005 order issued by Chief Judge Gerber ordering the 
service of the report on the parties and its inclusion in the record.  The order, with 
attachments, is accessible on the Tax Court’s website at: 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcDockInq/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexID=419
7532.   
217  Id. at 85–86.   
218  The change in the two reports is stark.  Whereas the initial report found that 
the events in question did not give rise to a suspicion of fraud, the subsequent 
report declared that “what we have here, purely and simply, is a concerted effort by 
an experienced tax lawyer and two corporate executives to defeat and evade the 
payment of taxes and to cover up their illegal acts.”  Investment Research Assocs., 
Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 1083.   
219  Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 67 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
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provided by former Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen, Judge Dawson, and 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion, each describing the procedures that were 
followed in the proceedings that culminated in the Tax Court’s 
memorandum decision in Investment Research Associates. Together, the three 
statements largely confirmed the “quasi-collaborative” judicial deliberation 
process assumed by the Seventh Circuit in Estate of Kanter and by the 
Supreme Court in Ballard.  A summary follows. 
On June 23, 1998, Special Trial Judge Couvillion transmitted his 
recommended findings and opinion in the case to Chief Judge Cohen.  On 
July 14, 1998, Chief Judge Cohen referred the document to Judge Dawson, 
for review and possible adoption.   
On August 20, 1998, Judge Dawson telephoned Chief Judge Cohen to 
inform her that he disagreed with Judge Couvillion’s report and could not 
adopt it.  Chief Judge Cohen next contacted Judge Julian I. Jacobs to 
determine if he could review the report for potential adoption.  Judge 
Jacobs declined, however, citing his personal friendship with Randall Dick, 
counsel for Kanter.  Chief Judge Cohen thereafter reviewed Judge 
Couvillion’s report to determine if perhaps she could adopt it.  Viewing the 
facts as not supporting the opinion, she concluded that she could not.   
Chief Judge Cohen thereafter scheduled a meeting with Judge Couvillion 
and Judge Dawson to discuss how to best proceed with the case.  On 
September 1, 1998, the day prior to their scheduled meeting, Judge 
Couvillion informed Chief Judge Cohen that he was withdrawing his report.  
In Judge Couvillion’s words, “I requested that the report I submitted be 
withdrawn for further consideration.”  The withdrawn report was returned 
to Judge Couvillion on that date and regarded by those involved as nullity.   
The judges thereafter agreed that Judge Couvillion and Judge Dawson 
would collaborate on the preparation of a revised report to be submitted by 
Judge Couvillion for adoption.  Judge Dawson’s statement indicates that 
this arrangement was requested by Special Trial Judge Couvillion, and that 
Judge Dawson agreed with the arrangement following the approval of Chief 
Judge Cohen.  This process yielded a revised report submitted by Judge 
Couvillion to Chief Judge Cohen on September 2, 1999.  Judge Dawson 
described the arrangement leading to the revised report as “a collaborative 
judicial deliberation” of the sort indicated by the Supreme Court and the 
Courts of Appeals.  For his part, Judge Couvillion described that he and 
Judge Dawson worked together on each of the many issues raised in the 
case, and that findings and conclusions on each were “based on the 
concurrence of the two of us.”  Chief Judge Cohen described the 
arrangement between Judge Couvillion and Judge Dawson as consistent 
with the collegial process that pervaded the Tax Court, citing the customary 
practice of proposed opinions being reviewed by the Chief Judge and all 
judicial officers of the court prior to their release.   
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Chief Judge Cohen referred Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s substituted 
report to Judge Dawson on September 2, 1999, for his final review.  On 
October 25, 1999, Judge Dawson adopted the revised report and submitted 
it to Chief Judge Cohen.  On November 4, 1999, Chief Judge Cohen 
approved the report with some modifications and directed that it be filed as 
a Memorandum Opinion.  On December 15, 1999, Chief Judge Cohen 
issued an order reassigning the cases to Judge Dawson for decision, and the 
opinion was filed as T.C. Memo. 1999-407 on that date.   
In her statement, Chief Judge Cohen specifically addressed the allegation 
that Special Trial Judge Couvillion had been “reversed” by Judge Dawson 
or, for that matter, anyone else.  She viewed this as a mischaracterization of 
events, explaining that “Judge Couvillion reconsidered the cases and 
reversed himself.”  
In an appearance before the Court Procedure Committee of the 
America Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting in September of 
2005, then Chief Judge Gerber sought to clarify the Tax Court’s procedures 
with respect to the review of special trial judge reports prior to the issuance 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard.  In particular, Chief Judge 
Gerber placed the review of special trial judge reports in the larger context 
of the Tax Court’s traditional practices: 
 
Judges prepare proposed opinions and submit them to the Chief 
Judge for review.  The Chief Judge, with the assistance of legal staff, 
reviews the opinions and notes changes in the text and margins.  On 
occasion, a proposed opinion may disagree with a prior opinion or 
several judges may have the same legal issue and the Chief Judge may 
arrange an informal discussion among the Judges to try to resolve 
any disagreements.  If a matter is sufficiently important, the Chief 
Judge may refer it to the Court Conference for consideration and 
review by all 19 presidentially appointed Judges.  A majority of the 
Court Conference may reach a result different from that proposed by 
the initial authoring judge, who may also have been the trial Judge.  
In that event, the opinion issued by the Court would differ from the 
report initially offered by the trial Judge.  That collegial process has 
served to provide a generally uniform body of law and precedent.   
Special Trial Judges’ proposed opinions under Rule 183 were 
reviewed and treated in the same manner as opinions of regular 
judges.  The Special Trial Judges’ proposed opinions were first sent 
to the Office of the Chief Judge where [they were] reviewed for 
quality and uniformity with prior precedent.  At this juncture, the 
Chief Judge did not decide how the opinion was to be published or 
whether it required full court review.  The Chief Judge’s staff made 
suggestions, both in the text and in the margins.  After that review, 
the proposed opinion was sent to a presidentially appointed judge for 
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review and adoption.  The adopting judge would also perform a 
review for quality and uniformity with prior precedent, likewise 
placing suggestions in the text and margins.  Finally, the opinion with 
editorial markings was returned to the Special Trial Judge, who 
decided whether or not to change the original proposed opinion.  If 
there was disagreement, there could be deliberations between the 
adopting judge and Special Trial Judge.  Ultimately, the Special Trial 
Judge would craft and forward an opinion which was adopted by a 
regular judge and, in turn, forwarded for the Chief Judge’s 
consideration and issuance.   
Judges and Special Trial Judges considered the draft of their 
opinion that was submitted to the Chief Judge to be part of the 
deliberative process.  Accordingly, each Judge or Special Trial Judge 
was permitted to set [his] own retention policy with respect to [his] 
own deliberative materials.  It is important to recognize that the 
Judges and Special Trial Judges understood that deliberative 
materials, which include draft opinions, are not made part of the 
public record.  As far as I am aware, that is the practice of all federal 
courts with respect to draft opinions.220   
 
7. Corrective Action 
 
On the heels of releasing Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial report, 
the Tax Court on July 7, 2005, proposed amendments to its Rules of 
Practice and Procedure governing cases assigned to a Special Trial Judge for 
hearing but not decision.221  As explained above,222 the amendments largely 
returned to the transparent review process embodied in former Rule 182 
prior to its amendment in 1983.  The proposed modifications were 
intended to align the Tax Court’s practice in this area with the procedures 
employed by Federal district courts to review the findings and 
recommendations of a Magistrate Judge.223  The amendments to Rule 183 
proposed an effective date of September 20, 2005, and amendments later 
                                                     
220  Chief Judge Joel Gerber, Speech to ABA Tax Section Court Procedure 
Committee, at 3–4 (Sept. 16, 2005); see also Sheryl Stratton, In Ballard’s Wake, Tax 
Court Releases Initial Reports, 108 TAX NOTES 1230, 1230–31 (Sept. 12, 2005) 
(reporting similar description provided by Chief Judge Gerber through interview).       
221  See Press Release, United States Tax Court, July 7, 2005.   
222  For an analysis of the 2005 amendments to Tax Court Rules 182 and 183, 
see text accompanying supra notes 102–106.     
223  Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 183, 125 T.C. 342, 345–46 (2005).  In 
addition to the amendments to Rule 183, the Tax Court revised its procedures 
under Rule 182 to incorporate the Rule 183 procedures when reviewing reports of 
special trial judges in cases concerning small amounts of tax that were not subject 
to the special small tax case procedures.  TAX CT. R. 182(e), 125 T.C. 342 (2005).     
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were adopted as of that date.224  Accordingly, the procedural environment 
that created the prospect of the Ballard litigation has been rectified.225   
In addition to rectifying its procedures going forward in the manner 
suggested by the Supreme Court, the Tax Court conducted a search for 
retained copies of initial opinions submitted by special trial judges to the 
chief judge pursuant to Rule 183(b).  The search involved reviewing over 
900 cases in which a report of a special trial judge had been adopted under 
the post-1983 streamlined procedures of Rule 183.  Of these cases, the 
court was able to identify 117 initial reports that had been preserved by the 
Court.226  “For purposes of transparency and in the spirit of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion,”227 Chief Judge Gerber ordered these initial reports to be 
served on the parties on August 19, 2005.  However, each order reminded 
the parties that the decisions in the cases were final under § 7481 and would 
not be re-opened.  
Responding to a request of a reporter from the Chicago Tribune, the Tax 
Court matched the 117 identified reports to the final opinions for review at 
the court.  This review identified four other cases in which the outcome of 
the final opinion differed from that of the initial report of the special trial 
judge; three were changed in favor of the taxpayer, one in favor of the 
Government.228  In this manner, the Tax Court attempted to eliminate any 
remaining shroud of secrecy surrounding its prior practices for reviewing 
the reports of special trial judges, to the extent possible.   
 
8. Remand of the Proceedings to the Tax Court 
 
Returning to the proceedings in the litigation, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Ballard, like the Seventh Circuit in Estate of Kanter, 
vacated the Tax Court’s decision in Investment Research Associates and 
                                                     
224  See Press Release, United States Tax Court, Sept. 21, 2005.  The 
amendments as adopted are reported in 125 T.C. 342–43 (2005).      
225  However, the potential incompatibility of the presumption of correctness 
afforded to the findings of the special trial judge under Rule 183 with the 
requirement that the decision in the case be entered by a regular Tax Court judge 
pursuant to § 7443A(c)—as raised in the Freytag litigation—remains.   
226  Sheryl Stratton, In Ballard’s Wake, Tax Court Releases Initial Reports, 108 TAX 
NOTES 1230, 1230–31 (Sept. 12, 2005).  Chief Judge Gerber later explained that the 
search included inquiries of retired judges and a search of the court’s computers for 
electronic copies.  Chief Judge Joel Gerber, Speech to ABA Tax Section Court 
Procedure Committee, at 5 (Sept. 16, 2005).   
227  Id.   
228  See Maurice Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed in at Least 5 Cases, 
Chi. Trib., Sept. 5, 2005, at C1; Sheryl Stratton, In Ballard’s Wake, Tax Court Releases 
Initial Reports, 108 TAX NOTES 1230, 1230–31 (Sept. 12, 2005); see also Chief Judge 
Joel Gerber, Speech to ABA Tax Section Court Procedure Committee, at 5 (Sept. 
16, 2005).   
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remanded the case to the Tax Court.229  Yet the Eleventh Circuit had the 
benefit of the Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial report in the case and 
the Tax Court’s clarifying statements at the time of its decision.  The 
Eleventh Circuit evidently was not mollified by the Tax Court’s explanation.  
If anything, the court appeared perturbed.  The court commented on the 
recently-disclosed details of behind-the-scene events at the Tax Court as 
follows:    
 
Altering the original credibility determinations and findings of Judge 
Couvillion without explanation was not only contrary to the 
requirements of the law but also misleading.  It is obvious now that 
the withholding of Special Trial Judge Couvillion's original report 
did, in fact, impede the process of appellate review.230 
 
The Eleventh Circuit therefore adorned its remand of the case with a 
detailed set of instructions:  (1) the “collaborative report” that served as the 
basis for the Tax Court’s decision in the case was to be stricken from the 
record; (2) the initial post-trial report submitted by Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion was to be reinstated; (3) the reinstated report was to be referred 
to a judge of the Tax Court who had no involvement in the preparation of 
the collaborative report; (4) the reviewing Tax Court judge was to give “due 
regard” to Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s credibility determinations, and 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s findings were to be presumed correct unless 
“manifestly unreasonable;” and (5) the Tax Court was to adhere strictly to 
its recently amended Rule 183(b) procedures.231  By footnote, the Eleventh 
Circuit specifically instructed that former Chief Judge Cohen, Judge 
Dawson, and Judge Couvillion were to have no involvement in the Tax 
Court’s review of the reinstated report.232  Reflecting its ongoing interest in 
the resolution of the case, the panel retained jurisdiction of any subsequent 
appeal of the Tax Court’s decision to be issued on remand.233  
The directive from the Eleventh Circuit left the unmistakable 
impression that it expected the Tax Court to adopt the initial report of 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion in full.  Yet the Eleventh Circuit could not 
order this result expressly, lest it usurp the role of the Tax Court as the 
body responsible for entering the trial decision in the case.   
A few weeks after the Eleventh Circuit remanded the Ballard case to the 
Tax Court on a restricted basis, the Fifth Circuit followed suit in Estate of 
Lisle.234  Although Lisle’s estate had not appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
                                                     
229  See Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005).   
230  Id. at 1032.   
231  Id.   
232  Id. at 1032 n.7.   
233  Id. at 1027.   
234 See Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2005).   
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in the case, the court nonetheless recalled its earlier mandate to the Tax 
Court to recalculate the remaining deficiency in the case “in the interest of 
fairness” and to prevent “possible injustice.”235  The Fifth Circuit subjected 
its remand of the case to the same terms and conditions mandated by the 
Eleventh Circuit.   
 
9. The Tax Court’s Resolution of the Case on Remand 
 
As directed by the Courts of Appeal, the initial post-trial report of 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion was reinstated in the record and assigned to 
Tax Court Judge Harry A. Haines for review.  Judge Haines clearly satisfied 
the requirement of having no involvement in the “collaborative report” 
produced by Special Trial Judge Couvillion and Judge Dawson, as Judge 
Haines was not a member of the Tax Court when those events transpired.  
To accommodate the recently revised procedures under Rule 183, the 
parties were afforded an opportunity to file written objections to Special 
Trial Judge Couvillion’s reinstated report.  The Commissioner and Kanter’s 
estate availed themselves of this procedural opportunity; Ballard and Lisle’s 
estate did not.  All three taxpayers responded to the Commissioner’s 
objections, and the Commissioner responded to the objections raised by 
Kanter’s estate.  
Judge Haines issued his decision in the case, captioned Estate of Kanter v. 
Commissioner,236 on February 1, 2007.  At the outset of the opinion, Judge 
Haines clarified that he would accept the factual findings of Special Trial 
Judge Couvillion unless “manifestly unreasonable” as directed.  Judge 
Haines wrestled with the precise contours of this standard of review at the 
outset of the opinion, concluding that the standard required Judge 
Couvillion’s findings to be accepted unless the finding was (1) internally 
inconsistent or so implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not 
believe it, or (2) directly contradicted by documentary or objective 
evidence.237  Judge Haines interpreted the remand instructions from the 
Courts of Appeals to have imposed this same level of deference to the 
credibility determinations reached by Special Trial Judge Couvillion, rather 
than directing those credibility determinations to have binding effect.238  
 In his opinion, spanning over 400 pages and addressing 24 identified 
issues, Judge Haines went to painstaking lengths to segregate the findings of 
fact incorporated from Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial report from 
those that reflected departures from the initial report.  In the course of the 
decision, Judge Haines determined that certain findings of fact warranted 
                                                     
235  Id. at 439.   
236  T.C. Memo. 2007-21, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721.   
237  Id. at 735.   
238  Id.   
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rejection even under the manifestly unreasonable standard, and he 
supplemented other original findings that he viewed as incomplete.  Most 
notably, Judge Haines determined that the ultimate holding recommended 
in Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s original report—that Kanter, Ballard, and 
Lisle did not participate in the alleged kickback scheme—was “directly 
contradicted by the overwhelming objective evidence” in the case.239  
Additionally, Judge Haines rejected a number of credibility determinations 
reflected in the initial report under the manifestly unreasonable standard.  
Ultimately, Judge Haines, like Judge Dawson before him, found that Ballard 
and Kanter had engaged in civil tax fraud240 and that all three taxpayers 
were liable for income tax deficiencies on unreported income.241   
 
10.  The Unwelcomed Return to the Courts of Appeals 
 
In light of the second round of appellate review in the Ballard litigation, 
Judge Haines’ thorough review of Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial 
post-trial report in the case proved to be an exercise in futility.  The 
Eleventh Circuit determined that none of Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s 
findings of fact were clearly erroneous;242 rather, in the court’s view, the 
record fully supported Judge Couvillion’s initial findings and conclusions.243  
The error rested with Judge Haines.  According to the Eleventh Circuit, he 
failed to accord the findings of fact and credibility determinations of Judge 
Couvillion the appropriate level of deference,244 conducting instead a 
“nearly de novo review of the facts.”245  Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit 
remanded the case to the Tax Court once again, this time with an even 
more restrictive instruction:  to vacate Judge Haines’ opinion and to enter 
an order approving and adopting Judge Couvillion’s report as the opinion 
of the Tax Court.246   
At this stage, it is worth recalling the taxpayer’s procedural argument in 
Freytag: that the level of deference required to be accorded the findings of 
the special trial judge under Rule 183(c) effectively permitted the special 
trial judge to enter the decision in the case, contrary to the limitation 
imposed § 7443A(c).  Following the Eleventh Circuit’s second decision in 
Ballard, the argument gained newfound persuasiveness.  
The Fifth Circuit was the next circuit court to follow suit.  After 
conducting an independent review of the record, it agreed with the decision 
                                                     
239  Id. at 787.   
240  Id. at 802.   
241  Id. at 805. 
242  Ballard v. Commissioner, 522 F.3d 1229, 1249 (11th Cir. 2008).   
243  Id. at 1254.   
244  Id. at 1249.   
245  Id. at 1254.   
246  Id. at 1255.   
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of the Eleventh Circuit as it applied to Lisle.247 Specifically, the court 
determined that the trial record adequately supported Judge Couvillion’s 
initial determination that Lisle had no deficiency in tax.248   
The Seventh Circuit rounded out the trio, following the two circuit 
courts before it in concluding that Judge Haines’ review of Judge 
Couvillion’s report amounted to an inappropriate de novo evaluation of the 
evidence.249  The court acknowledged that the evidence in the case was not 
one-sided:  “This is not to say that there is not plenty of evidence in the 
record that supports the Tax Court’s decision.”250  Accordingly, either 
interpretation of the facts likely would have survived clear error review.  
However, because Special Trial Judge Couvillion was the initial trier of fact 
whose findings were entitled to deferential review, they were to be upheld 
unless clearly erroneous.251  The Seventh Circuit was satisfied that Judge 
Couvillion did not clearly err.   
In the end, Judge Haines’ review of Judge Couvillion’s initial report in 
Investment Research Associates did not suffer the potential inconsistent results 
of being appealed to three different courts.  All of them ordered the 
decision to be vacated in its entirety.252  In its place, the appellate courts 
ordered the Tax Court to enter an order adopting Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion’s initial report as the opinion of the Tax Court.253    
The last gasp in the Ballard litigation concerned the manner in which the 
Tax Court complied with the directive to issue an order adopting the initial 
report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion as its opinion in the case.  On 
October 15, 2010, the Tax Court in the Estate of Kanter case issued an order 
                                                     
247  Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 541 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2008).   
248  Id. at 597.   
249  Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 590 F.3d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 2009).   
250  Id.  
251  See id. at 421(identifying Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial report as the 
one entitled to deferential review).  
252  An observation by Professor Carlton Smith appears particularly apt:  “As I 
read the appellate court judges, they are in effect saying that they will ignore the 
Tax Court judge reviews of the special trial judge and substitute themselves as the 
reviewers of the special trial judge opinions.”  Sam Young, Kanter Plaintiffs Call for 
Investigation of Tax Court Judges, 126 TAX NOTES 181 (Mar. 8, 2010) (quoting 
Professor Smith). 
253  See Ballard v. Commissioner, 522 F.3d 1229, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(instructing the Tax Court to “enter an order approving and adopting Judge 
Couvillion’s original report as the opinion of the Tax Court”); Estate of Lisle v. 
Commissioner, 541 F.3d 595, 605 (5th Cir. 2008) (instructing the Tax Court to 
“enter an order adopting Judge Couvillion’s original report as the opinion of the 
Tax Court and to enter judgment consistent with that report and this opinion”); 
Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 590 F.3d 410, 427 (7th Cir. 2009) (instructing 
the Tax Court to “enter an order adopting the special trial judge’s report as the 
decision of the Tax Court”).    
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providing that “the Special Trial Judge’s report, made part of the record in 
this case on June 16, 2005, shall be treated as the Court’s opinion in the 
case.”254  The estate thereafter sought publication of the Special Trial 
Judge’s report, as adopted by the Tax Court, as an independent opinion of 
the court—one that would be indexed under the “Opinions” tab of the 
court’s website.  The court granted the motion to publish, but did so by 
uploading the special trial judge’s report as an attachment to the June 16, 
2005 order that was available under the “Docket Inquiry” tab of the court’s 
website.  This resolution led to yet another appeal to the Seventh Circuit by 
the Estate of Kanter, in which the estate sought publication of the Special 
Trial Judge’s initial report as a stand-alone opinion.  Finding that the Tax 
Court had fully complied with its directive to issue an order adopting 
Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial report as its opinion in the case, the 
Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of a justiciable controversy.255   
 
11.  Conclusion 
 
By all accounts, the saga of Ballard, Kanter, and Lisle represented a 
bruising affair for all involved—the parties and the Tax Court alike.  In 
published decisions, two separate judges of the Tax Court affirmed the 
Commissioner’s allegations that the taxpayers had engaged in a kickback 
scheme generating income that they fraudulently failed to report.  To avoid 
not only the serious financial consequences of this determination but also 
the personal and professional reputational damage it carried, the taxpayers 
(in certain cases represented by their estates) engaged in multiple rounds of 
litigation that spanned well over a decade.  The taxpayers ultimately proved 
successful on the merits, and they received a healthy dose of vindication 
along the way.  However, it is doubtful that the taxpayers found the 
resulting path equivalent to the elusive un-ringing of a bell.  
From the Tax Court’s perspective, the institution by no means emerged 
from the litigation unscathed.  Several judges, among them titans of the 
institution, saw their integrity publicly impugned with little if any ability to 
                                                     
254 See Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 432 Fed. Appx. 618 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(recounting the procedural posture of this aspect of the litigation).  The order 
issued on June 16, 2005, which includes Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s initial 
report as an attachment, is available on the Tax Court’s website at 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcDockInq/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexID=419
7532.   
255 Estate of Kanter, 432 Fed. Appx. at 620 (“We cannot find a justiciable 
controversy in the details of the Tax Court’s website design.”).  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Judge Cudahy issued a separate opinion reluctantly concurring.  See id. 
at 620–21 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part) (“From all appearances, the Tax Court is 
not a graceful loser and I can appreciate the dissatisfaction of the prevailing litigant 
with the Tax Court’s response to correction.”).   
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defend themselves directly.256  And for a brief period, the conduct of the 
Tax Court in this and similar proceedings was the subject of Congressional 
inquiry.257  These were surely uncomfortable positions, ones with which the 
court and its judges were not familiar.   
The circumstances that gave rise to the Ballard litigation have been 
eliminated through the Tax Court’s return to its prior transparent process 
of reviewing the reports of special trial judges.  Hence, the Ballard saga 
should be of minimal practical relevance in the future.  The lasting value of 
the proceedings may rest in their lesson concerning the potential costs of 




                                                     
256  See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Original Tax Court Report Found No Fraud Against 
Kanter, Ballard, 107 TAX NOTES 1216 (June 6, 2005); Sam Young, Kanter Plaintiffs 
Call for Investigation of Tax Court Judges, 126 TAX NOTES 181 (Mar. 8, 2010). 
257  See Crystal Tandon & Karla L. Miller, Judge’s Statements on Kanter, Ballard 
Provoke Dismay, 108 TAX NOTES 394, 395 (July 25, 2005) (reporting on investigation 
conducted by the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee); Louise Story, 
A Glimpse Inside U.S. Tax Court and How It Made a Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2005, at C4 (same).     





THE SMALL TAX CASE PROCEDURE AND 
SUPPORT FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
 
As of 2012, 68 percent of cases filed in the Tax Court were prosecuted 
by taxpayers without the benefit of representation.1  While this percentage 
varies, in modern times, the percentage of cases filed by taxpayers on a pro 
se basis has consistently exceeded half of the Tax Court’s docket.2  In light 
of these figures, the court has undertaken a number of measures to render 
the forum more accessible and its proceedings less intimidating to taxpayers 
who navigate the process on their own, likely due to the inability to afford 
representation.  Before discussing the Tax Court’s institutional outreach on 
this front, this chapter will begin by exploring the single most important 
legislative development aimed at accommodating self-represented litigants 
before the court—the small tax case procedure of § 7463.   
 
A. Small Tax Cases 
 
The small tax case procedure currently reflected in § 7463 arose out of 
congressional concern over the failure to provide a readily available means 
of impartial review of modest deficiency disputes.3  In response to this 
concern, the court, in 1968, adopted a procedure for small tax cases which 
provided for a simplified petition, early assignment to trial calendar, 
informal trial procedures and waiver of briefs.4  However, Congress 
believed that the then existing statutory provisions, with their requirement 
of technical rules of evidence, precluded such a procedure from achieving 
its greatest potential.5   Accordingly, the 1969 Tax Reform Act authorized a 
                                                     
1  Statistics provided by the Clerk of Court, United States Tax Court.   
2  Id.   
3  S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 302 (1969). 
4  During the fall of 1968, the Tax Court “in recognition of the apparent 
demand for a procedure for handling small tax claims simply and expeditiously” 
drafted a separate set of rules to accomplish these objectives.  These new 
procedures became effective Jan. 1, 1969.  Memorandum from Chief Judge 
Drennen to Tax Court Judges, Nov. 26, 1968, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Decisions: Memoranda & Correspondence;” see also Tax Court Conference 
Minutes, Nov. 1, 15, 29, 1968. 
5  At this time the Internal Revenue Code required that all proceedings begun in 
the Tax Court, irrespective of dollar amount, be conducted with equal formality.  
Laurence Goldfein and Michael I. Saltzman, The New Tax Court Small Claims 
Division: How It Will Operate, 34 J. TAX’N 2 (1971).  Section 7453 provides that every 
hearing must be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to 
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simplified and relatively informal procedure for deficiency disputes 
involving not more than $1,000.6   This amount has been periodically raised 
over time to $1,500, $5,000, $10,000, and, most recently, to $50,000.7   
Legislative history indicates Congress intended that the Tax Court make 
extensive use of commissioners in small tax cases,8 and certain statutory 
modifications with respect to commissioners were designed to facilitate this 
objective.  Of importance in this regard was authorization for the court to 
appoint full-time commissioners who would be compensated at the same 
rate as commissioners of the Court of Claims.9  Prior to this statutory 
revision, the court had been authorized only to appoint an attorney from 
the legal staff of the court to act as a commissioner on a case-specific basis.    
Pursuant to the 1969 amendment, the court established a small tax case 
division under the supervision of a judge of the court.10  The majority of 
                                                                                                                       
trials without a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Section 7458 
requires every proceeding to be stenographically transcribed.  At the conclusion of 
each of these proceedings the court is compelled to report all of its findings of fact, 
opinions, and memorandum opinions.  I.R.C. § 7459(b). 
6  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 733 (enacting 
I.R.C. § 7463).  If neither the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute, nor the 
amount of any claimed overpayment exceeded $1,000 for any taxable year in the 
case of income and gift tax or $1,000 for estate tax, the taxpayer was given the 
option to request that the proceeding be conducted under a small case procedure.  
In addition, the Act provided that notwithstanding statutory limitations that require 
certain formal rules of evidence, publication, hearings, etc., the small case 
procedure would be conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence, practice 
and procedure as the Tax Court might prescribe. 
7  The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 increased the limit to 
$1,500. Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 203(b)(2), 86 Stat. 919, 945 (1972).  The Revenue Act 
of 1978 increased the jurisdictional amount to $5,000.  Pub. L. No. 95-600, 
§ 502(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2763, 2879 (1978).  The Tax Reform Act of 1984 increased the 
jurisdictional amount to $10,000.  Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 461 (a), 98 Stat. 494, 823.  
Most recently, Congress increased the ceiling amount on small tax cases to $50,000 
as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.  
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3103, 112 Stat. 685, 731 (1998). 
8  S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 304 (1969). 
9  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 958, 83 Stat. 734.  In 1986, 
Congress set the compensation of special trial judges to equal 90 percent of the 
salary paid to a presidentially appointed judge of the court.  Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514. § 1556(a), 100 Stat. 2754 (adding I.R.C. § 7443A(d)(1)).     
10 See Memorandum from the Ad Hoc Committee on Small Tax Cases to the 
Chief Judge, Apr. 2, 1970, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence,” wherein it was recommended that the Chief 
Judge assign one of the judges of the court as the judge in charge of such division. 
Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr. was designated as the first judge in charge of the 
Small Tax Case Division.  See Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970; 
General Order No. 2, U.S. Tax Court, Sept. 1, 1970.  Although other judges of the 
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small tax cases are assigned to special trial judges (the official designation 
since 1984)11 for hearing and the preparation of summary findings of fact 
and opinion.12  The report of the special trial judge is then submitted to the 
chief judge, or if the chief judge so directs, to a judge or division of the 
court for review.13  This review is conducted by the judge heading the small 
tax case division.  To expedite the resolution of small tax cases, such 
opinions, if authored by a special trial judge, generally are not subsequently 
reviewed by the chief judge.14           
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 authorized commissioners and 
later special trial judges to issue summary opinions in small tax cases, the 
commissioner/special trial judge lacked authority to enter the decision in 
such cases.15  Congress corrected this shortcoming in 1980, granting special 
trial judges the authority to make the decision of the court in small tax 
cases.16   
An important purpose of the small case procedure was to expedite the 
court’s workload by providing it with greater capability to manage many of 
the smaller cases conducted before it.17  Because all Tax Court decisions 
(other than stipulated decisions) prior to 1969 were subject to appellate 
review, a complete record of the court’s factual and legal findings had to be 
prepared in all cases to provide an adequate record for the courts of 
                                                                                                                       
Tax Court have been in charge of the Small Tax Case Division in the intervening 
years, Judge Dawson has now resumed those duties.   
11 In 1975, the court issued a General Order which provided that a 
“commissioner” should be referred to as a “special trial judge” except when in 
conflict with statute.  General Order No. 4, 65 T.C. IV (1975).  The Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 changed the statutory designation of a “commissioner” to “special trial 
judge.”  Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 464, 98 Stat. 494, 824–25. 
12 In more recent years, as the number of special trial judges has declined and 
the number of cases being tried under the small tax case procedure has increased 
(due in large part to the increase in the limitation on the amount in controversy), 
judges of the court have presided over approximately one-half of small tax cases.   
13 The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that a special trial 
judge presiding over trial of a small tax case shall “prepare a summary of the facts 
and reasons for the proposed disposition of the case” as soon as practicable after 
trial.  TAX CT. R. 182(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
14 Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970. 
15 See Memorandum from the Ad Hoc Committee on Small Tax Cases to the 
Chief Judge, Apr. 2, 1970, at 3 n.6, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Decisions: 
Memoranda & Correspondence;” Tax Court Conference Minutes, Apr. 17, 1970.  
The language of § 7463, as then in effect, permitted a brief summary of reasons to 
satisfy the requirements of a decision as defined in § 7459(b).  However, Congress 
made no change to § 7459(a), which required that such a decision be made by a 
judge.   
16 Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 105(a)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 194, 218 (1980). 
17 See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 (1969). 
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appeals.  Aimed at relieving what was perceived to be an unnecessary 
burden in many cases, § 7463 provides that small tax cases are not subject 
to appeal by either party, that they may not serve as legal precedent, and 
that a decision with a brief summary of the reasons for the decision are 
sufficient in such cases.18  Accordingly, summary opinions issued in small 
tax proceedings are accompanied by the following legend:   “[The] case was 
heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue 
Code in effect at the time that the petition was filed. The decision to be 
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not be 
cited as precedent for any other case.”  However, this is not to say that 
decisions in summary opinions have no lasting effect whatsoever.  In 
Gilanski v. Commissioner,19 the taxpayer unsuccessfully contested the 
Commissioner’s deficiency determination through a small tax case 
proceeding.  The taxpayer later attempted to contest the underlying tax 
liability through a collection due process hearing, contending that § 7463(b) 
precluded the decision in the small tax case from having any binding effect.  
The Tax Court disagreed, noting that § 7463(b) does not preclude a 
decision in a small tax case from having res judicata effect.20  
Because summary opinions issued in small tax cases have no 
precedential value, they are not officially published by the Tax Court or, for 
that matter, by any commercial publisher.  However, since January 1, 2001, 
the Tax Court has made summary opinions available to the public in a 
searchable format through the court’s website.   
The small tax case procedure assists the court in managing its heavy 
workload and also allows taxpayers with small tax disputes to litigate 
without a long delay.  The procedure has been well received by the public, 
and small tax cases constitute approximately half of the Tax Court’s docket 
in modern times.21  The scope and details of the small tax case procedure 
are discussed below.   
                                                     
18 I.R.C. § 7463(a), (b).  In 1982, the Tax Court was given additional flexibility to 
manage its workload when it was granted the authority to decide cases by bench 
opinion.  I.R.C. § 7459(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-362, § l06(b), 96 Stat. 1726, 
1730 (1982).  Accordingly, the Tax Court rules were amended to provide that 
judges and special trial judges could issue a bench opinion in small tax cases when 
appropriate.  See TAX CT. R. 152, 79 T.C. 1147–48 (1982); see also TAX CT. R. 182(a) 
(July 6, 2012 ed.) (accommodating the prospect of a bench decision in a small tax 
case). 
19 T.C. Memo. 2004-104, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249. 
20 Id. at 1249–50; see also Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 54, 58–64 
(2012) (explaining that decisions entered in small tax cases litigated under § 7463 
have res judicata effect).   
21 According to statistics provided by the Tax Court Clerk of Court, the 
percentage of Tax Court filings in which taxpayers elected to prosecute their cases 
under the small tax case procedure in recent years is as follows:  
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1. Amount in Dispute 
 
The small tax case procedure originally was limited to the Tax Court’s 
traditional deficiency and overpayment jurisdiction.  In this setting, the 
threshold requirement for application of the small tax case procedure is that 
the amount in dispute (both the deficiency and any claimed overpayment) 
does not exceed $50,000.22  The 1969 Act limited the small case procedure 
to cases in which the amount in dispute did not exceed $1,000.23  This 
limitation has been increased several times since.24  Most recently, in 1998, 
believing that use of the small tax case procedure should be expanded,25 
Congress raised the dollar limitation significantly from $10,000 to $50,000.26  
The deficiency placed in dispute includes not only the underlying tax, but 
also any additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties.27  In the case of 
income taxes, the $50,000 limitation applies to each taxable year in 
dispute.28  If the taxpayer’s gift tax liability is being contested, the dollar 
                                                                                                                       
 










22 I.R.C. § 7463(a). 
23 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 487, 733 (adding 26 U.S.C. § 7463(a)). 
24 For a recitation of the various statutory increases in the ceiling of the amount 
in dispute in small tax cases, see supra note 7.   
25 See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 50 (1998).   
26 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-206, § 3103, 112 Stat. 685, 731.  In increasing the ceiling on the small tax case 
procedure by such a sizeable amount, Congress recognized that the procedure 
could encompass cases of significant precedential value.  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-
599, at 245 (1998).  Accordingly, Congress signaled its intention that the Tax Court 
carefully consider the Service’s objections to the taxpayer invocations of the 
procedure.  Id.  At the same time, Congress directed the Tax Court to consider the 
financial effect on the taxpayer of not using the procedure, see id., presumably as a 
factor to be balanced against any objection raised by the Service.   
27 I.R.C. § 7463(e). 
28 I.R.C. § 7463(a)(1). 
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limitation applies to each calendar year.29  If the dispute between the Service 
and the taxpayer concerns estate taxes, the amount in dispute cannot exceed 
$50,000 overall.30   
Congress has periodically expanded the scope of disputes that are 
subject to the small tax case procedure of § 7463.  In 1982, the small tax 
case procedure was amended to include excise taxes relating to public 
charities, private foundations, qualified pension plans, qualified investment 
entities, and crude oil windfall profits.31  If these taxes are at issue, the 
amount in dispute cannot exceed $50,000 for any taxable period, or if there 
is no taxable period, for any taxable event.32     
In cases in which the small tax case procedure is elected, the court may 
not enter a decision redetermining a deficiency or determining an 
overpayment, except with respect to amounts placed in dispute within the 
jurisdictional limitations applicable to small tax cases, and amounts 
conceded by the parties.33  For example, if the Service determines a 
deficiency of $45,000 and the taxpayer elects to use the small tax case 
procedure and contests the entire deficiency, the Tax Court may not 
determine a total deficiency of more than $50,000 (assuming the Service 
asserts an increase in the amount of deficiency it earlier determined).34  
However, if the taxpayer were to concede a deficiency of $3,000, the Tax 
Court is authorized to determine a total deficiency of $53,000. 
In Kallich v. Commissioner,35  the Tax Court considered whether a taxpayer 
could concede a monetary portion of a deficiency without conceding the 
underlying issue in order to bring the taxpayer’s case within the 
jurisdictional limitation of the small tax case procedure.  In Kallich, the 
deficiencies determined against the petitioners exceeded $10,000 (the then-
applicable jurisdictional limit) for each taxable year in issue.36  The 
petitioners conceded a portion of the deficiencies so that the amount in 
dispute fell within the small tax case jurisdictional boundaries, and they 
requested that their case be tried under the small case procedures.37  The 
Service argued that since only one issue was in dispute, the petitioners could 
not “concede a monetary portion of the deficiency without conceding the 
entire issue which created the deficiency.”38  The Tax Court disagreed. 
                                                     
29 I.R.C. § 7463(a)(3). 
30 I.R.C. § 7463(a)(2). 
31 Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-362, § 106(a), 96 Stat. 
1726, 1730 (adding I.R.C. § 7463(a)(4)). 
32 I.R.C. § 7463(a)(4). 
33 I.R.C. § 7463(c). 
34 See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 n.2 (1969). 
35 89 T.C. 676 (1987). 
36 Id. at 677. 
37 Id. at 677–78. 
38 Id. at 678. 
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The court’s decision was in large part based on the legislative history of 
§ 7463.39  The Senate Finance Committee report provided: 
 
The Court would not be permitted to determine a deficiency more 
than $1,000 [the then-applicable limit] above the undisputed amount 
in the notice of deficiency.  For example, if a deficiency of $1,200 
were determined by the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayer 
put in issue in the Tax Court only $300 of that deficiency, then the 
remaining $900 of the deficiency would have been conceded . . . . [In 
any event], once the taxpayer invoked the small claims procedure and 
the Tax Court concurred, he could not have the deficiency reduced 
below $200.40 
 
This example, in the court’s view, made it clear that a taxpayer could 
concede a monetary portion of a deficiency without conceding the 
underlying issue.  “There is nothing in the Senate Finance Committee 
report which would indicate that the example was intended to illustrate the 
concession of an issue in a multi-issue case.  The example refers only to 
monetary amounts of a deficiency.”41  The court thus saw “no reason why a 
taxpayer should not be able to concede a portion of the deficiency so as to 
qualify for small tax case status.”42 Nonetheless, the court noted that the 
approach of conceding a portion of the asserted deficiency in a single-issue 
case may prove less than satisfying:    
 
[A] taxpayer may be at a significant disadvantage to the extent that he 
does concede a portion of the deficiency in a single issue case.  In 
such instance, even if the taxpayer were to win 100 percent of the 
issue before the Court, he could ultimately be assessed a tax on the 
portion of the deficiency conceded and not placed in dispute.  In 
seeking the election for small tax case status, a taxpayer would 
presumably weigh this disadvantage with other factors.43 
 
2. Expansion in Scope of Small Tax Cases 
 
In 1997, when it expanded the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review the 
Commissioner’s determination concerning the employment status of a 
service provider pursuant to § 7436, Congress created a small tax case 
                                                     
39 See id. at 680. 
40 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 303 n.2 (1969) (quoted in 89 T.C. at 680). 
41 89 T.C. at 680. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 680 n.6. 
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procedure for such disputes within § 7436 itself.44  Pursuant to § 7436(c), 
special trial judges are authorized to hear and decide employment status 
determinations where the amount of employment taxes in dispute do not 
exceed $50,000 for any calendar quarter involved.  While this jurisdiction 
technically falls outside the scope of the global small tax case procedure of 
§ 7463 (and thus requires a separate provision authorizing the special trial 
judge to make the decision of the court),45 it functionally serves as an 
expansion of that statute.  If the taxpayer so elects, the small tax case 
procedure applicable to proceedings under § 7463 applies to cases 
prosecuted under § 7436(c).46  Additionally, the decision in the case is not 
subject to appeal and the decision does not serve as precedent.47    
More recently, in 2000, Congress extended the availability of the small 
case procedure to petitions for innocent spouse relief under § 6015(e) in 
cases where the relief sought does not exceed $50,000.48  In determining 
whether the innocent spouse relief sought does not exceed the $50,000 
jurisdictional ceiling, the point of reference is the date on which the petition 
is filed.49  Hence, post-petition interest charges that cause the relief sought 
to exceed $50,000 will not preclude use of the small tax case procedure in 
this setting.50  As part of the same 2000 legislation, Congress added appeals 
of collection due process hearings under § 6330(d)(1)(A) to the scope of 
cases that could be tried as a small tax case.51  In this setting, the unpaid tax 
cannot exceed $50,000.  The $50,000 ceiling applies to the total amount of 
unpaid tax liability, rather than to the amount of any unpaid tax liability for 
a given year.52 
 
                                                     
44 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1454(a), 111 Stat. 1055 
(enacting I.R.C. § 7436).    
45 See I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(5). Interestingly, the authority of the special trial judge 
to enter a decision in these cases was not added until 2006.  See Pension Protection 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 857(a), 120 Stat. 1020 (adding current I.R.C. 
§ 7443(b)(5)).    
46 I.R.C. § 7436(c)(1).   
47 I.R.C. § 7436(c)(2).   
48 Community Tax Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 5662, § 313(b)(1), 
enacted into law by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, § 1(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-642 (adding I.R.C. § 7463(f)(1)).   
49 See Petrane v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 1, 6–7 (2007).   
50 Id. 
51 Community Tax Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 5662, § 313(b)(1), 
enacted into law by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, § 1(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-642 (adding I.R.C. § 7463(f)(2)).   
52 See Schwartz v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 6 (2007).  Additionally, the fact that a 
taxpayer may contest less than the $50,000 amount does not permit the case to be 
tried under the small tax case procedure where the total unpaid tax exceeds the 
$50,000 threshold.  See Leahy v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 71 (2007).   
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3. Election by the Taxpayer 
 
The small tax case procedure may be elected by the taxpayer when the 
petition is filed or at any time prior to trial.53  Although the statute requires 
that the Tax Court concur in the election, such concurrence is deemed 
given unless the Tax Court orders that the small tax case designation be 
removed.54  If the Service opposes the case being tried under the small tax 
case procedure, it must do so by motion filed with its answer in the case.55   
In 1978, in connection with amending § 7463 to increase the 
jurisdictional limitation in small tax cases to $5,000,56 Congress indicated its 
concern that the small tax case procedure not be used to impede judicial 
administration by trying cases under the small case procedure that would 
more appropriately be tried as regular cases. 
 
In view of the proposed increase in the small case jurisdictional 
amount to $5,000 it is contemplated that, the Tax Court will give 
careful consideration to a request by the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue to remove a case from the small case procedures when the 
orderly conduct of the work of the Court or the administration of 
the tax laws would be better served by a regular trial of the case.  
Thus, in some situations, proper Court management may require the 
removal of a case from the small case procedures so that it can be 
consolidated with a regular case involving common facts or a 
common issue of law.  Similarly, removal of the case from the small 
case category may be appropriate where a decision in the case will 
provide a precedent for the disposition of a substantial number of 
other cases or where an appellate court decision is needed on a 
significant issue.57   
 
Thus, taxpayers do not have an absolute right to have the small case 
procedures apply whenever their deficiency disputes fall within the 
jurisdictional amount.58 
If the court concludes that a case involves an important issue, it may 
order that the case be tried under the regular Rules of Practice and 
Procedure sua sponte or on the motion of either party at any time prior to 
                                                     
53 I.R.C. §§ 7436(c), 7463(a); TAX CT. R. 171(a), (c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
54 TAX CT. R. 171(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
55 TAX CT. R. 171(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.).  If the taxpayer makes the small tax case 
election after the filing of the answer in the case, the Service may move without 
leave of the court for the case to be tried under the regular procedures.  TAX CT. R. 
171(c) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
56 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 502(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2763, 2879. 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1800, at 277–78 (1978). 
58 See Kallich v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 676, 661 (1987). 
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trial.59  Such a motion is to be distinguished from a motion for 
discontinuance, which may be filed at any time after the commencement of 
trial, and which is decided according to specific statutory criteria.60  In cases 
in which the taxpayer’s election to have his case tried under the small tax 
case procedure is denied prior to trial, the court is not bound to limit its 
consideration to the factors set forth in § 7463(d).61  The statutory 
requirement that the Tax Court concur in the taxpayer’s election to utilize 
the small tax case procedure provides the court with authority to exercise 
such discretion.62  
Three categories of cases have been identified as presenting situations in 
which the court may decline to concur in the taxpayer’s election to have the 
small case procedure apply:  (1) cases involving an important issue;63 (2) 
cases involving an issue common to other cases before the court;64 and (3) 
cases involving an issue that will establish a principle of law important to 
other cases.65 
In Dressler v. Commissioner,66 the Service moved to deny the petitioner’s 
request to apply the small tax case procedure on the ground that the issue 
involved was of such importance that it merited regular case treatment.  
Petitioners resisted the motion, contending that the only statutory basis for 
discontinuance of small tax case proceedings would be a finding of 
reasonable grounds to believe that the amount in dispute would exceed the 
applicable jurisdictional limit, a basis specifically set forth in § 7463(d).  
Alternatively, the taxpayers argued that the case was not of sufficient legal 
or factual importance to warrant shifting it to the more expensive regular 
case procedures. 
The Tax Court disagreed with the taxpayer that the denial of an election 
to use the small tax case procedure is dependent on a showing of the 
grounds enumerated in § 7463(d).67  The court rejected this argument, 
noting that a showing of these grounds is only required after the 
commencement of trial.68  The Tax Court agreed, however, that 
 
a taxpayer should be entitled to have his case tried as a small tax case 
where the jurisdictional amount of the deficiency brings it within the 
                                                     
59 See id.; TAX CT. R. 171(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.).   
60 See Section A.4 of this Part.   
61 See TAX CT. R. 171(d) (July 6, 2012 ed.) (providing no grounds for the 
exercise of the court’s discretion to remove the small tax case designation).   
62 See I.R.C. § 7463(a). 
63 Earl v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1014, 1020 (1982). 
64 Page v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1, 13 (1986). 
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provisions of section 7463 unless respondent shows that the issue 
involved is an issue of importance which will establish a principle of 
law applicable to other tax cases.69  
 
In Dressler, the court found that the Service had failed to make such a 
showing.   The issue was whether the taxpayer, a “minister of music” was 
entitled to an exclusion as a “minister of the gospel.”  In previous cases, the 
Tax Court had concluded that a taxpayer had to be “ordained, 
commissioned, or licensed as such or must perform sacerdotal duties” to be 
entitled to the exclusion as a minister of the gospel.70  Because prior Tax 
Court decisions had addressed the legal issue involved in the case, only 
questions of fact remained to be resolved.71  
In Earl v. Commissioner,72 the Service’s motion to pursue the case using 
regular procedures was granted because it involved an important issue.  The 
issue presented in Earl was whether the Treaty of Medicine Creek of 1854 
required the exemption of income obtained by the Puyallup Indians from 
fishing in waters covered by the treaty.  The court held that the treaty did 
not require the exemption.73  Although the court did not explain why the 
issue was of sufficient importance to justify a transfer to the regular 
procedure, its decision to grant the Service’s motion to deny the small tax 
case election may have been grounded in the fact that the interpretation of 
a United States treaty was at issue. 
In Page v. Commissioner,74 the Service determined a deficiency attributable 
to the taxpayer’s windfall profit tax liability for calendar year 1980.  The 
taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination and then moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the period for the 
determination of windfall profit tax deficiencies was each quarter of a 
calendar year.75  The Tax Court disagreed, holding that the proper period 
for determining a windfall profit tax liability is a calendar year.76  Moreover, 
the court denied the petitioner’s election for small tax case treatment 
because the substantive issues in the case were common to other cases 
docketed in the court.77  Treating the case under § 7463 would deny the 
court’s decision of precedential effect and thus would unduly burden the 
                                                     
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 213. 
71 Id. 
72 78 T.C. 1014 (1982). 
73 Id.  at 1017–18. 
74 86 T.C. 1 (1986). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 7. 
77 Id. at 12–13. 
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At any time after the commencement of trial, but before a final decision, 
the Tax Court may discontinue the small tax case procedure and order that 
the case be tried under the regular Rules of Practice and Procedure.79  As 
noted above, the order for discontinuance is to be distinguished from the 
motion to deny a taxpayer’s small tax case election.  The former involves 
the consideration of specific statutory criteria, and such an order may only 
be issued if (1) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
jurisdictional dollar limit will be exceeded and (2) the court finds that justice 
requires such discontinuance, taking into consideration the inconvenience 
and expense that could result from such an order.80 
The Tax Court has held that the deficiency limitations of § 7463 do not 
apply once a case has been discontinued under the small tax case procedure.  
In Bruno v. Commissioner,81 the Service moved to discontinue the matter as a 
small tax case and claimed an increased deficiency.  The motions were 
uncontested by the taxpayer and granted by the court.  Later, the taxpayer 
objected to the increased deficiency on the grounds that it exceeded the 
jurisdictional limit applicable to small tax cases.  In its decision for the 
                                                     
78 Id. at 13.  Similarly, in Hubbard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-575, 54 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1121, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s invocation of the small 
tax procedures on grounds that the issue in the case was pending on appeal before 
various courts of appeals (including to the circuit to which the instant case 
otherwise would be appealable) and that the issue was common to other cases 
before the court.   
79 I.R.C. § 7463(d).  The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure formerly 
addressed the prospect of discontinuance of a small tax case as follows: 
After the commencement of a trial of a small tax case, but before the 
decision in the case becomes final, the Court may order that the 
proceedings be discontinued under Code Section 7463, and that the case be 
tried under the rules of practice other than the Small Tax Case Rules, but 
such order will be issued only if (1) there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the amount of the deficiency, or the claimed overpayment, in 
dispute will exceed $10,000 and (2) the Court finds that justice requires the 
discontinuance of the proceedings under Code Section 7463, taking into 
consideration the convenience and expenses for both parties that would 
result from the order. 
Former TAX CT. R. 173, 82 T.C. 1072 (1984).  In 2003, the court deleted this 
version of Rule 173 on grounds that the provision was merely duplicative of 
§ 7463(d).  See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 172, 120 T.C. 606 (2003).   
80 I.R.C. § 7463(d); TAX CT. R. 173 (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
81 72 T.C. 443 (1979). 
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Service, the court noted that the dollar limitation would only apply if the 
case were tried as a small tax case.  Once small tax case proceedings are 
discontinued, § 7463 makes it clear that the case becomes a regular tax case. 
 
5. Answers in Small Tax Cases 
 
In 1978, the Tax Court amended its rules to provide that the Service 
need not file an answer in small tax cases unless the case involved an issue 
on which the Service carries the burden of proof or unless otherwise 
directed by the court.82  The note accompanying Rule 175 as then amended 
provided as follows:  
 
The experience of the Court under its preexisting procedure has 
shown that the filing of answers in all small tax cases has not been 
helpful in the disposition of such cases and has resulted generally in 
merely calling for unnecessary additional paperwork, particularly in 
the light of the fact that most of these cases are actually disposed of 
without trial.  Furthermore, the Commissioner has assured the Court 
that, in the relatively small number of cases expected to be tried, he 
will file with the Court and serve upon the petitioner an informative 
statement amplifying the matters in dispute that are to be 
adjudicated.83 
 
However, in 2007, the Tax Court reversed course by amending its rules to 
require the filing of an answer by the Service in every case tried under the 
small tax case procedure.  The court cited several justifications for the 
change.  First, partly as a result of the considerable increase in the amount 
in dispute to $50,000, small tax cases came to represent approximately half 
of the Tax Court’s docket.84  Additionally, the court observed that taxpayers 
and the low-income taxpayer clinics that increasingly represented them in 
small tax cases often faced difficulty in contacting the attorney representing 
the Service due to the absence of a responsive filing.  Answers filed in small 
tax cases would provide this information and, as a result, facilitate essential 
pretrial communication between the parties.85  Lastly, the court observed 
that the filing of answers in small tax cases may promote the identification 
of novel legal issues at any earlier stage in the litigation, permitting the court 
to make informed decisions concerning whether discontinuance of the 
small tax procedure pursuant to § 7463(d) was appropriate.86   
                                                     
82 Former TAX CT. R. 175(b), 71 T.C. 1212 (1975). 
83 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 175, 71 T.C. 1212 (1978). 
84 Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 173(b), 128 T.C. 231 (2007).   
85 Id.    
86 Id.  
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6. Pretrial Procedures 
 
Small tax case trials are held in a greater number of locations around the 
country than are regular tax cases.87  Taxpayers may at the time of filing the 
petition request a place of trial, and the court will make every effort to 
conduct it at a location convenient to the one requested.88   
Approximately five months prior to the designated trial session, the 
court issues to taxpayers who have elected the small tax case procedure a 
Notice of Trial and a Standing Pretrial Notice.89  In addition to providing 
taxpayers information about the trial process, the Standing Pretrial Notice 
reminds the parties of their obligation to stipulate to all relevant facts and 
documents that are not in dispute.  Attached to the Standing Pretrial Notice 
is a form Pretrial Memorandum, which directs the parties to provide the 
following information about the case:  the amount(s) in dispute, the status 
of the case (probable settlement, probable trial, definite trial), current 
estimate of trial time, motions expected to be made, status of the stipulation 
of facts (completed, in process), issues in the case, witnesses the parties 
expect to call, a summary of facts, a brief synopsis of legal authorities, and 
evidentiary problems.   Unlike regular Tax Court proceedings, the taxpayer 
in a small tax case procedure is not required to file the Pretrial 
Memorandum; rather, the Standing Pretrial Notice merely states that the 
taxpayer should do so.  If the taxpayer does so, the Notice states that the 
Pretrial Memorandum should be sent so as to be received by the court at 
least seven days prior to the start of the trial session.
 
7. Informal Procedures 
 
Although taxpayers electing the small tax case procedure may represent 
themselves or obtain representation by any individual admitted to practice 
before the Tax Court,90 approximately 90 percent of all small tax cases are 
litigated on a pro se basis.91  The cost of representation likely constitutes the 
primary reason for the substantial degree of self-representation in the small 
tax case arena.  The fact that small tax cases are conducted under informal 
procedures, designed not to penalize taxpayers lacking litigation skills, may 
also encourage self-representation.92  The presiding judge or special trial 
judge usually will assist the taxpayer in eliciting relevant testimony from 
                                                     
87 Currently, small tax cases may be heard at 15 additional locations. See 
Appendix D; see also TAX CT. R. APP. I, Form 5.   
88 I.R.C. § 7446; TAX CT. R. 174(a) (July 6, 2012 ed.). 
89 The Standing Pretrial Notice is available on the Tax Court’s website at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/video/stpn.pdf.   
90 TAX CT. R. 174 (July 12, 2012 ed.). 
91 See Sterrett, supra note 32, at 121. 
92 Id. 
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witnesses.93  Moreover, any evidence having probative value typically is 
admitted.94  The court has made every effort to assure that taxpayers 
electing the small case procedure are not intimidated by the formal rules of 
evidence and procedure applicable to regular tax cases.95 
 
B. Court Measures to Support Self-Represented Taxpayers  
 
1. Taxpayer Information 
 
The Tax Court provides considerable institutional support for taxpayers 
who prosecute their cases before the court without the benefit of 
representation.  As previously discussed, the court essentially frames the 
contours of the proceedings before the court through the Standing Pretrial 
Order and Standing Pretrial Notice.96  The latter, issued to taxpayers who 
elect to prosecute their case under the small tax case procedure, provides a 
checklist of items the taxpayer should consider in preparing for the trial 
proceeding.97  However, the support provided by the Tax Court 
commences well before the correspondence that follows the filing of a 
petition. Beginning in 2006, the Tax Court website contains a prominent 
tab captioned “Taxpayer Information.”98  This tab contains a number of 
frequently asked questions, organized under the following four headings: (1) 
Starting a Case; (2) Before Trial; (3) During Trial; and (4) After Trial.  
Additionally, the tab contains a glossary of technical terms that a taxpayer 
may encounter.  Each of the frequently asked questions consists of a 
hyperlink that directs the reader to a concise explanation of the question 
                                                     
93 Id. 
94 TAX CT. R. 174(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see also William C. Whitford, The 
Small-Case Procedures of the United States Tax Court: A Small Claims Court that Works, 
1984 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 797, 814 (1984) (“evidentiary principles were 
generally ignored, and the pro se litigants . . . were permitted to tell their ‘stories’ as 
they preferred”). 
95 Section 7475(b), as amended by the sec. 860A of the Pension Protection Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, provides that the Tax Court’s periodic registration 
fee is available to the court to provide services to pro se taxpayers.  In accordance 
with this authority, the court assists low income taxpayers by paying (1) transcript 
fees in appropriate circumstances, and (2) the fees necessary to hire a translator to 
provide assistance at trial to a taxpayer who does not speak English as a primary 
language.  For an explanation of the circumstances in which the court will assist 
low-income taxpayers in this manner, see the Taxpayer Information section on the 
court’s website at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/taxpayer_info_start.htm 
#STARTING. 
96 See Part IX.H.   
97 See Pretrial Notice, ¶ 8, captioned “Petitioner  (Taxpayer) Getting Ready for 
Court Check List.”  A copy of the Pretrial Notice is provided in Appendix F.  
98 See http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/taxpayer_info_intro.htm 
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couched in layman’s terms.  The material in the question and answer 
section encompasses a wide variety of questions, ranging from specific 
questions, such as “How do I delete or redact my Social Security number or 
other private numbers from documents?” to more general questions such as 
“What happens at Trial?”  The information is aimed at a taxpayer who is 
not familiar with the Tax Court or the judicial process in general.  Through 
this question and answer format, the Tax Court has attempted to anticipate 
the areas of confusion encountered by unrepresented parties and to provide 
guidance in a clear, readily understandable format.  The website’s 
explanations permit taxpayers to digest the guidance at their own pace in a 
non-threatening setting.   
In 2009, the court augmented the question-and-answer feature with a 
professionally produced video that walks the viewer through the lifecycle of 
a Tax Court proceeding.99  As the video runs, links appear on the side of 
the screen that the taxpayer can click to see more information about the 
topic that is then being addressed.  The video explanation is provided in 
nontechnical terms that an average person would understand.  The video 
explanation is careful to highlight critical procedural requirements of 
proceedings before the Tax Court, often warning the viewer of the 
repercussions of not complying with those procedures.   
The video begins by explaining the circumstances that may trigger an 
examination by the Service and how this examination may lead to the 
issuance of a notice of deficiency.  The video addresses the critical time 
period for filing a petition with the court for independent review of the 
deficiency determination.  After providing background information on the 
Court, the video describes how to access and complete the forms necessary 
to petition the Tax Court for review.  In the process, the video highlights 
the potential for the taxpayer to litigate the case under the less formal small 
tax case procedure.   
After explaining how to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, the video 
focuses on the pretrial matters and options that are available to the 
taxpayer.  In particular, the video explanation addresses settlements, the 
pretrial order, and stipulations of facts. Following this explanation, the 
video devotes nearly 20 minutes to familiarizing the taxpayer with every 
aspect of the actual trial.  To do so, the video includes a realistic example of 
a court hearing concerning an imaginary taxpayer.  Using this example, the 
video highlights how to prepare for trial, the evidence that can be used, 
how to subpoena witnesses, what to bring the day of trial, the calendar call, 
testifying at trial, and the manner that the taxpayer should follow in the 
courtroom.  After the video has guided the taxpayer through the entire trial, 
the video continues with a brief section on what is going to happen after 
the trial. While this section is not as in depth, the video explains bench 
                                                     
99 See https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ustc_video_welcome.htm.   
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decisions, full opinions, and the taxpayer’s right to appeal (highlighting that 
neither party may appeal a decision entered in a case litigated under the 
small tax case procedure).   
Overall, the Taxpayer Information tab of the Tax Court website 
provides invaluable information to a taxpayer who navigates the proceeding 
on her own.  While this information may be available through other 
sources, the Tax Court has provided sanctioned guidance in a readily 
accessible location. This aspect of the Tax Court’s website illustrates the 
court’s continuing effort to better prepare unrepresented taxpayers to 
litigate before the court.  This effort can be characterized in broader terms 
as the Tax Court promoting access to justice, as well informed self-
represented litigants are more likely to present their contentions to the 
court in a manner that will allow the court to properly resolve their cases on 
the merits.   
 
2. Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics 
 
Along with the support that taxpayers can obtain from the Tax Court’s 
website, the court has provided institutional support for a number of other 
programs, including Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics (LITCs). LITCs 
represent qualifying taxpayers in proceedings before the Service and the 
Tax Court on such matters as audits, collection disputes, and appeals of 
adverse administrative determinations. To date, 144 clinics are recognized 
by the Taxpayer Advocate Service, consisting of clinics organized as stand-
alone non-profit organizations and clinics housed at law schools.100  The 
Tax Court supports LITCs through a variety of measures, including links to 
the clinics on the Tax Court website, meeting space for clinics and their 
clients on the day of calendar calls, and, since 2007, annual meetings to 
update clinicians and representatives of the Office of IRS Chief Counsel on 
developments at the court.   
Although the Tax Court currently supports the assistance provided by 
LITCs, the court initially opposed the idea of student representation 
through such clinics when it was first introduced in the 1970s.101  Stuart 
Filler, who organized a clinic originally affiliated with Hofstra Law School, 
made the initial attempt to allow students to represent taxpayers before the 
Tax Court on essentially the same terms those students could appear before 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.102  
As part of its consideration of the application, the Tax Court sought the 
                                                     
100  Internal Revenue Service, Low Income Taxpayer Clinic List, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4134.pdf.  
101  See Keith Fogg, Taxation with Representation:  The Creation and Development of 
Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, 67 TAX LAW. 3, 47–51 (2013).  (providing a history of 
the Tax Court’s support for tax clinics providing student representation).   
102  See id. at 47–48.   
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input of the ABA Section on Taxation.  The Tax Section, in turn, adopted 
the report of the Committee on Small Taxpayer Assistance opposing 
student representation.103  The position of the ABA proved influential, as 
the Tax Court subsequently declined to permit the students from the 
Hofstra clinic to represent taxpayers in proceedings before it.104  The 
Service, however, had a different view on the matter.  In early 1978, the 
Advisory Committee to the Commissioner recommended that students be 
permitted to practice in front of the Tax Court under the supervision of an 
attorney.105  The Tax Court thereafter dropped its opposition to the 
academic LITC model, instead embracing the assistance these clinics 
offered to taxpayers who otherwise would lack representation.     
In 2007, the Tax Court expanded its policy of encouraging 
representation of pro se taxpayers by LITCs.  The number of participating 
LITCs increased from 55 in 2007 to 105 in 2013.  The court provides 
significant support to LITCs through the court’s referral program. The 
referral program connects low-income taxpayers with tax clinics through 
“stuffer” notices that provide contact information for LITCs to all self-
represented taxpayers.  LITCs are required to provide a stuffer notice for 
their clinic to the Tax Court that tracks the sample letter provided by the 
court.106  Until 2013, stuffer notices were sent twice:  once with the letter 
from the Court to the taxpayer acknowledging filing of the petition, and 
again with the notice calendaring the case for trial sent five months prior to 
the trial session.     
In August of 2013, the Tax Court issued a press release announcing a 
simplified stuffer notice designed to make it easier for self-represented 
taxpayers to take advantage of the services offered by LITCs.107  The stuffer 
notice states in bold print “Do You Need Help With Your Tax Court 
Case?” and goes on to list the local clinics that can assist the taxpayer.108 In 
addition to providing the simplified stuffer notice, the August 2013 press 
release announced that the Tax Court would begin sending a third stuffer 
notice to taxpayers 30 days prior to trial.  The issuance of the stuffer notices 
                                                     
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 48 (referencing a letter issued by the Tax Court on November 21, 
1977).   
105  Id. 
106  United States Tax Court, “Requirements for Participation in the United 
States Tax Court Clinics, Student Practice & Calendar Call Program by Academic 
Clinics,” available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics_academic.htm. The Tax 
Court permits all LITCs to prepare stuffer notices written in both English and 
Spanish.     
107  United States Tax Court, Press Release, “Clinic Program Changes,” Aug. 16, 
2013, available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics/clinic_program_changes.pdf.  
108  The sample stuffer notice is available on the Tax Court’s website at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics/stuffer_notice.pdf. 
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yields a large number of referrals to LITCs, which in turn allows many 
otherwise unrepresented taxpayers to secure counsel. 
In addition to the stuffer notices, the Tax Court refers taxpayers to the 
LITCs through links and answers to questions on the Tax Court website. 
The instructional video discussed earlier includes several links to the list of 
LITCs that are currently operating and directs taxpayers to seek assistance if 
they think it would be helpful.  While the Tax Court does not endorse or 
support any particular clinic, the Tax Court’s wide referral program 
illustrates the Court’s continued effort to assist pro se taxpayers. 
Beyond providing taxpayers with LITC contact information, the Tax 
Court works to make the process of advocating for the taxpayer easier by 
providing space for clinicians to meet their clients.  Since 2013, LITCs have 
been provided access to the Counsel Room of the Tax Court in selected 
cities to meet their clients on the day of the calendar call.109  
The Tax Court not only devotes considerable effort to connecting pro 
se taxpayers with LITCs, the court also strives to keep the clinicians 
informed of the changes in the Tax Court that are most relevant to low 
income taxpayers.  Each year, a representative of the court provides a 
presentation to the Pro Bono and Tax Clinic Committee of the American 
Bar Association Section of Taxation on changes at the Tax Court that affect 
low income taxpayers.  Chief Special Trial Judge Peter Panuthos, who has 
spearheaded the court’s efforts to better serve low-income taxpayers, has 
contributed perennially to this programming.  In this manner, the Tax 
Court supports the work of LITCs by ensuring that clinical advocates are 
current on matters that will affect the representation of their clients.   
 
3. Bar Sponsored Calendar Call Programs 
 
In recognition of the significant percentage of self-represented taxpayers 
that appear before it, the Tax Court has encouraged participation in trial 
sessions by less formal Bar Sponsored Calendar Call Programs.  These 
programs provide taxpayers with an opportunity to meet with a tax 
professional free of charge when they appear before court at the call of the 
trial calendar. This approach to providing assistance to self-represented 
taxpayers took root in the Los Angeles and San Francisco communities.  In  
1992, with the assistance of Judge Stephen Swift of the Tax Court and the 
support of the IRS District Counsel’s office in San Francisco, Karen 
Hawkins designed and implemented a “Pro Se Pro Bono” project on behalf 
                                                     
109  The cities include, Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Denver, 
Detroit, Jacksonville, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Louisville, Miami, Nashville, New 
York, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Seattle, 
St. Louis, St. Paul, Tampa, Winston-Salem, and Washington, D.C. United States 
Tax Court, Press Release, “Clinic Program Changes,” Aug. 16, 2013, available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics/clinic_program_changes.pdf.     
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of the Executive Committee of the Taxation Section of the California State 
Bar.110  Ms. Hawkins recognized the high number of taxpayers who were 
self-represented, and without LITCs being funded at the time, believed 
some other form of assistance was needed.111  Since 2008, the Tax Court 
has facilitated bar sponsored calendar call programs by registering the 
programs with the court in an effort to ensure that the volunteers are 
qualified to provide the necessary counseling.  The number of cities in 
which these programs appear has grown considerably over the years.  In 
2008, three cities in which the Tax Court holds trial sessions were 
supported by the calendar call programs.  In 2013, that number stood at 24.   
To participate, the Tax Court requires that bar sponsored calendar call 
programs be registered with the Tax Court and include volunteers who are 
admitted to practice and in good standing with the Tax Court.112  To 
volunteer with a bar sponsored calendar call program, an attorney can 
simply register with the local program and then attend the calendar call to 
determine if any taxpayers are in need of advice.  The assistance provided 
by the attorney through the program does not constitute formal legal 
advice, and the arrangement alone does not give rise to an attorney-client 
relationship.  Rather, the program is designed to provide support to self-
represented taxpayers, often by enabling them to make more well-informed 
decisions with respect to prosecution of their case.   
In addition to the Tax Court’s requirements of calendar call programs, 
most programs impose additional requirements on participating attorneys.  
Oftentimes attorneys are required to be familiar with practice before the 
Tax Court, to be member in good standing of the Tax Court bar, to carry 
malpractice insurance, and to agree not to accept payment or to refer the 
taxpayer to another attorney for paid representation.113 While these 
conditions vary by program, they are required by most. 
                                                     
110  Interview with Karen Hawkins, Director of Office of IRS Office of 
Responsibility, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publishing/newsquarterly/04sum/pbar.authcheckdam.pdf.  
111  Id.  
112  See United States Tax Court, “Requirements for Participation in the United 
States Tax Court Clinics, Student Practice & Calendar Call Program by Academic 
Clinics,” available at  http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics_calendar_call.htm (listing 
the requirements to register with the Tax Court for the calendar call program).  
Registration with the court consists of an annual letter sent to the chief judge 
acknowledging the program’s intention to provide the service for the coming year.  
The Tax Court supplies a sample form letter for this purpose.  See United States 
Tax Court, “Letter to Chief Judge (sample),” available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics/letter_to_cj_calendar_call.pdf. 
113  For an example of the requirements imposed by one such bar sponsored 
calendar call program, see http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/tax/probono/losangeles1.authcheckdam.pdf (providing requirements for 
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Once a calendar call program is registered with the court, the court may 
“announce at the beginning of a calendar call that volunteer practitioners 
participating in the calendar call program are available to consult with and 
assist self-represented petitioners.”114  This allows any self-represented 
taxpayer to meet with a volunteer while they are at court for their calendar 
call.  While there is not a guarantee that the volunteer will enter an 
appearance for the petitioner, the volunteer will attempt to provide as much 
advice as possible to the taxpayer during their initial meeting.  Some bar 
associations even prohibit the volunteer attorney from entering an 
appearance for the taxpayer, limiting the assistance to the advice provided 
in the one-on-one consultation.115  
Calendar call programs have improved access to justice for self-
represented taxpayers.  Because the advice is available on the day of the 
taxpayer’s trial calendar, there is a better chance that pro se taxpayers will be 
able to use the resource because of the convenience of immediately meeting 
with an attorney.  Presenting a case before the Tax Court can be confusing 
for any taxpayer attempting to navigate the process alone, but the Tax 
Court supports the efforts of local bar organizations to make the process 
less intimidating and more manageable.   
 
 
                                                                                                                       
the Tax Court Pro Se Program sponsored by the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association and Beverly Hills Bar Association).   
114 United States Tax Court, “Clinical, Student Practice & Calendar Call 
Program: Bar Sponsored Calendar Call Programs,” available at 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/clinics_calendar_call.htm.  
115  See, e.g., Colorado Bar Association, “U.S. Tax Court Pro Bono 
Opportunities,” available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/139/ 
subID/11040/TAX/ (“An attorney volunteer does not, and under the guidelines 
established for the program, cannot, enter an appearance in any of the cases in 
which he or she advises.  Assistance is limited to meeting informally with the 
litigants.”). 
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WORKLOAD OF BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
AND TAX COURT 1925–2012 
 
Fiscal year 
ending June 30 Docketed Closed Pending 
1925 5,220 1,702 3,518 
1926 12,867 3,936 12,473 
1927 11,338 5,361 18,481 
1928 10,165 7,090 21,639 
1929 5,458 8,969 18,301 
1930 4,369 6,849 16,035 
1931 9,736 7,229 18,849 
1932 7,635 7,920 18,937 
1933 5,964 8,683 16,502 
1934 4,023 10,393 10,493 
1935 3,888 5,587 9,134 
1936 4,941 5,477 8,858 
1937 4,050 5,043 8,107 
1938 4,912 5,799 7,414 
1939 4,854 5,885 6,574 
1940 4,240 5,126 5,909 
1941 4,366 4,770 5,724 
1942 3,676 4,292 5,357 
1943 3,436 4,403 4,592 
1944 3,220 3,342 4,658 
1945 3,375 3,051 5,146 
1946 3,077 2,854 5,469 
1947 3,820 3,223 6,185 
1948 4,498 3,973 6,823 
1949 4,622 4,567 7,020 
1950 5,387 4,241 8,310 
1951 6,142 5,105 9,507 
1952 6,870 5,045 11,487 
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Fiscal year 
ending June 30 Docketed Closed Pending 
1953 7,122 5,880 12,889 
1954 4,200 6,913 10,347 
1955 4,981 5,333 10,164 
1956 4,591 4,922 9,908 
1957 5,259 4,645 10,666 
1958 6,220 4,627 12,403 
1959 6,774 5,855 13,434 
1960 6,369 6,743 13,171 
1961 5,385 6,966 11,712 
1962 4,775 6,102 10,483 
1963 5,362 5,786 10,188 
1964 5,661 6,295 9,654 
1965 6,887 5,864 10,765 
1966 7,025 6,358 11,523 
1967 6,224 7,362 10,501 
1968 6,326 5,920 10,997 
1969 6,075 5,987 11,154 
1970 7,390 6,610 12,040 
1971 8,335 7,801 12,660 
1972 9,245 8,531 13,388 
1973 9,181 8,893 13,792 
1974 8,757 8,917 13,727 
1975 11,213* 8,616 16,448 
1976 11,483  9,739 18,396 
1977 12,339 10,374 21,298 
1978 13,740 12,062 23,140 
   1979 17,126 13,382 27,043 
1980 22,009 14,470 34,865 
  
 *In 1975, approximately 950 were cases filed by I.T.T. stockholders.   
   Source: United States Tax Court, Statistics and Reports Section. 
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WORKLOAD OF BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
AND TAX COURT 1925–2012 
 
Fiscal year 
ending Sept. 30 Docketed Closed Pending 
1981 29,720 18,906 45,921 
1982 30,776 24,204 52,773 
1983 34,221 28,945 58,333 
1984 42,024 37,098 63,598 
1985 45,295 36,436 72,836 
1986 48,398 37,937 83,686 
1987 42,623 45,082 81,549 
1988 32,701 47,165 67,491 
1989 31,453 40,100 59,194 
1990 28,507 36,325 51,709 
1991 29,636 33,331 48,374 
1992 30,345 34,823 44,376 
1993 28,007 33,035 39,644 
1994 24,066 33,345 30,346 
1995 25,909 26,787 29,696 
1996 28,777 29,392 19,067 
1997 26,322 28,256 27,441 
1998 21,222 25,903 22,973 
1999 20,345 23,525 19,965 
2000 13,705 18,626 15,201 
2001 15,475 14,113 16,708 
2002 17,815 16,802 17,645 
2003 21,521 19,045 20,536 
2004 24,092 22,487 22,244 
2005 24,551 23,674 23,349 
2006 26,177 24,925 24,722 
2007 29,248 26,544 27,431 
2008 32,110 29,594 30,047 
2009 30,379 31,878 29,244 
2010 29,402 30,890 27,756 
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Fiscal year 
ending Sept. 30 Docketed Closed Pending 
2011 28,900 29,786 28,550 
2012 30,801 31,434 29,025 
2013 27,039 31,983 26,517 
 













1990 27,883 --- --- 1,126 81 
1991 30,162 --- --- 486 82 
1992 28,334 --- --- 410 35 
1993 27,071 --- --- 241 29 
1994 23,726 --- --- 377 25 
1995 26,746 --- --- 310 42 
1996 27,591 --- --- 197 40 
1997 24,753 --- --- 176 55 
1998 20,351 --- --- 258 209 
1999 18,683 97 6 295 146 
2000 13,112 277 137 74 127 
2001 13,908 414 406 55 158 
2002 19,011 1,173 870 77 139 
2003 21,104 654 813 60 86 
2004 23,497 604 713 103 75 
2005 23,551 700 587 133 73 
2006 25,810 831 513 136 115 
2007 29,272 1,075 463 144 77 
2008 30,216 1,023 448 264 73 
2009 29,970 1,094 577 198 92 
2010 27,977 1,486 599 153 82 
2011 29,118 1,786 530 134 85 
2012 30,703 1,811 173 136 98 
2013 30,046 1,486 342 143 84 
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AREAS OF FORMER TAX COURT JURISDICTION 
 
This Appendix details two aspects of the Tax Court’s historical 
jurisdiction that have since been transferred or have become obsolete.  The 
court previously was afforded jurisdiction to review agency determinations 
of excess profits in connection with the renegotiation of defense related 
contracts.  The court’s jurisdiction in this arena ended when judicial review 
was transferred from the Tax Court to the Court of Claims in 1971.  
Additionally, the court possessed jurisdiction to review refunds of the 
former processing tax after the Supreme Court declared such tax 
unconstitutional.  The Tax Court’s jurisdiction in this area naturally wound 
down once the underlying refund claims were resolved.  These two aspects 
of the Tax Court’s former jurisdiction are detailed below.   
 
A. Renegotiation Cases 
 
Renegotiation of defense contracts originally was authorized in the 
Renegotiation Act of 1942 to prevent excessive wartime profiteering by 
private contractors.1  Initially, renegotiation was limited to certain contracts 
and subcontracts made by the War Department, the Navy Department and 
the Maritime Commission.2  Such renegotiation was to be conducted by the 
Secretary of the respective departments.3  If the Secretary believed that 
excessive profits had been realized or were to be realized, he was directed to 
engage in negotiations with the contractor or subcontractor to adjust the 
contract price.4  The structure of the renegotiation process was left flexible; 
moreover, no explicit standards for determining what would be considered 
excess profits were promulgated.5  If excessive profits were determined, 
either by voluntary agreement or by unilateral order in situations in which 
the parties did not agree, the Secretary was directed to recover them.6 
The original legislation did not provide for any form of subsequent 
review, judicial or administrative, of unilateral determinations of excessive 
                                                     
1 Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 247, 
§ 403, 56 Stat. 245–46. 
2 Id. § 403(a), 56 Stat. 245. 
3 Id. § 403(b). 
4 Id. § 403(c)–(f), 56 Stat. 245–46.  This contract by contract approach was 
changed by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 801, 56 Stat. 982–85, which 
required renegotiation to be conducted with regard to all renegotiable contracts 
during the company’s fiscal year. 
5 Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 247, 
§ 403(d), 56 Stat. 245. 
6 Id. § 403(c)(3), 56 Stat. 245. 
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profits by the Secretary.7  The absence of such review and the lack of 
explicit standards for determining excessive profits posed problems of due 
process.8  To remedy what most considered a defect in the initial act, the 
House, in 1943, proposed legislation that would permit a contractor or 
subcontractor aggrieved by a unilateral determination of excessive profits to 
petition the Tax Court for a de novo redetermination.9 
The House proposal was not generally endorsed by the Bar,10 was 
strongly opposed by the Treasury,11 and was received with misgivings by 
the court.12  The opponents of renegotiation jurisdiction for the Tax Court 
advanced several arguments.13  First, the critics expressed the fear that the 
addition of renegotiation cases would severely hamper the court’s ability to 
deal with its major source of workload, deficiency cases.14  Second the 
limited number of judges on the court was believed insufficient to handle 
an expected large influx of renegotiation cases.15  In this connection, it was 
noted that renegotiation would require lengthy hearings and result in 
voluminous records, further adding to the potential burden.16  Finally, the 
relationship between excessive profits and taxes, coupled with the court’s 
familiarity with the latter, might lead to improper consideration of 
consequential tax treatment in a renegotiation proceeding.17  The argument 
was made that the Court of Claims, with its staff of commissioners and 
smaller caseload, was a more appropriate forum to receive the new 
jurisdiction.18 
As a result of this opposition, the Senate Finance Committee amended 
the House bill and substituted the Court of Claims as the forum for judicial 
                                                     
7 Id. § 403. 
8 See S. REP. NO. 79-927, at 32–34 (1943); H.R. REP. NO. 79-871, at 76 (1943); 
see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 791 (1947).  
9 See H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 37 (1943). 
10 See, e.g., Letter from E. Griswold to R. Paul, Nov. 24, 1943, filed at the U.S. 
Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction;” Letter from L. Lecher to R. Paul, Nov. 
26, 1943, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction.” 
11 Memorandum from R. Paul, General Counsel of the Treasury, to Judge 
Murdock, Presiding Judge, Nov. 17, 1943, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 
“Renegotiation Jurisdiction” [hereinafter cited as Treasury Memo]. 
12 Letter from Judge Murdock, Presiding Judge, to C. Stam, Chief of Staff, Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Oct. 15, 1943, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction.”  
13 Treasury Memo, supra note 11, at 1. 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 Id. 
16 Memorandum from H. Reiling to Mr. Wenchel, Nov. 16, 1943, filed at the 
U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction;” Treasury Memo, supra note 11, at 3. 
17 Treasury Memo, supra note 11, at 3. 
18 See S. REP. NO. 78-927, at 37 (1943). 
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review.19  Nevertheless, in conference, the Senate receded and jurisdiction 
was given to the Tax Court.20  Notwithstanding the strenuous opposition, 
Congress believed that the expertise of the court membership made the 
forum a logical choice.21 
As enacted, the Revenue Act of 194322 amended the Renegotiation Act 
of 1942 to provide that Tax Court jurisdiction would be invoked by the 
filing of a petition within 90 days of the mailing of a unilateral 
determination of excessive profits by the newly established War Contracts 
Price Adjustment Board.23  The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board was 
created to provide a single reviewing body that would replace the former 
practice of each procuring agency reviewing the profits of its own 
contractors.24  The proceeding before the Tax Court was de novo and not 
merely to review the prior determination.25  Thus, the findings of the prior 
determination were not accorded evidentiary weight.26  In keeping with its 
de novo function, the court was permitted to increase, decrease, or affirm 
the amount previously determined.27  Moreover, its jurisdiction was to 
extend to all questions of fact and law in its determination of whether 
excessive profits existed.28  The statute provided the court with generally 
the same powers and duties as it had in connection with deficiency 
proceedings.29 However, unlike the case with deficiency jurisdiction, 
petitioning the court would not operate to stay collection of the disputed 
amount.30 
The jurisdiction of the Tax Court was exclusive; no other relief was 
provided by the statute to a contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by a 
unilateral order.31  If the aggrieved party failed to petition the Tax Court, 
the unilateral order was final and not subject to review.32  If the aggrieved 
party petitioned the court, the amount determined by the Tax Court was 
not subject to review.33 
                                                     
19 Id. 
20 H.R. REP. NO. 78-1079, at 83 (1944). 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 76–77 (1943). 
22 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701, 58 Stat. 78, amending Sixth Supplemental 
National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 247, § 403, 56 Stat. 245. 
23 Id. § 701(e)(1), 58 Stat. 86. 
24 Id. § 701(d)(1), 58 Stat. 85. 
25 Id. § 701(e)(1), 58 Stat. 86. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 89 CONG. REC. 9930 (1943); 90 CONG. REC. 1355 (1944). 
29 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701(e)(1), 58 Stat. 86–87. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. § 701(c)(1), 58 Stat. 83. 
33 Id. § 701(e)(1), 58 Stat. 86. 
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The conclusion of World War II terminated the original reason for 
renegotiation.34  Accordingly, the Renegotiation Act of 1942, which expired 
in 1945, was not extended.  In 1948, however, Congress reinstituted 
renegotiation, primarily in respect of government contracts involving the 
construction of air-craft.35  Thereafter, in 1951, Congress enacted the 
Renegotiation Act of 1951,36 which represented a change in the application 
of renegotiation from solely a wartime measure to an ongoing and 
permanent part of the defense contracting process.37  Although the 1951 
Act largely paralleled earlier legislation,38 three important changes were 
made.  First, coverage was extended to a greater number of defense and 
collateral agencies having a direct connection with national defense.39  
Second, a Renegotiation Board, entirely independent of the procuring 
agencies, was established.40 Third, if Tax Court jurisdiction was invoked, the 
contractor or subcontractor could forestall collection of excessive profits 
during the pendency of the court proceeding by posting an adequate 
bond.41 
Apart from the addition of bond procedures and expanded coverage, 
the jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court remained essentially unchanged 
from prior legislation.42  As a result, the controversies which arose under 
the Revenue Act of 1943 continued under the 1951 Act.  These 
controversies, which included the nature of Tax Court review, the burden 
of proof in such proceedings, and the appellate review of Tax Court 
determinations, were sometimes difficult to resolve.  Ultimately, the source 
                                                     
34 See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 757–65 (1948). 
35 Renegotiation Act of 1948, ch. 333, § 3, 62 Stat. 259. 
36 Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, 64 Stat. 7 (previously codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 1211–1233 (1970 and Supp. V 1975)).  
37 See generally Charles M. Bruce, Reform of the Renegotiation Process in Government 
Contracting, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1141 (1971). 
38 Compare Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, 65 Stat. 7 with Sixth Supplemental 
National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 247, § 403, 56 Stat. 245 (as 
amended by Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 801(a)–(c), 56 Stat. 982); Military 
Appropriations Act of 1944, ch. 185, § 1, 57 Stat. 348 (1943); Renegotiation of War 
Contracts, ch. 239, § 104, 57 Stat. 564 (1943); Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701, 
58 Stat. 78 (1944).  
39 Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, §§ 102, 103, 65 Stat. 7, 8 (previously 
codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1212–1213 (1970 and Supp. V 1975)). 
40 Id. § 107(a)–(f), 65 Stat. 19 (previously codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1217(a)–
(f)(1970)). 
41 Id. § 108, 65 Stat. 21 (previously codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1218 (1970 and 
Supp. V 1975)). 
42 Compare id. § 108, 65 Stat. 21 with Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701, 58 Stat. 
78, amending Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 
247, 56 Stat. 245.  
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of controversy, at least with regard to the Tax Court, was eliminated by 
1971 legislation shifting renegotiation jurisdiction to the Court of Claims.43 
 
1. Nature of Remedy 
 
Two problems arose with respect to the nature of Tax Court review: (1) 
the exclusivity of the Tax Court remedy, and (2) the scope of review in the 
Tax Court proceeding. 
The first issue, that of exclusivity, was addressed in a number of early 
Supreme Court cases.44  As a group, these cases held that the only remedy 
of a party aggrieved by a unilateral administrative determination of 
excessive profits lay in the Tax Court, in which all issues of fact and law, 
including such questions as coverage under the Act, time limitations, and 
amount could be raised.45 Thus, the district courts were without power to 
enjoin collection until such time as the Tax Court had been resorted to and 
had rendered a decision.46  The failure to pursue a Tax Court remedy 
precluded the contractor from challenging an administrative order in any 
subsequent action by the Government to collect upon the order.47 
With respect to the scope of review, the 1943 and 1951 Acts provided 
that the proceeding was to be conducted de novo and not merely as a 
review of the prior determination.48  Thus, no issue as to the arbitrary or 
capricious manner by which the Renegotiation Board conducted its 
investigation could be raised in Tax Court pleadings as such issues would be 
irrelevant.49 
The decision by Congress to provide de novo redetermination was 
based on a desire to provide the contractor with a fresh start; only evidence 
presented to the Tax Court could be considered and the statement of 
reasons and findings of fact promulgated by the Renegotiation Board would 
be of no evidentiary value.50  Difficulties arose, however, as to whether the 
Tax Court was truly providing a de novo proceeding or merely reviewing 
                                                     
43 Pub. L. No. 92-41, §§ 2(b), 3(a), 85 Stat. 97, 98 (1971).  
44 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. 
v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 
(1946). 
45 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 789–92 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel 
Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 764–81 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544–45 (1946). 
46 Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 543 (1946). 
47 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 790–92 (1948). 
48 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 701(e)(1), 58 Stat. 86, amending Sixth 
Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 247, § 403, 56 Stat. 
245; Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, § 108, 65 Stat. 21. 
49 Grumman Aircraft Eng’r Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 152 (1969). 
50 See H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 37, 76–78 (1943). 
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the Board’s determination.  Such difficulties arose as a result of imprecise 
language in court decisions51 and certain provisions of the court rules 
dealing with renegotiation cases.  For example, court rules required the 
aggrieved party, in preparing his petition, to assign “each and every error 
which the petitioner alleges to have been committed by the Board or the 
Secretary in the determination of excessive profits.”52  The petitioner was 
also required to submit with his petition a copy of the unilateral 
determination, and if available, a copy of the statement of reasons prepared 
by the Renegotiation Board.53  These factors, critics urged, indicated that 
the court was ignoring its duty to redetermine the excessive profits afresh 
and merely was reviewing the previous determination.54 
The court, however, maintained that nothing in its rules or decisions in 
any way indicated that it was not providing de novo review.55  The court 
noted that it did not consider or rely on the Board statement, and decided 
renegotiation cases solely on the evidence presented.56  With regard to its 
rules, the court believed that it was necessary, in order to narrow the issues, 
that the petitioner be required to assign as error the differences in excess 
profit computation between itself and the Government.57 
 
2. Burden of Proof 
 
Closely akin to the criticism of the way in which the court appeared to 
be conducting its renegotiation trial proceedings was the issue over who 
would bear the burden of proof in such proceedings.  In the initial grant of 
renegotiation jurisdiction, Congress had authorized the Tax Court to 
provide for the burden of proof as it believed appropriate.58  In this 
connection, the legislation also required the court to conform its 
renegotiation procedures, insofar as possible, to those employed in tax 
                                                     
51 See, e.g., Vaughn Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 949, 960 (1958) (stating 
that “having carefully and painstakingly reviewed the entire record, we do not find 
error in the determination of the Board”). 
52 TAX CT. R. 64 (promulgated Mar. 28, 1944). 
53 Id. 
54 See Extension of the Renegotiation Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 262–63 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 House Hearings].  
55 Letter from Judge Murdock, Chief Judge, to Sen. Byrd, Chairman, Comm. on 
Finance, June 1, 1959, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction” 
[hereinafter cited as Murdock]. 
56 Id. 
57 Memorandum from Judge Turner to Judge Murdock, Chief Judge, c. 1959, at 
1, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction” [hereinafter cited as 
Turner Memo]. 
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 77 (1943). 
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deficiency cases.59  Shortly thereafter the Tax Court imposed on the 
petitioner both the burden of proof and the burden of coming forward with 
the evidence.60 
In light of the requirement that the proceeding be de novo, many critics 
urged that the petitioner should not bear the burden of proof, but that the 
court should redetermine the excessive profits from the evidence presented 
as if no previous determination had been made.61  Other complaints were 
grounded in the belief that the court placed a presumption of correctness 
on the previous determination.62  It was pointed out that in some decisions 
which affirmed the exact amount of the prior determination,63 the only 
evidence presented to the court was by the petitioner.  This presumption, 
critics believed, was not consonant with legislative intent that the 
proceeding be de novo.64 
In the view of the court, however, the burden of proof belonged on the 
contractor; additionally, it rejected the argument that it accorded a 
presumption of correctness to the previous determination.65  In respect of 
the former issue, the court pointed out that the moving party traditionally 
had to prove his allegations.66  Additionally, the congressional grant of Tax 
Court discretion to determine the burden of proof, in conjunction with the 
legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1943, provided implicit support for 
its decision to place the burden of proof on the petitioner.67  The court 
                                                     
59 Section 701(e)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1943 provided as follows: 
For the purposes of this subsection the court shall have the same 
powers and duties, insofar as applicable, in respect of the contractor, 
subcontractor, and the Board and the Secretary, and in respect of the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, notice of hearings, 
hearings before divisions, review by the Tax Court of decisions of divisions, 
stenographic reporting, and reports of proceedings, as such court has under 
sections 1110, 1111, 1113, 1114, 1115(a), 1116, 1117(a),1118, 1120, and 
1121 of the Internal Revenue Code in the case of a proceeding to 
redetermine a deficiency. 
60 See Cohen v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1002 (1946). 
61 See, e.g., H.R. 5123, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)–(b) (1959); H.R. 7086, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1959); 1959 House Hearings, supra note 54. 
62 See authorities cited in supra note 61. 
63 See, e.g., Vaughn Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 949 (1958). 
64 See 1959 House Hearings, supra note 54. 
65 Murdock, supra note 55, at 2; Unsigned Memorandum, c. 1959, at 1, filed at 
the U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction;” Memorandum from Judge 
Withey to Judge Murdock, Chief Judge, May 21, 1959, at 2, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction.” 
66 Murdock, supra note 55, at 2. 
67 See Cohen v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1002 (1946) (tracing the legislative grants 
and companion history of the 1943 Act in an attempt to show that its decision to 
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noted, however, that in situations in which the Government asked for 
affirmative relief, the burden of proof with respect to such affirmative relief 
would be shifted.68 As to the alleged application of a presumption of 
correctness, the Tax Court stated that it did not give the Government’s 
determination any indicia of correctness or any probative value.69 
Finally, the court believed that one of the parties had to go forward with 
the evidence, and that the rules of practice had placed that burden on the 
petitioner.70  The court noted that the burden of going forward many times 
would shift depending on the quality of the evidence presented.71  If the 
petitioner failed to introduce sufficient credible evidence, the court was 
bound to leave the parties as it found them.  In its view, this required that 
the previous determination be upheld.72 
Many of the critics were not persuaded by the court’s arguments, and in 
1959, two legislative proposals dealing with these issues were advanced.73  
The first of these sought explicit statutory directives to (1) prohibit any use 
of a presumption of correctness, and (2) remove the entire burden of proof 
from the petitioner.74  The second proposal was similar but provided that 
the petitioner bear the burden of going forward.75 The major objective of 
both proposals was the same—to remove the burden of persuasion from 
the petitioner.76  The second proposal was adopted in 1959 as part of the 
House bill to extend the Renegotiation Act of 1951.77 The Senate deleted 
the provision and in conference the House receded.78  It is interesting to 
note that the Court of Claims, after the transfer of renegotiation jurisdiction 
to it from the Tax Court by Congress in 1971, changed the Tax Court rule 
in respect of the burden of proof.  In Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. United 
States,79 the Court of Claims held that: 
 
                                                                                                                       
place the burden of proof on the contractor was consistent with congressional 
intent). 
68 See Beeley v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 61 (1949). 
69 See Finnie Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1182, 1188 (1959). 
70 See Cohen v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1002, 1010–14 (1946). 
71 Letter from Judge Murdock to Comm. on Ways & Means, c. Apr. 1959, at 3, 
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Renegotiation Jurisdiction.” 
72 Turner Memo, supra note 57, at 1–2. 
73 H.R. 5123. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1959); H.R. 7086, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 5 (1959). 
74 H.R. 5123, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1959). 
75 H.R. 7086, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1959). 
76 1959 House Hearings, supra note 54. 
77 H.R. REP. NO. 86-364, at 5–6 (1959). 
78 H.R. REP. NO. 86-619, at 5–6 (1959). 
79 459 F.2d 1393 (1972). 
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the contractor has the initial burden of going forward with proof as 
to the statutory factors upon which it relies to the extent that the 
facts pertaining thereto are within its knowledge or possession, are 
accessible to the public generally in the form of published reports, or 
are actually made available to the contractor by the Government, 
voluntarily through a request made in pre-trial proceedings, or by 
discovery under the rules of the court. . . .[W]hen the contractor does 
this, it will have made a prima facie case, i.e., a showing which, unless 
rebutted, would justify a judgment in accord with the contractor’s 
contentions. . . . [W]hen plaintiff has met the requirements stated 
above, the burden shifts to the Government to prove that plaintiffs 
profits were excessive and the extent thereof.  This encompasses not 
only the burden of going forward with evidence after plaintiff’s case 
in chief is closed, but also the burden of persuasion.80 
 
3. Appellate Review 
 
The issue of appellate review of Tax Court decisions in renegotiation 
cases was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1955.81  Prior to that 
time, two conflicting interpretations had been advanced.  One viewpoint 
was expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in United States Electrical Motors v. Jones, decided in 1946.82  The court, in 
examining the legislative history of the 1943 Act, the relevant statutory 
language of the Act, and the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
which authorized appellate review and provided venue rules, believed that 
appellate review was precluded only with respect to the amount of excessive 
profits finally determined by the Tax Court.83  Jurisdictional and 
constitutional issues were not, however, subject to such a limitation, as they 
did not reflect on the amount of excessive profits.84  Two years later, in 
Blanchard Mach. Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp. Price Adjustment Board,85 the 
D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision in United States Electrical Motors 
and held that the question of whether renegotiation was commenced timely 
by the Government was within the jurisdictional area reviewable by an 
appellate court.86 
The Ninth Circuit, however, in its 1950 decision French v. War Contracts 
Price Adjustment Board,87 disagreed with the approach of its sister circuit and 
                                                     
80 Id. at 1401–02. 
81 United States v. California E. Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 351 (1955). 
82 153 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1946). 
83 Id. at 136–37. 
84 Id. 
85 177 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
86 Id. at 728–29. 
87 182 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1950). 
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concluded that the 1943 Act withheld the power of review from any court 
or agency as to both “the accuracy of the figure found as the total of the 
excessive profits . . . [as well as] the determination as a judgment. . . .”88 The 
Ninth Circuit found support for its view in the legislative history of the 
1943 Act, which indicated that the issue of providing appellate review had 
been considered, but had been rejected.89  Additionally, the provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code for appellate review were enacted solely for 
appeal of tax cases and could not be read as supplying appellate 
jurisdiction.90  In this connection, the court noted that the “lack of 
appropriate venue provisions in the Act adds weight to the view that the 
affirmative provision in the Renegotiation Act prohibiting review applies to 
all that the Tax Court does in arriving at its judgment.”91 
Thereafter, the D.C. Circuit, although continuing in theory its 
differences with the Ninth Circuit, moved closer in practice towards the 
French view.  In two later decisions,92 the D.C. Circuit held that the issues of 
timely commencement of renegotiation and coverage under the Act, 
although jurisdictional, were unreviewable by an appellate court.93  This 
reversal of the earlier decision in Blanchard was accompanied by an 
explanation that such aspects of jurisdiction were “inherent” in the final 
determination of whether any excess profits existed and thus would of 
necessity, be unreviewable.94  In the later of these cases, United States v. 
California Eastern Lines, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and adopted 
the original view of the D.C. Circuit.95  Although the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code dealing with appeals from the Tax Court originally 
were intended to apply only to tax cases, the Court believed that they were 
broad enough to encompass jurisdictional and constitutional issues in 
renegotiation decisions.96  Accordingly, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit 
decision that the issue of coverage was not reviewable.97  In the Court’s 
view, two separate questions were always presented in Tax Court 
renegotiation cases: (1) whether a renegotiation contract was involved, and 
                                                     
88 Id. at 561. 
89 Id. at 563. 
90 Id. at 562. 
91 Id. 
92 United States v. Martin Wunderlich Co., 211 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1954); 
United States v. California E. Line, Inc., 211 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
93 United States v. Martin Wunderlich Co., 211 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1954) 
(timeliness not reviewable); United States v. California E. Line, Inc., 211 F.2d 635 
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (coverage not reviewable). 
94 United States v. Martin Wunderlich Co., 211 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
95 348 U.S. 351 (1955). 
96 Id. at 353–54. 
97 Id. at 355. 
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(2) the amount, if any, of excessive profits.98  The first issue, the Court 
believed, was not directly involved in the amount of excessive profits and 
hence would be reviewable.99  Following the Supreme Court decision, 
Congress amended the Renegotiation Act of 1951 to provide venue rules 
for such appeals.100 
In 1959, a more fundamental change was proposed to expand appellate 
review of Tax Court decisions in renegotiation cases.101 Under the proposal, 
an appellate court could either affirm the decision of the Tax Court or 
reverse and remand if not in accordance with the law.  In no event would 
mere reversal or modification of the court decision be permitted.102  
Although this proposal was not enacted,103 in 1962, a similar provision was 
adopted to provide for a more expansive appellate review.104  With certain 
limitations, appellate review of renegotiation cases was to be the same as 
review of tax cases.105  The first limitation was that in no case was the 
question of the extent of excessive profits to be reviewed.106  Second, the 
findings of fact by the court were to be conclusive unless such findings 
were found to be arbitrary and capricious.107  Finally, the appellate court 
could only reverse and remand on questions of law or affirm the 
decision.108  As with the 1959 proposal, no modification or reversal without 
remand was permissible.109 
In 1971, Congress transferred jurisdiction over renegotiation cases from 
the Tax Court to the Court of Claims.110  The decision by Congress to 
transfer jurisdiction was based on a number of reasons.  First, it was 
believed that the subject matter of renegotiation cases was similar to the 
types of cases handled by the Court of Claims.111  Second, the procedures 
normally employed in the Court of Claims were believed to be better suited 
                                                     
98 Id. at 354. 
99 Id. at 355. 
100 Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 821, § 12, 70 Stat. 791, amending Renegotiation Act 
of 1951, ch. 15, § 108, 65 Stat. 21.  See S. REP. NO. 84-2624, at 11 (1956). 
101 H.R. 7086, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b)(1959). 
102 Id. 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 86-619, at 3–6 (1959). 
104 Act of July 3, 1962, Pub. L. 87-520, § 2(a), 76 Stat. 134, amending 
Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, § 108, 65 Stat. 21. 
105 See S. REP. NO. 87-1669, at 5 (1962). 
106 Act of July 3, 1962, Pub. L. 87-520, § 2(a), 76 Stat. 134, amending 
Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, § 108, 65 Stat. 21 (previously codified at 50 




110 Pub. L. No. 92-41, §§ 2(b), 3(a), 85 Stat. 97, 98 (1971). 
111 S. REP. NO. 92-245 (1971), reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 1132, 1135.  
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to renegotiation cases than Tax Court procedure.  In this connection, it was 
noted that “it is not unusual for the Court of Claims to handle cases 
extending over a long period of time [while]. . . a Tax Court judge has a 
calendar of cases which must be disposed of as expeditiously as 
possible.”112  Third, the Tax Court’s deficiency caseload had grown so large 
as to make its continued handling of renegotiation cases burdensome.113  
Finally, it was noted that the Tax Court and the Court of Claims were both 
in favor of the transfer.114 
 
B. Refunds of Processing Tax 
 
A minor area of Tax Court jurisdiction was that involving processing tax 
refunds.115  The processing tax had been enacted in 1933 as part of the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act,116 and subsequently was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler in 1936.117  
In response to the Butler decision, the Revenue Act of 1936118 provided 
both substantive and procedural rules governing refund of processing taxes.  
To secure a refund of processing taxes was not simply a matter of proving 
payment of the taxes; refunds could be secured only to the extent that the 
persons who paid the taxes could “establish that they bore the burden of 
such taxes and did not shift such burden to others.”119  The refund 
procedure authorized by the 1936 Act did not involve the Board of Tax 
Appeals, but rather provided for a specially created Board of Review, a nine 
member agency of the Treasury Department,120 to review the allowance or 
disallowance by the Commissioner of claims for refund, and to determine 
the amount of refund due claimants with respect to such claims.121  
Generally, the procedures employed by the Board of Review followed those 
of the Board of Tax Appeals.122 
                                                     
112 Id. at 1136. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 619, 
§§ 504(a), (c), 510(b),(f)(1),(g)–(j), 56 Stat. 957, 967.  Eight cases were docketed 
with the court as of May 2, 1945.  Letter from Judge Murdock, Presiding Judge, to 
J. O’Connell, General Counsel of the Treasury, May 2, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax 
Court in “Processing Tax” [hereinafter cited as Murdock, 1945]. 
116 Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, §§ 14–19, 48 Stat. 39. 
117 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
118 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 906, 49 Stat. 1748. 
119 S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 258 (1942). 
120 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 906, 49 Stat. 1748. 
121 Id. § 906(a)–(e). 
122 Compare Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 906, 49 Stat. 1748 with Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 907, 44 Stat. 107.  There were, however, certain differences.  
First, the Government and the claimant were permitted to file briefs to the 
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By 1942, it had become apparent that the Board of Review’s function 
could be handled by the Board of Tax Appeals.123  A transfer of such 
function, it was believed, would be consistent with economy and 
efficiency.124  First, the number of cases pending before the Board of 
Review were few and easily could be absorbed by the Board of Tax 
Appeals.125  Second, many taxpayers who had a claim for refund of 
processing taxes were concomitantly involved in related litigation before the 
Board of Tax Appeals.126  In both types of cases, the evidence to be 
presented was much the same and the principles to be decided were 
similar.127 
In light of these considerations and the support exhibited by the tax 
bar,128 Congress in the Revenue Act of 1942, abolished the Board of 
Review and transferred its functions to the Board of Tax Appeals (renamed 
the Tax Court in the same Act).129  In transferring jurisdiction to the court, 
Congress provided that the procedure in such cases would conform as 
nearly as possible to the procedures then employed in regular deficiency 
cases.130  When the Tax Court took over jurisdiction, 53 cases were pending 
before the Processing Board of Review.131  Thereafter, only eight new cases 
were docketed with the court.132  By 1945, the court indicated that only 33 
                                                                                                                       
recommendations of a division.  Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 690(e), 49 Stat. 
1749.  Second, upon review of the Board’s decision in a Circuit Court of Appeals, it 
was possible to put in additional evidence.  Id. § 906(g), 49 Stat. 1750. 
123 See, e.g., Letter from P. Phillips to T. Tarleau, Legislative Counsel, Treasury 
Department, Aug. 28, 1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Processing Tax” 
[hereinafter cited as Phillips]. 
124 Id. at 2. 
125 Id.  As of Jan. 1, 1943, 53 cases were pending before the Board of Review.  
Letter from J. Murdock, Presiding Judge, to J. O’Connell, General Counsel of the 
Treasury, May 2, 1945, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Processing Tax.” 
126 Phillips, supra note 123, at 2. 
127 Id. at 1.  The letter explained this point in the following terms:   
The effect of the split jurisdiction is that frequently the same taxpayer has to 
prosecute the two cases in the two tribunals, producing practically the same 
evidence before each.  There is unnecessary trouble and expense involved 
to the taxpayer and a wholly unnecessary expense to the Government, since 
the Board of Tax Appeals could decide the two cases as expeditiously as 
one.   
Id. 
128 Letter from L. Lecher to H. Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, Sept. 4, 
1942, filed at the U.S. Tax Court in “Processing Tax.” 
129 Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 619, 
§§ 504, 510(b), 56 Stat. 957, 967.  
130 Id. § 510(a)–(b). 
131 Murdock, 1945, supra note 115. 
132 Id. 
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cases were still pending.133 The majority of these cases, the court noted, 
would be settled by stipulation.134 
                                                     
133 Id. 
134 Id. 




LOCATIONS OF TAX COURT HEARINGS 
 
All types of cases: 
 
Birmingham, AL Louisville, KY Oklahoma City, OK 
Mobile, AL New Orleans, LA Portland, OR 
Anchorage, AK Baltimore, MD Philadelphia, PA 
Phoenix, AZ Boston, MA Pittsburgh, PA 
Little Rock, AR Detroit, MI Columbia, SC 
Los Angeles, CA St. Paul, MN Knoxville, TN 
San Diego, CA Jackson, MS Memphis, TN 
San Francisco, CA Kansas City, MO Nashville, TN 
Denver, CO St. Louis, MO Dallas, TX 
Hartford, CT Helena, MT El Paso, TX 
Washington, DC Omaha, NE Houston, TX 
Jacksonville, FL Las Vegas, NV Lubbock, TX 
Miami, FL Reno, NV San Antonio, TX 
Tampa, FL Albuquerque, NM Salt Lake City, UT 
Atlanta, GA Buffalo, NY Richmond, VA 
Honolulu, HI New  York, NY Seattle, WA 
Boise, ID Winston-Salem, NC Spokane, WA 
Chicago, IL Cincinnati, OH Charleston, WV 
Indianapolis, IN Cleveland, OH Milwaukee, WI 
Des Moines, IA Columbus, OH  
 
Cases tried under Small Case Procedures Only: 
 
Fresno, CA Shreveport, LA Bismarck, ND 
Tallahassee, FL Portland, ME Aberdeen, SD 
Pocatello, ID Billings, MT Roanoke, VA 
Peoria, IL Albany, NY Burlington, VT 
Wichita, KA Syracuse, NY Cheyenne, WY 
 
926           The United States Tax Court – An Historical Analysis 
 




STANDING PRETRIAL ORDER 
 
 




The attached Notice Setting Case for Trial notifies the parties that this case is calendared
for trial at the trial session beginning on [day, date] 
Communication Between the Parties.  The parties shall begin discussing settlement and/or
preparation of a stipulation of facts as soon as practicable.  Valuation cases and reasonable compensation
cases are generally susceptible of settlement, and the Court expects the parties to negotiate in good faith
with this goal in mind.  All minor issues should be settled so that the Court can focus on the issue(s)
needing a Court decision.  If a party has trouble communicating with another party or complying with
this Order, the affected party should promptly advise the Court in writing, with a copy to each other
party, or request a conference call for the parties and the trial Judge.
Continuances.  Continuances (i.e., postponements of trial) will be granted only in exceptional 
circumstances.  See Rule 133, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.  (The Court’s Rules are
available at www.ustaxcourt.gov.)  Even joint motions for continuance are not granted automatically. 
Sanctions.  The Court may impose appropriate sanctions, including dismissal, for any unexcused
failure to comply with this Order.  See Rule 131(b).  Such failure may also be considered in relation to
sanctions against and disciplinary proceedings involving counsel.  See Rule 202(a).
Electronic Filing (eFiling).  eFiling is required for most documents (except the petition) filed
by parties represented by counsel in cases in which the petition is filed on or after July 1, 2010. 
Petitioners not represented by counsel may, but are not required to, eFile.  For more information about
eFiling and the Court’s other electronic services, see www.ustaxcourt.gov.
To  help the efficient disposition of all cases on the trial calendar:
1. Stipulation.  It is ORDERED that all facts shall be stipulated (agreed upon in writing)  to
the maximum extent possible.  All documents and written evidence shall be marked and stipulated in
accordance with Rule 91(b), unless the evidence is to be used only to impeach (discredit) a witness. 
Either party may preserve objections by noting them in the stipulation.  If a complete stipulation of facts
is not ready for submission at the start of the trial or when otherwise ordered by the Court, and if the
Court determines that this is due to lack of cooperation by either party, the Court may order sanctions
against the uncooperative party.
2. Trial Exhibits.  It is ORDERED that any documents or materials which a party expects
to use (except solely for impeachment) if the case is tried, but which are not stipulated, shall be
identified in writing and exchanged by the parties at least 14 days before the first day of the trial session. 
The Court may refuse to receive in evidence any document or material that is not so stipulated or
exchanged, unless the parties have agreed otherwise or the Court so allows for good cause shown. 
3. Pretrial Memoranda.  It is ORDERED that, unless a basis of settlement (resolution of
the issues) has been reached, each party shall prepare a Pretrial Memorandum containing the information
in the attached form.  Each party shall serve on the other party and file the Pretrial Memorandum not less
than 14 days before the first day of the trial session.





4. Final Status Reports.  It is ORDERED that, if the status of the case changes from that
reported in a party’s Pretrial Memorandum, the party shall submit to the undersigned and to the other
party a Final Status Report containing the information in the attached form.  A Final Status Report may 
be submitted to the Court in paper format, electronically by following the procedures in the “Final Status
Report” tab on the Court’s Web site or by fax sent to 202-521-3378.  (Only the Final Status Report may
be sent to this fax number; any other documents will be discarded.)  The report must be received by the
Court no later than 3 p.m. eastern time on the last business day (normally Friday) before the calendar
call.  The Final Status Report must be promptly submitted to the opposing party by mail, email, or fax,
and a copy of the report must be given to the opposing party at the calendar call if the opposing party is
present. 
5. Witnesses.  It is ORDERED that witnesses shall be identified in the Pretrial
Memorandum with a brief summary of their anticipated testimony.  Witnesses who are not identified
will not be permitted to testify at the trial without a showing of good cause. 
6. Expert Witnesses.  It is ORDERED that unless otherwise permitted by the Court, expert
witnesses shall prepare a written report which shall be submitted directly to the undersigned and served
upon each other party at least 30 days before the first day of the trial session.  An expert witness's
testimony may be excluded for failure to comply with this Order and Rule 143(g). 
7. Settlements.  It is ORDERED that if the parties have reached a basis of settlement, a
stipulated decision shall be submitted to the Court prior to or at the call of the calendar on the first day of
the trial session.  Additional time for submitting a stipulated decision will be granted only where it is
clear that all parties have approved the settlement.  The parties shall be prepared to state for the record
the basis of settlement and the reasons for delay.  The Court will specify the date by which the stipulated
decision and any related settlement documents will be due. 
8. Time of Trial.  It is ORDERED that all parties shall be prepared for trial at any time
during the trial session unless a specific date has been previously set by the Court. Your case may or may
not be tried on the same date as the calendar call, and you may need to return to Court on a later date
during the trial session.  Thus, it may be beneficial to contact the Court in advance.  Within 2 weeks
before the start of the trial session, the parties may jointly contact the Judge’s chambers to request a time
and date certain for the trial.  If practicable, the Court will attempt to accommodate the request, keeping
in mind other scheduling requirements and the anticipated length of the session.  Parties should jointly
inform the Judge as early as possible if they expect trial to require 3 days or more. 
9. Service of Documents.  It is ORDERED that every pleading, motion, letter, or other
document (with the exception of the petition and the posttrial briefs, see Rule 151(c)) submitted to the
Court shall contain a certificate of service as specified in Rule 21(b), which shows that the party has
given a copy of that pleading, motion, letter or other document to all other parties.
[Judge’s name]         
Judge                  
Dated: 
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Trial Calendar:  [city, State]
Date:  [day, date] 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM FOR   (Petitioner/Respondent)   
Please type or print legibly
(This form may be expanded as necessary)
NAME OF CASE:                                                                                                               DOCKET NO(S).:
ATTORNEYS: 
    Petitioner:  ________________________________     Respondent:  ________________________________
      Tel. No.:  ________________________________           Tel. No.:  ________________________________
AMOUNTS IN DISPUTE:
    Year(s)/Period(s)                         Deficiencies/Liabilities                          Additions/Penalties 
STATUS OF CASE:
    Probable Settlement_____     Probable Trial_____    Definite Trial_____
CURRENT ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TIME:  ____________________________
MOTIONS YOU EXPECT TO MAKE:  (Title and brief description)
STATUS OF STIPULATION OF FACTS:  Completed _______     In Process _______
ISSUES:




WITNESS(ES) YOU EXPECT TO CALL:
(Name and brief summary of expected testimony)
SUMMARY OF FACTS: 
(Attach separate pages, if necessary, to inform the Court of facts in chronological narrative form)
BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES: 
(Attach separate pages, if necessary, to discuss fully your legal position)
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS:
DATE:  _________________________ ________________________________________
Petitioner/Respondent
Trial Judge: [Judge’s name]
United States Tax Court, [room no.]
400 Second Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20217
[Judge’s chambers phone no.]




STANDING PRETRIAL NOTICE 
 
 




To the parties:  The attached Notice Setting Case For Trial provides
that this case is calendared for trial at the trial session commencing on
<DATE>. 
If this is your first time appearing before the Tax Court please pay
special attention to paragraph number 8 of this notice.
1. Status of the Court.  The U.S. Tax Court hears disputes between taxpayers
and the IRS.  The Court is not a part of the IRS.
2. Settlement Conferences.  Before the calendar call date, the parties should
meet and try to settle the case.  “Settle” means that all matters in
dispute in the case have been resolved.  Settlement documents should be
signed by all parties or counsel and submitted to the Court before or at
the call of the calendar.
3. Readiness for Trial.  If the parties have not submitted to the Court signed
settlement documents, the case will be called at the calendar call on the
date and time set forth in the notice setting case for trial. The Court may
excuse a party from appearance at the calendar call if the Court concludes
that a basis of settlement has been reached. Unless otherwise excused, the
parties must appear at the calendar call and be ready for trial at any time
during the session, which may last as little as 1 day or as long as 2
weeks.
a. Cases will not be continued other than under exceptional
circumstances.
b. Failure to appear may result in a dismissal of the case and a decision
against the non-appearing party.
c. Within 2 weeks before the start of the trial session, the parties may
jointly contact the judge’s chambers to request a time and date
certain for the trial.  If practicable, the Court will attempt to
accommodate the request.
4. Stipulation Agreement.  The parties should agree in writing (stipulate)
about all relevant facts and documents that are not in dispute.  Failure or
refusal by a party to stipulate may result in a finding against that party.
5. Pretrial Memorandum.  If a party concludes that a trial is probable, then
the party should submit to the Court and to the opposing party a pretrial
memorandum substantially in the form attached hereto.  The pretrial
memorandum should be sent to the Court so as to be received at least seven
calendar days before the first date of the trial session.
6.  Final Status Report.  If there has been a last-minute settlement or 
change in the status of a case, a party should submit a Final Status 
Report to the Court.  The parties may access an electronic version of the 
Final Status Report on the Court’s internet web site at www.ustaxcourt.gov 
(Continued on back...)




by clicking on the “Final Status Report” tab from the menu of options.  
A Final Status Report may be submitted to the Court electronically or by
fax sent to 202-521-3378 and the report must be received by the Court no 
later than 3 p.m. eastern time on the last business day (normally Friday) 
before the calendar call.  The Final Status Report must be promptly 
submitted to the opposing party by mail, e-mail, or fax, and a copy of the 
report must be given to the opposing party at the calendar call if the 
opposing party is present. 
7. The Trial.  The parties are responsible for presenting all evidence to the
Court at the time of trial.  Evidence consists of the stipulation, sworn
testimony at trial, and any documentary evidence accepted by the Court as
exhibits at the trial.  Accordingly, the parties should bring to court all
documents on which they intend to rely.
The only opportunity for the parties to present their evidence to the Court
is at the trial.  Information or documents previously presented to the IRS
are not before this Court.  Therefore, at trial, the parties must present
all documents and the testimony of all witnesses that they want the Court
to consider in deciding the case, even though this evidence may have
previously been presented to the IRS.
8. Petitioner (Taxpayer) Getting Ready For Court Check List
Before you come to Court:
G Think about what facts you want to tell the Judge.
G Organize your facts and argument so you can tell your side of the story.
G Meet and talk to people at the IRS who call or write to you after you get
this notice.
G Organize any documents you have to support your case.
G Provide copies of documents to the IRS.
G Agree in writing to facts and documents that are not in dispute.
G If the IRS will not agree with your documents (stipulation), bring three
copies of the documents to Court.
G Consider whether you need any witnesses to support your case.
G If you need a witness, make sure the witness is available and present for
trial at the trial session. (See 3.c. above).
G Come to Court early so you will be ready when your case is called at the
calendar call.
G Learn more about the Tax Court at www.ustaxcourt.gov 
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 




Trial Calendar: <CITY & STATE>
Date: <DATE> 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM FOR  (Petitioner/Respondent) 
Please type or print legibly
(This form may be expanded as necessary)
NAME OF CASE: DOCKET NO.(S):
ATTORNEYS: 
  Petitioner: _____________________ Respondent: _____________________
    Tel. No.: _____________________ Tel. No.: _____________________
AMOUNTS IN DISPUTE:
  Year(s)/Period(s)   Deficiencies/Liabilities   Additions/Penalties
STATUS OF CASE:
  Probable Settlement_____ Probable Trial_____    Definite Trial_____
CURRENT ESTIMATE OF TRIAL TIME: ____________________________
MOTIONS YOU EXPECT TO MAKE: (Title and brief description)
STATUS OF STIPULATION OF FACTS: Completed _______ In Process _______
ISSUES:
(Continued on back...)
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WITNESS(ES) YOU EXPECT TO CALL: (Name and brief summary of expected
  testimony)
      
SUMMARY OF FACTS: (Attach separate pages, if necessary, to inform Court of 
  facts in chronological narrative form)
BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES: (Attach separate pages, if necessary,    
 to discuss fully your legal position)
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS:
DATE:  _____________________        ____________________________
 Petitioner/Respondent
Return to:
United States Tax Court
400 Second Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20217





TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE COURT 
 
A. The Tax Court Website 
 
The Tax Court first launched its website, www.ustaxcourt.gov, on 
January 1, 1999.  The website provides a wealth of information to the 
public concerning the court, its operations, and its work product.  As 
discussed in Part XIII, the Tax Court utilizes its website to familiarize self-
represented taxpayers with the nature of proceedings before the Tax Court 
through the frequently asked questions feature and the professionally 
produced instructional video located under the “Taxpayer Information” tab 
on the website’s header.  Through the “Docket Inquiry” tab of the 
website’s header, the public may search and view court orders, docket 
records, and decisions in any case originating after 2004.  Additionally, the 
most recent version of the Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure are 
made available under the “Rules” tab.  In addition to this material, the Tax 
Court has made available its opinions and orders on the website in a 
searchable format, as described below.   
When the court launched the website, it began posting its opinions on a 
prospective basis.  The court thereafter made available all division and 
memorandum opinions dating from September 25, 1995 under the 
“Opinions Search” tab of the website header.  This database later was 
expanded to include summary opinions dating from January 1, 2001.  These 
opinions may be searched through various means, including by date, case 
name, authoring judge, keyword, text, and opinion type (division, 
memorandum, or summary). 
In an effort to make the court’s orders available to the public, the court 
announced on June 17, 2011 the addition of two features to its website:  
“Today’s Designated Orders” and “Orders Search,” both of which are 
located under the “Orders” tab on the website’s header.  Orders appearing 
under “Today’s Designated Orders” are those designated for posting by the 
issuing judge or special trial judge; nonsubstantive orders such as scheduling 
orders or rulings on motions for extension of time typically are excluded.  
As the designation practices of judges vary, the orders that are posted in 
this manner do not represent a complete inventory of issued orders nor do 
these daily posted versions constitute official documents of record.   
The “Orders Search” option, on the other hand, searches a database of 
all orders issued by the Tax Court on or after June 17, 2011, apart from 
computer-generated mailings of certain orders, such as standing pretrial 
orders and orders for amended petition and filing fee.  The orders in the 
“Orders Search” database are searchable through the same terms as the 
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Court Opinions – by date, case name, keywords, authoring judge, and text 
search. 
 
B. Electronic Case Filing 
  
In 2005, the Tax Court began electronically scanning most documents in 
cases filed on or after January 1 of that year.  In December of 2005, the 
court announced a proposed amendment to the Tax Court Rules of 
Practice and Procedure regarding the establishment of an electronic filing 
(“eFiling”) pilot program.  Under the proposed pilot program, electronic 
filing of documents with the court would be implemented in specific 
geographic areas only.  In those regions, the pilot program would be limited 
to taxpayers who had the benefit of representation.  Those participating in 
the pilot program would be permitted to file, sign, and verify case 
documents by electronic means.  While the court was crafting the pilot 
program, it announced that it was also considering whether and to what 
extent to provide public access to its electronic records online.   
In December of 2007, the court began mailing “Practitioner Services” 
letters encouraging practitioners to register for remote electronic access of 
documents.  In September of 2008, the court began mailing “Petitioner 
Access Registration” letters to taxpayers to allow them to register for 
remote eAccess as well.  At this time, the Tax Court introduced an 
electronic document access system to its website called “eAccess,” through 
which taxpayers and persons admitted to practice before the court can 
register to electronically view documents relating to their case (in addition 
to the orders, docket records, and decisions generally available under the 
“Docket Inquiry” tab). 
In January of 2009, the court began to provide electronic service (or 
“eService”) of court documents through the eAccess system.  The eService 
system encompasses the service of petitions, orders, and opinions. On May 
7, 2009, the court commenced the eFiling pilot program.  On November 
20, 2009, Chief Judge John O. Colvin announced the court’s adoption of 
Rule 26 authorizing the eFiling of case documents in all Tax Court cases—
not just those in which the taxpayer was represented.  The Internal Revenue 
Service formally consented to receive eService of documents on June 16, 
2010.   
Electronic filing (“eFiling”) became mandatory for all cases initiated as 
of July 1, 2010 if the parties involved were represented by counsel.  
Taxpayers who are represented by pro bono programs or low-income 
taxpayer clinics are exempt from the eFiling regime.  Though not mandated 
to participate, pro se petitioners are permitted to eFile their case documents 
and many have opted to do so.   
The eFiling regime does not extend to every type of court document.  
Filings that commence a Tax Court case, such as a petition in a deficiency 
Appendices                                            937 
 
 
proceeding, must be filed in paper form.  The Tax Court provides a detailed 
set of instructions concerning its eFiling program, and these instructions are 
available on the court’s website at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/eaccess/ 
eFiling_Instructions_Practitioners.pdf 
On April 25, 2011, the Internal Revenue Service started eFiling in all of 
its cases, even those in which eFiling was not mandatory, such as the cases 
in which the petition was filed prior to July 1, 2010. 
 
C. Electronic Courtroom 
 
The Tax Court made its first electronic courtroom available for court 
proceedings on June 1, 2004.  The “e-courtroom” is housed in the North 
Courtroom of the court’s headquarters building in Washington, D.C. The 
room is available to all Tax Court judicial officers for use in conducting a 
range of proceedings pursuant to a joint request by the parties.  The e-
courtroom has been used, for example, in trials, hearings, conferences, and 
oral status reports.  The proceedings are all recorded and transcribed.   
The technology available in the electronic courtroom includes an 
evidence presentation system, videoconferencing equipment, and wireless 
headsets used for enhanced listening assistance for hearing-impaired parties 
and any interpreter used by the parties.  The electronic courtroom is 
available for any type of Tax Court case, provided the available technology 
is appropriate for the proceedings in the matter. 
 
D. Security and Privacy Protections 
 
As the court has implemented its eFiling and eAccess programs, the 
court has been attentive to privacy concerns and the sensitive nature of 
many of the documents that are filed in the record of a Tax Court case.1  In 
an effort to protect a taxpayer’s taxpayer identification number (TIN), and 
consistent with the privacy policy adopted by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the court adopted Form 4, Statement of Taxpayer 
Identification Number, to permit the taxpayer to provide identifying 
                                                     
1 TAX CT. R. 20(b) (July 6, 2012 ed.); see also Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 20, 
130 T.C. 382 (2008) (“Privacy concerns regarding personal information contained 
in Tax Court case files came to the Court’s attention with the consideration by the 
Court of the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 205, 116 Stat. 2913, 
and its own electronic filing pilot program, and through requests by individual 
taxpayers to redact from Court documents their Social Security numbers.”).  The 
Court issued a press release regarding amendments to its Rules related to privacy 
matters and public access to case files on its website at 
http://ustaxcourt.gov/press/011508.pdf.   
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information to the court in a secure manner.2  Along these same lines, 
pursuant to Rule 27(a), all persons making an electronic or paper filing with 
the court are encouraged to refrain from including (or should take 
appropriate steps to redact) sensitive information such as taxpayer 
identification numbers, dates of birth, names of minor children, and 
financial account numbers.3   
In formulating its policy regarding remote electronic access to case files, 
the court initially reviewed certain policies applicable to analogous 
situations in other federal courts.  For example, the Judicial Conference of 
the United States decided to exclude Social Security appeals and, 
subsequently, immigration cases, from electronic access because of the 
inherently personal nature of the information contained in the case files.4  
Although there is no indication that they were specifically discussed, tax 
cases were not excepted from electronic access by the Judicial Conference.  
However, Congress recognized the importance of protecting tax 
information received by Bankruptcy Courts.  On April 20, 2005, the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was 
enacted.5  Section 315 of the act amended the Bankruptcy Code to require 
debtors in bankruptcy cases to provide tax returns and other tax 
                                                     
2 Id. at 382–83.  Form 4 is filed when a taxpayer files a petition with the court 
and is provided to the Internal Revenue Service with the copy of the petition, but 
the court does not make Form 4 part of the Court’s file in the case.  In adopting 
Form 4, the court eliminated the requirement of providing any part of the taxpayer 
identification number on the petition and extended the protection to any party or 
nonparty.   
3 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 27, 130 T.C. 395–401 (2008) (explaining 
that Rule 27 is modeled after Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).   
4 The Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration 
and Case Management on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files 
(available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm), explains as follows: 
After much debate, the consensus of the Committee was that Social 
Security cases warrant such treatment because they are of an inherently 
different nature from other civil cases. They are the continuation of an 
administrative proceeding, the files of which are confidential until the 
jurisdiction of the district court is invoked, by an individual to enforce his 
or her rights under a government program. Further, all Social Security 
disability claims, which are the majority of Social Security cases filed in 
district court, contain extremely detailed medical records and other personal 
information which an applicant must submit in an effort to establish 
disability. Such medical and personal information is critical to the court and 
is of little or no legitimate use to anyone not a party to the case. Thus, 
making such information available on the Internet would be of little public 
benefit and would present a substantial intrusion into the privacy of the 
claimant.   
5 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
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information to the Bankruptcy Court, trustee, and creditors.6  On 
September 20, 2005, in accordance with the act, the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts issued interim guidance 
providing that no tax information filed with a Bankruptcy Court will be 
available to the public electronically.7  The interim guidance defines tax 
information to include tax returns, transcripts of returns, amendments to 
returns, and any other document containing tax information provided by 
the debtor.  
In the light of these policies, the court decided to limit electronic access 
to information in its records in a manner consistent with the treatment of 
tax information in bankruptcy cases, and with Social Security appeals and 
immigration cases as prescribed in Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and rule 9037 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy.8  Specifically, 
in accordance with Tax Court Rule 27(b), the parties and their counsel have 
remote electronic access to any part of the case file that the court maintains 
in electronic form, but limits public online access to the court’s electronic 
records to the docket records maintained by the court, and to opinions 
(including bench opinions) and orders of the court.  Approximately 75 
percent of the docket of the Tax Court consists of self-represented 
petitioners, and the court believed it would be unrealistic to expect them to 
file case documents in a manner that adequately protects their privacy and 
security interests. The court, however, provides full public access to its 
electronic records at the Clerk’s Office during the court’s regular business 
hours. 
   
 
 
                                                     
6 119 Stat. 88. 
7 See http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/DirTaxGuidanceJCUS 
approved905.pdf.  
8 See Rules Comm. Note, TAX CT. R. 27, 130 T.C. 395, 400 (2008).  The 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 5.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
explains:  
Those actions [Social security cases and immigration cases] are entitled to 
special treatment due to the prevalence of sensitive information and the 
volume of filings.  Remote electronic access by nonparties is limited to the 
docket and the written dispositions of the court unless the court orders 
otherwise.  
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Appendix F.pdf, at Rules App. F-6. 
